Letter Sequence Approval |
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MONTHYEARML20004B8101981-05-22022 May 1981 Advises That Results of Westinghouse Owners Group Program Addressing Potential Reactor Vessel Integrity Concerns Will Be Provided by End of 1981.Util Will Provide Addl Detail Including Schedule for Reanalysis or Remedial Action Project stage: Other ML20030D6551981-08-21021 August 1981 Requests Addl Info Re Pressurized Thermal Shock to Reactor Pressure Vessels,Per Review of PWR Owners Group 810515 & Licensees 810522 Responses to NRC Project stage: Approval ML20031F1401981-10-0101 October 1981 Summary of 810918 Meeting W/Westinghouse Owners Group Re Pressurized Thermal Shock to Reactor Pressure Vessels. Attendance List & Handouts Encl Project stage: Meeting ML20069H2221982-05-31031 May 1982 Analysis of Capsule P from Northern States Power Co Prairie Island Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program Project stage: Other ML20069H2051982-10-12012 October 1982 Forwards Analysis of Capsule P from Northern States Power Co Prairie Island Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program Project stage: Other ML20137A0221986-01-10010 January 1986 Provides Projected Values of Pressurized Thermal Shock Ref Temp at Inner Vessel Surface of Reactor Vessel Beltline Matls,Per 10CFR50,Section 50.61(b)(1) Project stage: Other ML20202A7321986-06-23023 June 1986 Discusses Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Events,Per 860110 Response to PTS Rule, 10CFR50.61.Supporting Safety Evaluation Encl Project stage: Approval ML20202A7531986-06-23023 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events Project stage: Approval ML20199L4491986-06-23023 June 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Util 860110 Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events.Response Acceptable Project stage: Approval ML20199L4411986-06-23023 June 1986 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re Util 860110 Projected Values of Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events.Response Acceptable Project stage: Approval 1982-10-12
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211J2851999-08-26026 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 146 & 137 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20211D3981999-08-24024 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requested Actions to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20207B5931999-05-26026 May 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam (PT) of Seal Welds on Threaded Caps for Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations for part-length CRDMs ML20205B3351999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 143 & 134 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20202J1731999-01-22022 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NSP Proposed Alternative to Surface Exam Requirements of ASME BPV Code for CRD Mechanism Canopy Seal Welds Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety ML20198L2211998-12-0707 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 141 & 132 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20195D3821998-11-0404 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 140 & 131 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20195D3761998-10-30030 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 139 & 130 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60 ML20154B9241998-09-22022 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 138 & 129 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20237D6491998-08-13013 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 137 & 128 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20237A8171998-08-0505 August 1998 SER Related to USI A-46 Program GL 87-02 Implementation for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20236V4071998-07-28028 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 136 to License DPR-42 ML20247F9551998-05-0404 May 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 135 & 127 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20217M6901998-04-29029 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Methodology for Relocation of Reactor Coolant Sys P/T Limit Curves & LTOP Sys Limits Proposed by NSP for Pingp,Units 1 & 2 ML20203H8331998-02-20020 February 1998 SE Accepting Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam of Nonstructural Seal Welds for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Unit 2 ML20202B7211997-11-25025 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 134 & 126 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20199H7251997-11-18018 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 133 & 125 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20199C3671997-11-0404 November 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 132 & 124 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20212G9371997-10-29029 October 1997 Revised SE Re Amends 125 & 117 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60 ML20211E7901997-09-15015 September 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 130 & 122 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20141B0331997-06-12012 June 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 129 & 121 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20148D5441997-05-16016 May 1997 Safety Evaluation of Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Individual Plant Exam ML20138J9961997-05-0606 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam of CRD Mechanism Canopy Seal Welds ML20137S5561997-04-0101 April 1997 Safety Evaluation Approving License Request for Transfer of Licenses for Monticello & Prairie Island,Units 1 & 2 Nuclear Generating Plants & Prairie Island ISFSI ML20134N7411997-02-19019 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 126 & 118 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20147D8981997-02-10010 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 125 & 117 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20128L6181996-10-10010 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 124 to License DPR-42 ML20117J0851996-05-21021 May 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 116 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20093H5251995-10-0606 October 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 120 & 113 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20086E2161995-07-0303 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 119 & 112 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-62,respectively ML20083M7571995-05-15015 May 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 118 & 111 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20082M5711995-04-18018 April 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 117 & 110 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20081F3411995-03-10010 March 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 116 & 109 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20081A9081995-03-0808 March 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 115 & 108 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20077K2541995-01-0505 January 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 113 & 106 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20072C0901994-08-10010 August 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 111 & 104 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20069A1181994-05-17017 May 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 110 & 103 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20058N8021993-12-0808 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Approving Third 10-yr IST Program Requests for Pumps & Valves,Per 10CFR50.55a(f)(6)(i) & 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20058H0151993-12-0303 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 109 & 102 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20057A6141993-09-0303 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 108 & 101 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20046B6351993-07-29029 July 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 107 & 100 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20044D3151993-05-0404 May 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105 & 98 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20035H6041993-05-0303 May 1993 SE Accepting Util Responses Re Test Plan & Justification for Use of Dynamic Load Factor for Special Handling Device ML20035H1821993-04-27027 April 1993 SE Supporting Implementation of Reg Guide 1.97 Re Instrumentation to Follow Course of Accident,Per GL 82-33 ML20035A2281993-03-22022 March 1993 SE Supporting Conclusions in Licensee 901127 Rept That Analysis of as-built Configuration That Demonstrated Const Error Causing Insignificant Impact on Responses of Both D5/D6 Bldgs Acceptable,As Built ML20128P4861993-02-0505 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 104 & 97 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20127C0291993-01-0404 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting pressure-retaining Components of safety-related Auxiliary Fluid Sys Associated W/Edgs ML20127C0071993-01-0404 January 1993 Supplemental SE Accepting Changes & Additions Described in Rev 1 to Design Rept for Station Blackout/Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project ML20127C0151993-01-0404 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Instrumentation & Control Sys Aspects of Unit 2 Load Sequencer Sys in Station Blackout/ Electrical Safeguards Upgrade Project ML20127C0241993-01-0404 January 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Audit of Load Sequencer Implementation. Four of Five Items Reviewed Acceptable & Closed.One Open Item Remained Re Electromagnetic Environ Qualification for Lower Frequency Range of 30 Hz to 10 Khz 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217G4461999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pingp.With ML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers ML20216E7151999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20211J2851999-08-26026 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 146 & 137 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20211D3981999-08-24024 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Requested Actions to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20211C2531999-08-0404 August 1999 Unit 1 ISI Summary Rept Interval 3,Period 2 Refueling Outage Dates 990425-990526 Cycle 19 971212-990526 ML20210Q4891999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20211B5971999-07-31031 July 1999 Cycle 20 Voltage-Based Repair Criteria 90-Day Rept 05000282/LER-1999-007-01, :on 990625,loss of CR Special Ventilation Function Was Noted.Caused by Broken Door Latch Pins on CR Chiller Door.Ts Amend Request to Establish Allowed OOS Time Was Submitted1999-07-23023 July 1999
- on 990625,loss of CR Special Ventilation Function Was Noted.Caused by Broken Door Latch Pins on CR Chiller Door.Ts Amend Request to Establish Allowed OOS Time Was Submitted
ML20209J1131999-07-15015 July 1999 Safety Evaluation of Topical Rept NSPNAD-8102,rev 7 Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units. Rept Acceptable for Referencing in Prairie Island Licensing Actions ML20209F9811999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML20196F4081999-06-23023 June 1999 Revised Pages 71,72 & 298 to Rev 7 of NSPNAD-8102, Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units ML20195G5181999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With . Page 3 in Final Rept of Incoming Submittal Was Not Included ML20207B5931999-05-26026 May 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code for Surface Exam (PT) of Seal Welds on Threaded Caps for Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations for part-length CRDMs ML20196L2501999-05-13013 May 1999 Rev 0 to PINGP Unit 1 COLR Cycle 20 05000282/LER-1999-005-01, :on 990508,containment Inservice Purge Sys Was Not Isolated During Heavy Load Movement Over Fuel.Caused by Missing Procedure Step in D58.1.6.PINGP 1224 Was Initiated to Communicate Event & Forestall Repeating Event1999-05-0808 May 1999
- on 990508,containment Inservice Purge Sys Was Not Isolated During Heavy Load Movement Over Fuel.Caused by Missing Procedure Step in D58.1.6.PINGP 1224 Was Initiated to Communicate Event & Forestall Repeating Event
ML20206L6191999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20205N1081999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2. with ML20205B3351999-03-17017 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 143 & 134 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20205Q5101999-03-15015 March 1999 Inservice Insp Summary Rept Interval 3,Period 1 & 2 Refueling Outage Dates 981109-1229 Cycle 19,970327-981229 05000306/LER-1999-001-01, :on 990206,TS Required Reactor Protection Logic Test Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Sd Banks Were Inserted at 0544,RT Breakers Were Opened & Test Was Performed.With1999-03-0808 March 1999
- on 990206,TS Required Reactor Protection Logic Test Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Sd Banks Were Inserted at 0544,RT Breakers Were Opened & Test Was Performed.With
ML20207J6951999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ML20202J7711999-02-0404 February 1999 Simulator Certification Rept for Prairie Island Plant Simulation Facility,1998 Annual Rept ML20207L2811999-01-31031 January 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pingp,Units 1 & 2 ML20202G3761999-01-31031 January 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 7 to NSPNAD-8102-NP, Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant Reload SE Methods for Application to PI Units ML20202J1731999-01-22022 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NSP Proposed Alternative to Surface Exam Requirements of ASME BPV Code for CRD Mechanism Canopy Seal Welds Will Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety 05000306/LER-1998-006-01, :on 981219,unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp.Caused by Personnel Error.Control Room Took Prompt Action & Returned Plant to Proper Status & Second pre-job Briefing for SP-2126 Was Conducted1999-01-18018 January 1999
- on 981219,unplanned Actuation of ESF Equipment During Performance of Sp.Caused by Personnel Error.Control Room Took Prompt Action & Returned Plant to Proper Status & Second pre-job Briefing for SP-2126 Was Conducted
ML20205H0561998-12-31031 December 1998 Northern States Power Co 1998 Annual Rept. with ML20206P7861998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20198J6441998-12-17017 December 1998 Rev 0 to PINGP COLR Unit 2-Cycle 19 05000306/LER-1998-005-02, :on 981109,RT from 22% Power During Planned SD Operation Was Noted.Caused by Tt.Fw Heater Drain Level Control Was Thoroughly Inspected & Calibrated.With1998-12-0909 December 1998
- on 981109,RT from 22% Power During Planned SD Operation Was Noted.Caused by Tt.Fw Heater Drain Level Control Was Thoroughly Inspected & Calibrated.With
ML20198L2211998-12-0707 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 141 & 132 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20206N2731998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With 05000282/LER-1998-016, :on 981029,negative Flux Rate RT Occurred Upon CR Insertion After Failure of CRD Cable.Caused by Internal Short Circuit Developing in CRDM Patch Cables at Reactor Head Connector.Replaced CRDM Patch Cables.With1998-11-24024 November 1998
- on 981029,negative Flux Rate RT Occurred Upon CR Insertion After Failure of CRD Cable.Caused by Internal Short Circuit Developing in CRDM Patch Cables at Reactor Head Connector.Replaced CRDM Patch Cables.With
ML20196D7341998-11-20020 November 1998 Third Quarter 1998 & Oct 1998 Data Rept for Prairie Island Isfsi ML20195D3821998-11-0404 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 140 & 131 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20155K6301998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195D3761998-10-30030 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 139 & 130 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60 05000306/LER-1998-004-01, :on 980910,shield Building Integrity Was Breached.Caused by Inadequate TS Change.Revised Affected Procedures.With1998-10-0505 October 1998
- on 980910,shield Building Integrity Was Breached.Caused by Inadequate TS Change.Revised Affected Procedures.With
ML20202J7991998-09-30030 September 1998 Non-proprietary Version of Rev 3 to CEN-629-NP, Repair of W Series 44 & 51 SG Tubes Using Leaktight Sleeves,Final Rept ML20154H4061998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20198R8061998-09-30030 September 1998 Rev 1 to NSPLMI-96001, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Ipeee ML20154B9241998-09-22022 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 138 & 129 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20198P0571998-09-0303 September 1998 Rev 1 to 95T047, Back-up Compressed Air Supply for Cooling Water Strainer Backwash Valve Actuator ML20153B0761998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.With 05000282/LER-1998-009-01, :on 980731,noted That Recent Testing of RCS Vent Paths Had Not Been Performed in Literal Compliance with Wording of TS 4.18.1.Caused by Misunderstanding of Wording in TS Section 4.18.Will Modify Surveillance Procedures1998-08-27027 August 1998
- on 980731,noted That Recent Testing of RCS Vent Paths Had Not Been Performed in Literal Compliance with Wording of TS 4.18.1.Caused by Misunderstanding of Wording in TS Section 4.18.Will Modify Surveillance Procedures
ML20237D6491998-08-13013 August 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 137 & 128 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively ML20237A3961998-08-11011 August 1998 Safety Evaluation on Westinghouse Owners Group Proposed Insp Program for part-length CRDM Housing Issue.Insp Program for Type 309 Welds Inadequate from Statistical Point of View 1999-09-30
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e SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION REGARDING PROJECTED VALUES OF MATERIAL PROPERTIES FOR FRACTURE TOUGHNESS REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST PRESSURIZED THERMAL SH0CK EVENTS NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-282 INTRODUCTION As required by 10 CFR 50.61, " Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock" (PTS Rule) which was published in the Federal Register July 23, 1985, the licensee for each operating pressurized water reactor "shall submit projected values of RT surface)ofreactorvesselbeltlinematerialsbyg$kng(attheinnervessel values from the time of submittal to the expiration date of the operating license.
The assessment must specify the bases for the projection including the assumptions regarding core loading patterns.
This assessment must be submitted by January 23, 1986, and must be updated whenever changes in core loadings, surveillance measurements or other information indicate a significant change in projected values."
By letter dated January 10, 1986, Northern States Power Company (the Licensee) submittedprojectedvaluesofRT(IhselbeltlinematerialforthePrairieIsland together with material properties and fast neutron fluence of reactor Nuclear Generating Plant Unit No. 1.
The RT and fluence values were projected to June 25, 2008, theexpirationdateofthecuhfhntlicense.
By letter dated February 21, 1986, the licensee has applied for a license amendment which would extend the operating license to August 9, 2013.
This evaluation deals only with the reactor vessel material properties and fluence to the expiration date of the current license, June 25, 2008.
EVALUATION OF THE MATERIALS ASPECTS The controlling beltline material from the standpoint of PTS susceptibility was identified to be the circumferential weld joining the intermediate to the lower shell forging (weld W-3), Weld Wire heat number 1752.
The material properties of the controlling material and the associated margin and chemistry factor were reported to be:
Utility Suomittal Staff Evaluation Cu (copper content, %)
0.14 0.14 Ni (nickel content, %)
0.17 0.17 I (Initial RT F) 0.0 0.0
- PTS, 8607090421 860623 PDR ADOCK 05000282 P
PDR
~ -..
i 0 Utility Submittal Staff Evaluation M (Margin, F) 59 CF (Chemistry Factor, *F) 64 The controlling material has been properly identified.
The justification given for the copper and nickel contents and the initial RT are acceptable.
The margin has been derived from consideration N the bases for N
these values, following the PTS Rule, Section 50.61 of 10 CFR Part 50.
Equation 1 of the PTS Rule governs, and the chemistry factor is as shown above.
EVALUATION OF THE FLUENCE ASPECTS Themaximumazimuthalfluenceatthelimitingweldmaterial,thegircum{erential y
Weld, W-3 Weld Wire Heat No. 1752, was determined to be 4.3 x 10 p/cm at the end of the current license.
The Prairie Island Unit No. 1 fluence was estimated using an accepted two dimension transport code.
Details of the methodology are described in the licensee's submittal dated January 10, 1986.
The methodology and results were found acceptable.
EVALUATION OF THE CALCULATED RT According to the PTS Rule, 10 CFR 50.61, the applicable equation for calculating RT is:
PTS PTS = I+M+(-10+470xCu + 350xCuxNi) f.27 RT Where:
I initial RTNDT = 0 F
=
M uncertainty
= 59 F
=
% copper in weld W-3 = 0.19 Cu
=
Ni
% nickel in weld W-3 = 0.13
=
peakfluege([/ng 1.0 MeV) on weld = 4.3 f.
=
W-3 x 10 cm PTS = 0+59+(-10+470x0.19+350x0.19x0.13)4.3 27 0
Then:
RT RTPTS =
59+87.95x1.483=189.4 F To quantify the margin in terms of the fluence required to reach the screening criterion the staff solved the following equation:
27 300 = 59+64.13xf or f*2 = 241 =3.758 64.13 or f = 134.7 (where this fluence value is outside the limits of the available experimental data of Reg. Guide 1.99) and in terms of the end of life peak weld W-3 fluence it is 134.7/4.3 = 31 1.e., the fluence to the end of 32 EFPYs is about 3% of that required to reach the screening criterion.
- For circumferential weld material the governing of screening criteria at the expiration date of the license is 300 F.
189.4*F is less than 300 F by a very large margin (110.6*F).
This meets the requirements of the PTS Rule and is acceptable.
CONCLUSIONS Calculations show that RT is 189.4 F for the limiting circumferential weldmaterialattheexpihIkionattheexpirationdateofthelicense.
This is less then 300*F by a considerable margin which is the screening criteria for the limiting material at the expiration date of the license.
This is acceptable and thus meets the requirements of the PTS Rule.
In order for us to confirm the licensee's projected estimated RT the life of the license we will request the licensee to submit a Ih throughout p
evaluation of the RT and comparison to the predicted value with future Pressure-Temperatuhdbsubmittals which are required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix G.
Date:
Contributers to this SER:
P. N. Randall L. Lois D. DiIanni
, - - ~
6 Distr.ibution copies:
IDocket:llo(s)3 NRC PDR Local PDR PAD #1 r/f PAD #1 p/f TNovak, Actg. DD NThompson, DHFT ELD EJordan BGrimes JPartlow Glear PShuttleworth DDilanni ACRS (10)
.