ML20196J115
| ML20196J115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/04/1988 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8803140161 | |
| Download: ML20196J115 (83) | |
Text
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r UNITED S ES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUL ORY COMMISSION
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Title:
Briefing on Sequoyah Restart Location:
Washington, D.
C.
Date:
Friday, March 4, 1988
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Pages:
1 - 123-i i
l Ann Riley & Associates Court Reporters 1625 i Street, N.W., Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 d
s (202) 293-3950 8803140161 000304 b
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1 D l SC LA 1 MER 2
3 4
5 6
This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on a
3/04/88_
In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
'fi.
., Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public s
10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain f
12 inaccuracies.
13 The transcript is intended solely.for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in
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19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authorire.
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23 24 25
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UNITED STATES OF-AMERICA l
,(
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
r 3
I 4
BRIEFING ON SEQUOYAH RESTART 5
6, PUBLIC MEETING 7
8*
Nuolear Regulatory Commission 9
Room 1130 10 1717 H Street, Northwest 11 Washington, D.C.
12 13 Friday, March 4, 1988 14,
15 The Commission met in open session, pursuant t'o 16 notice, at 9:35 o' clock, a.m.,
the Honorable LANDO W.
- ZECH, 17 Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
18 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
1 19 LANDO W.
- ZECH, Chairman of the Commission 20 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Member of the Commission 21 FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Member of the Commission 22 KENNETH CARR, Member of the Commission 23 KENNETH ROGERS, Member of the Commission i
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1 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT THE COMMISSION TABLE:-
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M. RUNYON 3
S. WHITE 4
T. JENKINS 5
M. BLACKBURN l
6 N. KAZANAS 7
J. HOSMER 8
S.
SMITH I
9 J.
BYNUM 10 B.
RALEIGH 11 C.
DEAN 12 W. WATERS i
13 V.
STELLO l
14 S.
EBNETER
}
15 J.
AXELRAD 16 F. McCOY l
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17 S.
RICHARDSON 18 i
19 AUDIENCE SPEAKERS 20 A. MARINOS 21 B. HERRMANN 22 B.
PIERSON 23 24 l
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i t
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1 PROCEEDINGS 2
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
3 Both units at the Sequoyah site were voluntarily shut 4
down by the Tennessee Valley Authority in August of'1985 5
because of questions about environmental qualifications of 6
electrical equipment.
7 Additional questions and numerous concerns were, 8
subsequently raised about the overall adequacy of TVA's nuclear 9
program.
-Sequoyah has remained shut down since that time 10 pending resolution of these questions, and completion of 11 necessary corrective actions.
12 The purpose of today's meeting is for the Tenness'ee 13 Valley Authority and the NRC Staff to brief the Commission 14 concerning the readiness of the Sequoyah Unit 2.for restart.
15 This is an information briefing only. 'There will be no vote 16 today.
The earliest that a public vote will be taken by the 17 Commission would be some time late next week, and I emphasize 18 that is the earliest.
19 I understand that copies of slides are available at' 20 the back of the room.
21 Do any of my fellow Commissioners have opening 22 comments to make before we begin?
i 23 If not, Mr. Runyon, please begin, sir.
24 MR. RUNYON:
Thank you very much.
Good morning.
I 25 am pleased to be here today with my colleagues on the TVA i
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1 Board,'and with Admiral Steven White, our Manager of Nuclear 2
Power.
3 Before Admiral White makes TVA's detailed 4
presentation regarding the restart of Sequoyah, I'd like to 5
share my views concerning TVA's nuclear program, f
6 One of my first actions as TVA chairmon has been to i
7 visit each of TVA's nuclear sites and offices to meet the 8
people there and hear what they have to say.
People know that 9
you are concerned and involved when they see you walking the 10 floor.
11 I have been at Sequoyah once a week for the past four 12 weeks, and I have been there during all three shifts.
I was 13 sworn in just a little over five weeks ago.
My fellow board s
14 members visit these facilities regularly, and I know that 15 members of this commission have also visited our nuclear 16 plants.
i I
17 Although I am still studying TVA's nuclear 18 operations, I am favorably impressed by what I have seen so 1
19 far.
Unit 2 at Sequoyah looks to be in good shape and the L
20 employees there have a very positive attitude towards safety q
l 21 and quality.
l 22 I am new to TVA, but I am not new to the I
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23 manufacturing and production plants.
I spent 44 rewarding and j:
24 successful years in the automotive industry, most of them at f
1 25 plant sites, i
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O O e
5
~1 You can toll about any plant by walking the floor,
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2 talking to employees, paying attention to housekeeping details, 3
and examining the plant's maintenance program.
The best 4
facilities are always well maintained, have very positive 5
preventive and predictive maintenance programs.
Proper 6
housekeeping is an important part of any plant's overall 7
environment, and it is also indicative _of the emphasis that 8
employees and management place on quality and safety in 9
operation.
10 High quality plant environments are absolutely 11 essential in any industry, and particularly in the nuclear 12 industry, and I have found that kind of plant environment at 13 Sequoyah Unit 2.
14 There are, of course, differences between automotive 15 plants and nuclear p'lants, and we all recognize that, but 16 certainly procedural and regulatory requirements are more 17 extensive in a nuclear plant, and should be in order to protect 18 public safety.
Public safety is the most important test a 19 nuclear plant has to pass.
20 From what I have seen and been told, and from what I 21 know of the massive efforts put forth by both NRC and TVA, I 22 believe that Sequoyah Unit 2 is ready,to start.
I wouldn't be 23 here today if I thought otherwise.
24 There has been significant progress in the nuclear 25 program at TVA, and we are proud of our accomplishments.
We 4
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f a.
1
. trust they will earn your blessings.
2 In the future, we want to do more than meet 3
standards.
We want to set standards for quality, safety, and 4
efficiency in nuclear operations.
We know we have got a long 5
way to go, but we are confident that we can reach that goal.
I 6
We have already come a long way.
We will be taking a giant 7
step towards that goal through participative management, which 8
I believe can lead to improvements throughout TVA.
This is a 9
bottom-up style of management that requires people at the top 10 to make a greater effort to listen to employees.
11 I understand that many of TVA's past difficulties 12 were due to management problems, and to a lack of trust and 13 communication between management and the employees.
l
.14 A participative' style of management will help address l
15 these difficulties.
This approach recognizes that employees 16 are the real experts in making the process work.
In a 17 participative system, the manager makes sure the responsibility 18 for doing the job is clearly defined, and reaches down to the 19 employee doing the work.
20 The manager also listens to the concerns and 21 suggestions of employees.
These often include how the job can l
22 be done more efficiently or safely; or how other improvements
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23 can be made.
I recognize that other factors will go into make 24 such a system work in the nuclear context.
tiot the least of 25 those factors is an attitude of strict compliance with i
.a 1
regulatory requirements, including the commitments TVA has made 2
to NRC.
3 If we are to make long-term improvements in TVA, we 4
will have to improve the way people and programs are being 5
hanaged.
Many of the management changes that have been started 6
by Admiral White, such as the enhanced employee concerns 7
program, are changes.in the right direction.
Admiral White has 8
been in charge of TVA's nuclear program for more than two 9
years.
His skill and diligent efforts have brought us up to 10 the potential restart of Sequoyah Unit 2.
11 My wish 3s that Admiral White would stay through the 12 complete restart effort, including Sequoyah and Browns Ferry.
13 We are in the process of searching for several key managers for 14 our nuclear program.
Let me assure you that we are committed
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15 to strong leadership and a highly qualified management team for 16 TVA's nuclear program.
17 Well, let me tell you that we are having trouble 18 recruiting the talent we need with the pay limitations that we j
19 face, and we are working'to remove those barriers.
We will i
20 choose a successor who will be acceptable to the board and Mr.
21 White, and who will be capable of continuing, as well as 22 strengthening, our nuclear program.
23 In conclusion, let me assure you that as a board, my 24 colleagues and I are absolutely committed to the improvements i
l 25 in our nuclear program made by Steve White, and to abiding by
8 1
the regulations of the NRC.
-s 2
We are also totally committed to maintaining open and 3
honest communication with the NRC and its Staff.
4 on a personal note, I have made a commitment to TVA 5
to be a leader and a learner at the same time.
In this role, I 6
have had the opportunity to learn a great deal about nuclear 7
engineering and management, but there is a lot of learning left 8
to do.
I want to know more about the nuclear pbwer industry.
9 I plan to participate in INPO's training prog ~ ram for electric 10 utility CEOs, and I expect to learn a lot from that.
11 I also plan to undertake a study tour of nuclear 12 plants that you or members of your staff think would be 13 instructive for me to visit.
14 As a result of all this, I will be a more 15 knowledgeable member of the board and a more effective leader 16 in bringing TVA's nuclear power program back into full 17 operation.
TVA has been making tremendous progress in its 18 nuclear recovery efforts.
My colleagues on the board, who 19 began these ef forts, deserve the credit for bringing TVA to 20 today's meeting.
Together, we look forward to a healthy L
21 exchange of views, and hope that you will agree that Sequoyah 22 is ready to resume safe and reliable operation.
23 Thank you very much.
And now I would like to turn 24 our presentation over to Mr. White, with your permission.
6 25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Yes, sir.-
Thank you very much, and a
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we appreciate that.
f'~5, 2
Mr. White, you may proceed.
3 MR. WHITE:
I'm pleased to be here today.
It was two 4
years ago this month that I first came before you to discuss 5
how we were going to fix our problems at TVA.
At that time, I 6
knew the road would be rough.
You know, none of us was aware f 7
the. true dimensions of the problem.
Clearly there was no way 8
that we could have predicte.d that it would take two years to 9
get to the point that I could say that we were ready to resume 10 operations.
A lot has happened in those two years, and that's 11 what I intend to discuss with you today.
12 While our specific case today involves the restart of 13 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2, we all recognize that the issues 14 are much broader.
As you may recall from my comments in March 15 1986 and again in March 1987, we face the challenge of changing 16 a culture.
TVA's nuclear problems were evidenced in many 17 elements of the program, which by definition indicate that the 18 central issue was management.
19 Although TVA's problems in management were manifest 20 at all levels, they were most prominent at the top.
It was 21 clear that there was a lack of confidence and respect in 22 management.
There was no teamwork to resolve problems.
There 23 was no real sense of direction, and the organization was 24 diffused, splintered, and layered.
25 These management problems had to be resolved before
10 1
any real progress coul.d"be made in solving the literally g.,
2 thousands of specific issues.
My plan to resolve these basic 3
problems was embodied in our corporate nuclear performance 4
plan, which was submitted to you in March 1986.
This was and 5
continues to be my blueprint to change the TVA culture.
I feel 6
confident that we have made substantial progress, and that we 7
are now in a position to resume operation.
8 After our presentation today, I hope that you will 9
all agree with me.
10 By no means -- by no means am I saying today that in 11 all the broad areas of management requiring cultural change, we 12 have yet reached the level of excellence that I intend to reach 13 in the lenger run.
We still have a way to go.
What I an
'i 14 saying is that we have made tremendous progress, and we h' ave 15 achieved a level sufficient to assure safe operation of our 16 first plant.
17 We will also provide you today with a presentation 18 specifically addressing Segooyah Unit 2 and why we feel that 19 that plant technically, operationally, and in all other i
20 respects is ready to obtain your authorization to restart.
1 f
21 One theme I hope to be able to convey to you today is 1
4 22 that our corrective actions not only have been effective, but 23 they are permanent.
I have purposely avoided applying the so-l 24 called quick fix or Band-Aid approach.
Rather I have 25 maintained the constant goal of institutionalizing our changes.
11 1
For example, in rewriting our procedures, which, as 2
you know, were a mess, we have spent over $12 million at 3
Sequoyah alone so far, and we are still not through.
You will 4
see many other indications which will further bear out the fact 5
that we are driving for permanent solutions.
6 In the same context, you~have just heard Mr. Runyon 7
express his conviction that he and his fellow Board members 8
will insist on the permanence of what we are doing.
In the i
9 short time that I have known Mr. Runyon, I feel confident that 10 he has every intention and the ability to see that his word to 11 you will be carried out.
12 Finally, before we start the presentation, I would 13 like to say to you that I am enthusiastic -- I am enthusiastic 14 over the prospect and the results so far of revitalizing TVA's 15 nuclear program, and I am still very optimistic that it can be 16 done.
r 17 The Board of Directors has provided me with the 18 authority to do the job.
As you know, this authority is 19 spelled out in detail in the Memorandum of Understanding which 20 is part of th corporate nuclear performance plan which you have 21 approved.
22 And I might add that without their full support and 1
23 the authority given to me, I could not have achieved our 24 present level of performance, nor could I assure continued 25 progress toward the goals I have set.
12 1
That concludes my introductory remarks, and I would 2
like to now proceed with the presentation.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Proceed.
Thank you.
4 (slide.)
5 MR. WHITE:
Briefly here is what we will cover today.
6 Let me first reacquaint you very briefly with TVA.
7 We have nine plants consisting-of Westinghouse and I
They are widely separated in two states 9
over 100 miles apart, and although, for example, my 10 headquarters and most of the nuclear corporate organization is i
11 in Chattanooga, the Division of Nuclear Construction and the 12 Division of Nuclear E'ngineering is in Knoxville, over 100 miles 13 away.
1 14 Slide.
15 (Slide.)
16 I'm just going to let you read this.
I think it's l
17 important to review quickly your concerns of 1985 that d
l 18 eventually resulted in my coming to TVA to set up a management 19 team.
These are the things that you found and which caused the
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20 shutdown of five licensed plants and the inability to license 1
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21 two others, clearly a problem rooted in weak top management and 22 organization.
In my opinion, the other things on this slide j
j 23 are merely symptoms of that management organization weakness.
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24 As I said earlier, despite this list, no one really j
1 25 knew the true dimensions of the problems which faced us.
No l
13
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, one really understood the enormous magnitude of the problem.
1 2
Slide.
3 (Slide.)
c 4
Although we are here to discuss the Sequoyah plant i
5 startup, because of the nature of the problem, the nuclear 6
corporate fixes are inseparable from the fixes at the plants.
7 In other words, both had to be fixed.
I recognized early on 8
that the corporate had to be changed before we would be ready I
9 to ask for permission to start up any plant.
10 As you recall, the nuclear performance plan 11 identifies the corporate nuclear performance plan, identifies t
j 12 the root causes of the problems in the management of TVA's 13 p"clear program, and describes TVA's plans for correcting those 1
14 problems.
15 TVA has also submitted a specific nuclear performance j
16 plan for Sequoyah.
Taken together, these plans provide a 1
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17 complete account of the actions which TVA is taking to improve 18 its nuclear program.
These plans, which have been approved by 19 the NRC, resolve all the concerns raised by the 50.54 (f) letter 20 of September 1985.
I l
21
- Slide, i
I i
22 (Slide.)
I j
23 These are the objectives I established in 1986, early
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24 in 1986, to correct the root cause of TVA's problems.
You have i
25 seen these obiectives before.
They have not changed.
And I l,
e
14 1
would like to briefly update you on where-we stand.
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2 (Slide.)
3 With reference to the organizatien, we brought all 4
nuclear management matters under one control.
We removed non-5 nuclear matters.
We provided clear, simple lines of 6
responsibility and authority, along with consistency across the 7
entire nuclear program.
We also strengthened the weak areas, t
8 such as quality assurance, engineering, licensing, training, 9
and safety.
10 We also cut out a lot of layering.
For example, 11 today there are only four layers of management between me and 12 the shift supervisor at the Sequoyah Plant.
We've cut out a 13 great deal of layering.
14 The Policy Organization Manual contains the Office of 15 Nuclear Power statements on policy.
In other words, it 16 promulgates my philosophy.
It gives organizational 17 descriptions and responsibilities.
It provides organizational
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18 charts.
And, perhaps most importantly, it provides formal 19 interface agreements between the various parts of the 20 organization.
21 The Position Descriptions.
We've rewritten about 22 1,800, all of the management position descriptions, to 23 establish accountability, to eliminate duplication of 24 responsibilities, to assign missing functions, to provide 25 centralized control, to provide a basis for employee
15 1
evaluation, and, again, perhaps most importantly, those also g-2 define interface responsibilities.
I 3
(Slide.)
t 4
Here is the corporate organization.
With a couple of i
5 very minor changes, it is the same chart that I showed you two 6
years ago.
We have had a stable structure.
7 (Slide.]
8 With reference to the Management Team.
Since I've 9
come to TVA, we've hired as TVA employees, 48 senior managers.
10 Those 48 managers have a combined total of more than 1,000 11
' years, more than 1,000 years, of nuclear experience.
In l
12 addition, in the mid-level managers, those with an average of i
3 l
13 10 years of service, we have hired in as TVA employees, 487 4
14 additional experienced managers.
15 We'll discuss the second bullet later in the l
16 presentation.
17 (Slide.]
j Let me just hit a few things on this slide.
The l
18 l
19 hierarchy of documents refers to a system we have instituted of l
20 policies, directives, standards, procedures, and instructions.
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21 So, it goes from the top to the bottom, a disciplined way of 4
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22 doing business.
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23 With regard to the tracking systems, we have a
l 24 established a formal tracking system to keep track of 25 commitments to the NRC and to verify closure.
There was l
._--,,_______grm
W 16 1
literally a countless number of such' systems two years ago.
I f-2 think well over 50.
It was a crazy situation where everyone 3
almost literally had their own tracking system for commitments.
4 We now have one system to track our commitments to you.
5 With regard to the conditions adverse to quality, we 6
formerly had a hodgepodge'of over one-half dozen systems, 7
different systems, to provida problem identification.
No one 8
really knew what there was or what the status was.
We put all 9
of those into one system.
We put them all into one basket 10 where we could look at them, evaluate them, and prioritize them 11 for completion.
Of course, when we did that, we created an 12 immense backlog, a huge backlog, to work off.
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13 Configuration management you are all famillar with, l
14 and we have taken the steps to ensure that plant changes can't l
15 be done without a complete evaluation of the impact.
16 But of equal importance to me is the last bullet, 17 Central Control of Changes.
That, in effect, is configuration l
18 management for policies, position descriptions, and 1
J 19 organizations.
No longer can an individual in the system, i
l 20 uniquely at his site or his organization, change l
21 responsibilities, change position descriptions, or change the 1
organization without adequate review.
22 4
I 23 (Slide.)
24 With regard to Technical Integrity, TVA's efforts to j
25 ensure technical adequacy of Sequoyah are, I believe, i
17 i
unprecedented and the most comprehensive ever achieved in this h
2 country for an operating plant.
The major elements include i
1 3
design baseline and verification program, environmental I
t 4
qualification, design calculation review, restart test program.
j 5
These programs are the ones that reestablished the Sequoyah
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6 design basis.
We have implemented state-of-the-art design 7
control methods for making design changes at Sequoyah,
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q utilizing standalone modification packages.
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9 Additionally, new design control methods will j
i 10 maintain the design basis to ensure the continued adequacy of j
11 Sequoyah.
When we get Sequoyah on line, and we look to start 12 the next plant, we are not going to turn our back on Sequoyah.
l f
13 of course, basic to the thrust of the technical j
14 integrity is that we have given the responsibility for 15 technical ownership of the plants to the Division of Nuclear J
16 Engineering.
I 17 (Slide.)
I 18 If I were to use one word as a key word on this i
19 slide, I would say it would be teamwork.
Communications with 1
20 Employees.
We do that in many fashions, starting with my r
21 weekly staff meetings, the other staff meetings which report to l
t 3
22 the lower levels on what occurs in my weekly staff meetings.
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l 23 We have skip level meetings.
I have made it a practice to have i
24 luncheon meetings with craftsmen, engineers, secretaries, and a
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25 broad spectrum of personnel, and I've found those very valuable
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4 t
j I
t
18
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1 and many of my managers are now doing the same.
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1 2
We have roundtable discussions as part of our i
3 management training.
And we use many written sehicles, 4
including a monthly Upfront Magazine, which is mailed to the 5
homes of our people.
Nuclear dispatches, which are fast-track 6
flyers from me to all of our people.
Site and division k
7 dispatches and newsletters, as well as poster campaigns to 8
reinforce my philosophy.
9 But, ag'ain, the most important bullet to me on this 10 slide is the last bullet.
It is a basic philosophy of mine.
I i
11 found out.long ago that if you wanted to know what was going on j
12 you had to walk your ship.
If you wanted to know where your 4
13 problems were, you went and talked to the sailor repairing the 14 pump.
He could tell you what the problems are and he could 15 probably tell you how they could be fixed and the best way to 16 fix them.
It is no different at TVA.
1 17 This, perhaps, has been one,of the hardest 18 philosophies for me to instill at TVA.
But we have made l
19 tremendous progress.
For example, about six months ago, as a t
l 20 result of an NRC inspection, your staff was informed by the L
21 operators in the plant in the control room -- and this was 2
j 22 about cix months ago -- that they saw more of Mr. White in the 23 control room than they did of the plant manager.
And I can i
24 tell you that's no longer true today.
But we still have a ways f
1 r
i l
25 to go, and I won't let up on those efforts because they are I
i
19 1
extremely important.
i j
2 Throughout these five objectives you've heard me use 3
the words interface, communications, and teamwork.
During my j
l 4
first report to you in March 1986, I told you of the 5
difficulties I found in coordinating between the corporate
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1 6
organization and the sites, as well as between corporate j
l1 7
divisions.
And I gave you specific examples of those f
l 8
difficulties.
9 We have taken in these five goals and objectives a j
4 10 number of actions to solve that problem.
For example, from my 11 staff meetings, management training, roundtable discussions, 12 the new organization itself, the policy and organization j
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l 13 manual, the new position descriptions, and the new management i
14 talent infusion are only some examples of how we have attacked l
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15 this problem of interf ace, communic: dons, and teamwork.
1 16 And I am 7.v. yet sa*Iuried, but I recognize that this l
l 17 is the type of problem that is never..ermanently fixed.
A l
j 18 leader must continue to work at this d9y in and day out.
It is j
19 never permanently solved.
And I would ray that anyone who has t
j 20 attended my staff meetings would tell yo that I am constantly 1
1 21 after these problems of interfaces, commu.ications, and 22 teamwork.
Slide.
l 1
i i
23 (slide.)
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24 Now I would like to have you brir'ed on the Employee j
25 Concerns program.
This is one of the tools we are using to i
e
20 1
m'ake our management more effective.
Employees are the best j
- =7-2 source of information that we can get on technical anC Jafety 3
problems which might exist.
4 Hs. Jenkins will make the precantation, and let me 5
tell you a little bit about Ms. Jenkins.
She has a bachelor's j
6 degree in physics and another in math, and a master's in i
i l
7 nuclear physics.
She's been with TVA for 15 years.
l l
8 Interesting, perhaps, I recruited her from the non-9 nuclear part of TVA, and first assigned her a number of duties, l
j l
10 including a central focal point for my efforts to stamp out f
11 harassment and intimidation.
When she did a good job there, I f
i 12 promoted her and assigned her as the head of the Employee i
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13 Concerns Program.
And, because she had displayed her
,l l
14 management talents, I said to her, you take the new. job, but I
I f
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15 you take all your old jobs with you.
So, she then had two l
l 16 jobs.
I i
17 Two weeks ago I put her in charge -- and this is a j
i 18 promotion -- she's now head of Nuclear Personnel.
And, as the 19 pattern I've set in the past, I said, you get the new job and
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20 along with that you get to take the employee concerns, the i
i 21 harassment and intimidation job, and all your prior jobs.
So, i
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22 she's now fulfilling all of those functions.
Ms. Jenkins.
l i
23 MS. JENKINS:
Thank you.
In the NRC staff safety 24 evaluation.on the Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan, they 2
25 outlined three conditions which must be met prior to approving 4
l 21 i
1 the restart of Sequoyah.
What I am going to cover is how we i
2 demonstrate meeting those three conditions.
}
i f
i 3
(Slide.)
j 4
The first one was that the Employee Concerns. Program i
5 was working.
That program really entailed two efforts, one to i
6 deal with the employee concerns that had been generated by l
1 7
required interviews with more than 5,000 employees, which also j
1 8
generated more than 5,000 employee concerns during the year of 9
1985.
Coincident with the program to deal with the backlog of i
7
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10 concerns, we started an Employee Concerns Program that is 11 ongoing and is now more than two years old.
4 1
12 The program works by mail-ins, walk-ins from 13 employees, and exit interviews.
We know the process itself is
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14 working for more than half a dozen major internal and external l
t 15 audits, which culminated in the staff safety evaluation stating i
16 that the program itself was acceptable, September 30, 1987.
I i
17 We have continued to have a declining number of I
i 18 concerns.
When the program first started, in its first seven l
1 i
l 19 months, we were averaging more than 40 concerns a month.
The i
l 20 last three months in 1987, we were averaging three' concerns a d
21 month.
22 I want to emphasize our goal is not to drive that l
23 number to zero, because that program should now, and always, i
q 21 remain a safety valve so that employees always have an i
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25 alternate path, if needed, to report a problem.
And, in fact, l
1 1
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22 1
1 in January of 1988 we recorded 44 concerns.
It dropped back to i
2 four for February.
1 3
Line management.
The right people to do it are now 4-handling more concerns than they ever were.
Specifically at t
]
5 Sequoyah, for every one concern that was recorded in the formal 6
program and investigated there, two employees took their 1
7 problems and our recommendation back to their line manager to 8
get resolution.
In 1987, for every one employee who brought us 9
the concern to formally investigate, nine employees took their 10 problems back to line management.
[
11 And I know they are fixed there, because I track i
12 those as well as the formal ones.
In the two year period for I
l 13 Sequoyah 446 problems were taken back to the ling to be solved.
l 14 There are only 73 of them open today.
And I talk directly with i
1 15 the employee to find out if they are, in fact, satisfied with i
l 16 the resolution.
i i
l 17 The program itself is action oriented.
It gets 18 results.
In the two years we've had 87 piarcent of the l
19 recommendations generated by the investigations accepted by the l
20 line and implemented without change.
1 21 The second condition was that we should demonstrate
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22 that our employees are encouraged to report safety and quality l
23 concerns.
We get every employee coming and going.
They are q
24 given an orientation session, whether they come in to the t
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25 corporate office or through their general employee training at i
i I
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23 1
one of the plant sites, and they are a'cquainted with the p_
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2 program itself, in addition to the bulletin boards and other 3
official media.
4 We do exit interviews with every employee who leaves 5
the office of Nuclear Power.
We also do exit interviews with' 6
any employee transferring between two of our sites.
In the two 7
years we have had more than 11,000 employee contacts.
We have 8
generated cnly 850 concerns in that two year period.
9 The Condition Adverse to Quality Process you'll hear 10 more about later and the details of how it works.
From my 11 perspective, what I've seen it do is raise the consciousness 12 level of our employees, so that they understand their 13 obligation to report employee concerns in the proper channel.
14 Its a formal, but very simple, process to use to identify 15 problems.
16 At Sequoyah, 70 percont of those condition adverse to 17 quality reports come from non-QA employees.
Messages or the 18 employee's obligation are continuously sent, and Mr. White 19 covered a number of the media which we use to do that.
20 (Slide.)
21 The last condition was to demonstrate that there is 22 not a climate of intimidation and harassment.
A year ago I 23 addressed this same subject, and I told you then we had 24 identified three root causes for why a percepti.:. existed that 25 a climate of intimidation and harassment existed at TVA.
Those h
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root cau3es were an idanpropriate managetint ct(2ture -.br,
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.2 you've heard, charaetorized.by littlexor no comniunications, I
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between management and orlpoyees, insufficient managemend d
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5 Specifically, there were autstnatic penalties 'for 6
procedural V U.'ations that did not take into account the 7
emplc.yee'5s willingnesr t'o come, forwbrd nnd report the problem.
The poliefek vore punitiNa, and they were certainly perceived 8
9 to not be applied erplitably t.o c13 cratt.s, nanagers, and'
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11 Last year I listed seven or eight specific actions 12 that we had taken to start chiprinh away at those, rv.at causes.
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,4 13 A year later I J:ah.tell you we'. ve t?. ken broad s actions to o
14 eliminate {Ne ' root,causes.
Thel first' two her a,E commu nicatior.s Us,'
I 15 and velhing spades,'you'll hear a themo.,throu;nout'ted.ay, to L,
N 16 eliminate'the improper management cu]6ure that existed before, q
17 Disciplinary actions has two facets, one, those i
10 guilt y or believed to be guilty of jn,timidation an.1 harassment 19 were disciplined, regardless of the age of the-case.
And we 20 continue to discipline managers and employees found guilty of
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21 intuddation and harassment in the,workplace.
Butourdisciplinaryactio{andourdisciplinary 22 s
23 guidelines are corrective in nature,annd they do take intu' 24 account. the emp?oyees reporting the p oblem themselves.
It's 26 structured to ancew.4 age them to tell us about violationc.
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Lastly, and most importantly and maybe most far-
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reaching, is a comprehensive management training program,'.which 3
you'll hear about.
4 In summary, I'm convinced we have met and have 5
demonstrated those'three conditions.
Thank'you.
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6
[ Slide.)
N q
7 MR. WHITE:
Our next discussion is Management
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Training.
Let me tell you a little bit about Ms. Blackburn.
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9 She has a bachelor's degree in personnel management, and a o
10 master's degree in organizational psychology.
She's been a TVA 11 employee for nine years.
12 TVA had hired a contractor to do management training.
13 But I wanted a long-term program.
I did not want a bandaid II 14 fix.
I recognize that management training is a continuing
.15 program, and TVA should know best now to training TVA.
So, I 16 searched throughout TVA to find someone who was intelligent,
~ 17 innovative, and willing to work very hard and start off 18 running.
I recruited Ms. Blackburn from a non-nuclear part of 19 TVA.
And I will tell you that this lady has stepped up to bat 20 and has really' met the challenge that I put on her shoulders in 21 about March of last year.
Go ahead.
22 MS. BLACKBURN:
Thank you, Mr. White.
You've heard 23 management training and management effectiveness referred to 24 several times during the presentation. I believe management l
25 training and development is a part of the long-term fix, and I i
t
~
26 1
believe it's an area where we've made tremendous progress in f-2 the last year.
3 We outlined in Volume I a Management Training and 4
Development Plan.
We have implemented our management training 5
plan and we've begun the process of identifying managerial-6 skills and the individual development planning for the future 7
in the organization.
Next slide, please.
8 (Slide.]
9 There are three factors that I believs have 10 contributed to what is a successful and, I believe, an 11 impactful program of management training and development.
The 12 first one, Emphasis and Involvement by Top Management, you've 13 heard that emphasis today in the presentation.
The emphasis 14 really is on line management, training, and developing 15 employees as an everyday day-do-day process, 16 There are a couple ways that training is formally 17 taking place outside of the classroom.
Developmental 18 assignments, coaching and counseling, and then also seeing that 19 the training in the classroom is transferred back to the job.
20 In terms of management involvement, it's very visible
)
21' as a part of the training programs in the classroom itself.
We 22 have video tapes and written messages from Mr.. White outl.ining i
23 expectations, roles for supervision.
The five objectives that 1
24 he spoke about earlier in his presentation are integrated into 25 the content of the training.
27 1
In. addition, Mr. White referred to the roundtables.
~s 2
This is an opportunity for a senior manager, up to and 3
including Mr. White, to sit down at the end of a training 4
session and discuss questions, problems, concerns, and 5
philosophies.
6 Systematic and Required, the second factor, I 7
believe, has moved us into an impactful program.
It used to be 8
piecemeal and a deluded effort.
We now have a core required 9
for each level of manager.
We schedule on a 90 day schedule, 10 where a line manager actually integrates the training into the 11 work schedule for that 90 days.
We then track that at the very 12 senior level to make sure that we're meeting our commitments 13 within each division or site for their training.
This is 14 another way we send the message of the~ emphasis of line 15 management on continuous learning and training on the job.
16 Second is Quality and Quantity.
There is no doubt 17 that we have a lot of work to do in the area of management 18 training, but we were committed to quality, rather than just 19 manufacturing training.
We took in post-training system design 20 guidelines, and we applied them to the training wherever it was 21 possible.
That means we established our needs, we certified 22 our instructors, our objectives, our performance base.
23 In addition, we adopted a philosophy of continuous 24 evaluation.
We have evaluated in several different ways.
25 There were three goals that we evaluated against.
28-1 Professionalism of instructors, relevance of the training to r.
'f T
2 the participants, and then actual change back on the job.
3 We did our first follow-up evaluation in December, 4
and I can say that we're meeting all three of those objectives, 5
including beginning to see increased competence on the job as a 6
result of training.
7 MR. WHITE:
Let me interrupt for one second to say 8
that I don't want to leave the commission with the impression 9
that everyone in the organization now understands the 10 importance of management training.
You know, I face the 11 problems that you would expect, where there are many pressures 12 on managers to do many things.
13 We do keep very close track and I have to issue 14 periodic orders to the people that they,must go to class, 15 because other things come up, other priorities compete.
Ms.
16 Blackburn tells me that when one of the organizations is 17 starting to slack off a little bit, and then I take care of 18 that problem.
But we can see that it's a problem that will be 19 never-ending, like many others.
20 MS. BLACKBURN:
It's a balancing act for managers.
21 (Slide.)
22 The next slide shows you the quantity of training 23 that we have done since the shutdown of the plant.
The core 24 curricalum, listad at the top of that slide, we began in May of 25 1987.
That training represents over 65 managers a week, on the
8 s
29 1
average, in training, or over 8,300 person days of training 2
since May when we began delivering the training.
That's a 3
tremendous effort towards management training.
4 The second part of the slide shows that we have 5
identified, even beyond the core, some additional training 6
needs and some individual development needs for managers.
The 7
first two bullets under Additional Training are courses we have 8
delivered since May.
The other electives represent OMP 9
participation in TVA-offered corporate courses since January of 10 1986.
11 In summary, there's been a tremendous effo.rt and 12, emphasis put on management training.
We outlined a 13 comprehensive management training and development plan in 14 Volume I.
While there are still improvements and follow-ups to 15 be made, we have implemented a major portion of what was 16 outlined in Volume I.
17 As we reach our target for the core curriculum, we 18 will keep expanding into follow-up training, and we will be 19 bringing up additional programmatic efforts to increase 20 managerial effectiveness.
Thank you.
21 MR. WHITE:
Let me just make one comment on this 22 slide.
These courses, the core courses, are three to six days 23 each.
So, there is a lot of training.
But it is the 24 beginning.
You are how far through these courses?
25 MS. BLACKBURN:
The first two courses are about half
i 1
1 30 1
Way there.
2 MR. WHITE:
Since last May.
But the point is that 3
there will be many managers who will have to repeat those 4
courses.
So we intend,.before we go through the whole thing 5
the first time, we will have a good feeling for what increases 6
we need to have in terms of increased management training.
7 From our feedback system we will determine what parts of the 8
course need to be reemphasized or improved.
And, as I say, it 9
is a continuing program.
Thank you.
10 Let's talk about quality assurance.
Mr. Kazanas has 11 a bachelor's degree in metallurgical engineering, and an MBA.
12 He has 21 years of nuclear experience, including 15 years of QA 13 experience.
He is not a TVA employee.
He is a contract 14 manager on loan from GPU.
At GPU he most recently, for about 15 seven years, served as the corporate QA director responsible 16 for TMI-One, TMI-Two, and Oyster Creek. _
17 MR. KAZANAS:
Thank you, Mr. White.
Good morning.
I 18 am the Director of Nuclear Quality Assurance.
I would like to 19 summarize for you the improvements that we have made in quality 20 assurance at TVA over the last two years.
Next slide.
21 (Slide.)
22 TVA's nuclear commitments are contained in that plan j
i 23 and in the top of the QA plan.
TVA's QA program is fully 24 satisfied.
And, in fact, we have exceeded our commitments.
25 Many changes have been made in QA at TVA.
Foremost 1
31
'he QA organization has 1
among these changes are, number one.,
t
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2 been totally restructured.
Next slide.
3
[ Slide.]
4 All QA activities have been centralized.
Instead 5
of having five independent programs, with five separate 6
approaches, we now have an integrated QA program.
In addition, 7
the Director of Nuclear Quality Assurance now reports to the 8
Manager of Nuclear Power.
This organizati6nal change in 9
itself, along with others, has significa'ntly increased the QA 10 visibility.
11 MR. WHITE:
What Mr. Kazanas is saying is that when 12 the boss is interested, everyone's interested.
And that's the 13 way we've made QA.
14 MR. KAZANAS:
Number two, TVA has added 25 new QA 15 managers to the organization who bring in over 400 man years of 16 QA experience.
Many of them come from the outside and bring an 17 added valuable industry perspective and added professionalism.
18 Number three, a new subgroup within QA, Engineering 19 Assurance, has been created to provide the QA oversight of 20 engineering activities.
Engineering Assurance reports 21 administratively to Engineering, but functionally and 22 technically it reports to QA.
Engineering Assurance 23 extensively monitors TVA's engineering and technical 24 activities.
Next slide.
25 (Slide.)
32 1
Number'four, TVA has implemented substantial QA 2
training for its inspectors, monitors, and auditors.
We are 3
very proud of our QA training program.
Some utilities have 4
utilized our training modules as models for their own training 5
programs.
I would also like to add that our management review 6
guides have been adopted by the Operations QA Subcommittee of
~
7 the Energy Division of the American Society for Quality Control 8
as models in our industry.
9 MR. WHITE:
Those two things that he just m'ention'ed 10 tell you we've come a long way in two years, with other 11 utilities who want to copy what we are doing.
That in itself, 12 I think, is significant.
13 MR. KAZANAS:
We have conducted substantial QA 14 training for many of our employees, both within and outside the 15 QA organization.
Some 89,000 QA training hours alone in 1987.
16 And 22,000 training ho'urs already in
'88.
17 Number five.
QA has increased its emphasis on 18 performance-based quality verifications with the addition of QA 19 technical experts and increased site presence.
QA is looking 20 at the how-tos now, in addition to compliance.
21 Number six.
TVA has broadened its scope of its i
22 overview of a variety of plant activities that affect safety.
1 23 Number seven.
A number of new QA programs and 24 management initiatives have further. strengthened our program.
1 25 These include our level three oversight program, our upgraded I
I
33 1
inspection planning program, the QA monitoring program, and our 2
new corrective action program.
I would like you to focus your 3
attention particularly on our corrective action program.
Next 4
slide.
5 (Slide.]
6 TVA's corrective action program was initiated 11 7
months ago.
It incorporates earlier unresolved QA 8
deficiencies.
In this program TVA ensures that all conditions 9
that are considcred to be adverse to quality, called CAQs, are 10 prioritized, monitored, dispositioned, and verified.
11 We have employed an extremely low threshold for 12 classifying any condition as a CAQ'.
We rely n'ot only on.our QA 13 organization to initiate CAQs, but also identification from the 14 entire organization.
This is reflected by the statistic that 15 approximately 69 percent of the CAQs come from the line 16 organization.
17 The CAQ process involves the immediate prioritization 18 of an identified condition adverse to quality so that 19 operability issues, including issues of generic concern from 20 one of the other plants to another, are reviewed in a timely 21 manner.
In the event a CAQ is of less signi.ficance, it is 22 prioritized accordingly.
CAQs are tracked in our monthly 23 reports that are issued to Mr. White and the TVA line man ~gers.
a 24 In the event a CAQ is not corrected within the v
25 timeframe specified in the CAQ program, a mandatory escalation
34 1
procedure is triggered.
In a few instances, for example, this'
~
2 procedure has escalated a CAQ all the way up to Mr. White for 3
his resolution.
j 4
We have issued over 2,000 CAQs related to Sequoyah 5
since the initiation of this program.
A large, but not 6
surprising, number given our low threshold for initiation.
7 Today only a few CAQs remain that require resolution 8
prior to Sequoyah Unit Two restart.
And of the 1,100 CAQs that 9
exist today, approximately one-thir'd conce'rn only Sequoyah Unit 10 One.
One-third are minor discrepancies.
TVA is not satisfied 11 with the existence of the remaining 400 or so CAQs.
But we are 12 continuing to systematically reduce this number.
13 In summary, TVA today has a well organized and 14 thorough QA program, 15 MR. WHITE:
We now want to shift gears to talk 16 specifically --
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Let us interrupt just for a moment.
18 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Is Mr. Kazanas -- I hope I 19 pronounced that properly -- is his successor on board?
20 MR. WHITE:
His deputy is a TVA individual, and I 21 like competition for positions.
We are presently looking at 22 hiring, as a TVA employee, an additional person.
So, the two 23 individuals compete to take over when Mr. Kazanas leaves.
24 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Okay.
Thank you, y
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Let's proceed.
35
, e're going to shift gears now and get W
1 MR. WHITE:
.i 2
into discussing Sequoyah.
Let me just kind of set the stage by
~
3 saying that we have gone through three phases at Sequoyah.
4 The first phase, in 1986, you will recall I 5
established task forces.
The task force at Sequoyah was 6
primarily people from outside of TVA with extensive experience 7
working to fix problem plants.
The function of the task force 8
was to' dig out the problems, determine corrective actions 9
need'ed, and to recommend courses of corrective action.
10 The second phase at Sequoyah started in January 1987.
11 This was the phase of accomplishing corrective actions.
During 12 that phase we di'd a number o~f things, like move engineers to 13 the site, putting program managers in charge of critical path 14 programs, and so forth.
Both we and your staff have briefed 15 you before on the many, many programs and corrective actions 16 we've completed to date in these first two phases.
17 We are here today to discuss the third phase.
18 Understand that the second phase, that of corrective action, 19 does have some overlap with the third phase.
The third phase 20 started about August of 1987.
This phase was a phase to change 21 the mentality from what I call the overhaul or the outage 22 mentality to an operational mentality.
23 My experience -- and, believe me, I've had a. lot in 24 this area -- says that at the appropriate time you must take a 25 distinct, definite, conscious step to change that mentality.
i
l 36 1
It involves a number of things.
In our case, it involved 2
change-out of certain line managers, including the plant 3
manager.
It involves a lot of training and teaching.
4 And let me emphasize the teaching part, because it's 5
not only teaching to build an operational team.
It's more than 6
that.
You know that when you convert from the overhaul to the
~
7 operational mentality there will.lua mistakes made.
One of the 8
traps that people sometimes fall into is that the mistakes are 9
usually small one's and they are sometimes disregarded.
And I 10 consider those small mistakes as danger flags.
Because, if you 11 don't pay attention to them, the big mistake will get you.
'2 Therefore, what we've done as we've moved into this 1
13 phase is taken every opportunity of any mistake, any error, no 14 matter how small, of stopping what we're doing, getting our 15 people together and talking about it, discussing the errors,
~
getting other sections to understand what the errors were, and 16 17 using it as a teaching mechanism.
The plant manager has done 18 this, and I have done it myself in large groups of people.
19 So, mistakes will be made, and we've made some, and 20 we've used them as a learning experience.
Now, in the ideal 21 world you would hope that, if one part of the organization, one 22 watch section, made a mistake, then all the other watch 23 sections would immediately learn from it.
Unfortunately, in 24-the real world that isn't true.
In the real world the other 25 sections think to themselves, no matter what the manager says, O
~
37 1
they think to themselves, that's the other section, we wouldn't 2
make a dumb mistake like that.
3 So, sometimes you have to let each section make the 4
mistake in order to train so that they recognize that they, 5
too, are susceptible.
6 So, we are now in that third phase.
As part of that, 7
the operators must understand it is their plant.
It is their 8
plant.
They own that plant.
The aupport organizations must 9
understand the change in their role.
They still'have technical 10 ownership of the plant, in the case of engineering, and they 11 must be responsive to the operators.
Those, of course, are 12 only a few of the things of this change in mentality, of which 13 I speak.
14 Now, first, let's talk about that technical support.
15 Mr. Hosmer will talk to that.
Let me just tell you very 16 briefly something about Mr. Hosmer.
He has a master's degree 17 in chemical engineering.
This man already has 18 years of 18 nuclear experience under his belt.
I hired him last year.
19 I recruited him from an architect-engineer firm where he 20 had had 14 years experience and a proven track record of 21 accomplishments at San Onofre one, Two, and Three, Palo Verde 22 One, Two, and Three, South Texas, and Rancho Seco.
23 MR. HOSMER:
Thank you, Mr. White.
I'd like to spend 24 the next few minutes discussing the technical support 25 organization's readiness to support Sequoyah.
Next slide,
-~
,e
38
,1 please.
7_
2 (Slide.)
3 I'd like to talk about three things.
The major 4
transition we have made as an organization in the last two to 5
three yeais.
The technical support team, what it looks like 6
today.
And, lastly, what we are currently doing to support 7
plant operations.
Next slide, please.
8
'[ Slide.]
9 With respect to the major transition we have made, 10 there were three issues of concern brought up in the past.
11 There were concerns about timeliness, accountability, and 12 concerns of maintaining the design basis and concerns about 13 design control.
14 With respect to timeliness, in the past we were an 15 off-site available organization.
Today we are an on-site, real 16 time organization.
17 In the past, there were concerns about 18 accountability.
We were in Knoxville.
We were an on-call 19 service.
Today we are on-site.
We are a support team.
And we 20 have technical ownership of the plant.
And let me define what 21 I mean by that.
22 That means that any design disclosure documentation I 23 issue is my responsibility to ensure it is in accordance with 24 NRC regulations.
.In addition, it means that, if there are 25 problems'in the plant, the resolution of those problems should
o 39 1
be done in accordance with our commitments.
That is my 2
responsibility.
3 Concerning the design basis, there were concerns 4
about it being weakly maintained since the operating license 5
phase.
It has been reestablished.
Mr. White mentioned some of 6
those programs.
It has been reestablished today.
7 With respect to design control, in the past we were a 8
staff-type organization that issued the design by individual 9
drawings.
Today we use the industry standard design change 10 packages as our mechanism for issuing designs.
Those packages 11 include all the drawings, mechanical, civil, et cetera, needed 12 for the design.
And they are interface reviewed in my 13 organization for Appendix R, et cetera.
Next slide, please.
14 (Slide.)
15 Let me give you a glimpse of what we look like today.
16 I have approximately 1,400 people who work for me.
I have 17 three responsibilities today.
Daily support of Units One and 19 Two.
Unit One restart engineering.
And modifications 19 engineering.
20 With respect to daily support, approximately 400 of 21 those 1,400 people are involved in daily support of Units One 22 and Two.
Approximately 700 people are involved in the Unit One 23 restart engineering.
And the balance of the people are working 24 on modifications engineering.
That is, engineering needed for 25 the next refueling cycles and any NRC commitments that we have
o.
=
40 j
1 made.
2 In the future, with both units running, we will be an 3
on-site team that does daily support and modifications 4
engineering.
5 Let me briefly tell you about my team.
Not only am I 6
part of the construction, operations, engineering team, I have 7
a two-part team.
I have TVA people on-site and a few TVA 8
people in Knoxville that work for me, and I have access'to two 9
architect-engineers.
Of that 1,400 member team, approximataly 10 1,000 of them are either on-site or within a 10 minute driving 11 distance.
Next slide, please.
12 (Slide.)
13 To show you the daily plant support, the plant 14 manager conducts a daily plant meeting, seven days a week Ond 15 addresses what happens in the plant, what happened in the plant 16 in the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
I have five engineers that attend that 17 meeting.
I have an assistant senior project engineer that 18 represents me in that meeting.
He is also the same man that is 19 on 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> call for a seven day period as well as the other 20 site senior managers.
21 The plant manager forms the systems engineering group I ' ave provided ten design engineers as part of 22 in his plant.
h 23 a joint maintenance engineering, systems engineering, design 24 engineering team,'
They work for Mr. Smith but I have provided 25 ten people to him, and they are my first point of contact for i
0 41 1
problem solving in the field.
7_
~
2 The plant operations review committee, I am currently 3
an advisor to that committee.
I currently pre-screen my people 4
so they can make proper presentations to that committee.
We 5
have proposed a tech spec change to the Commission that will 6
make me a full time permanent voting member.
7 I think attitudes are very important in my team and 8
the rest of the teams.
We are working hard to work on team.
9 We are part of a team.
We are in a support role yet we have 10 the responsibility of retaining technical ownership.
11 In add'ition, in the nuclear ethics role, we work very 12 hard.
We work on not accepting the unacceptable, understanding i
13 root cause and trying to get better as an organization.
14 I have been with TVA nine months and I have seen two 15 very positive trends that I would like to share with you.
The 16 first one is in the corrective action area.
We have been able i
17 to characterize over 400 corrective actions needed for restart 18 of Unit 2 and closed basically all of them today to be able to 19 allow Unit 2 to restart.
20 In the design change area, I've seen two very 21 important changes.
One is timeliness.
One is quality.
In the 22 timeliness area, we have cut the time needed to issue a design 23 change by approximately 50 percent.
I think we have done three 24 things in the quality area that have enhanced the quality of 25 the product that I issue to the field.
42 1
One, we package the product and pre-review it in an 2
interdisciplinary way before it leaves my organization.
3 Secondly, before it ic issued as Rev.'O, there is a 4
constructability walk down so it can be built efficiently and 5
get-the plant restored to its normal operating configuration in 6
a quick manner.
7 Last but not least, when that package is finished, I 8
am responsible to ensure that the control room drawings are as 9
built.
10
[ Slide.]
11 In summary, the design basis in Sequoyah has been re-12 established.
Those processes needed to maintain it are in 13 place.
In my organization, the technical support people have 14 accepted their role as technical owners of a plant and they are 15 currently supporting plant operations.
16 Thank you.
17 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Mr. Hosmer, you are a TVA 18 employee?
19 MR. HOSMER:
Yes, sir.
20 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Thank you.
21 MR. WHITE:
The next speaker is Steve Smith.
I hired 22 Steve Smith last July as a TVA employee.
He has 22 years of 23 Navy and commercial experience.
Most recently as the assistant 24 plant manager during the recovery program at Davis-Besse.
He 25 had the responsibility there for the maintenance program which
i 43 1
got very high marks from the NRC.
He played a key role in the 2
restart program.
In fact, I believe you met Mr. Smith when he 3
briefed you on the maintenance program at Davis-Besse..
He is 4
my new plant manager at Sequoyah.
5 Steve?
6 MR. SMITH:
Thank you, Mr. White.
Chairman Zech, 7
Commissioners, good morning.
My name is Steve Smith.
I am the t
8 plant manager at Sequoyah nuclear plant.
My topic today will 9
be discussion of the overall readiness of the plant for 10 restart.
11 (Slide.)
12 When the Sequoyah units shut down in August of 1985, 13 a variety of problems had already been identified by the NRC, 14 INPO organization and other organizations which interfaced at 15 the site to conduct inspections and ob,servations.
16 Those issues as well as issues that were further 17 discovered at,the site, were taken into account in programs 18 established to approve the overall performance.
19 When I came to the site in late fall in 1987, it was 20 with the objectives to ensure that full implementation of those 21 programs had been accomplished and that we brought the 22 communications and organization to a state where they could 23 support the operational readiness and restart of Unit 2.
24 (Slide.]
i L
25 In the area of management involvement, we have
'l
44 1
reorganized the site organization to assure they are directly 2
aligned to support the operation of the plant.
We have created 3
a system engineering organization which I will discuss in 4
detail further.
We have reduced the levels of management at 5
the site to assure direct communications between craft and to 6
my level at the site.
7 We created a management roster which includes 8
representatives from all organizations a't the site which must 9
interface to support the ccrrection of operational problems and 10 we have fixed shift support.
11 (Slide.)
12 This assures that when a problem is identified during 13 the night or on the back shift, that problem gets immediate 14 corrective attention and corrective action.
This back shift 15 and weekend organization is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, seven days per 16 week, and is approximately 45 people in the various disciplines 17 and organizations to assure prompt action in the case of a 18 problem.
19
[ Slide.)
20 We have proceduralized the accountabilities and 21 responsibilities of these organizations and individuals in a 22 set of procedures called conduct of operations, although they 23 are not fully complete at this time, the most important ones, 24 those which are for operations or maintenance, are implemented.
25 Those procedures describe the duties, responsibilities and
45
.1
' interfaces of each level of supervision and craft in those two 7~
2 areas and their interfaces to the other organizations.
They 3
have been trained on those procedures and we re-emphasize the 4
contents and the reqdirements of those procedures in periodic 5
meetings.
6 (Slide.]
7 In the area of housekeeping, material condition, 8
although it has been judged as adequate for restart by a 9
variety of inspections on the part of the NRC and INPO, we felt 10 that housekeeping and material conditions at the site should be 11 used as an example of the excellence we intend to achieve in 12 all areas of our operations at the site.
13 We therefore implemented a very de. tailed upgrade 14 program which involves not only housekeeping but painting, 15 insulating, fixing s, mall material problems such as packing 16 leaks.
That program currently employs about 200 people.
It is 17 intended to' conclude in December of this year.
18 MR. WHITE:
Let me interrupt you one second.
The way 19 we did this was to select the worse spaces that we could find 20 in the plant and then I told the plant people, get the space 21 ready for inspection.
After several tries, that single space 22 passed the inspection.
We said, that's the standard, that's 23 the yardstick, take that and do it everywhere in the plant.
We 24 have done this both at Sequoyah and at Browns Ferry.
It has 25 been an effective way to do it.
l
\\
46 1
MR. SMITH:
As I said, it is a visual example of the r,
A 2
excellence we intend to achieve in all areas.
3 (Slide.)
4 The maintenance program has been upgraded both at 5
Sequoyah and on a corporate level.
The corporate program, as a 6
matter of fact, I was hired at Sequoyah to help establish.that 7
program, and I've had direct interface with that program since 8
going to Sequoyah as plant manager, there is a good working 9
relationship there and the directives and standards used to 10 establish the maintenance program through TVA nuclear are being 11 generat4d by'that organization.
12 Two of the most important facets in the maintenance 13 program at the site are the procedures upgrade program, which 14 has been in process for about a year, and the corporate 15 writer's guide for maintenance instructions and the validation 16 program have been selected by INPO and recommended to other 17 utilities to be used in their programs of upgrade.
18 Also the preventive maintenance program at the site--
19 MR. WHITE:
I might also make a statement with regard 20 to one change in maintenance that INPO is asking is some of our 21 things to use for guides, dramatic change in a period of a 22 couple of years.
23 MR. SMITH:
The preventive maintenance program at the 24 site now includes a review of those pieces of equipment that x
25 are important to power' production and operation of the balance
l i
47 1
of plant portion of the plant.
Preventive maintenance n
2 activities, once identified, are reviewed and concurred with by
~'
3 the nuclear engineering organization and also recommendations 4
come from that organization for both predictive and preventive 5
maintenance activities at the site.
6 We have a new work prioritization system which 7
assures that the right priorities are asrigned to work at the 8
site and that the plant's needs are addressed first.
9 The post-maintenance testing program involves two 4
10 phases, the first phase is a cookbook approach to those routine 11 and repetitive tasks to assure that the proper testing is 12 performed and to assure the operability of the equipment that 13 is repaired.
14 The second portion of that program is the criteria to 15 be used by engineers to develop post-maintenance testing for 16 critical and comp.' ex raaintenance activities to assure the 17 operability and serviceability of the equipment that is 18 repaired.
19 (Slide.)
20 As I said, we have created a systems engineering 21 organization and that organization has system sponsorship for 22 all the systems in the plant.
Thff coordinate between the 23 various organizations such as engineering, maintenance and 24 operations to assure that the proper action is taken when a N.-
25 problem is identified.
4
48 1
One of the most important functions of that 2
organization is to assure that'the proper implementation of 3
system modifications have been performed.
They are involved 4
with the modification from its conceptual stages through the 5
walk down in the plant, the actual implementation of the 6
modification, the development and conducting of the post-7 modification testing, to assure that we have gotten the correct 8
modification installed and the system performed by the design 9
basis.
10 (Slide.]
11 Another area of improvement that was a concern by 12 both the NRC and INPO in a variety of inspections is the area 13 of root cause determination.
We have provided training on root 14 cause determination.
The root cause determination program has 15 been established in a procedure at the site.
That procedure 16 also includes the formation of an incident investigation team.
{
17 Any time a problem occurs at the plant that involves equipment 18 or personnel performance, the incident investigation team is 19 called into action.
Their arrival on site is within hours of 20 the incident.
21 The program involves not only the quarantine of 22 equipr.ent once it is put in a safe condition but on-site at 23 time interviews of the personnel involved with the incident.
24 This helps to assure the correctness of the information that is gath'ered and management involvement directly at the site, at 25
t 49 1
the time of the incident, is assured.
Also the program 2
includes generic reviews for both equipment at the site and at 3
the other three nuclear sites within TVA.
4 (Slide.]
5 In the material area of plant readiness for restart, 6
we have several programs in place, several things have been 7
conducted.
8 (Slide.)
9 Plant modifications that were identified as part of 10 the design basis verification program and other a'ctivities at 11 the site during the recovery period for the Sequoyah unit are 12 now nearly complete.
They were originally approximately 370 13 modificatiens to be performed and as of this morning, there 14 were four modifications with remaining field work to do.
15 (Slide.)
16 In the area of the restart test program, more than 17 125 restart tests were identified in the review of the original 18 start up testing program, and of the technical specification 19 review at the site.
Those 125, as of this morning, there were 0
four tests remaining to be performed with one in progress.
21
-(Slide.)
22 Since the shut down in 1985, through the years of 23 1986 and 1987, over 40,000 work requests have been completed at 24 Sequoyah.
To date at Sequoyah from the first of the year, over j
25 2,700 work orders have been generated and 2,400 of those work
.N 50 1
orders have been completed.
g, 2
(Slide.)
3 In the area of maintenance backlog, currently we have 4
approximately 1,286 work orders and as you can see from the' 5
chart, from mid-year, that is a significant work down.
6
[ Slide.)
/
Of that approximately 1,300 work orders are currently 7
8 in existence; 500 of those work orders have to do with the 9
paint, fix up, clean up program, which are material conditions 10 type work orders and 750 are actual corrective maintenance 11 activities in the plant.
Of those 750, 90 of those work orders 12 are currently in line to be performed prior to the restart of 13 Unit 2.
14 If you base that number against the industry and 15 against our past two years' performance rate,'that is about a 16 two to two and a half month backlog of work, which is very much 17 in line with top performers'in the country right now.
They 18 generally carry about a three month backlog of work activities.
19 (Slide.]
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
This is top performers as 21 opposed to average performers?
22 MR. SMITH:
As opposed to average performers; yes, 23 sir.
24 In the area of communications, we have made a number j
25 of significant improvements.
We do have a daily plant status j
T
^
t 51' 4
,ai 1
sheet.
It is issued each morning at 7:30 and it' lists the O
-2, status of both Uni 7.s 1 and 2.
It lists any prob'lems which are 3
-fldentified over the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, conditions ~ adverse to
\\
e 4
' quality, work requesta, et cetera.
It also identifies any
- i.. - >
5 limiting conditions for operation which the plant may have 6
ent9 red during the last 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period.
7 Limited conditions for operation against a plant are 8
required to have 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, seven days a week support until the 9
condition is corrected.
10
/
We have structured pe'riodic meetings with all the
/
11 plant personnel.
I meet with my direct supervisors three times 12 weekly.
In those meetings, we discuss plant problems, which' 13 may be programmatical, administrative, personnel.
We meet 14 monthly with all the supervisors in the plant.
In that 15 meeting, we discuss what the plant has done during the past
~
16 month, What our goals and objectives are for the next month and 17 for the rsmainder of the year.
In those meetings we discuss arl problems which may be identified by the supervisors.
18 f
19 Quarterly, we meet with all plant personnel.
When I 20 sr,y "we," the superintendents who report directly to me, and I 4
21 meet with those people.
It is a very extensive meeting.
It
~
22 usually requires five days to conduct that. meeting because 23 there are over 1,200 personnel who report at the site.
24 Again, we discuss ongoing activities, where we have 25 come from over the past quarter and where ve intend to go to i
i s
../,.
m,.
m
,s s y o
i 52 1
during.the neIt quarter, q
2 COMMISSIObER'BERNTHAL:,hib{youexplainthe I
3 distinction between a maintenanc4 *;equest and a work request?
\\'\\
4 Is there a step between the two?d 5
MR. SMITH:
All $ctivities at the site are identifiid s
6 on a worg reiniest.
Thone corrective maintbnsnce sctivities 7
which involve safety related mtuipinent, a mahdenance requnst 8
is developed at that point in timem.The ma.!ntenance requast is 9
E much more detailed documard.
It dmbcdies things such'as A.9ME 10 code requirements, EQ requirements, fire,orotectiort 11 requireme:tts,
and it i ets a mora detailsd review by a variety J
12 of organizations over and above the work reqtiest.
13 Currently, we are modifying that pregrau.
l'he work 14 request itself gett {oo many reviews and we.are reducing it to li-one level review and putting it on what we call:s service 16 request, tnose things that m y,t.aint a wall, more a desk, those 17 a ctivy.t les.
18 We de have a required maridatory management attendance 19 and training sessior.t. in our daily shif t turnover theetings.
20 The shift turnove; neetings are a very la.portant phase of our t'
21 operation.
I mignt add that each oi the members of the board, 22 and Mr. Runyon himself, have atte ded our shift turnover 23 meetings at the site.
i 24 (Slide.]
s 25 The area of nt. clear ethics has been discussed on many P
53 h
1 1
occasions.
We spend a lot of time thinking about what the
.s 2
nuclear ethics is and what it means to us at Sequoyah.
We feel 3
those items listed are the essentials of a strong nuclear ethic 4
and we feel that improved communications and the trust between 5
employees and management give us the ability to convey those 6
ethics to the lowest levels of craft and operations at the 7
site.
8 (Slide.)
9 With those things that I have discussed, the ongoing 10 programs, the improvements in the programs that existed, I feel 11 that in all areas, Sequoyah Unit 2 is now ready for operation.
12 Thank you.
13 MR. WHITE:
Next I would like to have a discussion on 14 operational readi, ness by Joe Bynum.
Let me tell you a little 15 bit about Mr. Bynum.
He has a degree in electrical 16 engineering, a Bachelor's degree and a Master's degree in 17 nuclear engineering.
He has 15 years of commercial experience.
18 A very interesting background.
He was at TVA from 1972 to 19 1982, where he held many key operating positions including 20 assistant plant manager at both Browns Ferry and Sequoyah.
21 He left TVA in 1982 and from 1982 to 198'/, he was the 22 plant manager for all three units at Palo Verde.
During that 23 period of time, all three units at Palo Verde were licensed by 24 the NRC.
I think TVA is fortunate to have convinced Mr. Bynum v
25 to return home, like Mr. Smith and Mr. Hosmer, that you heard l
i 54 1
earlier, Mr. Bynum has a proven track record.
,A 2
MR. BYNUM:
Thank you, Mr. White.
3 I'd like to include that even though I am listed on 4
the corporate organization, I am assigned full time at Sequoyah 5
and have been full time there since October, since returning to 6
TVA, specifically looking at readiness for restart.
7 Mr. Smith has talked about overall plant readiness t
8 and now I would like to take the next few minutes to focus on 9
the activities in the main control room and interfacing 10 directly with the main control room.
11 (Slide.]
12 We have many inputs on operational readiness.
We 13 have already talked about the management team and unlike TVA of 14 old, we now have a lot of commercial experience from outside You'have heard from a few of those individuals today.
15 TVA.
16 In addition to the TVA management, and of course NRC, 17 we have addressed all the lessons learned in NUREG-1275.
We 18 have compared that against the nuclear performance plan.
You 19 see from the presentations that we have a strong emphasis on 20 operating mentality, shifting to operating mentality.
21 As a result of looking at NUREG-1275, we have added 22 evolutions into the start up training and I am going to discuss 23 this three day start up training in a few minutes.
We have 24 added evolutions, as a result of looking at NUREG-1275.
At the I
\\.
t 25 staff's request, we did provide our actions in each of the
55 1
lessons learned areas to the staff.
7-2 INPO did a plant evaluation in late 1986 and two 3
assist visits in November of 1987.
Those two assist visits P
4 were particularly important because during those visits, they 5
evaluated each individual operating crew on the Sequoyah 6
simulator.
7 The nuclear managers review group is a permanent 8
staff of approximately 25 people reporting directly to Mr.
9 White.
10 In the specific area of operational readiness review, 11 we have had two operational readiness reviews done at Sequoyah.
12 The first was in early 19'87, and after Mr. White reviewed this 1
13 report, he decided it was not tough enough.
He sanctioned a 14 second operational readiness review which began in August of 15 1987.
This review continued to February, 1988, consisted of 16 eight experienced' senior management level individuals with l
17 experience in the military, commercial and NSSS vendors.
18 An interim report was issued in October of 1987 when i
l 19 I came to TVA.
20 MR. WHITE:
Let me interrupt you for one second.
I l
i 21 think it might be interesting for the Commissioners to i
22 understand the direction I gave that second operational 23 readiness review team.
I made it clear to them that I did not 24 want to apply industry standards to TVA.
I wanted to apply 1
25 absolute standards and the highest standards.
I challenged 1
56 1
them to be extremely critical in everything we did and
( -
2 extremely thorough.
That is what they did.
3 The second ORR was much improvement in terms of 4
toughness over the first one.
5 MR. 3YNUM:
We just issued a final response to that 6
report in March.
7 (Slide.)
8 I'd like to really focus in on three specific areas 9
of operational readiness.
Management involvement; 10 administrative controls and standards of performance.
11 (Slide.)
12 We have already had several discussions on emphasis 13 on walking the space philosophy.
I won't go into that in any 14 further detail, observation and critique of training.
We have 15 established a schedule for operations management to observe and 16 critique training, both start up training, the three day 17 training and ongoing requalification training.
Again, Mr.
18 Smith has discussed periodic meetings with all personnel.
19 As far as the plant cperations review committee 20 responsibility goes, we revised Section 6 of the technical 21 specifications to go from the traditional procedure review and 22 approval process to responsibilities for an overall interface 23 and safety assessment.
This was discussed with the American 24 Nuclear Insurers when they were at the site earlier this year 25 and was a topic in one of their reports.
We have responded to
57 l
that report with all the actions that we have underway.
~
'~
2 (Slide.)
3 In the area of administrative controls, Mr. Smith 4
again has already discussed the establishment of the work 5
control group and the adrainistrative procedure changes, I chose 6
these four areas because these are specific areas which have 7
historically been problems in other nuclear plants.
I'd like 8
to discuss two of those in detail.
One is the conduct of 9
operations.
10 We have completely revised our conduct of shift 11 operations procedure.
In this provision, we have clearly 12 spelled out our standards of operation.
By "standards," I mean 13 standards for sites communication, standards for procedure 14 adherence, standards for a deliberate questioning approach.
15 In the area of control and temporary modifications, 16 we have completely revised our program for temporary 17 modifications.
This revision has emphasized reducing the 18 number of temporary mods and in addition to carefully 19 controlling temporary modifications when they are in fact 20 necessary and assuring that proper safety evaluations are done 21 when temporary modifications are made.
22 (Slide.)
23 In the standards of performance area, we train our 24 operating crews as crews on the simulator, with all of those 25 associated personnel assigned to the control room participating 4
o 58 1
in that training.
Specifically, we held a conduct of e
2 operations training based on the new conduct of operations 3
procedure.
In doing this, we held an one day seminar off-site.
4 At this seminar, we had an upper management level introduction,-
5 we had a professional attention to detail presentation done by 6
an outside contractor, and then we had the conduct of shift 7
operations procedure training performed by the shift supervisor 8
for each of their respective crews.
9 In the area of start up training, as I have 10 indicated, we developed a special three day start up training 11 course which each of the crews assigned to Sequoyah Unit 2 have 12 completed.
This emphasizes start up procedures such as heat 13 up, initial criticality, initial turbine generator 14 synchronization, and power ascension.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Was that done on the simulator?
16 MR. BYNUM:
Yes, it was.
It was a three day, 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 17 days, and we did both classroom and simulator but the bulk of 18 the training was performed on the sinulator.
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Each shift did that?
20 MR. BYNUM:
That is correct.
Each shift spent three 21 days.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
23 MR. BYNUM:
The heat up will allow us to re-
]
24 familiarize the operators with a hot plant.
We have developed 25 specific evolutions as I indicated in reviewing NUREG-1275.
We 1
o 59 1
put specific. evolutions for each operating crew to go through 2
during that heat up phase.
Those evolutions are things such as 3
placing the main feed pump in service, placing the auxiliary 4
feedwater pump in service, establishing steam generator blow 5
down and other evolutions.
2 6
We completely evaluated our non-licensed operator 7
program.
One of the problems we found we had too many watch 8
stations of which auxiliary operators, what we call our non-9 licensed operators, were required to be proficient on.
We 10 reduced that number by separating our stations into two 11 distinct groups.
One, water and waste processing and the 12 other, the traditional power bicek duties of auxiliary r
13 building, control building, and turbine building.
By doing 14 this now, auxiliary unit operators are only required to be i
15 proficient on six stations.
In addition to that, once we 16 assign the specific non-licensed operators to those stations, i
17 we have evaluated their proficiency on each station they are 18 assigned to.
19 We have integrated the shift technical advisors into i
20 the shift complement.
We have gone away from the traditional 21 firemen, 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> watch, within ten minutes of the control room, 22 to placing a shift technical advisor on each operating shift 23 and actually assigning them to the shift crew, so we now have 1
24 six STAS associated with the six operating crews, j
25 We have completely evaluated our chemistry shift I
D
i 60 1
complement and our radiation control technicians shift 2
complement.
We have assessed the experience and we now have 3
two ANSI qualified chem techs on each shift and four ANSI 4
qualified rad con techs on each shift.
In addition to that, we 5
put a supervisor level individual on each shift for better 6
interface and communications with the control room and better 7
accountability in each of these areas.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Do you have a college degree program 9
in place?
10 MR. BYNUM:
Yes, we do.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH: ' Encourage your operators and others 12 to take it?
13 MR. BYNUM:
Yes, we do.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Is it well subscribed?
15 MR. BYNUM:
Very well.
In fact, we generally --
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
When did you do that?
17 MR. BYNUM:
I don't know the exact date when it was 18 begun.
19 MR. SMITH:
Excuse me.
The program has been in place 20 for about two years and we have had six individuals graduate l
21 from the program and one individual that is magna cum laude.
j 22 There will be two more individuals entering the program in May i
23 of this year.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Are these operators?
I 25 MR. SMITH:
Yes, sir.
61 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
What happened to the fellow who g g, l'
2 graduated?
Is he still a shift operator?
3 MR. SMITH:
Three of them are back on shift; one is a 4
shift supervisor; two are working in our work control 5
organization and one is in training.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
What do you intend to do with them in 7
the future?
8 MR. SMITH:
They will be escalated into the 9
management program and help us to est0blish --
10 MR. WHITE:
Let me answer that by saying I can use 11 those people in a lot of places, Mr. Chairman, and I will.
i 12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I agree.
It is a commendable 13 program.
I think that is an important step.
14 (Slide.)
15 MR. BYNUM:
We divided the operational readiness P
16 review and the INPO reporte into both restart items and non-17 restart items.
With regard to the operational readiness review i
38 report, all restart items are complete and all non-restart 19 items have action plans.
Likewise for the INPO restart items, 20 all of those items are complete.
21 MR. WHITE:
Although all those items are complete, 22 there are a couple of areas which definitely need more 23 attention and are given more attention.
One is rad con and the 24 see nd is critical self assessment.
I'm not at all happy that i
25 we yet have the degree that I want to have on a longer term, i
s
62 1
MR. BYNUM:
How have we verified that our 2
implementation is --
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Before you get off that,'are you 4
telling us that as far as you are concerned today, you are 5
completely satisfied that all restart items are complete, you 6
don't have any problems at all?
7 MR. WHITE:
When you say "problems," obviously there 8
-are evolutions and testing that we still have going on today.
9 Mr. Bynum mentioned the fact that from the NUREG-1275, we 10 intend to do some other evolutions.
11 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I read that as only for the
\\
]
12 operational readiness part of the thing.
13 MR. WHITE:
We have done all the corrective actions 14 in terms of the ORR that we need to to start up.
15 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Personnel and training, that kind 16 of thing, not material?
t 17 MR. BYNUM:
Some of them are but basically they are j
18 procedures, training, things like that.
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
You have no remaining material and 20 technical issues?
1 1
21 MR. WHITE:
For example, we have seven modifications i
22 to complete and so forth.
If you were to grant us permission 23 to start up today, I wouldn't start up tomorrow.
Obviously we 24 have work to complete.
We have documentation to complete, s
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Could you tell me briefly what some
{
i l
il r
m -
,.--r
63 1
of those items are that you are still working on as far as 2
technical issues are concerned?
3 MR. WHITE:
We are still discussing with the NRC the 4
diesel generator issue.
I think that is almost resolved.
We 5
are discussing Appendix R issues, and I think that one is 6
almost resolved.
I believe your staff -- you would have to ask 7
them but I believe the IDI issues are all resolved.
8
.As a result of something we received about three 9 -
weeks ago on Westinghouse breakers, we are going to take a.look 10 at some breakers that have been an industry problem.
It is 11 that kind of odds and ends clean-up.
12 We are very, very close, 13 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, I know we're going to hear from 14 the Staff as far as their concerns, too, but I would hope that 15 you would agree with the Staff as to what you have remaining, 16 and perhaps you would be taking the initiative in telling us 17 what you have remaining as far as the technical side is going, 18 too.
19 MR. WHITE:
Well, I would hope that you will --
20 communications with the Staff have been very close, and I would 21 hope that you will hear the same report from them as 22 essentially what I've just said.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Proceed, please.
24 MR. BYNUM:
With specific regard to the s.
25 implementation and verification of the ORR and INPO items,
64 I
1 during heat-up, of course, we've had intense management 2
involvement, walking the spaces to ensure that any problems 3
we've encountered, that we stop.
We evaluate the problem, and 4
we communicate the lessons learned.
5 The shift operator advisor program is a special 6
program we put in place.
It's a joint program between the 7
Operations Department and the Quality Assurance Department'.
In 8
this program, we place four previously licensed SROs on' shift 9
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day on all shifts.
They were previously licensed 10 from facilities other than Sequoyah, to observe activities, 11 activities such as shift turnover and surveillance testing and 12 equipment operation and tagging, and specifically looking for 13 procedural adherence, knowledge of plant conditions, and a 14 cautious questioning approach.
15 In addition to chat, the Nuclear Managers Review 16 Group did an independent follow-up on the ORR/INPO action 17 plans, the procedures, the training, and they viewed the 18 performance of all operating crews.
19 Post-restart, of course, we have a continuing 20 verification program of operational professionalism and 21 readiness.
Management involvement again is the key to this.
22 In the quality assurance area, as I indicated, the 23 SOA program was a joint program between QA and Operations, and i
24 QA has taken particularly the performance-based elements out of 25 the shiZt operating advisory program and placed that in their 1
l
s a
65 1
ongoing quality assurance monitoring program.
2 Next slide, please.
3 (Slide.)
4 What are the results of our verification?
The shift 5
operating advisory program and the quality assurance review 6
indicate that all areas of shift conduct are acceptable for 7
restart.
Again, these are areas such as communications, 8
adherence to procedures, shift turnover, control of temporary 9
mods, and other things that we've discussed this morning.
10 In addition to looking at each area, each crew was 11 evaluated in each area, and all shift c'rews are acceptable for 12 restart.
Again, this is not to imply that we are where we want 13 to be.
We still have work to do.
We still have improvements 14 to make, but we are very rapidly making those improvements.
15 The Nuclear Managers Review Group, as I indicated, 16 independently looked at the INPO and the ORR report restart 17 items, and the acknowledged that they had been adequately 18 addressed, and in addition, that the corrective action 19 implementation was satisfactory.
20 INPO did a follow-up visit.
They reviewed the 21 corrective action plan for their items that they considered 22 important for restart, and they concluded that all corrective 23 actions were acceptable.
24 In the non-licensed operator proficiency evaluation,
.sj 25 we have certified each auxiliary unit operator as bein'g
o.
66 1
proficient for the watch stations to which they are assigne'd.
7s 2
Next slide, please.
3 (Slide.)
4 In conclusion, all areas of operational readiness 4
5 have been assessed from line management, from independent 6
outside observers, from the broad programmatic and attitudinal 7
aspects all the way to specific standards, detailed procedures, 8
and specific knowledge areas.
We have the program in place to 9
ensure continuing improvement and continuing self-assessment.
i 10 Here the emphasis is on management involvement.
11 I have directly participated onsite in the initial 12 start-up of seven units, all of those units over 1000 13 megawatts, three in the last three and half years as the Plant 14 Manager.
I recognize when a plant and its operating staff are 15 ready.
In my experience, I have never seen a unit as 16 systematically or as thoroughly looked at as Sequoyah Unit 2.
17 Therefore, it is with the highest degree of 18 confidence that I personally conclude that Sequoyah Unit 2 is i
19 ready for restart.
4 20 MR. WHITE:
This completes our presentation on the 21 results of our recovery effort.
You have already heard today i
22 of such things as 40,000 work requests accomplished, 350 23 modifications completed, and so forth.
24 Believe me, these things are only the tip of the
~./
25 iceberg.
I could spend much time discussing specific numbers
o.
67
'l of things done to illustrate the enormity of our 7 million plus 2
man-hours of effort -- over 7 million man-hours of effort -- to 3
get Sequoyah Un'it 2 ready.
4 But additionally there are many other actions which 5
are not as easily quantifiable with numbers, but they are there 6
nevertheless, and they are very important.
I speak of such 7
things as attitudes of the people, their commitment to reach 8
for the highest standards, their willingness to learn from 9
their mistakes and the. mistakes of others, their support for a 10 new operational code of conduct, their spirit and their morale.
11 And believe me, theres much more.
12 It is the totality of these things, both quantifiable 13 and non-quantifiable, that gives me the assurance that we truly 14 are ready to restart the TVA nuclear program.
In that restart, 15 as I have always done in a restart, we will be cautious.
We 4
16 will be conservative, and we will be deliberate.
And I and my 17 key people will be watching closely.
j 18 And I think, Mr. Chairman, kind of in regard to what 19 you said, I expect things may break and have to be fixed.
I 20 expect there may be some errors, and if there are, we will 21 stop.
We will use the lessons learned before we proceed.
l 22 What I hope we've been able to demonstrate to you 23 today is that TVA has put in place a recovery program, making 24 the necessary corporate level improvements, as well as 25 accomplishing the specific work whic'h would permit you to i
4 m.. _ _,,, _ _, _
68 1
authorize the restart of Sequoyah Unit 2.
In addition, we feel 2
that we have put in place the programs and the resources to 3
allow us to proceed toward the future start-up of other TVA 4
units.
5 I will continue to pursue excellence to make the TVA 6
nuclear program a showcase.
I want TVA to be an example of how L
7 things should be done, and I am confident that we are ready to 8
restart Sequoyah Unit 2, and that it will be operated in the 9
best interests of the TVA, its ratepayers, and the public 10 health and safety.
11 And that concludes our presentation.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Thank you very much.
13 Before we call the Staff, I would ask for questions, 14 comments perhaps, from my fellow Commissioners.
15 Commissioner Roberts?
16 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
In your opening remarks, if I 2
17 heard you properly, you mentioned the pay cap problem.
And did 18 I understand you to say you were trying to do something about l
l 19 it, and would you feel comfortable in elaborating on that, or 20 would you rather not?
21 MR. RUNYON:
It's a very real problem in that we're j
22 not competitive with the industry.
As a matter of fact, we're i
1 23 far from competitive.
I have with ma a study that -- a recent 24 study that TVA has had made by the Hay Company, who are very 25 well-known in establishing salaries, and we are working with l
e e
o e
69 1
people in Washington, the Congressional representatives and --
2 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Will it take legislation?
3 MR. RUNYON:
It could take legislation.
We're also 4
looking at some other ways that the Board might do something to 5
help alleviate the problem through some other types of 6
incentives, that.the Board might have authority to do., and 7
we're looking at that.
8 It's a tery real problem, and if we can't solve it 9
any other way, we'll have to solve it the way we solved Steve 10 White's situation.
He's here.
And we certainly know that's 11 open.
12 We would like to have, rather than consultants 13 working at TVA, we would like to have TVA employees working at I
14 TVA, because it's very important that we have people that say, 15 "I want to work for TVA for the rest of my life, and I'd like 16 to have that job," because they'll come in, and they'll do a 17 good job, and they'll want to see it improved because that's 18 going to be their home.
That's what they're responsible for.
19 Now I'm not putting down consultants.
Don't 20 misunderstand me, because they're absolutely necessary.
And if 21 we didn't have them, we'd be in pretty bad shape right now.
22 I'm talking to Steve about the fact that, hey, you can't leave, 23 fellow, until everything's done.
And every, thing's not done.
24 (Laughte..]
i 25 So, you know, we're talking to him about that, but in i
I o.
70 1
the meantime we are working very hard with the people that we g,.
2 know to work with, and that's the people in the Congress and 3
the Senate that right now control that, and we're working 4
within TVA to see what we can do internally to help the 5
situation.
6 MR. DEAN:
And any support you can give us, 7
Commissioner, we'd appreciate.
8 (Laughter.)
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Anything else?
10 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
That's all I have, j
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Bernthal?
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, we've got too little 13 time and too much to cover.
I think I'll try and pick out one 14 or two things here that I'd like you to comment on.
15 Incidentally, I am fully sympathotic with this pay 16 cap situation.
We've been talking about that now for the 17 better part of ten years, and the problem still hasn't been i
18 solved.
The Commission was aware of it some years ago and 19 indicated its concern, I think before all of this even started.
20 I want to focus for a moment on'a couple of the key 21 technical issues that have been raised, and I'll expect the 22 Staff to comment on these as well.
But let's get to the point 23 here on one or two.
24 First of all, on the diesel generator issue, I asked I
25 a question about that the last time the Staff briefed us here.
6 71 1
Our Staff, I believe, most recently has' offered some assurances 2
that they feel that the question of voltage droops under full 3
load, which I understand to be the principle problem that has 4
been resolved, and I'll ask them about that, but I'd like you 5
to explain to me why you're confident now that these diesels 6
will perform as expected under full. load.
7 And just for the sake of information for the public 8
here, station blackout is very often -- I don't recall for this 9
particular plant, but is very often one of the highest risk 10 factors.
When you lose all power in a plant, you're in a 11 serious situation, as you know, so it's essential that these 12 things be able to perform should you lose offsite power.
13 So have at it.
Explain to us why've should have 14 confidence.
15 MR. WHITE:
Well, in my terms as the manager, I have 16 the confidence because it's not only been a review by -- Mr.
17 Raleigh, you might come up -- Mr. Raleigh and the TVA people, 18 but we've hired the best experts that we could find in the 19 country to look over our shoulder, and I spoke to one of them 1
20 as recently as this morning, and he is completely objective, j
j 21 and it is his opinion that there is not a problem involving I
22 restart.
23 That's not to say that we don't want to make 24 improvements.
There are very few areas that I don't want to 25
'make them.
n I
r 72 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
Sure s i/~S i
o, 2
MR. WHITE:
But mine is based on both our review, as i
4 i
3 well as the outside technical people we brought in.
4 MR. RALEIGH:
Just the corrective action program for 5
the diesel --
[
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Excuse me.
What's your name again?
7 MR. RALEIGH:
Bill Raleigh.
8 MR. WHITE:
Bill Raleigh.
He's chief. Electrical 9
Engineer, and he is a new hire to TVA.
I brought him in first j-i 10 as a Contract Manager and then convinced him, I. guess, to stay
[
i 11 on as.a TVA employee.
He's now a TVA employee.
I I
l I
j 12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
You may proceed.
a, j
13 MR. RALEIGH:
The corrective action program started
[
i i
14 in May of 1986, and it involved testing and analysis.
That 1
~
testing and analysis then resulted in modifications, changes to
[
15 j
16 the surveillance instructions, and changes to the technical f
i 17 specifications.
I i
18 We have submitted that test and analysis to the NRC j
19 along with our conclusion that the system is safe to perform a
20 its safety-related functions.
i 21 In addition to that, we're pursuing long-term
[
i 22 improvements we can make in the system to further increase the l
I 23 performance or enhance the performance of the system.
But our i
l I
24 confidence is based on the test that we did.
It wasn't just a l
+
j 25 paper exercise.
We actually did tests.
[
l l
r
73 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
Now you've not 2
performed a test under full load, right?
3 MR. RALEIGH:
That's correct.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I understand that you're not 5
-- at least my understanding is, and Staff can explain, you're 6
not required to do that strictly under our regulations.
7 The revision, most recent revision to our 8
regulations, would have required you to do that.
Can you 9
explain to me-why that is not practical or feasible and why you 10 have confidence in the ability of the diesels to perform, 11 having not been tested under full load?
12 MR. RALEIGH:
It is not practical because the puup
-13 systems do not have a full flow bypass capability and as a 14 result you have to recirculate a portion of the fluid, and of I
15 course, it doesn't have the full flow capability.
It is a 16 relatively simple analytical methcd to compensate for that 17 difference.
18 In addition, we have tested the diesel up to its 19 capacity rating so we are sure it will carry that.
We have 20 also in our analysis that we have submitted to the NRC, 21 identified margins that no one else has identified that exist 22 in the system.
We are sure this system will perform its 23 function.
2 i
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Thank you.
I appreciate 25 that.
I will ask the staff to give their view on that as well.
I
74 1
One issue that is cited, I guess it is still a 2
preliminary safety evaluation report that Mr. Ebneter recently j
3 submitted to the Commission, as having remained unresolved at 4
this point or at least at the time you submitted it, concerned 5
temporary changes to drawings and your control of temporary 6
changes to drawings.
j 7
I gather there has been a question of implementation 8
of a single system here, so you have one focal point for all 9
such changes, obviously a good idea.
1 10 Has this issue been resolved yet?
11 MR. WHITE:
As far as I know, it has been.
Isn't 12 that right, Mr. Hosmer?
Are there any lingering issues?
13 MR. HOSMER:
I think the issue you are addressing is more focused on the control line red line drawing issue.
We do 14 i
15 have a single drawing program.
We have agreed to a system 16 about three days ago where we will stop red lining drawings, we 17 will issue a cad drawi'ng to the control room and to multiple 18 places in our system, such as outside emergency response l
19 facility.
That has been resolved.
Our procedures have been 20 chang'ed.
I think we have resolved that.
]
21 MR. RUNYON:
Commissioner Bernthal, if I might make a i
22 comment.
In my visits to the control room, the operators made 23 a point of showing me their drawings and telling me it had been l
24 resolved in their opinion.
l 25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Good.
Thank you.
1 4
y
-n.-..
a
9 75 1
One other question, and then I'll give so.neone else a i
~
2 chance.
3 I understand the American Nuclear Insurers, the 4
insurance group, conducted an inspection of the plant and i
~
5 especially looked at some of the structural, organizational 6
aspects at the plant and were somewhat critical, I think it is 7
fair to say, in certain areas, certain committees, plant 8
operation review committee was cited, for example.
They had 9
several recommendations for making improvements.
10 What have you done about that?
Could you address 11 that briefly?
12 MR. WHITE:
les.
First, let me say we knew -- I knew 13 that the PORC was not operating to standards that I wanted it 14 to.
15 COMMISSIONER 'BERNTHAL:
That is a bad word in this j
16 town, but go ahead.
17
( Laughter. )
i 18 MR. WHITE:
The plant operational review committee 19 wasn't operating to the standards I wanted.
We have a number,
- i 20 as you would expect, of other systems to make sure of the fact 21 that they were weaker than I wanted but wouldn't let something
]
22 fall through the crack.
When the new plant manager took over, 23 Mr. Smith, one of this first challenges that I gave him was to 4
24 fix that darn thing.
I'm tired of it not being to standard.
s_-
25 When the ANI people came in, they came in, I believe a
76 1
-,was that the first meeting?
,s
(
2 MR. SMITH:
Second.
3 MR. WHITE:
What they observed was, as you would i
c 4
expect, a training and teaching session, the new plant manager 5
was laying down the rules.
They observed this and they said, j
6 gee, the plant manager sure knows what is going on but we are 7
not sure about the other people, and they formed certain l
l 8
impressions.
l l
9 Since that time, we have taken a lot of their 10 suggestions, there were some good suggestions.
We put those 11 into the plan.
As of the first of March, the ANI people have j
12 written me a letter signed by Mr. Santacore, the Vice President i
i 13 for Nuclear Engineering, in which he says that our response was
[
14 prompt, we have identified their recommendations, we have taken
[
15 actions.
I think the particular issue that was involved was
[
i 16 the safety review process, whether as a result of this, i
?
17 anything had been missed in the past.
18 It is interesting, this one sentence, which I will i
19 quote to you, "The safety review process in our judgment has i
~
20 adequately addressed nuclear safety issues."
Very important.
l 9
21 He continues to say they need to gain a better appreciation for 22 the manner in which insurance issues have been resolved.
There 1
i J
l 23 are no nuclear safety issues involved.
I l
j 24 I talked to him the other day.
He is going to come i
i 25 down and we are going to meet and see if they have suggestions, i
i l
i
?
77 1
they want to learn more about our process in terms of what he 2
refers to as insurance issues.
I see no lingering of any problem at all.
3 4
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Thank you very much.
I would 5
hope that somebody here will ask you about Appendix R, but I 6
will let someone else.
Before you get away, I will, if there j
7 isn't a question.
8 CRAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Carr?
j
)
9 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I won't ask him about that.
1
]
10 My question is more for Mr. Runyon.
Obviously, Mr.
i 11 White has earned his support and when you bring in those.
12 consu'ltants, you have to listen to them.
What I am concerned t
l 13 about is when he uses all those recruiting powers and recruits I
14 his replacement for a Government salary, whether or not those l
l j
15 institutionalized changes and the authority to do the work that i
1 16 he has been doing carries on with that replacement manager.
It 17 takes a lot of corporate support, money, authority and so 1
18 forth.
I wondered if you would give us a few words on that 1
19 item?
l j
20 MR. RUNYON:
Yes, sir.
I'd be glad to do that.
It i
l 21 is my intention that what you have heard today is what I am 1
22 committed to do.
In reviewing this meeting saw the nuclear I
i
]
23 ethic and said, that is a business ethic that everybody should
]v 24 do and the only difference is the public safety is much, much j
25 higher in the case of nuclear than it is in another type of
{
i j
l 78 1
. operation.
g 2
The nuclear ethic is one that I totally support and i
4 3
what it takes to do that, I'm committed to do it.
4 COMMISSIONER CARR:
No doubt he has earned his l
5 support.
From what he says, and I'm sure you are all giving 6
him that kind of support, we as the Commission are interested 7
if that support is continuing even after Mr. short timer here 8
finishes his work and moves on.
f 9
MR. RUNYON:
It will continue.
10 MR. WATERS:
If I may respond, Commissioner.
This j
i 11 has been too hard to earn, too long in getting.
We have all i
j 12 worked too hard.
We are not going to let it slip.
We are 13 going to use our very best efforts, we are going to stay iighg j
14 on top of it, because we worked very, very hard to get to thin 15 point and we recognize the need to continue to give it that i
16 kind of attention.
17 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I have one more question.
How 18 many non-TVA employees are there in the management and senior 19 operational level at Sequoyah?
i 20 MR. WHITE:
We have some. contractors at the lower 1
21 levels, very low levels, maintenance and the work coordinataon i
22 cnd planning, but they are all TVA.
l 23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Rogers?
I 24 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
It looks like my question has j
25 been defined for me.
1 1
4 79 1
(Laughter.)
1 r
2 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
I will just ask you, if you i
3 would comment on the 26 questions that were sent to you from 4
NRC concerning Appendix R.
5 i
MR, WHITE:
Yes.
We took a look at all those.
As in f
'he case of dissal sentrator, I brought in some outside' people 6
t 7
and by,the way, one of them was the individual who formerly 8
worked for the NRC and wrote Appendix R, to look over our t
9 shoulder.
We have provided to the staff written response to 10 each of those issues.
11 Mr. Hosmer, do you know of any lingering issues after 12 providing the information?
13 MR. HOSMER:
I'm aware we ' core one s.*itten response 14 based on a phone call yesterday.
That in in the process of i
15 being prepared.
I 16 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
There is one yet to come?
i 17 MR. HOSMER:
Yes.
The response was previously 18 provided.
More information has been asked for to amend that l
19 response.
This will be a revision to the response.
20 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
Just a matter of detail but it j
i 21 is of interest to me.
In your systems engineers, how many t
22 systems engineers do you have and how many systems does each of 23 those people look after?
i 24 MR. WHITE:
I will let Mr. Smith speak to it but I x
25 think it is 30 and the end goal is 60 for both units.
,w-m-
- ~
(
d 3
a so' 1
MR. SMITH:
There' are c.urrently 30.
Let me modify ~
1 2
that.
We have a' maintenance engineering organization that is 3
about 65 people. 'Those individuals have been and continue to do some system ebgfneering work themselves.
We are in the 4
5 process of combin.0ag those two organi.:ations and should have 6
that done by ths:end of March.
hbt vill put the 60 to 65 7
engineers in plb e.
Each of those agineers '<ill have 8
approximately1three systems.
9 COMMISSI0 REP htOGERS: ' Very good.
That's all, Mr.
10 Chairman.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNT'IAL:
If I may, getting back to the 12 Appendix R issue, on orie - detall at least, I understa.nd there 13 was one issue and mayb3'others, and perhaps the staff can tell 14 us, that is going to require soue corrective action, something 1S about inturaction between cables, but you expected that only to 16 take a fel' days?
Am I not.c>nnecting?
17 MR. HOSMER:
I think you are referring to the latest 18 discussion I'm aware of dealt with concerns pbout the
.1. 9
,documentati.on, looking at high to low pressure interfaces, RHR 20 vaiva. interface, had we apptopriately implemented a Commission 21 generic letter.
What wa are providing in writing today is the 22 basis for the fact that we believe va had implemented that 23 properly in the pas;,.
I know of no physical changes or any 24 procedural change required to meet the submittal we. are o
25 providing today.
g v
v y
81 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
There was something about a 2
wire to wire short.
I know what it means generally but not 3
specifically, between different cables.
4 MR. HOSMER:
We are talking about the same issue, r
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Let me just make a few comments.
6 First of all, it is obvious you have put a lot of 7
attention into corporate management initiatives and 8
organizational initiatives and certainly what you have told us 9
today, I think, would give me the confidence that you have 10 attacked aggressively the problems at TVA.
There is no 11 question about that.
I think it certainly shows they needed 12 attention.
It would appear you have given it that attention.
13 Now what you have to do is execute.
Now what you 14 have to do is see results.-
Now what you have to do is as you 15 point out, a cautious, careful, deliberate, slow approach to r
16 the forthcoming potential start up events.
17 I appreciate what you have said about training, all 18 shifts, but there is nothing like the proof, as we all know.
I 19 know the staff has a plan to follow your careful, cautious, 20 conservative approach also.
21 I appreciate what you have said about quality i
22 assurance and I think you said you had 68 percent of your 23 conditions adverse to quality determined by the line.
I'd like 24 to emphasize that.
In my judgment, quality assurance ought to s,,
25 be a line function.
Certainly you need a quality assurance
82 1
organizat' ion to assist and ove,rsee and ensure that it takes 2
place and it looks like you have done an aggressive job in that 3
regard.
4 You can't really inspect in quality.
You have to 5
design it in, build it in, operate it in.
Your quality people 6
are a check on your line, but your line has to accept that 7
responsibility.
I want to emphasize that point, at least in my 8
view.
I've seen it happen too many times where perhaps they 9
decide to tu'rn over responsibilities for quality assurance to 10 the quality assurance people and that's a mistake in my 11 judgment.
The responsibility is the line,.across the board.
12 I' appreciate also what you said about small mistakes.
13 That's exactly right, small mistakes lead to big mistakes.
You 14 better find out what that small mistake amounted to before you 15 proceed.
16 I also appreciate your emphasis on ownership and team 17 work, because there is where you get people involved and that 18 really is, if there is any secret to success in this business, 19 as far as I'm concerned, it is management involvement and 20 everybody involved.
That's team work and ownership.
21 Your emphasis on the material condition upgrade I 22 think is very important.
We didn't talk about it very much.
i 23 Your emphasis on maintenance upgrade is very important.
We 24 didn't talk about that very much either.
Those are programs l
i
(
25 that require follow through in ceasuring success and results l
o.
83 1
and following through again.
i 2
I guess I feel that you have done a commendable job 3
as far as placing management initiatives at the TVA, at 4
Sequoyah.
Obviously, you have made what looks to be at least 5
big improvements that were necessary.
6 I guess the only concern I have with what you have 7
told us this morning perhaps -- or what you haven't emphasized 8
is what you have not told us.
We just mentioned a couple of 9
issues.
The diesel generator, as far as I'm concerned, maybe 10 you think it is solved, I don't know that it is solved yet.
11 Fire protection, you tiay be satisfied but I am not.
We will 12 hear from our staff, too.
The cable issue I know has been an 13 ongoing issue.
It was a serious issue and apparently it is 14 resolved but again, I think it would have been help'ul to f
15 emphasize some of the issues that you didn't talk about.
16 I am just mentioning this because I know we will hear 17 from the staff.
It would have been helpful to me at least and 18 I.think to my fellow Commissioners to have the confidence that 19 you have attacked some of these issues that as far as we know 20 are perhaps still outstanding or if they are resolved, they 21 have only been resolved very recently.
22 I mention that because I want to hear from the staff 23 on those regards.
Having said that, let me just say that I 24 think the technical issues are the ones that at least concern i.._.
25 me that are remaining.
I know they concern you, too.
-I would
b 84 1
like the staff to emphasize those technical issues when they 2
come up.
3 Are there any.other comments from my fellow 4
Commissioners before we call on the staff?
5 (No response.)
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
We appreciate 7
it.
8 Mr. Stello, you may begin.
9 MR. STELLO:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman 10 Let me introduce Steve Ebneter, the Director of the 11 Office of Special Projects, and then I'll have him introduce 12 the re'st of the people, and I will turn the briefing over to 13 him.
14 We don't have slides to pass out, and that was 15 intentional.
We wanted to be sure that we could listen 16 carefully to the briefing and add or emphasize those areas.that 17 we didn't think were covered during the briefing that the 18 Commission ought to be aware of.
We've already pointed out 19 some of those areas which we will, in fact, begin to relate to 20 the cable issue and the diesel generator and Appendix R issues.
21 We wil.1 give you a summary of our assessment of the 22 overall readiness of the plant.
23 I think to cut through to where we stand today, we 24 are watching very carefully.
We have 24-hour coverage of the 25 plant.
We believe that we are at the point that we can
i.
85 i
1 recommend to the Commission that when the Commission is ready n
2 to authorize the Staff to permit restart of Sequoyah.
Of 3
course, there are certain conditions, as you already are aware 4
from the briefing you've heard thus far.
There are still 5
evolutions of the plant that have not been completed, that we 6
want to see completed, further assessment of the readiness of 7
the plant.
We will be talking about that today.
8 We're not unhappy with what we have seen, but we want 9
to see more, as was indicated in the original plan, and that 10 would take us at least through next week and possibly 11 thereafter.
12 There is, of course, the issue related to fire 13 protection, and as you have heard, there is documentation to be 14 provided.
There is a meeting next week.
And pending the 15 outcome of that, which we believe will be satisfactory, we will 16 have no technical issues standing in our way, except the 17 completion of the things that are now on the plate.
18 I will ask Mr. Ebneter to take you through the 19 briefing, paying careful attention to those things that you've 20 asked us to emphasize, and we will do that this morning.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
You may proceed, Mr.
22 Ebneter.
23 MR. EBNETER:
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and 24 Commissioners.
s 25 Our last briefing was January 20, 1988.
I'll cover a
i.-
.86
,1 few items that you requested us to -- inifact, all~of the items 2
that you requested us to address.
Our objective is to really 3
address operational readiness.
We will talk about some 4
technical issues.
Three-of those issues -- the diesel 5
generators that Commissioner Bernthal mentioned and the 6
Appendix R and the silicon rubber cables.
7 Excuse me.
Mr. Stello~ reminded me to introduce the 8
Staff.
9 Steve Richardson is my TVA Project Director.
Jane 10 Axelrad is my deputy.
To the left of Mr. Stello and at the far 11 end is Frank McCoy, wLo is my Startup Manager at the site and-12 is playing.a very key role in this evolution of getting to 13 startup.
14 To get on with it, the technical issues, and then 15 we'll discuss the status of the 50.54 (f) letter.. Much of that 16 will be redundant to what TVA presented, so I'll sort of back 17 off some of the comments, and lastly we'll discuss the 18 operational readiness.
19 The technical issues first.
Let me address the fire 20 protection issue.
I do have the principal technical Staff 21 members here who have done the evaluations, and if you need 22 further information, we can have them address specific 23 technical concerns.
24 The fire protection issue, let me first_ address the 25 IDI.
Mr. White mentioned IDI.
)
i.
87 1
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Tell everybody what that is.
\\
~
2 MR. EBNETER:
'That is the integrated design 3
inspection.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
And tell them why you did that a 5
litcle bit.
I think it would be important.
6 MR. EBNETER:
We, the NRC, decided that there should 7
be an integrated look at the total design aspects of the 8
Sequoyah plant.
The efforts that TVA had done were somewhat 9
fragmented and did not address interfaces, so the Commission 10 decided to do the integrated design inspection, so that we 11 could get a complete look at one system in a vertical slice 12 approach and assure that all different interfaces had been 13 addressed.
14 That was an extensive effort.
It was completed last 15 September.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
In order to verify the design and 17 also walkdown the system and verify that the plant was built in 18 accordance with the design.
Is that what the purpose is?
19 MR. EBNETER:
Yes, sir.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
21 MR. EBNETER:
We have conducted follow-up inspections 22 to that, and TVA has submitted responses to 64 findings of 23 ours.
Those issues, we have essentially reviewed and have no 24 more concerns on.
So the IDI issues, as.Mr. White commented, 25 have been resolved.
88 1
The fire protection issue was a late-filed allegation
\\
2 which came in in late January by a previous employee of TVA, 3
who had worked in the Fire Protection Group and therefore had 4
knowledge of TVA's Appendix R analysis.
We took the 5
allegation.
We had two interviews with this gentleman.
They 6
have been transcribed.
We reviewed those, boiled out the 7
issues, and that resulted in the letter to TVA with the 26 8
questions, and that was a request for additional information.
9 TVA responded to that.
We have those in hand.
The 10 Staff has reviewed them.
There is a major issue with the Staff 11 with regard to cable-to-cable shorts, and this is the issue 12 that Commissioner Bernthal mentioned.
13 The submission that TVA made was not adequate for us 14 to perform the evaluation.
Now there are some complications 15 with the data that TVA sends us, because Sequoyah was what we 16 call a window plant.
It was one of those pinnts that was an 17 NTOL at the time the Appendix R issues came out, so they were 18 caught between some old requirements and the new rule.
19 So some of the data that is missing, TVA has stated 20 is available.
Now it may be in different forms that was not 21 considered as an Appendix R issue, but things such as 22 separations analysis, the design condition of the plant, 23 isolation devices for interfacing non-safety systems.
Those 24 types of analyses could help-the Staff significantly.
A 25 Now TVA, as Mr. John Hosmer has stated, owes us a
89 1
submission which should be here today.
We cannot resolve that, 2
obviously, today.
We will review-it, make our determination, 3
and we do plan to have a public meeting next Wednesday on this 4
issue.
5 Is there anything else in that particular area?
6 Commissioner Bernthal?
~
7 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Wel1, no, except the other 25, 8
then, I take it, you are reasonably satisfied with the response 9
or --
10 MR. EBNETER:
We are still reviewing some of those.
11 Preliminary analysis, we don't see any problem with those.
Now 12 that doesn't preclude something coming up.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
14 MR. EBNETER:
I might add, in those cases, some of 15 them -- some of the issues that we brought out came out of the 16 direct transcripts.
Some of those issues have been analyzed in 17 Chapter 15 events and things, such as pressurizer bubble, but 18 they came out of the transcripts, so we included them in the 19 total investigation that we're doing.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Fine.
Proceed, please.
22 MR. EBNETER:
The second issues that I wanted to talk 23 about that Commissioner Bernthal and Commissioner Roberts 24 mentioned was the emergency diesel generators.
25 The emergency diesel generator issue has been around
1 90 1
for a long time, as Mr. Hosmer again and Mr. Raleigh mentioned.
2 It came out of some employee concerns, some allegations from a 3
gentleman, Dallas Hicks, and it also -- the existence of a 4
problem or potential problem was verified when'TVA did a 5
reduced load test as part of their tech spec requirement.. The 6
test results analysis did not quite meet nameplate ratings, and 7
that caused the Staff some concern and prompted additional 8
investigations and analysis.
9 The issues were the dynamic characteristics of the 10 machine, as someone mentioned, the ability of the machine to 11 load, recover from the load, and not exceed overshoots and stay 12 within the minimum undershoots required.
13 TVA has told you that they did an analysis.
They 14 hired one of the best machine analysts in the country. Dr.
15 Concordia, as their consultant, and they also had another 16 consultant, at least one other that I'm aware of, from Sargent 17
& Lundy.
18 The Staff in their analysis -- our Staff did the 19 review, and to provide additional feedback, we hired a well-20 renowned consultant from MIT, Dr. Koskos.
He did our analysis.
21 We have reached agreement with TVA staff and consultants that 22 the machines, the EDGs, do meet requirements.
23 Now there was one area of the Reg Guide that wasn't 24 quite met; however, the analysis shows that we have at least 5 25 percent margin on contractor pickups in all cases, and the
a 91
- l 1
1 Staff has deemed that to be acceptable for startup and 2
operation.
3 TVA's consultant, Dr. Concordia, made three 4
suggestions to improve the operation of those EDGs.
It is our 5
contention, and we plan to fully impose these on TVA, that they 6
should implement those three suggestions, and one of them is in 7
relation to the regulator.
We will give TVA additional time to 8
make those upgrades, since the machines are acceptable for 9
startup and operation.
One of the problems is we don't want 10 TVA to rush out and get regulators that are not qualified or 11 have not been proven and install them in the diesel and really 12 give us some sort of a degraded condition.
13 That's the present stat us of the EDGs.
Is there any 14 further questions on those?
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, yeah, the very last 16 part you mentioned about replacement of the regulators.
Are 17 these not fairly standard items?
In other words, one might 18 have thought that you or they would have run out and bought 19 some a long time ago and have. replaced them.
20 MR. EBNETER:
Your question is good.
They did buy 21 some, and they're sitting in the warehouse.
But these devices 22 will have to be qualified and fully tested, and they've been 23 on the shelf for some period of time, and TVA is reluctant --
24 and we. agree with them; we're not sure of the status of those.
\\
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But it's not a question of
l 92 1
chem having, under normal circumstances, of those devices being rs s
2 qualified devices.
It's because they've been sitting there so 3
long, or is that the point?
4 MR. EBNETER:
That's part of it, and I'm not sure.
'I 5
could have Mr. Marinos comment from my staff, but I'm'not sure 6
what all procurement controls were placed on those.
7 Angelo, are you available?
Would you comment on 8
that, please?
9 MR. MARINOS:
My name is Angelo Marinos.
I'm the 10 Chief of Reactor Operations Branch, and I did review the diesel 11 generator issue.
12 The exciters that they have or regulators --
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Would you speak a little t.o the 14 microphone, please?
I don't think the reporter can hear you..
15 MR. MARINOS:
They need to be --
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
And identify yourself again, please.
17 MR. MARINOS:
Yes.
My name is Angelo Marinos.
I'm 18 the Chief of Reactor Operations Branch, the TVA Projects 19 Division, and my responsibility was to evaluate the adequacy of 20 the diesel generators for Sequoyah.
21 And in response to your question, Commissioner, about 22 the regulators that they have in the warehouse, it is not 23 necessarily compatible -- they do not automatically become 24 compatible with the machine.
They need to be investigated and s.
25 analyzed before they're placed in service with the. machines.
93 1
The machines, when they're built, they're built with
~
2 their appropriate excitation system and the regulator that is
~
3 accompanying it.
So therefore this is an external device, not 4
initially designed for that, and it has to be carefully 5
evaluated.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I see.
And while you're 7
here, you and our expert consultant from MIT are both confident 8
in the tests and calculations, simulations, whatever they may 9
be, that have been carried out, that those would confidently 10 predict adequate performance under full load?
11 MR. MARINOS:
Yes, Commissioner.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And that it's not necessary 13 to carry out the actual test for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> under full load.
14 MR. MARINOS:
No, it's not necessary to carry out the 15 full test.
That's correct.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
Thank you very much.
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Thank you very much.
You 18 may proceed.
19 MR. EBNETER:
The third technical issue I'd like to 20 discuss with you briefly is the silicon rubber cable issue, and 21 I'd like to just give you an overview of how we approached that 22 to assure you, the Commissioners, that there is a consensus of 23 opinion and that we have approached this problem from a generic 24 NRC concern.
s 25 The cable issue, there were many issues with it, and l
l
1 94
, j 1
I want to address primarily the test program in the resolution 2
of silicon rubber.
The test program was done primarily to 3
verify or confirm the adequacy of cable installation practices, 4
which had been called into question in the employee concerns 5
program at Watts Bar.
6 The generic -- it was determined to be generic to 7
Sequoyah, and that's how Sequoyah got involved with it.
8 When OSP was formed in February and March of 1987, 9
this issue had been under investigation by the senior 10 management team, and the senior management team had been using 11 a matrix approach to solve TVA problems by using various 12 portions of the NRC. organization, such as IE and the Region and 13 NRR.
14 When we took that over, the consultants on the cable 15 had already been involved and had issued their TER.
They had 16 proposed certain test programs.
We used the consultants, and 17 we' worked with TVA and NRR as a joint effort to establish a 18 test program that would be viable.
19 The test program was viable.
My staff, the Region 20 inspection staff, and our consultants all were involved in 21 witnessing the test program at Sequoyah, so that was a joint i
22 effort on our part.
We made several trips there, and Mr.
23 Marinos, who commented on the diesels, was also involved with
}
24 that.
s 25 The program was successful in demonstrating that
95 1
general cable pulling practices were adequate.
However, it 7S i
-~
2 also demonstrated that there was a sensitivity to these silicon 3
rubber insulation cables that was more severe than the normal 4
cable installation.
Therefore, we embarked on the silicon 5
rubber cable insulation test program.
6 That was a joint program between the NRC offices.
7 TVA submitted a Part 21 to the Commission, stating that there 8
was a potential generic problem with silicon rubber insulation.
9 The OSP staff reviewed that.
The OSP coordinated that with the 10 other NRC offices, AEOD, NRR, and at least three different 11 offices in NRR, the generic communications branch, the 12 technical reviewers, and the projec,t branches.
So, we had full 13 coordination on that.
14 We briefed NRR on.their weekly events operations 15 briefings.
We coordinated with NRR on issuing an information 16 notice to the industry that there was a potential problem with 17 silicon rubber insulation.
And, subsequent to that, we have 18 worked very closely with NRR staff in developing the final 19 generic position which will be submitted to the Commission 20 shortly.
~
21 So, I want to try to convince you that this has been 22 a very joint eff. ort among the entire NRC staff.
In conjunction 23 with that, the information notice and the generic issue 24 resolution, we're working to try to get a consensus of opinion s.-
25
-- and we have reached that consensus of opinion -- of what is
96 1
acceptable.
2 The problem of silicon rubber was a very complex 3
issue.
And, as with all complex issues, we had a variety of 4
opinions on what test voltages were acceptable and how to 5
handle the final resolution.
But, there was a consensus of 6
opinion reached.
That consensus will be demonstrated when you 7
receive the final paper on the generic issue of silicon rubber.
8 The status at TVA.
TVA has removed all the AIW 4
9 silicon rubber cable and some of the other cables manufactured 10 by Anaconda and Rockbestos.
The other cables that remain'in 11 there have been demonstrated to be able to function in a LOCA 12-through the Wyle Laboratories test, and we have accepted that.
13 The remaining issue on silicon rubber cable is that 14 the Wyle test program only demonstrated the life of that cable 15 at reduced insulation levels for 10 years.
We have required 16 TVA to demonstrate full 40 year life of that cable before 17 coming out of the first refueling outage of Sequoyah Two.
18 That's our present position of this.
Any questions 19 on silicon rubber?
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, just a brief one.
This 21 is an indirect question.
As I think you are aware, there was 22 some concern raised about the adequacy of your -- not you 23 personally -- but of the staff's oversight on some of this 24 testing and verification process.
In other words, our own QA, 25 if you will, and, more importantly, our own QA documentation
o.
97 1
for reaching the. conclusions that you have expressed here.
Can 7-2 you comment on that a little bit, or is that all prior to your 3
time, Stu?
Maybe you can.
4 MR. EBNETER:
Well, I'll give you some idea of some 5
of the overviews that were performed.
I was actively involved 6
in it myself and Mr. Richardson.
Since Mr. Marinos is a branch 7
chief and he was in charge of the technical review and 8
evaluations, I participated in some of the tests at the site 9
along with Mr. Marinos.
10 We reviewed all.of the material that was provided.
11 We participated in the public briefings for the staff 12 positions.
I was involved with those, and Ms. Axelrad and 13 Steve were involved with them.
14
.As a final overview of the entire issue, we held high 15 level management meetings.
One of them involved Mr. Stello, 16 Dr. Murley, and other high level managers, Mr. Sniezak in NRR, 17 to discuss the approach and resolution of this issue.
18 All of the contractor reports.
We made a change in 19 utilizing contractors after we took over the project.
The 20 contractors reported directly to us.
They did not write 21 individual TERs, but worked with the staff and formulated their 22 conclusions and inspection findings, and those are incorporated 23 directly in the SER and inspection reports.
24 So, we had direct control of all of the writings and j
x.>
25 findings of our contractors at that point.
Is there anything
98 1
more?
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
So, what you're saying, as far as 3
you're concerned, is that the cable issue has been resolved.
4 MR. EBNETER:
Yes.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And that you are confident 7
that the questions of oversight over contractors and whatnot 8
and documentation of results --
9 MR. EBNETER:
And consensus of opinion.
~
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
-- whether or not with Il respect to Watts Bar or with respect to Sequoyah, that those 12 questions, in your mind, are resolved with respect to Sequoyah.
13 MR. EBNETER:
For Sequoyah only, sir.
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
Thank you ve;y sauch.
15 MR. STELLO:
I would like to add that I would like 16 further opportunity to comment at a later time after we have ~
I 17 had a chance to look into this adequately, because I think it's 18 something that deserves fairly careful study, and we will 19 respond to you.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, if there's any doubt about it, j
21
'you have got to respond before you make your recomme'ndation for 22 restart.
23 MR. STELLO:
There is absolu*.ely no reservation 24 whatsoever that the cables at Sequoyah are okay.
It's whether s s 25 our internal process ought to be improved as we look to the O
99 1
future and, if so, how.
It is only in that context in whic'h I 2
reserved.
3 COMMISSIONER ZECH:
Fine.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes.
I fully agree.
The 5
question here is not one of physical readiness.
The question 6
is over our own processes.
7 MR. STELLO:
That is correct.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
But you're satisfied that our 9
process, in this regard, did give an adequate review.
10 MR. STELLO:
No question.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
But you had to modify our proc.ess in 12 order for it to do that, is that what you're kind of telling 13 us?
You had to make some modifications to make sure?
14 MR. STELLO:
Well, I'll reserve whether the
+
15 observations are correct or not.
Was there really any problem.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
But the review we gave to this 17 situation you're satisfied with, itself.
18 MR. STELLO:
Completely, yes.
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
And the issue itself?
20 MR. STELLO:
And the cables themselves are okay.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Fine.
Thank you.
You may proceed.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Didn't leave much wiggle room 23 there, but go ahead.
d 24 (Laughter.)
s 25 MR. EBNETER:
Thank you.
The next topic I would like w
w
100 1
to discuss briefly is related to operational readiness.
When
'I p,
2 Sequoyah shut down voluntarily in September of 1985, the 3
Commission under EDO sent a 5054 (f) letter to TVA directing 4
them that they could not restart the plant until they had NRC 5
approval.
6 The two major issues in the 5054(f) letter were 7
management controls and quality assurance.
You've heard a 8
great deal from TVA on that.
I'd like to address briefly what 9
we've done in that area.
10 'to the letter involved questions to TVA 11 on corporate issues, and that was the Board of Directors' 12 actions, management changes to strengthen TVA, corp' orate 13 tracking system, and the QA process.
Item C of that enclosure 14 was related to the Sequoyah Plant itself, and I'll discuss 15 those under that.
16 TVA, in response to the 5054 (f) letter, issued Volume 17 I,
the corporate nuclear plan.
We have reviewed that and 18 issued NUREG-1232, Part 1, which addresses our satisfaction 19 with the proposed plans to strengthen the corporate structure.
i 20 Some things that we did look at and evaluate, and 21 changes that have been made, I'll just quickly run over.
The 22 Board of Directors.
There is now a full complement of Board of 23 Directors.
Mr. Runyon is on board.
He is the new Chairman of 24 the Board, s
25 We do see a new change in direction by the committees
6 101 l'
and task forces that he has established.
Ms. Axelrad and I met 2
with Mr. Runyon, and we'rb very satisfied and impressed with 3
his comments with regard to support of the nuclear program.
4 TVA did establish an inspector general program, which 5
has been very significant in reducing I&H and controlling 6
internal management problems.
7 There is a new corporate structure.
I'm not going to 8
talk about it.
Mr. White discussed that extensively.
9 There is an extensive matrix management that provides 10 dedicated support to,each site.
I think that is one of the key 11 items that is now existing.
Mr. Hosmer mentioned to you, for 12 example, engineering.
He has 1,400 engineers supporting the 13 Sequoyah Unit alone.
And those are dedicated engineering sta,ff 14 for just Sequoyah.
That does provide the necessary resources 15 to solve their problems.
16 The QA program.
Mr. Kazanas mentioned that they did 17 revise it.
They took five independent QA programs and 18 integrated them into one.
We have approved that as a topical 19 report.
That has been implemented, and we do see significant 20 gains in the QA program.
Very significant improvements.
21 The evaluation we put into NUREG-1232, I would like 22' to comment briefly on.
The ACRS has been interested in this.
23 Their most recent letter -- of February 19th, I believe it 24 was -- was generally complimentary of the changes that have 25 been made at TVA in the management area.
102
~.
1 Some questions we have, concerns,-and you heard Mr.
2 Runyon echo this same one, that is succession planning.
I 3
clearly don't know what Mr. White's plans are, but clearly he 4
is a driving force in the recovery of TVA.
I know his contract 5
runs until next January.
It is not'too early for TVA to be 6
aggressively pursuing a replacement for Vr. White or some 7
enticement for him to stay, whatever their choice.. But they 8
have to do something~in this area, clearly.
9 One other area I think they're lagging behind, and it 10 does not impact restart but I want to mention it, is that 11 corporate procedures and directives are significantly behind 12 schedule.
They have fallen behind the pace of the normal 13 recovery.
I think TVA needs to direct attention to that.
14 ACRS had a concern about span of control.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I'm sorry.
That was fairly 16 generic terminology there.
17 MR. EBNETER:
Yes.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Do you want to tell me what 19 that means?
20 MR. EBNETER:
In the new corporate structure, the 21 plan is for TVA corporate to provide the. procedures and 22 directives that apply to all of the TVA plants, Browns Ferry, 23 Watts Bar, and Sequoyah.
Those are the oversight procedures 24 that provide the directions and implement goals.
25 Most of those are not completed.
They are in i
l
...a 103
.b -
1 process.
There are some good reasons for that.
They are not a 2
start-up issue, however.
But I just wanted to mention they are 3
behind.
4 The span of control issue that we had originally with 5
the large number of people reporting to Mr. White, the ACRS 6
reiterated their concern with that.
That also could be a 7
problem if Mr. White leaves and someone else has a different 8
style of management.
That span of control could be 9
significant.
10 That's all I have on the corporate area.
We're 11 generally satisfied with what TVA has done in that area.
We 12 think it's been very effective.
13 Are there any questions of the staff in that area?
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
You can proceed.
15 MR. EBNETER:
All right.
The Sequoyah site, the 16 5054(f) letter, we identified TVA in that area to address 17 several areas.
One of those was EQ.
You've heard about EQ 18 several times, and I'm not going to belabor it.
19 They have corrected that problem for Sequoyah, and 20 the staff now feels -- we have done a number of inspections 21 there -- the staff feels that is one of the better programs in 22 the United States on EQ.
And we have documented that in our 23 SE.
24 The upgraded management staff at Sequoyah.
You heard 25 a great deal about that from Mr. Smith.
I'm not going to
o 104 1,
comment too much on that.- We do think it is effective.
pq 1
2 There is a new deputy site manager who came from 3
outside of TVA.
Mr. Smith was outside of TVA.
The new 4
maintenance manager you didn't hear much about.
He came from 5
outside of TVA.
Which gives you a diverse and extensive 6
experience in these key areas.
So, we're very happy with that 7
upgrading.
8 The focus on teamwork, we agree that is significant.
9 The war room is a classic example.
And I think Mr. Bernthal 10 observed that when he was down there.
11 Some areas they have improved.
Plant procedures.
12 They have a new design baseline.
I'm not going to cover those.
13 TVA did.
14 The systems organization we think is a significant 15 addition to the TVA staff.
That was an area that was 16 consistently identified as lacking in TVA.
That is in place, 17 and we think that is an excellent program.
18 There is a new configuration management program in at 19 TVA.
They didn't comment much on it but I think that is one of 20 the most significant preventive measures they have in place.
21 If that is implemented. fully, it should prevent degradation of 22 the plant physical conditions and we are looking at that area 23 closely.
24 For evaluation of that area, by the way, Marilyn i
25 Blackburn commented on the training.
I did talk and interview
^
105 1
Ms. Blackburn.
She provided-me with some data.
Out at the TVA
~
2 Sequoyah site, over 190 supervisors on the Sequoyah staff have 3
taken those uanagement development courses, some of them as 4
many as three or four different core coursas.
We think that is 5
a significant improvement in management development at the 6
site.
7 We have issued the SE for that.
There are a few 8
areas they have completed and they are being revised and 9
incorporated in the SE.
It is in the public document room and 10 will be printed within the next few weeks, but it is available 11 to the public now.
12 Any questions on the Sequoyah overview?
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
You may proceed.
14 MR. EBNETER:
I would like to talk a little bit about 15 operational readiness.
Again, I'm going to be brief.
TVA has 16 done extensive work.
INPO conducted two evaluations.
TVA did 17 two, the major one extending from August, 1987 to January, 18 1988.
NRC, we have done our own overview of this End the ANI's 19 review, which you heard briefly about.
INPO had four key start 20 up items.
Those have been completed or will be completed 21 before start up.
The TVA overview identified 13 items that had 22 to be completed.
They specified that TVA develop a plan to 23 address all statt up issues.
TVA has done that.
We have seen 24 that and there is an official submittal coming in today on the 25 docket for that corrective action plan.
106 F
7-q Our review, we did an attributes revi'ew..
We are 1
i 2
generally satisfied with training of thy plant and\\htaff 3
oparations, procedure upgrades.
Our m,ajor concern last 4
December and January was the nuclear ethic.
We said it needed 5
significant improvement.
We have seen improvemente in that li 6
area.
7 The ANI issue, we agree with TVA's resglution.
- ANI, t
i l
8 the American Nuclear Insurers, came back and did do an'other i'.. ;
9 inspection.
There is a new report out that was dated March 1, i
10 which has just been submitted.
We'are reviewing that.
That is 11 more extensive than what we had on the docket before.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Can you give us a five word I
13 summary on what is the general tone?
i 14 MR. EBNETER:
The general tone is that their re-f 15 inspection, they have confirmed the TVA corrective actions are 16 adequate to correct the problems and particularly in the PORC i!
?
17 area.
That was the major issue.
[
18 There was one I might comment o'.
They did find a n
19 temporary alteration control form, a TNCF, that was over three 20 years old at the plant.
TVA has done some work in that area.
21 The last word I had on that, they didn't comment, but the TACFs i
22 had been reduced to 16 on the plant.
That is a figure that TVA 23 gave me.
I have not verified that.
They have c.4de significant 24 progress in controlling TACFs.
25 Anything else in that area?
e
1
,t 107 j
g It CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Go ahead.
1 2
MR. EBNETER:
I would just comment on the operating 3
stafi some features that perhaps didn't come through clearly
]
\\
4 by TVA.
They do have'six shift crew operations, it is an
]
5 integrated crew.
It consists of people around tre clock 6
coverage.
Each crew has HP, chemistry, mainterance and 7
engineering support on.it.
Ther<a is an STA cn each shift that 8
is part of that shift and trains with that shift.
They J
9 commented on some of that integrated crew training and we do 10 think that iz very aEfective.
j 11 Sque co$ne.nts and evaluations have been made.
The 12 INPO evaluations said that the crews are very good, they are 13 well above average., our staff generally feels that the crews 14 are above average and we feel those observations are, significapt.
15 p
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Could you very briefly 17 comment on an issue, 9hich hs you know, was raised tne first l
18 time I was down there, and that was the level of experience.
~
19 There was some concern expressed at that time and I, recall your 20 havfag prbaised to follow up on it, about the level of 21 experi$nce.
For all practical purposes here, we are looking'at starting a new pland.
The attitude has to be much the same.
22 23 You are confident in the SROs and in particular in 8
24 the Ros, the level of experience is mohe than adequate?
25 MR. EBNETER:
Yes, we think so.
Frank McCoy, who is l
4.
i L
9 Y
108 1
down at the site full time rJnning the start up program, Frank, 2
would you comment briefly or-that experiends, on the hot plant?
3 MR. McCOY:
Yes, sir.. We did a review of their
~
4 operational capabilities, past parational experience that the 5
Niarious people on shift have had.
What we have determined is 6
of the 12 TROs thaii are 'either assistant shif t engineers or 7
shift enginebr. capacity, two of them have not had shift 8
mansg7 ment experience as. an SRO but have had extensive reactor 9
operator experience.
Of th'e reactor operators, about 7 of the
.10 12 reactor c'perators have not had ani' substuntial operating 11 experience in,thp past.
They are relatively now.
We thinQ D.
12 that is a product of the axtended chut dewn and is positive.
14 We have confidence thal. If -liey do in fact proceed in 14 a methadical and deliberate manner, and our'expe$lence to date 15 in observing the shut down indicates that is the attitude and approachc.heyaretaking,butthatthhproblemsthatcanbe 16 17 encountired by those sorts of weaknesses should become self 18 correctirh/ as they go through this.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Thank yot.
20 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Can I ask you where they sent 21
.thei." people for hot plant training?
22 MR. McCOY:
I couldn't answer that, sir.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Does p/A wipt to answer that 24 question?
i 25 MR. BYNUM:
The hot plant training, what Mr. McCoy 8
l t.
109 l'
was talking about was those operators have greater than six
(,\\'
2 months experience at Sequoyah in Mode 1.
3 COMMISSIONER CARR:
But Sequoyah has been shut down a 4
couple of years.
Have they been anywhere else for training?
5 MR. BYNUM:
No.
We have not sent anyone off site for 6
training.
We trained on the Sequoyah simulator and they do 7
have Mode 1 experience on Sequoyah.
8 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Two years old?
9 MR. BYNUM:
That's correct.
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
You may proceed.
11 MR. EBNETER:
Two comments that I view as weaknesses 12 in this operational staffing structure.
In the last 13 presentation that TVA made to us, the Sequoyah staff has a 1
14 complement of approximate?y 250 supervisors.
There is at least 15 30 vacancies in those supervisory areas which we think they
\\
16 tihould spend some time on trying to staff.
17 We did an inspection on some other organizational 18 areas, in the rad waste and chemistry rad control area, and the 19 staffing level we found authorized 66 positions, 11 of those 20 were vacant.
We think they need to spend some attention on 21 meeting authorized staffing levels at the station.
22 The nuclear ethic again, we have seen good progress.
23 We would like to see more.
I wanted to comment on nuclear i
1 24 ethic in regard to the engineering staff.
We have applied this 25 nuclear ethic primarily to the operating staff.
In the recent e
r-
4 110 1
few weeks, we have seen some very poor submittals from the 3
.x 2
engineering side of the house that need attention.
It is not a 3
start up issue but I just wanted to get it on the table, 4
attention to details is' extremely important from the 5
engineering side as well as it is from the operating side.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is this the on-site 7
engineering staff or off site?
8 MR. EBNETER:
On-site, sir.
Small things like not 9
observing commitments made to the NRC, not following --
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
That's not a small~ thing.
11 MR. EBNETER:
Small in the isolated cases.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
As far as I'm concerned, that's about 13 as big a thing you can have.
14 MR. EBNETER:
We agree and that is why I want to 15 bring it out.
We have had sone discussions with TVA,and I 16 wanted to get a little more emphasis on it.
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I trust TVA will accept that 18 challenge right now.
Go ahead.
19 MR. EBNETER:
Just some quick comments on our 20 observations of what it looks like.
In the summer of 1987, we 21 were experiencing quite a few procedural adherence problems.
22 TVA took prompt action on that.
That has tapered off and we 23 have seen good progress in that area.
Just prior to going into 24 the heat up, they had significant problems,a the ice condenser
\\.
25 area, cleanliness of the plant, cleaning up and just following b
i
111 1
good housekeeping procedures, doing things in accordance with 2
procedures.
Again, they took good prompt corrective-action and 3
they got those resolved.
4 We authorized them to go into Mode 4 on February 4th.
5 They went into Mode 4 on February 6th.
We have about-28 days 6
or so experience in Mode 4.-
We have experienced 10 different 7
events.
I call them events.
Some of them were notifications -
8
- two of them were notifications of unusual event, several were 9
failure to follow procedure, a few of them were related to 10 failure to get authorization to perform maintenance.
11 Each time -- that's a significant number we think, 12 ten.
We tried to get a baseline against other plants.
We 13 weren't too successful in that because for example, TMI, TMI 14 did not have the standard tech spec.
They had a customized 15 tech spec and it was difficult to relate some of these.
They 16 didn't have all the tech specs -- '
i 17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
TMI-1 when they restarted?
18 MR. EBNETER:
Yes.
We did look at two others.
- Jane, 19 did you have any comments on those?
20 MS. AXELRAD:
We looked at Davis-Besse and Fermi only 21 had four days before it got to load two, and it didn't have any i
22 events.
It isn't really comparable. ' Davis-Besse had a 19 day 23 heat up period and they had one event during that time.
That 24 was all we could find.
's 25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
W
112 1
MR. EBNETER:
I would.say that the operators and the 2
staff did recover very well from these problems.
They
~'
3 identified themselves, recovered adequately and TVA has been 4
very' conservative as Mr. White mentioned.
They have case 5
studies.
They get the staff together.
Mr. White has talked to 6
them.
Steve Smith has talked with them, to try to instill this 7
nuclear ethic in the staff.
It is paying dividends.
8 In one case they did stop work for six days and in 9
another case they moved some of the work authority mechanisms 10 outside of the control room.
In speaking about the control 11 room, I'd like to address briefly your comment on the drawings, 12 We are requiring TVA to have all those drawings that are 13 essential for operations to be updated in the control room,and 14 in all the emergency response facilities, tech support center 15 and off site facilities such that we have a complete set of 16 currently configured drawings for operations and energencies.
17 That is the status of that.
18 That is generally our observation on the start up.
19 It is going slow but we think it has to go slow.
There has 20 been more events than we think should be there, but the r
21 recovery has been good.
22 Let me summarize quickly and then if you have any 23 questions, I would be glad to answer them or have the staff
)
24 answer them.
N -
25 In summary, we have one technical issue in the.
1
)
113 Appendix R issue that we do have to address.
The Volume 1 and 1
2 Volume 2 SERs that bound the 50.54 (f) letter, which is i
3 necessary for restart are essentially finished.
The 4
operational' readiness reviets that we have performed and that 5
TVA has performed generally support a start up decision.
6 We mentioned some concerns, the nuclear ethic, the 7
long term replacement and succession planning for Mr. White, 8
and full staffing at the plant.
That's essentially a summary i
9 of mine.
10 I would like to make one last comment.
The staff has 11 done an outstanding job, both at headquarters and on the site.
12 We have done more inspection at this plant than any that I know 13 of, under pre-heat up for the plant, there is no plant that I 14 know of that has been in 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> shift coverage by the NRC for 15 the length of time this plant has.
At TMI, on their restart, 16 that went into effect the day they went critical.
We are 17 getting a very good view and opportunity to observe the plant 18 heat up in a much greater detail than any other plant we know 19 of.
20 That's all I have.
i 21 MR. STELLO:
I think, Mr. Chairman, that concludes 22 our presentation.
I would again reiterate, I do not believe 1
23 based on what I understand, that TVA will in fact be ready to 24 go critical next week.
It will probably be the following week.
25 We would recommend that the Commission, when they
114 1
feel they are satisfied, to authorize the staff to permit TVA k-2 to go critical, when we resolve the issues you have heard about 3
today.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
We need to hear from you when they 5
are resolved.
6 MR. STELLO:
We intend to provide the Commission a 7
report and tell you that is in fact the case.
8 one last comment in the way of a challenge.
It is 9
our view that TVA has had indeed a very long and difficult 10 road.
I think they have managed to travel that difficult path 11 successfully.
I think they have to now set their sights on 12 truly achieving excellence and hope they will continue the 13 programs they have so that the Sequoyah plant will in fact be 14 one of the best operating plants in our country.
I think they 15 can do that.
They seem to have that commitment.
We are going 16 to try to help them achieve that goal.
,17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
Questions from i
18 my fellow Commissioners?
Commissioner Rogers?
19 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
No.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Bernthal?
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let me roll three items here 22 into one, from the preliminary safety evaluation that you 23 provided us.
There were two or three things that the staff l
24 stated that needed to be resolved before restart.
Let me just
,vs 25 name them.
I understand -- everyone understands there were a l
3
115 1
lot of problems with calculat. ions of various types two and a s
2 half years ago and before that.
There was one area that I am 3
told from your report, the area of civil calculations, certain 4
electrical calculations especially, that the staff states will 5
need to be resolved before restart.
6 Another area was small bore piping, that TVA needed 7
to complete some corrective action there.
A third area was 8
certification that all the field work was done on environmental 9
qualification before restart.
10 Have they satisfied all three of those items in your 11 judgment?
12 MR. EBNETER:
The staff has assured me of that.
Mr.
13 Herrmann, would you address that particularly on the cals and 14 the small bore pipe area?
15 MR. HERRMANN:
I am Bob Herrmann, Chief of the 16 Engineering Branch.
The issues on the calculation program as 17 well as the IDI issues and the other small bore pipe issues 18 have been resolved on the plan for restart.
There will be some 19 follow up actions for the long haul but we are done for the 20 restart.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
22 MR. EBNETER:
The certification issue, Mr. Pierson?
23 MR. PIERSON:
My name is Bob Pierson.
I am the Plant 24 Systems Branch Chief.
We have received a letter certifying 25 equipment qualification has been completed.
_m
116 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Thank you very much.
2 Finally, just a word.
The first time I was there, I 3
had a chance to meet with I guess 12 or 14 of our staff people 4
in a circle and whatever occasionally may or may not be said 5
about the NRC, I was greatly impressed with the quality of the 6
people and the attention they were giving to their work and 7
it's a tribute to your effort, Stu, and to Mr. Keppler's before 8
you, I think.
The candidness and openness, nobody-pulled any 9
punches.
I very much appreciated that.
10 Let me mention one item and see whether in your 11 judgment in the three to four neeks, whatever it has been since 12 that point that it has been resolved, there was a concern 13 expressed by two or three of the people doing the work over the 14 rapidity of response to some of the -- how does it go, 15 conditions adverse to quality, reports that were submitted.
16 There was a concern about how quickly the follow up occurred 17 within the organization.
I think based on my most recent visit 18 that has improved, but maybe you would like to comment.
19 MR. EBNETER:
The CAQR has been an issue that we have 20 been looking at for a year now.
The CAQR process came into 21 existence last February.' It's very complex and it has taken 22 some time for TVA to get it fully implemented.
We conducted an 23 inspection three weeks ago, I believe, a team inspection, and i
24 the staff still had some difficulties with the full 25 implementation.
There were three areas that were of concern.
117 1
The st.aff informed me this morning, we' discussed it again, that'
.3 2
TVA is taking the corrective action to correct those.
3 Timeliness has'been one of our primary concerns, such 4
that any safety issues that are identified get through the 5
system in a reasonable period and that corrective actions and 6
evaluations are done quickly.
We think the system essentially 7
is pretty good right now.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Thank you very much.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner carr?
10 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Yes, I have one question I'd like 11 to ask TVA.
I know you have a comprehensive fitness for duty 12 program.
Do you have any statistics on recent results for 13 fitness for duty?
14 MR. WHITE:
Our fitness for duty program, I think, is 15 one of the best in the country.
It's a two-pronged approach.
16 One is education of our people.
We have an education program 17 for both TVA and contractors, for the non-supervisory 18 personnel.
It's about a two-hour course; supervisory 19 management, it's about a four and a half hour course.
As I 20 recall, we have trained in the neighborhood of ten or eleven 21 thousand.
We're almost through the first training cycle.
22 That's the education part.
23 The preventive part consists of both dogs -- we now
)
24 have three dogs who are visually present at th.e sites and at
- v. -
25 the office locations.
And our random drug-testing program.
i
)
118 1
Now our drug-testing program has in itself several
- O 2
facets.
One is for cause; another is for unescorted access to 3
the plant.
But the most important and the one that I have-seen 4
work in the Navy has been the random process, and to date, our 5
screening of 2876. random screens, there have been 22' positive, 6
and that's
.8 percent.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Were any of those operators?
8 MR. WHITE:
I don't recall.
Were any of them --
9 SPEAKER:
No licensed operators.
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
No licensed operators.
All right.
11 Thank you.
12 MR. WHITE:
In terms of the for cause, there have 13 been.20 for cause, and as you'd expect, they're higher there; 14 two of those 20 for cause were positive.
15 Pre-employment, 20 out of 1209 were positive, and 16 that's 1.7 percent.
17 Those numbers are frankly much better than I had 18 expected when we instituted the program.
19 MR. EBNETER:
Commissioner Carr, we did do an 20 inspection of that, a team inspection, last fall to verify the 21 effect'iveness of the program, and we found that it was 22 acceptable.
23 COMMISSIONER CARR:
All right.
The only other thing 24 I'd say is, I'd compliment you personally, Mr. Ebneter, on f
25 jumping into a vacancy at short notice and running an effective
119 1
program, and my congratulations to you and you'r staff.
Thank 2
you.
3 MR. EBNETER:
Well, thank you, sir, but the staff did 4
the work, not me.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Rogers?
6 COMMISSIONER CARR:
So did Mr. White's staff, right?
7 (Laughter.)
8 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
Would you comment on the work 9
request backlog of about two, two and a half months that we 10 heard in the TVA presentation a little earlier as to whether 11 you think that is a stable number, it might go up, might go 12 down, and whether you're comfortable with it?
13 MR. EBNETER:
Well, we would obviously like to see it 14 go down.
I had the same question in the public meeting that 15 the Commissioners had here, and I got the same answer.
I don't i
16 have any personal experience of what would be an acceptable 17 level, but I would like to see it get lower than 700.
But I 18 don't have any real basis for that.
19 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
- Well, I,
you know, I couldn't 20 get a feeling from the presentation this morning whether TVA 21 thought that was going to be where they leveled off, or whether 22 they were really going to try to drive that down from that 23 point.
Could somebody comment?
24 MR. WHITE:
Well, of course, we're going to try and 25 drive it down.
The first thing we have to do is separate out
120-1 the nonsense items from our system.
j-
' ~
2 For example, we have a lot of trailers, temporary 3
trailers.
Literally, if one of those trailers has a flat tire, 4
it ends up being in the statistics.
So we've got to cleanse 5
our system, and then I'm going to drive it down as far as we 6
can.
And I may put too much pressure and overshoot, but I'd 7
like to see our backlog be the lowest in the country.
8 At the same time, I want to make clear that it's a 9
healthy thing to have your people out looking, so that you have 10 a backlog.
11 COMMISSIONER ROGERS:
Well, just also I'd like to 12 join my other Commissioners in complimenting the Staff on the 13 very assiduous attention that's been paid here.
It really 14-shows.
15 MR. EBNETER:
Thank you, sir.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Well, let me join my 17 colleagues, too, to the Staff, especially you, Mr. Ebneter, for 18 your leadership in taking on a very, very important mission for 19 this agency.
20 Ms. Axelrad has been with you all along, I know.
I 21 compliment you, too, and all the members of your team.
I 22 I know we're not done yet, and you're still' driving, i
23 so we expect you to keep going and give us the best 24 recommendations that you can and do it right.
25 Let me just say, too, I'd like to commend Mr. Runyon
o.
121 1
for his willingness to' step'into this very important 2
responsibility at TVA.
You do bring a lot of experience, not 3
necessarily nuclear experience, but you're getting help in that 4
regard, it looks like, but you are bringing a lot of management 5
experience into it, and it would at least appear to me 6
dedication to the TVA organization, which I think is 7
commendable.
8 To the other members of the Board of Directors, it's
}
been a long, hard row for both of you, but I think you made a
~
10 courageous decision some time ago to recognize what did appear 11 to be real shortcomings at TVA.
As painful as'that was, I do 12 think you showed the moral courage to do.what's right, and 13 we're not done yet, but I do think you deserve at least the 14 credit for painfully facing up to what does appear to have been 15 a necessary task.
16 I would say a last word to the Board.
I hope you 17 will continue your support for Steve White.
He needs that 18 support.
The whole organization needs the support of the 19 Board.
It's been painful, but perhaps healthy.
I like to 20 think it's healthy, what you've done, but the support needs to 21 stay there.
It needs to continue.
And as you form a more 22 permanent organization somewhere along the corporate level, I 23 commend you for what you've done in getting permanent TVA 24 people in,there, but that is awfully important, I think, for 25 continuity and strength over the long haul.
~
e 122 1
You've obviously made some significant and posit.ive
~
2 management changes at TVA.
I think there are some technical 3
issues, at least, that we want to be confident are fully 4
resolved.
We've mentioned several of them here today.
It 5
looks to me like you do have an experienced group of people at 6
TVA, and I commend you for your ability to recruit under i
t 7
difficult pay scale circumstances, and I think that's been an 8
effort that needs, recognition.
9 It looks like you've got almost a new team in many l
10 ways.
I know you've got some of the same people.
But when you 11 have a new team, and if startup is authorized, I think you've l
12 got to look at it in a sense like first-time startup and 13 recognize that caution and deliberate carefulness and slowness
[
i 14 step-by-step is the only way to go, as we mentioned earlier.
j 15 Let me just say, too, that speaking for myself -- and 16 I feel confident that I'm speaking for my fellow commissioners 17
-- that this Commission will only authorize the Staff to allow 18 the restart of the Sequoyah plant if and when we're satisfied 19 that there are no issues that we're aware of for the purpose of 20 restart that are standing in the way of a finding that there is 21 reasonable assurance that the plant can be operated safely 4
22 without undue risk to the public health and safety.
~
I 23 That's our mandate.
We intend to carry it out.
And j
1 j
as we pointed out earlier, although we've scheduled a tentative 24 25 session for a possible Commission vote for the loth of March i
i
e.
123 1
next' week, as Mr. Stallo points out, it could well be the f,.
2 following week or even later.
We're not going to authorize 3
restart until we're satisfied.
4 With that, I thank the Staff.
I thank TVA for an 5
excellent presentation, and unless there are any other l
6 comments, we will stand adjourned.
7 (Whereupon, at 12:35 o' clock, p.m., the Commission 8
meeting was adjourned.)
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 4
24 4
25
6 1
'~
2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 3
4 This is to certify that the attached events of a 5
meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
6 7
TIT 12 OF MEETING:
Briefing on Sequoyah Restart 8
PLACE OF MEETING:
Washington, D.C.
9 DATE OF MEETING:
Friday, March 4, 1988 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken
{'
13 stenographically by me,.thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
17 18 d--
/
Suzadne B.
ung 19 20 21 22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
83 24 25
^
3/4/88 SCHEDULING NOTES TITLE:
BRIEFING ON SEQUOYAH RESTART SCHEDULED:
9:30 A.M., FRIDAY, MARCH 4, 1988 (OPEN)
DURATION:
APPROX 2 HRS PART!CIPANTS:
TVA (LICENSEE)
[0ARD OF DIRECTORS 5 M!flS
- M.J. RUNYON, CHAIRMAN
- C, DEAfl
- W. WATERS MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER 70 MIf:S
- S.A. WHITE TVA STAFF
- T. JENK!Ns, EMPLOYEE CONCERflS PRCGPAM
- M. BLACKBURN, MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMEtlT
- N. KAZAtlAS, QUALITY ASSURANCE
- J. HOSMER, TECHft! CAL SUPPORT
- S. SMITH, PLANT PERFORMANCE
- J. BYflVM, PLAf1T OPERATIONAL READINESS ERC 45 MINS
- V STELLO, EDO
- S. EBNETER, DIRECTOR OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
- J. AXELRAD (OSP)
- S RICHARDSON (OSP)
- B.D. LIAW (OSP)
- E. MARINOS (OSP)
+
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l L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY i
l OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER i
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l SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT-l UNIT 2 NRC COMMISSION MEETING i
MARCH 4,1988 l
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AGENDA i
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4 OVERVIEW CORPORATE PERFORMANCE l
SEQUOYAH OPERATIONAL READINESS 1
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SEQUOYAH CHATTANOOGA BROWNS EFOME W
FERRY.
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W) 1 I
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HISTORY AND BACKGROUND NRC CONCERNS e
CORPORATE CONTROLS WEAK, LACK OF TOP MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT e
LACK OF NUCLEAR AND OPERATING EXPERIENCE IN PLANT ORGANIZATION e
TECHNICAL SUPPORT NOT MANAGED DECENTRALIZATION (OWNERIOPERATOR CONCEPT) NOT IMPROVING PLANT e
PERFORMANCE e
ALLEGATIONS e
POOR REGULATORY PERFORMANCE e
LACK OF INTEGRATED TRACKING SYSTEM e
LACK OF SITE-TO-SITE SHARED OPERATING EXPERIENCE o
UNTIMELY AND INEFFECTIVE LORRECTIVE ACTION 8
d 1
I AGENDA
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i OVERVIEW 4
=+ CORPORATE PERFORMANCE SEQUOYAH OPERATIONAL READINESS i
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NUCLEAR OBJECTIVES 4
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TVA OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER OBJECTIVES l
i TO ASSURE SAFE PLANT OPERATION 1
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l 1.
ESTABLISH A STABLE ORGANIZATION
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PUT A STRONG MANAGEMENT TEAM IN PLACE J
1 3.
ESTABLISH PROCEDURAllZED AND DISCIPLINED WAY OF DOING BUSINESS i
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4.
ENSURE THE TECHNICAL INTEGRITY OF THE PLANTS 4
5.
REESTABLISH TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN MANAGEMENT i
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OBJECTIVE 1: ESTABLISH A STABLE ORGANIZATION i
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NEW ORGANIZATION IN PLACE
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e POLICY AND ORGANIZATION MANUAL ISSLIED e
POSITION DESCRIPTIONS WRITTEN l
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ORGANIZATION BOARD OF DRECTORS GENERAL M AN AGER GENERAL INSPECTOR COUNSEL GENERAL MANAGER OF NtCLEAR POWER DEPUTY MANAGERS ASSSTANT NLCLEAR MAN VER PERSONNEL CHMRMAN DRECTOR NUCLEAR i
NtCLEAR M ANAGER S SAFETY REVIEW GROUP REVElw BOARD DRECTOR.
NUCLEAR BU9 NESS OPERATIONS STAR:F MANAGER NUCLEAR MMNT EN ANCE I
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l NUCLEAR DeRECTOR.
DRECTOR D RECTOR, ORECTOR.
DREC(CRS CONSTRUCTION OA ENGINEERNG SERVF.ES TRAff4NG REG AFFMRS DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUTY DEPUT Y DEPUTY ASSISTANT DEPUTY DRECTORS DIRECTOR DRECTOR DRECTOR DRECTOR DIRECTOR DRECTOR
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i OBJECTIVE 2: PUT A STRONG MANAGEMENT I
TEAM IN PLACE i
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INFUSION OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT TALENT 4
e MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT I
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-l OBJECTIVE 3: ESTABLISH DISCIPLINED WAY OF
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EXAMPLES:
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POLICY FOR EACH MAJOR PROGRAM l
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e HIERARCHY OF DOCUMENTS
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o COMPREHENSIVE TRACKING SYSTEMS 2
e SINGLE PROGRAM FOR CONDITIONS ADVERSE TO QUALITY i
e REVISED AND UNIFIED QUALITY ASSURANCE TOPICAL REPORT e
A CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
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TRAINING i
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e CENTRAL CONTROL OF CHANGES l
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OBJECTIVE 4: ENSURE THE TECHNICAL INTEGRITY
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e RE-ESTABLISHED DES!GN BASIS j
i e CONFIRMED COMP;. LANCE WITH COMMITMENTS A
'e ESTABLISHED DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS:
<a ORGAN!ZATIONAL CHANGES TO IMPROVE TECHNICAL OVERSIGHT r
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i OBJECTIVE 5: REESTABLISHING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN 4
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MANAGEMENT AND i
EMPLOYEES IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS WITH EMPLOYEES e
i EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM I
e INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT PROGRAM e
MANAGEMENT TRAINING PROGRAM e
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WALKING SPACES 1
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EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM T. B. JENKINS L____m_
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1 EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM IS WORKING:
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e EVALUATED AND RESOLVED PAST CONCERNS e
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDITS i
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DECLINING NUMBER OF CONCERNS I
e LINE MANAGEMENT NOW HANDLING CONCERNS l
e ACTION ORIENTED - GETS RESULTS l
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EMPLOYEES ENCOURAGED TO l
REPORT SAFETY AND QUALITY CONCERNS i
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM ORIENTATION / EXIT INTERVIEWS e
o CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY PROCESS
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e MESSAGES OF OBLIGATION OF ALL TO REPORT PROBLEMS e
EMPLOYEES USING LINE MANAGEMENT TO ADDRESS CONCERNS l
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4
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THERE IS NOT A CLIMATE OF INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT 4
ROOT CAUSES e
MANAGEMENT CULTURE MANAGEMENT SKILLS DISCIPLINARY POLICIES i
i ACTIONS e
COMMUNICATIONS WALKING SPACES l
e DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS i
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MANAGEMENT TRAINING i
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MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT 4
M.S.BLACKBURN I
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MANAGEMENT TRAINING l
EMPHASIS AND INVOLVEMENT BY TOP MANAGEMENT e
SYSTEMATIC AND REQUIRED
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e QUALITY AND QUANTITY
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MANAGEMENT TRAINING PROGRESS i
COURSES
- TRAINED CORE CURRICULUM
- ORIENTATION TO NUCLEAR SUPERVISION 1149
- SUPERVISOR DEVELOPMENT COURSE 1117
- MANAGING FOR EXCELLENCE COURSE 136
- SKILLS ASSESSMENT 255 ADDITIONAL TRAINING
- PROBLEM SOLVINGIDECISION MAKING (PILOT) 99
- TIME MANAGEMENT 529
- OTHER ELECTIVES 2335 I
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QUALITY ASSURANCE e
ORGANIZATION RESTo!!CTURED e
EXPERIENCED SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM e
ENGINEERING ASSURANCE WORKING e
EMPHASIS ON TRAINING l
INCREASED EMPHASIS ON PERFORMANCE-BASED QUALITY VERIFICATIONS o
BROADENED SCOPE OF COVERAGE i
e NEW PROGRAMS AND MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES l
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e QUALITY ASSURANCE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR DIRECTOR POWER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING D! RECTOR NUCLEAR QUALIT Y ASSURANCE
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SW EMS ASSURANCE EVALUATION SUPPORT ASSURANCE EXAMINATION
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _O_F F SI T_E_ _ _ _ _ _ _
ONSITE PROJECT SITE AUDIT OU LITY
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ASSURANCE ENGINEERS
j QUALITY ASSURANCE 1
e ORGANIZATION RESTRUCTURED.
e EXPERIENCED SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM ~
ENGINEERING ASSURANCE WORKING e
EMPHASIS ON TRAINING l
INCREASED EMPHASIS ON PERFORMANCE-BASED QUALITY e
i VERIFICATIONS e
BROADENED SCOPE OF COVERAGE e
NEW PROGRAMS AND MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES 1
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1j' CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CONDITIONS ADVERSE TO QUALITY) 11 MONTHS OLD i
e LOW THRESHOLD e
HIGHLY PARTICIPATORY
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e PRIORITIZATION TRACKING l
- STATUS REPORTS MANDATORY ESCALATION i
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i TECHNICAL SUPPORT READINESS 4
1 J.B.HOSMER 1
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1 TECHNICAL SUPPORT READINESS i
TRANSITION e
TECHNICAL SUPPORT TODAY e
PLANT SUPPORT 1
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ISSUE PAST TODAY TIMELINESS OFFSITE ONSITE AVAILABLE REAL TIME 4
ACCOUNTABILITY "ON CALL" "0WNERSHIP" l
SERVICE SUPPORT DESIGN WEAK REESTABLISHED BASIS DESIGN DRAWINGS PACKAGES CONTROL i
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TECHNICAL SUPPORT TODAY PROJECT TEAM ON SITE i
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RESPONSIBILITIES:
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- DAILY SUPPORT
- UNIT 1 RESTART ENGINEERING
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MODIFICATIONS ENGINEERING I
i FUTURE DAILY SUPPORT
- AllODIFICATIONS ENGINEERING TEAM:
- TVA ON SITE AND TVA KNOXVILLE
- ARCHITECT ENGINEERS ON SITE
i DAILY PLANT SUPPORT i
e PLAN OF THE DAY e
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PLANT OPERATIONS REVIEW COMMITTEE i
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e ATTITUDES
- TEAM
- SUPPORT
- OWNERSHIP i
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POSITIVE TRENDS l
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SUMMARY
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DESIGN BASIS REESTABLISHED TECHNICAL SUPPORT PROCESS IN PLACE e
TECHNICAL SUPPORT PEOPLE HAVE ACCEPTED
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TECHNICAL OWNERSHIP AND ARE SUPPORTING l
PLANT OPERATION
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l AREAS OF WEAKNESS MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT AT OPERATION AND CRAFT LEVELS 1
i ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEFINED RESPONSIBILITIES e
l HOUSEKEEPING AND MATERIAL CONDITIONS i
e MAINTENANCE PROGRAM l
1 SYSTEM SPONSORSHIP ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION i
I COMMUNICATIONS l
i NUCLEAR ETHIC l
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MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT ORGANIZATION TO DIRECTLY ALIGN RESPONSIBILITIES TO CRITICAL AREAS REDUCTION IN LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT BETWEEN AND STAFF MANAGEMENT DUTY ROSTER WALK YOUR SPACES POLICY PLAN OF THE DAY MEETINGS FIXED SHIFT SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS t
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i ACCOUNTABILITY AND i
DEFINED RESPONSIBILITIES 1
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RESPONSIBLITIES DEFINED IN SITE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES i'
PERSONNEL TRAINED AND HELD ACCOUNTABLE
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CORPORATE AND SITE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES DEFINED l
AND PROGRESS TRACKED i
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HOUSEKEEPING AND MATERIAL CONDITION 4
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e ESTABLISHED DETAILED HOUSEKEEPING AND MATERIAL CONDITION l
UPGRADE PROGRAM
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COVERS 100 PERCENT OF POWER PLANT AND SHOP FACILITIES f
e PROGRAM WILL COMPLETE IN DECEMBER 1988 e
WILL BE FOLLOWED BY RECURRING MAINTENANCE PROGRAM WHICH WILL KEEP PLANT CLEANLINESS AND MATERIAL CONDITIONS AT HIGH LEVEL l
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!NCLUDES EXPANDED PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
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MAINTENANCE PROGRAM UPGRADE l
0 CORPORATE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM 1
PROCEDURE UPGRADE i
j PREVENilVE MAINTENANCE i
e RESTRUCTURING 01: MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION o
PRIORITIZATION OF WORK ACTIVITIES l
e POST MAINTENANCE TESTING l
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OBSERVES SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 1
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- FREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE COORDINATES PROBLEM RESOLbil0NS o
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REVIEWS TEST RESULTS j
e VERIFIES PROPER INSTALLATION OF MODIFICATIONS I
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ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION PROCEDURAllZED ROOT CAUSE TRAINING e
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM e
IMMEDIATE MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT GENERIC REVIEWS l
4 i
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PLANT READINESS I
MATERIAL CONDITION COMPLETED MODIFICATIONS TO IMPROVE PLANT SAFETY RESTART TEST PROGRAM e
MAINTENANCE BACKLOG I
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MODIFICATIONS PERFORMED FOR RESTART 3704 350-TOTAL MODS 370 MODS REMAINING 14 300 -
250-200 -
15 0 -
10 0 -
50-1ST 2ND 3RD 4TH 1ST 2ND 3RD 4TH 1S OTR OTR OTR OTR OTR OTR OTR OTR OTR 86 87 88
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RESTART TEST PERFORMANCE 1254 TO 125 10 0 -
EST REM ININO 7
90-80-70-60-50-40-30-20-10 -
0 JUNE JULY
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FEB MA
WORK REQUEST PERFORMANCE
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1986 COMPLETED 19,001 1987 SUBMITTED 20,043 COMPLETED 20,362 1988 2,776 THRU COMPLETED 2,438 2-23-88
~
OUTSTANDING WORK REQUESTS FOR UNIT 2 RESTART -- 89 4
MAINTENANCE TOTAL OPEN MRs/WRs Number of MR's/WR*s Total Open
,ggg ME, MI, & MM 3750 3500 3250 3000 2750 2500 2250 2000 O
1750 g
1500 1250 1 86 1000 750 500 250 0
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,A WORK REQUEST BACKLOG CURRENT TOTAL 1276' HOUSEKEEPING AND APPROX.500 MATERIAL CONDITION CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE APPROX.750 BASED ON 2 YEAR WORKOFF RATE, THIS IS ABOUT 2-2% MONTH BACKLOG
}
1
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COMMUNICATIONS i
DAILY PLANT STATUS SHEET e
STRUCTURED PERIODIC MEETINGS WITH ALL PLANT PERSONNEL
- SENIOR SUPERVISORS THREE TIMES WEEKLY
- ALL SUPERVISORS MONTHLY
- ALL PERSONNEL QUARTERLY PERIODIC INFORMATION MEETINGS WHENEVER EVENTS DICTATE e
Pt AN OF THE DAY MEETINGS i
e MANAGEMENT ATTENDANCE AT TRAINING SESSIONS WITH PLANT EMPLOYEES d
MANAGEMENT ATTENDANCE AT DAILY SHIFT TURNOVER MEETINGS i
e COMMUNICATIONS FORMAllZED BETWEEN OPERATIONS / MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL i
NUCLEAR ETHIC d
e DEDICATION TO THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIROMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY e
ACTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDUSTRY PROVEN STANDARDS FOR PERFORMANCE AND OPERATION RIGOROUS ADHERENCE TO PROCEDURES AND INSTRUCTIONS WILLINGNESS TO IDENTIFY AND SOLVE PROBLEMS CLEARLY DEFINED EXPECTATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES PROFESSIONAUSM AT ALL ORGANIZATKNAL LEVELS 1
i i
I PLANT READINESS CONCLUSION
~
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e PLANT AND EQUIPMENT UPGRADED i
e STARTUP TESTING VERIFIED EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY NON-NUCLEAR HEATUP VERIFIED OPERABILITY AND PERSONNEL l
READINESS UPGRADED MAINTENANCE PROGRAM ENSURES CONTINUED EQUIPMENT e
READINESS TRAINING PROGRAM ENSURES CONTINUED PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE o
l CONCLUSION l
e READY FOR OPERATIONS i
i i
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OPERATIONAL READINESS J. R. BYNUM f
e
8
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INPUTS i
l ASSESSED BY:
e MANAGEMENT e
NRC e
INPO e
NUCLEAR MANAGER'S REVIEW GROUP e
OPERATIONAL READINESS REVIEW e
OTHERS i
t i
OPERATIONAL READINESS i
MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT e
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS e
STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE O
h
OPERATIONAL READI ESS MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT EMPHASIS ON WALKING SPACES PHILOSOPHY e
OBSERVATION AND CRITIQUE OF TRAINING e
PERIODIC MEETINGS WITH ALL PERSONNEL e
REVISION OF PLANT OPERATIONS REVIEW COMMITTEE e
RESPONSIBILITIES l
E T
1 o
OPERATIONAL READINESS ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS i
1 i
j 1'
ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORK CONTROL GROUP i
e ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES CHANGES e
l
- CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 1
I
- CONFIGURATION STATUS CONTROL I
- TAGGING PROCEDURE
~
- CONTROL OF TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS 1
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OPERATIONAL READINESS STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE i
OPERATING CREW TRAINING f
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- CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
- STARTUP TRAINING
- HEATUP
-TEAMWORK AND DIAGNOSTIC SKILLS 1
i EVALUATION OF NON-LICENSED OPERATOR PROFICIENCY e
INTEGRATION OF. SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISORS INTO j
SHIFT COMPLEMENT e
CHEMISTRY SHIFT ASSESSMENT
)
e RADIATION CONTROL SHIFT ASSESSMENT
I I
OPERATIONAL READINESS REVIEW e
ALL RESTART ITEMS COMPLETE ALL NON-RESTART ITEMS HAVE ACTION PLANS INPO ALL RESTART ITEMS COMPLETE i
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IMPLEMENTATION-VERIFICATION
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HEATUP t
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- MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT i
- SHIFT OPERATING ADVISOR - QA
- NUCLEAR MANAGER'S. REVIEW GROUP o
POST RESTART i
- MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT
- NUCLEAR MANAGER'S REVIEW GROUP
- QUALITY ASSURANCE i
i i
i
VERIFICATION SHIFT OPERATING ADVISOR PROGRAM - QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW
- ALL AREAS OF SHIFT CONDUCT ACCEPTABLE FOR RESTART
- ALL SHIFT CREWS ARE ACCEPTABLE FOR RESTART NUCLEAR MANAGER $ REVIEW GROUP e
- ALL OPERATIONAL READINESS REPORT, INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS RESTART ITEMS HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED i
- CORRECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION IN ALL AREAS lS SATISFACTORY FOR RESTART INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS e
- FOLLOWUP VISIT REVIEWED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN FOR INPO RESTA ITEMS - ALL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ACCEPTABLE ASSISTANT UNIT OPERATOR PROFICIENCY EVALUATION e
i
- ALL AUOs CERTIFIED PROFICIENT FOR EACH WATCH STATION ASSIGNED
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. CONCLUSIONS t
ALL AREAS OF OPERATIONAL READINESS HAVE BEEN ASSESSED PliOGRAMS ARE IN PLACE TO ENSURE CONTINUING IMPROVEMEN i
e SELF ASSESSMENT SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT IS SAFE FOR RESTART l
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_ Occument Control Cesk, 016 Phillips ADVANCE 0 COPY TO:
The Public Document Room DATE:
J/7/f/
/
l FROM:
SECY Correspondence & Records Branch j
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Attached are copies of a Comission meeting transcript and related meeting i
occument(s). They are being forwarded for entry on the Daily Accession List and i
placement in the Public Document Room.
No other distribution is requested or G
required.
2 l
Meeting
Title:
Stu 4 e No M + e-,ub d oUAA i
y
/
/
l Meeting Date:
d'///# P Open
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Closed i
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0 Item Description *:
Copies Advanced DCS l
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- 1. TRANSCRIPT 1
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(< )fpu aAufLY 4 A? elY 9, A<AcN 2.
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- PDR is advanced one copy of each document, two of each SECY paper.
C&R Branch files the original transcript, with attachments, withcut SECY 6
s papers.
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