ML20055G568
| ML20055G568 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1990 |
| From: | Lieberman J NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE) |
| To: | TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055G566 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-90-011, EA-90-11, NUDOCS 9007230323 | |
| Download: ML20055G568 (9) | |
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l UNITED STATES I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION )
i In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79 Sequoyah Nuclear Plant EA 90-011 1 Units 1 and 2 ;
i ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY !
l I l Tennessee Valley Authority (Licensee) is the holder of Operatin9 License No. DPR-77 and No. DPR-79 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission l (Comission or NRC) on September 17, 1980 and September 15, 1981, respectively.
The licenses authorize the Licensee to operate the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, at Soddy-Daisy Tennessee, in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
I II An inspection of the Licensee's activities was conducted on January 8-12, 1990.
The results of this inspection indicated that the Licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon the Licensee by letter dated April 12, 1990. The Notice stated the nature of the l l
violations, the provisions of the NRC's requirements that the Licensee had i violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violations. The Licensee responded to the Notice by letter dated May 9, 1990. In its response, the Licensee admitted the violations but requested reconsideration of escala-tion of the base civil penalty based on its asserted identification of the 9007230323 900720 PDR ADOCK 05000327 O FDC l
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residual heat removal (RHR) pump problem prior to the NRC identification and '
l its asserted extensive corrective action put in place prior to and following discovery of the RHR pump problem.
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After consideration of the Licensee's response and the statements of fact, explanations, and argument for reconsideration contained therein, the staff has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the violations ]
occurred as stated and that '.he penalty proposed for the violations designated ,
1 in the Notice should be iinposed.
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I In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act ;
of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Seventy-five Thousand Dollars ($75,000) within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, )
draft, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and )
mailed to the Director, Of fice of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coranission, ATTN: Doculaent Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555. '
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v The Licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order.
A request for a hearing shall be clearly marked as a " Request for an Enforcement i Hearing" and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Assistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement at the same address, and to the Regional Administrator, Region II, Atlanta, Georgia.
It a hearing is requested, the Consission Will issue an Order designating the time and place of the hearing. If the Licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of-this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedings. If payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
In the event the Licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be whether, on the basis of the !
violations admitted by the Licensee, this Order should be sustained.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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jamesLieberman, Director Office of Enforcunent Dated at Rockville, Maryland l thisjo ^t day of July 1990
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APPENDIX, EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSION r
On April 12, 1990, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice)wasissuedforviolationsidentifledduringaspecialNRC inspection at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. TVA responded to the
!!otice in a letter dated May 9,1990. In its response, the licensee admitted the violations, but requested reconsideration of the proposed civil penalty. .
The NRC staff's evaluation and conclusion regarding TVA's response is as follows:
- 1. Restatement of Violations
- a. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 6. Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, deviations and nonconformance are promptly identified and corrected.
NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety Related Pump Loss, issued May 5, t 1988, alerted licensees to a significant condition adverse to quality that involved the potential for the deadheading of one or more pumps in safety-related systems that have a miniflow line conson to two or raore pumps or other piping configurations that do not preclude pump-to-pun.p interaction during miniflow operation.
Licensee engineering calculation DNE SQN-74-0053, dated July 22, 1988, determined that RHR pump damage would occur for a pump that was run deadheaded for greater than 11 minutes.
10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information provided to the Comission by a licensee, be complete and accurate in all material respects.
Licensee letter to the NRC in response to NRC Bulletin 88-04, dated 1988, stated that the potential existed for deadheading a August safety-re2, lated RHR pump due to pump-to-pump interaction under miniflow conditions when the head differential between the pumps exceeded 11 l pounds per square inch (psi). The letter also stated that recent ,
surveillance test data denonstrated that the head differential between I the two RHR pumps was less than 11 psi, ensuring a minimum flow of i 100 gallons per minute to allow pump operation for up to 20 minutes without requiring operator intervention.
Ccutrary to the above, as of December 5,1989, the licensee failed to sc'ec,uattly identify and corrt.ct a significant condition adverse to quality regarding the potential for safety-related RHR pump damage from deadheadir.p due to punip-to-pump interaction curing n.iniflow conditions in that:
- 1. No action had been taken to preclude damage to u FHR ptp shculd 1 de6dheading develop due to pump-to pump interaction undu niini-flow conditions, until a special test demonstrated that the Unit 1 RHR_ pumps deadheaded under those conditions on December 5, 1989.
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< j Appendix 2. The licensee's evaluation of Unit 1 RHR pump survei,ltrice ttst data, referenced in their August 2,1988 letter to the NRC, was inadequate 'A identify that an RHR pump was likely to deadhead due to pump-to-pump interaction, as the majority of the test data from July 1987 through August 1988 indicated that the head cifferential pressure between the pumps exceeded 11 psi. As a ;
result inaccurate inforuation was provided to the Comission on
- August 2, 1988.
- b. Technical S)ecification 6.8.1, requires in part, that written ,
procedures se established, implemented and maintained covering the ;
applicable procedures recommended in Appendix "A" of Regulatory ,
Guide 1.33, Revision 2 February 1978.
Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, requires procedures for coirbating emergencies and other significant events.
Technical Specifications 6.8.2, requires in part, that changes to procedures be reviewed and approved prior to implementation as set ,
forth in Specificatien 6.5.1.A. '
Technical 5)ecification 6.5.1.A requires in part, that (ach review
- determine w1 ether or not an unreviewed safety question is ihvolved pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. ,
Contrary to the'above, on December 6,1989, the licensee performed an inadequate review of Einergency Instruction E-0, Reactor Trip and Safety injection, Revision 7, required by Regulatory Guide 1.33 to combat en.ergency events. The procedure change would terminate RHR operation prior to the procedure steps requiring operator exainination of certain parameters to diagnose whether a LOCA was occurring. The review failed to ensure that the procedure change did not involve an unreviewed safety question pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. ,
5 Violations A.1, A.2, and B are a Severity Level'111 Problem (Supplement 1).
Civil Penalty - $75,000 (assessed equally among the violaticns)
- 11. Sumary of Licensee's Response The licensee admitted the violttions citet in tbt subject Notice. However, the licensee believed that escalation of the base civil penalty based on NRC identification should be reconsidered. In additicn, the licenste stutea that tscalation of the proposed civil pentity to eitphasize the neeo for TVA te identify and address taese pas t picblems v.as cnnecessery.
Pertaining to the n.iti tien fcctcrs in St.ction \.1; of the enforcerent polity in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the licensce imede the to11 ewing 6rguments relative to ieccnsiceration of the proposed civil penalty. >
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l Appendix a. The licensee-stated that prior to the date of NRC discovery, TVA had discovered data suggesting the problem and was in the process of l determining the significance of the data. The licensee contended that its actions to address this issue both preceded and occurred in parallel to NRC's involvement leading up to full identification and confirmation of the RHR pump problem,
- b. The licensee also stated that the extensive programatic corrective I actions which had been put in place both prior to and folloteing discovery of the RHR pump problem merited consideration. The licensee believes'that these actions demonstrate TVA's willingness and ability to identify and correct problems. Additionally, because many of the corrective actions addressing key progransnatic weaknesses had been put ,
in place before discovery of the RHR pump problem, the licensee argued that escalation of the proposta civil penalty to emphasize the need for TVA to identify and address these past problems was unnecessary. <
III. NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Response
- a. Identification and Reporting
.The violathn was escalated 50% based on NRC identification of the issue. The NRC determined that the licensee should have reasonably discovered the violation before the NRC identified it.
In its determination to escalate under the Identification and Reporting factor, the NRC had already considered that the system engineer had found the discrepant RHR ) ump differential pressure data.
The NRC believes that the data should lave indicated to him that dead-heading of the RHR pumps would act#1y have occurred if a safety injection signal was received. Hoe.ser, System Engineering forwarded ,
this-information to Site Engineerik, without determining its signifi- '
-cance and without determining if this condition constituted ino)er- l ability or if a condition adverse to quality existed. Both of tlese determinations would have entered this issue into licensee admini-strative programs which would have placed a time limit on correcting ,
the problem.
When the system engineer's memorandum reached Site Engineering, which was about the same time that the NRC identified the problem, Site L Engineering also did not determine that this condition constituted I L inoperability nor that a conditicn adverse to quality existed until 5 -l days later when a confirmatory test was run by the operations l department. .l Similarly, Systems Engineering and Site Engineering were also involved l with a review of the Unit 2 RHR pump perforn.ance data prior to November 29, 1989 which inaicated that the performance of one RHR l- pump had changed. One of the criteria for changing the ASME Section XI dCCeptance criteria for the pump to maintain it as operable whs whether pump-to-pump differential pressure would resul', in deadheading of the L
weaker pump. The determination that dead-hecding of the Unit 2 puu;ps l- l
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Appendix would not' occur was made using the quarterly RHR pump. test data. ,
However, in the case of the Unit 1 RHR pumps, these two groups failed- '
to determine that the pumps were inoperable when a majority of the quarterly RHR pump test data indicated that pump-to-pump differential pressure exceeded 11 psi. The NRC believes that sufficient data was available to both System Engineering and to Site Engineering to have ,
immediately questioned operability of the Unit l' pumps and as a. l minimum to have identified the condition as a condition adverse to quality.
1 Since the licensee had not identified the issue in any established '
program that would have led to corrective action until five days after I the issue was identified by the NRC, and since significant additional l NRC involvement was necessary to obtain licensee action to properly identify the issue, the NRC concludes that the violation was NRC l identified. j l
Prior opportunities to identify the aroblem were also available before ,
NRC identified it. These included t1e original review as part of the '
Bulletin response, system engineer reviews of the quarterly ASME Section XI pump test data, the System Engineering and Site Engineering j reviews of the Unit 2 data described above, and the system engineer i review of the Unit I data described above. In addition,'during' preparation of corrective action at the time of the Bulletin response and during implementation after the Bulletin response the licensee l had opportunities to identify that the consequences of deadheading '
would not be prevented by the implementation of the corrective action.
Had the licensee used the 11 minute value calculated by it for time >
to damage during deadheaded operation instead of 20 minutes (the value submitted by the licensee in its letter dated August 2,1988, which i assumes a 100 gpm minimum flow) when reviewing the Emergency Procedures, the consequences of deadheading probably would have been prevented.
Based on the above, the NRC believes that the licensee should have reasonably discovered the violations prior to NRC. involvement.
-b. -Corrective Action In the area of corrective action, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C states that mitigation should be based on prompt and extensive corrective action. Escalation is appropriate if ccrrective action is not prompt or minimally acceptable'. Consideration should be given to timeliness, degree of licensee initiative, and comprehensiveness of corrective action.
Initial corrective action taken after NRC identification of the issue Wds not prompt. Plant management was notified by the NRC of this condition on December 1, 1989, the day after the condition was puinted out to Systems Engineering by the resident inspector. During the NRC resident inspector exit on December 4,1989, the NRC specifically requested the ' <ensee's position on operability of the RHR pumps.
The determination that inoperability existed occurred after a confir-mation test was run the following day. At that time, the licensee j
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. . Appendix e also determined that a condition adverse to quality existed. There-fore, corrective action began approximately 2 weeks af ter System Engineering cor.pleted it's review of the data and 5 days after Site Engineering and the NRC became aware of the condition.
l After the confirmatory test was run and inoperability declared, the licensee's immediate corrective action resulted in Violation B. NRC 1 prompting was necessary in order to achieve adequate iunediate -l corrective action in relation to the emergency procedure revision. l As stated in the letter dated April 12, 1990 transmitting the Notice .I of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, the NRC had recognized that most-programatic corrective actions had already been 1 identified and were either already in place or were in the process of being put in place. As a result, the proposed civil penalty was not- 1 escalated because the comprehensiveness of the overall programmatic .
corrective actions offset the lack of promptness and acceptability of the immediate corrective actions, and the degree of NRC interaction i necessary to achieve it.
IV. NRC Conclusion I The licensee:did not provide a sufficient basis for reduction of the proposed civil penalty. The NRC believes that escalation of the civil
-penalty is appropriate to emphasize the need to use established programs to-identify and correct problems. These programs ensure that potential conditions adverse to quality are adequately' evaluated and prompt, effec- !
tive corrective action taken. Consequently, the NRC staff concludes that I the proposed civil penalty in the amount of $75,000 should be imposed.
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. Tennessee Valley Authority
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- l c DISTRUBITION: ;
E -SECY r
.CA 1 HThompson, DEDS JSneizek, D3DR -
JLieberman, SE SEbneter, RIl- t LChandler, OGC- f THurley, NRR '
JPartlow, NRR .
Enforceraent Coord Nators t
.RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV FIngram,GPA/PA BHayes,.01 EJordan,=AE0D .,"
DWillian:s, OIG WTroskoski,_OE-Day File
.EA File.
DCS-DDandois, RM {
SBlack,.NRR-BWilson,-TVAP/RII .
LWatson,.TVAP/RII-JBrady,-TVAP/RII JRutberg,.0GC Glainas, NRR' FHebdon,--NRR JDonohew, NRR hRC Resident Inspector U.S. -Nuclear Regulatory Consiission s 2600 Igou Ferry ,
y : Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379
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