ML20217F453

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Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR70.24 Re Criticality Monitors at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
ML20217F453
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 03/25/1998
From: Collins S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Shared Package
ML20217F457 List:
References
NUDOCS 9803310416
Download: ML20217F453 (5)


Text

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e 7590-01-P UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328

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- (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

)

Units 1 and 2)

)

EXEMPTION 1.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA or the licensee) is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79, which authorize operation of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Units 1 and 2, respectively. The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors at the licensee's site located in Hamilton County, Tennessee.

II.

' Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, " Criticality Accident Requirements," requires that each licensee authorized to possess special nuclear material

- (SNM) shall maintain a criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such materialis handled,'used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (s)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 specify

', ' detection and sensitivity requirements that these monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two 990331'0416 900325 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P

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detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain emergency.

procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the procedures ensure that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause of the alarm and placement of radiation survey Instruments in accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of.

10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to identify quickly personnel who have received a dose of 10 rods or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies, and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of contaminated individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary. Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be used in the reactor.

Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any licensee who believes that there is good cause why he should be granted an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the relief requested.

Ill.

The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at SQN is in the form of nuclear g

~ fuel; the quantity of SNM other than fuel that is stored on site is small enough to preclude achieving a critical mass.- The Commission's technical staff has evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel et SGN, and has determined that it is extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur if the licensee meets the following seven criteria:

1.

Only one fuel assembly is allowed out of a shipping cask or storage rock at one time.

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i _ 2.

The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.

3.

If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density,' then the k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability,95% confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.

- 4.

The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with pure water.

5.

Tho quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than the quantity necessary for a critical mass.

6.

Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.

7.

The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight percent.

By letter dated December 5,1997, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request the licensee addressed the seven criteria given above. The

- Commission's technical staff has reviewed the licensee's submittels and has determined that SQN meets the criteria for prevention of inadvertent crthcality; therefore, the staff has l determined that it is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent criticality to occur in SNM handling or storage areas at SQN.

The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that such d

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an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has radiation monitors, as required by.

General Design Criterion 63, in fuel storage and handling areas. These monitors will alert -

personnel to excessive radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions.

The low probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the licensee's adherence to General Design Criterion 83, constitutes good cause for granting an exemption to the roouirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

IV.

The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this exemption is authorized by law, wi!! not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the Tennessee Valley Authority an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the environment (63 FR 14481

).

This exemption is effective upon issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a

o ector Office of Nuclear Reactor s gulation o

Dated at Rockville, Msryland,

- this :25thday of : March 1998-1 g

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. an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, in fuel storage and handling areas. These monitors will alert personnel to excessive radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions.

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The low probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the licensee's adherence to General Design Criterion 63, constitutes good cause for granting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

IV.

The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the Tennessee Valley Authority an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the environment ( 63 FR 14481

).

This exemption is effective upon issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Originalsignedby SamuelJ. Collins Samuel J. Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day of March 1998 Distribution:

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