ML20151A611
| ML20151A611 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1988 |
| From: | Lorion J CENTER FOR NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#388-6741 OLA-2, NUDOCS 8807200061 | |
| Download: ML20151A611 (20) | |
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80CNETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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- t BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-250 OLA-2
) 50-251 OLA-2 Florida Power & Light Co. )
) Spent Fuel Pool Expansion Turkey Peink, Units 3 & 4 )
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INTERVENORS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CONDITIONING LICENSE AMENDMENTS INTRODUCTION ",'.O_ BACKGROUND On April 19, 1988, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board issued their Initial Decision in the above captioned proceeding, which concluded that License Amendment Nos. 111 and 105 to License Nos. DPR-31 and DFR-4, respectively issued by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on November 21, 1984 should remain in full force and effect without modification.
Subsequently, on June 27, 1988, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board issued an Order in the proceeding which stated that it appeared that the Board ha'd placed considerable reliance upon two commitments by the applicant in reaching their initial decision in this operating license proceeding, and posed
- the question whether the Licesning Board should have imposed license conditions embracing those commitments.
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ARGUMENT Intervenors, the Center for-Nuclear Responsib'ility.and Joette Lorion, contend that the Board did place entirely too much taith in the commitments of the Licensee, Florida Power and Light Company, and that the Board should hn/e required that the License Amendments be conditioned to assure that the-Licensee would keep these commitments.
However, before Intervenors argue the merits of this contention, Intervenors would like to raise the question as to whether or not the Board would now have jursidiction to condition the amendments should it be decided that this is necessary to a protect the public health and safety.
Under NRC case law, Jnce the Licensing Board issaes a decision in which it disposes of a particular issue on the merits and a notice of appeal from that decision is filed, the Licensing Board no longer has jurialiction to act further with regard to that issue. See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-699, 16 NRC 1324, 1327 (1982).
Jurisdiction over that matter rests with the Appeal Board. Appeal Board sua sponte review authority can include the imposition of
! 31 cense conditions. See, e.g. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-746, 18 l
NRC 749 (1983): and Georgia Power Co., et al, (Vogtl Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 and 2), 25 NRC 23 (1987).
Thus, Intervenors contend that should this Appeal Board decide after reviewing the record of this proceeding that
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L conditions should have been imposed on the license amendments, this Appeal Board has the authority to impose such conditions.
I For instance, in a similar case, Sacramento Municipal Utility District, (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station),
18 NRC 749 (1983), the Appeal Board upon sua sponte review of the record af t'irmed the Licensing Board 's initial decision in the proceeding and affirmed it subject to the imposition of a license condition requiring additional radiographic inspections of certain high pressure injection nozzles. In their decision at 752, the Appeal Board ordered the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to impose an inspection regime as a condition on the licensee s operating license. Further, the Appeal Board required that certain of the Licensee s commitments be formalized by urging the staff to require that certair procedures be l incorporated into the techical specifications for the plant.
Id. at 754.
Thus, it is clear that there are many avenues that this Appeal Board can take should the members become convinced that the Board erred by not conditioning the license amendments.
PUBLIC SAFETY DEMANDS CONDITIONING -
Public safety is the first, last, and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction permit or a license to operate a nuclear facility. Power Reactor Development Corp. v. International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 402 (1961). The Commission must have reasonable assurance that the public health and safety are not l
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endangered by its licensing actions.
Part of the Commission t s responsibility in license amendment proceedings, such as the spent fuel expansion, is to see that the General Design Criteria (GDC) is met. In the proceeding at hand, there was a great amount of discussion as as to whether the requirements of GDC 62 would be met.
General Design Criterion (GDC) 62, PREVENTION OF CRITICALITY IN FUEL HANDLING AND STORAGE AND HANDLING, according to Laurence A. Kopp of the NRC, states that criticality in the fuel storage and handling system shall be prevented by the use of geometrically safe configurations. Mr. Kopp goes on to state that the NRC)s acceptance criterion for assuring that GDC 62 is me is found in the Standard Review Plan, Section 9.1.2, which requires, which requires maintaining a storage array neutron multiplication factor (keff) less than or equal to 0.95 in spent fuel pools in normal and accident conditions. (Kopp testimony at pg. 3).
And, according to both Staff and FPL witnesses at the hearing, this standard must be met with unborated water, because they l
l cannot take credit for the boron in the spent fuel pools in their calculations. (Transcript at 268 and 330, 331, 34'0). Thus, it is clear from the transcript of the proceeding that boron, is secondary safety measure in the spent fuel pool, while boraflex is the primary safety measure and the only material that can be consideredin calculating (keff).
Thus , if one reviews the record in this light, it is clear that should the boraflex at Turkey Point develop gaps at certain enrichments, it is clear that (GDC) 62, which requires a (kefg)
less than or equal to 0.95 will not be met. (Transcript at pp.
270-71, 281-283, 340-342). Intervenors believe that this is the reason that the Licensee stated in a letter to the Commission
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dated August 31, 1987, that Turkey Point would not store fuel with an enrichment of 4.1 percent prior to the completion of the next surveillance testing of Boraflex in approximately three years. Although the NRC Staff (tanscript at Wing testimony at pg 16) and the Licensing Board in their initial decision considered this to be a commitment not to store the more highly
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enriched fuel, Counsel for the licensee made it clear that there is no limit in Florida Power & Light's license that would prevent them from doing so. (Transcipt at 282). In fact, Licensee has requested and been granted a license amendment that would allow them to use the more highly enriched fuel in their reactors.*
NRC Information Notice No. 87-43, Gaps in Neutron Absorbing l Material in High Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks, dated Sep-tember 8, 1987, made it clear that the gaps identified in the Boarflex at Quad Cities is a potentially significant problem.
It also stated that the safety concern is that certain gaps might excessively reduce the margin of nuclear subcriticality in the pool. Intervencrs demonstrated at hearing that should gaps develop in the boraflex at Turkey Point in fuel enriched more than 4.1, that GDC 62 would not be met. The Board should l have conditioned the license amendments to require that the l
Licensee not store any fuel with an enrichment greater than 4.1 weight percent U-235 prior to completion of the next surveillance.
l Since the Board did not, the Appeal Board must now act to protect the public health and safety.
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- See ASLBP No. 84-505-08 LA l
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Finally, as to Licensee's assurances that they will undertake to establish.a surveillance program that will evaluate Boraflex' specimens in Regions 1 and 2_of the spent fuel pool and perform blackness testing on the Boraflex, Intervenors feel that the Board has again erred by not asking the Staff to request that the Licensee submit their formal program and incorporate the surveillance program into the technical specifications of the plant. Especially since the deteriora, tion of the boraflex in the spent fuel pool could pose a threat to the public health and safety. According to Mr. Wing of the NRC Staff, s ubstantial degradation can alter the neutron attenuation properties of the Boraflex panels and consequently decrease the margin of subcciticality in the fuel pool.
(Transcript at 350).
The Appeal Board should also take official notice of the fact that Florida Power and Light Company is currently under close scrutiny by the NRC because of poor management practices at the Turkey Point plant. a nd should consider whether or not this utility can be relied upon to mect their commitments if they are not formalized. (See attatchment A and B).
t CONCLUSION l
l For all of the above stated reasons, Intervenors believe that the Board erred by not conditioning the license amendments to formalize the two commitments of Licensee on which they appear to have made their decision.
However, Intervenors have reason to believe that the Board cannot now condition these amendments, since it is out of their i
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jurisdiction, and that the authority to condition them now rests _with the Appeal Board. Thus, Intervenors respectfully suggest that this Appeal Board consider placing the following x conditions on the license amendments:
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- 1. That the Licensee not store any fuel with an enrichment greater than 4.1 weight percent U-235 prior to completion of the next surveillance in December 1989;
- 2. That the Licensee conduct a safety analysis after the December 1989 surveillance to be submitted to the NRC Staff which provides reasonable assurance that spent fuel with enrichment tm to 4.5 weight percent U-235 can be stored in '
the Turkey Point spent fuel pools and maintain the 0.95 a
keff acceptance criterion before storing such fuel;
- 3. That the Licensee submit to the NRC Staff a formalized program for surveillance of the Boraflex in the spent fuel pools, including blackness testing, which would be conducted in December 1989, and five year intervals or sooner if industry experience indicates a shorter period for surveillance is warranted; and that this program be incorporated into the technical specifications.
- See McCracken testimony, transcript at 358-360.
The NRC, by regulation (10 C.F.R. 54.57 (a) (3) (1),
requires reasonable assurance that all license activities be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public. Intervenors believe that the Board's failure to condition the license amendments to include the two l
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- I 8- 1 commitments by the Licensee that would assure'the: integrity of the Boraflex material would cause the NRC to violate.this rggulation. Should the Boraflex material in.the pool breakdown, the chances of,a criticality accident would increase sa t certain enrichments. A' criticality accide he resultant release of radioactivity from the s, 1 pool is one'of the most feared nuclear accidents'and according to NUREG/CR 4982, Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools _in _____ _
Support-of Generic Issue.82 , such a worst case accident in a spent fuel pool could permanently contaminate a 224' square mile radius of land with long-lived radioactivity. (Transcript at P. 89).
In short, Itervenors believe that because the Board erred m
by not' conditioning these license amendments, that it is now the responsibility of the Appeal Board to act immediately so-that the public health and safety will not be jeopardized by-the Boatd 's failure to act conservatively in affirming the.
subject license amendments without formalizing the commitments of the utility.
Respectfully submitted, lb \ Su Joette Lorion Center for Nucler Responsibility 7210 Red Road #217 Miami, Florida 33143 (305) 661-2165 Dated. July 13 , 1988
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4 ' 00CKETE0 USNitC f"g UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. .88 al 18 P4 :25 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL. u. . BOARD
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In'the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-250 OLA-2
) 50-251 OLA-2 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. )
) Spent Fuel Pool Expansion Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4 )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Intervenors Memorandum In Support of Conditioning License Amendments in the above captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States y- Mail, first class, or as indicated by an asterisk, by Federal Express, this 13 th day of July, 1988:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Harold Reis, Esq.
Appeal Board Members
- Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1615 L Street NW Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20036 g Dr. Robert Lazo, Chairman Norman Coll, Esq.
Atomic' Safety and Licensing Board- 3200, Miami Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 100 Chopin Plaza Washington, D.C. 20555 Miami, F1. 33131 j Dr. Emmeth A Leubke .
Docketing and Service Section fr 5500 Friendship Blvd. Apt. 10 Office of the Secretary Chevy Chase, MD 20815 .U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr.-Richard Cole s
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
-Mitzi A. Young YM Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Joette Lorion Washinton, D.C. 20555 Director of the Center for Nuclear Responsibility 7210 Red Rd. 217 Miami, Fl. 33143 (305) 661-2165
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OAQh UNITED STATES '
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of '
) Docket Nos. 50-250 I
. ) 50-251 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY . ) License Hos. DPR-31
) DPR-41 (Turkey Point Nuclear Plant ) EA 87-85 Units 3 and 4) ,
ORDER (EFFECTIVE I MEDIATELY)
I Florida P,ower a'nd Light Company is the holder of operating Licenses No. DPR-31 and DPR-41 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Coenission (NRC/Cennission) on July 19, 1972 and Acril 10, 1973 respectively. The licenses authcrize the licensee to operste Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Units 3 and 4 in ac:Ordance with ,
conditions specified therein.
II Between July 1983 and May 1987, the licensee has been cited for 32 /iolations fer failure to izoiesent er to folicy precedures. Lack of manag n n centrols in these and other areas has resulted in multiple escalated enforcement actions including 'seven civil penalties since July 20, 1984 and two additional civil penalties in the brief period since July 21, 1987. Overall poor performance by the licensee additionally resulted in the Turkey Point Performance Enhancement Program. A Ccnfirmatory Order was issued on July 13, 1984 to confiru the implementation of this program. Subsequently to that, numerous additional violations were identified and the Phase II Assessment Program was developed by FP&L to be implemented in conjunction with the Performance Enhancement Program.
This was addressed in the Confirmatory Order issued on August 12, 1986, ik G fihb g"0
Routine inspections of the licensee's activities were conducted during May 18
- July 20, 1987. The results of these. inspections indicated that the licensee again had not conducted its activities 'in full cogliance with NRC requirewnts.
In conjunction wiiih this Order, a written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty is being served upon the licensee. The Notice of Violation details a number of examples of the failure to adhere to approved procedur'es and maintain configuration control over safety-related systems.
III Tie 'trst .tW violatiCns described in the Notice detJil a nub 6er of occasions wt>ere plant personnel manipulated valves without the use of approved procedures or approval of licensed supervisory personnel. The major areas of concern included operations personnel departing from approved procedures, failing to ncti'y the cont:~::1 ::ca of changes in system lineups, the loss of configuraticn l control over the safety-related emergency boration system, and system engineers directing plant operators to perform valve operations without first obtaining the proper authorization from the control roca staff and without using approved procedures. These failures to adequately establish or inplement procedures to assure configuration control of the safety-related emergency boration system resulted in the loss of boric acid flow paths which were required by Technical l
Specifications. Additionally, a turbine operatur closed valves which he thought were misaligned. The operator was unaware of the proper valve lineup l configuration, failed to report the system realignment t: the control recm, s
failed to inplement the approved system lineup procedure, and failed to document
l the perceived misalignavant and his subsequent realignment. At least one plant operator also failed to identify or promptly inform the control room staff of the status of the valves. The inproper manipulation of these valves resulted in the isolation of the nitrogen backup system for the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) flow control valves. The AFW flow control valves normally use the non-safety-related, non-seismic instrtnunt air system for automatic valve
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positioning; therefore, the failure to have the nitrogen back-up system available is unlikely to have prevented the AFV system frem operating. Never-theless, these failures by plant per:cnnel indicate a lack of appreciation for procMur31 ceccliance, systec config. nion control, and receiving appropriate authorization for realignments frca t.u control roca.
The third violation described in the Notice addresses an event involving operation of the Intake Cooling Water (ICV) system outside the plant design basis, another exazole wilere c e=u.ic::icas of recuired information to super-visory personnel was a centributing factor. On December 1,1986, a performance test conducted on the Unit 3 Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchangers indicated degraded performance. Revised data and proposed irmediate cleaning schedule were forwarded to the Shift Technical Advisors on December 4,1986, but the changes required by the revised performance data were not implemented and the cleaning schedule was not adhered to. As a result of this failure to perform corrective action, with the 38 CCW heat exchanger out of service for cleaning during a seventeen hour period on December 11, 1986, the tw CCV heat exchangers remaining in service would Det have been able to dissipate the maximum hypothetical heat load even with the ICW flow provided by two ICW
pumps as described in safety evaluation JPC-L-85-38, Rev. 2, and the turbine plant cooling system isolated.
- In addition on e September 13, ,1987, a licensed operator permitted an unauthor-ized, non-licensed individual to nanipulate the reactor dilution controls in Unit 3 control' room, and although a management representative on shift observed and reported the incident, neither the Site Vice-Presi^nt nor management at
- t. e Corporate Office were infor:r.d of the e/ent until a week later. The M C
"; continuing tO eY3luate the CirCutst3nces surrounding this event, but it is c' ear that an attitude that permits an unauthorized, non-licensed individual u perform such actions is unacceptable. The EC will consider whether further action is necessary on this issue subsequent to the coupletion of our evaluation.
IV The nature and number of deficiencies that have been identified over the past few years at Turkey Point described in Section II together with the more recent '
issues in Section III raise questions regsrding the ability of Florida Power and Light to adequately control activities at Turkey Point. In contrast, the licensee's St. Lucie facility has performed well with few of the weaknesses eYident at Turkey Point, Continued operation of the Turkey Point facility may require significant personnel and procedural changes at both Turkey Point and the Florida Power and Light corporate office in order to ensure a consistent level of adequate performance.
Florida Power and Light has taken the initiative in developing a nunner of
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- basis of selected systems, a review and revision of all operating piecedures, making a number of management changes, a nunagement on-shift program and.
contracting with an outside consuit:ht to review its activities. The last two initiatives which the licensee committed to in a letter dated October 7,1987 and further described in' meetings on Septerber 25, 1987 and October 8, 1987, as well as in a latter dated October 19, 1987 appear necessary te provide assurance that prcper controls are in place, along with qualified and committed management, and staff to properly perfcrm licensed activities. Therefore, I have determined that public health and safety require that Florida Fower and i
Light's plan for an independent evaluatien be confirmed as revised by this Order.
Pending the XRC evaluation of the results of the independent evaluation, I have also determined that the public health and safety requires that an on-shift oversight program be confirmed as revised by this Order.
Y In view of the foregoing pursuant to Section 103, 161(1), 161(o) and 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as anenc'ed, and the Cornission's regulations in 10 C1'R 2.204 and 10 CFR Part 50, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED EFFECTIVE IM4EDIATELY THAT:
l A. Within 30 days of the date of this Order, the licensee shall submit to
! the Region II Administrator for review and approval a plan for an l independent written appraisal of site and corporate organizations and activities that would develop reconnendations, where necessary, for i
! improvements in management controls and oversight to provide assurance that personnel will comply with required procedures. Upon approval
a e e dates shall not be extended without good cause and the concurrence of the Region II Administrator. The appraisal shall be completed as called for in the above plan, but in any case, within six months of the date this Order. The plan shall include at least the elements itemized below:
- 1) . An independent organization retained by the licensee shall evaluate current organizationel responsibi 41+1 ',, renagement controls, iriorovement and upgrade programs, staffing levels and ccmpetence, communications, the safety review precass, and operating practices both at Turkey Point ned the corporate cifice. The licensee's programs for personnel nativation such as incentive and disciplinary programs shall be examined in the appraisal. Where applicable, the practices at the St. Lucie facility shall be reviewed and coecared with those at Turkey Point.
- 2) The appraisal shall include a review of the licensee"s site and corporate management supervisory personnel as well as a representative nus6er of site working level personnel to determine their under-standing of both regulatory and adiinistrative requirements in the areas of procedural isolementation and compliance. Additionally, a determination of the level of commitment of the personnel to such goals should be made.
- 3) The appraisal report shall include the views of the indeoendent organization on the causes of the past failures to meet regulatory requirements referenced in Section II and III of the Order and an
.. 1 programs and management changes to achieve lasting safety improvements in compliance with Comission requirements. Past efforts to improve procedures relating to security and operations shall be reviewed.
Recomendations shall be made for procedural, organizational, personnel, or other changes to improve the safety of plant
, operations and compliance with Comission requirements.
- 4) A description of the appraisti program, the qual'fication of the appraisal team, a discussion of how the apprai::' is to be documented, and a schedule with appropriat? milestones. i j 5) Periodic meetings shall be provided between the outside organization and the licensee to alert the licensee o' potential safety issues that may need imediate carrecticn.
l B. The final report, as weli as interim findings, will be comunicated to l a senior-level review board consisting of the FP&L Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, the President and Chief Operating Officer, and the Group Vice President Nuclear Energy Department.
l C. The licensee shall direct the outside organization to submit to the l Region II Administrator a copy of the report of the appraisal recomendations
! resulting from the appraisal, and any and all drafts thereof, at the same time they are sent to the licensee or any of its employees or contractors.
Prior notice shall be given the Region II Administrator of any meeting between the licensee and the organization to discuss the results,
Administrator may designate a member of his staff to attend any such meetings as an observer. In addition the licensee shall Consider the recomendations resulting from the appraisal and provide to Region II Administrator within 30 days of the receipt of the appraisal an analysis of each such reconnendation and the action to be taken in response to recomend'ation. The licensee shall also provide at that time a schedule for accomplishing these actions. Justification shall be provided for any recomendation of the appraisal not adopted.
C. Pending the cce letion of the review of the results of the a'cve independent appraisal program, the licensee shall 1splement a continuous on-shift oversight program to monitor the safety of plant operations, both in and out of the control room. The oversight program shall be irclemented prior to either unit entering Mc<fe 2 (Startup) follewing the Current out3ges.
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l) At least one evaluator, whether licensee employee or contractor, on each shift shall have held a senior reactor operator license or have experience in auditing or appraising chreial nuclear plant operations and not have been an employee at the Turkey Point facility within the last two years.
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- 2) A guidane: document will be issued d ich identifies the purpose of the pre. gram, the responsibilities of the personnel assigned to the program, reporting requirements, and the authority given to the evaluators to act where necessary to prevent personnel error and to i
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shall be provided to the NRC. At a minimum the evaluators shall report observations of immediate safety significance to the shift supervisor and his. direct supervisor. Daily reports of all activities addressing questionable operating practices shall be made to the Site Vice President with same day copies provided to the President of FP&L.
. The President of FPal shall be directly responsible for the oversight program. A weekly summary report along with a compilation of daily repcrts shall be previded to the Region II Acministrator.
- 3) Fallcwing the licensee's review of the results of the independent appraisal program the licensee may seek to terminate the oversight program. Written justification of the termination shall be provided to the Region II Administrator, explaining the basis for termination after considering the significan:e of any appraisal or oversight
-incings in the area of plant operations.
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F. The Regional Administrator, Region II, may relax or terminate in writing any of the preceding provisions for good cause.
YI The licensee or any person adversely affected by this Order may request a hearing within 30 days of the date i.f this Order. A request for hearing should be clearly marked as a ' Request for Hearing" and shall be addressed to the Director.
Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cormission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, '4ashington, D.C. 20555, with cooies to the Assistant General Counsel for
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Enforcement, Regional Administrator, Region II, and the NRC Resident Inspector, Turkey Point Nuclear Plant.
If a hearing is requested, the Comission will issue an Order designating the time and place of the hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered shall be phether this Order should be sustained. If a person other than the licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which the petitioner's interest is adversely affected by this Crder and should address the criteria set for .'1 in 10 CFR 2.714(d). Upon the failure of the licensee and any other per:en adversely affected by this Order to answer or request a hearing within the specified time, this Order shall be final without further proceedings. AN ANSWER TO THIS ORDER OR A REQUEST FOR HEARING SHALL NOT STAY THE IMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS ORDER.
FCR TME NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMISSION l
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a s Taylor, puty Executive rector for Regional Operations Dated at Bethesda, Maryland This qciday of October 1987
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, The Miami Nevvs Tuestlay. July R.1988 5A
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l s U.S. presses FP&L execs over Tur<ey Point safety maintenance depat i ment. mduding olirrmg taetter and create an cu o worse work atmosphere. the DONMA GEHRKE private consultants did not indude "too many details"
- w ===** training to workers.
FP&L spokesman Gary Mchalik said executnes to FP&l. mar.agement according to the NifC report.
dated July 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission says a are aware of problems at the plant. but stressed that The 'NRC tea m found Ihe F.ncrcon repori private consultant's assessment of problems at none of them "There gwese any dangers hau been to the community.
smne probicms at Turkey Point. "hard-hitting." but it "undcr-repirted" the faults ol Turkey Point nuclear plant does not go f ar enough in corporate inanancment according to the federal laying the blame at the icet of Florida Power & Light and this < ompany is going to fix them." he said. study.
Co.*s corporate management. Alrea ty. the plant has incorporated some imprme-The federal regulatory agency is giving FP& L until ments. such as hising several top-level and highly lhe prnme rc W did not acknowledge the Aeg 15 to come up wath a long-range plan to solve respecieI nm lear pla n t managers to run turkey re mibility of cosporate tuanagement for mainte-the nuticar power plant's "significant problems and Pomt.Mrhahksani nance shortonnings." the NHC study said. "Fo' Atter,hring hurd mor e ihan 5900,000 for.Iurk"' - exampic. high plant availability (keeping it operating) their rent causes.
nt , uolanons in On- past four yeam Im was emphasiird rather than high plant reliabilitv.
NRC rpokesman Ken Clark in Atlanta said the C"*""""""'I a undy ast year to fimt out what u as Ihis hd to practices such as fixing things quickts language in his agency's report is unusually strong so wrong at t hc ?,.ou0 Dade nudear plant. rather than correctiv, building up excessive mainte-Turkey Point executives will stop certain practices. In Apnl. I nasa I aeed I'.ncrcon Servites iuned a ume bacup -nut
- running equipment until it such as running machinery untilit breaks down. '#P"" ""o f ound 09- idans lacked key twruunul w h" breaks.* *'
"This kind of.activ6ty decreases the margin of had admiuate nue Icar-enn a training and expriicm c. ,t he NHC tcpod ab.o aedited Hu enore succculul safety." Clark said. While the NRC does not think the **'" 'h"ugh it began op ting as a nudcar Lu shts operation of f P&l.,s St. 3.ucic nucicar plant to its n, he said. "Turkey Po i nt more than 16 scars ano Pl ant should be shut dow H WM for i PM to him m ie m W to ept
- midig m emging tiy the corporate of fire."
can operate much better The NHC team also found that Turkey Point s In going beyond the written recommendations of bringing in esce utis rs to work only a year or t wo trainers included those who had failed the te. Is they the private consultant, which found too-frequent . hefore bring transfertro to other departments. It also were trying to trach s equipment breakdowns and poorly trained staff, the recommeruled an emt to too much overtime that was FP&L spokesman Mchahk said utihty of fidals arc NRC is calling for Turkey Point executives to hire tiring workers amt creating a "higher risk of human discussing the NRt"s recommendations and deciding more workers, improve security, establish better error." Fcas in g that utshit ewcutives woubt our r ea. : how they couhl he implementrd.
accident prevention methods and reorganize the -
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