ML20151A490
| ML20151A490 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1988 |
| From: | Frantz S FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO., NEWMAN & HOLTZINGER |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#388-6719 OLA-2, NUDOCS 8807200014 | |
| Download: ML20151A490 (24) | |
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- DXKEIED U5NRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '88 dl 15 P4 :01 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD OFF ICC :s 5g ,, , ; . f 00CHriiN; 4 ;g,rjg BRAhC5
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In the Matter of )
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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-250-OLA-2 ,
) 50-251-OLA-2 (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating ) (Spent Fuel Pool Plant, Units 3 and 4) ) Expansion)
)
LICENSEE'S MEMORANDUM ON WBETHER LICENSE CONDITIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON THE TURKEY POINT SPENT FUEL POOL EXPANSION Steven P. Frantz Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, NW Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20036 Norman A. Coll Coll, Davidson, Carter, Smith, Salter & Barkett, P.A.
4 3200 Miami Center 100 Chopin Plaza Miami, Florida 33131 July 15, 1988 8807200014 800715 PDR ADOCK 05000250 G PDR 1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
Table of Contents ........................................
Table of Authorities...................................... 11 1 Y I. Introduction....................................
2 II. Background......................................
III. Under Standards Established By The Appeal Board, A License Condition Is Warranted Only If It Is Necessary To Prevent An Abnormal Condition Giving Rise To An Immediate Threat To The Health And Safety Of The Public................. ,8 IV. Application Of The Standard Established By The Appeal Board Demonstrates That A License Condition Is Not Warranted For The Use Of 14 Boraflex At Turkey Point........................
V. Conclusions..................................... 19
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,b TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PAGE CASES Cleveland Electric Illuminatina Co.
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), 10 ALAB-831, 23 NRC 62 (1986)..........................
Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-616, 12 NRC 419 (1980)......................... 10, 13 Portlan.d General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant). 9-14, 18 ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263 (1979)..........................
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-746, 18 NRC 749 (1983).......................................... 1.0 Vircinia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-578, 11 10 NRC 189 (1980)......................................
REGULATIONS 9, 12, 10 CFR S 50.59 .......................................... 13, 18 OTHER Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Reactors, 52 Fed. Reg. 10-12, 3788 (Feb. 6, 1987).................................
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G UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD r -l
)
In the Matter of )
)
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-250-OLA-2
) 50-251-OLA-2 (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating ) (Spent Fuel Pool Plant, Units 3 and 4) ) Expansion) -
)
LICENSEE'S MEMORANDUM ON WHETHER LICENSE CONDITIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON THE TURKEY POINT SPENT FUEL POOL EXPANSION I. Iptroduction On June 27, 1988, the Appeal Board issued an order in the above-captioned proceeding that invited the parties to file their views on the question of whether certain conditions should be imposed on license amendments authorizing Florida Power &
Light Company (FPL or Licensee) to expand the capacity of the spent fuel pools for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4. The purpose of this Memorandum is to present Licensee's views on this question.
As discussed below, Licensee submits that issuance of such license conditions would be unwarranted and without support in the record.
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II. Backaround on March 14, 1984, FPL applied for license amendments to allow expansion of the capacity of the spent fuel pool of each nuclear unit of its Turkey Point plant. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Staff determined that the amendments involved no significant hazards consideration and issued the requested amendments under 10 CFR S 50.92 on November 21, 1984, notwith-standing the pendency of a request for hearing on the amendments by Joette Lorion and the Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc.
(Intervenors). Pursuant to these amendments, FPL enlarged the capacity of the spent fuel pool for Turkey Point Unit 3 in early 1985.
The Intervenors proffered ten contentions, of which seven were admitted for litigation. 1/ In response to motions by the Licensee and the NRC Staff, the Licensing Board granted summary disposition of five of these contentions. Contention 5, pertaiiing to the seismic response of the spent fuel racks, and Contention 6, pertaining to the integrity of the materials in the spent fuel pools, were designated for hearing. 2/
Encompassed within Contentien 6 were issues involving the materials integrity of Boraflex. Boraflex is a neutron absorbing material or poison that has been used in the spent fuel storage racks of more than thirty nuclear plants 2/ including 1/ Memorandum and Order (Sept. 16, 1985).
2/ Memorandum and Order (Mar. 25, 1987).
1/ NRC Information Notice 87-43: "Gaps In Neutron-Absorbing
p Turkey Point as a means of preventing' spent fuel pools from becoming critical and from exceeding the NRC Staff's acceptance criterion of.0.95 for the effective neutron multiplication factor (K-effective) (criticality occurs when K-effective equals 1.0).
Hearings were held on Contentions 5 and 6 in September 1987, and the Licensing Board issued an Initial Decision dated April 19, 1988. At the t.?arings, Intervenors did not sponsor any witnesses or offer any evidence. The NRC Staff and Licensee presented. essentially uncontested evidence regarding the perfor-mance chrracteristics of Boraflex, FPL's actians to confirm the and current acceptability of the Boraflex in use at Turkey Point, FPL's plans for confirming the continued acceptability of Boraflex at Turkey Point in the future. Based upon this evidence, the Licensing Board made the following findings:
- Extensive testing has shown that Boraflex maintains its neutron attenuation properties after being subjected to an environment of borated water and irradiation. A/
- Experience with Boraflex at some operating nuclear power plants has shown some materials deterioration or failure (footnote continued from previous page)
Material In High-Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks" (Sept. 8, 1987), attached to les:ter dated September 10, 1987, from Mitzi A. Young (NRC St.iff) to Licensing Board members.
d/ Initial Decision (Spent Fuel Fool Expansion) (Apr. 19, 1988)
(hereinafter "Initial Decision"), at t 65.
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in integrity of Boraflex. For example, Boraflex surveillance coupons at Point Beach experienced some physical changes in color, size, hardness and brittle-ness, but no unexpected change in neutron attenuation properties. In contrast, gaps developed in some of the Boraflex panels used at Quad Cities (the maximum gap size was approximately four inches, which existed in one percent of the tested panels). There is informa-tion suggesting that *5e Quad Cities gaps may have resulted from a combina-l tion of shrinkage of the Boraflex due to f irradiation and deficiencies in the fabrication or design of the storage racks (1212, the racks restrained the Boraflex and did not permit shrinkage of the Boraflex without gap formation). S/
- The design of the Turkey Point storage l racks is different from that used at Quad Cities and is more similar to the design uaed at Point Beach, where Boraflex panels are not restrained from shrinking and have not experienced any 5/ 14. at 11 67-71, 75.
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-S-gaps. As a result, FPL does not expect gaps of significant size or extent to develop in the Boraflex at Turkey Point. 5/
- In early August 1987, FPL performed "blackness testing" of 54 Boraflex panels in the spent fuel pool at Turkey Point Unit 3. 1/ This testing was capable of detecting gaps of 1 to 1 1/2 inches or greater. 8/ FPL found no indication of gaps in any of the 54 Boraflex panels tested at Turkey Point.
Based upon this information, the NRC Staff believes that gaps will not likely form in the Turkey Point Boraflex panels. 1/
f/ Id. at St 72-74.
1/ These panels were representative cf those which have received9 the highest radiation dose to date, estimated to be 7.8 x 10 rads. The Boraflex panels with gaps at Qugd Citier were exposed to doses of approximately 1 x 10 rads.
Testing on behalf of the manufacturer of Boraflex has demon-stratedthatnoappreciableadditionalshringageoccurs 10 after radiation doses reach levels of 5 x 10 to 2.5 x 10 rads. (14. at 1V 67, 81, 83).
8/ The K-effective acceptance criterion would not be exceeded even if all Boraflex panels contained gaps smaller than 1.5 inches. (1d. at V 84).
E/ Id. at 15 72-74, 81.
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- The Licensee performed a sensitivity study to determine the effect of postulated Boraflex gaps on the margin of subcriticality at Turkey Point.
Calculations assumed that the spent fuel contained the maximum enrichment of 4.5%
permitted by the Technical Specifi-cations, and that the spent fuel pool water was not borated. Conservatively postulating that four inch gaps developed at the same elevation in half of the Boraflex " r.els at Turkey Point, the Licensee determined that the K-effective of the spent fuel pools would be less than the acceptance criterion of 0.95. lE/
' Borated water and the Boraflex panels are independent and redundant safety measures for preventing criticality in spent fuel pools. The Technical Specifications for Turkey Point require that a boron concentration of 1950 ppm
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be maintained in the spent fuel pool water. This concentration is sufficient lE/ 14. at it 75-78.
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R to maintain the K-effective of the spent fuel pools below 0.95, even in the absenbe of any Boraflex panels, 11/
- The Licensee has committed to perform two types of surveillance for the Boraflex at Turkey Polet, consisting of an in-service surveillance wptcimen program and blackness testing. This surveillance will evaluate the Boraflex for changes !n physical and nuclear characteristics and spa 6tal distribution of the Boraflex. The Licensee expects to perform its next surveillance by December 1989, and has made a commitment not to store fuel with an enrichment greater than 4.1% in its spent fuel pools prior to its next sur-veillance. 11/
After reciting this evidence at its Initial Decision, the Licensing Board found that, based on the evidenc- presented by the Licensee and Staff, no safety significant degradation in the Turkey Point Boraflex panels at Turkey Point is expected to occur.
The Licens s surveillance programs include blackness tcsting on Boraflex specimens and panels at specified schedules which are adequate to detect physical degradations, 11/ Id. at VV 64, 84, 86.
12/ Id. at 1$ 79-82.
including gaps, and will provide reasonable assurance that gap formation will be detected in sufficient time to enable Licensee to P.ake corrective actions such that the NRC acceptance criterion of k less than or equal to 0.95 is met. Li8bbseeandStaff have adequately analyzed the materials integrity of Boraflex and the material continues to be acceptable for use in safe storage of the spent fuel at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant.
As a result, the Licensing Board (Initial Decision at 1 87) ordered that the amendments "shall remain in full force and effect wi"Sout modification." (Id. at 52). '
In its Order of June 27, 1988, the Appeal Board characterized the Licensing Board as placing "considerable reliance" upon Licensee's commitments to perform surveillance of its Boraflex and not to store fuel with greater than 4.1%
enrichment in the spent fuel pool prior to the next surveillance.
The Appeal Board invited the parties to submit their views on whether these commitments should be imposed as license conditions.
III. Under Standards Established By The Appeal Board, A License Condition Is Warranted Only If It Is Necessary To Prevent An Abnormal Condition Giving Rise To An Immediate Threat To The Health And Safety Of The Public A restriction governing operation of a nuclear power plant may exist in one or more forms, such as plant procedures, the safety analysis report for the plant, and the technical specifications and license for the plant. As explained below, the degree of regulatory scrutiny afforded a change in a res-triction on operation varies depending upon the form of the
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restriction. This in turn affects the determination of whether a restriction should be included as a license condition or part of the technical specifications for the plant.
The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR S 50.59 estab-lish a hierarchy of changes to restrictions on operation of nuclear power plants. This hierarchy is as follows:
Chances in the technical specifications or the license - A licensee may not make a change in its facility er procedures as described in its tecnnical specifications or its license without prior Commission approval. ,
Chances in the safety analysis reoort which constitute an unreviewed safety cuestion - A licensee may not make a change in its described in the facility or procedures safety analysis report as/
13 without prior Commission approval, if the change conssi-tutes an unreviewed safety question.
Chances in the safety analysis reoort which do not constitute an unreviewed safety cuestion - A licensee may make a change in its facility or procedures as described in the safety analysis report without prior ,
Commission approval, if the change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.
However, the licensee must prepare a written safety evaluation for such changes and must submit a report to the NRC at least annually describing the changes and summarizing the safety evaluations.
13/ Although 5 50.59 uses the term "safety analysis report," the Appeal Board has ruled that 3 50.59 encompasses changes in a licensee's commitment in a design report submitted in support of a license amendment application.- Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 277-78 (1979).
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The Appeal Board in Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 273 (1979) (footnote omitted) set forth the circumstances under which a restriction on operation should be included in the technical specifications or as a license condition:
(T]here is neither a statutory nor a regulatory requirement that every operational detail set forth in an applicant's safety analysis report (or equivalent) be subject to a technical specification, to be included in the license as an absolute condition of operation which is legally binding upon the licensee unless and until changed with ~
specific Commiss'.on approval. Rather, as best we can discern it, the contemplation of both the Act and the regulations is that technical taecifications are to be reserved for those matters as to which the imposition of rigid conditions or limitations upon reactor operation is deemed necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise t's an immediate threat to the public health and safety.
This standard has been consistently utilized by the Appeal Board in subsequent cases, ld/
This standard has also been endorsed by the Commission in its "Proposed Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors," 52 Fed. Reg. 3788, 3789-3790 (Feb. 6, 1987). As the Commission noted in this 1A/ Egg Cleveland Electric Illuminatino Co. (Perry Nuclear Fower Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-831, 23 NRC 62, 66 n.8 (1986);
Sacramento Municioal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-746, 18 NRC 749, 754 n.4 (1963);
Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-616, 12 NRC 419, 422 (1980); Eircinia E.lectric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Statior., Uni'.s 1 and 2),
ALAB-578, 11 NRC 189, 217 (1980).
interim policy statement, there has been a trend toward increasing the volume of the technical specifications to include essentially all Commission requirements governing the operation of nuclear power reactors. This has caused an increase in the number of license amendment applications to effect changes in the technical specifications, which in turn has diverted both NRC Staff and licensee attention from the more important requirements in these documents and resulted in an adverse but unquantifiable impact on safety. Therefore, in order to reverse this trend, the Commission issued the interim policy statement to establish objective criteria 11/ for determining which operational provisions should be included in the technical specifications and for removing those technical specifications provisions that do not satisfy the criteria. In promulgating these objective criteria, the Commission stated that it was also adopting the subjective standard in Troian. 11/ Additionally, the Commission 11/ The objective criteria are as follows: "Criterion 1:
Installed instrunentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary . . .
Criterion 2: A process variable that is an initial condition of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or Transient Analyses that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier (and which is monitored and controlled during power operations such that process values remain within the analyses bounds)
. . . Criterion 3: A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient and either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier (such that the consequences of these events remains within appropriate acceptance criteria]." 52 Fed. Reg, at 3790.
15/ 52 Fed. Reg. at 3788-90.
clearly indicated its intention that technical specifications should be reserved for those conditions most important to safety.
There are several reasons why the license and the technical specifications should be limited to those restrictions on operation that are necessary to prevent an abnormal condition giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety. First, as the Commission stated in its interim policy statement, such a lin'itation "will result in Technical Specifications that focus licensee's and the plant operator's attention on those plant conditions most important to safety"and should also result in more efficient use of agency and industry resources." 52 Fed. Reg. Et 3789. Second, as the Appeal Board noted in Troian, even thcugh some restrictions on operation in a safety analysis report may not possess sufficient gravity or immediacy to warrant their translation into technical specifi-cations or incorporation into the license, changes in such
. restrictions are still subject to oversight by the NRC Staff through the provisions of 10 CFR S 50.59; if the Staff is dissatisfied with a licensee's changes, it can take appropriate remedial action. 9 NRC at 273-74. 17/
There have been two previous cases in which the Appeal Board has addressed the question of whether a materials sur-veillance provision should be imposed as a license condition or 11/ In its interim policy statement on technical specifications, the Commission stated that in light of its policy to limit the scope of technical specifications, the NRC "will give increased attention to changes made pursuant to S 50.59 . . . . " 52 Fed. Reg. at 3792.
4 part of the technical spec *fications. In each case, the Appeal Board decided against inclusion of such a provision in the license or technical specifications. Specifically:
- In Troian, the Appeal Board decided that a "corrosion coupon" program for the zirconium and stainless steel in the spent fuel pool need not be incorporated in the technical specifications. 9 NRC at 275.
- In Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-616, 12 NRC 419, 421-24 (1980), the Appeal Board held that :he technical specifications need not incorporate a licensee com- ,
mitment to undertake a corrosion surveillance program for the boral (neutron absorber) in the spent fuel racks.
Although the decision in each of these cases was based upon facts ,
particular to the case, these cases indicate that material surveillance programs in general do not rise to a level of significance requiring their incorporation in the technical specifications or as part of the license.
In summary, changes in a licensee's commitments in a safety analysis report (including a design report submitted in support of a license amendment application) are subject to over-sight by the NRC Staff under 10 CFR S 50.59. It is the policy of the Commission to restrict the technical specifications to condi-tions that are most important to safety, and a restriction on operation need only be imposed as a license condition or included in the technical specifications if it is necessary to obviate an abnormal condition giving rise to an immediate threat to the
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! public health and safety. In previous cases, the Appeal Board has held that specific materials surveillance-programs were not of sufficient significance to warrant a license condition or I inclusion in the technical specifications.
IV. Application Of The Standard Established By The Appeal Board Demonstrates That A License Condition Is Not Warranted For The Use Of Boraflex At Turkey Point As discussed in the preceding section, the Appeal Board has established a relatively high threshold for imposition of a license condition. Given the findings by the Licensing Board,.
there is no basis for imposing license conditions related to the use of Boraflex in the spent fuel pools at Turkey Point.
The Licensing Board in this proceeding was fully aware g
of Appeal Board precedent concerning the standards for imposition of a license condition, and it quoted from the Troian decision at length. 18/ After considering all of the evidence, the Licensing Board ruled that the amendments authorizing the Turkey Point spent fuel pool expansions shall remain in full force and effect "without modifications" 11g2, without a license condition. 11/
Thus, implicit in the Licensing Board's Initial Decision is the finding that a license condition related to surveillance of P;raflex or enrichmer.t of stored fuel is not necessary to prevent an abnormal si+.uation giving rise to an immediate threat to the public healtn and safety.
18/ Egg Initial Decision at 9 2.
11/ Id. at 52.
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The record is devoid of any evidence indicating that the use of Boraflex at Turkey Point would give rise to &n immediate threat to the public health and safety absent a license condition. To the contrary, the evidence in the record and the findings of the Licensing Board demonstrate that Boraflex continues to be acceptable for use in safe storage of spent fuel at Turkey Point. As discussed in detail in Section II above:
- 1. There currently ',,re no indications of gaps in the Boraflex at Turkey Point, and gaps are not likely to develop in the Turkey Point Boraflex panels in the future.
- 2. Even if it is assumed arguendo that the Borafier panels at Turkey Point were to develop 4 inch gaps in half of its Botaflex panels (which is far more severe than the gaps experienced at Quad Cities), the Turkey Point spent fuel pools would still satisfy the K-effective acceptance criterion of 0.95 under conditions with unborated water in the spent fuel pool.
- 3. The Technical Specifications require that the spent fuel pool water at Turkey Point be borated, and this borated water is sufficient to maintain the K-effective of the spent fuel pools below 0.95, even in the absence of all Boraflex.
Based upon these findings, a license condition requiring surveillance of Boraflex or limiting the enrichment of stored fuel is unnecessary, and imposition of such a condition l would be inconsistent with the standards for license conditions established by the Appeal Board. Given the fact that gaps have not been detected and are not expected to occur in the Boraflex i
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a at Turkey Point, there is no immediate threat from the use of Boraflex. Furthermore, given that Turkey Point could safely ,
withstand conditions involving unborated water with gaps more severe than experienced at Quad Cities or involving borated-water with the total absence of Boraflex, postulated degradation of Boraflex at Turkey Point poses no threat to the public health and safety. Under these circumstances, neither the licenses nor technical specifications for Turkey Point should be burdened with a requirement for surveillance of Boraflex or a limitatica on fuel enrichment prior to the next surveillance.
Additionally, imposition of a license condition on Turkey Point would be contrary to the Commission's interim policy statement on technical specification improvements. The Commission has stated its desire to restrict the extent of plant technical specifications in order to focus licensee attention on those plant conditions most important to safety and to permit more efficient use of agency and industry resources. As indi-cated in the interim policy statement, the types of restrictions that warrant inclusion in the technical specifications relate to control room instrumentation to detect abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, process variables chosen as reference bounds in the Design Basis Accident or Transient Analyses which are monitored and controlled during power opera-tions, and structures, systems, and components that are part of the primary success path and function to mitigate a Design Basis Accident or Transient and to maintain plant responses within the
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4 appropriate acceptance criteria. .The Licensee's commitments to perform a materials surveillance program for Boraflex and to limit enrichment of stored fuel to 4.1% until the next sur-veillance do not' fall within these criteria.
Furthermore, technical specifications and licenses for nuclear plants typically do not contain provisions for surveillance programs for materials in spent fuel pools. For example, as discussed in Section III above, the Appeal Board has not required other licensees to incorporate such programs in their technical specifications. Additionally, the Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse plants (Turkey Point is a Westinghouse plant) do not contain any requirement for a sur-veillance program for the materials in the spent fuel pool. EE/
Similarly, NRC staff guidance and acceptance criteria for spent fuel pool expansions state that surveillance testing should be performed for neutron absorbing material in spent fuel storage racks, but it does not recommend inclusion of such provisions in the technical specifications. 11/ Therefore, it would be anomalous and inconsistent with the NitC's practice to :.mpose such conditions on Turkey Point.
IE/ Egg Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors, NUREG-0452, Rev. 5, $ 3/4.9.
11/ Egg "OT Position for Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications," $5 III.1.5(1) and (5),
attached to letter from Brian K. Grimes (NRC) to All Power Reactor Licensees (April 14, 1978).
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Finally, a license condition is not necessary to ensure continued NRC Staff oversight of FPL's commitments to perform materials surveillance of its Boraflex at Turkey Point or to
.imit the enrichment of stored fuel to 4.1% until the next surveillance. FPL's commitment for an in-service surveillance for specimen program is contained in the safety' analysis report the Turkey Point spent fuel pool expansion. 22/ Therefore, under the provisions of 10 CFR S 50.59 and Troian, FPL cannot make a change in this commitment without prior Commission approval if such a change would entail an unreviewed safety question, and FPL may make a change that does not involve an unreviewed safety questior only if it prepares a written safaty evaluation and submits a summary of the evaluation to the NRC for its review.
FPL's cor.mitments to perform "blackness testing" and not to store fuel with an enrichment greater than 4.1% prior to the.next surveillanea are embodied in letters to the NRC Stsff. 22/ FPL will promptly notify the NRC Staff of any change in these commitments. Thus, even in the absence of a license condition, there are provisions for NRC Staff oversight of any changes in 22/ Sgt letter dated March 14, 1984, from J.W. Williams, Jr.
Eisenhut (NRC), with attachment entitled (FPL) to Darell G.
"Florida Power & Light Company, Turkey Foint Units 3 and 4, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Modification, Safety Analysis Report," Section 4.8.
22/ Egg letter dated August 27, 1987, from C.O. Woody (FPL) to NRC, transmitted to the Licensing Board by letter dated August 31, 1987, from Steven P. Frantz; letter dated July 10, 1987, from C.O. Woody (FPL) to NRC, transmitted to the Licensing Board, by letter dated July 15, 1987, from l Steven P. Frantz.
4 FPL's commitments with respect to its materials surveillance program for Boraflex and storage of fuel with an enrichment greater than 4.1%.
V. Conclusions Imposition of a license condition on Turkey Point is not necessary to obviate an abnormal condition giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety. Additionally, imposition of a license condition would be inconsistent with the Commission's interim policy statement on technical specificat, ions and with the NRC's practice at other plants. Finally, a license condition is unnecessary to ensure continued NRC Staff oversight of any changes in FPL's commitments related to its materials surveillance program. For these reasons, FPL's commitments to perform a materials surveillance pcogram for Boraflex and to limit the enrichment of stored fuel ut.til the next surveillance should not be incorporated as a license condition or as part of the technical specifications for Turkey Point.
Respectfully submitted, hD4m lFrantz My V
Steven P.
Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
1615 L Street, N.W.
Su!.te 1000 Fashington, D.C. 20036 Norman A. Coll Coll, Davidson, C:rter, Smith, Salter & Barkett, P.A.
3200 Miami Center 100 Chopin Plaza Miami, Florida 33131 July 15, 1988
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 38 JL 15 P4:01 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL _ BOARD yn iG:. u- o #
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In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-250 OLA-2
) 50-251 OLA-2 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY )
)
(Turkey Point Plant, )
Units 3 and 4) ) (Spent Fuel Pool Expansion)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Licensee's Memorandum On Whether License Condition Should Be Imposed On The Turkey Point Spent Fuel Pool Expansion were served on the following by depo-sit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid and properly addressed, on the date shown below.
Dr. Robert M. Lazo, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 5500 Friendship Blvd., Apt. 1923N Chevy Chase, MD 20815 Dr. Richard F. Cole
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 i-Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 j Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi'on Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Chief, Docketing and l
Service Section
' (Original plus two copies)
Mitzi Young, Esq.
Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Norman A. Coll, Esq.
Coll, Davidson, Carter, Smith, Salter & Barkett 3200 Miami Center 100 Chopin Plaza Miami, FL 33131 Joette Lorion 7210 Red Road #208 Miami, FL 33143 Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Requlatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Howard A. Wilber Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Christine N. Kohl Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Benjamin H. Vogler Office of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dated this 15th day of July, 1988.
A**
Steven P. Frantz /
Newman & Holtzinger. P.C.
1615 L Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone. (202) 955-6600 counsel for -
Florida Power & Light Company i
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