ML20147J335

Staff Exhibit S-2,consisting of Joint Affidavit of Bs Norris & DM Silk in Response to Aj Morabito Re Senior Operator Licensing Exam.Notice of Appearance & Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20147J335
Person / Time
Site:	05560755
Issue date:	02/21/1988
From:	Norris B, David Silk NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
References
SP-S-002, SP-S-2, NUDOCS 8803100086
Download: ML20147J335 (21)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA omct or 5EcEc;p NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00CKEllNG BRANCn A REH '

BEFORE THE ACMINISTRATIVE JUDGE  :

In the Matter of )

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A' fred J. Morabito ) Docket No. 55-60755

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(Senior Operator License for )

Eeaver Valley Nuclear Power )

Station, Unit 1) )

JOINT AFFICAVIT OF BARRY 5. NORT:IS AND DAVID M. SILK Earry S. N rris and David M. Silk co cepose and say:-

1. I. Barry S. Norris, arr a Senior Operations Engineer (Examiner /Inspe: tor),

in :ne Fressu-i:ed Water Rea: tor Se: tion. Operations Branch, Division of Rea:tc- Safety at the United States Nu: lear Regulatory Ccmmission. Region i

I. At the tir.e of the examir tion of Alf red J. Morabito my position was Rta: tor Engineer (Examiner) within Se: tion IC of the Division of Reactor Proje:ts. My responsibilities relative to that examination were as the certified examiner observing David M. Silk's administration of the simulator and oral examinations. I assisted in proctoring the written examination and I was responsible for the quality assurance review of the grading of that examination. See attachment to Joint Affidavit of Barry S. Norris and David M. Silk (dated 0:tober 9,1987) for rey professional '

4 qualifications.

2. I, David M. Silk, am an Operations Engineer (Examiner / Inspector) in the Pressurized Water Reactor Section, Operations Branch, Division of Reactor  !

Safety at the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I. At [

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the time of the. examination of Alfred J. Morabito my position was Reacter Engineer (Examiner) within Section 1C of the Division of Reactor  :

Projects. My responsibilities relative to that examination were that I p-epared, administered, and graded the -written examination - and i administerec tne oral and sinulator examinations under the observation of  !

Earry S. Norris. See attacheent to Joint Affidavit of Barry S. Norris  ;

and David M. Silk (datec October 9, 1987) for my professional l

cualifications.

3. Tne pu pose of this af ficavit is to respond to a letter filed by Mr. '

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Morasit: cated Novemoer 7. 1957 (Rebuttal). ,

j 4 k ister E>tmination Comments 2

Car.dicate com?ent or 6.03o (Recuttal oo.1 and 2):

The carcidate states on p. 2 of the Rebuttal that he had to consider all O tessible pl a r,t conditions when a n s.<eri ng the question' and that all i ars.cers proviced wf*e correct f rorr an operator's perspective. He states I that he should receive full credit. .

5. The candidate cites, as an example, a condition where the pressure in the ,

cceponent ecoling water (CCW) system would be greater than reactor f

4 coolant system (RCS) pressure. In this case, a thermal barrier rupture i i ,

would allow CCW to leak chromated water into the RCS.

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The candicate states that by observing the start of the backup cooling water pump due l

to the decreasing CCW pressure, and by observing the difference in the i t

flow indicators of the thermal barriers, an operator could determine that a problem existed in a thermal barrier. The candidate then states that.  ;

an outside operator could then be dispatched into containment, which l

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, I might be open and accessible, to isolate the leaking thermal barrier using the manual isolation valves; thus mitigating the consequences of ,

having chromated water leaking into the RCS.

6. Staff response:

The Staff examirers make every attempt to cevelop examinations which will fairly examine the knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of the candidates for an crerator license. See, Joint Affidavit of Barry S. Norris and David M. Silk, cated 0:tober 9, 1957 at pa-agraphs 3, 4, 5 and part'.cularly pa ragraph 15. The examiners' primary fun: tion is to determine whether a license should be issued to a candidate based upon the level of knowle:ge, cemonstrated on the day of the examination, to operate the plant in a safe and prucent tranner during all situations of plant y) operaticns.

7. Candicates are oirecte: in the examination guidelines, prior to the start cf tne written exa-iration, to state all assumptions so that the examiners may grade the candidate's response (s) accordingly. For the candidate to assume a plant condition other than normal operating temperature and pressure, and to not state that in his answer (su:h as claimed on p. 2 of the Rebuttal), would not be following the directions proviced to him. If a specific plant condition was intended to be i l

considered cther than normal operating temperature and pressure, the question would have specified it (e.g. 6.06a -

"cold solid plant operations"). Mr. Morabito argues at p. 2 in the Rebuttal that he should receive full credit for his answers which he claims were graded incorrect. Since the specific assumptions of low RCS temperature and O -

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( pressure were 'not stated by the candidate, the Staff. appropriately did not give credit for this answer in accordance with its conservative grading approach. To do otherwise, the Staff would have had to assume kneniedge on the part of the candidate.

E. If the RCS pressure was less than the CCW pressure, and if the CCW system was in operation, th6n his response that the cooling water backup pump would automatically start en cecreasing pressure is a true statement.

Honever, since the CCW system contains chemicals harmful to the RCS, the cooling water entering the RCS woul not rninimi:e ' the effects of a thermal carrier ru;ture. but w:uld increase the effect of the rupture.

9. In su mary. on tne day of the examination, Mr. Morabito did not state any assu'rptions te support or clarify his answers; even though the candidates O e 9 4 < e r. e4rectiac se it te 11 >c=c 4ce>- ^ee4t4cn iir- Mr.

Mo ra ci *.c ' s ortginal answer that tne ca ci.-up CCW pump would start to minimi:e the effects of a thermal tarrier rupture is incorrect because the chemicals in the CCW system would be adverse to the RCS.

20. Candicate commert en 6.06a (Rebuttal p. 3):

The candidate provides information to support his position that the-I.

i pressuri:er power operated relief valves (PORVs) are used to control RCS I

5 pressure. He references Appendir pc. 4 through 6 to show that PORVs are often referred to as pressure control components and receive signals t.*om instrumentation designated control channels vice protection channels. He

! also asserts that: alarms associated with PORV operation are referred to i

! as pressure control alarms (Appendix p. 7); one of the three PORVs is d

controlled by the pressurizer pressure controller (Appendix p. 8);

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.., -S- j O( i frilure of the PORVs to' function is a symptem for AOP 13. " Malfunction f of Pressuri:sr Pressure Centrol" ( Appendix p. 9); and operating a PORV .

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4 to redu:e in:reasing pressure is a control action (Appendix p.10).

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11. The candidate claims that the distinction between control and protection -

1 l regardir.g the PORVs is not clear, and that the use of the word "what" in l the question is ambiguous. Tne candicate contends that volumes of i literature lean towares the cefinition of the PORVs as pressure control .

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) 12. Staf' eesponse:

t It sn:uld oe noted at tne onset that the date on the referenced Appendix pc. 3 througn 5 is July 9.1957, almost one year af ter the date of the  ;

! examination. Tnis information was not available on the date of the examinatien and could not have been considered by Mr. Morabito at ' the '

i i tiet o' tre examination. '

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13. hestion 0.066 speci'ied cole solid plant oeerations. The setpoints and l lt t l figure free Appendix pp. 7 and 8 are for normal operating temperature  !

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! and pressure. Appendix pp. 3 through 5 are from a letter addressing  !

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j "FSAR Loss of External Electrical Lead Turbine Trip Event" (a plant ,

i t l condition of normal operating pressure and temperature). The use of the j 3

l PORVs in these instances, when the plant is at normal operating pressure I i

and temperature, may provide limited control capability for increasing i ,

pressure with the pressure safety valves available to provide RCS >

, s overpressure protection. However, during cold solid plant operations,

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1 i the safety valves' setpoint is too high to protect the RCS from sudden i

i pressure surges. In accordance with the Technical Specifications, during l

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. 6- V*i O g cold solid plar$t operations, the PORVs are required to be operable and to function as the Overpressure Protection System (OPPS). .Furthermore, based on the wordicg of the question, there was no indication that an emergency cor.dition existed that would require the use of the PORVs, nor did the candidate state ar emergency condition as an assumption.

24 The Esaver Valley Te:nnical Specifications (page B 3/4 4-20) state "The OPERAEILITY of two p0RVs ... ensures that the RCS"will be p-otected

[erchasis acded) from pressure transients ... when one or more of the ROS cold le;s are 5 275 0 F." To be in cold solid plant operation, the RCS wou': be less inan 200 F.

15. In su-rary. the candicate provided information inconsistent with the corcitions specifie: in the question; and, in one case, the infortnation was not available on the day of the examination. Additionally, the E, ease * "alley Te:hnical Spe:ifications consider the PORVs to be a crete:tive feature during cold solid plant operations.

16. Cancidate com ent on 6.06b (Rebuttal oc. 4 and 5):

The candidate admittee to providing an incorrect answer but provided the following ir.fernation to support his claim that the point deduction was retaliatory. The candidate states that the pressurizer vapor space is l the hottest temperature in the RCS (Appendix p.11). He also states the l 475 F interlock prevents the inlet valve to the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System from being opened if the temperature is greater than the setpoint, so that the answer cf 470 F would not have exceeded the [

l terperature capacity of the RHR system. He states the saturatior, i i

pressure for 475 F is $39 psia, which is greater than the pressure  !

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,- ai interlo:L pressure of 430 psig. In order for the pressure interlock to be ret, the candidate ' states the pressurizer vapor space temperature  ;

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• would be less than 455 F which is 15'F and 20'F less than his answer and the man;al setroint respe:tively. In addition, he states the operator is to snsure tr.at R S pressure and temperature are less' than '430 psig and-f 0

350 F before placing the RHR system into service (Appendix p. 12). f A: cording to tne candidate the tolerance for the- accuracy of the gauce ano :alioratica. is at least ,+ 1'i of full s: ale. The full scale reading 4 c' this instrument is 600 F which allows for an ina: curacy of ; E OF.

Thus. ne ciates tne toleran:e easily covers his answer of 470 F. The -

candicate also points out that a startup check list is completed before pia:ine tne RHR system into service (Appendix pp. }3 & 14) and again the eteratcr is to chect R S tem;,erature and pressure to verify they are m:re O restri:tive than the 47!,cF ressuri:er vapor spa:e temperature permissise.

17. Staff response: ,

l The candidate's explanation to support his answer of 470 F suggests that any temoerature within some broad range would have been adequate. The I original question stated that setpoints were required. All of Mr.

f Mcrabito's justifications do not alter the fact that his answer was i incorrect. As stated in our October 9,1937, affidavit (paragraph 22),

'l the examiners performing the regrade of the examination were not l

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associated with the original grading to ensure that the grading was fair l and correct. I O

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O( 18. Candidate comment on 6.07a (Rebuttal po. 5 and 6):

The candidate states that at Unit 1 the control rods are never selected for automatic operation and that operator response is generally neglected in safety analysis for off-normal events. The candidate refers to Appendix pp. 15 through 17 to provide support to his claim that steam generator safety valves provide the first means of protection against violatien of Section A of the Safety Limit Curve up to 78*. power while ciner cesign features afford secondary protection.  ;

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19. Staf f resDo95';,1 Altneugn M*. Mora:ite contends that the control rod mode selector switch is never selected to automatic, the system is capable of performing automatic opera. ions for tne control of Tavg. In fact, on the day of Mr.

Moratite 's simelater examir.ation, the scenarios were conducted using the I autoratic mooe cf roc cortrel.

20. The Te:nnica' Specification bases (p. B 3/4 7-1) state "Tne OPERABILITY cf the main steam line code safety valves ensures that the secondary system pressure will be limited to within its design pressure of 1085 1

esig during the most severe ar.ticipated system operational transient" (a turbine trip f rom 100*4 power with no condenser available). In the bases se: tion of the Technical Specifications, which includes the Safety Limit Curve, the main steam line code safety valves are not discussed.

21. The reactor protection system monitors primary and secondary parameters to protect the core. The reactor trip setooints are selected to ensure that the reactor core and RCS are prevented from exceeding safety limits I

during normal operations and design basis anticipated occurrences.

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( Therefore, the candidate's statement that the main steam line code safety valves provide the first means to prevent violating a safety limit has no basis. . Additionally, the Staff was unable to determine 'the source of Apperdix pp. 15 through 17. [

22. If a loss of turoine load should occur, as presented in the bases for thw ,

main steam line code safety valves, several other systems would actuate before tne safety valves. The atmospheric steam dump"vilves can provide a heat sink for the RCS ecuivalent to 30*. reactor power. In addition, if t

a turbine tric eccurs at greater than 10'4 power, an automatic reactor.

trip will occur. Also, tne pressure increase in the steam generators, as i

a result of a turbine trip. will reduce the steam generator water level j r

sufficiently to generate a reactor trip due to low steam generator level. i

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Thus, the mair steam line code safety valves are not the first means of

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25. Furtne anore , the nair, steam line code safety valves' lif t settings and  !

I relative capacities are established in accordance with the requirement of  ;

i the ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Boiler and Pressure  !

Vessel Code. Any effect that the main steam line code safety valves have  ;

on the primary system is coincidental. Even if a design feature that i accomplishes an unintenced effect is accepted as a possible correct f I

answer, the candidate's answer is still incorrect. The answer provided  ;

l by the candidate makes a blanket statement about the m51n steam line code l safety valves: "They provide the first means of protection for Tavg increases above program to prevent violating the safety limit curve." In I paragraph 6 on Appendix p. 17 of the Rebuttal the following statement O. -

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trip fro: evertemperature delta T or high pressure." In his examination arswer the candicate failed to state: any assumptions regarding the c.vrar t: situation of the core. Paragraph 1 of Appendix p. 16 says that tne steam generater safety valves protect Se: tion A of the curve up to approximately 75', power. The candidate failed to place any restrictions on his ori;iral answe . thus implying that the rain steam line code saf ety valves protect tr.e entire Safety 1.imit Curve (not just Section A) anc cover all ran;es of rea: tor power, even beyond 75'. power.

24 Ir su=ary M*. Morabite's cem ents regarding the status of the centrol ro:s c: n:t as:ress all possioie moces of operation. In aeditier., the O sver'4 e r <er r=. =>terie- < ti - ==v' e "c e tr>= e se i:= sovr=.

( c;:. eat) is net scopertec by the Te:hnical Soecifications.

3. Car <:ait c c-r e a.: er (.07e (F.eoutta' re. 6 and 7):

The original question asked specifically for two reasens, not conditions, wry the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) close on a steam line rupture. The cardidate claims that he described two reasons why the MSIVs are required to close, and that the original NRC answer key cescrioes two conditiers. To support his argument, the candidate claims that the answer key describes two conditions which could occur if the I

nain steam isolation valves (MSIVs) did not close. He claims that to avoid those conditions the leak must be isolated. The candidate claims i that operability of the MSIVs ensures that the two conditions in the answer key do not occur (Appendix p. 18) and all MSIVs are needed to  ;

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isolate the affected, as well as the unaffected, steam generators.

26. Staff response: ,

The candicate's a*gurent centers on his understanding of the words "reasons" and "condititns." Reason is defined as a statement offered in explanatien or ,iustification, condition is defined as something essential to tne o:currence of 3cretning else. (Webster's Ninth New Colleciate Di:tionary, copyright 1955 by Merriarr-Webster Inc.) The reasons why it

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is important fer the PSIVs to close in the event of a steam line rupture are (;) to mirdri:e tne ;ositive reactivity effect from an RCS cooldown asse:iated with a bic car anc (2) to limit the pressure rise within c o n t a i ne e r.: cue to a stear line rupture. One condition that will cause

e rain steam isciation valves (MSIVs) to close is high containment >

rressure. Another corditien that will cause the MSIVs to close is a steai lire ructure. Ins questiet asked for the reasons for the closure cf tre MSIVs curine a stear line rupture and t.hus was worded correctly.

27. A reasonable answer to the question, for partial credit, would be "to isolate the break." If the MSIVs are operable (and there was no reason for the candidate to believe etherwise nor did he state any assumptions to the contrary), thea they would all close when required and isolate the breat regarcless of its lo:ation. Mr. Morabito received half-credit for his original two responses because his first answer "to isolate the faulted steam generator" would inherently incorporate his second answer "to prevent blowdown of tFe non-faulted steam generators through the break " Thus, the candidate's responses are redundant.

28. In su~sary, the eeanings of the words "reasont." and "conditions" are h

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t sufficiently distin:t so as not to create any ambiguity in the question.

The question, as written, was clear. Although Mr. Morabito received .

rartial :recit for his answer, full credit was not awarded because his responses we e red.ndant.

29. Sirulate Exa-inst ie Oc- ents l Co olian:e/Use of Frc:ecures Candidates co- eats (:lebuttal Do. 7 throuch 9):

Tre :ard'date claims *e wa: che: Ling the precision (not the accura:y) of h

te nu: lear instre ents, an: tnere is no pro:edure available to an c era::e fo su:h a ceter-ination. The candidate states that he nad to ceter-ine whether er r:t he had a f ailed nuclear instrument. A failed l l

testr. tri ,coulc nave proviceo tne ne:essary symptoms for use of AOP-10, l O 'Talfu.: tier, of hu: lear Ir.strumentation."

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30. Tre can:icate thea askee severa' rhetori:al cuestions regarding the performaa:e of ir e:iate action steps i r. the e.ergen:y operating pro;ecures.

31. Staff resconse:

From the e-o:edure cited by the candidate in Appendix p. 19 (AOP-10), a symptom of a f ailed channel may be evidenced by erratic indication or a crift of indication. Cen.rary to the candidate's claim, with two i n st ru re r.t s reading lower than the other two, the symptom of erratic indication did exist and the candidate should have utilized AOP-10

( Abnormal Proteoure). Furthermore, if all channels of instrumentation are not in agreement, and if no channel of instrumentation has been l determined to te malfunctioning (as stated by Mr. Morabito), then a 1

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1. j O , surveiliance test shovid have been performed to-verify the calibration accuracy of each of the instruments. The candidate did not request that a surveillance test be performed. Therefore, whether or not the candidate considered the instruments to be malfun:tioning, the appropriate a:tions .ere not taken.

32. Tne candi: ate's enetorical coments regarding the emergency operating tro:ecures do not alter the fact that he failed to perform an' immediate action step of an emergen:y operating procedure (step 11b of E-0).

Ir.me:iate a: tion steps are required to be done fren memory in accorcance with Bea.ee Valley procecure - 0.M.1/2.48,2, page E, paragraph C.3.

33. In su mara . the :andida e's a:tions were in:orre:t with respect te the cis:repancy ce: ween tne ru: lear ir.struments because the operability of tne inst umerts was still in question. The :andidates rhetori:a1 g

c omm e".t t re;&r:in; tre e ergen:y operating pro:edures have no bearing or tne f t:: that he dt: n:: perfern. immediate action steps as required.

34. Contre 1 E:ard 0:erations Cardi: ate :omme ts (Rebuttal op. 9 and 10):

The candidate claims that in:orre:t a:tions should be commented on but that those com.ments should not be so significant as . to lead to an u satisfactory rating, esce:ially if the error did not cause the bounds of analy:ed accidents to be exceeded. He applies this claim to the reading of RCS pressure instrumentation (which resulted in the tripping 7 of the reactor coolant pumps) and to the verification of the position of f I

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35. Staff resconse:

As a control board operator, the failure to properly read pro:ess ,

instrumentatien is a significant deficiency. The inability to make an indepercent valve position verif t:atior, is also a significant deficiency.

ine fa: tna; a rea: tor a::ident did not occur as e result of his incorre: a:tions is irrelevant cetause a centrol board operator mN. be able te procerly rea: prc:sss irstrumentation and verify valve positions.

T r.e :k*:icate's efforts to ce-eepnasi:e his operational erreas cem:rstrates an un:enservative apprea:n to ny: lear safety.

35. Suce s'sor) W it ty Candicate co- erti (Rerutta' er. 10 and 11):

Ine :arci:ste receats tne clairs race in his Specification that he was tne first to r.ctice that the feedwater regulating valve was open and that

( :ne e was r,c alarx to :all his attentier, te the malfunction. Fe states t r,a t tre ta':r:e f :' art (E?) ope *ator had noved from ir f ront of the valve position iroitation and that he finally noticed t,he open indication during tre performan:e of the emergen:y operating procedures. He also claims to have been cre:::uoied with othe? events in the s:er.ario and that he had to prioritize the problems.

37. ine candidate tnen refers te nis past experience as demonstration of his supervisory abilities.

38. Staff respense:

The fact that the candicate claims to have been the first to notice the valve open is irrelevant, since the valve had already been open for twenty minutes. Moreover, in the scenario in question, there were no

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the first malfun: tion inserted. When the bypass valve opened, its associated feedaater regulating valve then partially closed to maintain pre;rke ed steam generator water level. The candidate was notified by One of tne board operatt s of the feedwater regulating valve movement; ary alarm re:eived would nave been in addition to this verbal netification. Mr. Morabito, along with the other two crew members, stood cire:tly in f ront of tre feed.ater portion of the control board and leelec. witneut ary costru: tion of view, at the controls and indications.

Trt :andicate, not coserving the mispositioned Dypass valve, then wallec away f rom tne b: arc. The :ardicate failed to diagnose the malfunction or to a:tively pursue ccrrection of the problem.

39. The :aa.cicate's referen:e te past enerience to suppcrt his supe visory atility is net eleva*. te gi s examination. Examiners base tneir e s s ' u a t i e r, en wnst tre) o: serve on the day of ths examir.ation.

40. I n s ur.Ta ry , tne candicate's claims are not supported by the examiner's retes of the sequence of events for the scenario in question. In addition, Mr. Morabit ;'s past experience has no bearing on this examination.

41. Cc-runicatiens/ Crew Intert:tiens Cardidate cemments (Rebuttal rp. 11 and 12):

The candidate states that the hand signal was proper. He contends that a verbal report coulo have introcuced several potential errors because a numerical reading would have had to have been extracted from a logarithmic scale, Those errors are: (1) choosing an incorrect integer, O) c -

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( (2) choosing 'a n incorre:t exponent of 10, and (3) parallax. The candidate claims that he would then have had to picture in his mind how far above ba:Lground tne reading was, thus introducing another opportunity for error.

42. Staff eesconse:

The candicate's :l a i r. trat he was con:erned with the possibility of err:rs t'.at could have beer. int-odu:ed by a verbal report has no basis in f a:t be:suse the operaters in the conteel roo'n are expe:ted to be able to pe::erly read the reters. Fu-thermore, re;ardless of whether the infer nic.9 wa s Oc Nr.i:ated verbally or visually, the candidate would have had tc picturt ( *. bis mind how f a" above background the instru tent was rea:ing. T r'u s , tne c ssibility for error, as expressed by the O c ==ici:e. =v'= ee cre> r: 4e eisrer c se.

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4. 0, e rai' $ r a ry-In the Rebuttal the :ardicate rereated several previous claims, as well as raise several new issues. The new issues are perceived by the Staf f as: (1) p' ant conditions are stated that aould lead to the start of the ta:L u: CN pu p to su;;:rt his answe* for Ous stion 6.03b; (2) the rermal operational mode of the control rods is stated 'o support his answer for Questien 0.07e; (3) the la:L of procedural guicance is contested when the operability of instrumentation is in question to support his argument for the competency of Compliance /Use of Procedures; (4) rhetorical comments l l

are listed regarding the emergency operating procedures to support his arguments for the area of Compliance /Use of Procedures; (5) distracting events during the scenario should be considered in evaluating the l 0 .

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, gg ~q 17 O I, competency of Supervisery Ability; and (6) additional errors would be introduced if verbal cem.tunications had been used vice hand signals, and that this should be considered in the competency of Communications / Crew Intera:tions.

G. The Staf f response to ea:h of Mr. Morabito's new issues as numbered in paragrapn 43 aoove, is as te (1), the cand 4 ate failed to follow cire:tions by not stating his assumptions; additionally, due to the chemicals in tne CCW system, the starting of the backup CCk' pump aggravates the e f f e:t.s cf a thermal barrier rupture. As to (2), the cont %; coes :an be used in the automati: mode of Joeration to ritigate the effe:ts of in:reasing tet.perature in the RCS, As to (3), the pro:t:gre previce: ty Mr. Ferabito in nts Rebuttal did, in fact, contain

, guidan:e if the indicatien was erratic. Moreover, even if Mr. Morabite 01: att :orsictr tre in:1:ation to ce erratic, a surveillan:e should have

ee ;erfer ed te vertfy the a: cura:y of the instruments. Tre candicate cid not consicer the instrutent inoperable, nor did he request that a surveillance be perferred. As to (4), the rhetorical com*ents relative to the final examir.ation grade do not negate the ft:t that the candidate f ailed to perform a required intediate action step from memory. As to (5), tnere were no cistracting events occurring.. as Mr. Morabito i centended, because the opening of the bypass valve was the first event to occur during that scenario. As to (6), the candidaW s argument that the  !

control board operators might have incorrectly read the etter is without  !

perit because it is iae:ted that licensed operators in the control room J Q will be able to properly read the reters and indications.

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45. The S af f contends that the candidate has failed to provide sufficient

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new information to demonstrate an error- in grading of his examination.

Thus, it is our opinion that the Mr. Morabito failed to adequately -

demonstrate a. sufficient level of knowledge on the day of the examination to warrar.t ee:eipt of a license.

46. The foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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JSC #A Davic M. Silk 7

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7Ksal e. 4A<L Notary Public q

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE .

In the Matter of )

)

ALFRED J. MORABITO ) Docket No. 55-60755

)

(Senior Operator License for )

Beaver Valley Nuclear Power )

Station, Unit 1) )

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE Notice is hereby given that the undersigned attorney enters an appearance in the above-captioned matter. In accordance with 10 CFR S2.713(b) the following information is provided.

Name: Jay M. Gutierrez Address: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I

( 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 '

Telephone Number: (215) 337-5321 Admissions: Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania West Virginia State Supreme Court Name of Party: NRC Staff Respectfully submitted, br y M. ierrez G/

giona ounsel Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 21st day of December 1987 O

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

• /

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

' BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE is In the Matter of )

)

ALFRED J. MORABITO ) Docket No. 55-60755

)

(Senior Operator License for )

5eaver Valley Nuclear Power )

i Station, Unit 1) )

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "Joint Affidavit of David M. Silk and Barry S.

Norris," dated December 21, 1987, and "Notice of Appearance" of Jay M. Gutierrez in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or as indicated by an asterisk through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 21st day of December, 1987:

Charles Bechhoefer, Esq. Alfred J. Morabito Administrative Judge 685 Tulip Drive Atomic Safety and Licensing Board New Brighton, PA 15066

(] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555x

(

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Colleen P. Woodhead U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Counsel for NRC Staff Washington, DC 20555* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Washington, DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Docketing and Service Section Board Panel Office of the' Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555* Washington, DC 20555*

Dr. David L. Hetrick, Professor Department of Nuclear and Energy Engineering University of Arizona Tucson, Arizona 85721

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M. ierrez giona ounsel

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