ML20151P087
| ML20151P087 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05560755 |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1988 |
| From: | Bechhoefer C Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#288-6099 87-551-02-SP, 87-551-2-SP, LBP-88-10, SP, NUDOCS 8804260084 | |
| Download: ML20151P087 (66) | |
Text
l [df f
(
4*
DOLKE T EC-LBk'$$Il0 UNITED SfATES OF AMERICA *2 APR 21 A9:27 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMICSAFETYANDLICENSINGBOARDPANELgFt 0 Qj. E]ijV BRANLH Before Administrative Judge:
Charles Bechhoefer SERVED APR 211983
)
In the Matter of ) Docket No. 55-60755 ALFRED J. MORABIT0 ASLBP No. 87-551-02-SP Senior Operator License for )
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 ) April 20, 1988
)
DECISION I
Appearances Mr. Alfred J. Mcrabito, New Brighton, Pennsylvania, pro se_, Applicant.
Colleen P. Woodhead, Esq., and Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq., Bethesda, Maryland, and day Gutierrez, Esq., King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, for the Nuclear Regulatory Comission Staff.
8G04260004 980420 SECY LIC55 05560755 PDR
}$0 %
4, TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Procedural Background 2 II. Opinion 9 A. Written Examination 9 B. Simulator Examination 10
- 1. Compliance /Use of Procedures 13 (a). Examiner's Comment 1 14 (b . Examiner's Coment 2 19 (c)). Examiner's Coment 4 21 (d). Conclusion as to Compliance /Use of
. Procedures Competency 22
- 2. Control Board Operations 23 (a). Examiner's Coment 1 24 (b). Examiner'sComment2 27 (c). Examiner's Comment 3 29 (d). Examiner's Comment 4 31 (e). Conclusion as to Control Board Operations Competency 35
- 3. Supervisory Ability 35 (a). Examiner's Coment 1 35 (b). Examiner's Comment 2 40 (c). Conclusion as to Supervisory Ability Competency 43
- 4. Comunications/ Crew Interactions 43 a). Examiner's Coment 1 43 b). Examiner's Corr.nent 2 48 c). Examiner's Comment 3 52 (d). Conclusion as to Communications / Crew Interactions Competency 54 C. Conclusions 54 l III. Additional Observations 56 IV. Conclusions of Law 60 V. Order 60 Appendix A: List of Exhibits (unpublished) A-1 Appendix B: Transcript Corrections (unpublished) B B-3 i
2 l i
DECISION This proceeding involves the appeal of Mr. Alfred J. Morabito (Applicant) from the denial by the NRC Staff (Staff) of his application for a Senior Reactor Operator (SR0) license for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1. The Staff denied Mr. Morabito's requested license on the ground that he had failed to pass both the written and simulator examinations which had been administered to him. During the proceeding, following its reevaluation of certain answers, the Staff conceded that Mr. Morabito had obtained sufficient points to have passed the written examination. Following an oral presentation held on February 22, 1988, and taking into account all the evidence of record, I now conclude, for the reasons set forth below, that Mr. Morabito has also passed his simulator examination and, accordingly, should be issued a Senior Reactor Operator license.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In order to obtain a Senior Reactor Operator license for a reactor, an applicant must, inter alia, pass both a written examination and an operating test which includes, where feasible, a simulated operating
3 test.1 Mr. Morabito, the Manager of the Nuclear Training Department at the Beaver Valley facility and a candidate for a SR0 license, took these examinations on July 22 and 23, 1986. By letter dated August 27, 1986, he was informed by Region I of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission that he had passed the operating test but had failed to pass both the written examination and the simulator test; and, accordingly, that his application for a SR0 license was denied. He was also informed that he could request a hearing with respect to those responses to examination questions which he claims were graded incorrectly or too severely.2 On September 11, 1986, Mr. Morabito filed with Region I his request for a hearing, setting forth the questions which he claimed were graded incorrectly or too severely, together with the bases for his claims.3 By letter dated November 12, 1986, Region I informed Mr. Morabito that it had performed a complete independent regrade of the written examination, had reviewed the simulator claims, and had determined that there was no adequate basis for reversing its original detennination.
I 10 C.F.R. Q 55.11(b)(1987). The regulations were revised effective May 26, 1987 (52 Fed. Reg. 9453, March 25, 1987), and similar examination requirements appear in the new regulations at 10 C.F.R.
il 55.43 and 55.45. This proceeding is governed by the regulations and regulatory guidelines in effect on the dates the examination was administered.
l 2 Letter from Harry B. Kister, Chief, Projects Branch No.1, Division t
of Reactor Projects, NRC, Region I, to Mr. Alfred J. Morabito, I
dated August 27, 1986.
3 Morabito Exh. 1, attached Exhibit S. A List of Exhibits is set l forth in Appendix A.
4 Region I further advised Mr. Morabito that he could continue to pursue his request for a hearing, to the NRC Division of Human Factors Technology in Washir.gton, D.C.4 By letter dated December 1,1986, Mr. Morabito advised the Director, Division of Human Factors Technology, that he wished to continue to pursue a hearing on the license denial. He forwarded the details of his claims by letter dated December 16, 1986.6 The Division of Human Factors Technology, by letter dated February 2, 1987, rejected Mr. Morabito's appeal with respect to both the written and simulator examinations,6 and it forwarded the appeal to the Office of the General Counsel for continuation of the hearing process.7 4 Under NRC guidelines, a Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit L.
candidate must pass each of several sections of the written examination with a grade of at least 70% and the examination as a whole with a grade of at least 80%. Mr. Morabito had originally passed all sections of the written examination except for section 6, on which he had been graded 59.7%. He had been graded 82.2% on the exam as a whole. On regrade, Region I increased the grade on section 6 to 67.6%, although in doing so it both added and subtracted points. On other sections, Mr. Morebito continued to pass each section, although in some cases with a lower score than earlier. His overall score declined to 80.6%, still sufficient for a passing grade. M., Attachment 1. On the simulator exam, Region I removed one adverse comment but continued to hold that Mr.
Morabito had failed. M., Attachment 2.
5 Morabito Exh. 1, attached Exhibit P.
6 Letter from William T. Russell, Director, Division of Human Factors Technology, NRR, to Mr. Morabito. NRR incnased Mr. Morabito's grade on section 6 of the written examinatLa from 67.6% to 68.1%,
still short of a passing grade.
7 Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit Q.
1 I
l 1
5 l After several telephone and written comunications between Mr.
Morabito and the Office of the General Counsel, the file of the proceeding was forwarded to the Commission which, by Order dated July 1, 1987 (unpublished), granted Mr. Morabito's request for a hearing. The Commission ruled that informal hearing procedures were to be used, that the hearing was to be conducted by a single Presiding Officer, and that the Presiding Officer might make use of proposed hearing procedures which NRC had published for comment approximately one month earlier.0 On July 2,1987, the undersigned was designated as Presiding Officer.9 By Memorandum and Order dated July 15,1987(unpublished),Iruled that the proposed regulations cited by the Comission would be used for guidance in this proceeding and that, in accordance with the provisions of proposed 10 C.F.R. 6 2.1231, certain specified documents would initially constitute the hearing file. I also invited Mr. Morabito to submit a Specification of Claims, to defir:e the matters as to which he wished to challenge the Staff's conclusions, and provided for a Staff response. Further, I issued a Notice of Hearing for the proceeding.10 8 Proposed 10 C.F.R. 65 2.1201 - 2.1263, 52 Fed. Reg. 20089 (May 29, 1987).
9 52 Fed. Reg. 26106 (July 10, 1987).
10 52 Fed. Reg. 27485 (July 21, 1987).
6 On July 31, 1987, Mr. Morabito submitted his Specification of Claims.11 The Staff filed its response on October 9, 1987.12 Mr. Morabito requested, and was granted, an opportunity to respond to the Staff. He filed his response on November 7, 1987.13 The Staff also requested an opportunity to respond to Mr. Morabito's response or rebuttal, and by Memorandum and Order dated Novemoer 24, 1987, LBP-87-31, 26 NRC 436, I granted that request. I also posed numerous questions to both parties, set forth a schedule for answering those questions, and directed that an oral presentation be scheduled. The II Morabito Exh.1, including attached exhibits A-Z and AA-BB. On "
September 10, 1987, Mr. Morabito filed an addendum to attached Exhibit J. As a result of the technical complexity of certain of the issues raised by Mr. Morabito, on October 5, 1987, I appointed Administrative Judge David L. Hetrick, a member of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, as a technical interrogator to assist me with respect to technical matters involving SR0 license oxaminations.
12 aff Exh.1, including the attached affidavit of Messrs. David M.
. ilk and Barry S. Norris. The Staff earlier had obtained an extension of time within which to file its response. Memorandum and Order dated August 19, 1987 (unpublished). In its response, the Staff indicated that one portion of one of Mr. Morabito's answers to a written question which had previously been graded as incorrect had in fact been determined by the Staff to be correct.
The Staff increased Mr. Morabito's grade on section 6 of the written examination from 68.1% to 69.2%, still short of a passing grade of 70%. Staff Exh. 1, at 6; see nn. 4 and 6, supra.
13 Morabito Exh. 2.
7 Staff responded to Mr. Morabito's rebuttal on December 21, 1987,14 and both parties responded to my questions by January 31, 1988.15 On February 17, 1988, the Staff filed the affidavit of Mr. Theodore L. Szymanski, Regional Support and Oversight Section Chief in the Operator Licensing Branch, Division of Licensee Performance and Quality Evaluation, NRR, Headquarters office.16 That affidavit took the position that Mr. Morabito had been incorrectly graded on one question of the written examination and that he was entitled to an additional 0.5 points. Although not specifically stated in the affidavit, the additional points were sufficient to provide Mr. Morabito with a passing grade on the written examination.I7 The oral presentation was held on February 22, 1988 in Pittsburgh, Pa. (about 25 miles from the facility and from Mr. Morabito's residence). Most of the record was developed through the direct testimony (several of the prior filings of the parties) and through questions posed to the parties by myself or the designated technical interrogator, Dr. David Hetrick. I pennitted each of the parties to ask 14 Staff Exh. 2, including affidavit of Messrs. Silk and Norris.
15 Morabito Exh. 3 (January 28,1988); Staff Exh. 3 (January 29, 1988), including affidavit of Messrs. Silk and Norris.
16 Staff Exh. 4.
17 By my calculations, which were later confirmed by the Staff, Mr.
Morabito would only be entitled to an additional 0.25 points, but that would be sufficient to give him a grade of 70.3% on section 6 of the written examination, a passing grade. See n. 22, infra.
t 8
a few questions (screened by me) to the other party. Witnesses presented by the parties to respond to questions were Mr. Morabito and Mr. Lawrence G. Schad (for Mr. Morabito) and Messrs. David M. Silk, Barry S. Norris and Theodore L. Szymanski (for the Staff). Mr. Schad is the Simulator Coordinator at the Beaver Valley facility. He participated in Mr. Morabito's simulator examination by assuming the role of SR0 while Mr. Morabito was being tested as a Reactor Operator;
\
he also was present in the observation booth during the period when Mr.
Morabito was acting as an SRO.18 Mr. Silk was the NRC examiner who prepared, administered and graded the written examinution and administered the simulator examination for Mr. Morabito. Mr. Norris was the certified NRC examiner who observed Mr. Silk's administration of the simulator examination as well as conducting certain reviews of the written examination.19 Mr. Szymanski, who is identified above, participated in the Headquarters review of Mr. Morabito's examination.20 At the oral presentation, both parties waived the opportunity to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.21 18 Tr.17, 92 (Schad). All transcript references in this Decision refer to the transcript of the oral presentation held on February 22, 1988. A listing of transcript corrections is attached hereto as Appendix B.
19 Staff Exh. 1, attached affidavit, ti 1, 2.
20 Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit Q.
21 Tr. 255-57.
9 II. OPINION A. Written Examination As set forth above, the Staff filed an affidavit which indicated that Mr. Morabito was entitled to extra points on the written examination. This determination, which responded to a position which Mr. Morabito had taken throughout his appeal, raised Mr. Morabito's grade on section 6 of the written examination to 70.3%.22 As a result, with the agreement of the NRC Staff, I ruled at the oral presentation that Mr. Morabito had passed the written examination.23 22 The dispute between the parties concerned the method of grading of question 6.03b, which called for three answers. The entire question was worth 1.5 points. Mr. Morabito provided four answers.
Initially, the Staff regarded only one of the answers as correct and gave Mr. Morabito credit for 0.5 points (one correct answer out ofthree). Later, when it determined that another answer was correct, the Staff shifted to a method of proportional grading and awarded Mr. Morabito U.75 points (two out of four correct). In its february 17, 1988 affidavit, the Staff stated that, although the method of proportional grading was in general preferable for multiple-answer questions, it was not appropriate for the Staff to have used it in the circumstances of the particular examination under review. Although the Staff indicated that Mr. Morabito would be entitled to 0.5 additional points, a recalculation indicates that Mr. Morabito provided two correct answers out of the three required and should be awarded 1.0 points for the question (an additional 0.25 points). Using that figure, Mr. Morabito has received 15.9 points out of a possible 22.6 points on section 6, or 70.3%. The Staff agrees with this figure (Tr. 5-6).
23 -
In reaching this conclusion, I express no opinion on any of 6.
ubstaritive questions raised by Mr. Morabito with respect to
- ne written examination. Given the concession made by the Staff in its affidavit (Staf" Exh. 4), those other questions have become moot.
10 B. Simulator Examination The examination administered to Mr. Morabito was governed by the Operator Licensing Examiner Standards set forth in NUREG-1021, Rev. 2 (April 1986), which were in effect on the dates uf Mr. Morabito's examination.24 Under those Standards, the simulator examination is a portion of the operating examination. Mr. Morabito passed all portions of the operating examination except for the simulator examination.
The scope and content of the simulator examination depends upon the type of license sought--for Mr. Morabito, an "instant SR0" license (i.e., a Senior Reactor Operator license where the applicant is not already a licensed reactor operator). During a simulator examination, a candidate is tested by carrying out the functions of a particular position during several hypothesized events or scenarios. The scenarios are developed by the NRC Staff based on information from the licensee concerning the design of the plant and the capabilities of the simulator.25 Instant SR0 candidates such as Mr. Morabito must demonstrate that they meet the requirements for both reactor operator and senior reactor operator positions.26 For that reason, during various scenarios of the simulator examination, Mr. Morabito acted 24 Some of those standards have subsequently been modified. See NUREG-1021, Rev. 4 (May 1987).
25 Staff Exh. 1, attached affidavit, 1 38.
26 NUREG-1021 (Rev. 2), i ES-302, 11 B. D.3.
11 cither as a reactor operator or as a senior operator. During these scenarios, positions other than that occupied by the candidate are carried out either by other candidates undergoing examination or by representatives drawn from the facility staff.27 During the simulator examination, Mr. Morabito was tested on three scenarios: (1) a boron dilution accident followed sequentially by a vacuum breaker leak, pressurizer reference signal failure, erratic governorvalvecontrol,andstationblackout;(2)theBsprayvalve fails closed and the T-ave (temperature average) input to steam dumps fails low followed sequentially by B loop FRV (feedwater regulating valve) bypass fails open, loop 3 Th (hot leg temperature) fails high, turbine generator valves fail closed, PORV block valve fails open for 4550 due to a breaker problem and Pzr (pressurizer) PORY 455D fails open; and (3) PRNI (power range nuclear instrument) (44) fails high followed sequentially by S/G (steam generator) tube leak (developing into a rupture), pzr level fails high, FWP-1A trip from 75% power, and "A" HHSI (high head safety injection) pump fails tc auto start on low pressure SI.20 In the third scenario, Mr. Morabito functioned as a reactor operator; in the first two, he functioned as a senior operator.
27 Mr. Schad was one such representative (see p. 8, supra).
28 1, Staff Exh 1, attached affidavit, 1 37; see also Morabito Exh t
attached Exhibit J, Attachment 3 (Simulator Scenario Fonns),
i
. , , , , -n., -- - -- -- ,
12 In accordance with NUREG-1021 (Rev. 2), G ES-302, 11 0.3 and 0.8, the scenarios (collectively) are designed to test the candidate's proficiency in eight competencies, under conditions of normal evolutions, instrument failures, component failures, and major plant transients. In the case of an instant SRO examination such as was administered to Mr. Morabito, the eight competencies are (1)
Understanding / Interpretation of Annunciator /Alann Signals; (2) Diagnosis
-of Events / Conditions Based on Signals / Readings; (3) Understanding of Instrument / System Response; (4) Compliance /Use of Technical Specifications; (5) Compliance /Use of Procedures; (6) Control Board Operation; (7) Supervisory Ability; and (8) Connunications/ Crew Interaction.29 With respect to each competency, a candidate may receive a grade of satisfactory (S), marginal (M), or unsatisfactory (H).30 Justification (in writing) is required for each M or U rating. One or more written connents by the examiner may serve the purpose of such justification. A particular connent may in some circumstances be applicable to more than one competency. In the case of Mr. Morabito's examination, he was graded as satisfactory in the first four of the above competencies and i unsatisfactory in the last four of the competencies. Under the 29 See also Staff Exh. 1, attached affidavit, 1 38, 30 NUREG-1021 (Rev. 2), i ES-302, 1 F,2, and i ES-303, 1 B. The current version of NUREG-1021 no longer includes the Marginal grade category. See NUREG-1021 (Rev. 4), i ET-302, 1 C.
l
13 guidelines, a grade of U in one competency gy (but need not) be considered an adequate basis for failure of the examination. There must also be an assignment of an overall rating, "based on the specific circumstances of candidate's performance during the examination."31 At the time of Mr. Morabito's examination, this general rating was described by the Examiner Standards as "a professional, subjective judgment on whether a candidate should pass or fail this segment of the examination."32 With these general principles in mind, I turn now to Mr. Morabito's claims concerning the simulator examination. I will treat each of the competencies in which the candidate was rated as unsatisfactory and, within those competencies, will discuss each of the statements supporting the unsatisfactory rating.
- 1. Compliance /Use of Procedures 1 Mr. Morabito's unsatisfactory rating in this competency was initially based on four convrents. During the initial review by Region I, the third convrent was deleted.33 I shall review the first, second and fourth conrnents seriatim.
31 NUREG-1021 (Rev. 2), i ES-302,1 F.3; Tr.19-20 (Norris).
32 NUREG-1021(Rev.2),iES-303,1B.
33 Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit L Attachment 2 at p.1; ~id.,
attached Exhibit J, i ES 202-11, Attachment 1/4, 1 3.
[
14 (a). Examine 's Coment 1.
The first comment reads as follows:34 During first scenario candidate did not consult any procedure when decreasing load to check power range indicator response for two power range indicators that were lower than the other two. A0P-10 calls for the planttobeinMode3[hotshutdown]iftwopowerrange channels are malfunctioning.
Elsewhere on the examination, the examiner set forth essentially the same comment with respect to the activity in question, as follows:35 Candidate did not consult any procedure when decreasing load to check Power Range indicator response for two PR indicators that were reading lower than the other two.
If candidate considered two PR indicators inoperable then plant should be in Mode 3 with[in] 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> as per A0P-10.
In his appeal, Mr. Morabito took the position that he did not consider two power range (PR) instruments to be inoperable; he considered two instruments to be reading differently from the other two but did not know why. He directed a 10% power reduction to determine if all instruments responded to a power change and, in addition, to comence reducing power to achieve Mode 3 conditions if it turned out that the PR instruments were not responding to the power change. After a 5% decrease, he observed that all cetector outputs were responding appropriately and he stopped the power decrease at that time.
34 Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit J, i ES-202-11, Attachment 1/4,1 1.
l 5
Morabito Exh. 1, attached Exhibit J. 5 ES-305, p. 6, t 5.2.A
("Offnorwal/ Abnormal Procedures").
I
15 He claims that no procedure is required for a power reduction of up to 10%. Indeed, he claims that, prior to invoking procedure AOP-10, he would have to inform the crew that two PR channels were inoperable and also which instruments were defective. He explains that he ordered the small reactivity change in order to determine whether this was in fact the case. He draws a distinction between checking the "precision" of instruments (agreement with each other) and the calibration (accuracy of
. indication) of the instruments; he maintains that no procedure covers the first of these activities. He also claims that his action maintained temperature and power levels within specifications, and that eventually the reason for the PR instrument readings (an undetected boron dilution) would have been discovered. (Mr. Morabito learned of the undetected dilution only after a post-examination discussinn with the examiners.)36 At the oral presentation, Mr. Mo abito introduced for the first time a new reason for his having reduced power in the reactor. He stated that "we were approaching the temperature limit . . . temperature was near its top limit, and some action had to be taken." 37 For its part, the Staff agrees that certain minor power reductions may be authorized without resort to a formal procedure. It also i
36 Morabito Exh.1, at 13-14,17; id., attached Exhibit 5, Attachment 8, pp. 4, 9; see also id. Hed Exhibit P. Attachment 3, p. 1; Morabito Exh. 2, at 7- E , atta 37 Tr. 58, 76-77, 78-79 (Morabito).
i
16 acknowledges that, in an emergency, the formal procedures would be supplanted by the emergency operating procedures (E0P) which must be I
memorized by operators and which do not require producing the fonnal procedure, as is otherwise required.30 But it maintains that, in the circumstances, no power reduction was permissible without using a formal procedure. The Staff would not have insisted that procedure A0P-10 be utilized. If Mr. Morabito wished to investigate the accuracy of
. instruments, he could have resorted to a surveillance procedure, which is another formal procedure; he would not have been downgraded for using '
such a procedure. By reducing power gradually, however, without using a procedure, Mr. Morabito masked the indications of the dilution accident which was creating the unsafe reactivity condition.39 In response to Mr. Morabito's new argument about approaching the temperature limits, the Staff asserts that the automatic operation of control rods should have been maintaining the temperature within its programmed band of variation.40 Mr. Morabito agrees with the Staff that the automatic control was functioning properly, but maintains that the temperature nevertheless was increasing.41 ;
38 Staff Exh. 3,145; Tr. 83 (Norris).
39 Staff Exh. 1, attached affidavit, 11 41-42; Tr. 82, 85-86 (Norris). j 40 Tr. 60-61. 79-81 (Norris).
4I i Tr. 86-87 (Morabito).
i
. a i
17 The Staff also advances a procedural objection to Mr. Morabito's introduction of oral testimony that had not previously bcen presented in written form. It asserts that it would be inappropriate to allow Mr.
Morabito to offer additional reasons to justify his actions of a year and a half in the past, and that testimony should be restrained to that which had already been presented in writing.42 Evaluation of this corrrnent is a close question. Mr. Morabito took essentially conservative actions in responding to a situation which he did not fully understand. However, he clearly failed to utilize any procedures in formulating his response. The operability of certain instruments was in question--not their precision or accuracy, using Mr.
Morabito's terminology. Given the operating rules of the Beaver Valley facility, it appears that, although some power reductions may be undertaken without a procedure, a reduction in a circumstance in which a procedure is called for would mandate that a procedure be followed. At the very least, a surveillance procedure would be used to test the operability of instruments.43 Mr. Morabito's new argument that he reduced power partly because the plant was approaching temperature limits does not contribute to the resolution of this issue. It has the appearance of a belated 42 Tr. 72-73.
43 Staff Exh. 3,147; see also Tr. 82, 85 (Norris).
I
18 rationalization; and, as the Staff notes, it was not advanced in any written documents prior to the oral presentation.
In any event, Mr. Morabito is being faulted not for reducing power but for doing so without following an appropriate procedure. The interaction of boron dilution, control rod motion, and intermittent rise and fall of temperature, as described by Mr. Morabito, is a slowly evolving process and not an emergency condition such as would justify
.imediate action.N Utilization of an appropriate procedure is required in such circumstances for a power reduction.
As the Staff points out, Mr. Morabito was being tested as much for his ability to follow required pre tdures as for his ability to maintain the plant in a safe condition:45 This was an audit of his knowledge, and an audit of his ability to operate the plant in accordance with Duquesne Light procedures.
He is licensed to Sperate the plant in accordance with approved procedures. That is part of his license and part of his requirements.
That being so, I agree with the Staff that Mr. Morabito should be downgraded for the activity recorded by the examiner's first connent. I note, however, that the Staff takes the position that this comment, by 44 Tr. 83 (Norris); cf. Tr. 62-65, 87 (Morabito).
45 Tr.80(Norris).
i 19 itself, would not justify a grade of unsatisfactory for the Compliance /Use of Proca.dures competency. O r (b). Examiner's Comment 2.
The second coment undte this competency reads as follows:47 During second scenario while in ES-1.1 step 27 candidate asked "Are RCS hot leg temperdturps grea*er than 395 F?" Candidate did not wait for a.t operator response und assumed the answer to the question was "yes" by <>nswering "yes" aloud to himself.
The operator then injicated the ansWr to the question was "No."
On his appeal, Mr. Merabito ackr.aledges the accuracy of th?
coment but challenges the implica tions which the Sta(t draws from it.
He claims that thinking out lout by trainees is encouraged, even though the thinking M y b1 incorrect. He &ckhhw'. edges that he had expected a "yes" answer but streroes 4.iri he lA'2 f.o action prior to nearing the operator response, oN the(n divectef the correct 64 tion. He adds that i
he reacted with excellent supervisery uwtal to direct a proper action, rather than the icticn i.e might haya bun expested to direct; and that the action he directed was the one required by th; aoplicable procedure.40 46 Staff Exh. 3, 1 51.
47 Morabito Exh.1 attached Exhibit J. % ES-?OP-il, Alf;&chnent 1/4, f 2.
j 8 id., attachr!! Exhibit S. Attachent B.
Morabito at 9; see also id., attache TE/sibit F, Atischunt 3 et 1.
Exh.1, at 17-18;
20 The Staff notes that Mr. Morabito has not refuted the comment. It asserts that the candidate's connents indicate an incorrect analysis of the transient in progress and an improper attempt to analyze an event instead of using the symptomatic dpproach provided by emergency procedures.49 In response to my inquiry why this commest was relevant to the Compliance /Use of Procedures competency, the Staff asserts that all procedures are written with the premise that correct information will be used in the determination of actions; and that, if Mr. Morabito was not in a position to verify a parameter, then, rather than guess, he should have -[ sited for and insisted upon a report from the reactor operator. The Staff adds that ji[ Mr. Morabito had proceeded on the basis of incorrect information, he would not have been mitigating the I accident in progress but rather worsening the condition.50 Insofar as this comment bears on Compliance /Use of Procedures, it appears to be remote at best and, more likely, inconsequential. Mr.
Morabito took no action that was not consistent with applicable procedures. He indicated that he would never have taken any action without a response to the question he had posed.51 The Staff's assumption that Mr. Morabito might through incorrect analysis r.ake the
- accident more severe is thus purely hypothetical and specular.fve. With 49 Staff Exh.1, at 13; id., attached affidavit,145.
50 Staff Exh. 3,153.
61 Tr.99-100(Morabito).
i l
Q, _ ,m y - <- , e -
s, ,- - t-- w, w, , - - - -- --,-a- - - - , - --- -,
21 respect to its applicability to the Compliance /Use of Procedures competency, this coment is insubstantial and should be deleted.
(c). Examiner's Coment 4 S2 The fourth coment under this competency reads as follows:53 During the third scenario [during which Mr. Morabito was acting as a reactor operator), after the reactor tripped and SI activated, candidate did not check if LHS! pumps were running as required by immediate action step 11b of E-0. SR0 had to remind candidate to check if LHS! pumps were running.
Mr. Morabito acknowledges that this coment is valid but questions the weight that should be given to it.54 He views it as a minor event and also questions whether other candidates have been graded as harshly as he for the failure to adhere to one of the imediate action steps.55 The Staff points out that Mr. Morabito's failure to perform an imediate action step of the emergency operating procedures is significant since the imediate action steps are required to be comitted to memory and the third scenario provided the only evaluation 52 As noted earlier, at p.13, supra, the third coment under this competency was deleted by Region I and is not now at issue.
53 Morabito Exh. 1, attached Exhibit J, i ES-20E-11, Attachment 1/4, 1 4.
54 Morabito Exh. 1, at 18.
55 Morabito Exh. 3, at 11; see also Morabito Exh. 2, at 8-9.
22 of Mr. Morabito's ability to comply with these procedures.56 More specifically:
This is one of the few tasks where we expect it to be performed almost flawlessly. This is the emergency procedure.
This is a condition where the plant is not in a safe condition. To protect the safety of the public; to protect the core, itself, certain actions should take place. Those actions are automgpic and they should be verified. He could not perform that In this instance. I accept the Staff's evaluation that this coment should remain a deficiency. Operators must be fluent with the emergency operating procedures, irrespective of the significance of any particular procedure. Mr. Morabito failed to adhere precisely to the mandate of one such procedure. But I : ko note that the Staff does not believe this deficiency in itself is significant enough to warrant an unsatisfactory grade for the competency.58 (d). Conclusion as to Compliance /Use of Procedures Competency.
l The Staff .aitially based its rating of unsatisfactory for this competency on the four deficiencies set forth in the examiner's report.59 After Region I had eliminated one of the four deficiencies, the Staff examiners still believed that the remaining three deficiencies 56 id., attached affidavit,150; Staff Exh.
Staff Exh.1,affidavit, 2, attached at 13-14;1 72.
57 Tr. 125 (Norris).
58 Staff Exh. 3,157; Tr.125 (Norris).
59 Staff Exh. 3,164; Tr.126-27 (Norris).
23 warranted an unsatisfactory rating--the deleted coninent constituting, in their opinion, the least significant of the four.60 I have now deleted another of the consnents. Nonetheless. I regard the ability to follow procedures correctly as significant enough to warrant a rating of unsatisfactory based on the two deficiencies that remain. The unsatisfactory rating in this instance, however, is not of the type which would justify a failing grade on the simulator examination as a whole. In particular, the two connents on which the rating is premised did not involve situations where the reactor was placed in any danger. Moreover, although Mr. Morabito exhibited less-than-ideal U srence to procedures in two instances, he followed procedures adequately in other situations and demonstrated considerable knowledge of and familiarity with procedures generally.61
- 2. Control Board Operations Mr. Morabito was tested on this competency only in the third scenario, in which he was perfonning as a reactor operator. His unsatisfactory rating was based on four connents, none of which were deleted through Region I or Headquarters review. I will deal with them seriatim.
60 Tr.120-29(Norris).
61 See, e.g., pp. 26, 28-29 and 47, infra.
24 (a). Examiner'sComment1.
The first of the examiner's comments under this competency reads as follows:62 Following SI actuation as the RCS pressure was decreasing the candidate misread RCS wide range pressure indication.
Candidate misread 1600 psig as 1040 psig and then checked with other operator to confirm RCP trip criteria.
Mr. Morabito concedes that "[t]his comment is accurate. It documents a significant error."63 But he claims that it alone should not be sufficient to produce a failing grade. He explains that it is always desirable to avoid a loss of forced flow cooling but that, when necessary, natural circulation is adequate; and that, in this instance, he established and maintained natural circulation. As the scenario progressed, he also discovered on his own that he had tripped the pumps prematurely and stated that he was about to announce that fact to the ,
SR0 when the scenario ended. He then informed the SRO that he had tripped the pumps prematurely. Mr. Morabito adds that all parameters were maintained safely within limits; that the induced transient was mild; that his actions in tripping the pumps were "within the bounds of the analyzed accident;" that no adverse effects on the health and safety !
of the public or station personnel occurred; and that there was no !
equipment damage. Finally, he asserts that he flawlessly performed the 62 Morabito Exh.1 attached Exhibit J, i ES-302-11, Attachment 2/4,1 1.
63 Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit S. Attachment B at 10. ,
1 1
1
.- - .- ,,_____- _ _ _ _ . _ .__ _ _ _. _ _ _ . _ - _ - - . _ ____ _, -- _ _..~ -._- , ,,-
25 complex procedure for securing the reactor coolant pumps, providing evidence of his Dmiliarity with the control board and of his dexterity in perfoming several simultaneous and dependent sequential actions.04 The Staff takes the position that the fact that Mr. Morabito correctly perfomed an inappropriate action does not obvit.te the fact that during a test of hi ability to read process instrumentation he demonstrated an inability to do so correctly. The Staff believes that maintaining plant safety limits in this instance does not excuse the admitted error.65 It adds that Mr. Morabito's efforts (as part of his appeal) to de-emphasize operational errors "demonstrates an unconservative approach to nuclear safety."66 As both parties acknowledge, the deficiency noted here was significant. But the fact that a deficiency may be significant need not automatically produce a "U" grade for the competency. The context in which the deficiency occurred, the corrective action adopted by the candidate, and his recognition of the error on his own, without prompting, all are relevant to the candidate's knowledge and abilities with regard to control board operations. I find somewhat disingenuous 64 Id.; Morabito Exh. 1 at 18-19; Morabito Exh. 2 at 9-10. Mr.
Fdrabito also claims that he did not misread the guage at 1040 psig, as claimed by the examiner, but rather misread it at 11v0 psig. The difference is insignificant. See Tr. 133-36 (Morabito, Norris).
65 Staff Exh.1, at 15; attached affidavit,153, 66 Staff Exh. 2,135.
26 l
l
[ the Staff's position that, in attempting to place his operational error l
into context as part of his appeal, Mr. Morabito demonstrated an "unconservative approach to nuclear safety." The Staff itself acknowledges that this deficiency by itself would not warrant a "V" grade for the competency.07 Moreover, the Staff's approach does not measure Mr. Morabito's attitude or knowledge when he took his examination but, rather, appears to attempt to penalize Mr. Morabito for
< exercising his appeal rights.
Based on the entire record concerning this deficiency, it is clear that this deficiency must result in some downgrading of Mr. Morabito's score on "Control Board Operations" and that he is not entitled to an "S" rating on this competency. The crucial consideration which is relevant is Mr. Morabito's self recognition of his error, together with his exercise of sufficient control to minimize any ill effects which might otherwise have attended the error. Under applicable guidelines, a candidate who initially provides a wrong answer and then later l
recognizes the mistake "with little prompting" and goes on to correct it is to be rated as marginal.68 Mr. Morabito here recognized his mistake and was prepared to correct it. He could not carry out the correction because the scenario ended. Further, in reacting to his mistake, he exhibited familiarity with the control board and applicable procedures.
67 Staff Exh. 3,166.
66 NUREG-1021 (Rev. 2), i ES-303,1 B, at p.1 of 6.
27 Under these circumstances, this admittedly significant deficiency should result in downgrading to no worse than a marginal rating.
(b). Examiner's Coment 2.
The examiner's second consnent under the "Control Board Operations" competency reads as follows:09 In step 4c of E-3, the Residual Heat Release valve was to be checked to ensure it was closed. Candidate was looking at the demand indicator for the manual control of Residual Heat Release Valve and not at the indication lights for the valve.
Candidate was hesitant to respond to the check verification and appeared confused until other operator came over and explained the controls and indications to the candidate.
Mr. Morabito claims that this comment is incorrect and should be withdrawn. First, he asserts that there are no position indicating lights for the Residual Heat Release valve; thus, the statement that he t should have been looking at those lights was (by definition) erroneous.
Second, he claims that he was not confused but only hesitant to verify that the valve was closed based on observation of the demand signal alone. He states that he had been cautioned during training against relying on a demand signal alone to determine whether the RHR valve was closed. At the oral presentation, he described such cautions as "comon in the industry. 70 After consultation with the other operator to verify that the demand signal was the only way to verify the valve 69 Morabito Exh.1. attached Exhibit J, n ES-302-11 Attachment 2/4,1 2.
70 Tr.147 (Morabito).
28 position from the control room, he responded appropriately to the SR0 that the valve was closed. He cites his activities as a good example of crew interaction and teamwork.71 For its part, the Staff acknowledges that its examiner made a mistake as to the presence of indicator lights. Indeed, the Staff concedes that, contrary to a fair reading of its comment, Mr. Morabito was properly looking at the demand indicator.72 It divides the coment
.into two segments, however, and claims that the candidate was deficient in having to be instructed by another operator in control board operation and component verification.73 It is clear that the first part of this comment, concerning indicator lights, which the Staff concedes is erroneous, must be deleted. Further, it is by no means certain that the Staff's error would not infect the entire coment--i.e., the theory that if Mr.
Morabito was looking in the wrong place, all of his subsequent actions must be tainted. However, treating the second part of the coment (concerning consultation with another operator) as divisible from the first, I do not perceive that second part as reflecting a lack of knowledge on the part of Mr. Morabito. Rather, it reflects an attempt 71 Morabito Exh.1, at 19; jd_., attached Exhibit 5, Appendix B at 10.
72 Tr.147,151-52(Norris).
73 Staff Exh. 1, at 15-16; attached affidavit, 11 56-57; Tr.147-49 (Norris).
e 0 29 by Mr. Morabito to assure that he was following the only procedure available to keep the reactor in a safe node of operation, given the existing circumstances. This was not an emergency situation, where time for consultation would not be available.74 Thus, the consultation for which Mr. Morabito is being criticized is an example of his utilizing teamwork to achieve the greatest possible degree of safety. For these reasons, I am deleting this comment.
(c). Examiner's Coment 3.
The examiner's third convrent reads as follows:75 In step 9a of E-3, the containment sump pumps were to be stopped. Candidate stopped one containment sump pump and the Incore Instrument sump pump. The other operator came over to show the candidate where other containment sump pump switch was located.
Mr. Morabito agrees that the actions occurred as stated in the comment, although he clarifies that he was not shutting down any pumps but, rather, putting the control switches in the "off" position rather than leaving them in the automatic position.76 Although acknowledging his mistake, Mr. Morabito claims that the step was precautionary in nature and was not a major oversight in the overall scheme of the accident. He notes that eight actions are required to complete the step 74 Tr.149 (Morabito).
75 Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit J, i ES-302-11, Attachment 2/4, T 3.
76 Morabito Exh.1, at 20; Tr.153-54 (Morabito). The Staff concurs with the clarification. Tr. 154 (Norris).
30 and that, of the eight, he missed only one (reflecting his general familiarity with the control board). He attributes his mistake to his haste in completing the step and adds that this occurrence should not support a grade of "V" for Control Board Operations.77 The Staff takes the position that the candidate operated the wrong switch and that his mistake was identified by another operator; and that even though the candidate's action did not degrade plant conditions, the
. fact that he incorrectly positioned the wrong switch without noting his l mistake supports an unsatisfactory evaluation. The Staff adds that the missing of a single step of a procedure being conducted from memory is significant.70 I agree with the Staff (and t'r. Morabito does not dispute) that the deficiency here is significant. I will treat it in that light. I note however, that the Staff does not consider this deficiency significant enough to lead, without more, to a grade of unsatisfactory on the competency as a whole.79 77 1, at 20; id., attached Exhibit U.
Porabito Exh 78 Staff Exh.1, at 16; attached affidavit, 11 60-61.
9 StaffExh.3,174.Tr.158(Norris).
t 31 (d). Examiner's Coment 4 The fourth (and final) comment under the Control Board Operations competency reads as follows:80 In step 11 of E-3, CIA was to be reset. Candidate depressed the CIA Train B button and the CIB Train A button. CIA did <
not reset. Candidate di 890tverifyCIAwasresetfollowing his attempt to reset CIA Mr. Morabito asserts that this consnent should be reconsidered because it is not entirely correct; that there is no way to verify CIA reset from the control room other than attempting to cycle the CIA valves. He claims that, after the scenario had ended, the examiner asked him how to get RCS samples; and that, after some confusion regarding the thrust of the examiner's question, he explained that the CIA sample valves would have to be opened. Upon request by the examiner 4 to open those valves, Mr. Morabito opened the train B valves and they came open. The train A valves did not open. Mr. Morabito then imediately realized that train A of CIA had not been reset and (without prodding) reached over in front of the examiner, pushed the train A reset button and opened the train A sample valves. He claims that this is "exactly how" a failure to reset CIA in the plant would be detected.
He adds that failure to reset CIA properly has no safety significance to 80 Morabito Exh. 1, attached Exhibit J, i ES-302-11, Attachment 2/4, 1 4.
81 CIA and CIB refer to two steps in the isolation of the containment.
Tr. 159-60 (Norris).
4 32 the public or the plant and that his actions following the scenario represented "def t operation of various controls." He concludes that his actions do not warrant a grade of unsatisfactory.82 The Staff, although recognizing that plant conditions were not degraded, asserts that Mr. Morabito's argument does not refute the fact that he failed to reset the CIA properly, or provide any excuse for his "inability" to operate the control board adequately in this respect.83 It makes no reference to Mr. Morabito's activities following the conclusion of the scenario or to whether those activities should have any impact on the grade awarded. The Staff concludes, however, that the deficiency by itself is not sufficient to justify a grade of unsatisfactory for the competency.84 Based on further questioning by myself and Dr. Hetrick at the oral presentation, I conclude that one part of this consnent is unfair to Mr.
Morabito and the other part should lead to a grade no worse than marginal. The unfair portion concerns the verification of CIA reset.
The record denenstrates that, as claimed by Mr. Morabito, there is no way to perform such verification from the control room other than by ,
attempting to cycle the CIA valves. (The reset buttons for these valves !
82 Morabito Exh. 1, at 20-21; id., attached Exhibit S. Attachment B, at 11. ,
b Staff Exh.1 at 17; attached affidavit,164 0# Staff Exh. 3, 1 76.
o O 33 i
are spring-return buttons which have no indication of status.85)
Further, the scenario was teminated prior to any opportunity for Mr.
Morabito to perform such cycling.86 Why was it terminated so soon? The Staff explained that it had observed enough information about the candidate in that phase of the examination: ,
You have to realize that we could take any one scenario and run it on for 9any 8 hours to some point where we beat it to .
death . . '
In this instance, permitting the scenario to continue would have been the only way to test Mr. Morabito's knowledge and ability concerning CIA reset. For these reasons, the last sentence of the i
comment is unfair to Mr. Morabito and nust be deleted for that reason.
The first part of the comment reflects Mr. Morabito's pushing one button correctly and one incorrectly. The incorrect action represents a deficiency in Control Board Operations. After the conclusion of the scenario, however, Mr. Morabito was questioned by Mr. Silk and asked how he would know whether the CIA had been reset. He responded (correctly) that the only way was by operating the valves.
Mr. Morabito was then asked to operate the valves. He operated one and found it had been reset. Then, without further prompting, he attempted to operate the second set of valves and discovered it would 85 Tr.165 (Morabito; Norris).
86 Tr. 172 (Silk).
87 Tr.172(Norris).
34 not operate, indicating it had not been reset. Mr. Forabito then reached over, hit the reset button, and then immediately opened the ,
valves.88 By carrying cut the < seration correctly, Mr. Morabito i reflected knowledge of this aspect of control board operation. The Staf f suggests that he did so only with prompting.69 But the prompting was only with respect to performing the test, not with respect to how ,
the test was to be performed.
Mr. Morabito's perfomance here reflects some aspects of a 1 satisfactory performance and some of a marginal perfomance. He appears to be familiar with equipment and procedures--an attribute of satisfactory perfomance.90 However, he made a mistake, which he corrected with little prompting--i.e., prompting only with respect to revisiting the test and not with how to perform the test--and thereby l met the criteria for a marginal evaluation.91 He exhibited none of the attributes of an unsatisfactory evaluation, other than the initial mistake. He cannot be fairly attributed with a poor working knowledge 3
and understanding of the system- "obvious unfamiliarity"--such as would l
properly attend an unsatisfactory rating.92 in these circumstances, the l
l 88 Tr. 171-72 (Morabitsi.
89 Tr. 172 (Silk).
90 NUREG-1021(Rev.2),iES-303,1B(5).
91 NUREG-1021 (Rev. 2), i ES-303, 1 B (M).
92 NUREG-1021 (Rev. 2), i ES-303, 1 B (V).
l
35 Staff's rating of Mr. Morabito's performance here was unduly harsh and not supported by the record. He is to be evaluated as no worse than marginal on his attempted reset of the CIA valves.
(e). Conclusion as to Control Board Operations Competency.
Of the four comments under this competency, I have found only one serious enough to be equated to a level of unsatisfacto','y. I have deleted one coment and found the others no worse than a level of marginal. The one unsatisfactory coment is not significant enough to warrant a rating of unsatisfactory for the entire competency. Fr.
Morabito has clearly fallen short of a satisfactory level for this competency, for he has made several mistakes. but his understanding of the control board and its operation appears to be satisfactory. For these reasons, I am changing the Staff's grading of Mr. Morabito on this competency from unsatisfactory to marginal.
- 3. Supervisory Ability.
Mr. Morabito's unsatisfactory rating in the Supervisory Ability competency was based on two consnents. The second of the coments, however, incorporated a number of other coments by reference.
(a). Examiner's Consnent 1.
The first of the examiner's coments under this competency reads as 93 fo110ws:
93 1, attached Exhibit J, i ES-302-11. Attachment 3/4,1 I Morabito Exh 1.
1 i
m
36 In the second scenario, the candidate did not notice that the feed reg bypass valve indicator was indicating that the valve was open during diagnosis of unusual feed reg valve movement.
Mr. Morabito claims that this comment is erroneous. He states that, as SRO, he was the first to notice the stuck-open valve and called it to the attention of the balance-of-plant (B0P) operator. The B0P operator then observed it and initiated corrective action to close it.
Mr. Morabito adds that his account is verified by the fact that the reactor operator had no way of knowing that the valve was stuck open unless he had henrd Mr. Morabito and the B0P operator discussing it; and that, when discussing it with his examiner, the reactor operator knew the valve was stuck open and acknowledged hearing Mr. Morabito's discussion of it.94 Mr. Morabito also claims that the examiner's scenario called for a high level alarm to be the initiating event for the bypass valve failure, and that the alarm did not occur. He explains that, with no ,
alarm to call his attention to a potential problem, there was no reason for him to do rrore than acknowledge the 80P operator's report that B ster.:n generator feed flow was spikina in a manner similar to what had occurred in the first scenario (where there had been a problem with the simulatoritself). After calling maintenance to check the problem, and after verifying with the 80P operator that the feedwater flow increase was returning to normal and was under control, Mr. Morabito concurred 94 Morabito Exh.1, attached Lxhibit S, Attachment B, at 11.
\
. a 37 with the B0P operator's request to take manual control of the B steam generator feed regulating valve and then turned his attention to other matters. Mr. Morabito adds that these measures were "obviously effective" since he and the B0P operator never lost control of 8 steam generator level.95 The Staff acknowledges that Mr. Morabito recognized a problem with the steam generator feed flow. It faults him for not aggressively pursuing the root cause of the problem and for not identifying the root cause for twenty minutes. It deems the lack of an alarm to be irrelevant, on the ground that many problems initiated at nuclear plants do not initiate an alarm but must be identified from abnonnal parameter readings. The Staff also considers the malfunctioning of the simulator to be irrelevant, inasmuch as the candidate was instructed to respond to all indications as he would in the actual control room. The Staff concludes that Mr. Morabito has not shown that the examiner's coment was not a valid assessment, although it concedes that the failure to ascertain the cause of the problem aggressively was the significant fact in its evaluation of the candidate.96 In evaluating the validity of this coment, it is important first to look at the grading standards applicable to Mr. Morabitc's examination. For a coment leading to an unsatisfactory evaluation, 95 Morabito Exb:. 1, at 21; see also id., at 26.
96 Staff Exh.1, at 18; attached affidavit, 11 67, 68.
c .
38 such as this one, the standards require that the evaluation "be supported by detailed notes stating the particular action or response that resulted in the unsatisfactory evaluation."97 The justification for the unsatisfactory rating should be "explicit in what action was unsatisfactory and w3."98 The examiner's first coment under Supervisory Ability fails to satisfy these standards.
The examiner's coment, as wri+. ten, can only legitimately bt-understood as stating that Mr. Morabito did not notice that a valve indicator was reading in a certain way. However, it was not the responsibility of the SR0 (in which capacity Mr. Morabito was acting at that time) to notice the open ir.dication. That was the responsibility of the reactor operator.99 Moreover, as the Staff does not dispute, before the end of the scenario Mr. Morabito noticed that the valve was open.100 When Mr. Morabito noticed the open valve, he took action to determine the reason.101 The Staff acknowledged that the action taken by Mr. Morabito in this respe:t was appropriate.102 The Staff's only 97 NURGE-1021(Rev.2),9ES-303,1B(M),atp.2of6.
98 NUREG-1021 (Rev. e), 6 ES-303,1 B (V), at p. 2 of 6, emphasis in original.
99 Tr. 175, 176-77 (Norris); 186 (Morabito).
100 Tr. 183-84 (Morabito).
101 Tr. 184, 192 (Morabito).
102 Tr. 193 (Norris).
o 1 1
39 real coment was that Mr. Morabito took too long to react to the situation, that he did not pursue a remedy with enough aggressiveness.103 Whether or not that comment would have been warranted as a deficiency, the connent as written does not reflect what the Staff intended. All that it reflects is that Mr. Morabito failed to For that, perform an action which he had no responsibility to perform.
he should not be faulted.
As for the Staff's argument that Mr. Morabito should not have assumed (as he admittedly did) that there was a simulator malfunction, the short answer is that all the actions taken by Mr. Morabito were based on there being a real problem; they were not influenced by his assumption. The assumption was based on a report to that effect from the reactor operator, but Mr. Morabito took appropriate steps to detennine the cause of the valve problem. Mr. Morabito admits that he was tempted to "write . . . off" the problem as a simulator malfunction, based on an earlier malfunction.104 He neither expressed that view during the examination nor took action in accordance with it. He should thus not be downgraded for this reason.105 103 Tr.196-97,199 (Norris).
104 Morabito Exh. 1, at 26; Tr. 199 (Morabito).
105 Mr. Morabito's argument that the comment should be deleted because of a simulator malfunction (Morabito Exh. 1, at 21) relates to the failure of the alarm to sound. The simulator did not malfunction in this respect. This alleged malfunction is different from the (Footnote Continued)
40 In conclusion, this comment is legally defective and, in addition, does not reflect an action for which Mr. Morabito should be downgraded.
It must be deleted.
(b). Examiner'sComment2.
The examiner's second comment under this competency reads as follows:106 Unsatisfactory use of procedures and unsatisfactory crew interaction supports an unsatisfactory performance in supervisory ability. .
With reference to this comment, Mr. Morabito seeks its deletion for the same reasons he opposed the various comments which are incorporated by reference. He also has submitted a number of documents which he claims attest to his supervisory leadership (in other positions), his judgment, his capabilities, and his ability to discharge supervisory responsibilities in field operations in a nuclear power plant envi ronment. These documents stem from his previous employment at another reactor (Shippingport).107 The Staff takes the position that Mr. Morabito's actions and communications observed during the examination displayed a callousness (Foutnote Continued) one to which the Staff was referring, end is not relevant to the validity of the examiner's comment.
106 Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit J, 9 ES-302-11, Attachment 3/4,1 2.
107 Morabito Exh. 1, at 21-22; id., attached Exhibit S, Attachment B, at 11.
41 to procedures and less than precise comunications. For the first time, the Staff provides examples of the incorporated actions which it deems to affect the candidate's supervisory abilities. The Staff also asserts that Mr. Morabito's past accomplishments at another plant do not measure his performance on the date of the examination at the Beaver Valley plant.108 I agree with the Staff that, in evaluating whether Mr. Morabito passed certain examination questions, I cannot rely on his past accomplishments at another plant. Beyond that, however, there are other compelling reasons why I cannot accept this coment. It suffers from the same legal deficiency as the first in this competency. It fails to apprise Mr. Morabito which of the comments in the incorporated competencies have an effect on Supervisory Ability and why each does so.
I inquired which of the comments affected Supervisory Ability and was initially told that all of them did. Later, the Staff acknowledged that two of the initial coments (including one of those still remaining) under the Compliance /Use of Proceduros Competency related to situations when Mr. Morabito was functioning as a reactor operator and not as an SRO, so that those coments would have no bearing on his supervisory ability.109 In addition, neither this coment nor those incorporated by reference makes any attempt to spell out why each of the comments has a 108 Staff Exh.1, at 18-19; attached affidavit,171.
109 Tr.209-11(Norris).
o o
42 bearing on Supervisory Ability. I had to ask a number of questions to develop the record in this respect.110 Based on these considerations, the examiner's second comment under Supervisory Ability is impermissibly non-specific and must be deleted for that reason.
I should add that, on the merits, none of the comments under Compliance /Use of Procedures or under Communications / Crew Interactions which still remain after my review would warrant an unsatisfactory rating in Supervisory Ability, either individually or collectively. The first conrnent under Compliance /Use of Procedures, 4hich I have judged to be significant, relates to Supervisory Ability only marginally. The fourth comment under Compliance /Use of Procedures, which I have also judged to be significant, does not have any bearing on Supervisory Ability (since Mr. Morabito was acting as a reactor operator at that time). Although these two significant coninents were sufficient to result in an unsatisfactory rating in Compliance /Use of Procedures, they are not significant enough to lead even to a marginal rating in Supervisory Ability.
Nor are the two remaining comments under Communications / Crew Interactions which I am rating marginal in that context (see pp. 48, L 53-54, infra). In the first, I am downgrading Mr. Morabito for acting prematurely and giving what turned out to be an incorrect direction.
There was nothing wrong with the manner in which he directed his 110 See Tr. 211 (Norris).
l t
43 subordinates, however, and I do not believe that Mr. Morabito should be penalized twice for this action. I am deleting the second coment as essentially inaccurate; it is likewise so for this competency. The third coment (concerning "thinking out loud") is the same as the second coment under Compliance /Use of Procedures, which I deleted with respect to that competency. I rate the coment as marginal under Comunications/ Crew Interactions because of its potential for misleading others. Because no one was in fact misled, however, there seems to be no deficiency with regard to Supervisory Ability. Coupled with the procedural deficiencies of the incorporation by reference, this coment should continue to be deleted.
(c). Conclusion as to Supervisory Ability Competency.
Based on my deletion of both of the coments under this competency, Mr. Morabito must be judged as satisfactory in Supervisory Ability.
4 Communications / Crew Interactions.
The fourth and final competency in which Mr. Morabito was rated as unsatisfactory is Comunications/ Crew Interactions. The rating was based on three coments.
(a). Examiner's Coment 1.
The examiner's first coment under this competency reads as follows:III 111 Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit J, i ES-302-11, Attachment 4/4,1 1.
44 During the first scenario, following the loss of offsite power, the candidate went to ECA-0.0 when he mistakenly l observed that he had no emergency busses energized. Candidate I should have relied upon verification of emergency busses from (
his operator who did properly verify that one emergency bus was energized and informed the candidate as such.
Mr. Morabito concedes that, during a discussion after the scenario, he informed the examiner that he must have mistakenly read the DF bus as de-energized and that he was astonished as to how he could have done 1 that. Upon later consideration, however, he detennined that he had not )
misread the DF bus voltmeter and that in fact it was de-energized when he looked at it. He claims that, several seconds later, af ter the only available diesel generator was up to speed, it closed on the bus and loaded. He further asserts that he then correctly directed the performance of ECA 0.0 (loss of all AC power) for the indications that he saw at the time. During performance of ECA 0.0, step 8, he asked the operator to verify that the emergency busses were de-energized, as required by that step. When the operator responded that the DF bus was energized, Mr. Morabito acknowledged tha~c he was surprised but, without getting flustered, properly directed transition to step 1 of E-0, as required by the procedure. He adds that at no time was the plant placed in a less safe position and safe shutdown was achieved.112 The Staff asserts that, during a loss of off-site power where the diesel generator started and loaded as designed, Mr. Morabito did not 112 Morabito Exh. 1, at 22-23; attacted Exhibit 9, Appendix B, at 12.
4 45 recognize that the diesel generator does not load for approximately 10 seconds after loss of offsite power, so that his action was not based on a correct assessment of plant conditions. Further, Mr. Morabito failed to ask the operator about the AC buses and consequently failed to use available information before taking action. As a result, the candidate entered the emergency operating procedures incorrectly, in that he went to ECA-0.0 (loss of all AC power) instead of E-0 (reactor trip / safety
.inj ection) . The Staff concludes that the failure to communicate with the operator prior to taking action on an incorrect understanding of plant conditions demonstrates deficiencies as a senior operator.113 The deficiencies, however, are not so significant that, standing alone, they would warrant an unsatisfactory rating in the competency.114 response to my inquiry whether the candidate (who was here acu:4 as a senior operator) would normally be expected to communicate with the operator before taking action in this situation,115 the two parties reach differing conclusions. The Staff acknowledges that for a short period of time the busses were not energized.116 It justifies its position that Mr. Morabito should have conmunicated with the operator with the general proposition that, although the SRO, as supervisor, l
113 1, at 20; attached affidavit, t 74.
Staff Exh 114 Staff Exh. 3, 1 100.
115 LBP-87-31, supra, 26 NRC at 443, question Sa.(ii).
116 Tr.221(Norris).
I 46 should not be involved with control board operations, he must maintain the overall plant conditions in a safe manner.117 On the other hand, Mr. Morabito's negative answer is premised on his understanding that symptoms of loss of all AC power are "quite evident" and that neither operator objected to his direction to perform the immediate actions of ECA 0.0, He states that the B0P operator verified that one AC bus was energized when questioned by Mr. Morabito in accordance with step 8.a of ECA 0.0, When the B0P operator provided his response, Mr. Morabito personally verified the response and then directed the transition to E-0, step 1, in accordance with step 8.d of ECA 0.0. Thus, according to Mr. Morabito, the emergency procedure contemplated the situation presented by the examination, by containing an automatic provision for aborting the procedure once an operator realized that a bus was energized; and he properly followed the procedure.118 Procedure ECA 0.0 requires, as entry conditions, loss of off-site power and no emergency busses energized.119 Both parties agree that there was a loss of off-site power and a short period of time when the emergency busses were not energized. The real question here is whether Mr. Morabito acted prematurely in entering procedure ECA 0.0.
f l
117 Staff Exh. 3, f 94.
118 Morabito Exh. 3, at 17-18; Tr. 217-18 (Morabito).
119 Tr. 221 (Norris).
1
47 Mr. Morabito claims that he did not act prematurely; that the emergency procedures are symptom-based and "when you see the symptoms ,
you implement" the procedures, without "wait [ing] a second or two [to]
see if those symptoms are going to go away."120 The Staff, however, maintains that one diesel generator had started prior to Mr. Morabito's entering the procedure; that this starting was reflected in lights on the control panel; and that, in any event, Mr. Morabito's training should have taught him that it would take up to 10 seconds for the diesel generator to get started and he should have waited those few seconds to determine if it would do so.121 This coment represents another very close question. I find that, as a result of the training he received, Mr. Morabito should have realized that it would take a few seconds for the diesel generator to start and, since the start-up would negate one of the entry conditions to the procedure, should have waited briefly to ascertain whether the entry conditions were met. Mr. Morabito's action was therefore premature. However, the effect on reactor operation was trivial, particularly since the procedure included a mechanism for exiting once it was discovered that the bus became energized. Moreover, Mr.
Morabito, during questioning by myself and Dr. Hetrick, seemed completely knowledgeable about how the procedure worked.
120 Tr. 215 (Morabito).
121 Tr. 222, 223-24 (Norris).
l l
l
48 That being so, his action in neglecting to wait several seconds before entering the procedure may be equated as falling between a "slight or minur difficulty relating to system interactions" (one of the standards for a satisfactory rating) and a "difficulty . . . in relating the interactions of systems" (one of the standards for a marginal rating).122 His activities clearly do not reflect the "obvious unfamiliarity with subject and/or system" characteristic of an unsatisfactory rating.123 In these circumstances, this corranent will remain a deficiency but will be evaluated at a level no lower than ma rginal .
(o). Examiner's Comment 2.
The examiner's second coment under the Communications / Crew Interactions competency reads as follows:I24 During the second scenario, step 6 of E-1 calls for checking secondary radiation levels. An operator checked the monitors and said "One indicator is about this much (holding fingers about 1/2 to 1 inch apart) higher than normal. Candidate proceeded in E-1. During followup questioning after the scenario, the candidate admitted misunderstanding the operator's report of secondary radiation levels and assumed there was no reason to go to E-3. [ Emphasis in original.]
Mr. Morabito acknowledges that he relied on a hand signal from the reactor operator but claims that he asked follow-up questions to assist 122 NUREG-1021 (Rev. 2), i ES-303, 1 B (S, M), at p. 1 of 6.
123 NUREG-1021, i ES-303,1 B 'U), at p. 2 of 6.
124 Morabito Exh.1, attacher, Exhibit J, 5 ES-302-11, Attachment 4/4,1 2.
1
49 him in making certain that he understood the signals. He indicates that, in the circumstances, the hand signal was appropriate, inasmuch as a verbal description could have introduced other errors. He denies that he admitted to misunderstanding the operator's report, explaining that he misunderstood certain follow-up questions asked him by the examiner.
He also asserts that, given the answers to questions he received from the operator, there would have been no reason to turn to procedure E-3 (setting forth a procedure to follow in the event of tube rupture). Mr.
Morabito stresses that, on the basis of the operator's report (the hand signal) and his own follow-up questions, he made the correct decision.125 The Staff claims that Mr. Morabito relied on hand signals from the operator and that hand signals are not a reliable means of comunication in the control room. It explains the basis for its non-reliability view as "self-evident". The Staff adds that whether or not Mr. Morabito understood the particular signal is not relevant to the coment, inasmuch as it was inappropriate (per se) to rely on a hand signal. As for Mr. Morabito's alleged misunderstanding of the situation, the Staff merely states that it is "based on a verbal statement by the candidate."126 125 Morabito Exh.1, at 23; id., attached Exhibit S, Attachment 8, at 12; Morabito Exh. 2, at U-12; Tr. 232-34 (Morabito).
j 126 Staff Exh.1, at 21; attacivid af fidavit,177.
l
50 I can agree with the Staff that the use of hand signals in the control room is not to be encouraged. As the Staff points out, the potential for erroneous interpretations is as grect, if not greater, than the potential for verbal misunderstandings to which Mr. Morabito referred.127 But, in response to my inquiry, both Mr. Morabito and the Staff indicated that they were not aware of any rule or standard which would preclude the use of such signals.128 Nor was Mr. Morabito given instruction, either by NRC or Duquesne Light Co., concerning the use of hand signals. During his training, he was never told that it was inappropriate to use band signals or to permit use of hand signals by persons serving under his direction.129 The Staff would have preferred Mr. Morabito to have responded to the hand signal with a question such as "how much?, which would in effect have been a rejection of the hand signal.130 The Staff did not recall any follow-up discussiun between Mr. Morabito and the reactor operator.131 Given the consistency of Mr. Morabito's claim (starting from his first appeal) that he did ask certain questions of the 127 Staff Exh. 2, 1 42.
128 Responses to question B.5.b(i): Morabito Exh. 3, at 19; Staff Exh.
3, 1 102.
129 Responses to question B.S.b(ii): Morabito Exh. 3, at 19; Staff Exh. 3,1 104; Tr. 230 (Morabito).
130 Tr. 236, 238-39 (Norris).
131 Tr. 237 (Norris).
51 operator, I find that he did indeed ask questions designed to ascertain whether there were any indications of a tube rupture (the situation which would have called for entering procedure E-3).132 As a result of his inquiries, he determined that a tube rupture had not occurred and reached the correct decision not to go into procedure E-3.
Furthermore, it seems apparent that Mr. Morr.bito did not admit to the examiner, following the scenario, that he had misunderstood the hand signal. What he admitted misunderstanding was the off-on status of the simulator, following the conclusion of the scenario. Knowing that fact was important for purposes of responding to the follow-up questions asked him by the examiner.I33 Based on the foregoing, I conclude that Mr. Morabito was knowledgeable of the events that were occurring and that he did not utilize the correct procedure fortuitously. He did not admit to any misunderstanding of the events that were occurring, only to follow-up questions asked him by the examiner. There was no regulatory bar to his reliance on hand signals, nor was he instructed as part of his training not to do so. For these reasons, this comment of the examiner must be deleted.
132 Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit S, Attachment B, at 12; Morabito Exh.1, at 23; Morabito Exh. 3, at 19; Tr. 231 (Morabito).
Tr. 233-35 (Morabito).
I l
52 I stated earlier that I agrced with the Staff that use of hand signals in the control room may be inappropriate. If the Staff believes that use of hand signals is inappropriate to the extent necessary to lead to deficiency ratings on operator or SR0 simulator examinations, it should either publish a standard or guideline setting forth that view or, alternatively, mandate that that viewpoint be included in operator training programs. Absent guidance of that type, a candidate cannot fairly be penalized for reliance on hand signals, particularly where (as here) no incorrect actions were taken as a result.
(c). Examiner's Coninent 3.
The third (and final) comment under Comunications/ Crew Interactions reads as follows:134 During second scenario, while in ES-1.2 step 27, the candidate asked, "Are RCS hot leg temperatures greater than 395 F?"
Candidate did not wait for an operator response and assumed the answer to the question was "yes" and answered "yes" aloud to himself. The operator then indicated the answer to the question was "No".
This is the same ccmment as the examiner's second comment under the Compliance /Use of Procedures competency. I deleted the coninent in that context as being insubstantial. See pp. 19-21, supra.
With respect to this competency, the arguments advanced by the parties on this coment are similar to those advanced under the other competency. Mr. Morabito stresses that "thinking out loud" should be 134 Morabito Exh.1, attached Exhibit J, 0 ES-303-11, Attachinant 4/4,1 3.
L
53 encouraged and that the procedure was carried out correctly, on the basis of the operator's report. In terms of this competency (as well as that of Supervisory Ability, into which this coment is incorporated by reference), Mr. Morabito concludes that "[i]t takes a good supervisor, a good comunicator, a good crew interactor to be able to generate enough information during an emergency to subsequently subjugate his own thoughts to the real facts and act accordingly and correctly."135 1
i The Staff adds only that Mr. Morabito not only failed to await the correct Information but also incorrectly analyzed the effects of the transient in progress and improperly anticipated plant parameters. This coment is said to reflect Mr. Morabito's lack of care in comunicating '
and interacting with other operators.136 In terms of Comunications/ Crew Interactions, the significant implication of "thinking out loud" is whether others in the control room would be misled. Both parties agree th6t no one was misled by Mr.
Morabito's incorrect statement.13 Moreover, no incorrect action was taken, either by Mr. Morabito or by anyone else. The potential for misleading others, however, did exist. Although insubstantial in the circumstances, some downgrading for the incorrect initial statement is 135 Morabito Exh. 1, at 24; ~id., attached Exhibit S, Attachment 8, at 13.
136 Staff Exh.1, at 22; attached affidavit,180.
137 Responses to question B.S.c(iv): Morebito Exh. 3, at 20; Staff Exh. 3, 1 116.
54 perhaps warranted, because of the potential for misleading others. Mr.
Morabito argues that, at worst, his action should be evaluated (with respect to Comunications/ Crew Interactions) at a level no lower than "M".138 I agree.
(d). Conclusion as to Communications / Crew Interactions Competency.
Of the three connents under this competency, I have deleted one and rated the other two as no worse than a level of marginal. Mr. Morabito, on the basis of a lack of substantiality of the two coments, might possibly be awarded a satisfactory rating. In the interest of conservatism, however, I will evaluate Mr. Morabito as marginal in the Connunications/ Crew Interactions competency.
C. Conclusions With respect to the simulator examination, the Staff rated Mr.
Morabito as unsatisfactory in four competencies and, on that basis, gave him a failing grade on the examination. Upon a complete review of all the comments which were used in reaching the various unsatisfactory ratings, I have determined that Mr. Morabito should be rated as unsatisfactory in one competency, marginal in two others, and satisfactory in the fourth.
A candidate may, under NRC guidelines, be deemed to have failed an examination on the basis of a rating of unsatisfactory in only one 138 Morabito Exh. 3, at 20 (response to question B.5.c(v)).
55 competency.139 But that result need not take place if a candidate's overall performance suggests that it is not warranted. That is the situation here. As I previously pointed out, the unsatisfactory rating in the Compliance /Use of Procedures competency is now based on two actions which are not serious enough to warrant a failing grade on the examination as a whole. The two marginal grades are also based on actions which are not very serious. Indeed, the Staff acknowledged that the potential consequences which may follow from particular actions of a Candidate may be taken into account in determining a Candidate's 140 and that none of Mr. Morabito's activities put the reactor in grade any danger.141 Taking into account all these factors, I find that the single unsatisfactory competency rating, together with marginal ratings in two other competencies, do not warrant a failing grade on the examination as a whole. I find that Mr. Morabito passed the simulator examination which was administered to him. Insofar as this record reflects, passage of the simulator examination was the only remaining bar to Mr.
Morabito's obtaining the SR0 license for which he is a candidate.
139 NUREG-1021 (Rev.2), i ES-302, 1 F. 3.
140 Tr. 159 (Norris).
141 Tr. 253 (Norris).
56 Accordingly, he should be issued a Senior Reactor Operator's license for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1.142 III. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS On the basis of my review of the entire record in this proceeding, several additional points must be stressed. First, both parties are to be commended for the assistance they provided in developing the record of this proceeding to the degree necessary for me to provide an informed ruling on many technically complex issues. This proceeding utilized (at the suggestion of the Comission) the proposed procedures for informal proceedings. Although those procedures were not specifically designed for appeals in operator examination proceedings, they enabled the parties to present their positions effectively and provided the Presiding Officer with enough flexibility to fill in gaps in the record which might have compromised a full and fair determination of the merits of various substantive questions. Nonetheless, the procedures, although less complex than those for formal adjudications in 10 C.F.R. Part 2 Subpart G, do include certain complexities.
142 The two-year term of the SR0 license (see 10 C.F.R. 6 55.32 (1987))
is to run from the date of its issuance. I construe NUREG-1021 (Rev. 2), 1 ES-112, 11 C.8, C.11 and 0.4 (guidelines concerning effective date of a license) to be applicable only when a license denial is overturned through NRC Staff review. To make the term of Mr. Morabito's license consistent with that of others who took the examination, as provided by the guidelines, would be unfair to Mr.
Morabito, in view of the length of his appeal process and the several extensions of time granted to the NRC Staff.
e 57 Mr. Morabito, a non-lawyer, <.: cceeded in overcoming those complexities to the extent necessary to create a record significantly more complete than at the time he instituted his appeal. The Staff, for its part, carefully responded to the arguments propounded by Mr.
Morabito and attempted to provide a complete background for the issues raised by Mr. Morabito. Both parties provided thoughtful responses to the questions which I raised. I especially connend the Staff for its willingness to modify its position (as in the written examination) when information was brought to its attention for the first time through this process of developing the record.
Second, notwithstanding my reversal of the Staff on the result reached in the sinulator examination, I strongly emphasize that I do not subscribe in any way to Mr. Morabito's frequently expressed claim that the NRC Staff examiners were "incompetent". At issue were a number of complex and close questions which could reasonably be decided several ways. That I ruled in favor of Mr. Morabito and rejected the Staff position on many of these questions represents a difference of professional interpretation of events, not a judgment as to the competence of the individuals who originally rendered their decisions.
My only critique of the Staff examiners was their seeming tendency to accord undue weight to alleged deficiencies which, even if they were properly deemed to be deficiencies, were essentially trivial in nature.
They tended to overlook the forest for the trees, to ignore the considerable knowledge and skills demonstrated by Mr. Morabito because of the few minor deficiencies which he exhibited. perhaps this
e 58 situation is attributable to a relatively junior exaniinar (two years out of engineering school at the time of the examination and certified as an examiner for power reactors less than six months prior to the examination) evaluating a candidate with more than twenty years' experience in the nsclear industry.143 Or perhaps the situation is a necessary attribute of the examination process; but, if so, it may deprive the nuclear utilities of employing as opera' tors or senior operators a number of competent and well-qualified individuals.
Finally, Mr. Morabito sought to use his appeal as an avenue for refonning the operator licensing process.144 I early ruled that this matter was beyond my jurisdiction in this proceeding, although my findings and conclusions could perhaps serve as a vehicle for later changes in the process which he might seek to pursue through other channels.145 Now, after having gone through this proceeding, I would recomend one modification to the process followed for Mr. Morabito's examination.
I noted earlier (at p.13, supra) that the grading of the simulator examination was described by the NRC Examiner Standards in effect at 143 Cf. Staff Exh.1, professional qualifications of David M. Silk, Eth Morabito Exh.1, at 2-3 and attached Exhibit B; and license application form, provided to Presiding Officer and parties by letter oated July 21, 1987 (entitled "Addition to Motion on Burden ofProof").
144 Morabito Exh. 1, at 1-2 and 31.
145 LBP-87-23, 26 NRC 81, 84-85 (1987).
O 59 that time as being a "subjective" judgment. In my opinion, it should be less so. Indeed, the current Examiner Standards have dropped the "subjective" characterization, referring to the pass-fail detennination only as a "professional judgment."146 More objective standards for the evaluation of a candidate's activities than were followed in Mr.
Morabito's examination should be instituted, so that there is less potential for different grading of candidates for similar positions.
. In a similar light, although affecting the written rather than the simulator examination, was the differing grading standards employed by the Staff for multiple-answer questions, such as question 6.03b. See n.
22, supra. The grading method favored by the Staff Headquarters reviewers may well be preferable to that used by the examiner (which was eventually accepted by the Staff). If so, it should be prescribed for all examinations. Although I have no authority to put into effect any changes in practices which would lead to greater objectivity in grading, I can note that changes of this type appear to be underway. I also can express some hope that the Connission will continue to explore this matter and attempt to develop some more definitive guidance in this regard.
146 NUREG-1021 (Rev. 4), i ES-302, 1 C.
i l
60 l IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW l
l Based on the foregoing, and the entire record of this proceeding, I hereby conclude:
- 1. The Applicant (Mr. Morabito) has passed the prescribed written l examination, operating test and simulated operating test, as required by 10 C.F.R. I 55.11(b) (1987).
- 2. The Applicant has learned to operate and to direct the
. licensed activities of licensed operators in a competent and safe manner, within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. 6 55.11(b) (1987).
- 3. Having fulfilled the requirements of 10 C.F.R. I 55.11(a) and (c) prior to the institution of this proceeding, the Applicant has l
fulfilled all requirements for a Senior Reactor Operator's license, as specified in 10 C.F.R. 6 55.11 (1987).
V. ORDER For the reasons stated, and based on the foregoing opinion, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, it is, this
)
20th day of April .1988 .
ORDERED
- 1. The determinations by the NRC Staff that Mr. Alfred J.
Morabito has not passed the written and simulator portions of the examination for a Senior Reactor Operator license are hereby reversed.
- 2. The Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation or, as appropriate, the Regional Administrator, Region I, is hereby directed to issue a Senior Reactor Operator license for the Beaver Valley Power Station, I
O 61 Unit 1, to Mr. Alfred J. Morabito, subject to the standard tenns and conditions which govern such licenses.
- 3. This license authorization is imediately effective. The term of the license shall run from the date of its issuance.
- 4. In accordance with the Comission's Order dated July 1,1987 (unpublished), which instituted this proceeding, and as further provided by the Comission's Order dated October 2,1987 (unpublished), this Decision will become final agency action thirty (30) days after the date of issuance unless the Comission, on its own motion, undertakes a review of the Decision. No petition for review by a party will be entertained by the Comission.
PRESIDING 0FFICER 1 Abs Charles Bechhoefer
/ $ A/
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
/
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 20th day of April,1988.
l
(
APPENDIX A List of Exhibits Tr.
N o,. Description RefWence Morabito Exhibits 1 Specification of Claims, dated 11 July 31, 1987, including attached Exhibits A-2. and AA-BB.
2 Response to NRC Staff Response to 11 Specification of Claims, dated November 7, 1987 3 Response to Request for Additional 12 Infonnation, dated January 28, 1988 4 Non-Normal Conditions (portion of 42, 95-96 Beaver Valley Power Station Operating (not Manual), undated admitted) 5 Examination Report 269-70 for Mr. A. Christopher Bakken, III, (not dated March 21, 1986 ad.31 tted)
Staff Exhibits 1 NRC Staff Response to Specification 14 of Claims, dated October 9, 1987, including attached Joint Affidavit of Barry S. Norris and David M. Silk, and Statements of Professional Qualifications 2 Joint Affidavit of Barry S. Norris and 15 David M. Silk, dated December 21, 1987 3 Joint Affidavit of Barry S. Norris and David M. Silk, dated January 29, 1988 15 4 Affidavit of Theodore L. Szymanski, 15 dated February 17, 1988, including Statement of Professional Qualifications A-1
e APPENDIX B Transcript Corrections Page Line Change 18 12 "Gold" to "Gould" 27 11 "grievable," to "reasonable,"
30 22 "reference" to "referenced" 31 16 "observer" to "observe" 48 1 "If happens" to "If he happens" 53 5 "plan" to "plant" 53 24 "bore rating" to "borating" 55 2 "that are" to "that you are" 59 20 "boring" to "boron" 62 5 "cf temperature?" to "of the temperature limit?"
65 16 "stated" to "started" 67 2 "revolution" to "evolution" 84 4 "conservative" to "conservatively" 90 16 "evidence" to "evidenced" 97 16 "N" to "M" 100 10 "What does" to "What difference does" 100 21 "180" to "180" [ degrees]"
101 24 "RSC hot shut" to "RCS hot side" 102 14 "it" to "he" 105 4 "pervaded on" to "been provided in" 113 23 "leave" to "lead" 117 18 "posed" to "provided" B-1
). i l
.. 1 Page Line Change 117 19 "Backing" to "Bakken" 117 20 "Backing" to "Bakken" 123 17 "reactive" to "reacter" 125 2 "reactive" to "reactor" 134 1 "reactive" to "reactor"
?34 3 "reactive" to "reactor" 135 20 "reactive" to "reactor" 136 6 "reactive" to "reactor" 136 7 "reactive" to "reactor" 138 13 "include" to "conclude" 164 9 "what is" to "what it" 172 21 "death then" to "death. When" 178 23 "asserted" to "inserted" 179 22 "turbon [ph]" to "turbine" 182 8 "Some" to "Something"; delete "been" 184 21 "freshwater" to "pressurizer" 184 22 "[ph] stray" to "spray" 184 23 delete "pretty" 187 10 "reporters" to "recorders" 187 12 d
reporters" to "recorders" 188 6 " h e re" to " F.e r" 191 1 ,,
"quarter" to "recorder" 191 4 "flow and" to "flow in" 191 13 "quarters" to "recorders" 193 1 "reserved" to "observed" l
B-2
O Page line Change 195 3 "I's" to "I'd" 195 18 "megawod" to "megawatt" 197 2 "didn't" to "did" 199 7 "fell" to "valve" 200 10 ";e" to "we" 200 18 "negawods" to "megawatts" 204 21 "balance plant" to "balance-of-plant" 205 10 "stray valve and" to "spray valve in the" 206 21 "commend" to "commence" 210 24 "Communication to Crew" to "Communications / Crew" 214 21 "communications through interactions" to "Communications / Crew Interactions" 219 19 "This is" to "Is this" 219 25 "coring" to "cooling" 221 22 "If" to "Was"; delete "is" 223 8 "to" to "go" 235 4 "balance plan" to "balance-of-plant" 242 20 "bilance plant" to "balance-of-plant" 243 6 "pre-even" to "pre-event" 245 2 "Brown" to "Morabito" 245 5 "simulated" to "simulator" 250 21 "Dufuesne" to "Duquesne" 255 14 "filing in" to "filing. In" 8-3