ML20140D598

Response to Util Motion for Summary Disposition of Ctr for Nuclear Responsibility Contention 10 Re Increase in Spent Fuel Pool Capacity.Proof on Contention 10 Not Met.Motion Must Fail

ML20140D598
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	03/19/1986
From:	Lorion J CENTER FOR NUCLEAR RESPONSIBILITY
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#186-525 OLA-2, NUDOCS 8603260383
Download: ML20140D598 (4)

Text

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March A9, 1966

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i. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f?i , f il  ;

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l/

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BEFORE THE AT OMIC SAFETY AND LICENSINGYBOARd' ' .O f

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xp j In the ' Mc ' ter of - ) Docket Nos. 50-250-OLN.12

) '50-25.1-OLA-2 't FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY )

) (Spent Fuel Pool Expansion)

(Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4)) l d

INTERVENORS RESPONSE TO LICENSEE'S MOTION FOR -

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION OF INTERVENORS' CONTENTION 10 f I. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION Under both the Commission's and Federal Court Rules of Practice, '

"the burden of proof lies upon the movant for summary disposition, who must demonstrate the absence of any issue of. material fact." {

, Adickes v. Kress and Co., 398, U.S. 144, 157, Perry ALAB-443, suora, 6 NRC at 753. Again under both NRC and Federal Rules, "the record

is to be reviewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing i

the motion." Dairyland Power Cooperative, 16 NRC 512, 519 (1982) citing: Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System Inc. , 368 U.S. 464,

473 (1962)

Crest Auto Supplies Inc. v. Ero Manufacturing Co.,360 i

j F. 2d, 896, 899 (7th Cir. 1966); United Mineworkers of America, Dist.

i

! 22 v.'Ronoco, 314 F. 2d 186, 188 (10th Cir. 1963); Pennsylvania Power l

& Light Co. and Allegheny Electric Co-operative Inc. (Susquehanna Steam' Electric Station, Units 1 and 2) LBP 81-8, 13 NRC 335, 337 i

(1981); Seabrook, LBP-74-36, supra, 6 NRC, supra, 7 AEC at 879.

. " Because the proponent of a motion for summary disposition i

has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of i l

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s material fact, it does not necessarily follow that a motion supported by af fidavits will automatically prevail over an opposition not supported by affidavits. The Board must scrutinize the motion to determine whether the movant's burden has been met." Carolina Power

& Licht Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Acency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2) LBP-84-7, ASLBP No.

82-468-01-OL, 19NRC 432 (1984).

Finally, for a contention to remain litigable, the Intervenors must present to the Board a sufficient factual basis "to require reasonable minds to inquire further." Pennsylvania Power and Licht Company and Allegheny Electric Cooperative Inc., (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2) ALAB 613, 12 NRC 317, 340 (1980).

The issues of material fact raised in the Intervenors' Response to Florida Power & Light's Motion for Summary Disposition of the foregoing contention demonstrate that a sufficient material basis on the contention has been raiced; and that the Licensee's motion for summary disposition of this contention must fail.

II. INTERVENORS' CONTENTION 3 The purpose of this response is to address Intervenors' Contention 10, which states:

CONTENTION 10. That the increase of the spent fuel pool capacity, which includes fuel rods that are more highly enriched, will cause the requirements c; ANSI *:I6-1975 not to be met and will increase the probability that a criticality accident will occur in the spent fuel pool and will exceed 10 C.F.R. Part 50, A62 criterion.

BASES FOR CONTENTION: The increase in the number of fuel rods stored and the fact that many of them may be more highly enriched and have more reactivity will increase the chances that the fuel pool will go critical, and cause a major criticality accident, and perhaps explosion, that will release large amounts of radioactivity to the environment in excess of 10 C.F.R. 100 critoria.

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1. This contention is concerned that the' increase in fuel density of the spent fuel pool, combined with storage of fuel with a higher enrichment and burn-up will increase both the possibility and consequences of a criticality accident.

2. U 235-loading of 52.40 grams per axial centimeter is the maximum loading which can assure a Kerg of no greater than 0.95 including uncertainties. Staff Safety Evaluation, Sept. 5, 1984, at page 2.

3. In order to allow fuel with a maximum uranium 235 enrichment of 4.5 weight percent to be stored in the spent fuel pool racks, the pool was divided into two seperate regions.

4. The Licensee's consideration of_the required calculational uncertainties, conservative assumptions, and worst case design basis accidents resulted in a predicted keff f 0.9403 for Region I and a k eff f 0.9304 for Region II. Kopp affidavit at 5.

5. GDC 62, " Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling", states that criticality in fuel storage and handling systems shall be prevented by physical systems or processes.

The NRC acceptance criterion for assuring that GDC 62 is met is found in the Standard Review Plan, SRP, Section 9.1.2, which requires maintaining a storage array neutron multiplication factor (kegg) less than 0.95 in spent fuel pools during normal and accident conditions. Kopp affidavit at 2.

6. Intervenors contend that the storage of the more highly enriched spent fuel and the increased density, which increanes the kegg should not be allowed because it reduces a critical safety margin to within a fraction of the allowable limit.

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It is interesting to note that before 1976, the acceptable kefg

- for the 95/95 standard was 0.90. Because the 95/95 standard is 4

less conservative, prudence would dictate that one leave a significant margin of safety between the calculated k egg : limit and the standard.

7. It is clear from the Licensee's newly calculated values for k egg that there adherence to the standard is no longer conservative and that the safety margins for spent fuel storage 3

have been significantly reduced, and that the possibility of a criticality accident occurring in the spent fuel pool'becomes more likely.

8. Also, because the use of more highly enriched uranium t

fuel rods with a greater burn-up creates more fission products i

poisons (Boyd affidavit at 5), it follows that the storage of this l fuel not only increases the possibility of a criticality accident; i

it would increase the radiological consequences of such an  ;

i accident.

In conclusion, the Licensee has not met its burden of proot on contention 10, because they have not demonstrated that

! their reduction of the margin of safety in the spent fuel pool l

is not significant and that a criticality accident will be prevented. Their motion for summary disposition must fail.

Respectfully submitted, jfh W%

• Joette Lorion Director, Center for Nuclear i

Responsibility

7210 Red Rd #208 1 Miami, Pl. 33143 March 19, 1986 i

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