IR 05000483/1997007
| ML20137Q621 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137Q613 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-483-97-07, 50-483-97-7, NUDOCS 9704110058 | |
| Download: ML20137Q621 (25) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50 483 License No.:
NPF-30 Report No.:
50-483/97-07 Licensee:
Union Electric Company Facility:
Callaway Plant Location:
Junction Highway CC and Highway O Fulton, Missouri Dates:
February 16 through March 29,1997 Inspectors:
D. G. Passehl, Senior Resident inspector F. L. Brush, Resident inspector J. F. Ringwald, Senior Resident inspector, Wolf Creek Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental Information C704110058 970400
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- a EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
4 Callaway Plant
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NRC Inspection Report 50-483/97-07
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A conduit was observed resting on the mechanical overspeed trip rod for the
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turbine-driven auxiliary feed pump. The licensee's response was appropriate and
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j prompt (Section 01.2).
The licensee ran a safety injection pump without cooling water to the lube oil
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cooler. This was a noncited violation. The licensee's immediate actions were l
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appropriate. The documented basis for the immediate operability determination was weak (Section 01.3).
The licensee decreased reactor power to approximately 65 percent in response to a
problem with the main feedwater Pump B governor control circuit. Control room operators were very attentive to plant parameters during the power reduction.
t Operators exhibited good communications (Section 04.1).
Maintenance
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Instrumentation and control technicians performed in-shop testing and adjustment of
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a circuit card that controlled a motor-driver. auxiliary feedwater pump discharge flow control valve. The work package contained several weaknesses.
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Documentation of work performed was also weak (Section M1.4).
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The licensee discovered z Iiishlight in Emergency Diesel Generator A. The i
licensee's followup actionc vere appropriate. The flashlight was left during a previous maintenance inspection. Housekeeping controls on the emergency diesel generator during the previous maintenance inspection wera inadequate. This was a
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noncited violation (Section M2.1).
One of four power range instrument channels tripped during the power ascension,
following repairs to the main condenser. An instrument and control technician had installed an incorrect trip setpoint. The cause was personnel error. This was a
noncited violation. The licensee's corrective actions were appropriate (Section M4.1).
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Enaineerina
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The licensee performed an operability evaluation after discovering the flashlight in
Emergency Diesel Generator A. The licensee's evaluation was lacking. The evaluation addressed some important points, but did not fully support conclusions drawn in the formal safety evaluation (Section E1.1).
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The inspectors i&ntified a discrepancy between the Final Safety Analysis Report
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and plant test practices. The response time of certain monitors that isolate control
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room ventilation was listed as'3 seconds, but this response time had not been l
verified by testing. This was an unresolved item (Section E3.1).
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- Plant Sucoort t
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. Overall material condition of normally inaccessible high' radiation areas in the
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I auxiliary building was good to excellent. Housekeeping was generally ' good, but
weak in the letdown heat exchanger and valve room (Section R2.1).
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Reoort Details Summarv of Plant Status
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The unit be0an the inepection period at 30 percent reactor power with repairs to the main
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condenser in progress. A condenser tube rupture occurred on February 14,1997. This event was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-483/9703. Plant maintenance personnel completed condenser repairs. On February 16,1997, the licensee returned the plant to full power operation.
j On February 25,1997, the licensee reduced plant power to approximately 65 percent in l
f order to repair the main feedwater Pump B governor control circuit. The licensee returned
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the plant to full power operation the following day.
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i 1. Operations
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Conduct of Operations
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01.1 General Coinments f71707)
Tne inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations, in general,
the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Plant status, operating problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room coordination were properly controlled. The inspectors observed i
numerous shift turnovers and noted no problems.
01.2 Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Potential Conduit interference a.
Insoection Scope (71707)
The inspectors toured the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room and noted a conduit resting on the mechanical overspeed trip rod. The inspectors notified the
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licensee and evaluated the licensee's response, r
b.
Observations and Findinas During a tour of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump room, the inspectors
noted an electrical conduit from the electronic governor lying on the mechanical overspeed trip rod for turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump trip-throttle
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Valve FCHV0312.
l The inspectors informed the shift supervisor. The shift supervisor immediately contacted electricians and directed them to reroute the conduit to eliminate the potential interference. The electricians promptly re-routed and secured the conduit.
The licensee initiated a suggestion-occurrenco-solution report. The licensee planned to document the formal engineering operability evaluation on the report.
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-2-The inspectors discussed with licensee engineering personnel whether a prior operability concern existed. The licensee stated that the conduit would not have prevented the auxiliary feedwater pump trip-throttle valve from closing during a t'ormal shutdown of the pump. Also, the conduit would not have prevented the auxiliary feedwater pump trip-throttle valve from closing upon reaching the electronic overspeed trip setpoint. The reason was that the mechanical overspeed trip rod would actuate to close Valve FCHV0312 only on a mechanical overspeed trip.
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The licensee Turther stated that there would be approximately 25 pounds of force applied to the mechanical overspeed trip rod on a mechanical overspeed trip. The licensee stated that the conduit applied very little pressure on the rod and would not have prevented a mechanical overspeed trip.
The inspectors will review the licensee's formal evaluation at a later time. Pending the inspectors' review, this is an Inspection Followup Item (50-483/9707-01).
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's immediate corrective action was appropriate and prompt.
j 01.3 Safety Iniection Pumo Run Without Component Coolina Water a.
Inspection Scope (71707)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to an event in which safety injection Pump A was run for 13 minutes without component cooling water flow to
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the tube oil cooler. The inspectors reviewed surveillance test Procedure OSP-EM-P001 A, "Section XI Safety injection Train A Operability," Revision 22.
b.
Observations and Findinas On March 12,1997, the licensee performed postmaintenance testing of safety injection Pump A. During the pump run, operators noticed that the local component cooling water flow indicator read zero flow. Also, elevated lube oil temperatures were seen on the local temperature indicators.
The operations field supervisor and system engineer found that component cooling water Train A was not in service as required. Component cooling water supphes the tube oil cooler on the safety injection pump. Operators stopped the safety injection pump. The licensee initiated a suggestion-occurrence-solution condition report and discussed the problem.
The licensee found that the tube oil temperature rose to approximately 120 F during the 13 minutes that the pump was run without component cooling water. The
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-3-licensee's immediate operability review determined that the pump remained operable. The pump had successfully passed the postmaintenance surveillance test.
The licensee then declared the safety injection pump operable.
The inspectors noted a weakness in that the licensee did not sufficiently document the basis for concluding that the pump was operable. The inspectors reviewed the safety injection pump vendor technical manual to determine the maximum allowable iube oil temperature. The manual stated that the maximum allowable lube oil temperature was 128 F at the inlet of the pump bearings, and 155 F at the outiet.
In spite of this documentation weakness, the licensee's operability determination reached the appropriate conclusion.
The licensee's immediate and long term actions to prevent recurrence were the following:
The operations department manager reviewed the event with the shift
personnel who performed the surveillance.
Shift supervisors reviewed the event with all the other shifts.
- The plant manager planned to review the event with the current and future
operator requalification training classes.
The licensee initiated a change to both safety injection pump surveillance
procedures. The change would move the initial condition, that component cooling water be running prior to starting a safety injection pump, into the aody of the procedure. The intent would be to improve human factoring of the procedures.
A few weeks prior to this event, the licensee grouped all operating
procedures, and assigned each group to a single senior reactor operator. The intent was to have a single owner for all operating procedures. The senior reactor operators were assigned the responsibility for maintaining the procedures, and working with the system engineers to ensure that the procedures are in full compliance with the Final Safety Analysis Report and the licensee's internal commitment tracking system.
The licensee had a schedule for review of the operating procedures. The
plan was to have each senior reactor operator review and revise the operating procedures by October 31,1998.
The inspectors found the licensee's corrective and planned actions to be comprehensive.
Procedure OSP-EM P001 A, Step 4.2, stated the initial condition that component cooling water system Train A be in servce prior to starting the safety injection
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-4-pump. The failure to ensure that the component cooling water system Train A was in service is considered a violation. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/9707-02).
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Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's immediate actions were appropriate.
However, the documented basis for the immediate operability determination was weak.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Review of Eauipment Taaouts (71707)
The inspectors walked down the following tagouts for the containment spray system Train B planned maintenance outage:
Workman's Protection Assurance 22465 Containment Spray Pump B Room Cooler; Workman's Protection Assurance 22466 Feeder Breaker to Containment Spray Pump B; and Workman's Protection Assurance 22467 Containrnent Spray Pump B from Refueling Water Storage Tank Suction Valve.
The inspectors did not identify any discrepancies. All tags were on the correct devices and the devices were in the position prescribed by the tags.
Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 Reiaction in Plant Power Due to Main Feedwater Pumo A Problems f
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Jaspection Scooe (71707)
The inspectors observed the briefing and reduction to approximately 65 percent reactor power in response to a problem with the main feedwater Pump B governor control circuit. The main feedwater Pump B turbine control oil pressure was oscillating, causing small oscillations in the associated pump control valve position.
Operators performed the power reduction using Procedure OTG-ZZ-0004, " Power Operations," Revision 26.
Section M1.3 discusses the maintenance effort to troubleshoot the circui,
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Observations and Findinas There was no significant effect on the feedwater system since operators detected the problem at the onset of the oscillations. Plant operators placed the feedwater pump control in manual to minimize the effect of the oscillations on steam generator water levels.
The control room supervisor held a thorough briefing which covered the normal operating procedure for reducing power. Also, the control room supervisor discussed contingency actions to be taken in accordance with off-normal Procedure OTO AE-0001, "Feedwater System Malfunctions," Revision 3, if the feedwater pump tripped. Management was present for the briefing and ensured that the control room staff was aware of their expectations. Operators actively participated in the discussion and had good comments.
During the power reduction, control room operators performed well. The operators were very attentive to plant parameters. There were no unexpected annunciator alarms. Operators exhibited good communications. The inspectors did not note any problems.
Miscellaneous Operations issues 08.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-483/9607-01: Penetrations and Valves not Shown on Final Safety Analysis Report Fiaure 6.2.4-1 a.
Insoection Scope (92901)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions regarding some containment penetrations and valves that were not shown on Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 6.2.4-1.
b.
Observations and Findinas The inspectors performed a walkdown of containment penetrations in piping penetration Rooms A and B. The valve lineups were compared with Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 6.2.4-1, which illustrated the normal at-power lineup for the containment penetrations. The inspectors identified some containment penetrations and associated isolation valves that were not shown on Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 6.2.4-1:
Containment Penetration 57 with postaccident sampling system to reactor
coolant drain tank outlet downstream test connection Valve SJVO114 was not shown; Containment Penetration 36 with refueling service access penetration
isolation Valve GPV0048 was not shown;
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I Containment Penetration 50 with refueling service access penetration
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isolation Valve GPV0049 was not shown; and
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i Containment Penetration 68 with refueling service access penetration i
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isolation Valve GPV0050 was not shown.
i Although not yet shown on Figure 6.2.4-1, the penetrations and valves were shown on the licensee's approved design drawings.
-The licensee was performing a review of several sections of the Final Safety Analysis Report and had already identified the need to update Figure 6.2.4-1.
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The licenstse's letter of February 5,1997, committed them to review the Final Safety Analysis Report. In the letter, the licensee stated that a task team was
formed in March 1996 to determine the scope of review required to provide
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assurance that the Callaway plant is operated according to the Final Safety Analysis Report.
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i The task team completed the review in July 1996 and identified actions and j
prioritized various Final Safety Analysis Report sections for review. The highest i
priority for review was Section 6.2, which included Figure 6.2.4-1.
j The inspectors reviewed the licensee's action plan to review the Final Safety Analysis Report for Figure 6.2.4-1. By June 15,1997, the licensee intended to:
(1) develop a template for Figure 6.2.4-1 with a revised format and content; (2) determine what other information should be included in the figure; (3) produce a reference document; (4) verify accuracy of the reviews; and (5) process Final Safety Analysis Report changes as necessary.
The Commission recently approved modifications to the NRC Enforcement Policy (NUREG 1600) to address departures from the Final Safety Analysis Report.
Section Vll.B.3 of the Policy, " Violations involving Old Design issues," addresses enforcement discretion when licensees identify the problem. Although NRC inspectors identified the errors in Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 6.2.4-1, it is apparent that the licensee would have identified those errors in light of the defined scope, thoroughness, and schedule of their review plan.
Therefore, pending the inspectors' review of the licensee's completed actions to resolve the discrepancies in Final Safety Analysis Report Figure 6.2.4-1, this is considered an Inspection Followup item (50-483/9707-03).
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11. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance
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M 1.1 General Comments - Maintenance r
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Inspection Scone (62707)
The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following w,rk activities:
Work Activity W172793 - Emergency Diesel Generator A Ce n Shaft Cover
Gasket Replacement; Work Activity C574798 - Replace Emergency Diesel Generator A Instrument
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Piping with Tube and Swage Fittings; Work Activity W598498 - Replace Emergency Diesel Generator A Emergency
Service Water Supply Valve EFV0272, Actuator; r
Work Activity C595995 - Replace Emergency Service Water Valve EFV0058,
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Outlet; Work Activity W184514 - Replace Emergency Diesel Generator A Governor
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Control Handswitch; Work Activity W184212 - Repack Valve BNHV0003, Containment Spray e
Pump B from Refueling Water Storage Tank Isolation Valve;
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Work Activity W176123 - Rework Foxboro Circuit Card to Verify Proper
Operation; Work Activity W182324 -Inspect Emergency Service Water Piping for
l Blockage at the Containment Spray Pump B Room Cooler; and Work Activity G597690-027 - Troubleshoot and Repair Main Feedwater
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Pump B Governor Control Circuits.
b.
Observations and Findinas Except as noted in Section M1.4, the inspectors found no concerns with the maintenance observed. All work observed was performed with the work packages
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present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were
present when required.
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M1.2. General Comments - Surveillance a.
Insoection Scoce (61726)
The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following test activities:
Surveillance Procedure OSP-NE-0001 A, " Standby Diesel Generator A
Periodic Tests," Revision 2;
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Surveillance Procedure OSP-EM-P001 A, "Section XI Safety injection Train A
Oporability," Revision 22; and
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Surveillance Procedure ISF-SE-ON42A, "Special Fctnal-Nuc; Nuc Inst Pwr
Rng N42," Revision 6.
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b.
Observations and Findinas Surveillance testing observed during this inspection period was conducted satisfactorily in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the Technical Specifications.
M1.3 Troubleshootina of Main Feedwater Pumo B a.
Insoection Scope (6270Z1 The inspectors observed the maintenance briefing and troubleshooting of the main
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feedwater Pump B governor control circuit. The inspectors reviewed the work package, generic work request G597690-027, " Troubleshoot and Repair Main Feedwater Pump B Governor Control Circuits."
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Observations and Findinas
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The briefing covered the maintenance troubleshooting activities. This included expected communications between the control room and the field and how to respond to an unexpected trip of the pump. Maintenance management and the
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system engineer were present at the briefing and job site, i
Theiashtenance technicians performed the troubleshooting within the bounds of
the eutK packQe. The inspectors observed that technicians were very deliberate-
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when attaching instrument test leads to various points in the governor control
circuit. This was because an inadvertent ground could have. caused a plant transient due to a potential pump trip or significant change in pump speed.
The technicians discovered that a circuit card in the governor control circuit was
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bad. Operators removed the pump from service to allow replacement of the card.
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The technicians also found, during further troubleshooting with the pump not in service, a second faulted card for the governor servo. The technicians successfully replaced and tested both cards.
The inspectors did not observe any problems during the troubleshooting activities.
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Conclusions
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The inspectors concluded that the troubleshooting conducted on main feedwater Pump B was good.
M1.4 Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Control Valve Card Test jntsrection Scoce (62707)
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r The inspectors observed instrumentation and control technicians perform in-shop testing and adjustment of the Foxboro circuit card controlling motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to Steam Generator B flow control Valve ALHV0009.
b.
Observations and Findinas The licensee observed card output drift and the instrumentation vendor recommended this test to further evaluate the drift. The licensee performed this testing in the maintenance shop.
The inspector observed several planning weaknesses with the work document.
The document contained several pen-and-ink changes, some of which had
not been initialed and dated.
The work planner determined that a jumper was not needed and deleted the
step in the work package with a pen-and ink change. The planner failed to delete the subsequent step to remove this jumper.
The work instructions directed the technicians to adjust signal limits.
- However, the work instructions did not direct the technicians to restore these limits to their proper settings.
The technicians experienced difficulty getting the card to respond properly.
- The technicians reviewed the vendor technical manual and maintenance instructions. The system engineer and planner were required to make pen-and ink changes to the work instructions.
The work instructions directed the technicians to use vendor-supplied
directions to test the card. However, these instructions did not provide sufficient guidance for the technicians to complete the test.
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The technicians made some assumptions during the test. The technicians proceeded using these assumptions without verifying that the assumptions were correct.
The technicians plugged the card into a vendor-supplied card test module.
- The technicians then installed a jumper between two incorrect pins with the card energized. The technicians did not evaluate the consequences of having jumpered the wrong pins on the card until after this was questioned by the inspector.
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i The inspector questioned whether a switch in a cable connecting vendor-
suppfied components was in the correct position. The technicians identified the purpose of the switch, then suggested that they "fhp the switch to see what happens." The technicians subsequently flipped the switch and noted that there was no change in the card output. The technicians then proceeded with the testing without verifying that the switch was in the correct position.
Other observations:
The technicians did not record on the work document the various
adjustments made, the use of varying jumpers, test voltages, and test equipment. The technicians did not communicate this with the planner or the supervisor.
The system engineer suggested that the technicians should adjust high and
low limit potentiometers to see if this adjustment affected the card's output.
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This activity was not in the work instructions and was not docurrented.
The inspectors did not identify any violation of regulatory or licensee requirements j
during any of the in-shop testing. Although there were no procedure violations
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identified, many of the above observed activities did not meet the licensee's expectations for performing and documenting work. The postmaintenance test was satisfactory.
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Conclusions
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The inspectors concluded that the work package contained several weaknesses.
The technicians proceeded with work based on unverified assumptions. The testing evolved into an uncontrolled and undocumented troubleshooting effort that relied j
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solely on the skill of the craft to prevent damage to the card.
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M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M 2.1 Flashliaht Found inside the Ememency Diesel Generator A Enoine a.
Insocction Scooe (62707_1 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's investigation after the licensee discovered a flashlight in Emergency Diesel Generator A. The inspectors reviewed Procedure APA-ZZ-00801, " Foreign Material Exclusion," Revision 9, which implemented the licensee's foreign material exclusion program.
The inspectors also reviewed Procedure MPM-KJ-OKOO1, " Emergency Diocel Generator inspection," Revision 14, which the licensee used to perform the diesel inspection during the Fall 1996 refueling outage. The licensee determined that the emergency diesel generator was operable after the refueling outage with the flashlight in the camshaft area. The inspectors' review of the licensee's operability determination is addressed in Section E1.1.
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Qbservations and Findinns
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On February 18,1997, licensee personnel discovered a flashlight in the camshaft galley on the left side of the diesel engine. This was during a scheduled maintenance outage on Emergency Diesel Generator A. The flashlight was lying in
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the lube oil return drain path. The licensee determined that the flashlight had been
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lef t in the diesel during the Fall 1996 refueling outage. The last time personnel had access to the camshaft galley, the area was inspected by a vendor representative.
Procedure APA-ZZ-00801 identified areas requiring mandatory foreign material exclusion controls. The procedure did not identify the emergency diesel generator engines as mandatory foreign material exclusion control areas. The procedure stated that, for any plant equipment, either foreign material exclusion or normal housekeeping controls could be implemented when foreign material exclusion i
controls are.ot mandatory, Prior to the 1996 refueling outage, the licensea determined that normal housekeeping controls were adequate for the inspections planned for the emergency diesel generators. This was based on using the " Foreign Material Exclusion Control Determination Criteria" flowchart in Procedure APA-ZZ-00801, Attachment 1. The flowchart stated that normal housekeeping controls could be implemented if final inspections of the areas were possible and foreign material could be easily retrieved.
For the planned maintenance work in February 1997, prior to finding the flashlight, the licensee implemented foreign material exclusion controls. This was due to the extensive maintenance scheduled to be performed on the emergency diesel generator engine.
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-12-After finding the flashlight, the licensee retrieved the flashlight and thoroughly
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inspected the camshaft area. The licensee did not find any other foreign objects in j
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the camshaft galley. The licensee determined that Procedure APA-ZZ-00801 properly implemented foreign material and housekeeping controls.
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The licensee's planned followup actions included:
Enhancing the foreign material exclusion program training for vendor
representatives;
Adding cleanliness inspection signoffs to the diesel inspection procedures;
and, Reviewing the method for determining whether an area should have foreign a
material exclusion or ncrmal housekeeping controls.
Procedure MPM-KJ-OK001, Step 2.2, stated, in part, that internal cleanliness of the i
diesel engine will be verified upon completion of emergency diesel generator i
inspections. The failure to ensure that all foreign material was removed from the diesel engine following the Fall 1996 inspection is considered a violation. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/9707-04).
c.
Conclusions
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The licensee's immediate and followup actions were appropriate. The housekeeping controls dunng the Fall 1996 Emergency Diesel Generator A inspection were
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inadequate.
M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance
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M4.1 Power Ranae Instrument Trio Setooint incorrectiv Set a.
Inspection Scope (617261 On February 16,1997, power range instrument Channel N42 generated a trip signal
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at 99 percent reactor power. The trip setpoint was required to be set between 108.5 and 109.5 percent reactor power. The inspectors ;,iewed the licensee's actions and Procedure ISF-SE-ON42A, "Specict Fctnal-Nuc; Nuc Inst Pwr Rng N42,"
Revision 6.
b.
Observations and Findinas
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During the power reduction due to the main condenser tube leak, the licensee set the power range nuclear instrument trip setpoints to a lower value as required by
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I Procedure ISF-SE-ON42A. Prior to returning to 100 percent reactor power, the licensee was required to return the setpoints to between 108.5 and 109.5 percent (
reactor power.
However, during the reactor power increase, at approximately 99 percent reactor
. power, power range instrument Channel N42 tripped. Two out of four power range
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trip signals were required to generate a reactor trip. Plant operators reduced reactor i
power to 94 percent, as a precaution, to prevent an additional power range channel trip.
l The licensee commenced an investigation. The licensee determined that only one of the four power range trip signal had been incorrectly set at 99 percent reactor.
power. The licensee determined thet an instrument and control technician had set the power range instrument Channel N42 trip setpoint incorrectly.
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The licensee performed surveillance Procedure ISF-SE-ON42A to set the power range instrument Channel N42 trip setpoint to the correct value. Additionally, the
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licensee performed similar surveillance procedures on the remaining three power
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range instrument channels as a precautionary measure. The other three power channels were set correctly.
l The licensee determined that personnel error was the cause of the event.
Procedure ISF-SE-ON42A required the technician to record the applicable trip i
setpoint range (as determined by the shift supervisor), arid adjust a potentiometer while reading a meter. The meter indicated the trip setpoint. The licensee determined that the technician misread the meter. The trip setpoint values as determined by the shift supervisor and concurred by the technician were correct.
The inspectors reviewed the working copies of Procedure JSF-SE-ON42A that were used to set the trip setpoints. As required by Section 6.3, the shift supervisor determined the correct trip setpoint value for power range instrument Channel N42.
The technician correctly recorded this value, and the as left trip setpoint value, as required by the procedure. The inspectors agreed with the licensee's finding that the technician apparently misread the meter.
Failure to properly enter the correct trip setpoint for nuclear instrument Channel N42 was a violation of Procedure ISF-SE-ON42A, Step 6.3.4. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-483/9707-05).
The licensee reset the trip setpoints for Channel N42 and checked the other three channels. The licensee planned on implemertting the following corrective actions:
Revising the trip setpoint procedure to include setpoint checks following
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14-Revising, as appropriate, other procedures that do not have trip setpoint
checks following calibration (e.g., radiation monitoring procedures).
The inspectors also reviewed performance of relevant portions of the procedure on a nuclear instrument channel drawer used for training. The inspectors did not note any problems correlating the procedure steps with the appropriate components on the drawer, c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the inadvertent power range instrument trip was due to personnel error. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's corrective actions were appropriate.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 (Closed) Inscoction Followuo item 50-483/9518-05 Emeraency Core Coolina Svstem Flow Path Verification And Ventina a.
Inspection Scope (92902)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions to address pressure buildup from the plant accumulators into the safety injection and residual heat removal systems, b.
Observations and Findinas in early 1996, the licensee identified some accumulation of nitrogen in the discharge header of the safety injection pumps. The licensee identified the root cause to be nitrogen leakage through the accumulators' fillline into the safety injection system.
In addition, the licensee identified leakage from the accumulators into the discharge header of the residual heat removal and safety injection pumps. The licensee identified various components for repair during Refueling Outage 8.
For the nitrogen leakage, the licensee repaired the following valves:
Safety injection Accumulator Tank A Fill Line isolation Valve EMHV8878A;
Safety injection Accumulator Tank B Fill Line Isolation Valve EMHV8878B;
Safety injection Accumulator Tank D Fill Line Isolation Valve EMHV8878D;
l Safety injection Pump to Accumulator Tanks' Fill Line Inner Containment
isolation Check Valve EMV0006; and, Safety injection Pump to Accumulator Tanks' Fill Line Outer Containment
isolation Valve EMHV8888.
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-15-Postmaintenance test results for the above valves were satisfactory. The licensee noticed little or no nitrogen gas during recent venting evolutions. The licensee vents the emergency core cooling system pump discharge piping high points on a monthly basis to comply with Technical Specification 4.5.2.b.1.
For the leakage from the accumulators into the residual heat removal and safety injection systems, the licensee repaired several valves during Refueling Outage 8.
These included the following:
Residual Heat Removal Pumps to Reactor Coolant System Cold Leg Loop 1
Check Valve EP8818A; Residual Heat Removal Pumps to Reactor Coolant System Cold Leg Loop 2 e
Check Valve EP8818B; Residual Heat Removal Pumps to Reactor Coolant System Cold Leg Loop 4 e
Check Valve EP8818D; and, Safety injection and Accumulator Test Line isolation Valve EMHV8823.
- Postmaintenance testing for these valves was satisfactory. Leakage into the safety injection and residual heat removal systems from the accumulators was significantly reduced. This was based on the inspectors' comparison of accumulator pressure and level trends before and after Refueling Outage 8.
Although the licensee expended a good effort to eliminate the accumulator leakage, a different leak path emerged in January 1997. The licensee identified an j
approximate 0.2 gpm leak from the reactor coolant system. The path was through the safety injection system test line and into the radwaste holdup tanks. The licensee identified the source of the leakage to be safety injection / accumulator to reactor coolant system Loop 3 cold leg check Valve BB8948C. The maximum allowable leakage through Valve BB8948C is 5.0 gpm, per Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.
l The thensee eliminated the leakage by closing reactor coolant system cold leg Loop 3 to safety injection system test line isolation V'.lve EPVO128. The licensee initiated work requests to repair various valves during the next refueling outage in 1998.
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Conclusions The inspectors found that the licensee's actions to address leakage from the plant accumulators was satisfactory. The inspectors concluded that the licensee was proceeding in an acceptable manner to address the other newly identified leak _ _ - -
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- 16-Ill. Enaineerina E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Emeraency Diesel Generator A Operability Evaluation a.
Insoection Scoce (37551)
The inspectors reviewed Request for Resolution 17840, Revision A, and the proposed formal safety evaluation. The Request for Resolution documented the licensee's operability evaluation, and was intended to support conclusions drawn in the formal safety evaluation. The formal safety evaluation had not yet been reviewed by the Onsite Review Committee.
Section M2.1 describes the event.
b.
Observations and Findinas The licensee found that the emergency diesel generator remained operable with the flashlight in the camshaft galley. The reasons were the following:
The licensee noted no problems with engine operation subsequent to the
flashlight being left inside. The licensee successfully performed a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> surveillance run after the flashlight was lef t inside the cam galley. Also, monthly surveillances have been performed since the refueling outage with no problems noted.
The flashlight could not block oil flow from the cam galley into the crankcase
because of the dimensional differences between the oil drain hole and flashlight. Additionally, there was another drain hole at the opposite end of the esm galley, which also drained back to the crankcase.
The flashlight was not damaged by the rotating camshaft. There was over
2 inches of clearance between the flashlight and cam lobes. Additionally, even if the flashlight had been fragmented, there was no possibility of the pieces entering the oil pump suction pipe because this is covered by a fine mesh strainer screen.
Leakage from the two D-cell batteries was not a concern. If the batteries
were to leak, the impact to the diesel generator would be insignificant. The i
engine crankcase contains over 1000 gallons of lube oil so any leakage from the batteries would be diluted to an extremely small concentration.
The environment inside the cam galley had no adverse impact on the
flashlight so there does not appear to have been any danger of the flashlight deteriorating and causing any problem in the engin.
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-17-The inspectors found that the operability evaluation aadressed some important points, but did not fully support conclusions drawn in the formal safety evaluation.
Based on reasons cited above, the formal safety evaluation concluded that there would be no increase in the probability of occurrence of a malfunction of the emergency diesel generator. The support for this conclusion was weak. The licensee did not fully address, for example, the effect of high lube oil temperature on the flashlight after an extended run of the emergency diesel generator during a design basis accident. The licensee did not address (1) whether the flashlight could have melted; and (2) whether the melted plastic could have entered the oil pump suction pipe rendering the emergency diesel generator inoperable.
The inspectors found that the emergency diesel generator 24-hour run included a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> loaded run at approximately 110 percent of the continuous rating of 6201 kilowatts. The licensee did not present this information in the operability evaluation to support the conclusion that the environment inside the cam galley (e.g., hot lube oil or metal) had no adverse impact on the flashlight.
In addition, the licensee did not take oil samples on the emergency diesel generator after finding the flashlight to confirm that leakage from the 2 D-cell batteries was not a concern. Further, the licensee did not include the results of recent oil samples to support this conc osion. The inspectors independently reviewed the results of oil samples taken from Emergency Diesel Generator A on December 23,1996, January 6,1997, and March 19,1997. No abnormal values were shown.
Lastly, the licensee left out specQc Hormstion on when the flashlight was likely i
left inside the engine, and when subsequent engine runs were performed.
The inspectors determined that the flashlight was left in the diesel engine sometime between October 14 and October 17,1996, based on the time the inspection was performed on the machine. The licensee performed a postmaintenance run and subsequent operability test. The licensee did not note any problems. Further, the licensee completed the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run; and performed six 1-hour runs during the time the flashlight was in the engine, c.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee's engineering evaluation and formal j
safety evaluation were adequate and reached the correct conclusion that the flashlight did not render the engine inoperable. However, the engineering evaluation
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did not take full advantage of available data and did not fully support the conclusions drawn in the formal safety evaluation.
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- 18-i E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation
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E3.1 Resoonse Time Discrepancy With Control Room Ventilation Radioactivity Monitors
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insoection Scope i37551)
i The inspectors identified a discrepancy between the Final Safety Analysis Report
and plant test practices. The discrepancy involved the response time of the control
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room ventilation isolation system.
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Observations and Findinas
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Final Safety Analysis Report Table 7.3-7 states that the response time of the control room ventilation radioactivity Monitors GKRE04 and GKRE05 is less than 3 seconds.
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These devices continuously monitor the supply of air of the normal heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning system for particulate, iodine, and gaseous
radioactivity. Their purpose is to protect control room operators in the event high
airborne radioactivity is introduced into the control room heating, ventilation, and air i
conditioning supply duct.
The only response time test performed on the monitors was in April 1984, during preoperational testing. The response time reported for GKRE04 was 4.1 seconds.
The response time reported for GKRE05 was 3.8 seconds. The licensee stated that this preoperational test was not performed to verify the Final Safety Analysis Report Table 7.3-7 response time limit,
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t The licensee initiated a suggestion-occurrence-solution condition report. The licensee started the following action.
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Provide all pertinent technical background information regarding monitor
response tirne and any degradation over time.
Evaluate whether the monitor response time can be expanded to 5 seconds
without an adverse impact on control room habitability during a postulated
worst case accident.
Initiate and process a Final Safety Analysis Report Change Notice based
upon the findings.
The licensee found that no immediate operability concern existed. The response time would not affect assumptions in the current calculation for dose to control
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room operators. This calculation assumes zero transport time for radioactive particles to reach the control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning supply j
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duct from any postulated release point.
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inputs.
The inspectors agreed that there was no immediate operability concern. The inspectors will review the licensee's formal evaluation at a later time. Pending the inspectors' review, this is an Unresolved item (50-483/9707-05).
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Conclusionq The inspectors concluded that the licensee's actions wore appropriate.
IV. Plant Support R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls R 1.1 General Comments (717E0J The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely touring the radiologically controlled areas. Prejob briefs for work in radiological
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controlled areas were satisfactory, with open discussions on radiological and
personal safety. Licensee personnel working in radiological control areas exhibited good radiation worker practices.
Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys j
posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a sample of doors required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection and found no problems.
R2 Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment R2.1 Auxiliary Buildina Tour a.
insoection Scone (71750)
The inspectors accompanied licensee personnel on a detailed walkdown of high radiation areas in the auxiliary building. The tour was performed to inspect radiologically controlled areas not normally accessible.
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Observations and Findinas i
The inspectors toured the following areas:
Demineralizer Valve Rooms;
Seal Water Heat Exchanger Room;
Pipe Space A;
Pipe Space B; and,
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Letdown Heat Exchanger and Valve Room.
- The' inspectors found the various rooms to be in good to excellent material condition. Housekeeping was generally good. The inspectors identified some minor
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items, such as tools, improperly stored in some areas.
The inspectors identified a housekeeping concern in the letdown heat exchanger f
room. This room had heavy insulation dust on the floor due to contract l
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maintenance work during the 1996 refueling outage. The licensee cleaned the letdown beat exchanger room and initiated appropriate corrective actions to correct
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the discrepancies.
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Conclusions
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Overall material condition was good to excellent. Housekeeping was generally
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good. Housekeeping in the letdown heat exchanger and valve room was weak.
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V. Manaaement Meetinas
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X1 Exit Meeting Summary
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i The exit meeting was conducted on March 27,1997. The licensee did not express
a position on any of the findings in the report. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined dering the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
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[>ARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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Licensee R. D. Affolter, Manager, Callaway Plant-H. D. Bono, Supervising Engineer, Licensing Fuels and Site Licensir.g
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B. P. Bredeman, Operating Supervisor, Maintenance
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R. E. Farnam, Supervisor, Health Physics, Design Engineering R. T. Lamb, Superintendent, Operations
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J. V. Laux, Manager,' Quality Assurance
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C. D. Naslund, Manager, Nuclear Engineering J. R. Peevy, Manager, Emergency Preparedness / Organizational Development G. L. Randolph, Vice President, Nuclear M. A. Reidmeyer, Engineer, Quality Assurance R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Chemistry and Rad Waste M. E. Teylor, Assistant Manager, Work Control INSPECTiQN PROCEDURES USED 37551 Onsite Engineering 61726 Surveillance Observation 62707 Maintenance Observation
71707 Plant Operations
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l 71750 Plant Support Activities
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92901 Followup Plant Operations
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92902 Followup Maintenance
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-2-ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
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Ooened 9707-01 IFl Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Potential Conduit Interference
(Section 01.2)'
9707 02 NCV Safety injection Pump Run without Component Cooling
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Water (Section 01.3)
9707-03 IFl Penetrations and Valves not Shown in Final Safety Analysis Report (Section 08.1)
9707-04 NCV Flashlight in the Diesel Generator (Section M2.1)
9707-05 NCV Power Range Instrument Trip Setpoint incorrectly Set (Section M4.1)
9707-06 URI Response Time Discrepancy Control Room Ventilation Radioactivity Monitor (Section E3.1)
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Closed 9707-02 NCV Safety injection Pump Run without Component Cooling
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Water (Section 01.3)
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9607-01 URI Penetrations and Valves not Shown in Final Safety Analysis Report (Section 08.1)
9707-04 NCV Flashlight in the Diesel Generator (Section M2.1)
9518-05 IFl Emergency Core Cooling System Flow Path Verification and Venting (Section M8.1)
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9707-05 NCV Power Range instrument Trip Setpoint incorrectly Set (Section M4.1)
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