ML20137L591

Response Opposing Jf Doherty 850611 Petition for Show Cause Order Requesting NRC to Institute Consolidated Proceeding Per 10CFR2.202.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20137L591
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Crystal River, Rancho Seco, 05000000
Issue date:	09/10/1985
From:	Reynolds N ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO., BISHOP, COOK, PURCELL & REYNOLDS
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-#385-474 2.206, NUDOCS 8509120435
Download: ML20137L591 (10)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UUCXfTTh EC80ARr ER$$cht%'V' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,,

BEFORE THE DIRECTOR OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION t

In the Matter of: )

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ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT ) 6 COMPANY, ET AL. ) Docket No. 50-313y 4 L ,

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(Arkan as Nuclear One, )

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RESPONSE TO JOHN F. DOHERTY 5 2.206 PETITION I. INTRODUCTION On June 11, 1985, John F. Doherty filed a

" Petition / Request for Show Cause Order" in the above-referenced docket. The petition requests that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") institute a consolidated proceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.202 by issuing a show cause order for Arkansas Power and Light Company, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1; Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Rancho Seco, Unit 1; Florida Power Corporation, Crystal 8509120435 850910 f

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River, Unit 3; Duke Power Company, Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3; and General Public Utilities, Three Mile Island, Unit 1.

The petition asserts that these Babcock & Wilcox ("B&W")

Pressurized Water Reactors ("PWR's") should have their licenses suspended or revoked pending the outcome of an ,,

inspection of each reactor's control rod driven mechanism

("CRDM"). The basis for the petition is the NRC's IE Information Notice No. 85-38: Loose Parts Obstruct Control ,

Rod Drive Mechanism (May 21, 1985) ("IN 85-38"). The NRC, in a letter from H.R. Denton to Mr. Doherty, dated July 17, 1985 (served on each licensee), indicated that the petition would be treated under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. Arkansas Power & Light Company ("AP&L") herein responds to the petition.1 II. BACKGROUND IN 85-38 is an NRC information notice alerting recipient licensees to a problem related to locking springs and other loose parts inside the CRDM at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant. Davis-Besse is a B&W PWR. The notice reported three incidents of a jammed control rod at Davis-Besse. The 1/ Under the Commission's regulations, licensees are not required to respond to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 requests absent a specific, request by the.NRC pursuant to'10 C.F.R. 5.50.54(f). However, licensees may respond to such petitions voluntarily. See Duke Power-Co.-(Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1.and 2), DD-84-10, 20 NRC 161, 163 at n.1 (1984).

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incidents occurred in 1981, on March 16, 1985, and in a test on March 21, 1985. Inspections subsequent to the March 21 test revealed foreign objects and a broken locking spring in the CRDM. A broken spring or other loose parts could potentially cause a control rod to jam. IN 85-38 further ,

suggested a cause for the Davis-Besse locking spring failures as follows:

.The most likely cause of the spring failures is that the unit went into service with some of the locking springs not in their correct position. The present assembly procedure has the maintenance technician determining that the spring is in the correct position by

" feel" through a long handling tool. If this process is not successful, the reactor will be placed in operation with the spring out of position. When the control rod is fully withdrawn, an out-of-position spring will hit the inside of the torque tube cap and snap when sufficiently loaded.

Corrective actions were taken at Davis-Besse and are being considered as a part of that plant's routine maintenance procedures.

IN 85-38, on its face, requires no specific actions or responses by recipient-licensees, and does not constitute any NRC requirement. See IN 85-38, a t 1. The NRC expects only "that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities." Id.

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• III. DISCUSSION ,

A. IN 85-38 Is Insufficient Basis For A Generic Show Cause Or<ler.

Section 2.202 of the Commission's regulations calls for ,

issuance of a show cause order in cases of violations of NRC regulations or other "potentially hazardous condition (s]."

The Commission has further stated that the standard to be ,

applied in determining whether to issue a show cause order is whether " substantial health or safety issues [have] been raised. . . . [A] mere dispute over factual issues does not suffice." Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429, 433 (1978), citing, Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, CLI 8, 2 NRC 173, 176 (1975). The events at Davis-Besse do not warrant a finding of a violation of NRC regulations, a potentially hazardous condition, or a substantial health or safety issue with respect to continued operation of Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 ("ANO-1"). The-extraordinary relief .

requested by Mr. Doherty should be denied.

An NRC information notice such as IN 85-38 does not

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require the modification, suspension, or revocation of an operating license. An information notice reports no more and no less than a potential condition at one plant which requires the attention of licensees with similarly designed

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. plants. By the express terms of the information notice, the NRC has not made the requisite findings under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.202 or the Bailly decision, that conditions exist at any B&W PWR sufficient to justify issuance of a show cause order. The NRC correctly assumes that once apprised of the ,

relevant information, each licensee will take prudent measures to assure compliance with the Commission's regulations and to protect the licentie's economic ,

investment.

Specifically, IN 85-38 reports events solely at Davis-Besse and makes no finding of generic significance. No similar events have been reported at other B&W PWR's. In addition, at Davis-Besse, no more than one control rod jammed at any time. Mr. Doherty's S 2.206 petition recognizes that the failure of one control rod to insert will not prevent the system from achieving subcriticality.

Mr. Doherty's petition is based entirely upon the 2/ As is discussed in Section III. B below, AP&L has reviewed IN 85-38 for its applicability to ANO-1 and has taken appropriate measures to assure safe operation of the plant and protection of its investment.

3/ Not only have no similar events been reported, but no broken locking springs have thus far been detected at other plants. As of this writing, four of the seven B&W units singled out for receipt of IN 85-38 have conducted inspections of locking springs. Although several unlatched springs have been identified, no broken or cracked springs (which could result in jamming control rods) have been found at Oconee, Units 2 and 3, Rancho Seco,. Unit 1, or Crystal River, Unit 3.

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speculative concern that two adjacent control rods could fail to insert, possibly leading _to localized fuel melt.

Petition at 4. The evidence from Davis-Besse is simply insufficient to support a show cause order based on this concern. In compliance with General Design Criterion 26, ,,

ANO-1 is equipped with two diverse systems for achieving safe shutdown --the control rod scram system and the boron injecting system. In addition, in compliance with GDC 25 ,

and 26, the control rod system will provide reactivity control'during. anticipated operational occurrences, and is designed to operate effectively assuming any single failure, including the failure of the highest worth control rod to insert. Thus, the reactor meets NRC regulations and may be safely operated pending licensee evaluation and response to IN 85-38.

Further, the incidents at Davis-Besse were not of sufficient frequency to warrant a finding of "a potentially hazardous condition" or of " substantial health or. safety issues." Three. incidents of a single jammed control rod at Davis-Besse have been reported. The 1981 jammed control rod has not been linked to broken or incorrectly installed locking springs.4 The March' 16,-1985,~ control rod drive

]If See IN 85-38, at 1, which reports that the locking springs were inspected in 1984_and appeared to be in satisfactory condition.

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l incident was apparently due to locking spring failure.

However, this failure did not prevent control room personnel from eventually driving the rod downward. The third and last incident reported was in testing, on March 21, 1985, of the previously failed CRDM. The rod jammed during the test ,

after three cycles of operation and therefore was slow to insert. These events do not warrant an immediate show cause ordor. ,

Finally, contrary to Mr. Doherty's Petition, continued operation of the plant is not contrary to General Design Criterion 29. GDC 29 states:

Criterion 29 - Protection against anticipated operational occurrences. The protection and reactivity control systems shall be designed to assure an extremely high probability of accomplishing their safety functions in the event of anticipated operation occurrences.

The reactivity control systems at ANO-1 meet this requirement, and the events at Davis-Besse do not provide a sufficient basis for assuming that the plant cannot continue to operate in compliance with the GDC. Mr. Doherty has not demonstrated a violation of NRC regulations at ANO-1 and, thus, a show cause order is not warranted.

5/ See IN 85-38, a t 1.

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• B. AP&L Has Taken Specific Measures To Respond To IN 85-38.

AP&L has taken specific measures at ANO-1.to respond to ,

the concerns identified at Davis-Besse and reported in IN 85-38. These licensee measures reasonably assure that control rod drop difficulties of the type experienced at Davis-Besse will not occur at ANO-1.- These measures underscore the conclusion that the information actice is an insufficient basis under the regulations for a show cause order, and provide further reason for a denial of Mr.

Doherty's Petition with respect to ANO-1.

The actions taken by AP&L were reported to the NRC in a letter dated August 30, 1985. In sum, plant personnel reviewed the results of a full control rod drop test recently conducted at the plant. This test would have indicated any control rods that were either slow to drop or failed to insert due to jamming. No such_results were found in the test data. Plant personnel also reviewed data related to the function of the CRDM during_the past five reactor trips at ANO-1. The data reveals no anomalies such as would result from jamming control rods. Finally, AP&L has reviewed the plant maintenance procedures in.effect at ANO-l to assure that the procedures include verification that locking springs are correctly installed. These procedures were in place during the last refueling outage L

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l and provide further assurance that the currently installed locking springs will not be snapped as at Davis-Besse. The procedures, of course, will also be followed during future

outages. In conclusion, AP&L has taken adequate measures to address the information notice relied upon by Mr. Doherty, ,,

and a show cause order is not justified.

IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Petition to issue a show cause order and to institute a proceeding under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.202 should be denied.

' Respect u ( submitted, l'

Nichola S./$eynolds David A ep8a BISHOP, BERMAN, COOK, PURCE & pSYNOLDS 1200Sevent(eenthStreet, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 857-9817

, Counsel for Licensee Dated: Septemer 10, 1985 t

a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE DIRECTOR OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION In the Matter of )

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ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT )

COMPANY, ET AL. ) Docket No. 50-313

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(Arkansas Nuclear One, ) ,

Unit 1) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Arkansas Fower & Light Company's " Response to John F. Doherty $2.206 Petition" in the above-captioned matter were served upon the following persons .tur deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid on the 10th day of September,1985.

Harold R. Denton Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20 555 William L. Clements Docketing and Service Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 John F. Doherty 318 Summit Avenue Apartment 3 Brighton, Massachusetts 02135

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i Nichola S. $4ynolds l l

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