ML20137F394
| ML20137F394 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1986 |
| From: | Hollar D CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137F380 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8601170505 | |
| Download: ML20137F394 (18) | |
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JanuaryIS(, D UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '66 jg y6 A9 :59' BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD [ ~ ' . EN .
.a In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )
AND NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant) )
)
APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION OF EDDLEMAN CONTENTION EPX-2
!. INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.749 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Rules of Practice, Applicants Carolina Power & Light Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency hereby move the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board for summary disposition in Applicants' favor of Wells Eddleman's Contention EPX-2. For the reasons explained herein, Applicants respectfully submit there is no genuine issue as to any fact material to this contention and that Applicants are entitled to a decision on this contention as a matter of law.
In support of this Motion, Applicants rely on the attached Affidavits of Dayne H.
Brown, William Ethridge, Alvin 11. Joyner and Mark Scott, Applicants' Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue to be Heard on Eddleman Contention EPX-2, Applicants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions for Summary Disposition on Emergency Planning Contentions (October 8,1984), and the pleadings and discovery in this proceeding regarding Contention EPX-2.
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,n II. . BACKGROUND On May 17 and 18,1985, the pre-Ilcensing full participation emergency planning exercise, required by 10.C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, SIV.F., was condreted for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. The exercise involved the participation of Carolina Power & Light Company, the State of North Carolina, and the four counties within the plume emergency planning zone ("EPZ") - Wake, Chatham, Harnett and Lee Counties.
By . all accounts, the exercise was a success, enabling the Federal Emergency Management Agency (" FEMA") to find " reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the [public] health and safety" In the event of a radiological
- emergency at Harris. See Carolina Power & Light Compay (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-49,22 N.R.C. _, slip op. at 17 (Dec.11,1985).I The Licensing Board rejected ten of Mr. Eddleman's proposed contentions arising from the exercise, but admitted two of them (EPX-2 and EPX-8). The Board admitted EPX-2 as originally proposed, with one modification in wording. The admitted contention is comprised of six subparts, each of which addresses a different communications issue from the exercise. For convenience and ease in reference, Applicants have numbered the subparts below and will address each separately in this Motion. Thus, EPX-2 contends:
Communications deficiencies revealed in the exercise could have severe bad effects in a real emergency, including lack of effective communications and radiation monitoring results, lack of contact with field and ground units, etc. Specifically (1) The emergency inter-system mutual aid frequency was so overloaded the state's communications evaluator stated it was " proved there could be absolutely no communication with ground units on this frequency due to constant misuse."
I Nevertheless, on September 30, 1985, Intervenor Wells Eddleman filed twelve proposed " Contentions Based on Emergency Planning Exorcise." in its Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Planning and Safety Contentions, t1.< Board explained the bases for its ruling on these proposed contentions. LBP-85-49, supr. , slip op. at 14-24.
r-Other examples:
(2) The Highway Patrol evaluator found " communication inadequacies; equipment . . . is not yet capable of adequately handling the impact of so many units responding to an emergency of this type";
(3) Harnett County had " insufficient telephones";
(4) "[E]xtra radio traffic overloaded personnel on duty" in Chatham County; (5) excessive delays" in Emergency Medical services office receiving messages from SERT (State Emergency Response Team);
(6) communications from the mobile radiation lab had to be relayed to base station at times, which "always introduces the possibility of delayed and/or incorrect informatigp" according to the State Radiation Protection Section Evaluator Applicants have served one set of interrogatories and request for production of documents on Mr. Eddleman regarding EPX-2. See " Applicants' Emergency Planning Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Intervenor Wells Eddleman (Third Set)" (November 25,1985), at 1-E. " Wells Eddleman's Response to Applicants' (EPX) Emergency Planning Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents (Third Set)" was filed on December 23, 1985. Mr. Eddleman filed one set of interrogatories on the subject of EPX-2 on Applicants and a separate set of interrogatories on the NRC Staff and FEMA. See " Wells Eddleman's General Interrogatories to Applicants Carolina Power & Light et al. (EPX Set)" (November 26, 1985), at 1-16; "Wel!s Eddleman's interrogatories to NRC Staff and FEMA (Eighth Set)"
(November 26,1985) at 1-16. " Applicants' Response to Wells Eddleman's General 2
The Board struck the words "For example" from the beginning of the second sentence of the proposed contention and substituted the word "Specifically." The Board Chairman stated that the reason for the word change was to clarify that "the contention is limited to the specific points that fo!!ow and is not an open-ended contention encompassing any communications problem that time and the record might otherwise disclose." Tr. 9973. Although Mr. Eddleman objected to this limitation on the scope of the contention, the Chairman stated that the " Board under these circumstances thinks that it is reasonable to limit this contention as we have." Tr. 9976.
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Interrogatories to Applicants Carolina Power & Light et al. (EPX Set)" was filed on December 20, 1985. FEMA's response to Mr. Eddleman's interrogatories is due by January 16, 1986, pursuant to an extension of time. See " FEMA Motion for an Extension of Time" (December 13, 1985). The NRC Staff / FEMA filed no discovery requests on the subject ot' EPX-2.
Pursuant to the schedule established by the Board, the last date for filing discovery requests on EPX-2 was November 25,1985. Thus, with the exception of FEMA's response to Mr. Eddleman's interrogatories, discovery on this contention is complete.3 The Board established January 13, 1986 as the last day for filing summary disposition motions on this contention. The NRC Staff / FEMA response to a summary disposition motion is due February 3,1986, and Mr. Eddleman's response is due February 13, 1986. Tr. 10,206.
Thus, the instant Motion is timely. The Board has indicated that it expects to decide summary disposition motions by the end of Feb.uary. LDP-85-49, supra, slip op. at 24.
Ill. APPLICABLE LAW The well defined standards applicable to motions for summary disposition under 10 C.F.R. 52.749 are discussed in detail in " Applicants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions for Summary Disposition on Emergency Planning Contentionr," filed in this proceeding on October 8,1984. Applicants rely upon the discussion therein, which is incorporated by reference, and upon the discussion herein regarding the application of those standards to EPX-2.
3 Applicants and Mr. Eddleman have also produced documents to one another and resolved a number of discovery matters. Applicants understand that Mr. Eddleman has given notice to the Board that he will seek to compel further discovery from Applicants on the basis of the alleged inadequacy of Applicants' response to one interrogatory. We understand that this matter will be the subject of a conference call with the Board.
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The requirement for an emergency planning exercise prior to issuance of a licenn for a nuclear power plant is contained in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, SIV.F. That section provides, in pertinent part, that a " full participation exercise which tests as much.
of the licensee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted at each site . . ." prior to issuance of an operating license. There is no requirement in the Commission's regulations or otherwise that the emergency planning exercise be perfect and without flaw in order to obtain an operating license. What is required instead is a finding of " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1). Indeed, the evident purpose of having a pre-lleense exercise is to identify areas for improvement and to make any changes that will improve future emergency response capabilities.
The Commission's emergency planning regulations require that "[p]rovisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public." 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(6). In admitting EPX-2 on the basis of the exercise reports, the Board observed that the contention, if substantiated, could involve a " fundamental flaw" in planning. LBP-85-49, supra, slip op. at 18. The Board also noted that "[t]f, as the Applicants argue, Contention (EPX-]2 merely ' strings together a series of diverse, relatively minor communications problems,' It should be amenable to summary disposition." Id.
IV. ARGUMENT EPX-2 constitutes six separate allegations of deficiency in offsite communications during the exercise for the llarris Plant. None of these allegations ev!dence anything more than relatively minor communications problems during the exercise. None of these problems afford any basis for questioning FEMA's ultimate conclusion from the Ilarris exercise thatt 9
[T]he State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and the exercise demonstrated that offsite preparedness is ,
adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be i taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Station in the event of a radiological emergency.
Krimm Memorandum at 2. In addition, all of these problems are presently being '
addressed by the responsible State and local emergency preparedness officials. Where necessary, corrective actions will be taken prior to full power licensing of the Harris Plant to improve specific communications problems that became evident during the exercise.4 Each of the alleged communications defielencies and the response of emergency preparedness officials will be discussed separately below. Given the nature of the problems and the responsive actions that have been or are planned by emergency preparedness officials, it is clear that communications among response agencies are not fundamentally flawed. No genuine issues of material fact remain concerning these communications problems, and the instant Motion for Summary Disposition of EPX-2 should be granted in its entirety. '
A. Communications on the Emergency Mutual Ale Frequency is Not a Problem Because the Use of Tone-Encoded Radios Alle'..ates Overcrowding, Other Frequencies Are Available, and Emergency Planning Officials Have the Capability to Resolve Any Problem During an Actual Emergency by Shifting Communications to Other Frequencies.
l Subpart (1) of EPX-2 alleges that !
- i The emergency inter-system mutual a!d frequency was so overloaded that !
l the State's communications evaluators stated it was " proved that there could be absolutely no commun! cations with ground units on this frequency due to
. constant misuse."
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As explained below and in the Affidavits, in some Instances communications l problems were unique to the exercise situation where other real emergencies received 1 priority. The problems would not occur during an actual emergency.
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N j The origin of this allegation is a statement by an evaluator that is included in
" Evaluation Report, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Exercise (May 17-18, 1985)"
Phillip C. Riley, Chief State Evaluator (hereinafter " State Evaluation Report"), at 14.5
! With respect to this communications problem, the evaluator explained that:
l The exercise called for alllocal traffice [ sic] to be on 155.280, which proved
! to be very confusing to all involved. This frequency, although assigned by L
FCC for inter-system mutual aid during emergencies, is being used da!!y for day-to-day operations by many rescue squads and even some small local police departments. Any incident which requires the use of this statewide mutual aid channel will be confused due to constant misuse in this area.
! Id. This issue is addressed in the accompanying Affidavit of Alvin II. Joyner, the Lead l
[ Planner for Fixed Nuclear Facilities for the North Carolina Division of Emergency i
Management ("DEM"). According to Mr. Joyner, the so-called Special Emergency Frequency of 155.280 milz, which is used in North Carolina by rescue squads, was also used for radio traffic directly related to the Harris exercise. This is the frequency referred to in Contention EPX-2 as the " emergency inter-system mutual aid frequency."
Affidavit of Alvin H. Joyner on EPX-2 ("Joyner Affidavit"),14.
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Mr. Joyner states that many public safety agencies in North Carolina conduct their normal and emergency radio communications on many different fregaencies, including 155.280 mHz. This was true during the May exercise, as well as at other times. Joyner Affidavit, 1 14-5. He acknowledges that 155.280 mHz is a heavily utilized radio frequency. Joynar Affidavit,115,7. However, in the four counties comprising the
! Harris EPZ, all of their pub!!c safety organizations that operate on this frequency operate on multiple frequencies which are dedicated to specific services. None of the counties rely on 155.280 milz as their sole primary frequency to respond to any l
S A copy of the State Evaluation Report was served on the Board and the parties with " Applicants' Response to Eddleman Proposed Contentions Based on Exercise" l (October 15, 1985).
, _O emergency situation. In addition, if under extenuating circumstances this frequency needed to be used by the emergency responders on a priority basis, it could be done.
Either the State or one of the counties could come on the frequency and order traffic to move to other channels. Joyner Affidavit,17. In addition, with the benefit of radios equipped with tone-encoding and the characteristics inherent with VHF transmissions, particular agency users are able to successfully conduct their own communications operations on 155.280 mHz. Joyner Affidavit, 15. Tone-encoded radio equipment prevents interference from unwanted signals by blocking those from radios other than those used by a particular response agency. Id. Thus, mechanisms exist whereby emergency response agencies can conduct all necessary communications on this and other available frequencies.
Finally, Mr. Joyner explains that the State evaluators' perceptions of the communications difficulties on 155.280 mHz may have been accentuated by the fact that they were operating without tone-encoding equipment and were listening to communications from a helicopter in flight over the EPZ. For this reason, the evaluators flying above the EPZ received not only the local transmissions directly below them, but most' likely stations miles beyond the local area around Harris. Because VHF transmissions are limited to "line-of-sight," these distant transmissions would not have been received on the ground and would not have interfered with emergency communicatons. Emergency personnel were using tone-encoded radios that prevented interference from extraneous signals. Joyner Affidavit,115-6.
In short, Mr. Joyner confirms that to the extent any difficulty in using the 155.290 mHz frequency arises during an actual emergency, State and local emergency response !
officials have the capability to deal with the problem. He is confident that 155.280 mHz and the many other frequencies available to the respondi g agencies would be able to ,
handle al: of the traffic during an emergency at the Harris Plant. 4pyner Affidavit,17.
Thus, no factual Issue remains with respect to this subpart of EPX-2.
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B. The North Carolina Highway Patrol Has an Adequate Communications Capability to Effectively Respond to an Emergency at the Harris Plant.
The second subpart of EPX-2 alleges that:
The Highway Patrol evaluator found " communications inadequacies; equipment . . . is not yet capable of adequately handling the impact of so many units responding to an emergency of this type."
t The origin of this allegation is also a comment by the Highway Patrol Evaluator in the State Evaluation Report. The evaluator noted that participation in the Harris exercise tested the ability of Highway Patrol personnel "to successfully evacuate residents that would be affected by an off-site radiation release" and that "this exercise was a very good training vehicle, one which we feel was invaluable." State Evaluation Report at 8.
. The evaluntor made a number of comments and suggestions for improvement, including:
The Patrol experienced the usual probl.t% with communications inadquacies [ sic]; equipment, which is designed to support our statutory mission, is not yet capable of adequately handling t!~ inpact of so many units responding to an emergency of this type. We are slowly resolving this problem, but as always, budget restrictions are a governing factor.
Id. These comments are addressed by William Ethridge, a Captain in the Highway Patrol who is responsible for directing and coordinating the Patrol's role in emergency response planning for fixed nuclear facilities. In his Affidavit, Captain Ethridge confirms that communications problems identifled during the exercise are being resolved and that the Highway Patrol will be able to effectively respond to an actual emergency at the Harris Plant. Affidavit of William Ethridge on EPX-2 ("Ethridge Affidavit"),19.
Captain Ethridge has familiarized himself with the concerns of the state evaluator and their bases. Communications difficulties experienced by the Highway Paf:T during the exercise were limited to delays in radio communications through the RaN. y t Radio ,
and to communications difficulties encountered by the Highway Patrol repgiative in the Harnett County EOC. Ethridge Affidavit,12. He exp'ains that the Highway Patrol base station, known as "Raleigh Radio," is used by other Stato and federal agencies with m--, , . , . _ , - . - , , , , , . , - - _,.mw. _,,._.,,..-%,, , _ . ,,,.,..-.-w - - - . - -- . - , . . . , _ _ . -
law enforcemen* responsibilities. Radio traffic is normally handled by two telecommunicators or " dispatchers," which was the number of telecommunicators maintained during the exercise. Ethridge Affidavit, 13. In addition to the four frequencies normally used by the Patrol, two additional frequencies were added for purposes of the exercise and exercise-related traffic was placed on those two frequencies. Ethridge Affidavit,14.
Captain Ethridge reports that approximately 100 additional radio-equipped vehicles were handled by the telecommunicators during the exercise, in addition to the approximately 350-400 vehicles that Raleigh Radio typically handles. Ethridge Affidavit,
- 15. This additional number of vehicles increased the radio traffic handled by the telecommunicators during the two days of the exercise, and contributed to' minor delays in the transmission of exercise-related traffic. I_d. During the exercise, the telecommunicators gave preference to actual situations and emergencies rather than to the exercise-related traffic involving a simulated emergency. This treatment of exercise-related traffic also contributed to minor delays in the transmission of exercise messages. Ethridge Affidavit,14. The liighway Patrol has the ability to resolve any delays in radio communications through Raleigh Radia during an actual emergency. Had there been an actual emergency, much of the liighway Patrol's routine traffic would have been taken off the frequencies, and, if needed, there would have been no hesitation or difficulty in adding telecommunicators and communications channels to handle increased radio traffic. Ethridge Affidavit,15.
With respect to the only other communications difficulty encountered by the Illghway Patrol, Captain Ethridge attributes occasional difficulties with communications at the lIarnett County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to conditions occurring in the temporary EOC which the county had established for the exercise lie explains that the lack of telephone equipment in the temporary EOC necessitated that the liighway Patrol representative at the EOC use radio communications' to transmit and receive information. This contributed to delays in transmission of messages. Ethridge Affidavit,
- 16. Harnett County 's developing a permanent EOC, equipped with improved communications capabilities, and the Highway Patrol Communications Section is taking steps to assure that this capability will be compatible with that of the Highway Patrol.
Additional telephone capability will be available to the Highway Patrolin the permanent EOC. Captain Ethridge expects that this corrective action will prevent the communications difficulties experienced by the Highway Patrolin Harnett County during the exercise from being repeated. Ethridge Affidavit,17; see also Joyner Affidavit, 1111-12 (confirming that the permanent Harnett County EOC will contain additional telephone lines). In addition, the installation of a microwave repeater tower will allow excellent radio coverage in the counties surrounding the Harris Plant. Ethridge Affidavit,17.
There were no other communications problems during the exercise which are sufficiently important to interfere with the Highway Patrol's responsibilities in the event of an actual emergency. Ethridge Affidavit, 18. Given Captain Ethridge's representations concerning the communications capabilities of the Highway Patrol and actions that are being taken to resolve any communications difficulties, there is no factual issue remaining that communications difficulties will prevent the Patrol from effectively responding to an actual emergency at the Harris Plant.
C. Telephone Communientions Problems at the Harnett County EOC are Being Resolved.
The third subpart of EPX-2 contends that "Harnett County had ' insufficient telephones.' " The source of this allegation was also a comment by a state evaluator.
State Evaluation Report at 5. This issue is addressed by Mr. Joyner in his Affidavit. The telephone communications difficultles arose due to the temporary nature of the facilities h
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Harnett County used for an EOC during the Harris exercise. The temporary EOC only had three telephone lines coming into it with only a few additional telephones in adjacent offices. Mr. Joyner agrees that this was an insufficient number of telephones. Joyner Affidavit,111.
In order to address this issue, Harnett County is now developing a permanent EOC with the cooperation and consultation of DEM. DEM is studying the telephone needs of the new EOC and will advise the county on the number of telephones which will be needed. Current thinking envisions at least eleven telephone lines in the permanent EOC. Additional lines will be added with the financial support of Applicant Carolina Power & Light Company. Completion of the permanent EOC will be prior to full power licensing of the plant. Mr. Joyner confirms that this action will resolve the telephone problems experienced by the Harnett County EOC staff during the exercise. Joyner Affidavit,112. Because corrective actions are being taken to resolve the telephone communications difficulties, there is no factual issue remaining concerning this subpart of EPX-2.
D. Extra Radio Traffic Was Only a Problem in Chatham County for a Drief Period of Time, and Additional Radio Dispatch Personnel Have Been Added.
Subpart (4) of EPX-2 contends that "'[E]xtra radio traffic overloaded personnel on duty' in Chatham County." The source of this subpart is a comment by a State evaluator. In fact, the evaluator's comments were actually more narrowly worded than the portion quoted in EPX-2. The relevant part of the State Evaluation Report states at <
4:
The evaluator Indicated that overall operations in Chatham County went well. In the initial stages extra radio traffic overloaded personnel on duty (emphasis added).
The Evaluation Report reflects the fact that any problems handling radio traffic in Chatham County were quite minor and of short duration. This issue is discussed in the
accompanying Affidavit of Mark Scott, the Coordinator of Emergency Management in the Chatham County Office of Emergency Services. Mr. Scott was responsible for directing the Chatham County EOC, which controlled radio communications with emergency agencies participating in the Harris exercise. Affidavit of Mark Scott on EPX-2 (" Scott Affidavit"),12.
Mr. Scott explains that Chatham County had one radio dispatcher on duty at the start of the exercise, which was the normal staffing level for that time. Upon notification of the simulated emergency at the plant, the dispatcher correctly followed a
" call-in" procedure to obtain assistance, and the called-in personnel arrived approximately ten minutes after being notified. Their arrival provided the EOC with two radio dispatchers and two additional dispatchers to handle telephone commnications.
Although Mr. Scott acknowledges that radio traffic was heavy during the very brief period when only one dispatcher was on duty, after this initial period, the additional dispatchers adequately handled all cf the traffic that took place in Chatham County for the remainder of the two day exercise. Scott Affidavit,14.
During the exercise, radio traffic regarding the simulated emergency was added to Chatham's County's normal, routine radio traffic. Had an actual emergency been occurring at the Harris Plant, the radio traffic regarding the county's response would have received an appropriate priority consistent with other emergencies within the county. Scott Affidavit,15.
In addition, as a result of Chatham County's assessment of the exercisd, the County has improved its communications staff by adding additional personnel. Chatham County now has two full-time radio dispatchers who will work in the communicaticas center during the hours of the week that the greatest communications traffic occurs. This provides the ability to effectively handle increased radio communications which might suddenly develop from a major emergency withaut the immediate call-in of additional s
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personnel - even if this happens at a time of normally high radio traffic. The County still maintains a call-in list of additional dispatchers in case they are needed to respond to an emergency. Chatham County has also taken steps to remove some traffic from the airwaves by installing a repeater station which is used for fire dispatch. The repeater allows units on this frequency to hear each other without the need to relay through the-central communications center. Scott Affidavit,16. Mr. Scott is confident that the additional dispatchers will assure the capability to respond to initial and continuing radio traffic levels which would be experienced in the event of an accident at the Harris Plant. Scott Affidavit,17.
.Given that the level of radio traffic was only a problem in Chatham County for a brief period of time and that the County has added additional personnel to its communications staff, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the capability of Chatham' County personnel to handle radio traffic in the event of an accident at the Harris Plant.
E. Improved Procedures for Message Runners Within the State EOC Will Prevent
.} Delays in OEMS Personnel Receiving Messages.
N Subpart (5) of EPX-2 contends that there were " ' excessive delays' in Emergency Medical services office receiving messages from SERT (State Emergency Response
- Team)." The source of this part of the contention is also a state evaluator's statement.
- State Evaluation Report at 11. This issue and corrective actions that will be taken are
' addressed in Mr. Joyner's Affidavit.
According to the Affidavit, Mr. Joyner has reviewed the comments by the evaluator for the Office of Emergency Medical Services (OEMS) regarding the delay in r,eceipt of messages within the State EOC, and has been informed by the evaluator that this comment was the result of a delay in a single, key message. In particular, the OEMS s
representatives were. not made aware of a briefing in the State EOC in which the s
announcement of a release from the plant was simulated. Under real conditions, this would be important information for OEMS. Joyner Affidavit,18.
This situation was not a problem of communication between State agencies located in geographically ~ dispersed areas, it was strictly a problem of communications within the State EOC. As Mr. Joyner explains, a ring of offices surrounds and is immediately adjacent to the central room at the State 1:OC. These offices are used by representatives of each State agency making up SERT, including OEMS. Joyner Affidavit,19. Communications among personnel in the EOC and in these offices is effected by means of a public address system which makes general announcements and by the use of EOC staff members as " message runners" for special or important messages.
Mr. Joyner states that the OEMS staff at the EOC was probably unaware of the briefing due to their inability to hear the public address system or a failure on the part of message runners to properly notify them. Id.
In order to address .this problem, DEM plans to develop and implement new procedures for message runners immediately that will improve their effectiveness and assure that messages receive'the direct attention of the recipients. The new procedures will require that the EOC runners receive a direct acknowledgment, such as a signature or initials, from the recipients, thus eliminating the possibility of missed messages.
Acknowledgments will be reviewed by the message control office for completeness of.
notification and receipt of message traffic. 'Joyner Affidavit,110. Given Mr. Joyner's representation that DEM intends to develop these new procedures to correct this problem, there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining as to Subpart (5) of EPX-2.
F. Communications Relay Procedures Occasionally Used by RPS Do Not Result in Any Significant Delays or Potential Introduction of Errors in Transmission of-Monitoring Data; RPS Has Responded to A Suggestion in the State Evaluation Report that Will Reduce the Need to Relay Messages.
The sixth and final subpart of EPX-2 deals with communications involving the RPS
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a mobile radiation laboratory. Subpart (6) contends that " communications from the mobile radiation lab had to be relayed to base station at times, which 'always introduces the possibility of delayed and/or incorrect information' according to the State Radiation Protection Section Evaluator." This allegation is taken from the State Evaluation Report. However, it is clear from reading the Report that the evaluator was referring to communications from field survey teams to the mobile radiation laboratory, not from the laboratory. The evaluator explained that "[d]ue to topographical differences, communications at times had to be relayed to the base station" and stated that RPS "may want to consider positioning of the Mobile Lab at an elevated area outside of the EPZ to improve communications." State Evaluation Report at 12. Overall, the evaluator concluded that "the field survey teams were competent in performing their specified task in accordance with their pertinent procedures * *
- and would be able to perform their assigned responsibility during an actual emergency." I_d.
This issue is addressed in the accompanying Affidavit of Dayne H. Brown, Chief of the Radiation Protection Section (RPS). As Mr. Brown explains, RPS had teams of radiation monitoring personnel collecting radiological data during the Harris exercise.
These field teams would transmit, via radio, the data back to the RPS mobile radiological laboratory for processing. Affidavit of Dayne H. Brown on EPX-2 (" Brown Affidavit"),
- 12. Mr. Brown explains that field survey teams came across some locations in the Harris EPZ while performing their task that were not as conducive to radio communications as others. The reasons for such differences in communications capability are discussed in i
i his Affidavit. Brown Affidavit, 13. It should be emphasized, : however, that communications were maintained from the field units at all times during the exercise.
Brown Affidavit,17.
l i During the exercise, one field team found it necessary to relay communications at various times. Simulated data were relayed to the mobile laboratory through the RPS l
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transmitter at the Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) at the Harris Plant. Brown Affidavit,14. Paragraph 5 of Mr. Brown's Affidavit explains why this procedure does i not have a greater potential for transmitting inaccurate data than the use of direct communications. As Mr. Brown explains, the RPS relay procedure is designed to ensure the accuracy of transmissions by using such precautions as repeating back the data to the transmitting party. Brown Affidavit,15.
Mr. Brown also explains why the relaying procedure only results in a momentary delay in the. transmission of data and causes less delay than trying to relocate the field ,
units to an area where direct transmissions would be possible. Brown Affidavit,16.
The relay technique used during the Harris exercise is a normal operating procedure for RPS communications, and is used whenever conditions require. Brown Affidavit,
- 19. - Occasional use of a relaying procedure is a necessity for an agency relying on radios
. to carry out its duties. However, RPS has taken measures to reduce the need to relay messages. In response to the suggestion in the Station Evaluation Report, Mr. Brown states that the location of the mobile radiation laboratory has been changed to a more elevated area than the location used during the exercise. Even when relaying is necessary, Mr. Brown confirms that the use of a relay procedure does not detract from RPS's communications capability. Brown Affidavit,18. Accordingly, there is no genuine
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issue of material fact as to the communications capability of RPS between the mobile laboratory and field teams.
V. CONCLUSION i
In sum, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any of the allegations in EPX-2. The specific difficulties raised by this contention represent only relatively minor communications issues that are being fully addressed by the responsible emergency preparedness agencies. Where corrective actions are necessary, they either have already 4
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.o been taken or will be taken prior to full power licensing of the Harris Plant.
Accordingly, there is no issue of material fact as to EPX-2, and a hearing on this
-contention would serve no useful purpose. Applicants are entitled to a favorable decision on this Motion as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, Applicants respectfully request that this Motion for Summary Disposition of EPX-2 be granted.
Respectfully submitted, Dale E. Hollar, Esquird ~ M Richard E. Jones, Esquire Carolina Power & Light Company Post Office Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 (919) 836-8161 Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
Delissa A. Ridgway, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street,- N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 Dated: January 13,1986
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