ML20137F349

Deletion of Automatic Load Following Testing from Power Ascension Test Program, Safety Evaluation

ML20137F349
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	08/20/1985
From:	Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Shared Package
ML20137F347	List: ML20137F342 ML20137F349 ML20137F361 ML20137F368 ML20137F393 ML20137F427
References
PSE-SE-Z-002, PSE-SE-Z-2, NUDOCS 8508260198
Download: ML20137F349 (4)

Text

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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY HOPE CREEK PROJECT SAFETY EVALUATION No. PSE-SE-2-002 TITLE:

DELETION OF AUTOMATIC LOAD FOLLOWING TESTING FROM THE POWER ASCENSION TEST PROGRAM Da te :

NE20M 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this Safety Evaluation is to document the results of the evaluation performed to delete testing the Automatic Load Following (ALF) capability of the reactor from the Power Ascension Test Program.

2.0 SCOPE Automatic Load Following capability is a part of the Recirculation Flow Control system which is a subsystem of the Reactor Recirculation system.

3.0 REFERENCES

1.

FSAR Chapter 14 2.

GE Startup Test Specification No. f.3A4137 Rev. 0 3.

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.68 - Revision 2, August 1978 4.

Hope Creek Generating Station D; aft Technical Specifications 4.0 DISCUSSION Regulatory Guide 1.68 (Revision 2, August 1978), Appendix A,

paragraph 5.h.h requires that the dynamic response of the plant to design load swings be demonstrated and shown to be in compliance with design and paragraph 5.s requires calibration and verification of the performance of major plant control systems.

Testing of the Automatic Load Following (ALP) capability of the reactor is currently planned to be performed during the following control system tuning tests specified in Hope Creek's FSAR Table 14.2-5: Test Number 20 - Pressure Regulator, Test Number 21 - Feedwater System Response (level control) and Test Number 27 - Recirculation Flow Control System.

It is proposed to delete ALF mode testing during these tests.

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Acceptance criteria require that the system response to step changes in system inputs while operating in the ALF mode be non divergent (level 1).

In addition, criteria on the power change rate and the range over which ALF is operable are defined (level 2).

The Automatic Load Following mode of operation is not-a safety related function but is instead intended to provide additional operating versatility to the utility.

The ALF mode ca'n be disabled since the system consists of non-essential equipment.

Since ALF will be disabled, the

. plant will not be subjected to load swings associated with. ALP, and no testing is required for this mode of operation.

5.0 CONCLUSION

Automatic Load Following mode of operation is not a safety related function.

Disabling of the ALF function does not require / involve any Technical Specification change (ALF is not addressed in the TS) and will not af fect any safety systems or the safe operation of the plant and therefore does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

6.0 DOCUMENTS GENERATED NONE 7.0 RECOMMENDATIONS The FSAR and Startup Test procedures shall be revised to reflect the deletion of Automatic Load Following function testing from the Power Ascension Test Program.

9.0 SIGNATURES f

Originator !1 i ([h l u,

1. T Date verifier

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TEST NUMBER 17 - CORE PERFORMANCE SUBSTITUTE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCE i

O BJECTIVE :

Regulatory Guide 1.6 8 (Revision 2, Augus t 1978), Appendix A, paragraph 5.b requires that steady-state core performance to be in accordance with design throughout the permissible range of power-to-flow conditions.

Test Number 17 (FSAR Figure 14.2-5), Core Performance, evaluates the principal thermal and hydraulic parameters associated with core behavior.

These parameters include the core thermal power and flow and thermal margins.

Testing is performed at Test Cont'tions 1, 2,

3, 4, 5, and 6 of FSAR Figure 14.2-4.

It is proposed that the Plant Technical Specification Surveillance Procedures, associated with compliance to required thermal margins, be substituted for Test Number 17.

DISCUSSION:

The Plant Technical Specifications define the monitoring requirements for demonstration of compliance with thermal margins (Maximum Linear Heat Generation Rate - MLHGR, Maximum Critical Power Ratio - MCPR, and Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rates - MAPLHGR).

The applicable Technical Specification sections (section 3/4.2.4, 3/4.2.3, 3/4.2.1) require that at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> the thermal margins are verified to be within the specified limits when core thermal power is greater than or equal to 25% of rated l

thermal powe r.

In addition, within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> af ter a thermal power increase of at least 15% of rated thermal power the thermal limits must also be verified.

Complying with these Technical Specification surveillance requirements meets the l

objectives of Regulatory Guide 1.68 (Revision 2, August l

1978), Appendix A, paragraph 5.b and Test Number 17.

Plant' Surveillance Test procedures in accordance with Technical Specifications are also utilized to calibrate the Local Power Range Monitors (LPRMs) and Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs).

Together, these two plant surveillance procedures ensure that the APRM instrumentation is correctly measuring core thermal power and the demonstration of compliance to rated power is required by the plant operating license.

Tes t Number 11 ( S T-13 ), Process Computer, verifies the performance of the process computer under plant operating l

conditions.

As part of this verification, manual or off-line

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t HCSTRPl/ TEST 19.WKS PAGE 1 16-Aug-85 j

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calculations are used to evaluate the process computer calculations for MCPR, MLHGR, and MAPLHGR.

In addition,

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manual heat balance calculations are performed to verify the accuracy of the process computer power calculation.

This tect, therefore, provides assurance that the process computer calculation for core thermal power and thermal margins are consistent with design methods.

To provide assurance that the core flow measurement system is functioning properly, two specific tests are dedicated to the 2

calibration and measurement of core flow parameters.

Test i

Number 29, Recirculation System Flow Calibration, provides a complete calibration of the installed recirculation flow I

instrumentation including specific signals to the plant process computer.

The core flow is measured by summing the flow from the individual jet pumps.

The jet pump flows are i

determined from single and double tap pressure differential i

instruments.

Recirculation drive flow, which is an input to i

rod block and scram setpoints, is determined from an elbow tap differential pressure.

The calibration of the l

instrumentation is performed at Test Condition 3 and Test l

Condition 6, of FSAR Figure 14.2.4 to ensure that the system will provide a correct core' flow indication at rated 1

j conditions.

Tes t Numbe r 28C, Recirculation System Pe rformance, records recirculation system parameters during i

the power test program (Test Conditions 2, 3,

4, and 6).

Core flow (from jet pump flow instrumentation), core pressure 3

drop, jet pump M-ratio, drive flow and recirculation pump efficiency are evaluated and compared to predicted values.

l The flow control system is also adjusted at this time to limit the maximum core flow to 102.5% of rated.

These tests, therefore, provide adequate assurance that the core flow is being measured properly.

I CONCLUSION:

i Compliance with the Plant Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements, via existing surveillance procedures, and performance of the system tests and

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calibrations noted above will satisfy the objectives of j

Regulatory Guide 1.68 (Revision 2, August 1978), Appendix A, paragraph 5.b, as well as the requirements of Test Number 17.

Based on the above discussion, the proposed change will i

not affect any safety systems or the safe operation of the l

plant and therefore does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Based on the above, the Plant Technical Specification Surveillance Procedures can be substituted for Test Number 17.

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I HCSTRPl/ TEST 19.WKS PAGE 2 16-Aug-85 l

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