ML20137F342

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Forwards Safety Evaluations Re 5 of 29 Power Ascension Test Mods,Including Test 17, Core Performance, Test 19, Core Power-Void Mode Response & Test 25, Turbine Trip & Generator Load Rejection
ML20137F342
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek 
Issue date: 08/21/1985
From: Mittl R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Butler W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20137F347 List:
References
NUDOCS 8508260197
Download: ML20137F342 (3)


Text

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Pubhc Service PS G Company S

E! ectr c and Gas 80 Park Plaza, Newark, NJ 07101/ 201430 8217 MAILING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101 Robert L. Mitti General Manager Nuclear Assurance and Regulation August 21, 1985 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814

..utention:

Mr. Walter Butler, Chief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing Gentlemen:

POWER ASCENSION PROGRAM CHANGES HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 As discussed at meetings with the NRC on August 1, 1985 and August 7, 1985, PSE&G plans to implement an accelerated power ascension test program for the Hope Creek Generating Station.

In order to eliminate any uncertainty with respect to applicable Hope Creek regulatory criteria during power ascension testing, PSE&G is requesting NRC review and approval of certain aspects of the accelerated test program.

This letter transmits the following 5 of an expected 29 power ascension test modifications for NRC's consideration:

1.

Automatic Load Following Testing 2.

Test Number 17 - Core Performance 3.

Test Number 19 - Core Power-Void Mode Response 4.

Test Number 25 - Turbine Trip and Generator Load Rejection 5.

Test Number 27 - Recirculation Flow Control System Per NRC's suggestion, Attachment I consists of General Electric

' Company's technical analysis and PSE&G's safety evaluation for each of the aforementioned items.

The safety evaluations are in a format consistent with PSE&G's " Site Engineering Technical Documents" procedure which will be utilized to implement the requirements of 10CFR50.59 after fuel load, for conditions other than design changes.

The conclusion for each item shows the proposed modifications pose no increase 850826019 (330 PDR 0821 ADOCK 05000354 A

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i Director of Nuclear 2

8/21/85 Reactor Regulation in risk to the health and safety of the.public or an unreviewed safety question.

The Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) has reviewed each evaluation and concurs with the conclusions of the safety evaluations. consists of marked up FSAR pages applicable to the propesed testing modifications.

These FSAR changes will be included as an amendment to the FSAR pending approval for implementation from the NRC.

Since the enclosed modifications impact finalizing the related power ascension testing detailed procedures, an expedited review is requested.

PSE&G is ready to meet with cognizant NRC personnel to discuss the proposed modifications should you require additional information.

'Very truly yours, 2.L. SK8

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l Attachments C

D.H. Wagner USNRC Licensing Project Manager A.R.

Blough USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

(prarat t s

AUTOMATIC LOAD FOLLOWING TESTING DELETE SELECTED NON-ESSENTIAL TESTS OBJECTIVE:

Regulatory Guide 1.68 (Revision 2,' August 1978), Appendix A, paragraph 5.h.h requires that the dynamic response of the plant to design 1 cad swings be demonstrated and shown to be in compliance with design and paragraph 5.s requires calibration and verification of the performance of major-plant control systems.

Testing of the Automatic Load Following (ALF) capability of the reactor is currently planned to be performed during control system tuning tests, Test Number 20 - Pressure Regulator, Test Number 21 -

Feedwater System Response (level control) and Test Number 27

- Recirculation Flow Control System.

It is proposed to delete the ALF mode testing during these tests.

DISCUSSION:

Acceptance criteria require that the system response to step changes in system inputs while operating in the ALF mode be non divergent (level 1).

In addition, criteria on the power change rate and the range over which ALF is operable are defined (level 2).

The Automatic Load Following mode of operation is not a safety related function but is instead intended to provide additional operating versatility to the utility.

The ALF mode can be disabled since the system consists of non-essential equipment.

Since ALF will be disabled, the plant will not be subjected to load swings associated with ALF, and no testing is required for this mode of operation.

CONCLUSION:

Disabling of the ALF function will not affect any safety systems of the safe operation of the plant and therefore does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Therefore, since the ALF function will be disabled, testing of the ALF mode can be deleted from the Power Ascension Test Program.

thj 16-Aug-85