ML20135A661

Review of Millstone Unit 3 Tech Specs,Northeast Nuclear Energy Co, Technical Review Rept

ML20135A661
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	07/19/1985
From:	Beckham D, Cooney R, Farron P PARAMETER, INC.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20135A643	List: IR 05000423/1985037 ML20135A641 ML20135A661
References
CON-NRC-05-85-157-01, CON-NRC-5-85-157-1 NUDOCS 8509100231
Download: ML20135A661 (62)

Text

. . .- - - _

O TBCitiICAL REVIEW REPORT REVIEW OF MIILST0blE UnitT 3 TintilCAL SPECIFICATIONS BORTHEASP WCLEAR EMENGY CNANY NilC DOCKEF No. 50-423 NIC CONTRACT NO. NRC-05-85-157-01 TASK ORDER No. 002 ONSITE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED July 8 - 19, 1985 Prepared for: Preparal by:

U.S.N.R.C. Region I Parameter, Inc.

631 Park Avenue 13380 Watertown Plank Iki.

King of Prussia, PA 19406 Elm Grove, WI 53122 NRC Liaison Personnel: Authors:

E.C. McCabe D.A. Deckman P.W. Esselgroth P.R. Farron H.F. Van Kessel R.J. Cooney W

0509100231 850030 pg ADOCK O3000423 pg G

o TABLE OF 00lmBFFS SECTION TITLE PAGE EXDCUTIVE SUM ARY.......................... I

1.0 INTRODUCTION

............................... 4 1.1 PURPOSE

1.2 BACKGROUND

& GMERAL SCOPE 1.3 GENEFAL EVALUATION CRITERIA 1.4 GENLRAL EVALUATION METHODS 2.0 EVALUATION - GENERAL....................... 7 2.1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS............................. 7 2.2 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION A!O RELEASE SYST m.................. 10 2.3 CONTAINMENT HYDROGM MONITORING -

AND RENOVAL SYSTENS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2.4 QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM.................. 12 2.5 CONTAI! MENT RfEIRCULATION SYSTIN..... 14 2.6 AUXILI ARY FEED &TER SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.7 AC POWER SOURCES..................... 19 i- 2.8 DC POWER SOURCES..................... 20 2.9 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBITTION. . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.10 SAFETY INJD3 ION SYSTEMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 J

2.11 CHENICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.............................. 25 2.12 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES AND STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPIIERIC RELIEF VALVES....................... 28 2.13 PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF AND BLOCK VALVES............. 30 2.14 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM................. 31 2.15 CLRAL INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROLS... 33 3.0 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS........................ 34

, 4.0 APPENDICES

, _ _ , ,t- - -_-

j Executive Sumary l

EXECLRIVE SLMERY Parameter, Inc., under the direction of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission, conducted an inspection at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3:

to determine whether the draft Technical Specifications (TS) and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are compatible with the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics; and, to determine whether the draft Technical Specification Requirments are definitively measurable.

The inspection was concentrated on plant systems, structures and cmponents identified by the licensee's Probabilistic Safety Study as having particular significance with respect to minimizing the severity of potential accidents and accident consequences. The systems evaluated included: containment and related support systems, containment spray systems, mergency core cooling systems (IECS), soluble poison reactivity control systems, electrical power systms, and selected secondary plant systs and camponents.

The facility descriptions and operating characteristics for the systems, structures and cmponents found in the FSAR, the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and the proposed TS were compared to licensee drawings, procedures and actual plant hardware to establish whether the as-built configuration of the systms, structures and components is compatible with the safety analyses and proposed TS.

Licensee documents reviewed included: Piping and Instrumentation Drawings, Logic Diagrams, Electrical Schmatics and One Line Diagrams, Operating ard Emergency Procedures, Surveillance and Inservice Test Procedures, Calibration Procedures and data, Maintenance Procedures, Preoperational Test Procedures and data, Administrative Procedures, calculations, and correspondence. In situ plant equipment was visually inspected on a samplirg basis to verify that actual installations agreed with the various docments.

Surveillance Procedures were also reviewed to verify that the surveillance

, methods planned by the licensee were consistent with the requirements of the draf t TS and that the proposed TS requirements were definitively measurable or determinable.

At the time of the inspection the draf t TS were still under develognent by the licensee in conjunction with the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor leN. ulation (NRR) . The inspection was conducted using draft TS prmulgated by NRC on June 27, 1985, and using pending revisions to that draf t provided by the licensee. 'Ihese revisions had been partially subnitted to NRR on July 5,1985; the remaining revisions were awaiting submittal to NhR.

Page 1

l I

I.

Executive Stenary

?

Additionally, the licensee's programs for preparation of surveillance and operating procedures had just recently reached draf t production levels; nearly all the procedures reviewed during the inspection were in draf t j form.

I The inspection determined that the draf t Technical Specifications were compatible with the as-built systens, structures, and components in the areas inspected and that compliance with the Technical Specifications j could be definitively measured or determined.

i Because both the proposed TS and the licensee's implementing procedures i were still under development, many plant configuration, operating characteristic, and parameter details remained to be . firmly established.

The licensee's programs for accomplishing this appeared to be functioning satisfactorily in most areas. Several inconsistencies and areas of concern were identified with respect to these activities and were presented to the l

licensee during the inspection. These observations includal:

i me finalization of TS will involve many changes in its setpoints,

! quantitative Limiting Conditions for Operation, Surveillance i

Requirement acceptance criteria, and other numerical limits and I

" criteria. Wese changes will require a rigorous licensee program for j

revising and confirming the accuracy of the facility operating, j

surveillance, preoperational, and inservice test procedures for verification and implementation of the TS. The licensee's planning in j this regard was in progress but incomplete at the close of the j inspection.

j At the time of the inspection, the licensee's preparation of

{ surveillance and inservice test procedures and other operating j documents had just recently entered full production. Developnent of a

surveillance master index, a computerized production and I

implementation schedule, and inter-departmental coordination methods were also in progress but incomplete.

Although the licensee had prepared most surveillance procedures in at least draft form, the draf t procedures reviewed during the inspection

- appeared to require substantial refinenent to ensure their technical j

accuracy, to incorporate information still under development, and to j meet various regulatory ccanitments.

I Additionally, minor inconsistencies between the draf t TS, related design 4

doctanents and plant procedures were identified during the inspection. We

) inconsistencies generally involved the preliminary status of TS or FSAR information and the plant procedures and doctrnents. Wese were generally

resolved by the licensee during the inspection; in most cases, the I

resolution involved confirmation that the item was being actively pursued by the licensee and was included in the various open items listings and

}

i consnitment . control listings that the licensee is using to administer i

i Page 2 t

o Executive Suntnary document developnent.

CONCLUSION The Technical Specification preparation process appears to be functioning properly. The Technical Specifications and implementing procedures reviewed appear to be ccxnpatible with the as-built plant configuration.

That information which is still under developnent for incorporation into the Technical Specifications and implementing procedures appears to be subject to sufficient managenent control to assure adequate ccxnpletion of the process.

Page 3

1 INTRODUCTION i.

1 1.0 - IHmm)UCTION l

, 1.1 - PURPOSE *

)i The. purpose of this inspection was to assist the Nuclear Regulatory j comnission in determining that the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit j 3, Technical Specifications were compatible with the as-built configuration of plant systems, structures and components and that the Technical Specification requirements were definitively measurable or i

4 determinable. ,

1.2 - BACKGROUND AND GENERAf SCOPE Startup testing and subsequent plant operation at comnercial nuclear power

) plants has demonstrated that discrepancies sometimes exist between the

" plant's Technical Specifications (TS), Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Safety Evaluation Report (SER), and as-built plant configuration. i During low power physics testing at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, significant discrepancies of this nature were identified and  :

subsequently corrected.

This inmection was conducted to gain additional assurance that the i.

proposed Millstone Unit 3 TS are compatible with the assumptions and l

i requirements of the safety evaluations performed' and the as-built plant configuration. Parameter, Inc. was regaested to assist NRC Region I in l performing this inspection at the Millstone Unit 3 site.

J l The general scope of the inspection included: .

l Report J

I Section  !

2.1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS

) 2.2 SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM j 2.3

' CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MONIMRING & REMOVAL SYSTEMS 2.4 QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM i 2.5 CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SYSTEM l 2.6 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM i

2.7 AC POWER SOURCES l- 2.8 DC POWER SOURCES i

2.9 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION 2.10 SAETTY INJBCTION SYSTEMS l }

2.11 OlEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM  !

2.12 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES AND

} STEAM GENERAMR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES j ,

2.13 PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF A!O BLOCK VALVES 2.14 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM l 2.15 GEh2RAL INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROLS I

Page 4

(

l 1 i _

_ , . _. , , _ - _ - . _ _ . -_. - , _ ~ - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . -__ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

INTRODUCTION The following general categories of docments were reviewed:

Technical Specifications Final Safety Analysis Report NRC Safety Evaluation Report (with Supplement 1)

Pipirg and Instrmentation Diagrams (P& ids)

Instrmentation and Control Logic Diagrams (LSKs)

Electrical One Line Diagrams (EEs)

Electrical Schenatic Diagrams (ESKs)

Instrunent Loop Drawings Plant General Arrangment & Layout Drawings Preoperational Test Procedures and test data Surveillance Test Procedures (SPs) f%intenance Procedures (MPs)

Operating Procedares (ops)

Dnergency Operating Procedures (EOP)S Inservice Test Procedures Mninistrative Control Procedures (ACPs)

Setpoint Calculations Icop Calibration Procedures and data 1.3 - GENERAL EVALUATION CRITERIA The above systens and docunentation were reviewed with respect to:

The compatibility of the draft TS with the as-built configuration of the systes, structures and components; The consistency of the draft TS with the documents listed in 1.2 above;

'Ibe capability to definitively measure or determine compliance with the TS requirements considering both the sof tware and hardware available; and, The adequacy of the licensee's surveillance and inservice test programs to provide for the implementation of the TS Surveillance aequirments.

1.4 - GENERAL EVALUATION METHODS Prior to the onsite inspection activities, the licensee's Probabi'listic Safety. Study (August, 1983) was reviewed to identify those systems, structures and cmponents which were particularly significant with respect to preventing or mitigating the consequences of analyzed accidents. 'Ihose systems with postulated failures or malfunctions identified by the study as being significant contributors to dominant accident sequences were Page S

INTRODLCTION given inspection priority, resulting in the listing of Section 1.2 above.

During the onsite inspection activities, the facility descriptions, operating characteristics and related information found in the proposed TS, the FSAR, and the SER were compared to the licensee documents listed in Section 1.2. Concurrently, the TS were evaluated to confirm that the performance criteria and requirenent established therein were definitively measurable or determinable.

Particular erphasis was given to the efficacy of surveillance tests and inservice tests established by the licensee to demonstrate conformance with TS and the requirenents of 10CFR50.55a The detailed inspection plan used to conduct the onsite activities is provided as Appendix 1 to this report. Key evaluation items included:

Plant drawings were reviewed to establish that the plant design and construction doctrnents were compatible with the FSAR, TS, and SER.

Preoperational and functional tests were reviewed to verify that the "as tested" systen configurations were consistent with the FSAR, TS, and SER. The Millstone Unit 3 Startup Manual also provides for pre-core verification of Operating Procedures, Surveillance Procedures, valve lineups, etc.; accomplishment of these actions was verified where practical.

Surveillance Tests were reviewed where available to verify their conformance with the TS and to establish that the TS requirements could be definitively measured.

Operating, Dnergency, Maintenance, and Inservice Test procedures were reviewed where available to establish their conformance with the TS and accuracy with respect to the design and construction documents and with the as built plant.

Page 6

)

EVALUATION 2.0 EVALUATION GENERAL In addition to the specific inspection and review items below, the following documents were reviewed and used, in part, for the evaluation of the licensee's various programs for TS implementation:

ACP-QA-1.01 Millstone Administration, Revision 4 ACP-QA-1.02 Organization and Responsibilities, Revision 16 ACP-QA-2.02B Retests, Revision 10 ACP-QA-2.02C Work Orders, Revision 2 ACP-QA-2.12 System Valve Alignment Control, Revision 6 ACP-QA-9.03 Inservice Plant Testing, Revision 5 ACP-QA-9.02 Station Surveillance Program, Revision 12 Millstone Unit 3 Startup Manual, Revision 3 Stone & Webster Master Setpoint Listing, June 4, 1985 Precautions, Setpoints, and Limitations IC 3408A02, Non Tech Spec Instruments With Licensing Requirements, Revision 0 Preservice Unit Instruction PUI-QA-5.02, Performance of Phase II & III Tests fEU Listing of Licensee /NRR Action Item for Resolution of TS Open Itans, Urr3ated 2.1 - CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS 2.1.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope The containment normal and energency operating environmental conditions were reviewed including containment isolation valves and selected initiating signals and the containment normal purge and exhaust systems.

These systems and specifications were reviewed with respect to the criteria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. Appendix 2.1 contains a listing of the docunents reviewed.

Proposed TS 3/4.6.1. 4, 3/4. 6.1. 5, 3/4. 6. 3, 3/4.6.1.7, 3/4.6.1.8, 3/4.6.5.1, 3/4.6.5.2 and 3/4.9.9 were compared to the documents listed in Appendix 2.1 to verify that the proposed TS accurately represented the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics were in agreenent with the information in the FSAR and SER.

Page 7

EVALUATION 2.1.2 - Discussion The Containment Isolation System isolates piping lines which penetrate the containment boundary to minimize the release of radioactive materials to environment for postulated- accidents within the containment. The containment pressure and temperature are maintained within a specified band to ensure the containment pressure following the design basis accident (DBA) remains below the containment design pressure. The Containment Ventilation Systs provides for air filtration, recirculation cooling, and contaiment atmosphere purge capability.

An as-built configuration review of the systems included a sampling of system piping configuration, instrmentation, operating logic, setpoints, and system operating parameters and limits. In addition, selected draf t surveillance tests, normal operating procedures and Phase II preoperational tests were reviewed to determine that the design features were accurately reflected by the test and that operating methods were consistent with the proposed TS.

The system review also included the system normal and emergency lineups and system valve response to isolation signals. Specifically the system features and operations involving the following were reviewed:

Isolation valves and initiating logic Containment temperature and pressure limitations Containment air filtration Containment air recirculation Containment purge air subsystem A visual inspection of portions of the systems and selected equipment established that the design features were accurately translated into the as-built plant. The visual inspection was also conducted to compare systes and equipnent with the proposed TS.

2.1.3 - observations and Conclusions During the review process several inconsistencies were identified. Most of the inconsistencies were licensing issues that were previously identifis3 and in the process of resolution by the licensee with NRR:

1. FSAR Table 6.2-65 contains a listing of the identified containment isolation valves for containment penetrations. Proposed TS Table 3.6-1 contains a listing of containment isolation valves required to be operable. Both tables also contain valve isolation times.

Review of these tables found differences between the respective FSAR and TS listings of the valves and the valve stroke times. Contaiment Page 8

i

=

l EVALUATION Atmosphere Monitor discharge valve CMS-MOV24 had a proposed TS isolation time of less than or equal to 15 seconds 'while FSAR Table i 6.2-65 listed the stroke time as less than 10 seconds. Containment Atmosphere Monitor valves 01S-CrV23, 20, 21 had TS ' isolation times of less than or equal to 4 sc.tconds while FSAR Table 6.2-65 listed the stroke times as less than 10 seconds. I<eactor Plant Cmponent Cooling Water (RPCCW) contaiment return valves CCP-MOV48A,B were listed on proposed TS Table 3.6-1 and not on FSAR Table 6.2-65. FSAR Table 6.2-65 listed Residual ' Heat Removal (RHR) suction valves and seal

- water return valves which were not listed in the TS.

The licensee stated the proposed TS and the FSAR valve isolation tables were not. finalized and some valves (stean line isolation valves and feedwater isolation valves, etc.) were a recognized licensing issue that was in the process of resolution with NRR. ihe licensee's efforts in this regard were reviewed, found consistent with the above, and considered acceptable.

2. FSAR Section 6.2 states that the normal containment operating pressure is between 9.0 - 12.5 psia. Proposed TS 3.6.1.4 and_ Figure 3.6.1 indicate that the normal operating pressure band is between 8.9 psia and approximately 10.65 psia. During-the review it was also-identified that the Containment Isolation A and B setpoints differed between FSAR Section 6.2 and proposed TS Section 3.6.1 with the proposed TS setting for both isolations at 17.7 psia.

The licensee indicated that the normal contairmnent operating pressure E

and the isolation setpoints for Containment Isolation Phases A and B I

signals were also under review by the facility architect engineer (AE) and Nuclear Steam. System Supplier (NSSS) . The licensee stated that, once the parameters were finalized they would be reflected by a later revision to the FSAR and draft TS.

Except as noted, the as-built configuration matched the documents

' reviewed. Apparently, a considerable amount of work remained before the valves, isolation times, and setpoints could be finalized.

The licensee demonstrated, however, that administrative controls for completion of.the above activities were functioning effectively and would, if applied consistently, ensure acceptable resolution of the above matters.

Page 9

EVALUATION 2.2 - SUPPLEMENTARY LEAK COLLECTION AND RELEASE SYSTEM l 2.2.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope p~

The Containment Enclosure Building and all conticuous buildings are maintained under negative pressure of at least 0.25"in, wg. following a DBA by the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) .

The system exhausts air from these. buildings, filters particulates, removes gaseous iodine from the air, and discharges to the atmosphere via the Millstone stack. A radiation monitor samples the common discharge header of the filters (2 x 100% capacity units) prior to discharge. The system is not normally in operation but starts upon receipt of a Safety Injection Signal (SIS) .

l The systems and equipment were reviewed with respect to the enteria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendix 2.2 for a listing of documents reviewed.

Proposed TS 3/4.6.6.1 was compared to the documents listed in Appendix 2.2 to verify that the proposed TS accurately represented the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics and was in agreement with the information in the FSAR and SER.

l 2.2.2 - Discussion The review of SLCRS emphasized comparison of the various system l

surveillance procedures with the TS Surveillance Requirements and review of the system preoperational tests. Specifically, the system operability j

testing, negative pressure verification, and radiation monitoring

! calibration procedures were reviewed with no discrepancies noted.

Additionally, detailed review of the SLCRS bypass logic found it consistent with the FSAR and SER.

A visual inspection the systs included observation of several contiguous building spaces serviced by SLCRS to verify the ductwork and damper configuration. The filter / heater assablies were also fourd to agree with

, the docunentation. Incal differential pressure instrunents were observed as were system control switches, indicators, and alarms in the control room.

All TS Surveillance Procedures reviewed were in draft form; see l additional discussion of surveillance and inservice test program status in i

Section 3 of this report.

Page 10

EVALUATION 2.2.3 - Observations and Conclusions No inconsistencies were noted in the documentation reviewed nor during the visual inspection. We as-built system appears to be in agreement with the documentation and TS requirementa appear to be definitively measurable.

2.3 - CONTAINMENT COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL 2.3.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope Ccxrbustible gas control is provided by the Hydrogen Recombiner System and Hydrogen Monitoring System which monitor and maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment to ensure acceptable (noncombustive, nonexplosive) concentration during a DBA.

The Hydrogen Recombiner System has two,100% capacity trains, each including a recombiner blower, an electric preheater, a thermal recombiner, and an air cooler. We fixed displacement recombiner blower provides a controlled gas flow from the containment to the thermal recombiner. The gas is heated to about 1200 F. before entering the recombiner where it is ccxrbined with oxygen to scavenge the hydrogen.

Two complete Hydrogen Monitoring System trains are also provided, each with a control and an analyzer cabinet.

We systems were reviewed with respect to the criteria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendix 2.3 for a listing of docunents reviewed. Proposed TS 3/4.6.4.1 and .2 were compared to these docunents to verify that the TS accurately reflected the as-built plant configuration and were in agreenent with the FSAR and SER.

2.3.2 - Discussion The system piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) was reviewed and found in agreenent with the FSAR and SER. Surveillance and preoperational test procedure drafts were reviewed and found consistent with the TS, FSAR, SER, and design drawings, including the P&ID, logic and elementary diagrams.

A walkdown of the system found that the recombiners and analyzers appeared to be installed in accordance with the FSAR. It was noted that the Delphi hydrogen monitor furnished with the recombiner was an in-place spare in addition to the separate Hydrogen Monitoring System.

Page 11

EVALUATIOM 2.3.3 - Observations and Conclusions No inconsistencies were noted in the documentation reviewed nor during the visual inspection of the systm .

2.4 - QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM 2.4.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope The Quench Spray System, in conjunction with the Containment Recirculation Spray System, make up the Containment Depressurization Systems. The Quench Spray System was reviewed with respect to the criteria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. Appendix 2.4 provides a listing of the docments reviewed.

Proposed TS 3/4.6.2.1 and 3/4.3.2 were compared to the docments listed in Appendix 2.4 to verify that the proposed TS accurately represented the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics were in agrement with the information in the FSAR and SER.

2.4.2 - Discussion The Quench Spray System provides containment cooling and depressurization after receipt of a Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA) signal.

Each redundant Quench Spray subsyste draws water independently from the RWST. Sodium hydroxide solution is added to the quench spray by gravity feed from the Chemical Addition Tank. The Quench Spray System then discharges through two 360 degree spray headers in the contairrnent dme.

An as-built configuration review of the system included a review of the system piping configuration, instrmentation, operating logic, setpoints, and system operating parameters and limits. In addition, selected draf t surveillance tests, normal operating procedures, and the system Phase II preoperational test were reviewed to determine that the design features were accurately reflected by the test and operating methods and that these methods were consistent with the proposed TS. The system review also included the system normal and emergency lineups and system valve and pump response to a CDA signal.

A visual inspection of portions of the system and selected equipment established that the design features were accurately translated into the as-built plant. The visual inspection included a walk-through of selected system operations to verify the accuracy of the draf t surveillance tests, approved operating procedures and compliance with the proposed TS surveillance requirments.

Page 12

EVALUATION 2.4.3 - Observations and Conclusions During the review, potential deficiencies and inconsistencies were identified. In each case, the licensee either provided a resolution or demonstrated that the matter would be properly resolved. We following is a description of those items and the current status.

1. FSAR Section 6.2 states that the Quench Spray maximum overall system response time is approximately 64 seconds assuming loss of offsite power and only one operating pump. We minimm response time without a loss of offsite power and with both pumps operating is approximately 33 secoMs. Proposed TS Table 3.3-5 lists the overall system response times as 3 seconds with offsite power available and 18 seconds with a loss of offsite power.

The licensee indicated that the response time limits had only recently been received from the AE and NSSS and that supporting documentation was not yet available (See Section 2.6.3) . Once the supporting documentation is received, the licensee will then definitively determine the TS response time bases and make the appropriate changes as necessary.

2. FSAR Section 6.2 states that the CDA signal setpoint is either 24.7 psia or 24.7 psig depending on which Table is being reviewed.

Proposed TS Table 3.3-4 lists the setpoint as 22.7 psia.

The licensee again indicated that the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESPAS) trip setpoints had only recently been received and were still under review. W e FSAR listed setpoints would be updated when the ESFAS trip setpoints had been finalized.

3. Review of the Phase II preoperational test (T3309-P001) for the Quench Spray System noted that the stroke time acceptance criteria for the Quench Spray discharge valves (QSS-MOV34A,B) was less than or equal to 60 seconds. These valves are normally closed and open on a CDA signal. A review of FSAR Table 6-2.65, Containment Penetrations, listed the valve maximum stroke time as 30 seconds and the maximum system response time of 64 seconds.

Wrough discussions with the licensee, it was determined that the acceptance criteria in the preoperational test was based on a maximum acceptable closure (contairrnent isolation) time (vice systs actuation (valve opening) time) and a change to the FSAR had been initiated to change the maximum stroke to time less than or equal to 60 seconds.

When the acceptable stroke time for QSS-MOV34 A,B was being changed, the licensee reviewers apparently did not consider how the change would affect the overall system actuation response time. To resolve the problem the licensee initiated a Deficiency Report (#0NS4807) to page 13

EVALUATION evaluate the effect on the overall system response time and to review all the FSAR Table 6.2-65 stroke times for consistency with required systm response times. The actual tested stroke times of the val'ies was approximately 31 seconds.

4. Proposed Draft TS 4.6.2.1, Surveillance Requirement - Quench Spray System Operability, states: "Each containment quench spray subsystem shall be d monstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by:

1. Verifying that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

2. Verifying the temperature of the borated water in the refueling water storage tank is within the limits shown on Figure 3.6-1."

r Figure 3.6-1 does not provide temperature limits on the refueling water storage tank but is a plot of service water temperature vs.

) maximum allowable primary containment air partial pressure. The licensee stated that the figure for borated water tmperature had not been generated but would be correctly reflected in the TS.

l Except as noted above, the as-built configuration of the system structures, and compcnents compared satisfactory with the documents reviewed. The m:hnical Specification requirements except as noted above were measurable.

2.5 - CONTAINME!E RECIRCULATION SYSTEM 2.5.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope The Containment Recirculation Spray System, in conjunction with the Quench Spray System, make up the Containment Depressurization Systems. The Containment Recirculation Spray Systs was reviewed with respect to the criteria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. Appendix 2.5 provides a listing of the docments reviewed.

Proposed TS 3/4.6.2.2 were compared to the documents listed in Appendix 2.5 to verify that the proposed TS accurately represented the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics were in agreement with i the information in the FSAR and SER.

Page 14

l .

! EVALUATION 2.5.2 - Discussion The Containment Recirculation System provides long term containment

cooling and depressurization after receipt of a Containment

! Depressurization Actuation (CDA) signal. Each of two containment recirculation subsystems consist of two containment recirculation coolers l and pumps which share two 360 degree spray headers. The containment l recirculation subsystems are normally inoperative and actuate on a CDA i signal during a DBA.

t l An as-built configuration review of the system included review of the l systan piping configuration, instrmentation, operating logic, satpoints, l and system operating parameters and limits. In addition, selected draf t surveillance tests, normal operating procedures, and the system Phase II preoperational test were reviewed to determine that the design features I were accurately reflected by the test and operating methods and that these f

methods were consistent with the proposed TS.

An overall system review was performed which included the features and methods for systen valve lineups, pump operation and recirculation cooler operation.

A visual inspection of portions of the system and selected equipment I established that the design features were accurately translated into the l as-built plant. The visual inspection includes a walk-through of selected l systan operations to verify the accuracy of the draft surveillance tests, l approved operating procedures and compliance with the proposed TS l surveillance requiranents.

l l

2.5.3 - Observations and Conclusions This portion of the inspection activities found that the proposed TS for l the Containment Recirculation Spray System were compatible with the I as-built plant and operating characteristics in the areas reviewed. Some

! inconsistencies, as discussed below, were identified during the review.

I In each case the licensee provided a resolution or demonstrated that the matter had been previously identified and was being resolved.

i

l. During the review of the approved operating procedures, draf t l surveillance tests, the system P&ID (EM-ll2C) and the FSAR, l

discrepancies were identified involving the normal system valve lineup. The Containment Recirculation Spray System Operating Procedure (OP3306) and several draf t surveillance tests indicated that system motor operated suction and discharge valves were lef t in the closed position for a normal lineup while the system P&ID and FSAR Section 7.3 showal the valves normally open.

'Ihe system startup engineer stated that the normal system lineup had been under review and, currently, it was intended to leave the valves Page 15

EVALUATION normally open, which is consistent with the system P&ID. The draft procedures would be corrected during the review process.

2. As previously mentioned, the Containment Recirculation Spray System starts on a CDA signal. Wroughout the FSAR, the CDA signal is listed as either 24.7 psia or 24.7 psig while the most recent licensee TS subnittal indicates the CDA signal setpoint as 22.7 psia.

The licensee resolved this discrepancy as described in Section 2.4 of this report.

Except as noted above, the as-built configuration of the system structures, and components compared satisfactory with the documents reviewed. As noted in other sections of this report, operating surveillance tests were written as first drafts or not drafted at all and i

no reliable comparison could be performed with these documents and the TS l

surveillance requirenents. We Phase II preoperational test was reviewed and, with the exception of minor transcription errors, satisfied the intended test objectives.

2.6 - AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM 2.6.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope The Auxiliary Feedwater (AEW) System provides a supply of high pressure feedwater to the secondary side of the steam generators for Reactor Coolant System heat removal following a loss of normal feedwater and during normal plant startup and shutdown. The systen consists of two half capacity motor driven pumps and one full capacity steam turbine driven pump. We Auxiliary Feedwater System and equipment were reviewed with respect to the criteria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. Appendix 2.6 contains a listing of the docments reviewed.

Proposed TS 3/4.7.1.2 and 3/4.3.2 were compared to the docunents listed in Appendix 2.6 to verify that the proposed TS accurately represented the as-built plc.nt configuration and operating characteristics were in agreenent with the information in the FSAR and SER.

2.6.2 - Discussion An as-built configuration review of the system included a review of the system piping configuration, instrunentation, operating logic, setpoints, and system operating parameters and limits. In addition, selected draf t surveillance tests, normal and emergency operating procedures, and the systen Phace I and II preoperational tests were reviewed to determine that the design features were accurately reflected by the test and operating methods and that these methods were consistent with the proposed TS.

Page 16

EVALUATION 4

A system overall review was performed with emphasis placed on the turbine-driven punp aM associated components and features.

A visual inspection of portions of the system and selected equipment established that the design features were accurately translated into the as-built plant. The visual inspection included a walk-through of selected system operations to verify the accuracy of draf t procedures and compliance with the proposed TS surveillance requirements and system configuration.

2.6.3 - Observations and Conclusions During the review, several potential deficiencies and inconsistencies were identified. We licensee resolved most of these items during the course of the inspection or demonstrated that the items had previously been identified and would be resolved. The following is a description of those items and the status at the e,nd of the inspection.

1. FSAR Section 15.2 states that following a feedwater line break the auxiliary feedwater pumps will supply feedwater to the intact steam generators following receipt of a low-low steam generator water level signal and a 60 second time delay. Proposed TS Section 3/4.3.5, Table 3.3-5, states that the time response for the Auxiliary Feedwater System is either 43.5 seconds or 60 seconds depending on the initiating signal.

The licensee indicated that the response time limit for TS Table 3.3-5 had only recently been obtained and supporting documentation was not yet available. Once the supporting documentation is received, the licensee plans to ensure the FSAR and TS time response values are consistent.

2. During the review of the systen P&ID (EM-123A) and the system visual inspection, it was noted that a long section of the steam supply piping to the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump turbine was isolated and free of steam during normal operation. This section of piping consisted of numerous sharp bends and elevation changes, would be relatively cold (free of steam), and had no normally open drains or traps. Wis section of piping may accumulate condensate with no means of drainage and the piping and turbine may be adversely affected upon systen actuation under these conditions.

We plant operating staff had previously identified similar concerns.

The matter had been reviewed by the licensee's engineering staf f and dispositioned as acceptable, although the plant staff's concerns remained. The licensee stated that their engineering staff will reevaluate the systen design.

IE Information Notice No. 85-50, Canplete toss of Main and Auxiliary

,Page 17

, o EVALUATION Feedwater at a PWR Designed by Babcock and Wilcox, was issued but unavailable during this inspection. Review subsequent to the inspection noted that one possible contributor to ths Notice's referenced event was misoperation of the AEW pump turbine due to steam line moisture resulting frm circuitous and uMrained piping.

3. While reviewing the steau driven auxiliary feedwater system response time and the system valve lineups, steam supply isolation valves MSS-A0V31A,B,D operating characteristics were compared with FSAR Section 6.2.4 and Table 6.2-65, Conta,irinent Penetrations, for response time and initiating logic. Upon review 'it was found that these valves were not listed on Table 6.2-65, but four other nonexistent valves (MSS-MOV21A,B,C,D) were listed as steam supply isolation valves with correspording stroke times.

The licensee had also previously identified this discrepancy and had issued an internal mmo on Novaber 15, 1984 to initiate resolution of the doc mentation problem. Apparently a system design change to the AEW system had been made approximately two and one-half years prior and all but this section of the FSAR had been revised to reflect the change. At the time of the design change the current method for .

ensuring that all docmentation is updated was not in place.

The actual manufacturer's specified stroke time for the valves per the licensees " Active Valve Listing" is approximately seven seconds, eight seconds faster than the MOVS they replaced. Actual stroke time verification will be performed during Phase III through IX preoperational testing.

4. FSAR Section 15.2 states that following a feedline rupture the Auxiliary Feedwater System is assumed to supply a total of 480 gpm to three unaffected steam generators. FSAR Section 10.4.9 states that the auxiliary feedwater system is designed to supply a minimum of 470 gpm total flow to at least two steam generators even with the occurrence of a single failure for a spectnan of transients, including a secondary syste pipe rupture.

The licensee is aware of a possible inconsistency between these two sections and the limiting flow requirments will be confirmed prior to finalizing the TS.

5. While reviewing the licensee draft surveillance tests and the proposed TS surveillance requirments it was observed that the system 31-day ,

flow tests (TS 4.7.1.2.1 & 2) would be performed via the pumps minimum recirculation lines. 'Ihe lines will be orificed for 45 gpn and 90 gpn respectively for the motor-driven pumps and the steam-driven pump.

These lines may be further throttled per the draf t surveillance test to achieve the desired discharge pressure.

This technique results in checking pump operation near shutoff head Page 18

,. ... -- __ __ _ _. .- y_.- __. .. . __ . . . _

+ r

, EVALUATION y

j conditions and.is considered questionable for demonstrating pump capability to provide rated head / flow conditions. AEW Pump flow is

i.  ; only enecked per the proposed TS at (near) rated conditions (via flow to the SGs) following extended cold shutdowns.

l

[, The licensee indicated that these tests were performed in a similar 1

manner at Millstone Unit 2. If the method or data was later deemed

, unacceptable an alternate method of testing -the system would have to be established.

i1

! - Except as 'noted. above, - the _ as-built configuration of the system structures, and components compared satisfactorily with the documents

,revi ewed. The potential discrepancies identified appear to be isolated cases and no similar items could be identified. *

' i -2.7 - AC SOUICES '

2.7.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope i ,

i.

The AC power sources that serve vital plant auxiliary loads. consist of two connections to the 345 KV grid system and. two redundant Emergency Diesel e

', Generators (EDGs) complete with auxiliary ' systems such as fuel and lube

]/ f

' oil, cooling systens and starting air 'systens.

These systems and equipment were, reviewed with respect to the criteria and

. methods of'Section 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendix 2.7 for a i listing of doctanents reviewed.

1 Proposed TS 3/4.8.1.1 and 3/4.8.1.2 were compared to the documents listed in Appendix 2.7 to verify that the proposed TS accurately represent the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics and were in agreement with the infonnation in the FSAR and SER.

7 ,

2.7.2 - Discussion

!. The Main one Line/ Phasing Diagram and the flow path 'of power from the 345 KV _offsite system to each Class lE 4.16 KV bus (34C tr -34D) was traced to verify that the paths shown'on the drawing are consistent with the description in the FSAR and > SER. (This diagram. indicates the normal position of the breakers in these flow paths. In the same manner, the

flow path of power from each diesel generator was traced. SP3670.1 which -

!- applies.to circuit breaker alignment was not ready for review during the audit,;but the above review of power flow paths provides reasonable assurance -that this procedure when prepared can satisfy Surveillance-Hequirenent 4.8.1.1.'a. -

Surveillance Requirements relating to the EDGs and support systems -were a

f

'; , .Page 19-

• '.' ( ( , _ . .

_ . . _ _ .,--_..,_.,,,e--.----.y - - , - --- , , - r- r

WALUATION available as Draft A versions only. SP-3646A (Operability Test) assures that the diesels will start, accelerate and synchronize per TS 4.8.1.1.2; it also verifies fuel level in the day tank, lubricant supply and checks for water in the fuel all of which are required by TS 4.8.1.1.2.

SP-3646.B5 provides a procedure for verifying the presence of impurities

-in the fuel. SP-3646.AD. (Independence Test) provides a procedure for meeting TS 4.8.1.1.2.f.

Operating procedures 3346A and 3346B were reviewed an found to be consistent with the FSAR and SER.'

A visual inspection of the diesel generator rooms indicated that installed equipment is consistent with the documentation. Equipment on the D.C.

Electrical and Mechanical Panels were observed; local and main control roon instrmentation and controls wure also observed.

Inspection of the 4.16 KV switchgear indicated diesel generator relaying in accordance with the FSAR. Blocking circuits for EDG trips bypassed during accident conditions were confirmed via the elementary diagram as well as the 2/3 logic for lube oil trips.

The power flow path and breaker control switch alignments from the 345 KV systs to the Energency Bus was confirmed via the mimic display on the Main Control Board.

2.7.3 - Observations and Conclusions No inconsistancies' were noted in the documentation reviewed or during the visual- inspection. The as-built systems are in agreement with the docmentation. The technical specification requironents were definitively measurable. t 2.8 - CLASS lE DC POWER SOUFCES Y

,2.8.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope Class ,lE DC power sources consist of station batteries 301A-1, 301A-2, 301B-1, and 301B-2 and their associated battery chargers and backup

' chargers. In addition to providing power for DC control circuits, the batteries and chargers provide backup sources to the 120 VAC vital bus via <

' inverters.

These sources were reviewed with respect to the criteria and methods of sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendix!2.0 for a listing of the doc ments reviewed. i

, s Proposed TS 3/4.8.2.1 and 3/4.8.2.2. were canpared to the docments listed

' rs 5

?

i Page 20

, i I * '

t >

EVALUATION in Appendix 2.8 to verify that the proposed TS accurately represented the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics and were in agreement with the information in the FSAR and SER.

2.8.2 - Discussion-Draft A of' Station Battery Surveillance Testing (SP-3712N) was reviewed to assure that.it adequately reflects the Surveillance Requirements of TS 4;8.2.1 and 4.8.2.2 for weekly, quarterly,- eighteen month and five year testing. The procedure ~ also addresses TS Parameter Table A for

- electrolyte level, specific gravity and cell voltage as well as Parameter i Table B relating to these same characteristics. The procedure also identifies the need for visual inspection of battery terminals and the measurement of internal resistance. In addition, visual inspections of battery racks, ils and plates and a test to assure that battery charger capacity is' maintained are required by SP3712N.

l The One Line Diagram (12179-EE-1BA-10) was reviewed for battery and charger ratings and connections and found to be in agroment with the FSAR and SER.

i

) A visual inspectiion confirmed battery and charger ratings as well as

electrolyte level indications on each cell. Specific gravity testing devices were available in each battery room. (Batteries 301-Al & 301-B1 are rated at 1650 ampere hours (8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> rate), 301-A2 & 30L-B2 are rated at 750 mpere hours (8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> rate) . Chargers for batteries 301-Al & 301-Bl.

are rated at 200 amperes and chargers -for batteries 301-A2 and 301-B2 are rated at 50 amperes; backup chargers are rated at 200 aaperes.

i 2.8.3 - Observations and-Conclusions j

i No inconsistencies were noted in the docmentation reviewed or during the visual inspection. _'The as-built -system is in agreement with the i docm entation. 'Ibe Technical Specification requirements were definitely measurable.

f 2.9 - ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION '(AC & DC)

'2.9.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope

~

The onsite power. distribution system includes 4.16 KV. busses 34C and D,

. 480 VAC busses, and 120 VAC vital busses energized via associated 125 VDC inverters, busses and the station batteries.,

The review also included the degraded grid undervoltage protection scheme which senses prolonged voltage degradation which could be Jetrimental to 4

Page 21'

EVALUATION 1

continued operation of energized equignent.

Additionally, electrical equipment protective devices including containment electrical penetration protective circuitry, motor operated valve overload bypasses, and series connected interrupting devices for non-lE loads inside containment served from Class lE busses. (Note:

Series connected interrupting devices were not reviewed in detail during this inspection'.)

The systens and equipnent were reviewa3 with respect to the criteria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendix 2.9 for a listing of doctrnents reviewed.

2.9.2 - Discussion Operating procedures were reviewed for the AC and DC systems and were found to be in agreement with .the design documents and FSAR/SER. The integrated preoperational test procedure for the electrical distribution system was reviewed as were all the applicable one line wiring diagrams.

A visual inspection of the 4.16 KV switchgear, several 480 VAC load centers and motor control centers, and all four 120 VAC and 125 VDC systems indicated that the installed systems agree with the design and licensing doctznentation.

We one line diagram for 4.16 KV Class lE Bus 34C was reviewed to verify the incorporation of degraded grid undervoltage protection devices.

Associated logic diagrams were reviewed to assure that the logic schemes were appropriate and implemented by the hardware. A visual inspection of the switchgear arrangenent confirma3 the installation of the degraded grid undervoltage relaying. Review of TS Tables 3.3-4 and 4.3-2 found that setpoints had not yet been established for these circuits and will be provided later. Wis iten was being tracked by the licensee.

Surveillance tests and elanentary diagrams for containment equipment and penetrations were reviewed with regard to the methods used for penetration protection and for bypassing thermal overload heaters on accident signals.

No visual inspection was made in this area.

2.9.3 - Observations and Conclusions No inconsistencies were noted in the documentation reviewed nor during the visual inspections. te as-built systens appear to be in agreement with the design and licensing doctrnentation. TS requirements are definitively measurable.

Page 22

EVALUATION 2.10 - SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEMS 2.10.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope The High Pressure Safety Injection (SIH) Systs, the Low Pressure Safety Injection (SIL) function of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, and the Safety Injection Accumulators provide the means to inject water to the core during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), and to provide long term, post accident core recirculation cooling. The Coolant Charging Pumps of the Chmical and Volme Control Systm (CVCS) also provide a high pressure safety injection function (See Section 2.11) .

These systems and equignent were reviewed with respect to the criteria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendix 2.11 for a listing of documents reviewed.

Proposed TS 3/4.5.1., 3/4.5.2, 3/4.5.3, 3/4.5.4, 3/4.4.1.4.1, 3/4.4.1.4.2, 3/4.4.1.4.2, and 3/4.4.1.3 were compared to the documents listed in Appendix 2.10 to verify that the proposed TS accurately represented the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics and were in agrement with the information in the FSAR and .SER.

2.10.2 - Discussion The features of these systems reviewed included normal, abnormal, and mergency operations described by the FSAR, Section 15, Safety Analysis, arx1 the licensee's draft and approved procedures.

The as-built configuration portion of the review included a sampling based review of system piping configuration, instrumentation and control setpoints and operating logic, systs operating parameters and limits, arxl electrical controls design. Operating Procedures, Surveillance and Inservice Tests, Preoperational Tests were reviewed on a sampling basis to determine that the design features were accurately reflected by the test and operating methods and that these methods wero consistent with the requirments of the proposed TS.

Specifically, the systcm features and operations involving the following were reviewed:

Normal system alignments and operations Energency systs alignments and operations EDCS Injection Phase Operations EXIS Recirculation Phase Operations System testing alignments and methods Flow Balance Testing Flow Path Operability Testing Page 23

~

EVALUATION Systs Operational Readiness Testing Pm p and Valve Inservice and Operability Testing A visual inspection of portions of the systems and selected equipment established that the design features were accurately translated into the as-built systms. 'Ihe visual inspection included verification of system piping and fluid system flowpath and component configuration, main and auxiliary control station instrmentation and controls, simulated partial performance of system alignments and tests, and general cmparison of the systes arxl equipment with the proposed TS.

2.10.3 - Observations and Conclusions A number of minor inconsistencies were identified. In each case, the licensee either provided a resolution or dmonstrated that the matter had been previously identified arrl was in the process of resolution.

1. SIH Pmp Discharge Valves, 3CHS*MOV8821A and B are motor operated valves which do not receive any Safety Injection actuation signals and must be open for its respective SIH Pmp train to fulfill its accident function. 'Ihe valves are equipped with power-lockouts which permit deenergization of the motor operator while maintaining rmote position irrlication.

An early draft of TS 4.5.2.a had required these valves to be deenergized via the power lockout and verified in position every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. 'Ihe licensee had deleted this feature from the current draf t TS for operational flexibility. 'Ihe TSs have not been fully approved by NRR.

2. Review of draf t Surveillance Procedures (SPs) listed in Appendix 2.10 identified a number of inconsistencies and concerns regarding procedure content. All SPs reviewed were in draft form.

Report Section 3.1.4 discusses the licensee's comnitments to implement the guidance of NUREG 0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Beguirments, Its I.C.6, for restoration and independent verification of system aligments following maintenance or testing. Examples of draf t reports which do not conform to these commitments were identified during the above review: SP 3601A.4, SP 3601 A.5, SP 3601A.6. Each SP provided no specific restoration alignments; restoration was to be " per the Shift Supervisor", etc.

Discussions with the unit Operations Supervisor indicated that the planning for impim,entation of the above commitment. vas incomplete but included performance of the systems' monthly TS alignment verification immediately following each SP which af fects the aligment, i.e. coordinating surveillance performance to ensure that the monthly TS alignment check serves as the verification per NUREG i

l Page 24 i

i

EVALUATION 0737. One example of such was found in SP 3608.5, SIH Pump Flow Balance, Draft A.

3. As indicated above, all SPs reviewed were in draf t form. Discussion of the overall SP preparation status is also provided in Section 3 of this report.

Except as noted above no discrepancies were identified. The as-built configuration of the system, structures, and components compared satisfactorily with the documents reviewed. We Technical Specification requirments reviewed were definitively measurable.

2.11 - CHEMICAL AND VOLUME COtTfROL SYSTEM 2.11.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope Redundant reactivity control is provided by the boron soluble poison addition function of the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) , its Primary Makeup (PMU) subsystem, and the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) portion of the Quench Spray System (QSS) . The Coolant Charging Pumps of CVCS also provide a high pressure safety injection function.

These syste s and equipment were reviewed with respect to the criteria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendix 2.11 for a listing of docments reviewed.

Proposed TS 3/4.1.1.1, 3/4.1.1.2, 3/4.1.1.3, 3/4.1. 2.1, 3/4.1. 2. 2, 3/4.1.2.3, 3/4.1.2.4, 3/4.1.2.5, 3/4.1.2.6, and 3/4.1.3.6 were campared to the documents listed in Appendix 2.11 to verify that the proposed TS accurately represented the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics and were in agrement with the information in the FSAR and SER.

2.11.2 - Discussion The systems arxl subsystes listed above provide the capability to reduce nuclear core reactivity under normal, abnormal and emergency conditions.

The features of these systems reviewed included normal, emergency and gravity boration flow paths from the Doric Acid Storage Tanks to the Reactor Coolant System via the CVCS System and the abnormal / emergency flowpaths frm the RWST.

The as-built configuration portion of the review included a sampling based review of system piping configuration, instrumentation and control setpoints arri operating logic, systs operating parameters and limits, and electrical controls design. Operating procedures, Surveillance and Inservice Tests, and Preoperational Tests were reviewed on a sampling basis to determine that the design features were accurately reflected by page 25 L.

EVALUATION  !

4 4 1

l the test and operating methods and that these methods were consistent with

! the requirments of the proposed TS. -

L Specifically, the systen features and operations involving the following were reviewed:

j  ;

i Normal CVCS and PMU operations i

anergency and Gravity Boration operations System testing alignments and methods Flow Balance Testing Systen Operational Readiness Testing Pump'and Valve Inservice and Operability Testing Bnergency (Accident) Operations -

i Engineered Safety Features (ESP) Operating Modes l Interrelations with other ESF Systans i

A visual inspection of portions of the systems and selected equipment

! established that the design features were accurately translated into the j as-built systans. We visual inspection included verification of system piping and fluid system flowpath and component configuration, main and ,

auxiliary control station instrunentation and controls, simulated partial '

I performance of partial systan aliganents arxl tests, and goceral comparison of the systems and equipnent with the proposed TS.

l 2.11.3 - observations and Cbnclusions i

A number of minor inconsistencies were identified. In each case, the

! licensee either provided a resolution or denonstrated that the matter had been previously identified and was in the process of resolution.

1. FSAR Section 9.3.4.5 states that the Doric Acid Tank Low Level Alarms (LT-102, -104) are set to indicate the minimum tank level to ensure 1

' sufficient borated water is available for a cold shutdown with one

-stuck control rod. We miniman borated water volume to be specified j in TS 3.1.2.5.a.1 has not yet been finalized.

During review of the system test and calibration data, an apparently erroneous setpoint calculation (Calculation No. SP-3CHS-7, 3CHS*LT104) was identified. Wis calculation appeared to base the above setpoint  :

on its relationship to the High (Tank overflow) Alarm vice the FSAR criteria.

{

Additional information provided by the licensee showed thatt the setpoint was consistent with the proper tank level value; a minor calculational error had previously been found and was in the process i of correction; the apparent incorrect setpoint basis was a result of an incorrect reference docunent listing in the calculation package;

)

i and, the setpoint would be reviewed with respect to the value for TS , 3.2.1.5 when finalized.

Page 26

EVALUATION 1

OP 3304C, CVCS System, Revision 0, was checked for correlation of level setpoint values with the Logic Diagrams and Setpoint Calculation; the OP was annotated for "later" provision of the setpoint.

See Section 3.2 for additional discussion of the administrative control of setpoints and other parametric limits.

3. TS 3/4.1.2.6.a.3, Borated Water Sources - Operating requires a minimum temperature of 65 degrees F. for the Boric Acid Tank borated water contents and the tank rooms. The tank temperature is to be verified once per seven (7) days per the TS. 'Ihe tank temperature is measured and an alarm generated by Temperature Element Loop TE-103.

Review of logic diagram ISK 26-2.5A found that the TE-103 temperature alarm setpoint was 60 degrees F., five degrees below the TS minimum limit. (Note that the alarm is not a requirement of TS but is an operator aid alarm). Operating Procedure, OP 3304C, CVCS System, Sections 8.1 and 8.5, Alarms arx1 Malfunctions, lists this setpoint as

<60 degrees F.

The Operations Supervisor and the Instrtunent and Controls Supervisor were queried regarding the licensee's alarm setpoint practices (e.g.

alarm actuation prior to reaching a limit, etc.) and the need to revise operating arri maintenance docunents when TS or other upper tier

doctrnents' paraneters change.

The licensee representatives advised that the need for extensive review of all setpoints potentially affected by TS issuance had already been recognizcx1 and will be accomplished prior to licensed operation. Plans for this review are in process; sea Section 3.2 for additional discussion.

4. The Surveillance Procedures (SPs) listed in Appendix 2.11 were reviewed for general content and conformance with the TS requirments.

General Conclusions, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss general observations involving the inconsistencies and quality of draf t SPs. Specific examples involving the CVCS systs are noted below:

SP 3604A.1, "A" Charging Putp Operational Readiness Test, Draft Rev. O_

Initial Conditions and Prerequisites are silent regarding applicable Operating Modes or prerequisite plant conditions except for reference to the system OP.

The Shift Supervisor or Supervising Control Operator are designated to determine the above without specific procedural guidance.

Page 27

EVALUATION SP 33604C.2, Borated Water Source Flow Path Verification - Monthly, Draft A_

Same as above for SP 3604A.1.

No precautions are provided, including those already available via the System ops and general radiological or industrial safety precautions for activities involving contaminated systems and spaces, etc.

SP_ 3604C.3, Borated Water Source Flow Path Operability - Refueling, Draft A, Same as above for SP 3604A.1 and SP 3604C.2.

The above SPs and the others listed in the Appendices to this report were quite inconsistent with regard to the content of procedure steps.

Some procedures required " step-by-step" signoffs, others had no signoff provisions, even at procedure completion. Some procedures required pretest personnel briefings, many did not. The procedures often varied considerably in the level of detailed instruction provided.

Except as noted above no discrepancies were identified. The as-built configuration of the system, structures, and components compared satisfactorily with the docments reviewed. 'Ihe Technical Specification requirments reviewed were definitively measurable.

2.12 - MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES A!O STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE RELIEVING VALVES i 2.12.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope The thin Steam Isolation or Trip Valves provide the capability to isolate the non-safety related portions of the Main Steam (MSS) System from the four Steam Generators (SGs) and/or containment under accident conditions.

The two principal accident functions are isolation of a failed SG (steam generator tube rupture, etc.) and termination of uncontrolled blowdown of more than one SG in the event of a steam line break.

The SG Pressure Relieving Valves (or atmospheric steam dump valves), one in each of the four main steam lines, provide an alternate means of removing heat from the Reactor Coolant System following a load rejection or turbine generator trip by automatically relieving steam to atmosphere if the condenser turbine bypass system is unavailable. The air operated SG Pressure Relieving Valves are equipped with non-automatic motor operated bypass and isolation valves. The automatic and non-automatic page 28

LVALUATION f

valve sets each have a capacity of 15% rated steam flow.

These systems and equipnent were reviewed with respect to the criteria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendix 2.12 for a listing of doctanents reviewed.

Proposed TS 3/4.7.1.5 and TS 3/4.3.2 including Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation and Instrinnentation of TS Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3-2 for Steam Line Isolation were reviewed with respect to the documents listed in Appendix 2.12 to verify that the proposed TS accurately reprerwnted the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics and were in agrement with the information in the FSAR and SER.

2.12.2 - Discussion The as-built configuration portion of the review included a sampling based review of system piping configuration, instrumentation and control setpoints ard operating logic, systm operating parmeters and limits, and electrical controls design. Operating procedures, surveillance and inservice tests, preoperational tests were reviewed on a samplirn basis to determine that the design features were accurately reflected by the test and operating methods and that these methods were consistent with the requirments of the proposed TS.

Specifically, the system features and operations involving the following were reviewed:

Steam Line Isolation Actuation Manual High Containment Pressure Low Steam Line Pressure Steam Line Pressure tkv.jative Rate i

Valve Operability Testing Dnergency (Accident) Operations and ESF Operating Modes Interrelations with other ESP Systms A visual inspection of portions of the systems and selected equipment established that the design features were accurately translated into the as-built systas. 'the visual inspection included verification of fluid system flowpath and component configuration, main and auxiliary control station instrunentation and controls, simulated partial performance of system aligranents and tests, and general comparison of the systems and equipnent with the proposed TS.

2.12.3 - observations and Conclusions A ntrnber of minor inconsistencies were identified. In each case, the Page 29

EVALUATION r liceaseo either provided a resolution or dmonstrated that the matter had been previously identified and was in the process of resolution. ,

The Surveillance Procedure SP 3616A.1, Main Steam Valve operability Tests, Draft A, was reviewed for general content and conformance with the TS requirements. General Conclusions, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss general observations involving the inconsistencies and quality of draf t SPs. No specific coments on SP 3616A.1 rmained unresolved at the completion of this review.

Except as noted above no discrepancies were identified. The as-built configuration of the system, structures, and components compared satisC2ctorily with the docments reviewed. 'Ihe Technical Specification requirments reviewed were definitively measurable.

2.13 - PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF Ato DIDCK VALVES l

2.13.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scopo

'Ihe Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) provide overpressure control capability for the RCS Pressurizer to limit the severity of pressure transients and prevent reaching the Pressurizer code safety valve set pressures. The valves are controlled by the Pressurizer Pressure Control loops ansi are equipped with motor operated block valves.

! The PORVs and block valves were reviewod with respect to the critoria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Appendix 2.13 for a 4

listing of docments reviewed.

Proposed TS 3/4.4.4 for the PORVs and block valves were reviewed with respect to the documents listed in Appendix 2.13 to verify that the proposed TS accurately represented the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics and were in agreement with tho information in the FSAR and SER.

2.13.2 - Discussion

'!he as-built configuration portion of the review included a sampling based review of system piping configuration, instrumentation and control setpoints and operating logic, systm operating parameters and limits, and electrical controls design. Survol11anco and Inservico Tests, and Preoperational Tests were reviewod on a sampilng bauis to determine that the design features were accurately reficcted by the test and operating methods and that these methods were consistent with the requirements of the proposed TS.

A visual inspection of portions of the systems and selected equipment Page 30

EVALUATION established that the design features were accurately translated into the as-built syst m s. We visual inspection included verification of fluid system flowpath and cmponent configuration, main and auxiliary control station instrmentation and controls, simulated partial performance of system alignnents and tests, and general comparison of the systems and equipnent with the proposed TS.

2.12.3 - Observations arxl Conclusions A nmber of minor inconsistencies were identified. In each case, the licensco either provided a resolution or dmonstrated that the matter had a been pr9viously identified ard was in the process of resolution.

%e Surveillance Procedure SP 360lG.1, PORV Isolation Valvo Operability Test, Draft A, was reviewed for general content and conformance with the TS requirements. General Conclusions, Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss general observations involving the inconsistencies and quality of draf t SPs. No specific comments on SP 3616A.1 remained unresolved at the

! completion of this review.

Except as noted above no discrepancies were identified. The as-built configuration of the system, structures, and components compared satisfactorily with the doc eents reviewed. %e Technical Specification requirments reviewod wore definitively measurable.

2.14 - SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 2.14.1 - Evaluation Critoria and Scope The Station Servico Water System (SWS) and Ultimato lleat Sink (UllS) provide cooling to both safety related and non-safety related plant heat loads. %o systs was reviewod with respect to the critoria and methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. Appendix 2.14 provides a listing of the docments reviewed.

Proposed TS 3/4.7.4 arxl 3/4.7.5 were compared to the documents listed in Appendix 2.14 to verify that the pro [osed TS accurately represented the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics were in agrement with the information in the FSAR and SER.

2.14.2 - Discussion I

The Service Water System in conjunction with the UHS provido cooling to the Dnergency Diesel Cencrators, ECCS compononts and room coolers, and various balance of plant systems. The Service Water System is also available to supply emergency makeup water to the Auxiliary Feedwater Page 31

LVA!EATION l

System by the installation of spool pieces in the SWS supply lines.

An as-built configuration review of the systun inc1 Mod a review of systen piping configuration, instrumentation, operating logic, and system operating paranoters and limits. In addition, selected draft surveillance tests, nornal operating procedures, and the system Phase II preoperational tests were reviewed to determine that the design features were accurately reflected by the test and operating methods and that these methods were consistent with the proposo] TS.

h specific systan features and operations of the normal and emergency line ups for the Emergency Diosol Generators, the Containment Recirculation Coolers, and the Auxiliary Feedwater system supply were reviewed.

A visual inspection of the principal system flow paths and the selected features describal above was performed. h visual inspection included a simulated performanco (walk-through) of system operations to vorify the accuracy of the draf t procedures and compliance with the proposed TS surveillance requiranents.

I i

2.14.3 - Observations and Conclusions i

l With the exception of a few minor discrepancies the au-built system ,

matcint the evaluation criteria dolineation in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. All  !

J of the discrepancies had been previously identified and were in the proccas of being resolved.

t 1. We containment recirculation flow indicators FI 59 A,B,C,D continued  ;

! to indicato syston flow when the systen is shut down. Wis deficioney was fouM by the licenseo during the preoperational test progran and a design clungo was initiated to resolve the problem.

1

2. We systen P&ID (EM-1330) did not match tho as-built plant in that a check valve was akled to syston that was not reflected on the P&ID.

The check valve was installed to prevent the draining of a vertical pipo run to safety rotatal equipnent when the systen is shut down. Tin 11censeo had initiated a chango to the P&ID with the system design chango but the P&ID revision was la<fJing behind and the licensco was aware of this discrepancy.

3. The licensoo draf t TS and the NRC draf t TS differed in that the licensco proposed TS did not includo a minimum water level f or tho (RIS. FSAR Section 9.2.1 states that the minimum water loval for operation of the servico water is -8.0 foot MSL.

The resolution of this dif ference is a licensing matter and the licensco is aware of the differenco. Tho 0113 minimum level f or operability was not includal in the liconsoo's deaf t TS becauno the Pago 32

l .

, EVALUATION l

minim m historical water at New London Connecticut, is -4.8 feet MSL

[ and the minimm estimated off-shore water level at the site should i

never be less than -5.9 feet MSL.

In general, the as-built configuration of the system, structures, and l components compared satisfactorily with the docments reviewed and the TS requirments were definitively measurable.

2.15 - REMC7FE SIKTIDOWN AND AOCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMLWTAION 2.15.1 - Evaluation Criteria and Scope 1

The Rmote Shutdown tenitoring Instrmentation is provided primarily at the Auxiliary Shutdown Panel ( ASP) and includes Train A and B instrmentatian separated by a "non-train" panel. Only one channel (RCS Wide Range Pressure) of accident monitoring instrmentation was reviewed in detail. Primary emphasis of this review centered on the remote shutdown features. The instrmentation was reviewed with respect to the criterja aM methods of Sections 1.3 and 1.4 of this report. See Apperrlix 2.15 for a listing of docments reviewed.

2.15.2 - Discussion Proposed TS 3/4.3.3.5 was compared to the docments in the above appendix to verify that the proposed TS accurately represented the as-built plant configuration and was in agreement with the information in the FSAR and SER. Table 7.4.1 of the FSAR lists the instrument channels required for remote shutdown. All of this instrumentation was confirmed to be incorporated in the ASP except for Reactor Trip Dreaker indication which is locatal at the Reactor Trip Switchgear.

A visual inspection of the ASP and Reactor Trip Switchgear established that the instrmentation channels were accurately translated into the as-built systm .

2.15.2 - observations and Conclusions No inconsistencies were noted in the documentation reviews nor during the visual inspection.

I Page 33 l

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 3.0 Q30EAL CONCLUSIONS

. The inspection determinal that the licensee's proposed (draft) Technical l Specifications were compatible with the as-built plant configuration and operating characteristics in the areas inspected and that the Technical Specification Surveillance futuironents were definitively measurable.

In general, the licensee's design control process appears to be working effectively. The findings below indicate that the problem areas identified typically involve documentation programs rather than the l functional aspects of the facility's engineering and construction. The licensee appears to provide aggressive control of its engineering and construction contractors.

The existing pre-approval proculure review processes appear to be rigorous (most document review coment sheets had extensive and meaningful coments) . As the schedule for Operating License issuance proceeds, increasing pressure will be placed on procedure production for the operating phase arti pecaxiure implanentation and verification schedules.

The current level of attention to the procedure review process must be l maintained or enhanced, particularly in light of the current draf t cortlition of many operatinj phase procalures (see below) .

The licensee is also displaying comendable initiative in certain areas.

I For example, tim regulatory requirunents are not completely definitive for the calibration and testing of instruments not having specific TS calibration or testing requirements but which are used to measure TS l parameters or provido post accident monitorinj capability.

Ttw licensee has evaluated instrunents such as the above as well as those involval in their fire protection (10CFR50, App. R) and environmental qualification programs, establishing a program for the control of calibration anj testinj in Procalure IC 3408A02, Non Tech Spec Instrunents With Licensing Requirunents, Revision 0.

The inspection did, however, identify several inconsistencies between he draf t Technical Specifications, the Final Safety Analysis Report, and the licensee's implanenting proculure programs as discussed in Sections 2.1 through 2.15 of this report. Where inconsistencies were identi fied, the licensee providol resolution or demonstrated that the matter had been previously identifial, was documented for eventual disposition, and/or that actions were in progress to achieve disposition as part of the licensinj process.

Review of the licennee's programs for implanentation of TS also identifial the followinj oppirent or potential probluns of a general nature.

Page 34

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 3.1 Surveillance and Inservice Program preparations In May, 1985, NRC Inspection No. 50-423/85-21 found that the surveillance and inservice test programs' procedure preparation efforts were just beginning with a large backlog of implementing procedures to be written.

During the current inspection, sme progress was noted:

1. The Unit 3 Surveillance Master Index had been established and computerized with most procedure needs identified and assigned to responsible plant departments for preparation. Because the proposed TS were incomplete, corresponding gaps existed in the Index. The licensee was, however, able to resolve discrepancies during this inspection. Considering the preliminary status of the Index, the licensee appeared to have a workable approach and demonstrated their efforts for further refinment and groming of the index.

2. The status of actual procedure production was note quantitatively determined by the inspection. Numerous procedures were reviewed during the inspection, nearly all of them in draf t status. The unit Surveillance Coordinator, Maintenance Supervisor, operations Supervisor, Instrument and Controls Supervisor, and various staff members were also interviewed to determine a general overall program status.

At the time of this inspection, only a small percentage of surveillance and inservice test procedures had been through the complete review and approval process. Most (on the order of 80-90%)

were in draft form, being reviewed for the first time on a multi-departmental basis. Within the previous two months, the licensee had assigned additional personnel to the effort, including a Coordinator, ard had begun a major effort to produce all procedures in draft form with a similar mass review process to follow. A small fraction (on the order of 10-15%) of the identified procedure needs had no draft procedure available or in preparation.

The licensee representatives interviewed (above) appeared to recognize the level of effort necessary to complete procedure production, approval and performance verification prior to fuel load and acknowledgod the rat *1er tight schedule for completion on the current fuel load schedule (Novmber,1985) .

3. 1he draf t procedures reviewed appeared to accurately reflect the as-built plant configuration and the proposed TS. The performance instructions (" procedure steps" section) generally appeared to achieve the procedures' purposes, although the level of detail and comprehensiveness varied greatly among the procedures. Similar variability was found in the " acceptance criteria", " references",

"proroquisites", " initial conditions", and " restoration" procedure sections.

page 35

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS The licensee had not finalizal a standardized minimum content for the above general procedure sections. For example, precaution sections were frequently minimal, do not even include applicable existing systs precautions appearing in the available ops and SPs. Similarly, initial conditions sections are frequently silent with regard to the TS operating Mode, specific system or plant conditions required or applicable to the test. Few procedures involving systems which will be radiologically contaminated included any relevant precautions.

Although the licensee acknowledged these observations and stated that the review process was expected to correct each of the examples identified, several areas warrant additional licensee attention.

4. 'Ihe inservice test (IST) procedures were at about the same stage of development as the other Operating Department surveillance procedures.

Except where included in SPs, IST implementing procedures and overall program planning were in a very preliminary status.

Additional detailed review of the program and procedures appears needed by the licensee's IST group to assure conformance with the TS and 10CFR50.55a requirements. Because of this need, similar compression in the procedure development, implementation, and baseline data acquisition schedule versus the fuel load schedule will likely occur. For example, the majority of the approved IST procedures were written in 1983 and will likely require review and revision prior to fuel load.

5. NUREG 073. , Clarification of 'IMI Action Plan Requirements, Item I.C.6, stipulated that measures be implemented to ensure that equipment important to safety is subject to independent verification of its restoration to service following testing (and maintenance).

Additionally, return to service (restoration) equipment alignment should be conducted using appropriately detailed instructions.

Licensee comitments in this regard are discussed in Section 15.9.2 of the SER. Station Administrative Procedure ACP-0A-2.12, System Valve Alignment Control, Revision 6, provides general guidance for implmentation of these considerations at all three Millstone units.

Only two of the SPs reviewed (as listed in Appendices 2.1-2.15) had specific provisions for independent verification of specific system restoration aligrments. Again, the rmaining procedures' treatment of this matter was highly variable. For example,, the Recirculation Spray System normal valve lineup (OP3306) was not restored by the applicable steps of SP3306G; the system P&ID reflected yet another

" normal" lineup configuration.

The operations Supervisor orally presented his plans for detailed implementation of these procedure features, indicating that those plans were still under discussion by station management and not yet Page 36

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS promulgated to the staff for implementation. In general, when a procedure disturbs the " normal" system alignment, it will include specific and detailed steps to restore the alignment.

Then, the respective system's SP for TS required valve lineup verification will be immediately performed, constituting the independent verification per NUREG 0737. It was also noted that policies need to be established for situations not suitable to the above verification methods and for docunentation of accomplishnent.

The Operations Supervisor further stated that the provisions, when finalized, would be incorporated in the procedures during the review and approval phase for each procedure.

3.2 Control of Setpoints and Parametric Limits Because the proposed TS were still under development at the time of this review, a number of Limiting Safety System Settings, Limiting conditions for Operation, and Surveillance Requirements were either missing numerical criteria or had just recently had the parameters incorporated. Consequently, many of the SPs and ops reviewed either lacked the corresponding parameters or had out of date parameters incorporated. For example, newly issucd setpoints for the RHR Suction valve /ICS Pressure Interlocks were found to affect as many as six different procedures.

The licensee's plans for incorporation and verification of final TS parameters and verification of procedure accuracy were discussed with the Operations, Maintenance, Startup Engineering, and I&C Department heads. At the time of this inspection, no formalized plans were identified for accomplishnent of this activity.

In some cases, the Plant operations Review Committee commitment control system and/or the AE's Engineering and Design Change Request (E&DCR) system would appear to " trigger" identification of needed procedure parameter backfits. For example, the NSSS Assistant Startup tunager demonstrated that potential impacts upon the preoperational and-startup test programs would be identified by the E&DCR system.

Similar examples of formal and informal feedback loops were discussed with each department.

However, these discussions also indicated that a rather massive procedure effort would be necessary to ensure that correct parametric information was backfit and/or verified in both issued and draf t procedures prior to their implementation. Although administrative controls already exist in several areas to identify parameter changes, the existing programs do not appear to provide overall assurance that TS implementing procedure parameters will totally accurate. This Page 37

3 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS conclusion was acknowledged by the licensee representatives during the discussions.

Additionally, some inconsistency was found in the documents which the respective departInents viewed as " baseline" setpoint or parametric information. In some cases, the NSSS vendor's " Precautions, Limitations, a t Setpoints" Document and the AE's Master Setpoint List were identified as the baseline controlled documents while in other cases, the licensee's Loop Calibration Reports or similar documents were in use. In each case, a measurable revision lag time can affect the currency of the docunents with respect to the license requiranents and " actual" implenented data.

Page 38 I-

Millstone Unit 3 Inspection Plan Page 1 APPROIX 1 MILLSTONE UNIT 3 - INSPBCTION PUW VERIFICATI(Di 0F AS-BUILT COBOITIOBIS 10 TfDMICAL SPECIFICATI0bE AIO FSAR/SER OBJBCTIVES:

Conduct, on a sampling basis, reviews and inspections of as-built safety related systems, structures, and components in order to:

determine whether the Technical Specifications and FSAR/SER are compatibile with the Millstone Unit 3 as-built plant, and to determine whether 'Ibchnical Specification requirements are definitively measurable.

General Scope Selection of the inspection sample of systems, structures and components will be based, in part, on the safety sensitivities identified by the licensee's Probabilistic Safety Study (PSS) .

The facility descriptions, operating characteristics, and related information found in the FSAR, SER and the proposed Technical Specifications (TS) will be compared to corresponding licensee drawings, procedures, and actual plant hardware to establish whether the as-built configuration of the systems, structures and components is compatible with the safety analyses and proposed (TS) .

Concurrent with the above, the TS will be evaluated to confirm that the performance criteria and requiranents established by the TS can be definitively measured or determined, i.e. that the means and methods to establish conformance with the TS requirements are responsive, sensitive, and sufficiently definitive to actually establish the requiral level of conformance.

Particular anphasis will be given to the efficacy of surveillance tests and inservice tests established by the licensee to demonstrate conformance with TS and the requirements of ASME Bt.PV Section XI and 10CFR50.55a.

l .

l Millstone Unit 3 l Inspection Plan l Page 2 In general, the systems, structures, and components to be reviewed will include a sample of the following:

P. Farren

~ Containment & Support Systems #

Purge & Exhaust Hydrogen Removal Post Accident Sa pling/ Monitoring Contairinent Isolation Contairunent Quench & Recirculation Spray i Recirculation Spray Raw (Service Water)

• Auxiliary Peedwateri AEW Ptmp/ Turbine Accessories & Cooling Systems

• D. mm,4mmni IIfgh Pressure Safety Injection & CVCS 4 Low Pressure Safety Injection Residual Heat Renoval i Bnergency Doration (Redundant Reactivity Control) #

Steam Generator Atmospheric Steam Dumps Main Steam Isolation Valves R. Oooney Wtal AC Power (4160/480/120 VAC) #

Bnergency Diesel Generators i Vital DC Power i General I&C

1. Note: Items to be given priority

• Note: Itcms added by PRA Team Specialist Review Inspection Itass Doctanents:

Technica1 Specifications Final Safety Analysis Report Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements Surveillance / Test Procedures Ireoperational Test Procedures Inservice Test Procedures Normal, Abnormal and Bnergency Operating Procedures reocess & Instrtsnentation Diagrams Elanentary, Iojic, and Imp Drawirns l Fabrication and Installation Drawings Equipment 1w:hnical Manuals Inspection Tasks:

1. Identify the TS applicable to the subject systems and select a sample of requirements (Limiting conditions for Operation,

M111ctone Unit 3 Inspection Plan Page 3 Surveillance Requirements, etc.) for inspection. Review the corresponding sections of the FSAR arti SER.

2. Obtain applicable as built (or Approved for Construction) P& ids, Elmentary Diagrams, Loop and IAJ i c Diagrams, etc. for the subject systms. Select areas of inspection by identifying (red lining) portions of each drawing. Develop a listing of specific equipnent itens within the systen area which are subject to the TSs.

3. Verify for selectal portions of each systan that:

1) the proposed TS adequately reflect the system configuration depictal by the drawings,

2) the drawings match the information provided in the FSAR and SER, and

3) the proposed TS are consistent with the FSAR cornnitments and SER conclusions.

Confirm that the systen configuration and equipment will support definitivo measuronent or determination of conformance with TS performanco critoria an] requiranents

4. Develop a checklist of itens for field verification during system an] proceduto walkdowns.

5. Identify and obtain the opera ting, surveillanco and other pertinent licensco procedures appilcable to the system areas and TS being reviewed. Working froni the drawings and TSs to the procedures, confinn that:

1) the procedure (s) adequately address the selectal equipnent anl TS requironents identifiol in the FSAR anl SER1,

2) proceduros accurately reflect the installed (as-built) hardware configuration and coalition, and

3) the test and or operating methods meet the TS or FSAR/SER requirements, commitments and analyson (review actual performance data whero practical) .

6. Includo procedure field verification itms in checklint for syston and proceduto walkdowns.

7. Conduct an in plant walkdown of subject systems to verify tho results of the docunont review; confirm that

1) the as built hardware configuration matches the information obtainal fran the docunent review,

2) the installed hardware in adequately addronned in tho

Millctone Unit 3 In pection Plan Pago 4 procedures an] TS,

3) the licensco's test and operating methods are appropriato to the actual equipnent, ani

4) the equipment configuration and features provido for definitivo determination or measurement of conformance with the TS.

8. Review the licensee's program for correlating TS requirements to procedures arti procedure revision neals, design chawjo impact upon TS and TS implementing proceduros, planning and scheduling of surveillar testing, etc.

Technical krview ingott (httlino Cover Sheet Table of Contents Executivo Sumnary Introduction Purpose of Inspection luckgrours! and General Sco[w General Evaluation Criteria General Evaluation Mithods Evaluation - Dy Systun for Each Systan lloview!

Scopo E, Evaluation Critoria Itoforences (Listal in Aptwndices)

Discussion Firklings aryl Obnorvations Conclusiona 02noral Conclusions Appmlicem Licensco Purnonnul Contactol Documents Itoviewal (!!y Systun)

Data Shoots Page 1

) APFW DIX 2.1 f

! IISPE:TIGI IMOWF DAffA SEh?

i OBflRIIDM IIIDEATICII AGE SJF90IEF SYSTWW '.

a t

}

I l SYSTDt/BQUIPMENT: CORTAIlmfNT ISOLATION SYSTEN  !

j- CONTAIPMEKr PURGE AND EXHAUST l TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

I 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT IS0tATION SYSTEM -

! COMTAIINENT ISOCATION VALVES ,

3/4.6.1 CONTAltNENT IMrEGRITY

3/4/9.9 CONTAINMERP PURCE & EXHAUST '

l IS0tATION SYSTEN

', 3/4.6.5.2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS - MirilANICAL VACUUM PUMPS 1 3/4.6.5.1 CONTAINMENT SYSTINS - STEAM JET l STEAM JET AIR EJ10CTOR J

FINE SAETTY ANALYSIS R}7ERENCES g Section No.):

i j 6.2, 7.3.1, 9.4.7, 15 i j

j NHC SAFETY INALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

i 6.2.4, 6.2.1 l

~PROCEDURES Alm DRAWINGS RfNIPMED:

t NrJrEt All drawing ntabers are prefixal by "12179 "

l All " letter" revisions irxlicato draf t doctments i

DOCUMEMP TITLE REVISION SP-36128.1 00MrAINMENT tdANUE ISOfATION VALVI:S (0.S. COMPAltNENT) A 1

SP-36120.1 CONTA!!NfNT MANUE ISOLATION VALVES (I.S. COMrA!) MINT) A l SP-3447A01 CONTAINMtNT !!! 1,2,3 CAL. O IN-153A CONTAIMNr STRUC'lVRE VtNr!!ATION 2 ,

j SP3613.F1 COtrAINMENT WIG f. SUPPLY EXilAUltr ISOfATION VALVE sum /E!LtANCE A i SP3613.F2 CONTAINMENT PUlG AIR ISOLATION VEVE OPERAHILITY TEST A SP3613.F4 CONTA!!NENT PURGE SYSTtN VAfNE >

OPERAHILITY TFET A  ;

3313EP CONTAINMtWP PURCE AIR SYSTr>l I'REOP.  !

ERATIONE Tr#r 0 ESK-70F CONTA!!NPNP PUlG & EXilAU!Pr DAMPER E!JNtNTARY DIAGRAM 4 l

j ESK-6BA CottrAINMDff AIR RfCIRCUfATION ,

FAN ELfNtNFARY DIAGRAM 7  !

ESK-6AV COWTA! M Nr SHHOUD FAN 11PNtNTARY  !

DIAGRAM 6 t I

f

Data Sheets Page 2 1 APPlacIX 2.2 i i

IIEPETION REFOIt? DATA SMRT 1RJPFLWWRARY LEAK nnrmyg(3g Agg) RgLEASE SYSI'Et 4

i

, SYSTEM /EQUIPMFRFt SUPPLEMENTARY LFAK COLLBCTION NO RELEASE SYSTEM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

1 3/4.6.6.1 CONTAINMINT SYSTEMS - VENTILATION j SYSTEM A i j FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES g Section No.)

6.2.3, 7.3.1.1.5 1.

]

s NHC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

j 6.5.1. (4)

PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEM D NUTE: All drawinry numbers are pretixed by "12179 "

l l DOCUMENT TITLE RLYISION IM-148E P&ID RF)CTOR PLAMP VENTIIATION A

!' T-3314-IP SIfRS PilASE II TESTING 0 SP-36141.1 SIfRS OPERABILITY TEST A

{ SP-3614I.8 SIERS NEXMTIVE PRESSURE VERIFICATION DRAFT SP-3712F SIfRS FILTER ASSDELY IrrH j SURVEIILANCE TESTING A SP-3449001 SIERS RADIATION MONI'IOR CALIBRATION DRAE'r

[SK-221T SIERS BYPASS INDICATION 4 i

I i  !

2 i

r 2

l

Data Sheets Page 3 APRBDIX 2.3 IIEPBCTICII REI M T DATA SIEEET QBNRIN Hvtlanne RingynL SYstet SYSTDVEQUIPMENT: CONTAIPMENT HYDROGEN REMOVAL SYSTEM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.6.1 CONTAI!NENT INTEGRITY 3/4.6.2 CONTAIPNENT RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM FINAL SAFE.TY ANALYSIS REFERENCES 1By Section No.):

6.2.5 NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.) :

6.2.5 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEMED:

tKyrE: All drawirg nebers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMENT TITLE REVISION SP-3613A.3 HYDR RDCOMBINER VALVE OPERABILITY TEST A SP-3712E liYDR REXXNBINER IfEATER SURVEILLANCE TESTING A 4 T-3313-AP HYDR RECOPBINER/MONIER & IlYDR RDC0131NER BIDG. VENTILATION SYSTEMS 0 OP-3313A HYDR RECOPUINER, ilYDR MONIMRS &

RECOPUINER BLDG. VENTILATION O IM-115A P&ID QUENCil SPRAY & ilYDR RDCOPEINER 2B LSK-13A DBA !!YDR RECOMBINER SYSTEM IDGIC 4 ISK-13B ' DBA HYDR RECOMBINER SYSTEM LOGIC 4 LSK-13C DBA ilYDR RECOMBINER SYSTEM IDGIC 4 i

LSK-13D DBA liYDR RECOPUINER SYSTEM IDGIC 4 l LSK-13E DBA IlYDR RECOPOINER SYSTEM IDGIC 4 l ESK-7XQ liYDR INLETT AIR & EX. DPR. MOD 20A/21A 2 ESK-7XR flYDR INLET AIR & EX. DPR. MOD 200/21B 2 ESK-7XS IlYDR INLET & O(ITLET DPR. MOD 23A/23B 1 ESK-7XT IfYDR EXilAUST FAN FN-1 1 6

Data Sheets Page 4 APPERDIX 2.4 IblSPECTIObi REPORT DATA SHElfr 00BrFAIIDEBrf QUEIDI SPRAY SYSTIM SYSTm/ EQUIPMENT: CONTAINMENT QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM TEGINICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.6.1 CONTAINMENT QUENQI SPRAY SYSTEM -

CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFE?rY FEATURE ACTUATION SYST m INSTRUMENTATION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES g Section No.):

6.2.2.4.1, 15.6.5, 7.3.1 NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

6.2.2 PROCEURES AND DRAWINGS REVIE4ED:

NOTE: All drawing ntrnbers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMEMP TITLE REVISION m-ll5A P&ID QUEN01 SPRAY & HYDR RECOPEINER 2B 73309-P001 QUEN01 SPRAY SYSTEM 0 ESK-5DG QUEN01 SPRAY PUMP P3A 8 ESK-6LS QUENCH SPRAY HDR ISOL VALVE MOV34A 4 OP-3309

• QUEN01 SPRAY OPE 3ATING PROCEDURE O OPS EURM'3309-1 QUENOi SPRAY VALVE LINEUP 0 OPS FORM 3309-2 QUENQi SPRAY VALVE LINEUP (TRAIN A) 0

+

OPS FORM 3309-3 QUENO{ SPRAY VALVE LINEUP (TRAIN B) 0 OPS FORM 3309-4 QUENQi SPRAY ELECTRICAL LINEUP 0 SP-3609.3 CONTAINMENT QUEN01 SPRAY TRAIN A VALVE LINEUP SURV. A SP-3609.1 QUENO{ SPRAY PUMP A OPERATIONAL READINESS TEST B ESK-7TP ESF AUX. RELAY TRAIN A 4 ESK-6tC REFUEL WrR CFIN. ADD TK DIESEL VLV MOV29A 4 ESK-7AM REFUEL WIR RECIRCULATION PR. SUCT.

ISOL W AOV27,28 4 ACP-QA-2.12 SYSTm VALVE ALIGMENT CONTROL 6

l o

Data Sheets Page 5 APPERDIX 2.5 IDEiPBCTIObi REPORT DATA SHEET ODIFIRISMENF RICIICUEATIObi SYSTIM SYSTE4/ EQUIPMENT: CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM

'TEQiNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3.6.2.2. CONTAINMENT R E IRCULATION SYSTEM.-

CONTAltNENT RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM

, FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES g Section No.):

- s 6.2.2.2, 7.3.1, 9.2.1, 10.5 NRC _ SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

1 4

6.2.2

, PROCEDURES A?O DRAWINGS REVIEWED:

NorE: All drawirg ntrnbers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMENP TITLE REVISION W il2A/B/C LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION 1 EM-133A SERVICE WATER & OIEMICAL FLOOD -

CHIDRINATION 2

EM-133B ,, SERVICE WATER & OiEMICAL FID00 -

OfIDRINATION 2 T3306-P CIMP RECIRCULATION SPRAY l 1, '

ESK-6IJi CIMP RECIRCULATION PMP SUCT. ISOL V MOV 23 A 4 f ESX-6ID CIMP RECIRC. WrR SPRAY liOR. ISOL 3

V 20A 5

'dP-3606.1 CIMP RECIRCULATION PUM 3RSS PIA l

OPERATION READINESS TEST C SP-3606.7 CIMr REIRCULATION RESPONSE TEST A SP-3606.5 C.Mr RECIRCULATION SPRAY SYSTEM TRAIN A MONIHLY VALVE LINEUP OiECK A W il5A QUENCH SPRAY & HYDR RECOMBINER 2

, ESK-77P ESF AUX. RELAYS (TRAIN A) 4 SP-3606.8 RECIRCULATION SPRAY VALVE OPERABILITY A

, ESK-SQi CNIMP RECIRCULATION PUMP 1A B

. ESK-27-11A FIDW DIAGRAM 00NTAINMEMP RECIRCULATION 9 i ,

i r

,i

Data Sheets Page 6 APPIM)IX 2.6 IBEEPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET t AUXILIARY FEEDNhTER SYSTEM i

SYSTEM /IX)UIPMENT: AUXILIARY FEECWATER SYSTEM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS, REFERENCES g Section No.) :

10.4.9.1, 7.1.1, l$.2 NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

10.4.9 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEWED:

NOTE: All drawing nunbers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMENT TITLE REVISION EOP-35E-2 FAULTED STEAM GZNERATOR ISOLATION O EOP-35E-1 IDSS OF REACIOR OR SICONDARY COOIAvr 0 EOP-35E-0 REACIOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 0 EM-130B FEEDWATER SYSTEM 2 EN-130A FEEDWATER SYSTENS 2 FSK-6-2A AUXILIARY FEEDWATER & RECIRCULATION- 13 FSK-6-2B AUXILIARY FEEDWATER & RECIRCULATION 11 EM-123A MAIN STEAM 1B FSK-3-1 MAIN STEAM 9 FSK-3-1A MAIN STEAM 14 T-3322-Pt- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM 02 PREOP. O SP-3622M AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM LINEUP OPERABILITY TEST .

A SP-3622.5 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP OPERABILITY START . a A SP-3622.1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP PlA OPERABILITY READINESS TEST B SP-3622.3 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP P2 '

OPERABILITY READINESS TEST B SP-3622.6 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FIDWPATH VERIF. A ESK-5DX STEAM GENERATOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP MOIOR DRIVEN PlA 12 SP-3444D01 AUXILIARY F10 FLOW-INDICATORS (15C) 0 4-SP-3450B01 TDAF RAD. MONITOR DET. CALIBRATION 0

• ESK-GW V 9 . AEW 'IURB. STEAM SUPPLY NON-RETURN ,

, VALVE MOV 17A 5 ESK-7XA AEW PUMP CONTROL VALVES 3 i' , y

O Data Sheets Page 7 APPERE)IX 2.7 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET AC 10WER SOUICES SYSTEM /EQUIPMEt#: AC POWER SOURCES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.8.1 ELECTRICAL POWER - AC SOURCES 3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFEfY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMEtEATION

FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES _(By, Section No.) :

8.3.1.1.3; 9.5.4; 9.5.5; 9.5.6; 9.5.7; 9.5.8, 8.3.1.1.4 (3C)

NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

8.3.1.7; 8.3.1.8; 8.3.1.9; 8.3.1.10; 8.3.1.11; 8.3.1.12; 8.3.1.13; 8.3.1.14; 9.5.4.2; 9.5.5; 9.5.6; 9.5.7; 9.5.8 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEWED:

NOTE: All drawirg ntznbers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMENT TITLE REVISION SP-3646A EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN. OPERABILITY TEST A SP-3646AD EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN. INDEPENDENCE TEST A SP-3646B.5 EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN. FUEL OIL STRG TANK DEWATERING & SAMPLE ANALYSIS OP-3346A EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 1 OP-3346B DIESEL FUEL OIL 0 ESK-70 DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER AUX. CKT.

ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM 7 ESK-8KD EMERGENCY GEN. A STOP CKT. ELEMEtRARY DIAGRAM 6 ESK-8JF ENERGENCY GEN. A SHUTDOWN CKT.

ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM _

3 ESK-7TP EMERGENCY GEN. A AUX. RELAY ELEMFNTARY DIAGRAM 6 EE-lK 4.16 KV ONE LINE DIAGRAM BUS. 34C (TRAIN A) 12 EE-lL 4.16 KV ONE LINE DIAGRAM BUS. 34C (TRAIN A) 9 i

l'

Data Sheets Page 8 APPERDIX 2.8 IIEPECTION REPOkT DATA SHEET D.C. POWER SOURCES SYSTEWEQUIPMENT: D.C. POWER SOURCES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.8.2 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS -

D.C. SOURCES FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES g Section No.):

8.3.2.1.2.2; 8.3.2.1.2.3 NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES & Section No.):

8.3.2 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEWED:

NOTE: All drawing nunbers.are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMENT TITLE REVISION SP-3712N STATION BATTERY SURVEILLANCE TESTING A EE-1BA ONE LINE DIAGRAM 125 VDL & 120V AC 10 DISTR. SYSTEM COMPOSITE E ,

. , . - - n - -- r - w

Data Sheets

, Page 9 APPEleIX 2.9 IMSPHCTION REPORT DATA SHEET ONSITE POWER DISTRIBlfflON SYSTDVEQUIPMENT: ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.8.3 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS -

ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION 3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS -

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES g Section No.):

8.3.1.1.2; 8.3.1.2; 8.3.2.1.2; 8.3.2.2, 8.3.1.1.4 (TABLE 8.3.3)

NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

8.3.2.1; 8.3.2.2; 8.3.2.3, 8.3.3.6.1, 8.3.3.6.2, 8.3.3.6.3, 8.3.3.6.4, 8.3.3.6.5, 8.3.3.6.6 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEWED:

NOTE: All drawirg nunbers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMENT TITLE o REVISION OP-3343 STATION ELECTRICAL SERVICE (4KV) 1 OP-3344A 480-VOLT LOAD CENTERS 1 OP-3344B 480-VOLT MOIOR CONTROL CENTERS 1 OP-3345B 120-VOLT VITAL INST. AC 0 OP-3345C 125-VOLT DC A 3345BP-001 120-VOLT AC CHANNEL A 3-lHT-3000 (AP 3024) ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION DRAET EE-lK 4.16 KV. ONE LINE DIAGRAM BUS 34C 12 EE-IL 4.16 KV. ONE LINE DIAGRAM BUS 34C 9 EE-IN 480-VOLT ONE LINE DIAGRAM (BUS 32R&W) 6 EE-APA 125-VOLT DC & 120-VOLT AC ONE LINE DIAGRAM (X)MPOSITE 10 EE-1A MAIN ONE LINE/ PHASING DIAGRAM 7 POWER DIST. COMPOSITE E"K-6LH CONTAI! MENT RECIRCULATION PP. SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM VALVE 3RSS*MOV23A 5" ESK-LEK 480-VOLT ONE LINE DIAGRAM 3EJS*US-4A

& US-4B 2 SP3712T CONTAINMENT. PENETPATION OVERCURRENT A DEVICE SURVEILLAPCE TEST LSK-24-3C,D RESERVE STATION SERVICE BREAKER 6 H,L, -

CONTROL II)GIC DIAGRAM LSK-24-4A,B MEDIUM VOLTAGE SERVICE BUS TIE 6 BREAKER CONTROL ESK-5BD,BF;7J 4KV BREAKER ELEMENTARY- DIAGRAMS VARIOUS

O Data Sheets Page 10 APPROIX 2.10 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET SAFETY IETICFION SYSTBE

- SYSTEM / EQUIPMENT: SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEMS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.5.1 BORATION SYSTEMS FfLW PATH - SilUTDOWN 3/4.5.2 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTENS

- ECCS SUBSYSTEMS T-avg >350F 3/4.5.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTENS

- ECCS SUBSYSTEMS T-avg <350F 3/4.5.4 ENERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTENS -

REFUELING NATER SIORAGE TANK 3/4.4.1.4.1 REACIOR COOLANT SYSTEMS - REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION 3/4.4.1.4.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTENS - SAFETY VALVES 3/4.4.1.3 REACIOR COOLANT SYSTEMS - PRESSURIZER FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES g Section No.):

6.3 (ENTIRE) , 5.4.7,15.0 (ENTIRE)

NRC SAFE 7tY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

6.3 (ENTIRE) , 5.4.7 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEWED:

N0frE: All drawirg ntrnbers a;e prefixed by'"12179 "

DOCUMENT TITLE REVISION EM-ll3SH1-2 P&ID, HIGI PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION 1 EM-ll2SH1-3 P&ID, ILW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION 1 3307BlIO2 RHS INSTRUMENTATION TEST 0 33081E02 HPSI PUMP P3 TEST 0

.3307 BlE03 RHS PUMP PlA,B TEST 0 3306P RECIRCULATION SYSTEM TEST 0 3307AP001 LPSI TEST 0 3307AP003 SI ACCUMULATOR TEST 0 3307AP002 RHS TEST 0 3308P001 HPSI FIDW BALANCE TEST 0 3308P002 HPSI SYSTEM TEST 0

.SP3608A/B SI PUMP OPERATIONAL READINESS TEST 0 SP3610A/B RHR PUMP OPERATIONAL READINESS TEST 0 LSK-27-2A-D HPSI IDGIC DIAGRAMS VARIOUS ISK-27-3A-H LPSI LOGIC DIAGRAMS VARIOUS LSK-27-7G-J 'RHR LOGIC DIAGRAMS VARIOUS LSK-27-llA-H CNIMP RECIRCULATION LOGIC DIAGRAMS VARIOUS LSK-27-2E-L HPSI LOGIC DIAGRAMS VARIOUS ESK-6?W CHS/RCS COLD -LEG ISOL VLV ELEMENTARY . 6 ESK-6MN HPSI MINI-FIDW BYPASS ELEMENTARY 5 l

i

Data Sheets Page 11 ESK-6MF WST-SIP ISOLATION EL M ENTARY 5 ESK-6MX RWST-RHR ISOLATION ELEMENTARY 7 ESK-6MZ RHR-COID LEG ISOLATION EL MENTARY 8 SP3852 ISOLATED IDOP BORON CONCENTRATION DETEIMINATION DRAPP SP3859 RWST BORON CONCENTRATION DRAPP SP3610.A4 RHR IDOP OPERATIONAL VERIFICATION DRAFT SP3610.A3 RHR SYSTEM VENT AND LINEUP DRAFT SP3610.Bl SI ACCUMULATOR ISOLN VALVE DISABLES DRAFT SP3610.B2 LPSI VALVE OPERABILITY TEST DRAFT SP3608.5 SIH PUMP FLOW BALANCE DRAPP SP3608.1 SI PUMP OPERATIONAL READINESS 0 SP3608.3 DJCS SUBSUSTm THROTTLE VALVE SETTING VERIFICATION DRAFT SP3610.A5 RHR PUMP LOGIC W/RWST LEVEL TEST DRAPP SP3610.A6 RHR PUMP INJEI' TION FIDW VERIFICATION DRAPT SP3610.A7 RHR "A" TRAIN VALVE OPERABILITY TEST DRAPT SP3604.C3 BORATED WATER SOURCE FIDW PATH OPERABILITY DRAFT SP3604.C2 BORATED WATER SOURCE FLOW PATH VERIFICATION DRAPP MP3712D RHR SUCTION RELIEVE VALVE SURVEILLANCE TESTING DRAPT DOP3505 IDSS OF SIRTfDOhW COOLING (RHR) 0 EOP3504 COOLDOWN OLTTSIDE CONTROL ROOM 0 EOP3503 PLANT SHUTDOWN OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM 0 OP33104 RHR SYSTEM 0 OP3208 PLANT 000LDOWN 0

Data Sheets Page 12 APPERE)IX 2.11 DEiPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET OEMICAL AIO VOLIME C0tmIOL SYSTM SYSTEM / EQUIPMENT: CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM TTHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.1.2.1 BORATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATH - SHUTD0hH 3/4.1.2.2 BORATION SYST ES FLOW PATH - OPERATING 3/4/1.2.3 CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN 3/4.1.2.4 CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING 3/4.1.2.5 BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN 3/4.1.2.6 BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING 3/4.1.1.1 BORATION CONTROL - SHUTDOWN MARGIN, T-avg <200 F.

3/4.1.1.2 SHIrrDOWN MARGIN - Tavg - >200 F.

3/4.1.3.6 ROD INSERTION LIMITS 3/4.3.2 ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES g Section No.):

4.6, 9.3.4, 9.3.5, 15.1, 15.4 NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

4.6, 9.3.4, 9.3.5, 15.1 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEWED:

NOTE: All drawing numbers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMENT TITLE REVISION EM-ll3A-B HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION P&ID 1 E ll2A-C P&ID, IDW PRESSURE SAFETY INJETION 1 N 104A-D CVCS P&ID 2 FSK-26-2 CVCS FTEW DIAGRAM VARIOUS 3304AP001 CHARGING LETDOWN AND PURIFICATION O PREOPERATIONAL TEST 3304P002 CHARGING PUMP FIOW BALANCE TEST 0 3304CP- BORIC ACID SYSTEM TEST 0 3304 AIM 002 CHARGING PUMP FLOW TEST 0 SP3604A/B/C CHARGING PUMP OPER'L READINESS TEST 0 SP3604F CVCS VALVE OPERABILITY TEST 0 SP3604D/E BORIC ACID PUMP OPER'L READINESS 0 LSK-26-2.2D VOLUME CONTROL TANK LOGIC DIAGRAM 1 LSK-26-2.5A-G RX MAKEKUP ADN BA BLENDER LOGIC DIAGR VARIOUS SP-3CHS*7 3CHS*LT102, -104 SETPOINT CAff'N. 1 LSK-26-2.3A OIARGING PUMPS IOGIC DIAGRAM VARIOUS

~

Data Sheets

, Page 13 i ESK-7LW VOLUME CONTROL TANK ISOLATION AND VARIOUS DIVERT ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM

, ESK-7CT BORIC ACID INJECT A E MU ELEM. DIAGR 4 SP3604C.2 BORATED WATER SOURCE FLOW PATH VALVE DRAFT LINEUP VERIFICATION SP3604C.3 BORATED WATER SOURCE ETAW PATH DRAFT OPERABILITY TEST AOP3566 ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCOEDURE - 0 I!HEDIATE BORATION OP3201 PLANT HEAT UP OPERATIONS 0 OP3203 PLANT STARTUP OPERATIONS 0 OP3208 PLANP COOLDOWN OPERATIONS 0 j

a i

i i

+

I L

?

I x

i

- - a ,4- . - - - , - .---nr s , n ,

Data Sheets Page 14 APPDOIX 2.12 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET MAIN STEAM IS0[ATION VALVES AIO STEAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES SYSTEM / EQUIPMENT: MAIN STFAM ISOLATION VALVES AND STFAM GENERATOR ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.7.1.5 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS - MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES 3/4.3.2 POWER DISTRIBITTION LIMITS - ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES g Section No.) :

10.3, 15.1.5, 3.84, 7.3 NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

10.3, 15.1.5, 15.6.4 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEWED:

NCfrE: All drawirg numbers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMENT TITLE REVISION EM-123SHl P&ID, MAIN STEAM & REHEAT 1/2 3316AP001 MAIN STEAM PREOPERATIONAL TEST 0 LSK-3-1.2A-E MSIV LOGIC DIAGRAM VARIOUS LOOP 27 D MSIV [DOP DIAGRAM VARIOUS LOOP 20 SG AIMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES VARIOUS SP3616A.1 MSIV AND SG ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE OPERABILITY TESTS DRAPr 3 MSS-020A [OOP CALIBR REPORT MS PRV 1 3 MSS-77A LOOP CALIBR REPORT MSW l ESK-7UW MSIV ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM 4 ESK-7UX MSIV ELDiENTARY DIAGRAM 4 ESK-7UV MSIV ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM 4 ESK-7UZ MSIV ELDiENTARY DIAGRAM 4 1

l l.

r  ;

Data Sheets l Page 15 I APPEROIX 2.13 INSPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET PRESSURIZER P(MER OPERATED RELIEF ABD BIDCK VALVES SYSTEM / EQUIPMENT: PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF AND BLOCK VALVES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.4.4 REAC'IOR COOLANT SYSTEM - RELIEF VALVES FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES _(By Section No.) :

1 5.2, 5.4, 7.7, 15.5 NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

5.2.2, 5.4.11, 15.9.7, 15.9.8 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEWED: '

NOTE: All drawing ntebers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMDff TITLE REVISION EM-102A-C REACTOR COOLANT SYSTDi P&ID VARIOUS 330lP002 BCS PREOPERATIONAL TEST 0 LSK-25-1.2A-H PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL LOGIC VARIOUS IDOP 456 PRESSURIZER PORV IDOP DIAGRAM 7 SP2601.Gl PORV ISOLATION VALVE OPERABILITY DRAFT LRC-3RCS*455A-C LOOP CALIBRATION REPORT - PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL 1 EM-3442-501 BCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE CALIBRATION O LRC-3RCS*463 PORV PIPING TDiPERA'IURE LOOP CALIBRATION REPORT 1 3301E05 PORV BIOCK VALVE PREOP TEST 0 i

1 e

i L

a -

Data Sheets Page 16 APPm0IX 2.14 INSPECFION REPORT DATA SHEET SERVICE MkTER SYSTIDE SYSTEM / EQUIPMENT: SERVICE WATER SYSTEM TIEHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES g Section No.):

9.2.1, 9.2.5,10.4.5, 2.4.11.5 & 6 (OHS LEVEL)

NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.):

9.2.1, 2.4.11.2 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEWED:

NorE: All drawirg ntInbers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMENT TITLE REVISION EM-133A SERVICE WATER & CHEMICAL FEED CHIDRINATION 2 EM-133B SERVICE WATER & CHEMICAL FEED CHIDRINATION 2 OP-3326 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 0 OPSFORM 3326-16 SWS (A CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION SUPPLY) 0 OPSFORM 3326-1 SWS (TRAIN A) 0 T-3326P SWS PREOPERATIONAL 0 3326/3328 SWS TRAINING MANUAL 0 SP-3626J A SERVICE WATER TRAIN VLV. LINEUP CK. O SP-3626.4 A SERVICE WATER PUMP OPERATIONAL READINESS TEST DRAPI B ESK-5CJ SERVICE WATER PUMP PlA 12 ESK-6AAV SERVICE WATER PUMP DIESEL VALVE ESK-6AAA CONTAINMENT RE. (SW) OUTLET VALVE MOV 57A 5 ESK-6AAF CONTAINMENT RE. (SW) OUTIEP VALVE 6 L

o =< '

Data Sheets Page 17 APPEWIX 2.15 I MPECTION REPORT DATA SHEET REM 0rE SWTDOW ARO MIIDENT MONI'IDRING IETRMENTATION SYSTEM / EQUIPMENT: ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION REMOTE SHlTIDOWN INSTRUMENTATION TIIHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:

3/4.3.3.6 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMDirATION 3/4.3.3.5 *RDDIE SHUTDOWN INSTRLNENTATION

• NOTE: REVIEW LIMITED TO RCS W.R. PRESSURE CHANNEL ONLY FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REFERENCES g Section No.):

7.5, 7.4, TABLE 7.4.1 NRC SAFM'Y EVALUATION REPORT REFERENCES g Section No.) :

7.5.2.4, 7.4.2.3 PROCEDURES AND DRAWINGS REVIEWED:

NOTE: All drawing ntunbers are prefixed by "12179 "

DOCUMENT TITLE REVISION SP-3442-501 RCS WIDE RANGE PRESSURE CALIBRATION 0 ESK-4BA AUXILIARY SHUIDOWN PANEL ELEMDfrARY 6 SHEETS 3 THRU 9 L

APPEtoIX 3_

REVIEW OF MILISIONE UNIT 3 TIDINICAL SPEEIFICATIONS LICENSEE PERS0tMEL CONTACTED DURING INSPECTION The inspection team met and held discussions with and inspected plant systems with numerous licensee personnel. Listed below are the licensee contacts who materially participated in the inspection and entrance or exit meetings.

NAME TITLE M. Brown I&C Supevisor P. Brown Startup Engineer K. Burton Operations Supervisor J. Chunis Startup Engineer C. Clonent Maintenance Supervisor J. Crockett Unit 3 Superintendent J. Dimarzo Startup Engineer E. Fries Startup Engineer C. Goldberg SWEC Construction Engineer K. Gray Staff Asst. - CQA R. Grebasch Startup Engineer

, R. Kozler Startup Engineer T. Kulterman Operations Erv31 neer J. Langan Startup Enginer R. Infebsre Project Staff Engineer D. McDaniels Operations Supervisor F. Michaels Startup Ery3 1neer D. Miller Startup Manager L. Nadeua Asst. Project Engineer B. Nichols Startup Engineer S. Orefice Nuclear Project EryJi neer B. Pinkowitz Startup Engineer R. Rothgeb Staff Engineer S. Savage I&C Technician D. Scase Startup Engineer A. Stengel Startup Engineer S. Sudigala NSS Asst. Startup R1 nager W. Terry Senior Engineer