ML20134F442
| ML20134F442 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1996 |
| From: | Harry Freeman, Gage P, Gody A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129G138 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-96-11, 50-446-96-11, NUDOCS 9611050257 | |
| Download: ML20134F442 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000445/1996011
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION !
REGION IV .
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Docket Nos.: 50-445;50-446
License Nos.: NPF-87; NPF-89 ,
Report No.: 6445/96-11;50-446h
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Licensee: TU Electric (
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Facility: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 )
Location: FM-56, Glen Rose, Texas
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Dates: {Igust 18 through September 28,199p
inspectors: A. T. Gody, Senior Resident inspector
H. A. Freeman, Resident inspector
P. C. Gage, Reactor inspector
Approved By: J. l. Tapia, Chief, Project Branch A
Division of Reactor Projects !
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9611050257 961023
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1 Comanchs Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2
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NRC Inspection Report 50-445/96-11:50-446/96-11
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This resident inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maint
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and plant support { The report covers a 6-week period of residentT6TpEction.
Operations
- Operations response to transients continued to be characterized by strong command
and control and effective three-way communications (Section 01.1).
- Licensed operators were knowledgeable of degraded system conditions, potential
consequences, and the appropriate responses (Section 02.1). 1
- Initial disposition of the operations notification and evaluation for a danger-tagged
valve found out of position was inappropriate and would not have resulted in a root-
cause analysis (Section M1.1).
- Appropriate pre-evolution briefings and good communications and self-verification
techniques characterized the performance of two slave relay tests conducted by
operators (Sections M4.2 and M4.3).
Maintenance
- The inspector identified that a danger-tagged valve found out of position for main
feedwater pump maintenance was a violation of Station Administrative
Procedure STA-605," Clearance and Safety Tagging," (Section M1.1).
- Lack of attention to details and poor self verification techniques led to a number of
maintenance performance observations which included: the incorrect measurement
of a safety-related pilot cell voltage and personnel safety weaknesses
(Section M1.2).
- The method for transferring control of diver lines during an inspection of the service
water intake bay was not thoroughly reviewed nor evaluated and led to their
entanglement in Service Water Pump 1-01. The inspector determined that there
was . sufficient line to become entangled in both Unit 1 pumps (Section M1.3).
- The licensee's decision to suspend all diving activities until the resolution of the
entangled service. water pump plant incident was conservative (Section M1.3).
- A lack of attention to detail was evident in work order packcges. Several steps had
been performed in two work order procedures without the steps being signed.
While not a violation of procedures, this practice did not meet licensee
management's expectations (Sections M1.1 and M3.2).
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- Instrument and control surveillances were characterized by excellent
communications and good procedures adherence (Section M4.1).
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- * A maintenance preventable functional f ailure of a centrifugal charging pump lube oil
l pump coupling led to a conservative decision to inspect another pump's coupling
(Section M7).
Enoineerina
- Appropriate involvement of both engineers and technicians was noted dering the l
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identification and repair of reactor coolant system cold leg temperature instrument
loops (Section E2.1).
- Engineering appropriately considered the effect of a motor current indicator design
change on operations (Section E2.2).
j * The containment spray system was maintained and tested in accordance with
design docu.nents; however, the Technical Requirements Manual limits for pump
- flow and head were inconsistent with the implementing surveillance test and the
Technical Specification (Section E3.1).
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- Plant Support
I * The excellent use of a remotely operated vehicle and a radio transmitter dosimeter
allowed the licensee to retrieve a highly radioactive object while receiving minimal
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dose (Section R1.2).
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Report Details
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Summarv of Plant Status
Unit 1 remained at approximately 100 percent power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On September 18, a lightning
strike in the vicinity of the containment building induced a reactor trip. Unit 2 remained in
Mode 3 to repair equipment problems until restart on September 20. Power was stabilized
at 55 percent on September 22 to complete repairs on a feedwater pump, a heater drain
pump, and a turbine plant cooling water pump. On September 27, the unit was returned to
full power and remained there through the end of the inspection period.
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l. Operations
- 01 Conduct of Operations
01.1 General Comments (71707)
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Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing
plant operations, in general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-
conscious; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
01.2 Liahtnina induced Reactor Trio (Unit 2)
a. Inspection Scope (93702)
On September 18, with Unit 2 operating at 100 percent of rated power, a lightning
strike induced a voltage transient in Loops 2 and 4 cold leg temperature instruments
of the reactor coolant system. This, in turn, caused a reactor trip. The inspectors
responded to the control room and observed the operators' response to the event,
including: operator monitoring of annunciators and parameter trends, supervisory
oversight, and the implementation of emergency operating procedures.
b. Observations and Findinas
The voltage transient caused the indicated temperature to rise on the Reactor
Coolant System Loops 2 and 4 cold leg temperature instruments. The increase in
indicated temperature caused the temperature compensated over-
temperature / nitrogen-16 setpoint to drop for the two channels. The magnitude of
the drop was such that the setpoint became less than actual power and caused a
The inspectors responded to the control room and verified that all safety equipment
responded as required. The inspectors noted the control room crew responded well
to the situation. Their response was characterized by strong command and control
and effective three-way communications. The inspectors verified that the crew
used the appropriate emergency procedures.
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I O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
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O2.1 Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater System
! a. Insoection Scope (71707)
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The inspector performed periodic tours of the plant in accordance with inspection ;
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Procedure 71707, discussed observations with the appropriate system engineer and
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licensee management, and independently verified operator knowledge of current
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( b. Observations and Findinas
During a routine plant tour, the inspector observed that the pump discharge piping
l to Steam Generator 1-02 in the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was warm
to the touch. The inspector was concerned that the backleakage of hot water into
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the auxiliary feedwater system could heat the auxiliary feedwater piping sufficiently
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The inspector discussed the concern with the system engineer and found that the
system engineer was aware of the auxiliary feedwater system backleakage from
j Steam Generator 1-02. The system engineer indicated that the check valve in the
discharge piping to Steam Generator 1-02 had already been selected to be replaced
! with a nozzle check valve during the next refueling outage. In addition, the system
l engineer indicated that he periodically used an ultrasonic probe to determine if ;
voiding was occurring in the auxiliary feedwater system piping. The system
engineer was not aware that the backleakage into the identified portion of piping
could be felt so close the pump. He independently walked down that portion of
piping and also requested maintenance engineering support to determine the extent
of leakage with acoustic monitoring equipment. The leakage was determined to be
very small and was not adversely affecting operability, j
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l The inspector questioned several reactor operators on different shifts concerning the )
l indications and consequences of excessive auxiliary feedwater backleakage. The i
! inspector found that all the operators interviewed knew how to identify excessive
auxiliary feedwater system backleakage, knew the potential consequences, were
sensitive to periodic monitoring of the degraded condition, and were knowledgeable
of the abnormal operating procedures for correcting excessive auxiliary feedwater
system temperatures.
c. Conclusions
The inspector concluded that the degraded auxiliary feedwater system condition
was being appropriately monitored and that existing plant procedures, operator
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training, and system engineering involvement precluded the potential for auxiliary
feedwater voiding and a subsequent waterhammer from occurring.
08 Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)
08.1 (Closed) Violation 50-445/9517-01: operators inadvertently aligned the Unit 1 )
refueling water storage tank to the Spent Fuel Pool X-01 while attempting to purify '
the refueling water storage tank. The inspectors verified the licensee's corrective
actions to prevent recurrence which included: (1) a design modification to the
spent fuel pool ventilation registers; (2) the installation of a camera to allow control
room operators to monitor spent fuel pool level; (3) management re-emphasis on
pre-evolutionary briefs and self checking; and (4) a design change to raise the
refueling water storage tank low level alarm above the Technical Specification (TS)
required minimum level of 95 percent. The inspectors verified that the licensee's
corrective actions had been implemented and concluded that they were sufficient to
prevent a similar occurrence.
11. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 Main Feedwater Pumo (Unit 2)
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a. Insoection Scoce (62707) I
The inspector observed maintenance to repair Main Feedwater Pump 2-01, a risk-
significant component within the scope of the maintenance rule, and reviewed the
clearance tags and work order procedure.
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b. Observations and Findinos
On September 23, while observing maintenance activities on the feedwater pump,
the inspector noticed that a danger tag was hung on Sealinjection Filter 2-02
isolation valve (2FW-0509). The inspector noted that the tag (2-96-02507-0036)
required that the valve be closed but that the valve handle was in line with the
piping, which indicated that the valve was open. An auxiliary operator verified that
the valve was fully open and reported that information to the control room. The
control room directed the auxiliary operator to place the danger-tagged valve in the
required (close) position. The licensee then reverified the entire clearance lineup.
TS 6.8.1 requires the licensee to establish, implement, and maintain procedures
covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory
Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. TS 6.8.1 applies to Station Administrative
Procedure (STA) STA-605," Clearance and Safety Tagging," Revision 13. Isolation
Valve 2FW-0509 being open, contrary to Clearance Tag 2-96-02507-0036, is a
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! violation of TS 6.8.1 in that STA-605 required that the valve be placed in the
required position and prohibited changing the designated position of the valve
(50-446/9611-01).
l The inspector concluded that the licensee's initial disposition of the incorrect valve
position documented on an Operations Notification and Evaluation (ONE) Form was
inappropriate. The inspector was concerned that the root cause, whether it was a i
training issue or the inappropriate manipulation of a danger-tagged valve, would be '
ignored if dispositioned as " Manager's Trend System." The inspector discussed the
issue with the shift operations manager and concluded that the licensee intended to i
perform further investigations into the issue. The following day, the disposition of
, the ONE Form was changed to " Deficiency Resolution," which the inspector
concluded was appropriate in that it would result in a root cause evaluation.
The inspectors reviewed the work order being used by mechanical maintenance and
noted that the workers were performing steps to remove a bearing housing, but had
not signed off previous steps, which included verification that appropriate
housekeeping boundaries were established and that required piping and temperature
instruments to be removed. The inspectors noted that these activities had in fact
been accomplished. The inspectors concluded that this was a lack of attention to
detail and did not meet management's expectations for performing and documenting
work.
M1.2 Class 1E Station Batteries Weektv Insoection
a. insoection Scope (61726)
The inspectors reviewed Procedure MSE-SO-5000," Class 1E Station Batteries
Weekly inspection," Revision 0, and observed portions of the weekly battery
surveillance for the Unit 1, Train A batteries.
b. Observations and Findinas )
While observing pilot cell voltage measurements on Station Battery BT1ED1, the
inspector noted that the electricians did not connect the voltmeter in accordance
with the referenced procedure diagram. For personnel safety reasons, the inspector
waited until the electrician's hands were clear of energized equipment and then
questioned them on the improper voltage measurement. The electricians reviewed
the measurements that they had just taken and agreed that they had incorrectly
measured the pilot cell voltage. The inspector observed the electricians properly
measure the pilot cell voltage and document the correct data in the work psckage.
The inspector noted that Step 8.2.3 of Procedure MSE-S0-5000was identified with
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a V symbol, which stood for verification and required either a documented signoff
or data entry. The inspector identified that neither the person performing the step
t nor the data recorder were aware of the mistaken voltage reading.
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The inspector discussed the lack of self-verification with licensee management.
Licensee management agreed that the lack of self-verification did not meet their
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expectations,
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The inspector noted that the licensee did not initiate a ONE form on the personnel
error. The inspector discussed the threshold for writing ONE forms with tha site
vice president at an interim exit meeting. The site vice president discussed his ,
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expectations regarding writing ONE forms with the electrical maintenance manager.
Subsequently, a ONE form was written concerning the lack of self-verification. The
inspector concluded that it was written clearly and properly dispositioned.
The inspector also noted that, while one electrician adjusted the voltage, the other
measured the 135 Vdc output of the Class 1E battery charger using a digital
voltmeter. The electrician measuring the voltage had both hands holding test leads
inside the energized cabinet with the voltmeter balanced on one raised leg while i
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electricians were not demonstrating the proper attention to electrical safety and
provided the observation to licensee management.
The inspector concluded that the observed routine surveillance activity
demonstrated a lack of attention to detail by electricians in the areas of self-
verification and personal safety.
M1.3 Diver Hose Becomes Entanaled in Service Water Pumo
a. Inspection Scope (62707. 71707)
The inspector's review of an incident in which a diver's hose became entangled in
an operating service water pump included observation of a pump recovery planning
meeting, a performance enhancement review committee meeting, an inspection of
the service water intake bay layout, and a discussion of the causes and preventive
measures with management.
b. Observations and Findinas
On September 4, a contract dive team was performing an annualinspection of the
service water intake structure for sitt, debris, and freshwater clams when the diver's
lines became entangled in a running Unit 1 service water pump. The diver
disconnected the lines and made an emergency ascent to the surface. At the same
time, control room operators noted a sudden drop in indicated flow rate and secured
the running pump.
The inspection was being conducted in a common bay that supplied all four service
water pumps (two per unit). From west to east, the pumps are ordered: 1-02,
1-01, (Unit 1): 2-02, 2-01, (Unit 2). Because the diver was using hard hat
equipment, line tenders were required to assist the diver and to ensure that the lines
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did not drift into the pump bays. The dive team was using two tenders to control
the lines (one near each end of the walkway). When control of the lines was
passed from the individual at the east side of the walkway to the individual at the
west side, the east side tender let go of the lines. The inspector calculated that the
amount of free line when the transfer took place was more than sufficient to
become entangled in the service water pump. Additionally, the inspector found
that, while improbable, there was enough line in the water to become entangled in
both Pumps 1-01 and 1-02.
Discussions with licensee management and other personnel involved in the incident
revealed that the pre-evolutionary brief was thorough in providing direction to
personnel involved in emergency procedures, general control of hoses, personnel
safety practices, communication responsibilities, and coordination responsibility.
Nevertheless, the inspector found that the specific method for transferring control
of the diver's lines was not reviewed and evaluated sufficiently prior to the dive to
prevent the incident. The inspector concluded that the licensee's decision to
declare the service water pump operable following visual inspections and a
surveillance test was appropriate. The inspector noted that the licensee's decision
to cancel any further diving activities, including a dive of the safe shutdown
impoundment, until the plant incident review completed was conservative. The
inspector concluded that the licensee's decision to classify the event as a plant
! incident was appropriate.
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M1.4 Conduct of Maintenance Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that maintenance was conducted in a manner which did
not always assure that personnel safety and equipment operability were maintained.
Several examples of weak attention to detail in the planning and conduct of j
maintenance were directly observed by the inspectors. Poor planning resulted in a
diver's hose being entangled in a running service water pump (Section 1.3).
Electricians were observed to measure safety-related battery voltage incorrectly and
demonstrate weak personal safety practices (Section M1.2). A violation was
identified by the inspectors when a danger-tagged valve was found out of position
(Section M1.1). In addition, the ONE form written on the danger-tagged valve
finding was not initially characterized in a manner that would result in the cause
being identified.
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M2 Maintenancs and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment
M2.1 Unit 2 Steam Plant Pumo Failures
.a. Insoection Scope (62707)
In accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 62707, the inspectors periodically
observed the conduct of repairs on several steam plant pumps within the scope of
the maintenance rule to determine the cause of the failures and the licensee's
corrective actions.
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors observed a mechanic honing damaged edges on the heater drain
pump casing while not wearing protective eye wear. The inspectors discussed the
observation with the mechanic, who immediately put safety glasses on. The ,
' inspectors discussed this observation with maintenance management and they l
indicated that the mechanic was not meeting their expectations regarding personnel l
safety. The inspectors agreed. I
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The inspectors planned to review the licensee's root cause analysis of the pump l
failures and their maintenance rule disposition as an inspection followup item I
(IFl 50-446/9611-02).
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
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M3.1 Unit 2 Rod Droo Testina
a. Inspection Scoce (71707. 62707)
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During a plant tour on September 19, the inspectors observed reactor engineers
implement portions of rod drop testing in accordance with Work -
Order 5-96-500300-AB.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector reviewed the work package and found that work was in progress
without an approval signature. The inspector questioned the reactor engineer, who
indicated that they had discussed the work with the Unit 2 supervisor in a pre-
evolutionary brief and that he directed them to begin work. The inspector l
questioned the unit supervisor, who indicated that the reactor engineers were only
setting up equipment and that he had not given permission to begin rod drop I
test 4g.
The inspector also observed that the space on the work order for the radiation
protection signature had an "N/A" in it. Rod drop testing procedure required the
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reactor engineers to enter the Unit 2 containment to set up their equipment. The
inspector also questioned the reactor engineers on the "N/A" and they indicated
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The inspector observed a reactor engineer perform work inside an energized cabinet
y while wearing a metal ring and watch. Once the reactor engineer paused to
connect the next wire, the inspector discussed electrical safety practices with the
engineer and he removed the ring and watch. 5
The inspector discussed conduct of maintenance with operations, radiation
protection, and reactor engineering management. The shift operations manager
discussed his expectations regarding work package signatures with the unit
supervisor and issued a lessons learned message to all operations supervision. The
radiation protection manager discussed when it is appropriate to place an "N/A" in
. the radiation protection block with the work control manager. The reactor
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engineering manager reinforced his expectations regarding attention to detail and
electrical safety to his reactor engineers.
The inspector conc!uded that work activities in this area were not meeting licensee
management expectations. Additionally, the inspector concluded that the
, observations represented poor electrical safety practices by engineering personnel
and a lack of understanding of work document expectations by unit supervision.
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- M3.2 Staoina and Partial Fabrication of Turbine-Driven Auxiliarv Feedwater Pumo Pioina
a. Insoection Scope (71707. 62707)
During a plant tour on September 19, the inspectors observed contract personnel
! implement portions of Work Order 2-95-100995-00,which involved the installation
- of a 6-inch vent line for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump flash tank for
, Design Modification 95-000054-00-00.
- b. Or4 vations and Findinas
The inspector noted that the work was being performed safely and in accordance
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with station procedures. A fire permit was properly posted and a fire watch was
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present. The welder was using weld material with the proper documentation. The
inspector found that the workers had completed a number of steps that were not
initialed, some had been completed several days earlier. The inspector questioned
the contract supervisor present and he initialed the steps that had been completed.
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M3.3 Maintenance Documentation Conclusions
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observed involved findings of incomplete or incorrect documentation. These types
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i of observations are discussed in Sections M1.1, M3.1, and M3.2. The inspector
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concluded that these observations were a departure from previous performance and ;
represented poor documentation and attention to detail. I
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M4 Maintenance Staff Knowledge and Performance
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M4.1 Instrument and Control Surveillance Observations
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a. Insoection Scoce (61726)
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The inspectors observed all or portions of the following surveillance tests:
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- Steam Generator 1-01 narrow range level channel operational test and ,
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- Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Flow Loop 3 channel operational test and calibration 1
- (INC 77688) on September 18 )
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors found that the surveillances were performed professionally and that i
f the communication between the technicians was excellent. The surveillance
{ procedures were followed and verification and independent verification steps were
1 performed correctly.
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M4.2 Unit-1, Train B, Safeguards Slave Relay K614 Actuation Test
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- a. Insoection Scooe (62703) )
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On August 20, the inspector observed the licensee perform a Train B safeguards l
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slave Relay K614 actuution test. l
) b. Observations and Findinas -
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The pre-evolutionary brief was focused on self-verification and expected plant ;
response, which the inspector found appropriate. The unit supervisor established )
an environment conducive to participation of the personnelinvolved, and all i
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personnel involved in the evolution took part in the discussion. l
During the surveillance test, operators appropriately communicated with each other
, and unit supervision. The inspector noted that good independent and self- ;
verification techniques were used. .
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The inspector reviewed past surveillances and found that the licensee had
performed the quarterly surveillance within the required TS interval for the past
3 years. The inspector reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and plant
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I drawings, determined that the slave relay test satisfied the licensee's commitments
to periodically test the engineered safety feature actuation signal, and concluded
- that the surveillance test was sufficient to partially verify the operability of the
! containment ventilation isolation.
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M4.3 Unit 1, Train A, Safeguards Slave Relay K609 Actuation Test
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j a. Lnsoection Scope (61726)
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- On August 30, the inspector observed the licensee perform a Train A safeguards !
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slave Relay K609 actuation test. The test was being reperformed due to Train A
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emergency diesel generator speed fluctuations observed the previous day. The
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inspector questioned operators and technicians on the fluctuations and subsequent
- troubleshooting efforts and testing prior to performance of the surveillance test on
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l The inspector reviewed the troubleshooting of the Train A emergency diesel l
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generator speed control, which included a complete system walkdown and visual j
inspection, and found the scope appropriate. In addition, a complete emergency
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and voltage control circuitry. !
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i The inspector noted that the pre-evolutionary brief prior to performing the slave !
relay test appropriately focused on equipment and personnel safety.' The
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contingency action plan considered the potential failure modes and the appropriate
operator actions, both in the control room and in the field. The inspector noted that
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the contingency plans considered the troubleshooting effort and included . l
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compensatory actions which would provide diagnostic information in addition to l
safety controls.
l The slave relay start of the emergency diesel generator start was performed
i satisfactorily and the surveillance was completed satisfactorily.
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M7 Quality Assurance in Maintenance Activities
! a. Inspection Scooe (62707)
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1 The inspectors reviewed a licensee finding of improperly performed maintenance on
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a centrifugal charging pump / lube oil pump coupling. The inspection included a
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review of the maintenance procedure and work orders used to perform the
maintenance and a review of the licensee's actions to correct the problem.
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b. Observations and Findinas
On September 10, a Unit 1 control room operator noted that the light for the
running centrifugal charging pump auxiliary tube oil pump was lit, indicating that the
pump was running on Pump 1 A. The auxiliary lube oil pump starts when oil
pressure from the shaft-driven tube oil pump f alls below a preset value. Operators
secured the centrifugal charging pump after starting the other train pump. The
licensee's subsequent investigation revealed that the coupling between the shaft-
driven tube oil pump and the charging pump had been incorrectly assembled and
had failed. Maintenance repaired the coupling and restored the pump to an operable
status.
The inspector attended a licensee meeting concerning the status of the couplings to
the other centrifugal charging pump lube oil pumps. System engiruring concluded
that the failure was an isolated occurrence and that the other pumps were not
affected. The mechanical maintenance manager took a more conservative position
that Pump 2B in Unit 2 should also be inspected because one of the mechanics
involved in the incorrect assembly of Pump 1 A was also involved in the
maintenance of Pump 2B. At the next available outage window, mechanics
disassembled the coupling and verified that the coupling had been correctly
assembled. The inspector concluded that the additional verification of Pump 2B
was conservative.
The inspector noted that the licensee had appropriately classified the failure as a
maintenance preventable functional failure.
M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
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M8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-445(446)/9512-01: the licensee failed to define an interval
for calibration of the low battery voltage shutdown device in eight Class 1E safety-
related Elgar inverters. The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions
described in the licensee's response letter, dated October 6,1995, were
appropriate. No similar problems were identified.
4 M8.2 (Closed) Violation 50-445(446)/9513-01: the licensee failed to establish,
implement, and maintain procedures. Three examples were given: written
procedures established for the operation and maintenance of the safety-related
auxiliary feedwater system were not followed by the operator; written procedures
were not established and implemented for the operation and maintenance of the
auxiliary feedwater system; and an STA for work requests and work orders did not
establish the requirement that procedures should be followed. The inspectors
reviewed the corrective actions described in the licensee's response letter, dated
October 2,1995, and found them reasonable and complete. No similar problems
were identified.
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{ E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
[ E2.1 Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Looo Cold Leo Temperature Elements
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a. Insoection Scooe (92902,92903)
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The inspector attended troubleshooting planning meetings, reviewed reactor coolant
i; loop cold leg resistive temperature detector design changes, and reviewed time-
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domain reflectometer troubleshooting results following the Unit 2 reactor trip from a
(F lightning strike.
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- The inspector noted that the discussions during the licensee's troubleshooting
planning meetings were open and conducive to participation by all who attended.
- Both technicians and engineers were present and provided recommendations to
l licensee management. The licensee used a time-domain reflectometer to identify
j problems with cable runs between the reactor coolant system cold leg temperature
- elements and the instrument racks in the electrical control building. The licensee
provided the results to an independent contractor for analysis.
j The time-domain reflectometer results indicated that some impedance mismatches
- occurred in the instrument cables at containment penetrations but that they were
j minor and of little consequence. However, the results also indicated that the shield
i conductors on two temperature instruments for Reactor Coolant System Loops 2
and 4 were grounded fairly close to the temperature element inside containment.
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instrument loops and found it to be complete and that it recommended the
appropriate repair. The design change directed technicians to cut the shield wire in
j the first_ termination box from the temperature element. The inspector concurred
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with the licensee's conclusion that this repair would prevent induced current flow
- . from an induced voltage potential between buildings which could occur during a
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j c. Conclusions .
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The inspector concluded that the licensee demonstrated appropriate involvement of
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.both engineers and technicians in the identification and repair of the reactor coolant
- system cold leg temperature element instrument loops,
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E2.2 Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pumo 2-04 Ammeter
a. Insoection Scope (92903)
The inspector reviewed a temporary design modification which removed a failed
Reactor Cooiant Pump 2-04 motor ammeter from the control room,
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector reviewed the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and design change
which removed the Reactor Coolant Pump 2-04 motor current indication from the
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control room. The inspector found that the 10 CFR 50.59 and design change
documents were complete and well written.
The inspector noted that the licensee had developed changes to their reactor
coolant pump standard operating procedure, which required an auxiliary operator to
monitor the Reactor Coolant Pump 2-04 motor current locally at the motor control
center. The inspector concluded that the licensee appropriately considered the
affect the unavailability of reactor coolant pump motor current would have on an
operator.
E3 Engineering Procedures and Documentation
E3.1 Containment Sorav System Waikdown
a. Scope (37551.71707)
The inspector performed a partial walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 2
containment spray system. The inspector reviewed the Final Safety Analysis
Report, design basis documents, TS, the Technical Requirements Manual, and
surveillance test procedures.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspector found that the containment spray system was maintained in a
condition as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report and was tested in
accordance with TS and ASME Section XI requirements. The inspector verified that
the flow and head test points were values which were analyzed in accident
analysis.
Additionally, the inspector found that the requirements listed in the Technical
Requirements Manual for testing the containment spray system were inconsistent
with the TS and the surveillance test. The licensee agreed that the wording in the
Technical Requirements Manual should be clarified to more closely match the TS
and initiated a design change. The inspector concluded that the inconsistency was
administrative and that the surveillance test demonstrated each pump's operability.
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E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92700)
E8.1 (Closed) LER 50-445/94004: failure of annunciator - required TS actions for
quadrant power tilt ratio were not performed. Approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following a
Unit 1 load reduction to 50 percent power on August 22,1994, the licensee
identified that the quadrant power tilt ratio had exceeded the TS 3.2.4 limit of 1.02
and that the computer alarm had not sounded. The licensee identified that the
alarm had been set to 1.05 rather than 1.02 since initial plant startup and that the
required surveillance to determine that the quadrant power tilt ratio be within this
limit while above 50 percent power by calculating the ratio at least once per 12
hours when the alarm is inoperable was not performed. The licensee determined
that the condition was applicable to both units and immediately corrected the
setpoints.
The licensee conducted an evaluation and found that the computer point was
originally set at 1.05 and that a design change was issued to change the setpoint to
1.02 in 1990. The licensee det.,rmined that a software vendor had changed the
alarm limit to 1.02 but had not changed the alarm constant. The licensee reviewed
archived data and determinect that no significant quadrant power tilting had
occurred since the previous :efueling outages of the two units while greater than
50 percent power. The TS requirement was not applicable below 50 percent
power. On August 22,1994, quadrant power tilt had exceeded 1.02 while power
was approximately 49 to 50 percent. The licensee also discovered that, even
though quadrant power tilt had exceeded 1.02 for approximately 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> following
a runback to approximately 55 percent power on May 14,1996, they were in
compliance with the TS action statement.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's root cause determination and corrective
actions and determined them to be thorough. The inspector also reviewed the TS .
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limiting condition for operation action statement for exceeding 1.02 and concluded
that the licensee was in compliance during these two events.
IV. Plant Support
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
R1.1 General (71707)
During periodic plant tours, the inspectors noted that radiation workers adhered to
their radiation work permits and followed appropriate radiation work practices.
Radiation workers were observed utilizing the radiation protection staff in j
determining the specific hazards that they could encounter during their assigned i
activities. The inspectors observed that radiological hazards were properly posted
and controlled in a manner that promoted ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable).
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R1.2 Fuel Pin End Cao Retrieval
a. Insoection Scoce (71750)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's retrieval of a fuel pin end cap from the spent
fuel pool transfer canal by observing a video tape of the evolution and discussing
the survey and retrieval process with members of the radiation protection staff,
b. _ Observations and Findinas
On August 18, the licensee identified a small cylindrical object in the Unit 1 transfer
canal sump which had a dose rate of 200 Roentgen per hour beta dose on contact
and 90 Roentgens per hour gamma. The object, believed to be a fuel pin end cap
noted missing during a previous refueling, was discovered while draining the sump
area to support canal repairs. The licensee retrieved and placed the object into the
spent fuel pool in a locked basket.
The inspectors found that the licensee made excellent use of a remotely operated
vehicle and radio transmitter dosimeter to perform the initial survey in the sump and
to identify the object. The inspectors also found that the licensee's mockup was
effective as evidenced by the extremely low dose (3.3 millirem) received during
retrieval of the object.
R8 Miscellaneous Radiological Protection and Chemistry issues (92904)
R8.1 (Closed) Violation 50-445(446)/9606-02: involved several examples of radiation
workers not adhering to their radiation work permit requirements. The site radiation
protection manager distributed a site wide lessons learned memorandum and
conducted training for radiation protection personnel. The inspectors reviewed the
training records for the radiation protection personnel and concluded that the
appropriate personnel attended the training. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed
the lessons learned memorandum, discussed its contents with a number of
maintenance personnel, and concluded that radiation workers were generally
cognizant of their radiation work permit requirements and hcw to use the process
for deviations.
F2 Status of Fire Protection Facilities and Equipment
a. Insoection Scope (71750)
The inspector sampled the operation of normally open, double fire doors for freedom
of movement and proper operation and discussed the results with the licensee.
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b. Observations and Findinas
On July 30, the inspector verified that the doors operated freely and that the
closure device ensured that the passive door would close before the active door
fully shut. However, the inspector noted that the lower flush bolt on one door had
been tripped and that the door would not swing shut until the bolt was reset. The
inspector found the licensee's decision to randomly check the flush bolts during
normal visual inspections every 3 months to be appropriate. By the end of the
inspection period, the licensee had identified two other instances where a flush bcit
had been tripped. The licensee was determining if additional actions were required
to address the bolts.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee manapsment
at an interim exit on September 20 and at a final exit meeting on September T.6,
1996. The interim exit was held to present the findings Mr. Gage, in conjunction
with the resident inspectors, identified. The licensee acknowledged the findings
presented. No proprietary information was identified during the exit meetings.
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ATTACHMENT
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] PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
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TU Electric
Blevins, M. R., Plant Manager
i Byrd, R. C., Mechanical Maintenance Manager
Curtis, J. R., Radiation Protection Manager
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Flores, R., System Engineering Manager
i Kelley, J. J., Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Support
4- Kross, D. C., Operations Support Manager
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Moore, D. R., Operations Manager
- Muffett, J. W., Station Engineering Manager
. Terry, C. L., Group Vice President, Nuclear Production
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! INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
37551 Onsite Engineering
i 61726 Surveillance Observations
! 62707 Maintenance Observations
- 71707 Plant Operations I
71750 Plant Support Activities
92700 Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
Facilities
92901 Followup - Plant Operations .,
92902 Followup - Maintenance i
92903 Followup .- Engineering
92904 Followup - Plant Support
93702 Prompt Onsite Response To Events At Operating Power Reactors
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED j
Opened
50-446/9611-01 VIO failure to follow station tagout procedures during feedwater
pump maintenance
50-446/9611-02 IFl turbine plant pump failures i
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Closed
50-445/9517-01 VIO failure to follow procedure while aligning the refueling
water cleanup system
50-445(446)/9512-01 VIO f ailure to define calibration interval for low battery
voltage shutdown device in eight Class 1E safety-
related Elgar inverters
50-445(446)/9513-01 VIO failure to follow procedures with regard to the
auxiliary feedwater system
50-445/94004 LER failure to perform required TS surveillance for quadrant
power tilt ratio
50-445(446)/9606-02 VIO failure to follow radiation work permit procedures