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Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs C($7 c p%c AW E
Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment Oversight He,aring Quality Assurance at the Zimmer Nuclear Station September 14, 1982; 9:45 A.M.; Room 1324 Longworth Building Witness List PANEL I Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. James Keppler, Director Region III, and associates PANEL II Cincinnati Gas and Electric Mr. Earl A.
Borgmann, Senior Vice-President Mr. Harlan Sager, Manager, Quality Assurance Henry J.
Kaiser Company Mr. Donald Iselin, Group Vice-President State of Ohio
'i Mr. Donald Milan, Chief, Division of Boiler Inspection Mr. Richard Jagger, Assistant Director of Inspections National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors Panel III Government Accountability Project (GAP)
Mr. Thomas Devine, Legal Director Cincinnati Environmental Advisory Council Mr.
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David Altman, Chairman
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT OVERSIGHT HEARING ON QUALITY ASSURANCE AT THE ZIMMER NUCLEAR STATION STATEMENT OF THE HON. MORRIS K.
UDALL
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Tuesday,, September-14, 9:45 A.M.
On June 10 of this year the Subcommittee held an oversight hearing to consider the quality assurance (QA) breakdown at the Zimmer nuclear powerplant. In this case and possibly others there has been a widespread failu're to adhere to the NRC 's quality assurance requirements.
At Zimmer, the severity of the problem was recognized only after construction was virtually complete.
My primary concern now centers on the NRC's ability to determine that a reactor can be safely operated following a QA breakdown like that at Zimmer.
To give some idea of the extent of the Zimmer problem, I will indicate briefly the nature of some of the.. issues that must be addressed prior to issuance of an operating license.
--Deficient weld procedures.
- Apparent falsification of weld procedure test data.
-Insufficient documentation to demonstrate that many of the 2000 welders who have worked at the Zimmer site were qualified for the work they performed.
The NRC has informed me that, "The potential impact of the (inadequate} welder qualification records is that a substantial number of welds may have to be replaced. "
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-The chemical and physical properties of certain safety related piping cannot be do.cumented. The NRC' staff has stated that, "The potential impact of the loss of traceable piping is that a substantial amount of such piping may have to be replaced. "
-Significant quantities of safety related materials were purchased from vendors not qualified to supply such materials.
The NRC has stated that, "The potential impact of the material purchases is that installed materials may have to be replaced. "
While the June 10 hearing yielded useful qualitative information, NRC staff were vague with regard to specifics.
Testimony at the hearing and subsequent correspondence cause me to question whether the NRC staff is on top of the problem.
Today's hearing is a direct result of my not being satisfied with information that we have been provided to date.
In addition to our having been provided incomplete information, there are other disturbing aspects of this matter.
I am concerned, as I said on June 10, that the NRC staff has not required an independent audit of the Zimmer plant.
It seems unrealistic to have confidence that the company that neglected quality assurance for so many years will on its own fully uncover the deficiencies resulting from its neglect.
An independent audit is even more important in view of the NRC suggesting that they have _ _, _,
o-insufficient staff to address the important Zimmer issues in a timely fashion.
My intent now is to compile a record that gives a much better picture than has,been presented to date of the status
. and prognosis of the Zimmer project.
I hope to get an idea of the major corrective actions now known to be necessary prior to plant operation. I also want to know what will be required if existing uncertainties cannot be resolved through ongoing reviews.
The belated discovery of the Zimmer problem, the manner in which it came to light, and subsequent Commission actions create doubt that the NRC ls willing and able to make sure that the Zimmer deficiencies are found and co'rrected.
I hope therefore that the NRC witnesses will take advantage of this and subsequent opportunities to establish confidence that they are fulfilling their responsibility to protect the public health and safety.
In addition to the NRC, we will hear today from representatives of the City of Cincinnati Environmental Advisory Council, the Cincinatti Gas & Electric Company, Kaiser Engineers, the State of Ohio Division of Boiler Inspection, and the Government Accountability Project.