IR 05000029/1985013

Insp Rept 50-029/85-13 on 850603-07.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Requirements for Const of Safe Shutdown Sys (SSS) Bldg & Observation of SSS Bldg Concrete Const Activities & Soil Backfill

ML20133D548
Person / Time
Site:	Yankee Rowe
Issue date:	07/05/1985
From:	Varela A, Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20133D520	List: IR 05000029/1985013 ML20133D517
References
50-029-85-13, 50-29-85-13, NUDOCS 8508070366
Download: ML20133D548 (6)

Text

__ . - _ . _ _ _ _ _ .-. ._ - , . . . . . _

-

. .

e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

!

Report N /85-13 Docket N . License N OPR-3 Priority -- Category C Licensee: Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name: Yankee Nuclear Power Station Inspection At: Plant Site - Rowe, Massachusetts '

i Inspection Conducted: June 3-7, 1985 '

Inspectors: . i' N.[V/v 2, / ( L> f A. A.'Varbi , Lead Reactor Engineer date Approved by: ( 4 b Chief dat'e DT'. Wiggig,(bcesses terials & Fr Section Inspection Summary: Inspection on June 3-7,1985 (Report No. 50-29/85-13)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection by one region-based inspector of licensee requirements for construction of the Safe Shutdown System Building, observation of SSS Building concrete construction activities and soil backfill and, follow-up of previously identified inspector items. The inspection involved 34 hours3.935185e-4 days <br />0.00944 hours <br />5.621693e-5 weeks <br />1.2937e-5 months <br /> of direct inspection time on site and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of in-office inspection tim Results: No violations were identifie ,

,

i i

A 29 -

0 PDR

,

.. .

.

DETAILS 1.0 PERSONS CONTACTED ,

Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)

• L. X. Bozek, QC Supervisor

• L. Drawbridge, Assistant Plant Superintendent

• E. Durfey, Maintenance Engineer

• Ellis, Plant Engineer

• K. Henderson, Technical Director

• Holmgren, Lead Mechanical Engineer /NSD

• E. Land, Maintenance

• D. Melin, Construction Engineer

• J. Parker, Senior Engineer /NSD

• D. B. Pike, Manager Operations Quality

• N. St. Laurent, Plant Superintendent-R. Mitchell, Maintenance Supervisor M. Franklin, Operations Quality Assurance

.

J. Hazeltine, Project Manager A. R. Green & Son, In W. Goulding, Construction Superintendent Soil and Material Testing, In P. Gemmiti, Quality Control Technician, Soils USNRC

• H. Eichenholz, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

• attendees at Exit Meeting 2.0 INSPECTION PURPOSE AND SCOPE The purpose of this inspection was primarily to review with cognizant YAEC (Framingham) engineers responsible for engineering requirements for construction of the Safe Shutdown System Building (SSS), its equipment installation and, buried conduit. Inspection was performed of ongoing concrete construction and soil backfill for the SSS building. Addition-ally, previously identified inspector items are addressed in this repor .0 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM BUILDING 3.1 Operational Capability of the SSS and its Classification The SSS Building provides the capability to maintain the plant in hot

.

shutdown, reach hot shutdown and cool the plant down to cold shutdow .- ..

.

-3-This capability also is utilized following a fire and is designed to meet the fire concerns of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. The SSS Building is being installed under YAEC's EDCR No.84-310. The building, all building accessories, buried instrumentation duct banks, buried fuel oil tank and associated piping are classified as nonsafety related, but are seismically analyzed and installed. The inspector verified the acceptability of this classification with NRR's project manager for the Yankee facility in telephone conversation of June 12, 198 .2 Seismic Qualification of Foundation The SSS Building foundation soils are qualified to resist soil

,

liquefaction potential by an engineering evaluation and analysis performed by Geotechnical Engineers Inc., dated February 22, 1980, for the Fire Water Tank (FWT) adjacent to the SSS Building. The analysis is based on five borings performed in 1979 in the vicinity of the FWT. Additional qualification performed by YAEC in a report dated January 2, 1985, uses the standard penetration resistance of the above borings taken in the dense glacial till beneath the build-ing. The liquefaction potential of the soil foundation is evaluated in this report for the Yankee Composite Spectrum earthquake loading of 0.19 . The conclusion of the liquefaction analysis is that the soils beneath the SSS Building are not susceptible to liquefactio .3 Requirements for Building and Accessories The principal requirements for the SSS Building and accessories as identified in EOCRs84-309 and 310 are as follows:

• Loads and load combinations are based on Massachusetts Building Code, SEP Seismic Reevaluation and Retrofit Criteria, and extreme environmental hazard loads developed by NSD Environ-mental Engineerin * The Building, underground reinforced concrete duct bank, and underground fuel tank were designed to withstand the most critical combination of decd loads plus live, seismic, or wind /missle loads. The design allowable values are based on ACI 318-83 Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete.

l Structural design work was performed by Cygna Energy Services, In * The Building concrete construction is required to conform to YAEC specification YRS-001 which endorses ACI 301, Specifications for Structural Concrete for Building .4. Observation of Construction Activities and Discrepancies Identified The inspector observed the SSS Building's concrete footings, equip-ment foundations and walls previously placed during May. Where formwork had been removed and concrete finishing was completed, no discrepancies were note m

-

. . .

.

_4_

'

The building walls at the north end, identified as the pump cubicle, were inspected on the afternoon of June 3, soon after completion of concrete placement and,,during the succeeding days of this inspec-tion. The following observations were noted starting June 3, and identified to YAEC cognizant engineers as discrepancies in concrete construction practices described in ACI 301, Chapter 12 regarding concrete postplacement curing and protectio * Initial protection of the plastic concrete construction joint (for the roof slab) at the top of the wall was not provided to prevent washout should heavy rain occu * The loose clear plastic protection applied on June 3 was inadequate to prevent the concrete joint from drying overnight, as observed on June 4

• Lack of adequate protection, lack of continuous water applica-tion or the moisture retaining cover allowed the concrete joint to dry intermittently during the wee * Concrete wooden forms exposed to heating by the sun were not kept wet to prevent loss of moisture in the wall *- Form removal test cylinders kept adjacent to the structure and cured by the same methods were not used to measure compressive strength of concrete for removal of the forms and termination of the curin These deficiencies in concrete construction were acknowledged by licensee engineers. They responded at the exit meeting and agreed to perform penetration resistance tests of the hardened concrete walls, using a powder-actuated device, as designated by ASTM C-803-75 The inspector was informed by telephone that six sets of Windser Probes conducted on June 11, by an independent test laboratory, had a minimum value of 4,600 psi. The tests were performed on walls placed May 22, which similarly lacked the appropriate concrete post placement curing and protection. The design strength required of the SSS Building reinforced concrete is 3,000 psi; test cylinder strength at 28 days of earlier walls were reported to have minimum compressive strength-of 4,500 psi. However, these test cylinders were cured in accordance with ASTM C-192, under laboratory contro The inspector considers the deficiencies he observed in concrete post placement cure and protection to have been resolved by the Windser probe tests performe .5. Observed Soil Backfill and Compaction Tests Soil backfill placement, soil vibro-compaction and, nuclear moisture and density tests were observed at the south exterior end and sides

--

.

.. s .

.

-5-of the SSS Building during this inspection. The inspector determined that these activities conformed to the governing specifications and referenced ASTM standards. The Troxler nuclear gage was observed to have been certified and was being operated by a qualified technician employed by the licensee's independent test laborator No violations were identifie .0 FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED INSPECTOR ITEMS 4.1. (Closed) Follow Item (50-29/80-08-02): (a) Conflict between two procedures relating to fuel pool modification on torque value for bolt tightening. Licensee, in documentation dated August 20, 1980, corrected Mercury Company's procedures 703 and 705 to agree in bolt torque value of 200 ft. lbs; (b) Mercury procedures to address off-center baseplate bolts: Mercury procedure 705 was revised to require correction for off-center position of baseplate bolt .2. (0 pen) Follow Item (50-29/81-06-04): Testing of lapsplice reba Magnetic particle test results on reactor column base modifications /

welded rebar were not availabl .3 (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-29/84-14-01): YAEC procedure OP-5625 does not adequately address thread engagement, bolt spacing and edge distance. Licensee procedure 5265 Revision 3 contained the necessary revisions for conformance to NRC/IE Bulletin 79-0 .4. (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-29/84-14-02): Existing pipe supports reviewed under the SEP program as not requiring modifications were not reevaluated to determine the effect of base plate flexibility on anchor bolt loads. Licensee's internal memorandum dated May 8,1985, from D. LeFrancois / B. Holmgren to J. Hazeltine on resolution of NRC Audit 84-14 Findings was reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee engineer. Reevaluation of these base plates for flexibility resulted in factor of safety for the anchor bolts of at least 4 for wedge or 5 for the shell type anchors. The above anchor bolt base plate flexibility evaluation disclosed no Technical Specification violation due to the increase in bolt load .0 QA/QC INTERFACES FOR SSS BUILDING CONSTRUCTION The observation of SSS Building construction and inspection by the NRC inspector fesulted in findings of deficiencies, as identified in paragraph 3.4. These were discussed with YAEC Framingham engineers and construction personnel. Documentation was provided to the inspector to apprise him on the conduct and interface between the Framingham construction department and che plant's operation QA personnel. The NRC inspector concluded from his observations that control of the interface between Framingham and the plant, regarding the SSS building concrete construction, needs strengthenin _ . _

-

-

,; ..

.

-6-YAEC memorandum dated May 23, 1985, from Mr. J. Hazeltine to the Director of QA, Mr. A. Shepard, resulted from a meeting on May 15, 1985. The memorandum identifies the SSS building design changes as classified non-nuclear safety, but seismic, and, adds that although "QA inspections" are not a requirement, the importance of "QC" is to be recognized. The meeting resulted from adverse "QC inspection" findings, identified by the assigned plant QA inspector and other YAEC personnel, at the start of the SSS construction. As a result of the meeting, the responsibility for resolution of unsatisfactory findings by "QC inspectors" rested primarily with the YAEC Construction Department. However, the NRC inspector concluded from his discussions with the plant QA inspector, from a review of this inspector's qualifications and from review of records and physical work activities that the interface between YAEC Construction and the assigned "QC inspector" was not sufficient to prevent the problems discussed in paragraph 3.4 regarding post placement curing of the concret Although the building is not classified as safety related and not normally under the purview of NRC inspections, the building will house equipment important to safety and warrants managements attention. Therefore, this deficiency was identified as an NRC concern at the exit meetin .0 EXIT MEETING

'The inspector met with licensee representatives (see Paragraph 1) at the end of the inspection June 7, 1985, at the plan The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and identified the inspection findings. Additionally, the inspector discussed the results of concrete testing with Mr. B. Holmgien on Jun~e 11, 1985. At no time 4 during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee.

,

!

l

!

l l

t

_ .