ML20129H861
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'o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666 h.
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E2 NOV 181991 4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ben B. Hayes, Director Office of Investigations Jack Goldberg, Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement, Office of the General Counsel FROM:
James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement
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SUBJECT:
V0GTLE COMMISSION PAPER AND PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT ACTION (EA91-141)
The enclosed revision of the Comission paper and proposed enforcement action resulting from the staff's review of OI Report 2-90-001 reflects the incorporation of comments received from NRR, OGC and Region II.
I intend to forward this paper to the ED0's office by this Friday (11/21/91).
To facilitate that schedule I request that 01 review the revision in order to satisfy the coordination paragraph of the Cosmiission paper and OGC forward the revision to the General Counsel in preparation for EDO signing and submitting the final version to the Comission. Please call me with any final coments or question.s.
Y James Lieberman, irector Office of Enforcement
Enclosures:
As stated cc:
J. Sniezek, DEDR J. Partlow, NRR S. Ebneter, RII
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OFFICIAL COPY 9611040002 960827 PDR FOIA KOHN95-211 PDR
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-For:
The Consissioners i
From:
James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
' PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST GEORGIA POWER j-COMPANY, V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 (EA91-141)
Purpose:
To consult with the Commission because the staff's 4
conclusions differ, in part, from those of the Office of Investigations (01).in that the staff cannot conclude the violations of plant Technical Specifications (TS)
.were connitted willfully.
Background:
On January 19, 1990, the Region It Regional Administrator requested that an investigation be initiated.into the facts l
and circumstances of alleged' intentional violations, in l
October 1988, of Vogtle Unit 1 TS 3.4.1.4.2 by the then
-plant operations manager and NRC licensed supervisors.
to the TS,-
i Specifically, it was -alleged that, contrary [RMWST) valves certain Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank were deliberately opened to facilitate a chemical addition while the plant was in Mode 5 (cold shutdown), loops not i.
filled, a condition in which the valves were to be closed F
and secured in position in order to preclude a boron dilution criticality event. Specifically, the TS stated, i
in part, that in Mode 5, loops not filled; i
" Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) discharge j
j valves (1208-U4-175, 1208-U4-176, 1208-U4-177 and 1208-U4-183) shall be closed and secured in position."
Further, ACTION c. of the TS states "With Reactor Makeup-
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Water Storage Tank (RMWST) discharge valves (1208-U4-175 1208-44-176, 1208-U4-177 and 1208-U4-183) i i
not closed and secured in position, immediately close and secure-in position the RMWST discharge valves."
Contact:
J. Lieberman, DE 20741 1
m.
The Commissioners
- OI issued the investigation report (2-90-001) concerning this matter on March 19, 1991. The report concluded that i
TS 3.4.1.4.2 was knowingly and intentionally violated by four NRC licensed senior operators with the express knowledge and concurrence of the then operations manager, who was also an NRC licensed senior operator. The investigation also determined that_the reporting i
requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 were violated when the facility licensee subsequently became aware of the TS 3
issue. With regard to the reporting issue, 01 concluded f.
there was insufficient evidence of a deliberate violation.
Finally, the investigation did not substantiate, as
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j originally alleged, that the then operations manager either j
perscnally operated or directed.the operation of the valves in question.
f Based on the conclusion that deliberate violations
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occurred, OI referred the results of the investigation to 1
i theDepartmentofJustice(D0J).
In a letter dated April 18, 1991, DOJ declined to pursue the issues raised by the investigation.
f Once the staff began to consider possible courses of action, based on the enforcement policy's threshold for enforcement actions against individuals, two of the four senior operators j
included in OI's findings were dropped from consideration for enforcement action. Specifically, these two individuals raised their concerns about the applicability of the TS to 4-their management, the then operations manager. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that they subsequently performed l
evolutions that the staff concludes violated the TS, they did so only after consulting their superior and receiving i
approval. Under the enforcement policy, the facility licensee rather than the individual is normally held accountable in the enforcement context, in such a situation.
Discussion:
On June 3,1991, after review of the 01 findings, the staff
- j' issued Demands for Information (Demands) to Georgia Power Company (GPC), the now former operations manager, and two senior licensed operators directing that they provide information as to why their licenses should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or other enforcement action taken to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
Because the Demands alleged potential willful violations and the staff was not prepared at that time to issue orders, the Demands and the licensees' responses have not been placed e
in the PDR.
Following resolution of this matter, the staff i
intends to place the Demands and the licensees' responses into the PDR.
Following. review of all four responses, the staff scheduled 1
and held transcribed enforcement conferences with GPC and
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The Commissioners-a the former operations manager on September 19, 1991. Based on the discussions at the GPC enforcement conference, the staff requested additional information from the company.
That information was provided in a letter dated October 1, l
1991.
After reviewing all of the available information it is clear 2
to the staff _that the valves in question were operated a l
number of times in violation of the TS. None of the parties involved dispute the fact that the valves were operated.
However, the interpretation of the TS is at issue. That 2
being the case, the issue in this matter is whether the j
involved individuals acted willfully to misinterpret the TS
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requirements or whether they mistakenly misinterpreted the TS with no intent to violate its provisions.
l With regard to the two senior operators who were issued Demands, the staff concludes, based on their responses to the Demands, that even though they acted without consulting 3
the operations manager, they had specific management
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approval.to perform the chemical addition evolution in the form of an approved outage schedule. Further, their l
responses indicated that they ordered the valves manipu-lated because they did not consider the TS restrictions to i
be applicable due to their misinterpretation of the plant conditions to which the TS applied. The two senior operators stated that they did not understand that the plant conditions existing at the time constituted " loops not filled." GPC acknowledged at the enforcement l
conference that sufficient training had not been provided i
to licensed operators with respect to what conditions constitute " loops not filled."
In sum, the staff cannot conclude that the operators acted to willfully violate the TS. Therefore, while understanding of TS applicability and awareness of plant conditions are important aspects of a l
senior operator's performance, absent a willful act, the j
facility licensee nonna11y is held accountable by the NRC for the actions of its employees.
With regard to the former operations manager, whether he acted in willful violation of the TS is e difficult staff finds the TS intent to be clear (g of the TS, the question. While he disputes the meanin do not open the i
valves in Mode 5 with loops not filled).- In addition, he raised the issue of the permissibility of voluntary entry into TS ACTION requirements, stating that past practice as he was aware of it allowed such entries.
It is the staff's position that voluntary entry into the TS ACTION requirement is precluded by the language of the TS. The TS specifically l.
provides that the valves shall be secured and closed and the i
use of the word "innediately" in the TS ACTION requirement l-4 d-
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The Commissioners 4-makes that intent clear.* The staff is also troubled by the fact that when he was made aware of a possible problem with complying with the TS, he spent very little time actually j
pursuing his basis for concurring in proceeding with the opening of the valves to permit the chemical addition.
Further, he did not contact those persons or groups normally responsible for helping make these types of decisions, such l
as the plant manager or the-plant Review Board. Finally, a determination that the evolution could not proceed because i
of TS restrictions might have impacted the plant's critical i
path to outage completion. While the former operations 1
manager stated at the enforcement conference that he was j'
authorized to delete the evolution from the outage schedule, it-is.not clear that he could have done that without other approvals or at least notifications. On the other hand, 4
when the question of the TS applicability was initially
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raised with him, he did place the evolution on hold j
temporarily and he did do some research into the matter.
4 The former operations manager maintains that when questioned about the TS by the senior operators, he l
researched the various applicable documents and questioned a more experienced senior owrator before reaching the conclusion that operating tie valves under administrative controls (which would preclude an uncontrolled boron dilution) would not violate the.TS. According to the TS basis, the TS was in place to preclude an uncontrolled I
dilution of the reactor's primary system. While the staff agrees that proper administrative controls could have satisfied the TS basis, they could not satisfy the TS requirements.
Further, it must be pointed out that the controls the then operations manager had put in place were i
only verbal instructions and not the expected written j
procedural directives.
l The heart of the disagreement between the staff and both
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the former operations manager and the facility licensee is the proper interpretation of the TS in view of its basis. The staff maintains that the words of the TS l
clearly prevent any boron dilutions in Mode 5, loops not i
filled, by prohibiting all manipulations of the RMWST valves and thereby prohibiting all dilutions, controlled or t
uncontrolled. The former operations manager claims he concluded that use of administrative controls which in this case consisted of limiting the amount of time the valves could be opened during the chemical additions, satisfied L
The staff recognizes that in the past it has allowed voluntary entries into E
.various TS ACTION requirements and has not provided an explicit TS definition of the term "innediately." However,-in this case when the TS is read as a whole.it is. clear that the valves are to be closed and secured and if that requirement is followed the issue of "immediately" is not reached.
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The Connissioners- -
i the TS basis. Further, he claims that his understanding of voluntary entries in TS ACTION requirements reinforced his i
l belief that his decision was a correct one. The staff finds l
these to be plausible though flawed arguments to support i
the opening of the valves. Both the former operations manager and GPC are willing now to accept the staff's interpretation of the TS. However, both the former operations manager and the facility licensee continue to maintain that j
their 1988 reading was reasonable at the time and therefore they believe that no violation of the TS occurred.
Based on the above, while the staff cannot conclude that the
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former operations manager acted willfully and therefore does not intend to take enforcement action against him, it does intend to issue the enclosed letter which points out the shortcomings the staff found in his dispositioning of this 1ssue. Because, as discussed earlier, the staff cannot conclude the two senior operators who were issued Demands 1
acted willfully, the enclosed letters will also be issued, closing this matter with respect to their involvement.
As the facility licensee, however, GPC is held responsible under the enforcement policy for all regulatory violations caused by its employees, whether willful or not. As stated earlier, the staff maintains that the words of the TS are clear and notwithstanding the licensee's arguments about the basis of the TS and the acceptability of voluntary entry into the ACTION requirement, a violation occurred.
In addition, during the course of the investigation and the staff's subsequent review of the events, a number of other regulatory violations, including the reporting violation mentioned earlier, were identified. Therefore, the staff intends to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) to GPC. As indicated in the Notice, the base civil penalty of $50,000 has been escalated 100% to reflect NRC identification of the violation and the licensee's lack of long-term corrective actions.
Recomendation:
The staff recommends that the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty be issued to the GPC and the enclosed letters be issued to William Kitchens, the former operations manager at Vogtle, as well as Jimy Cash and John Bowles, Vogtle senior licensed operators.
If the Comission does not direct otherwise the staff intends to issue these documents two weeks from the date of this paper.
Coordination:
The Otrice of the General Counsel has no legal objection to this action. The Office of Investigations concludes that the facts used herein that are taken from the invest mation report are carrect, and that the sumariza-tion of'the investigation conclusions are accurate.
The 00missioners ~
Note:
This paper discusses a pending enforcement action and therefore should not be publicly disclosed.
James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations
Enclosure:
As stated 4
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d Docket No.-50-424' i
License No.NPF-68 l-
- EA 91-141 Georgia Power Company.
L ATTN:
Mr. W. G.'Hairston, III
' Senior'Vice. President -
Nuclear Operations i.
_ Post Office Box 1295 i
Birmingham, Alabama 35201 i
Gentlemen:
[
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OFLVIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL i'
PENALTY - $100,000 (NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 1:
NO. 2-90-001)
,This' refers to the investigation conducted by the Nuclear Esgulatory Commission's Office of Investigations (OI) at Georgia i
. Power Company's (GPC) Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) which was completed on March 19, 1991.
The investigation was initiated as a result of information received by Region II in
- January 1990, alleging-that VEGP Unit 1 was intentionally placed
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in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS).
The I
i event in question involved the alleged willful violation of TS 3.4.1.4.2 that occurred when Unit-1 Reactor Makeup Water. Storage Tank (RMWST) valves were opened to facilitate chemical cleaning i
j of the Reactor. coolant ~ System - (RCS) in October 1988, while the plant was in a refueling outage.
The TS required the RMNST 1
valves to be closed and secured in position chile the plant was in Mode 5 with the reactor coolant loops not' 1'illed.
A notice of l-enforcement conference and Demand for Information' was sent to you on June 3, 1991.
An enforcement conference was held on September 19, 1991, in the Region II office to discuss this issue, its cause, and subsequent corrective actions taken.
As a result of questions raised during the enforcement conference, a supplemental response to the Demand for Infermation was requested.
The. additional information was received by the NRC on October 1, 1991.
The list of personnel in attendance at the i
enforcement conference and ccpies of the presentatfor. material
- provided by your staff during the enforcement conference are l
enclosed.
The violations described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty-(Notice) resulted from the failure of GPC management tc provide adequate procedures, appropriate tr'aining~and guidance relative to mid-loop operation, and' planning assistance to operations personnel-at VEGP during the first' refueling outage and associated chemical cleaning i
evolution that involved the-injection of chemicals into the RCS.
- As a result of this failure, several'VEGP' operators and operations management personnel placed the plant in an unanalyzed condition.
Furthermore, the root cause that led to the inappropriateLvalve manipulations condition _were not fully i
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Georgia Power Company 2
- addressed by GPC management until more than a year after the l
4 events.
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The NRC staff recognizes that GPC maintains that the basis of TS j,
3.4.1.4.2, precluding an uncontrollsed boron dilution, was met by operating the valves under administrative controls.
However, the words of the T.S. prohibit uncontrolled boron dilutions in Mode
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5, loops not filled, by prohibiting all dilutions through the j
flow path at issue.
Additionally, the NRC staff understands your position about voluntary entry into the TS ACTION requirement.
i Again the NRC staff concludes that the words of the requirement clearly prohibit entering ACTION 6c. of TS 3.4.1.4.2.
- However, j
the issues specific to the TS aside, procedures and training were inadequate.
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The violations, when considered collectively, indicate a significant breakdown in managerial and administrative controls
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i of licensed activities in a number of interrelated areas.
Such a 1
l 1 breakdown is also indicative of a significant lack of attention to licensed responsibilities by plant personnel.
This breakdown in control was wide-ranging in that it not only involved inadequate actions and faulty decisions during the event by individual senior licensed operators in management positions, but j'
included the Plant Review Board which subsequently performed an i
inadequate review of reportability, failed to recognize that an j
-unanalyzed condition existed, and consequently confirmed the reasonableness of a flawed Technical Specification interpretation.
Therefore, in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
(Enforcement Policy) 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the L
violations are classified in the aggregate as a Severity Level III problem.
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l After careful deliberation, the NRC has concluded that based on l
the evidence available a willful violation of regulatory requirements due to the manipulation of the RMWST valves in i
October 1988 could not be substantiated.
This conclusion was i
based on the OI report, a review of the information provided by your staff in the several responses to Demands for Information which were received on August 29, 1991, as well as presentations at the enforcement conferences on September 19, 1991.
The NRC
.also recognizes that the personnel who were directly involved in this matter provided credible assurances that they intend to comply with regulatory requirements in the future.
To emphasize the importance of ensuring that plant staff is complying with Technical Specifications, and that management is maintaining control of plant activities I have been' authorized, after concultation with the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor' Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, and the
' Commission to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $100,000 I
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Georgia' Power Company 3
for the Severity Level III-problem.
The base value of a civil penalty for a severity Level III problem is $50,000.
The escalation and mitigation factors in the Enforcement Policy were considered.
The base civil penalty was escalated by 50 percent because the i
violations: vere identified by the NRC and should,have been i
identified when the questions were raised by your staff.
l Escalation of 50 percent was applied for the corrective action factor since no corrective action was promptly taken to prevent 2
recurrence.
Even as-late as one year after the initial occurrence, the Plant Review Board had still not made the
.cppropriate reportability decision regarding the circumstances of opening the RMWST valves because an adequate root cause i
evaluation had yet to be made.
They did, however, initiate actions to change the operable Technical specification.
The 4
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other adjustment factors in the Policy were' considered and no j
.further adjustment to the base civil penalty is considered appropriate.
Therefore, based on the above, the base civil j
penalty has been increased by 100 percent.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response.
Your response may cross reference year previous submittals concerning these events.
In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional action you plan to prevent recurrence. ~After reviewing your response to i
i this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether 4
further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance
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with NRC regulatory requirements.
i In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's
" Rules of i
Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
Also being placed in the PDR now that our evaluation of these events is complete are the i
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Georgia Power Company 4
Demand for Information sent to you and your response to it.
The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearan~e procedures of the Office of Management c
and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.
Sincerely, 1
a Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator
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Enclosures:
1.
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty 5
2.
Copy of licensee presentation material i
i 3.
List of Attendees at NRC enforcement conference, 9/19/91 1
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- Georgia Power Company 5
cc w/encls:
R. P. Mcdonald
' Executive Vice President-Nuclear 1
Operations Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 C. K. McCoy Vice President-Nuclear 4
Georgia Power Company P. - O.
1295 i
Biriingham, AL 35201
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i W. B. Shipman General Manager, Nuclear Operations Georgia Power Company i
P. O.
1600 Waynesboro, GA 30830 j
J. A. Bailey-Manager-Licensing Georgia Power Company P. O.
Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 D. Kirkland, III, Counsel Office of the Consumer's Utility Council Suite 225, 32 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30302 Office'of Planning and Budget Room 615B 270 Washington Street, SW Atlanta, GA 30334 1
Office of the County Commissioner Burke County Commission Waynesboro, GA 30830 Joe D. Tanner, Commissioner Department of N&tural Resources 205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252 Atlanta, GA 30334 Thomas Hill, Manager Radioactive. Materials Program Department of Natural Resources 878 Peachtree St., NE., Room 600 Atlanta, GA 30309 i
Georgia Power Company 6
Attorney General Law Department 132 Judicial Building i
' Atlanta, GA 30330 l
Dan Smith, Program Director of Power Production oglethorpe Power Corporation 2100 East Exchange Place 4
P. O. Box 1349 i
Tucker, GA 30085-1349 Charles A. Patrizia, Esq.
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 12th Floor l
l 1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, D.
C.
20036 4
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' Georgia. Power Company 7
bec w/ encl:
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. SECY CA i
JSniezek,'DEDR SEbneter, RII' JLieberman, OE JLuehman, OE i
J JPartlow,'NRR JGoldberg, OGC Enforcement Coordinators RI,'RII, RIII, RIV, RV FIngram, PA l
BHayes, OI DWilliams, OIG EJordan, AEOD FA File Day File f
~ S. Sparks, RII D. Hood, NRR P. Skinner, RII A. Hardt, RII Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
P. O. Box 572 Waynesboro, GA 30830 i
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4 NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Georgia Power Company Docket No. 50-424 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant License No. NPF-68 Unit 1 EA 91-141 During an NRC investigation conducted between February 1,
- 1990, and March 19, 1991, violations of NRC requirements were identified.
In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10'CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.
2282, and 10 CFR 2.205.
The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
J A.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.1.4.2 (1988 edition) i required that two residual heat removal (RHR) trains shall be OPERABLE and at least one RHR train shall be in operation.
Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) discharge valves (1208-U4-175, 1208-U4-176, 1208-U4-177, and 1208-U4-183) shall be closed and secured in position whenever the plant is in Mode 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled.
ACTION c. of TS 3.4.1.4.2 required that with the RMWST valves not closed and secured in position immediately, close and secure them in position.
Contrary to the above, on October 12 and 13, 1988, with Unit 1 in Mode 5, loops not filled RMWST valves 1208-U4-170 and 1208-U4-177 were, opened in order to add chemicals to the Reactor Coolant system.
B.
50.73 (a) (2) (ii) (B) requires licensees to submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) within 30 days after the discovery of any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in a condition outside the design basis of the plant.
Contrary to the above, on or about November 17, 1989, the Plant Review Board (PRB) determined that the opening of the RMWST valvr.s specified in TS 3.4.1.4.2 was not reportable and therefore an LER was not submitted within 30 days, even though opening the valves on October 12, and 13, 1988 had placed the plant in a condition outside the design basis.
i Opening the valves constituted a condition outside thc plant design basis because at the time the valves were opened an analysis for a boron dilution accident through the valves did not exist.
C.
Technical Specification 6.7.1 requires written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities recommended by Appendix A of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.
Section 2 of j
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Notice of-Violation 2
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Appendix A of RG 1.33, recommends procedures for general plant operation.
The following procedures, in part implement TS 6.7.1.
1.
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Operations Procedure Number 12006-C, Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown, in use on October 12 and 13, 1988, stated in
.Section D4.2.14 that valves 1-1208-U4-175, 1-1208-U4-1 176, 1-1208-U4-177, 1-1208-U4-181, 1-1208-U4-183, and i
others be closed, locked and tagged in Mode 5 loops not i
a filled.
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2.
VEGP Procedure-10000-C, Conduct of Operations, Section
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2.10.2 in use October 12 and 13, 1988, stated that the Unit Superintendent (US) is responsible to ensure plant operations are conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications and approved procedures.
I Contrary to the above:
e 1.
On October 12 and 13, 1988, licensee personnel failed 4
to implement the requirements of procedure number 12006-C in that, valves 1-1208-U4-176 and -177 and 181, which were required to be closed, locked and tagged, were opened in Mode 5 loops not filled.
l 2.
On October 12 and 13, 1988, the US did not ensure that 1
plant operations were conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications in that valves 1-1208-U4-176 and -177 were opened in Mode 5 loops not filled with i
the express knowledge of the US.
D.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B,-Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
VEGP Procedure No. 13007-1, VCT Gas Control and RCS Chemical Addition, Section 4.7, Procedure No. 35110-C, Chemistry control of the Reactor Coolant System, Section 4.7 provide the instructions on chemical additions to the Reactor Coolant System.
Contrary to the above, on October 12, and 13, 1988, VEGP
. Procedure Nos. 13007-1 and 35110-C.were inadequate-in that these procedures did not contain provisions for adding chemicals to the. reactor coolant system in Mode 5, loops not filled.- Specifically, the procedures specify such conditions as having a reactor coolant pump running which is not.possible in Mode 5, loops-not filled.
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-Notice of-Violation 3
This is a Severity. Level III problem (Supplement 1).
Civil Penalty - $100,000 (assessed equally among the four violations).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Leorgia Power Company 1
is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice of j
Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice).
i This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each alleged violation:
(1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, and if denied, the reasons why, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be i
achieved.
If an adequate reply is not received within the time j
specified in this Notice, an order or a demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.
Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by j
letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order, or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part, by a j
written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued.
Should the Licensee elect to file an i
answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil i
penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may:
(1) deny i
the violations listed in this Notice in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed.
In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the j
penalty.
t-In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors i
addressed in Section V.B of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988),
i should be addressed.
Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference
(
(e.g., citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition.
The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282(c).
The' response noted above (Reply to Notice of Violation, letter 1
with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to:
Director, Office of Enforcement,.U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II, a
copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this day of November 1991 i
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4 Docket No.. 55-20395 License No. SOP-20458-1 j
EA 91-066
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Mr. John E. Bowles
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HOME ADDRESS DELETED
'UNDER 10 CFR 2.790 t
Dear Mr. Bowles
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SUBJECT:
~ NRC REVIEW OF DEMAND FOR INFORMATION RESPONSE By letter dated June'3, 1991, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory j
Commission's (NRC) Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research provided you with a 2
Demand for Information.
The basis for the Demand for Information 1
l Lwas your. involvement in an apparent willful violation of Vogtle i
- Electric Generating Plant Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2.
The event in question occurred on October 12, 1988,.and involved the j
opening of Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) discharge valves 1-1208-U4-176 and 1-1208-U4-177 to' facilitate a chemical
}
cleaning evolution of the Reactor Coolant System when Technical Specifications required.the valves to be closed and secured in
!~
position while the plant was in Mode 5.
This event occurred i
while you were on duty as a Shift Supervisor.
I We received'your~ August 29, 1991 response to the Demand for Information and a careful review.and evaluation has been i
completed..
In the Demand for Information of June 3, 1991, you were advised that various sources of information would be used in j'
' deciding what NRC actions, if any, would be appropriate regarding your continued involvement'in 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 55 licensed activities.
We have' carefully considered your detailed response which provided additional clarification of the issue, information received during enforcement conferences conducted on September 19, 1991, with representatives of Georgia Power Company, and-1, other information developed during the course of NRC's review of this matter.
i After deliberation and subsequent consultation with the Deputy Executive Director-for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional f
Operations and Research, and the Commission it has been decided Lthatino additional enforcement action'will'be taken regarding.
your NRC license.
Although your actions did not meet NRC expectations, there is insufficient evidence to support a Lconclusion that your actions relative to opening the RMWST valves on October 12,.1988, involved a deliberate attempt on your part to disregard and intentionally circumvent plant Technical'
-Specifications.
Nevertheless, the TS was violated in that the h
k,
Mr..Jehn E. Bowles 2
l words of the TS clearly prohibit uncontrolled boron dilutions in Mode 5,_ loops not filled, by prohibiting all dilutions through i
the specific flow path.
. As a licensed Senior Reactor Operator serving as a Shift Supervisor it is incumbent upon you to remain totally involved in those activities under your direct responsibility.
Your admitted 4
j reliance on assumptions, lack of awareness of ongoing operational conditions, and a less than adequate understanding of mid-loop operation collectively contributed to your inability to identify
)!
- the manipulation of the RMWST valves as a conflict with-Technical Specifications.
l You are reminded that you hold a license from the United States f
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission which confers upon you a special j
trust and confidence that you will do your utmost to ensure the safe operation of the Vogtle Electric. Generating Plant.
Inherent in this.is the presumption that your approach to operational decisions is made with extreme care and in full compliance with
- regulatory requirements.
l You are not required to respond to this letter, which will be j
made a part of your.NRC docket file.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR).
Also being placed in the PDR now, that our evaluation of these events is complete, are the Demand for Information that was sent to'you and your response to it.
Sincerely, i
l-Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator cc:
Georgia Power Company ATTN:
W. G. Hairston, III Sr. Vice President -
Nuclear Operations Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 6
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. Docket No. 55-20551-1 License No. SOP-20461-1 l-EA 91-065 Mr. Jimmy P. Cash HOME., ADDRESS DELETED UNDER 10 CFR 2.790
Dear Mr. Cash:
i.
SUBJECT:
NRC REVIEW OF DEMAND FOR INFORMATION RESPONSE By etter dated June 3, 1991, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's - (NRC) Deputy ' Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research provided you with a L
Demand-for-Information.
The basis for the Demand for Information Lwas:your involvement in an apparent willful violation of Vogtle
{
-Electric Generating Plant Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2.
The fevent in question occurred on October 12 and.13, 1988,' and involved the opening of Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) i i
discharge valves 1-1208-U4-176 and 1-1208-U4-177 to facilitate'a i
chemical' cleaning evolution of.the Reactor Coolant System when L
Technical Specifications required the valves to be closed and j
secured in position while the plant was in Mode'5.
This event occurred while you were on duty as Operations Superin,tendent On Shift.
'We received'your August 29, 1991 response to the Demand for j
t Information and a careful review and. evaluation has been completed.
In the Demand for Information of June 3, 1991, you were advised that various sources of information would be used in
. deciding what NRC actions, if any, would be appropriate regarding j
your continued involvement in 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR'Part 55
)
licensed activities.
We have. carefully considered your detailed response which provided additional clarification of the issues, information received during enforcement conferences conducted on September 19, 1991,.with representatives of Georgia Power' Company, and other information developed during the course of NRC's review of thir matter.
4 After deliberation and subsequent consultation with the Deputy i
Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional i
Operations: and Research, and the commission it has been-decided that no additional enforcement action will be taken regarding l-your NRC license.
Although.your actions did not' meet NRC expectations, there is insufficient evidence to support a
- conclusion: that. your actions relative to the opening of the RMWST 4
valves.on October 12 and 13,.1988, involved a' deliberate attempt fon your part toLdisregard and intentionally circumvent plant'
-Technical Specifications.'
Nevertheless, the TS was violated in 4
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Mr. Jimmy P. Cash 2
1 that the words of the TS clearly prohibit uncontrolled boron dilutions in Mode 5, loops not filled, by prohibiting all dilutions through the specific flow path.
s As a Senior Reactor Operator serving as the Operations l
Superintendent On Shift, a position of critical importance and j
high responsibility, it was incumbent upon you to be totally 1
i aware of those activities under your direct responsibility.
In your August 29, 1991 response you stated that you were not involved in the evolutions in question, but that others on your chift were; that the chemical addition was a pre-planned outage activity; and that you were involved in several significant l
activities other than the Reactor Coolant System cleaning evolution.
These are understandable activities which may have temporarily deflected your attention, but they should not be used i
to minimize your overall responsibility for ensuring your awareness of activities involving mid-loop operations wherein the manipulation of RMWST valves conflicted with Technical i
Specifications.
You are. reminded that you hold a license from the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission which confers upon you a special trust and confidence that you will do your utmost to ensure the j
safe operation of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.
Inherent in this is the presumption that your approach to operational decisions is made with extreme care and in full compliance with
}
regulatory requirements.
You are not required to respond to this letter, which will be made a part of your NRC docket file.
l I
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of l
Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room i
(PDR).
Also being placed in the PDR now that our evaluation of g
these events is complete are the Demand for Information that was j
sent to you and your response to it.
4 1
Sincerely, 1
I 1
Stewart D.
Ebneter Regional Administrator i
cc:
Georgia Power Company ATTN:
W. G. Hairston, III l
Sr. Vice President -
Nuclear Operations Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 1
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a Docket No.- 55-20117 License No. SOP-20467-1 EA 91-064-Mr. William F. Kitchens HOME ADDRESS DELETED UNDER 10 CFR 2.790
Dear.Mr.. Kitchens:
lSUB5ECTI. ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE OF SEPTEMBER 19,'1991 By letter dated June 3, 1991, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC). Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research' notified you of a pending enforcement conference and provided you with a Demand for
-Information.. Those actions were predicated upon an apparent willful _ violation of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Technical Specification 3.4.1.4.2-involving the opening of Unit 1 Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RNWST) valves to facilitate chemical
' cleaning of the Reactor Coolant System when Technical specifications required the valves be closed and secured in position while the plant was in Mode 5.
Your August 29, 1991 response to the Demand for Information was reviewed by the staff.
On September 19, 1991, an enforcement conference was conducted with you in the NRC Region II office with your attorney, and several members of the Georgia Power Company staff in attendance at your request.
)
Following completion of a detailed review and evaluation of all
. relevant information in this matter by the staff, and after l careful deliberation and subsequent. consultation with the Deputy
{
Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, and the Commission it has been decided i
that no additional enforcement action will be taken regarding your NRC license.
Although your actions did not meet NRC expectations, there is insufficient evidence to support a conclu-sion that your actions relative to opening the RMWST valves on October 12 and 13, 1988, were a deliberate attempt to disregard and intentionally-circumvent plant Technical Specifications.
Nevertheless, the.NRC maintnins that the.TS was violated in that the words of the.TS clearly ~ prohibit uncontrolled boron dilutions in' Mode 5, loops not filled, by prohibiting all dilutions through the specific _ flow path.-.
Further, the NRC recognizes the
. arguments you.made about the acceptability of voluntary entry cinto'the TS ACTION requirement.
However, the words of the requirement preclude such an entry.
4,
In reaching this conclusion,-the overall unacceptability of your i
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was balanced against several factors that, after considerable review, were found to ultimately weigh in your favor.
Some of those factors included your stopping operations to review the chemical cleaning evolution after members of the plant operations staff raised the potential conflict between the chemical addition activity and the Technical Specification; your admittedly brief discussions with another management level person regarding the 1
. applicability of the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation with the associated Action Statement requiring i
immediate action;'
your review of the Techn'ical Specification l
basis and relevant portions of the Final Safety Analysis Report l
for.the plant that apparently led you to the erroneous conclusion 1
that opening the valves for a short period of time was j
permissible; the operations log entries for the dates in question indicating that the valves were opened; and, the absence of any indication that attempts were made to conceal the valve
' manipulations on October 12 and 13, 1986.
}
In retrospect, some of the actions you took were inadequate under the circumstances, and reflect adversely cn your control of 4
operational activities.
We recognize that you accepted full
{
responsibility for the decision to open the valves and now f
realize that it was not permissible to voluntarily enter an
)
immediate action statement.
It would appear that your conduct in this matter lacked the high degree of discipline and judgment expectsd of a licensed individual in your position.
Your haste to justify the valve manipulations with logic that does not i
support a conclusion that valves required to be closed and l
H secured could be opened, even momentarily, gives the appearance l
of prioritizing critical scheduling requirements ovar prudent operational considerations.
L i
You are reminded that you hold a license from the United States j
Nuclear Regulatory Commission which confers upon you a special i
trust and confidence that you will do your utmost to ensure the l
safe operation of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant.
Inherent j
in this is the presumption that your approach to operational decisions which could affect the safety of the plant are made with extreme care and conservative deliberation that ensures that
)
1 j
such critical decisions are in full compliance with regulatory requirements.
You are not required to respond to this letter, which will be i
made a part of your NRC docket file.
l i
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6
. i
e Mr. William F. Kitchens 3
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR).
Also being placed in the PDR now that our evaluation of these event is complete are the Demand for Information that was sent to you and your response to it.
Sincerely, Stewart D. Ebneter Regional Administrator cc:
Georgia Power Company ATTN:
W. G.
Hairston, III Sr. Vice President -
Nuclear Operations Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 i
1 1
Georges Power Company 40 trwmees Ceneer PerDwey Post Ofice Box 1295 j
Bem,ngnam. Alacema 35201 Teeepnone 205 877 7122 L
3 g. c. Georgia Power
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' r"nesourneme,cuesysvem f** 'y **'
November 22, 1991 ELV-03243 1214 Docket No. 50-424 U. S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.
20555 Gentlemen:
V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP FLOW DURING DRAINDOWN OF REACTOR CAVITY 1
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the enclosed report related to an event which occurred on October 26, 1991.
Sincerely, C. K. McCoy CKM/NJS/geb
Enclosure:
LER 50-424/1991-009 xc: Georcia Power Company i
Mr. W. B. Shipman Mr. M. Shelbani NORMS Mr.S.D.Ebneter,RegionalAdministrator/
U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission l
Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle r
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TITLE (6) l IDSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMWAL PLB(P FIDil DIELDIG DRAINDuiti 0F REACIOR CAVIIY EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUNsER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTNER FACILITIES INVOLVED (5)
NONTN DAY TRAR TEAR SEE sun REV NONTN DAf TEAR FACILITT NAME5 SOCEET "L ?"R(5) 05000 i
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WEA CODE 404 826-3209 MEHDI SHEIBANI, NUCIEAR SAFE 1Y AND CIMPLIANCE i.ud LETE oME LINE FOR EACM FAILURE DE5CRIBED IN TNI5 REP 01T (13) gP T
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i A51 TRACT (16) l l
On October 26, 1991, tinit I was in a refueling outage. Core reload was complete but the reactor head had not been installed and the reactor cavity was flooded.
i i
At 1833 EDT, the 1A residual heat removal (RHR) pump was started to lower the cavity to just below the reactor flange to allow reinstallation of the head.
l During the last segment of the draindown evolution, indications of vortexing and air entrainment were observed for the IB RHR pump which was operating at a l
higher flowrate in the shutdown cooling mode. Operators took action to reduce j
the flow of the 18 pump and to stop the draindown via the 1A pump. However, the j
discharge pressure for the IB pump remained low. A subsequent review of computer data indicated the 18 pump was operating at or near no-flow conditions.
1 I
The 1A pump was realigned to raise the reactor coolant system (RCS) level.
j Reduced shutdown cooling, via the 15 pmRp, was reestablished within 16 minutes
^
from the time the 15 pump started showing indication of vortexing, and full shutdown cooling was reestablished within 50 minutes.
j
'Ihe event was caused by inaccurate RCS level indication due to an inadequate pressurizer vent path. A pressuriser safety valve had been removed, and it was thought that an adequate vent path existed; however, a high efficiency i
particulate air (HEFA) filter had been attached (via a flexible duct) to the flange opening for the safety valve and obstructed the vent, causing a vacuum to develop during the draindown resulting in false hi h RCS level indication.
5 i
j Corrective actions include revising procedures to ensure verification of vent paths for all evolutions and tightening controls for HEFA filter installations.
4 j
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TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY mant (1) occKti numsta (r)
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v001U IUCIRIC GDERATDC PIAlff - INIT 1 05000424 91 009 00 2
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REQUIREMENT POR REPORT This report is required per 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(v) since the inadvertent draining of the reactor coolant system (RCS) to a level less than that i
indicated by available level instrumentation could have potentially prevented the fulfillment of the residual heat removal (RHR) safety function of the RHR system.
5.
UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT Unit I was shut down in Mode 6 (Refueling) with the reactor vessel head removed. Core reload had been completed and the upper internals had been reinstalled. The Train 5 RHK pump was aligned to provide recirculation shutdown cooling and was operating at a flowrate of approximately 3000 Sal / min. The Train A RHR pump was aligned to drain the reactor cavity by taking suction from the RCS loop 1 hot leg and discharging to the refueling water storage tank (RUST) and was operating at a flowrote of approximately 675 gal / min. RCS system temperature was approximately 88 F and RCS pressure was atmospheric since the reactor head was removed.
C.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT i
At 1724 EDT on October 26, 1991, post refueling operations were initiated per the instructions of Unit Operating Procedure 12000-C, " Post Refueling Operations (Mode 6 to Mode 5)."
The reactor cavity water level was at an elevation of 210 ft 4 in. and the first major task to be accomplished was to lower the level to 192 ft (i.e., 2 feet below the reactor vessel head flange level) to allow the reinstallation of the reactor vessel head.
(Note: Unit 1amid-loop" elevation is 187 ft and reduced inventory controls are required by procedure whenever level is reduced below 191 ft.) To lower the level, Procedure 12000-C directs the operator to establish draining using the RHR l
system per operating instructions provided in Procedure 13011-1, " Residual Heat Ramoval System."
Prior to commencing the draindown, control room operators contacted j
Maintenance Department and Outage Support personnel to determine the status of the pressurizer code safety valves. Information was provided that one of the code safety valves was removed. Just prior to the start of cavity 1
l draining, an assistant plant operator (APO) in the Unit 1 containment was l
contacted and directed to establish a watch at the tygon tube which is used i *
- ~
for monitoritig RCS level during draindown and "mid-loop" operations. During the outage, a modification had been implemented to install a " permanent" sight glass (a permanently installed piping system connected to a tygon tube l
with a mounted scale) in the Unit 1 containment for use in monitoring RCS i
level. Although it had been installed, the new might glass had neither been tested nor released for operations use. The APO was not aware of the
. modification status of the new sight glass. He had noticed the sight glass after it was installed, had received training on the sight glass, and during 1
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DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUN 8ER (5)
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TEAR 5[Q NUM REV 1
90Gr!E EIACIRIC GDGRATDIG PIAlff - INIT 1 05000424 91 009 00 3
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the previous Unit 2 outage, had seen an identical sight glass being monitored in the Unit 2 containment. Therefore, the APO interpreted the control room instruction as direction to monitor the new " permanent" sight glass versus the backup " temporary" tygon tube which is installed and q
removed during each refueling outage. gased on his understanding, the APO 1
proceeded to the new sight glass and established communications for monitoring the draindown.
At 1833 EDT, the draindown was started with the 1A RHR pump being used to pump water at a flowrate of approximately 1000 gal / min to the RWST. The 15 RHR pump was operating to provide recirculation shutdown cooling at a 1
i flowrote of approximately 3000 gal / min. At 1848 EDT, the night shift unit i
shift supervisor (USS) relieved the day shift USS. The reactor cavity water level was noted to be at an elevation of approximately 208 ft as indicated by the pressuriser cold calibrated level indicator (1LI-462). At 1930 EDT, a night shift plant equipment operator (PEO) arrived in the Unit 1 containment to relieve the day shift APO who was performing the tygon tube j
watch. The control room reported that level was approximately 207 ft.
This meant that the sight glass being monitored should be coming on scale; i
however, no level indication could be observed in the sight glass as yet.
Im estigation by the oncoming PE0 then found the permanent sight glass was not valved-in correctly. The control room was informed and the draindown 4
was stopped while the problem was investigated. The PE0 and the APO then proceeded to valve-in, fill, and vent the permanent sight glass and the sight glass level rose to 205 ft 6 in.
In valving-in the permanent sight glass, the PEO and the APO did not utilize procedural guidance and, consequently, an upper isolation valve was inadvertently left closed. This error was not recognized at the time, apparently because the level indicated by the permanent sight glass was then consistent with the level indicated by j
the temporary tygon tube and with control room indication. The sight glass l
was believed to be providing an accurate indication of level.
i l
At approximately 2010 EDT, the draindown was resumed. A drain.t,wn flowrate j
of approximately 1000 gal / min was maintained until indicated reactor cavity level was at 202 ft 6 in.
The flowrote was then increased to a reading of approximately 2500 gal / min, which was maintained until the indicated level was at 197 ft.
The flowrate was then reduced to approximately 1800 gal / min, and within approximately 6 minutes, to approximately 900 gal / min.
At 2200 EDT, with a reactor cavity level of approximately 194 ft being j
reported by tEh tygon tube watch, annunciator ALB06 D03, " Accumulator (4 Hi/14 Level," was received in the Unit 1 control room. This annunciator was j
part of a recently added modification to provide a temporary RCS high level alarm (setpoint 192 ft 6 in) during refueling operations. On receiving the j
annunciator, the control room reactor operator oleserved level indicator I
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DOCKET NUM8ER (2)
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V0GTE E2CIRIC CDMRATDC PLANT - INIT 1 05000424 91 009 00 4
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1U -957 to be at top of scale (100 percent) and tapped on the indicator.
This caused 1U -957 level indication to drop to 60 percent (i.e., 190 ft 9 l
in). The draindown was stopped by realigning the A RHR pump so that it temporarily recirculated to the RCS. The PEO performing the sight glass 1
watch was directed to visually verify RCS levei. The PEO reported that the level appeared to be even with the reactor vessel head flange (194 ft),
l which agreed with the level indicated by the permanent sight glass and the temporary tygen tube. The control room contacted an Instrumentation and l
Controls (I&C) foreman and discussed the IU -957 indicated level. The I&C
~
foreman indicated that the reference leg for 1U -957 might need to be filled. Therefore, it was decided that 1U -957 was not providing an accurate indication of level and, since it was believed that three reliable j
indications of level (i.e., vessel visual, the permanent sight glass, and the temporary tygon tube) were available, it was decided to continue with j
the draindown to 192 ft.
i l
At approximately 2217 EDT', the draindown was resumed at a reduced flowrate j
of approximately 675 gal / min. At approximately 2233 EDT, with a level of approximately 193 ft being indicated by the sight glass, a control roon 2
operator observed discharge pressure, flow, and motor current oscillations i
for the 18 RHR pump, indicating that vortexing or cavitation of the pump was occurring. Operator action was taken as directed by Abnormal Operating Procedure 18019-C, "Imss of Residual Heat Removal," to close the discharge valves for the 1B RHR pump, putting the 15 RHR pump on miniflow. Motor current readings for the 15 RHR pump stabilized; however, discharge pressure 1
j remained low. At this time, 1U -957 was observed to be at approximately 30 j
percent (i.e., 188 ft 3 in) and narrow range instrument 1U -950 was observed to be at approximately 60 percent (i.e., 187 ft 6 in).
i
~
At approximately 2234 EDT, the draindt,wn was stopped by closing the 4
i discharge valves for the 1A RHR pump so that it was operating on miniflow.
}
The 1A RHR pump was then shut down and its suction was realigned to the RUST. At approximately 2239 EDT, the 1A RHR pump was restarted and operated at a flowrate of approximately 400 gal / min to transfer water from the RWST l
back to the RCS.
Shortly after beginning the refill of the RCS, the i
discharge pressure of the 15 RHR pump began to show some improvement and a j
recirculation cooling flow of approximately 350 gal / min was reestablished.
At approximately 2244 EDT, the 1A RHR pump discharge valves were closed, 4
placing the 1A RHR pump on miniflow. The 1A RHR pump suction was realigned to the RCS and leakage through the discharge valve provided a recirculation j
cooling flow of approximately 350 gal / min. At this time, an attempt was made to increase the recirculation cooling flow of the 1B RHR pump.
j However, after increasing flow to approximately 2600 gal / min, indications of
)
vortexing or cavitation were again observed. The 15 RHR pump flow was reduced to 1800 gal / min and the pump operated satisfactorily with no indication of vortexing or cavitation.
(Note: A subsequent review of computer data indicated that RCS temperature began to decrease at this
,i time.) Additional refill of the RCS appeared to be required ts obtain
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TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAMI (2)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
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PAGE (3)
TEAR 5LQ NUM REV 90GTIE EU!CIRIC CENDtATING P1 ANT - INIT 1 05000424 91 009 00 5
DF 9
TEX 1 full recirculation cooling flow of the IB RHR pump. Therefore, the 1A RHR pump was again aligned to take suction from the RUST.
At approximately 2256 EDT, the refill of the RCS was reinitiated at a flowrate of approximately 400 gal / min. The refill was terminated at approximately 2310 EDT, and level as indicated by the sight glass was 194 ft 10 in.
A visual check of the reactor vessel level was made and level appeared to be almost even with (i.e.,1 in below) the vessel flange.
At approximately 2316 EDT, another attempt was made to obtain full recirculation cooling flow for the 15 RHR pump. The 15 RHR pump flow was j
increased to approximately 3000 gal / min and the pump operated satisfactorily r
with no indication of vortexing or cavitation.
Due to concerns about the adequacy of the level instrumentation that was monitored during the draindown, a senior reactor operator (SRO) and a PE0 were dispatched to containment to walkdown the tygon tube and the sight glass level indicators. They found the uppe,r isolation valve for the sight glass closed and hold tagged. This indicated that a clearance was in effect for the sight 5 ass. Subsequent investigation determined that a hold tag 1
had also been installed on the lower isolation valve but must have fallen off since it was not present at the time the sight 5 ass was put in service.
1 i
The clearance for the sight glass was released and the upper isolation valve was opened. It was also discovered that a HEPA filter unit was connected, via a flexible duct, to the opening where the pressurizer safety valve had been removed. At the time of discovery, the HEPA unit was running and the flexible duct was found collapsed. The collapse was apparently due to the vacuum created by the running HEPA filter and RCS draindown. The HEPA unit was turned off and a vent port on the unit was opened to relieve the vacuum on the pressurizer.
D.
CAUSE OF EVENT The direct cause of the event was false high RCS level indications which led to the RCS level being inadvertently lowered to the point where vortexing occurred. The false high indications of level were caused by an inadequate pressurizer vent path and by the closed upper isolation valve for the sight glass. RCS level instrumentation utilized at VEGP for mid-loop and reduced l
inventory operations provides level indication based on differential
~
pressure as measured between the hot legs of RCS loops 1 and 4 and the pressurizer (for the level transmitters) and between the intermediate leg of RCS loop 1 and the pressuriser (for the permanent sight glass and the
- ~
~
temporary tygerttube). The pressurizer serves as a common reference point for all mid-loop reduced inventory level instrumentation (wide range and narrow range indication provided in the control room, and permanent sight glass and temporary tygon tube indication available in containment).
Consequently, any blockage of the pressurizer vent path would affect all 3
reduced inventory level instrumentation. During a draindown of the RCS, a vent path bicekage such as that which occurred in this event would induce a vacuum on the reference leg of this instrumentation inducing a false high indication. 'Although engineering review has determined that no permanent damage would have occurred to the instrumentation, each channel would have presented a false hi h indication. While the sight glass was actually 5
i i
l
gno.7am u.a. maum -un w,um amen LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT couTInnarrom
~
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUM8ER (5)
PAGE (3)
YEAR 5tQ NUM RLV j
i NOCTIE EI2CDLIC GBERATIIC FiANT - UtIT 1 05000424 91 009 00 6
0F 9
TLAI isolated from the pressurizer (due to the upper isolation valve being inadvertently left closed), the valving error also made it subject to i
vai:uum effects and explains why it also presented a false high indication of j
level.
t f
The root cause of the event was procedure inadequacy. Procedures for reducing RCS level during refueling operations provide sufficient steps to ensure the proper installation of level instrumentation and the adequacy of j
vent path (s) during the initial RCS draindown; however, sufficient steps to reverify these items were not included in the procedures for the subsequent l
draindown evolution. Additionally, administrative controls were inadequate in addressing the reviews and documentation required for the attachment of i
HEPA filter units to plant equipment. In this case, the HEPA filter unit j
was installed without a temporary modification or a work order. Since such controls were not applied, the control room was not aware of the i
installation.
l A contributing cause was the failure of the operating staff to sufficiently investigate the cause for the receipt of the RCS "high" level annunciator or j
the cause for the ensuing " low" level indication of 1U-957. Had j
troubleshooting or a contaimeent walkdown of the level instrumentation been i
initiated at the time of these occurrences, then the problem affecting the level instrumentation may have been recognized. One of the causes for not implementing troubleshooting of 1U-957 at that time was apparently the 4
reliance placed on the visual verification of RCS level. Since the upper internals were installed, it cannot readily be determined whether this was an accurate indication of level since the upper internals tend to retain
[
water. The lack of awareness by the operators of the specific status of the permanent sight glass modification is seen as an additional contributing Since the sight glass confirmed the temporary tygon tube and visual cause.
i level indications, operators felt that they had multiple accurate level indications. On this basis, they delayed troubleshooting of 1U -957.
j E.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT i
Certain items were noted which helped to lessen the consequences of the event. The first was the operating crews' practice of assigning a dedicated reactor operator to monitor the RHR system during the draindown evolution, j
The second was the extensive training the operators had received on industry
{
events involviq, loss of RHR. This included training and simulator scenarios on operator response to a loss of RHR during the requalification j'
~ ~ ' training sepi3ht prior to the refueling outage. In addition, a previously implemented modification allowed trending of RHR pump motor current on the emergency response facility (ERF) computer display. Together, these factors helped the operators diagnose the occurrence of vortexing and take corrective actions to mitigate the effects of the event.
-gggaym u.>. nuum nuumi uman 4.en LIC'ENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (2)
DOCKET huMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (5)
PAGE (3)
TEAR 5LQ NUM RE)
V0G'1H ELECIRIC GENERATDC PLANI - INIT 1 05000424 91 009 00 7
0F 9
j TLAI l
During the event, the 1B RHR pump was unavailable to provide recirculation shutdown cooling for approximately 16 minutes and full recirculation cooling flow was not reestablished until approximately 50 minutes after the first j
indications of vortexing and air ingestion. While a subsequent review,of j
computer data indicates that the pump was operated at or near no flow j
conditions for approximately 13 minutes, all available data indicate that j
the pump experienced vortexing but did not experience cavitation. When vortexing occurs, it causes air to enter the suction of the pump. This will i
j cause the pump performance to decrease but will not necessarily cause damage j
to the pump such as would be expected should cavitation occur. However, if enough air is introduced into the suction of the pump, it will cause the pump to become air bound and the pump flow to stop. When flow stops, it is possible to overheat and subsequently damage the pump. Due to concerns that operation of the 1B RHR pump under these conditions may have caused damage i
to the pump, vibration measurements and comparison with the pump's characteristic curve were satisfactorily completed on October 28, 1991, v.ith j
no indication of pump damage. On November 1, 1991, the inservice test (IST) l for the pump was reperformed. The results of the IST confirmed that no j
degradation of the 1B RHR pump had occurred.
For the 1A RHR pump, operator action was effective in preventing degradation of the pump. After observing indications of vortexing for the 18 RHR pump, control room operators responded appropriately per the contingency actions provided in AOP 18019-C for such an event. This included operator action taken to reduce the flow of the IB RHR pump, stop the RCS draindown via the 1A RHR pump, and realign the 1A RHR pump to raise RCS level. Based on our understanding of the event at the time, a determination was made on October 26, 1991, that the event did not represent l
a reportable condition pursuant to 10 cm 50.72 (b)(2)(iii). However, a i
subsequent detailed review of computer data which were not available to the j
operators at the time of the event has indicated that possible air ingestion for the 1A RHR pump may have started to occur shortly before the pump's discharge valve was closed. This manifested itself in the form of a slightly reduced discharge pressure and flow. Based on this new information j
from the post-event critique, a determination was made that the event could have possibly prevented the fulfillment of the RHR function of the RHR l
system. Therefore, an Rvent Notification pursuant to 10 cm 50.72 (b)(2)(iii) was made on November 6, 1991. Although the 1A PMR pump had not been operated under any apparent adverse conditions, the IST for the 1A RHR i
pump was also reperformed. No degradation in pump performance was indicated by the IST for the 1A RHR pump.
-,:a
,o i
l i
1 w.
u.x -= muu w,wam g gugo won amen LICEN'EI EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION I
idCILiff sAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (5)
PAGE (3)
TEAR 5IQ NUM RLV i
VOCH2 EI2CTRIC CDIERATDIG PIANT - INIT 1 05000424 91 009 00 8
0F 9
l TLAI j
l The lowest RCS level occurred at the time the 1A RHR pump's heat exchanger discharge valve was closed. As noted above, there is some evidence to suggest that air ingestion for the 1A RHR pump may have started to occur at i
l that time. Based on our analysis of the available data, the lowest RCS level during the event was in the range of elevation 186 to 187 ft.
t j
While Georgia Power Company now believes that a possibility did exist for a loss of RHR as provided by the RHR system, calculations have determined that the event did not pose any threat to plant safety or the health and safety l
of the public. The estimated decay heat being produced at the time of the i
event was 0.1022 E8 Reu/hr. A subsequent review of RHR heat exchanger inlet temperature data suggests that the RCS actually experienced an average heatup of 19 F (i.e., 88 F to 107 F), which is reasonable considering the maximum calculated local RCS temperature. The maximum local RCS temperature j
was calculated to be approximately 116 F.
Further calculations were made.to determine the time before boiling and the core uncovery based on conditions 1
at the time of the event and assuming a total loss of RHR and no makeup to j
the RCS. The time to boiling was determined to be 82 minutes and the time to core uncovery was determined to be 543 minutes. It was also calculated that a flowrate of approximately 400 gal / min, either from the RWST or by one of the RHR pumps operating in the shutdown cooling mode, would have i
maintained the RCS water temperature at or below 140 F.
If needed, the l
calculated required flowrate of 400 gal / min could have been supplied by aligning a centrifugal charging pump or a safety injection pump to take 1
suction from the RUST. Therefore, it is concluded that the event did not represent a potential for causing a release or an adverse radiological L
condition either within containment or external to the plant. Furthermore, the containment equipment hatch was in place and negated the need for precautionary action to replace it.
F.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1.
All procedures used for draindown of the reactor vessel will be reviewed l
to ensure sufficient steps are included for verification of vent path adequacy for all draindown evolutions. Additionally, the review will ensure that precautions are included as applicable regarding the use of visual verification from the refueling deck as a reliable means of 2
i determining RCS level during draindown evolutions with the upper internals installed.
Procedure revisions, as necessary, are expected to be completed by December 30, 1991 (prior to future "mid-loop" operatiene)e.
4-1 4
- 2.
Administrative controls will be revised to ensure appropriate reviews and documentation for the attachment of HEPA filter units to plant equipment. This revision is expected by January 15, 1992.
1 f
a 4
i
=
M IJ.b. EEAAJUL EMEAHMT r23M=
U E3W J 3D-Glps LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT couTIwaarzou i
FACILITY NAMI (1)
MKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUM8ER (5)
PAGE (3)
TLAR 5LQ NUM REV VOC112 ELEHRIC CENIRATING FiANT - 13(IT 1 05000424 91 009 00 9
0F g
}
lLAI 4
\\
3.. The reduced inventory RCS level instrumentation will be reviewed for i
procedural or hardware modifications to reduce common mode effects of a j
single vent path. This review is expected to be complete by January 15, 1992.
j 4.
Shift personnel involved in the event have been appropriately disciplined and counseled regarding the need for additional emphasis on j
maintaining awareness of plant configuration status and for investigating problems / inconsistencies noted during major evolutions.
5.
A case study will be developed by the personnel involved in the event and will be presented to the Operations staff. The case study will emphasize lessons learned from the event, including the importance of establishing an adequate vent path; the proper steps that should have been taken for the problems / inconsistencies that occurred during the l
event; the importance of utilizing procedural guidance for placing the sight glass in service; and the need for appropriate communications, 1
j turnovers, and briefings. The case study is expected to be presented by March 1, 1992.
i 6.
The modification status system will be reviewed for possible i
enhancements to make modification status more readily available to the Operations staff. Revisions to the program, as necessary, are expected to be complete by January 21, 1992.
4 7.
Abpormal Operating Procedure 18019-C will be reviewed against i
Wetainghouse Abnormal Response Guideline ARG-1, % ss of RHR While Operating At Mid-Imop Conditions," to evaluate the adequacy of specified j
actions for stopping a RHR pssp or other actions to take after indications of vortexing or pump cavitation are observed. This review 4
j is expected to be complete by December 30, 1991.
G.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1.
Failed Components Identification l
None.
l 2.
Previous Similar Events i
~
None.
i 4
3.
Energy Industry Identification System Codes i
Reactor Coolant System (FUR) - AS Residual Heat Removal System (PUR) - SP E
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November 22, 1991
[ con Ne u ffa11t d est C i
Charles Mullins, Esq.
office of General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
^g Washington, D.C.
20555
.\\p Carolyn Evans, Esq.
William Cline
/
David McGuire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission g
Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W.
-Atlanta, CA 30323 Re:
Mosbauch Tape 844
Dear sirs and Madame:
l on November 19, 1991, I spoke with Region II r ional i
counsel, Ms. Carolyn Evans, who indicated to as th Georgia Power Company had contacted Region II with respec to the contents of one of the Mosbaugh tape recordings, pecifically tape #44.
As you are aware, the tape recordi uestion were recently returned to Mr. Mosbaugh by the NRC pft r t e NRC i,
reassured Mr. Mosbaugh that the returned tap ot contain safeguards F.aterial.
After the tapes were returned to Mr.
Mosbaugh, pursuant to court order, the tapes were turned over to GPC's counsel, Troutman, Sanders, Lockernan & Ashmore (Hfg{gh) i~
for use and duplication with respect to a pending Department of Labor Section 210 proceeding, known as Mosbauch v. Georaia Power i
comoany,.91-ERA-11.
V Confidentiality 'is sought under 10 C.F.R. Part 9, subpart D, inasmuch as this letter constitutes the work product
.of Mr. Mosbaugh's counsel and sets out aspects of future testimony of NRC officials which may be relied upon by the complainant during_the course of the Mosbauch Section 210 proceeding.
[
v f
m -
m,,.
1 1
Page 2 Kohn to NRC November 22, 1991 Mr. Mosbaugh and his counsel have long assumed that GPC would allege that one of the tape recordings contained safeguards As explained below, GPC has compelling reasons toGP material.
fabricate such a claim.
First, before the Department of Labor, GPC, through its counsel, has chosen to defend senior management's decision to discharge Mr. Mosbaugh on the assertion that Mr.
A second and perhaps more compelling reason GPC attempts to assert that portions of the Mosbaugh tape recordings contain l
5 safeguards material is to better defend itself against an L
upcoming disqualification motion which TSLA knows is about to Indeed, in filed in the Mosbauah Section 210 proceeding.
correspondence from TsLA, GPC's counsel seeks to justify its apparent unethical conduct of questioning Mr. Mos needed to protect the release of " safeguards" material at theEtt Attached time the tape recordings were dupilcated.12, 1991 (responding to the from TSLA to Kohn, Dated November Specifically, in Respondent Georola Power Coreany's F
Brief in conosition to complainant Allen Mosbauah's Motion for Partial summary Decision, (dated July 25, 1991), GPC's counsel states at pp. 24-26 (emphasis added):Mr. Mosbaugh had taped rec
... and that these conversations contair.ed restricted safeauards Information, and such taping appeared to violate Nuclear Regulatory Vice President Ken commission regulations.
McCoy was sufficiently concerned about this possible violation that he personally called the NRC to report his knowledae of a nossible
_safeauards violation, as would be required by NRC regulations... (And) the issue of whether Aafeauards Information is cont _ained on the tanes cannot be determined until the
~
tanes have been reviewed...
l
-(emphasis added).
Page 3 I
Yohn to NRC November 22, 1991 f
l ttached October g4,1991 letter from Kohn to TSLA, which is a s hereto).
f Given GPC's desire to be able to claim that at least it is not the tape recordings contains safeguards material, d
on tapa surprising that GPC now claims to have located sa 844 will demonstrate that tape f 44 does not con 444.
l i
Weaknesses identified in RER exit meetina had already 1.
been corrected.
The portion of tape f 44 which GPC appears to claim as t
safeguards material relates to an approximate 12 minute segmen i
l!
of " tentative" findings announced during a NRC RER exit meet A detailed review of this held at plant Vogtle on 4-13-90.
segment of the tape will demonstrate that the f
j Under $73.21, the findings as defined under 10 C.F.R.173.21 discussed at the RER exit meeting constitute the kind of i
l
" inspections, audits and evaluations" which fall outside the scope of "information to be protected" set out in 10 l
573.21.
l as safeguards material.
l answered is, at the time cf the RER exit meetin whether a weakness discussed during the meeting remained
]
i l
a ncorrected" (i.e., if a defect, weakness, or vulnerabil ty identified during the RER exit meeting was corrected, then u
j 4
4 l
J TSLA's questioning of Mr. Mosbaugh without obtaining his counsel's consent appears to constitute a per se violation of 1/
l Standard 47 of the State Bar of Georgia State Bar requirements.
i Georgia statest During the course of his representation of a client, a j
lawyer shall not ecmmunicate or cause another to party he knows to ba represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the crior written consent of the 4
lawyer representing such other party or is authorized A violation of this standard may be by law to do so.
punished by a public reprimand (emphasis added),
L
i.
j.
i Page 4 Kohn to NRC l
November 22, 1991 p
under 10 C.F.R. 373.21 it no longer qualifies as safeguards).
i Indeed, even where the weakness was previously properly classified as safeguards, once corrective action is-taken it no(i.e safeguards" a
longer qNalifies~as once the correction has been made, the past defect, weakness or vulnerability, information regarding these very defects, j
weaknesses or vulnerabilities "may be released").F i
All of the weakness mentioned during the RER exit on tape f44 had been corrected either on the spot as they were identified i
by the RER team or compensatory measures were already in place.
Indeed, during the taped exit meeting, the RER team leader j
specifically mentioned that prompt corrective actions had been 2
taken with respect to weaknesses identified, and he praised the speedy response in which plant personnel fixed the id l
problems.
the RER team leader stated:
l The team recognizes that the weakness in the
{
e l
ccTV system have already been identiflad by the licenses and were bein ompensated f r 60 by 4 additional of ficers...
l l
M 10 C.F.R. 973.21(b) (3) (i). reads as follows:
eg l
Repirements for the Protection of safeguards f
/
Information...
F Q
(b) Information to be Protected...
j (3) Inspections, audits and evaluations -
Information not otherwise classified as National Security Information or Restricted i
Data relating to safeguards inspections and reports.
Specifically:
i)
Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or l
investigations that contain details of a i
11censee's or applicant's physical see ty
- efects, system or that disclose uncorrecte weakness, or vulnerabilities i e.*' system.
i Information regarding def
, weakness or,
[
-vulne illt s na e eased after correc io een made.
L l
l
4 Page 5 Kohn to NRC l
November 22, 1991 i
j The team leader then goes on to describe other corrective i
sensures taken by the licenses with respect to the CCTV.
As such, it appears that corrective measures were already in Moreover, n's place at the time of the RER exit meeting occurred.
l the RER team leader acknowledged the sufficiency of l
j
$73.21), contain safeguards definition (i.e.10 C.F.R.
information.
Indeed, GPC's motivation for contacting the NRC with respect 1
to tape #44 is evident given that-some 19 months have passedIn this re since the RER exit meeting was held.
5 to classify the segment of tape' f 44 as " safeguards" at this late date reqpires an evaluation of the corrective measures taken
}
It is simply far fatched for Mr.
+
during the last 19 months.
Hosbaugh and his counsel to believe that a security weaknessTo say the leas would remain uncorrected for sone 19 months!
it would be extraordinary for the NRC to have allow j
for 19 months.
GPC's assertion that tape (44 constitutes safeguards when it i
was made on 4-13-90 is incredible, and GPC's claim 1s disingenuous ybest.
l Reculatory Guide 5.62 indicates that Taoe #44 does not 2.
l contain safecuards.
i Pursuant to NRC Regulatory Guide 5.62, defects, weakness and i
vulnerabilities in a security system that could allow unauthorized or undetected entry into a protected or vital area must be immediately corrected or compensated for within 10 Co l
i
[
minutes of the discovery.
Based must. restore full compliance with security requirements.
t on the contents of tape 144, it is apparent that full andi l
i Specifically, the RER team leader Regulatory Guide 5.62.
[F acknowledged this during the exit meeting I
It is important to emphasize that these findings do not constitute any requirenent for any licensee action... We would like to remind you again the tentative findings do not constitute a request for any licensee action at this time.
5
Page 6 Kohn to NRC Hovenber 22, 1991 The statements of the RER team leader, in conjunction with the requirements set out in Regulatory Guide 5.62, demonstrate that the NRC was satisfied that adequate immedia As such, under 10 C.F.R.
vulnerabilities identified in tape f 44.$73.21, this ' portion of l
i Indeed, to claim otherwise would indicate unconscionable conduct on the part of the NRC's information.
4 a finding of weakness at the exit constitutes safeguards is to l
claim that it remained uncorrected for more than 10 minutes, and as such would violate the basic requirements of reg l
act of radiological sabotage, which is the very def 5.62).
l As such, the comments and action of the NRC during the RER meeting demonstrates beyond question that the weaknesses l
presented during the RER exit were adequately c l
i safeguards.
The RER team would have announced durina the exit l
meetina if the findinas to be cresented contained 3.
_safeauards information.
The normal and appropriate procedure would require the RER team leader to announce the fact that safeguards information would be presented before addressing a large number of NRC and
- Indeed, plant personnel assembled at the plant 'fogtle site.
Vogtle since Mr. Mosbaugh was placed in charg The fact is that the NRC team leader knew before hand what information would be presented at the exit (the sum Given the exceedingly large notes during the exit meeting).
crowd ~ assembled during the RER, it would have been proper procedure to verify whether the individual audience nenbers we cleared for safeguards.
determine that the audience was cleared for safeguard the meeting.
~..
s,..-
i i'
1-Page 7 Kohn to NRC November 22,-1991 l
4
)
l The nature of the RER erocess makes some connants_
l and findinos bevond the scope of "safeauards."
4.
i Due to the nature of the RER process, some findings and comments are necessarily beyond the definition of safeguards regulatory requirements and are, by definition, not defects, During the weaknesses or vulnerabilities in the security system.
l RER exit meeting in guestion, the RER team leader l
The RER team leader specifically states thatt Any finding that is a violation of NRC rules i
will be identified by regional inspectors prior to your receiving our report..
l A finding that exceeded regulatory requirements, or was not 1
under 10 C.F.R. 373.21 and, even if it remained unc l
vould not constitute safeguards material.
l Portions of the RER exit meetina which discuss n are by definition not safeauards.
5.
strenaths a
l.
The balance of the findings and comments conta'ined in the RER exit meeting segment contained on tape f44 concern theBy definition, l
" strengths" of plant vogtle's security system.
this information does not constitute safeguards.
i l
In summary, a careful analysis of the contents of tape #44 demonstratestgelackof" safeguards" materials,asdefinedin10 l
GPC's motivation for clalaing that tape f 44 C.T.R. 573.21.
Given contains safeguards material is demonstrably suspect.
GPC's-and its counsel's desirA to locate safeguards information e
on the tapes, the NRC should not rely upon GPC's analysis of the l
The decision as to whether the tape j
content of the tape.
contains safeguards should be based on the actual contents of the Such tape and additional facts related to the RER exit meetin safeguards information.
To date, Mr. Mosbaugh's counsel has not possessed a 4
F copy of or reviewed any segment of tape #44.
Complainant's counsel will not review the tape until the NRC determines that it As such, Mr. Mosbaugh's
.does not contain safeguards material.
counsel has relied solely on Mr. Mosbaugh analysis of the tape n
segment in preparing this letter.
Page 8 Kohn to NRC November 22, 1991 i
i In closing, I thought I would point out that Mr. Mosbaugh is 1
When the not alone in his analysis of the content of tape f44. releva head of security of another nuclear facility, he agreed with Mr.
i Mosbaugh's position that tape f44 does not appear to contain safeguards material.
Mr. Mosbaugh and his counsel appreciate the NRC's bring this matter to our attention and we would greatly appreciate addressing any other portions of the Mosbaugh tapes GPC now, or in the future, claims to constitute " safeguards."
l Respectfully yours, k
l
~
i Michael D. K6hn Counsel to Allen L. Mosbaugh t
i
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i s(CH N. KC.4 N & CC LADINTO. O c.
Af t o mh tv 5 A'. Aw
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i
~ as a 4
f M D S M T-I A L
_m a R1v1a,x October 24, 1991 1
via_Paesimila James E. Joiner, Esq.
I i
' Trout:aan, Sanders, Lockerman and Ashmore
- ,400 Candler Building 127 Peachtree Street, N.E.
l Atlanta, GA 30303 Case Nos. 91-ERA-01 and 91-ERA-11 Re:
Mosbauch v. Georola Power Company
~
i l
Dear Mr. Joiners in this Yesterday afternoon I received from zy co-counsel b
ratter, Ms. Sandra Michaels, copies of affidavits she obtained from Allen Mosbaugh.
I an enclosing.
a Larry stavis and our client, As you can see, the copies of these affidavits for your review.
affidavits concern the fact that another mer.ber of your law firm, I
Mr. Jesse P. Schaudies, questioned Mr. Mosbaugh on the morning of 4
4 October 22, 1991.
Ms. Michaels and I are troubled because it appears to us that Mr. Schaudies' questioning of Mr. Mosbaugh may have violated the l.
Model Rules of Profes:tional Conduct ("MRPC) and/or the Responsib,llity
("CPR").
As your are no doubt f amiliar, Rule 4.2 of the MRPC and DR 7-104 of the CPR both bar an Professional attorney from cor.sunicating with a party the attorney knows to be represented by another lawyer with respect to the subject matter of the representation unless the attorney has the consent of the other As Ms. Michaels and I lavier or was authorized to do so by law.
understand the facts, 1)
Mr.
Schaudies' knew of my and Ms.
- 2) that Mr. schaudies Michaels' representation of Mr. Mosbaught l
of our client occurred without our Knowledge or consent; 3) that the subject matter of the communication drove at questioning the heart of an important area of our litigation -- specifically, to obtain an admission from Mr. Mosbaugh as to whether he believed l.
the tape recordings do, in fact, contain " Safeguard i
L whether the tape recordings contained safeguards materials.
l l'
i
. ~ -
STWTh LY EONrlDEM TAL t
4 Page 2 Kohn to Joiner October 24, 1991 4
1 comunication been limited to a trivial or tangential matter and had he not pushed the matter with such vig Had Mr. Schaudies' Ms. Michaels and I could advise our client that the questioning was inadvertent or that the subject matter was relatively trivial.
we are unable to do so, we wish to obtain further information from you in the hope resolving this matter.
Because specifically, we request that you address our concern with resp ed to whether a violation of Rule 4.2 and/or DR 7-10 i
I wenld greatly appreciate hearing from you as soon as l
possible, but in any event no later the afternoon of October 30 l
Please zake sure to copy your response to Ms. Michaels.
1991.
Sincerely, i
A i
Michael D. Kohn Counsel to Allen Mosbaugh l
cci sandra Michaels, Esq.
65a/ Joiner f
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l AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY STAVIS l
I nake this state: tent, to the best of my knowledge and belief ur. der the pains and penalties of perjury as follows:
e 1.
1 I an a resident of the State of Georgia and I am over the age i
of eighteen.
2.
I am an ampicyee of Tech Rentals, 6000 Peachtree Rd. NE J
i Atlanta, GA-30307, 3.
on or about October 22, 1991 at approxiamatley 8:25 a.m. I i -
witnessed Jay Schaudies read a prepared question in the form of a statement written on a legal yellow pad to an individual named Allen, later identified as Allen Mosbaugh, who had just delivered approximately 201 audio cassette tapes to my place of employment for copying.
4.
Jay had written this question on the yellow legal' pad about 5 minutes before Allen arrived.
When Allen arrived Jay asked me We went if there was a place that he and I could talk in private.
to the dubbing room where Jay read the prepared statenant to me.
We then went out to the recording room where Jay then read it to Allen.
I was present when Jay read it to Allen.
S.
The general thrust of the prepared question read by Jay to Allen was that neither I, Larry Stevis or Jay were cleared for
saf eguards inforniation. Then Jay asked Allen if, knowing that they were not cleared for saf eguards information did Allen have any safeguards concerns with I, Larry Stavis and Jay handling the tapes.
6.
A:.'.en replied "I don't have to answer your questions."
7.
a Jay then read the last part of the prepared statement saying that if no reply is given, it will be assumed that there is no safeguards material on the tapes.
8.
Allen again responded, "I
do not have to answer your Jay again read to Allen the last part of the prepared q;estions."
The state. ent that it will be assumed that it is ok to proceed.
three minutes.
two of the:n went back and forth approximately 4
9.
It appeared that Jay was attempting to elicit a "yes" or "no" response from Allen.
10.
I art not cleared for safeguards or for any security clearance.
Affiant says nothing further.
This d day of 10e#
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Larry R avis Affiant
e AFFIDAVIT OF ALLEN MOSBAUGH 4
i to the best of my knowledge and belief I make this statert.ent, under the' pains and penalties of perjury as follows:
1.
I am a resident of the State of Georgia and I am over the age of eighteen.
2.
1991 I was present at Tech Rentals, On er about October 22, to deliver for copying, 201 6000 Peachtree Rd. NE Atlanta, Georgia I arrived at approximately 8:10 a.m.
Jay audio cassette tapes.
Neither of my attorneys were present.
f Schaudies was already there.
I was introduced to Larry Stavis the technician who would be l
copying the tapes.
3.
if there was A
f Jay S<d.audies (Jay) asked Larry Stavis (Larry) somewhere private where they could talk.
Jey and Larry went away for a few minutes.
4.
At that They came back and we convened in the copying room.
point Jay proceeded to read a prepared question in the form of a i
As best I can recall the stat.a..t f ro:n a yellow legal pad to me.
statenant was as follows, Larry and I are not cleared for and a person previously cleared for safeguards safeguards; as is on the tapes do you have any concerns about us
. knowing what handling the tapes?'
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5.
F "I don't know what is on My response to Jay's question was, the tapes.*
Jay then re-read the last part of the prepared question again to me.
My response was, " Jay, I can't answer your questions."
6.
Jay then said, "If you don't reply we will take your response d ) and to indicate that you have no concerns (regarding safeguar s it is ok to proceed."
My reply again was, " Jay, I can't answer At that point Jay turned to Larry and said, "You your questions."
After that, Larry made no comment.
saw his rep'y, didn't you?"
Jay read the last portion of the prepared question a few core tim tions."
with my responding each time, " Jay, I can't answer your ques 7.
I felt pressured by Jay's repeated questioning of me and Jay's
- also felt attempt to get Larry Stavis to witr.ess my response.
l I was threatened by Jay's mentioning ny obligations under NRC ru es.
Jay's repeated state.,ent to me that by not very concerned about responding it would be construed es a response that I had no I did not know how to concerns regarding safeguards on the tapes.
answer his questions but felt compelled to respond based on Jay's assertion that no response would be considered a response. I do not these answers adequately reflected my thought on the feel that i
issue but I felt I should not engage in a discussion with Georg a Power's attorney without my attorneys present.
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November 12, 1991
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VIA TELECOPY Michael D. Kohn, Esq.
1 Kohn, Kohn, Colapinto. P.C.
517 Florida Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20001 Rei Mosbaugh v. CPC, 9'.-ERA-11_
i Dear Mr. Xohns I received your letter of October 24, 1991 in which you requested that I inquire into. a conversation between Allen Hoabaugh and Jay Schaudies on October 22 and determine whether l
any violation.of ethical standards may have occurred.
Although the affidavits which were to have been enclosed with your letter were inadvertently omitted, Ms. Sandra Michaels was kind enough When I received the complete package, I to send them by trail.
looked into this matters and I now want to address the concerns you raised.
J As I understand the situation, Jay Schaudies spoke with you on Monday, October 21, following the. prior week's telephone conference with Judge Glennon, and made arrangements for delivery of 201 tapes to us for duplication at Tech Rentals at 8:30 the i
fo11cwing morning.
This arrangement was confirmed by letter 4 : 50 p.m. Monday.
On Tuesday torning, at 4
f axed to you at approximately 8:25 a.m., Mr. Schaudies met Mr, Mosbaugh in the duplicating roo:n of Tech Rentals in the presence of Larry stavis s
and made the following statement to Mr. Mosbaughs Mr. Stavis is about to dup 2icate all of these tapes.
During that-process, and as a result of that process, he and I will hear all or portjene of the. conversation on these tapes.
Neither one of us are safeguards cleared under NRC regulations.
You'know what is on 4
e these tapes, and as an individual who has previously been cleared for' access to safeguards material, you are familiar'with l
NRC regulations pertaining to the handling of safeguards material'.
I am relying upon you, and invoking your obligations under NRC
. regulations, to advise us before we hear
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Michael Kohn, Esq.
November 12, 1991 Page 2 l
these conversations if there is any safeguards material on these tapes.
Your failure to advise us that the tapes have.
safeguards material will be construed as a statement that there is no safeguards material on the tapes.
Please-let us know if we.should stop this process bocause of safeguards concerns, 4
Xr, Schaudies recalls that if there was any deviation at all i
i from the foregoing, it was only a'few words.
He further recalls that when.he said "You know what is on these tapes,' Mr. Mosbaugh i
stated, 'I. haven't listened to them. "
Mr. Schaudies then responded that Mr. Mosbaugh had a good idea of what was on the tapes and that he was present at _ the time of the conversations, i
Af ter Mr. Schaudies.made the statement to Mr. Mosbaugh, Mr.
Mosbaugh responded that he was not going to answer any questions.
1 i
Mr. Schaudies then told Mr. Mosbaugh that his silence would be l
taken as a statement that there was no safeguards 2.aterial on the tapes.
Mr. Mosbaugh stated that he was not saying one way or the other and then said,
'You can't take my silence as an indication of.anything.' Mr. Schaudies responded that he would take Mr.
Mosbaugh's silence as an indication that there was no sefoguards p
inatorial and that the duplicating process could begin.
the preceding' i's, I' believe, the substance of the conversation that i
occurred.
In considering whether there is any possibility that an ethical violation may have occurred, it seems to me that there L
are three critical f actors which must be kept in mind.
In the first place, you knew, and I presume Ms. Michaels knew, that Mr.
Mosbaugh and Mr.- Schaudies would be present at tech Rentals on tuesday morning.
You therefore knew, or should have known, that some conversation was bound to o6 cur.
Because you or Ms.
i Michaels had the opportunity to be present at Tech Rentals and 1
because you both chose not to-be. pres 6nt, I believe that you tacitly consented to conversations taking place between Mr.
i Schaudies and Mr, Hosbaugh.- Seco9dly, Mr. Schaudf an was__under oy,g,rriding ethical and lega13.blication to assure thap l
representinj his client. neither,_.ht.S.9Ct'ha-ch9ptwould engage ib any concuct which would amoun_t.1p a viole_ tion of NRC ^ '
l safeguards regulations or any other law.
ft was in this context oT'FiETssuring TilliH1f'that neither he nor his client were, by 4
duplicating or lietoning to the tapes,- going bayond the limits of
' legal; conduct, that the conversation occurred.
Thirdly,_the implication in your letter that Mr. Schaudies' purpose was to obtain an admission from Mr. Mosbaugh about whether he believed the tqe recordings contained safeguards raterf el is e!.elv
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Michael Kohn, Esq.
November
- 2, 1991 Page 3 4
4 incorrect.
To the contrary,.Mr. Mosbaugh had already stated in his sworn affidavit that there were no safeguards materials on i
j the tapes.
What Mr. schaudies was doir.g then, was simply getting a precautionary confirmation of Mr. Mostaugh's earlier statement on the record.
With these three factors in mind, I do not believe that there. is any possibility that a violation of applicable e,thical standards could have occurred.
I hope and believe that you will
. agree with my conclusion.
I certainly appreciate the opportunity 1
to respond to the concerns you raised.
Sincerely yours, g
D' wames E. Joiner JEJ jer ce s - Sandra Michaele 1
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