ML20128B419
| ML20128B419 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 01/25/1993 |
| From: | Starkey R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128B423 | List: |
| References | |
| NLS-93-017, NLS-93-17, TAC-M84686, TAC-M84687, NUDOCS 9302030046 | |
| Download: ML20128B419 (71) | |
Text
_ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
- g. e t CA&L Carolina Power & Light Company P.o. Box 1b51
- Ralevi. N o. 27602 JAN ?.51993 R. B sTAnKEY.JR vice Presidem SERIAL: NLS 93-017 Nuclear Servces Der +tment
(
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-325 & 50-374/ LICENSE NOS. DPR 71 & DPR 62 NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION STEAM LEAK DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION NUMAC UPGRADE (NRC TAC NOS. M84686 AND M84687)
Gentlemen:
The purpose of this letter is to provide additional information in response to the NRC staff's letter dated November 25,1992. The staff questions relate to Carolina Power & Light Company's (CP&L) license amendment request dated September 14,1952 for installation of a General Electric NUMAC-based steam leak detection system at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. The staff questions and CP&L's responses are provided in Enciosure 1. Responses to the staff questions concening EMI and RFIissues are not included in :.ne enclosed responses. The Company plans to provide responses to these EMI and RFIissues in a separate resoonse no later than February 8, 1993.
Please refer any questions regarding this submittal to Mr. D. B. Waters at (919) 546-3678.
Yours very truly, Itb R. B. Starkey, Jr.
WRM/wrm (nts93017.wpf)
Enclosure R. B. Starkey, Jr., having been first duly sworn, did depose and sa/ that the information contained herein is true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief; and the sources of his informatk a are officers, employees, contractors, and agents of Carolina Power & Light Company. jon,,,,, ,
q W C.L %{MLk [ Y***
Notary (Sealf fW *'
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My commission expires: ed Cilf l{
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, .000 essa n 9302030046 930125 i
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- Document Control Desk' NL5 93 017 / Page 2 :
cci . Mri Dayne H. Brown (w/o oversized attachments) .-
Mr. Si D, Ebneter (w/o oversized attachments)
Mr. P. D. Milano -
Mr. R. L. Prevatte (w/o overstred attachments) i s
= . -
e r ENCLOSURE 1 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 NRC DOCKET NOS, 50 325 & 50 324 OPERATING LICENSE NOS. OPR 71 & DPR 62 -
tvne REQUEST FOP. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION STEAM LEAK CaECT!CN INSTRUMENTATION NUMAC UPGRADE (NRC TAC NOS. M84686 AND M84687)-
+
1,0 General Backaround information
1.1 Ouestion
' Provide design information of the CE microprocessor based NUMAC system, include the descriptions of the devices used in the microprocessor,-
the programming language, compiler, type of microprocessor, etc."
Response: The NUMAC ciasc 1E architecture consists of a family of firmware based -
80C86 (16 bit) and 80376 (32 bit) controllers with application specific -
analog and digital modules connected via a NUMAC bus, An independent -
display controller connects to the class-1E processor via a serial; ink and provides the man-machine interface without affecting the calculations of the class 1E process. The NUMAC architecture elso includes both hardware and -
software watchdog timers and an integral self-test system. ,
The NUMAC Leak Detection Monitor (LDM) uses the same processor, ,
. language, and compiler as that previously approved by the NRC in NEDO 31439-A (NUMAC-WRGM). As of the date of this writing, there are over 300 NUMAC instruments in operation with this general ct,afiguration (i.e., operating system, assembler, compiler, and processor).
1.2 Ouestion
" Provide drawings and descriptions of the physicallocation of the replacement system in the plant."
Response: The NUMAC LDMs will be instaked in the 1-H12 P614 and 2 H12 P614 control room panels in BNP units 1 and 2, respectively. . Drawing F-07008, .
which shows the locations of those panels, is included as Attachment .1.2.11 to this letter.
For your information, the location of other existing BNP NUMAC systems are.
also highlighted on the above drawing. The Rod Worth Minimizer NUMACs -
are installed in panels 1 H12-P603,1-H12 P607, 2-H12-P603 and 2 H12 P607. The M6in Steam Line Radiation Monitor NUMACs are installed in 1-H12 P606 and 2-H12-P606, Plant modification sketches SK-91038 2 7034 Sheets 1, 2 and 3, which -
show the planned NUMAC equipment arrangement within the 1 H12-P614 panel are included as Attachments 1.2.2 through 1.2.4 to this letter -
El-1
- e- _t 1.3 - Question: " Discuss the temperature and humidity qualifications of the NUMAC system and how these qualifications meet normal plant and worst-case accident- -
conditions."
Response: .The NUMAC LDM environmental tests consist of component aging, PC board (module) qualification, instrument qualification, and instrument heat -
rise. The NUMAC LOM instrument is qualified for operation between 40'F -
and 122'F and between 10% and 90%'non-condensing humidity.- All=
NUMAC LDM modules have completed additional qualification programs; ,
where they have been operationally tested at 158'F. Maximum LDM '
instrument internal heat rise has been measured at 18'F in the vicinity of.
the power supplies.
The design ranges for BNP control room temperature and humidity are as follows: _,
Temperature: Normal 40 - 120 F '(750F' Avg) ,
Design Basis Accident 40 - 120 F (75'F Avg): ,
Humidity: Normal ' 30 60% RH (45% Avg)-
Design Basis Accident 30 - 60% RH (45% Avo)
The control room average air temperature is maintained at ~
appropmately 75'F. The temperature is observed and recorded daily as directed in BNP procedure 0103.4 " Control Operator Daily Check Sheet". -If -
the temperature exceeds 77'F surveillance is increased to once per shift.
As part of our response to the Station Blackout Rule, CP&L has committed to implement around-the-clock HVAC trouble shooting activities.when :
temperatures exceed 84'F. The basis for the 84*F trigger is a calculation -
that demonstrates that the control room temperature will not 9_xceed 120*F within one hour after loss of HVAC power starting at an initial ambient temperature of 85'F.
1 The margin between the normal control room general area ambient -
temperature and the NUMAC qualification temperature is adequate to '
accommodate potentiallocal heating effects inside the H12 P614 panel' Humidity is not a directly controlled parameter at BNP; however, the design humidity range stated ebove'is broadly bounded by the 10% to 90%-
humidity range to which the NUMAC is qualified.
r 2.0 Software Verification and Validation
2.1 Question
" Provide references / guidelines used for the NUMAC system "
Response: The software development process used_for the NUMAC Leak Detection '
Monitor is based primarily on the following standards: ,
IEEE ANS 7 4.3.2; Application Criteria for Programmable Digital Computer Systems in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Generating -
Stations i
El-2
e t Reg Guide 1,152 R-0, Nov 1985; Criteria for Programming Digital Computer System Software in Safety Related Systems of Nuclear Power Plants Additional applicable references / guidelines that are listed in GE's NUMAC '
Leak Detection Monitor Design and Performance Specification 23A5227 include:
Reg Guide 1.38 R 2, May 1977; Ouality Assurance Requirements for Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handling of items for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants Reg Guide 1.45 R 0, May 1973; Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems Reg Guide 1.47 R-0, May 1973; Bypass and inoperative Status Indication Reg Guide 1.89 R-1, June 1984; Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants Reg Guide 1.100 R 2, Jtne 1988; Seismic Qualification of Electrical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants ANSI /IEEE Std 3831974; IEEE Standard for Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field splices, and Connectors for Nuclear Power Generating Stations NUREG-0700, Sept 1981; Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews Reg Guide 1.29 R 3, Sept 1978; Seismic Design classification ANSI /IEEE Std 3231974; Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations ANSI /IEEE Std 344-1975; Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations.
IEEE Std 1971; Criteria for Protection Systems of Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
MIL Hdbk 217D; Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment MIL Std 883C; Test Methods and Procedures for Microelectronics
2.2 Question
" Discuss any differences with IEEE 7.4.3.2."
Response: The GE program fully complies with the guidance of IEEE 7-4.3.2.
, El-3
-,; e 2.3 ' Oueniort 1
- Describe the plans for performing the verification and validation (V&V) of l the NUMAC system logic. _ if the VS V_ has been performed, provide the documentation of the V&V plan.- If the V&V has not been performed, .
- describe the process by which CP&L will ensure the adequacy of the software used in the NUMAC system for 1E applications.*.
Response: The Leak Detection Monitor (LDM) software was developed using the same Verification and Validation (V&V) program as that previously approved by the NRC in NEDO 31439 A (NUMAC WRGM).' This program specificallyf addressed issues, such as design control, change control, documentation,'
record keeping, independent verification, and specific software development requirements as delineated in NRC RG 1.152.
The basic approach of this V&V methodology is as follows:
(a) The design process is divided into logical steps, starting from the top, with each step resulting in a documented output.
(b) Ind6 pendent technical verification reviews are performed for each - -
step of the design process, including verification of test methods and results.
(c) The design steps are divided into logical groups, starting from the top, each of which comprise a baseline for the next set of design -
steps.
(d)- An independent process review is performed after each group of design steps to assure that the process, including technical verification review, is being followed and issues resolved.
- 0) A final comprehensive validation test is performed on the completed -
softwaro in the target hardware.-
(f) All steps of the process are dccumented.
The overall LGM design process was divided into seveial'oroups of design activitics, each of which comprised a baseline for subsequent activitiesc All '
LDM software, including the display and self-test functions, were included in -
the V&V program. 1 Detailed documentation of the V&V plan and results were audited by the -
NRC during a January 11 through 15,1993 trip to San Jose.
V&V has been performed on work already completed and
- 3ing on work stillin progress. The same process will apply tr /ork that may be necessary for maintenance or evolution of this % application.
i
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El-4
v s.
c 2.4 Questioni- " Provide the acceptance criterla'for hardware and sof tware, and also discuss traceability of products at_ different development staget to thelft
, specifications " ~
Response: The acceptance criteria for NUMAC' hardware / software is established from; the requirements defined in the performance specification and design specification. A series of baselines and matrices along the development :
path provide checkpoints to assure that all requirements are incorporated and the validation tests adequately test the hardware and firmware.
Procedures are contained in DRF A00 05019 (this is a GE Design Record File -
which is similar to DRF's reviewed by the NRC during GE reviews and -
approval of the Licensir": topical Report NEDO 31439-A for the NUMAC Wide Range Neutron Monitor);
2.5 Question
" Provide the acceptance criteria and procedures for, and results of, the hardware / software inter. a testing."
Response: In accordance with GE's Suitware Management Plan 23A5162 the integration test is performed as described above. Results are contained in-DRF A00-05019 (Brunswick LDM).
2.6 Question
" Provide the procedures and results for the startup testing." ,
Response: These tests have not yet been performed. The procedures are included in the Acceptance Test portion of the Unit 1 Plant Modification PM 91038.
During the NRC audit of GE in San Jose, it was agreed that these procedures would not be transmitted as part of this response, but will made available for review durir'g the upcoming BNP site review trip.
2.7 Question
" Provide a listing of all software errorr, and their ensuing corrections."
Response: The software development process exists to find and correct errors early in-the design cycle. Note that detection of hardware errors follows a similar :
process (a more rigorous documentation process exists for code reviews, module test, integration test, and validation tests). This information is contained in DRF A00-05019 (Brunswick LDM).
. 3.0 Ooerations/Surveillances
3.1 Question
" Describe site acceptance / pre-operational testing; specifically address loss -
and restoration of power to the NUMAC system during standby and power operation._ Also describe the memory-retention capability of the NUMAC system."
. Response: Site Acceptance / Pre-ooerational Testina:
As described in the response to Question 2.6 above, the Plant Modification documents that describe the NUMAC testing will be available onsite for El 5
. .i, review during the upcoming BNP site trip.
Loss of Power to NUMAC Durino Standbv and Power Occratiom
' The interface between the NUMAC ::ystem's alarm and isolation logic and the external plant circuitry occurs at the Output Relay Unit.which consists of sixteen individual relays. - Through the channel setup function, each relay can be assigned to a specific' monitoring channel or channels and can be set as normally encroized/de-energized. The isolation initiation logic for each of -
the involved plant systems has been established to result in the preferred '
' fail-safe" valve lineups.
Totalloss of Offsite Power (sustained or'n.omentarv):
The leak detection instrurr. 7tation that is being replaced per this modification derives it's power as follows:
Div i Groups 3 (RWCU) and 4 (HPClh 480/120 VAC via ES Emergency Bus Div 11 Groups 3 (RWCU) and 4 (HPCth 480/120 VAC via E6 Emergency Bus-Div i Group 5 (RCICh Div i 125 VDC Battery Bus
. Div 11 Group 5 (RCICh Div ll 125 VDC Battery Bus
~
.This modification eliminates the DC power supply to the Group 5 lsolation .
initiation instrumentation. The replacement NUMAC systern will be powered, as follows:
Division i Groups 3,4, and 5: 480/120 VAC via E5 Emergency Bus-Division 11 Groups 3,4, and 5: 480/120 VAC via EO Emergency Bus-The original design provided DC power for the Group 5 Isolation -
instrumentaticr: as one of the design considerations necessary to satisfy the -
requirements stated in GE Specification 22A3010 for intra-divisional separation between the HPCI and RCIC isolation valve circuits. .In addition .
to the diverse power supply feature, CP&L Specification 048-004 implemented GE's requirement for physical intra-divisional separation between the Group 4' and 5 isolation valve cabling, internal panel wiring and components.
Within the scope of this project, GE reevaluated the Group 4/ Group 5' isolation. valve separation requiremynts defined in their Specification .
22A3010. As a result, GE provided CP&L with a Revision 4 to that specification which eliminates the requirement for-separation between the.
Group 4/ Group 5 isolation valve wiring within the same separation division.
The basis for this criteria change is that RCIC is not considered redundant to HPCI. RCIC is not safety related and it's flow capacity is much smaller _-
than HPCI. GE advised that they have not imposed this separation requirement on other plants. CP&L research determines that we are not specifically committed to such separation in the FSAR.- This design basis change permits the following design advantages:
The DC power supply and TOPAZ inverters that currently supply the RCIC Riley components and associated relays will be eliminated and will be -
replaced by an Emergency AC power supply.
L El-6 L
's'- 8
's in the event or totallo:s of AC powerithe leak detection system. response 1 will be as follow .: '
n The Group 3 NUMAC output relay will be set'up as:*De-energize to trip (isolate)",~ On loss of power, these normriily energize >l_ relays wills fail to the shelf r. tate which willinitiate closure of the RWC.U -
isolation valves. The outboard Isolation valve G31 F004, which is c -
DC poweredi will then ' start closing immediately, The inboard isolation valve G31 F001, which is AC powered, can start closing 1 upon restoration of the E5 Emergency 480 VAC bus via Diesell .
Generator No,_1.- Since RWCU serves no Safety Related or Safe -
Shutdown purpose, isolation of this system following Loss of AC..
power is an acceptable response' This post modification Group 3; isolation logic will be the same as currently exists.
The Group 4 and Group 5 NUMAC output relays will be set up as -
" Energize to trip (isolate)". _On loss of power, these relays will f ail in" the shelf state and will not cause either the HPCI or RCIC isolation'.
valves to close.
For the purpose of HPCl/RCIC availability, it is necessary that the isolation valves fail "as is" in order to not block the' potential _-
operation of either HPCI or RCIC, both of which are required to start ,
and operate with only DC power available.
~
In the event that a leak actually occurs on either the HPCI or RCIC system during the AC power outage, the NUMAC output relays will; j'
'still trip within 13 seconds as assumed during HELB respo'nsei calculations. The 13 seconds includes 10 seconds for the Diere!
Generators to restore power to the E5 and E6 busses and 3 seconds; for the NUMAC system to respond to the high temperature hput and actuate the corresponding isolation output relay.
If an output isolation relay had already been tripped prior to the loss _ .
of AC power, the NUMAC relay would fail _back to the shelf stato; however, each of the Group 3; 4 and 5 isolation logic circults; _
include seal-in features that wouki prevent reset of those isolation commands without intentional operator action.
Loss of One Division of AC Power (sustained or momentarv)f F
The consequences of this occurrence are bounded by the above discussio_n -
for Total Loss of Offsite Power,-
5 NUMAC Memorv-Retention Caoabilitv:
Each NUMAC chassis stores its unit and channel setup parameters ichannel functional names, thermocouple types, alarm and isolation setpoints, etc) in non-volatile EAROM memory, These parameters are retained'during power in;erruption. Upon power restoration, the LDM automatically restarts and _-
trip capability on the isolation outputs is operational within three seconds.
E1-7'
i
3.2 Question
" Discuss coordination of self check and continuous monitoring modes with normal NUMAC system operations."
Response: The LDM has a self-test system that verifies hardware integrity and assures that internal parameters are being accurately retained. Self-test runs continuously in the OPERATE mode and cannot be stopped by the user. A complete self-test cycle takes about 2 minutes. Functional performance is-not inhibited by the self test function in the OPERATE mode When a fault is detected, a
- FAULT" message will appear in whichever NUMAC display screen is currently displayed and a detailed message identifying the specific fault will be available on the self-test monitoring display screen, in addition, a trouble relay will operate and result in actuation of a " Steam Leak Detection Test / Trouble" overhead annunciator in the main control room. That fault is retained in memory and the self test cycle will continue.
In the OPERATE mode, the user may select a display screen that monitors the current status of the self check function, including details such as the current module under test and identification of the last failure and the cycle in which it occurred.
In the INOP mode, the self test feature is only performed upon user demand.
Once initiated, it will continuously cycle until it is manually stopped or the kfNitafgh( -
modo is exited. In the INOP modo, self-test stops when a fault is detected.
This is usefulin diagnostic work when multiple faults might be present.
A detailed description of the specific error messa00s and of the screen displays is included in the NUMAC LDM User's Manual 23A5227AA as provided to you by GE in preparation for the recent software V&V audit in San Jose.
3.3 Ouestion
" Describe the steps required to recover the NUMAC system if a loss of system function is detected."
Most credible casec cf ioss of system function will be automatically detected via the system self-test function and will be externally annunciated. Less credible instances of loss of system function might not be detected by the self-test function. Some such failures could result in spurious system isolations or annunciations and thereby be quickly identified. Potential " fail as-is" type failures might not be noticed until a surveillance test should fail.
CP&L maintenance procedures for recovery from loss of system function will be prepared based on recommendations contained in GE's O&M manual.
Most failures will result in the display of appropriate diagnostic messages.
Those diagnostic mecsages will dictate the initial troubleshooting approach to system restoration.
For problems identified external to NUMAC, such as signal input failures or out of-limits, the corrective action will focus on restoration of correct function in the external portion of the system. For internal NUMAC El 8
~,
- J
= problems, the primary method o'f corrective action will be card or. module -
replacement in accordance with tne on screen displayed error messages or trouble-shooting instructions outlined in the O&M manual.
~
Dependent on the types of components that are replaced, all or portions of the chassis and/or module calibration procedures might need to be 1 perfortred. For major repairs, it may become necessary to "re initialize" the unit and channel parameters.
As with any instrument repair, applicable portions of the associated '
surveillance tests will be performed to demonstrate the post maintenance; operability of components that are Technical Specification related.
3.4 Question
" Describe all provisions for "back up" provisions to the NUMAC system."
I Response: The safety related functions of the NUMAC LOM consist of contribution to the primary containment isolation function for the High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI), Reactor Core isolatien Cooling (RCICL and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) systems, in addition to the NUMAC high temperature contribution to either the HPCIL and RCIC system _isolations, each of those systems also features a 300%;
high flow isolation function. That function is physically separate from'the NUMAC system and constitutes a diverse, redundant, safety related backup, that is capable of responding to a design basis ime break within tha same; response time as the NUMAC temperature detection function.= Other contributions to the HPCI and RCIC isolation logic include low steam supply '.
pressure and high turbinc exhaust pressure.
For the RWCU system, there is no equivalent to the 300% flow monitoring feature described above for HPCI and RCIC. Other functions that do contribute to an RWCU sutomatic isolation include reactor vessel water level-low level 2, high process temperature entering the RWCU filters and Standby L.iquid Contrel systmn initiation. Since RWCU is a non safety related system, the design " fail-safe" NUMAC isolation logic configuration is to fail " closed", Upon loss of either external or internal power to NUMAC,
~
and in response to an indeterminate' percentage of possible internal failures,~.
the NUMAC output relays that contribute to the RWCU isolation logic will--
de-energize to the trip state. ,
in the event that both division NUMACs were to fail to the non-isolate state ~
concurrent with an actual RWCU line break, the alternate means for detection of that break would include such provisions as reactor building sump cycle and run time alarms, room flood alarms and direct observation by personnel. None of these methods are based on safety related instrumentation, none contribute to an automatic isolation and none would result in isolation within the same response time as the NUMAC temperature -
function.
The probability that a simultaneous dual division NUMAC failure will occur-coincident with a full design basis double ended guillotine RWCU break is small. The comprehensive software V&V program strongly minimizesc
, E1 ,, -. , - -
although cannot eliminates the likellhood of common mode NUMAC failure, in addition, the " leak before break" concept in line break analysis tends to.. ;
support a low probability of occurrence for an instantaneout :fouble ended -
guillotine break,1The alternate leak detection rmthods descobed in the .
above paragraph are therefore considered to , . de adequate backup in the -
event of loss of the both divisions of the NUMAC , WCU isolation function,
3.5 Question
"Does the system provide alarms for the loss of the NUMAC system's self-diagnostic features?"
Response: The NUMAC architecture includes an INOP relay output contact which .
causes a System Test / Trouble control room overhead annunciator to alarm-under the following circumstances:
a) loss of external or internal power to the NUMAC b) placing the keylock switch out of OPERATE c) failure of a hardware module during self test diagnostics (performed.
approximately each 12 minutes in the Leak Detection Monitor).
d) detection of an open thermocouple cd flow transmitter signal circuit.
el failure of the class-1E processor to update the hardware watchdog on regular intervals.
f) any software task which is not running at its expected intervals.
3.6 Question
" Discuss the potential failures for which the NUMAC system is not capable -
of detecting during channel functional testing."
Response: As discussed in more detail in the responses to Questions 3.2 and 11.0,'the continuous self-test feature will alarm upon gross failures of the temperature and flow input signals.
The NUMAC " Trip Check" test feature will be used as the basis for performance of the Technical Specification required periodic Channel:
Functional Surveillance Tests. The Trip Check feature is used to precisely -
verify each :hannel's set and reset points, For each channel to be testedi the technician will be able to control, via ine NUMAC softkeys; a test digital temperature value that is to be compared with that channel's set and reset points. During this testoany trip contribution that is generated will be blocked from entering the output contact logic, Essentially, Trip Check. ,
ensures that the set and reset points have not drifted beyond prescribed.
limits.
On both the temperature monitoring and the RWCU flow monitoring -
channels, it is hard to identify potential failures that would not be detected by either self-test or by Trip Check. Calibration drift of channel components other than the digital set and reset points would not be discovered by these
- tests; however, the specified channel drift characteristics justify only monitoring fuil channel accuracy at greater rurveillance frequencies.
The more comprehensive NUMAC " Channel Calibration" test feature will be performed as the basis for the Channel Calibration Surveillance Test that is' proposed to be run on a Refuel cycle freo=*y Channel Calibration is used El10
4 h
to prove the proper operation of each channel from the front end amplifier -
up to and including where the signalis ccnverted to a ~
-compensated / corrected digital value (ready to be displayed and compared -
with the various setpoints)..The user selects the channel to be tested and then selects the temperature to be simulated.1 A miniature relay then disc'onnects that channel's thermocouple input and substitutes a test inputi corresponding to the temperature selected. The temperature resulting from-this simulated input is displayed. Any trip contribution ls blocked from entering the output contact logic.
3.7 Question
" Discuss the NUMAC system stability.*
Response: A description of the accuracy and drift specifications for the NUMAC. -
temperature monitoring channels is provided in Section 5,4 of the GE Design <
and Performance Specification 23A5227, which is included as Attachment 3.7.1 (2 pages) to this letter.
A description of the accuracy and drift specifications for the NUMAC RWCU =
differential flow monitoring funt.iion is provided in Section 6.6.6 of the GE Design and Performance Specification 23A5227, which is' included as Attachment 3.7.2 (4 pages) to this letter.
Additionallnformation relative to accuracy of the RWCU differential flow
. function is addressed in the response to Question 14.0.
4.0 Electromaanetic interferencerrladio Frecuenev Interference (EMI/RFI) i-4.1 . Ouestion: ' Provide the NUMAC electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) specifications and -
i- justify the margin between the EMC specifications and expected electromagnetic interfarence."
Response: Discussion on this topic among CP&L, GE and the NRC occurred during the week of January 11,-1993 in San Jose . CP&L's response to the.overall:
topic of EMI/RFI qualification is still in preparation. Finalizat_lon is contingent - :
on resolution of open issues raised during the San Jose meeting and integration of those conclusions with the CP&L corporate design approach to this subject.
Our response to this topic will be provided to you as a supplement to this RAI no later thra February 8,1993. That response will, at a minimum,.
address the issues raised in Questions 4.1, 4,2, 4.3, 4.4.- 4.5 and 13.3 of this RAl.
4.2 Question
" Discuss the process by which CP&L will verify that the electromagnetic environment at the plant.ls enveloped by the NUMAC EMC test parameters:
4.2.1 Provide a list of the test equipment used in the onsite EMI/RFI testing and their technical specifications.
l El-1'1 g -
g T
E- 4.2.2 = Provide the methodology and the results of the onsite electromagnetic interference survey.
4.2.3 -Provide the evaluations of the vendor's EMI/RFI testing methodology..-
and the results of the factory testing for radiated and conducted (e.g., power supplies) susceptibility. '
4.2.4 Provide the results of the licensee's comparison between the onsite ,
and factory EMl/RFI testing."
Response: This response will be provided via a supplement to this RAl'(as per response .
to Question 4.1).
4.3 Ouestion
" List the EMl/RFI testing frequencies and provide justifications for any frequencies not tested."
Response: This response will be provided via a supplement to this RAI (as per response ,
to Question 4.1).
- 4. , 4.4 Question: "During the pre-operational test, are there any transient monitors installed?.
If any, what are the parameters being monitored?" +
Response: This response will be provided via supplement to this RAI (as per response :
to Question 4.1).
6
4.5 Question
" Provide the surge transient susceptibility testing specifications for the _ .
NUMAC system and justify the margin between the spccifications and D expected surges."
Response: This response will be provided via a supplement to this RAI fas per response .
to Question 4.1).
5.0 Man-Machine Interf ace
5.1 Ouestion
" Discuss the MMI and how it interacts with the NUMAC system."
Response: The NUMAC Man-Machine Interface (MMI)is built upon the visible system.-
features such as the normal and diagnostic displays, on-line help, keylock L control, password blocks, etc.
A keylock switch on the front panel display is a key element of the NUMAC ,
MMI. The keylock switch has two positions, ."OPER" (Operate) and "lNOP"i During normal operations, the key for this switch will be removed and maintained by the control room operations staff. Function opt;cm available to the user in the "OPER" mode include display of the current values of the
- monitored variables, display of the assigned unit and channel characteristics,-
indication of the status of channel alarm and isolation trip functions, status of the self-test function and help text. With the keylock in the 'OPER" E1-12
m ,
_c ..-
- position, access to setpoint adjustments', to unit and channel ch'aracteristic L
= setup and to calibration functions is totally blocked. - The interface design between the front panel and functional controller precludes the possibility that inadvertent softkey operations can have any affect on system-configuration or operation.
5.2 Question
" Discuss the process of altering setpoints through MMi or other means, i.e.,
password protection, administrative control, etc."
Response: Access to the NUMAC functions that establish' and/or change alarm and isolation setpoints, along with all other user-definable unit and channel parameters, is restricted by a combination of keylock and password controls.
With the key inserted, positioning of the keyldek switch to "lNOP" provides the user access to the channel Trip Check and Channel Calibration. .
functions,. Within the "INOP" mode, entry of the control password will '
l permit the user further access to the unit and channel parameter setup
! features, including trip and reset setpoint management; l
L - Setpoint values are established in accordance with Technical Specification:
limits and engineering calculations . The current controlling BNP documents for instrument setpoint values are the plant system descriptions - Those setpoint values, along with the necessary password information, will be incorporated into surveillance, calibration and corrective maintenance procedures. Within those procedures, all physical actions'that initially enter or revise channel set-up parameters, including set and reset points, will require independent verification by a separate qualified individual.
f These system descriptions and procedures are controlled within the Plant
!- Operating Manual. Plant Modifications are required to authorize any changes to the setpoints reflected in those system descriptions and procedures, 6,0 1E and Non 1E lsolation
6.1 Question
" Provide a detailed description of the devices used to accomplish electrical-isolation between the 1E and non 1E systems and describe the specific .
testing performed to demonstrate that the devices are acceptable for this application."
l- Response: Each of the four NUMAC LDMs are assigned to a particular separation division (either Division I or Division ll) of safcty related circuits, Each'of the -
4 LDMs can accommodate 1E as well as non 1E inputs and outputs. ' All-interfaces for instrumentation and control circuits to and from the NUMAC LDM chassis take place via either a Thermocouple input Unit, RWCU i Interface Unit, and/or a Relay Output Unit.
I i
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The following non-1E and cross divisionalinterfaces will exist; 1)J Some non-1E ambient and differential thermocouple inputs will -
-connect to each of the Thermocouple. Input Units.
- 2) - Three non 1E RWCU process temperature thermocouplesione of which is routed throt ;h Division I cable raceway, will connect to the RWCU Interf ace Unit for the Division 11 NUMAC LDM B21 XYr 59498.
- 3) The control logic relay contact output for the Division i RWCU c system isolation logic necurs at a relay on the RWCU interface Unit for the Division ll NUMAC t.DM B21 XY 59498.
- 4) The annunciator cables originating at the Relay Output Unit connect into the non 1E annunciator system.
- 5) The fiber optic output provides a signal to the non 1E Emergency Response Facility information System (ERF:S) computer.
Specific design features are incorporated into the NUMAC design to protect.
the NUMAC equipment from faults that may occur in the non 1E and cross-divisionalinterfaces described above. .The 4 20 mA flow signals are input through a pair of 170 mA fuses'(one on the + 15v and one on the 15v-side) at the RWCU input unit before interfacing with the L DM,L The thermocouple signals are input through magnetically coupled electronic isolation components located on the Thermocouple Module circuit boards.-
The NUMAC interface with the extemalisolation and annunciation logic circuitry occurs at the contacts on the relays mounted on the Rday Output-Unit assembly. Specifically, the isolation feature is the coil to-contact separation provided within the individual relays. In the single specific case--
where the Division 1 RWCU isolation circuit wiring connects to relay contacts on the Division ll Relay Output Unit, that intruder wiring will be?
~
enclosed in flexible conduit within the Division 11 portion of the panel and up to the point where it termir,tes on the Relay Output Unit terminal board.--
(This method of divisional separation is standard practice at BNP.) The j
--Division I isolation signal is handled through a separate output relay, eThe fiber optic communication method rrovides the necessary isolation between NUMAC and the non-1E ERFIS computer system.
Additionalinternal circuit protection is provided by the use of high impedance resistors on input and output circuit paths and by the use of poly-fuses within individual NUMAC modulesc A more detailed discussion of the various credible thermocouple input faults.-
is as follows. -Since the RWCU process thermocouples and some of the:
ambient and differential thermocouples and circuitry are non 1E (not safety. i F
related and not environmentally / seismically qualified), they must be considered to be subject to a variety of credible failures to the components and cables / conduits.- These failures include:
L. 1) Thermocouple open circuit
- 2) Thermocouple and/or wires short circuit without ground
- 3) Wire / cable short circuit with ground
- 4) Imposition of line voltages that are present in adjacent cables onto - j
, the thermocouple input wire / cable i E114 j
- . . ~
-The NUMAC LDM has been tested for each of these fault conditions and the '
results are as follows:
Thermocouple inout Circuit'- . NUMAC 1DM Status -
- 1) Open circuit (any one of the = 10utput goes to low temperature signal Isads)-i condition, Jhe forced downscale .
z . response prevents actuation cf -
the channel alarm and/or isolation ;
trips, which is consistent with the system design. basis. The -o downscale response will trigger.
the INOP alarm and assure the" ,
necessary operator attention.
-themselves cannot damage the -
NUMAC.
Input leads shorted to 'each other at a point between the .
thermocouple instrument and the -
NUMAC input would create a new single junction at the short .
location. The channel would.
Indicate the temperature at the
- location of the short, assumed to be somewhere within the interconnection cable raceway.
The ambient reading at that point
.. would likely be a believable value and the short would not be easily detected except by a test that aoplies a bulk temperature, change input to the thermocouple instrument The channel would not respond to that heat-application and troubleshooting -.
wou!d be initiated.
- 3) Grounding of any one signal No effect on De output circuit. ,
lead LOM temperature reading remains steady.- ,
E1-15
M Therm 2C2uole Inout Circuits NUMAC LDM Status :
- 4) Imposition of external voltagei No damage to internals or to the on one'of the signalleads -output circuits.
(up to 700 VAC/VDC)
Since the thermoc_ouple input is
- an ungrounded circuit,
- application of external voltage tol
~
either the copper or constantan -
connecting wires wnuld have no:
effect on the indicated - ,
temperature.
- The thermocouple input modules contain magnetically coupled isolation devices which protect..
the NUMAC internals and output :
circuits against faults'on the input circuits of up to :
700 VAC/VDC.
The analysis and testing described above demonstrate that, for the potential-credible faults at the thermocouple input signal circuits, adequats isolation exists that will prevent any degrading influence of these faults on the outputt circuit or other circuits.
6.2 Question
" Provide data to verify that the maximum credible faults applied during the test discussed in the above question were the maximum voltage / current to which the device could be exposed, and explain how the maximum voltage / current was determined."
Resporse: The thermocouple and flow transmitter cables are routed exclusively in' -~
raceway that is restricted to instrumentation cabling. No high voltage or high current cabling is permitted in those raceways,
6.3 Question
" Verify that other faults were considered (i.e., open and short circuits)"
Response: All credible faulta, including opens and shorts are discussed in the response ~
to 6.1 above.
6.4 Question
" Define the acceptance criterie. for each type isolation device."
Response: The only external iso!ation feature provider # 3 the flex conduit on the inter-division RWCU isolation wiring.- This fen M passive and the only-acceptance criteria is that it be verified to be installed as per the design.
The internalisolation features such as the fuses and magnetic isolators are tested by GE within their NUMAC factory testing procedures.
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6.5 Ouestion; " Provide the electrical wiring diagrams which show the non 1E connections to the NUMAC system.' ;
- Response: - .The following CP&L documents are provided as Attachments 0.5.1 through ,
6.5.4 to this letter: s 1): Sketch SK 91038 2 7001 Shs 1 through 3, Elementary Diagrams for the Steam Leak Detection system (marked up to show non 1E -
interfacesF ,
- 2) Elementary Diagrams for the Rehetor' Water Cleanup system (marked-up to show non 1E and cross divisionalinterfaces)'
7.0 Confiauratior Control
7.1 Ouestion
" Describe the process for future modification to the software and hardware of the NUMAC system." ,
Response: Emergent needs for future chai . a to the NUMAC software design that might be identified by CP&L will be managed through our normal project .
identification and control processes. A Plant Modification will be required to, define, approve, implement and test any changes to NUMAC software or hardware.
CP&L willidentify any requirements changes to GE; GE will'then implement those changes in accordance with their QA and software V&V programs.
The modified hardware or software would then be provided to CP&L for site implementation in accordance with our Plant Modification procedures.
8.0 Commercial Grade item Deggation (Is the system beina crocured as a safetv-related system?)
Comment: This is not a commercial grade dedication product. :it has been designed, ,
marketed, procured, manufactured, tested, shipped, received,' stored, installnd and tested in accordance with the GE and CP&L OA programs. On that basis, the section 8.0 topic is not applicable to BNP; however, brief discussions are provided below for tho:,e questions that appear equally applicable to a safety-related procurement.
8.1 Question
" Provide the procurement documentation for the NUMAC system."
Response: The NUMAC Leak Detection System has been procured for BNP as nuclear -
safety-related. CP&L and GE OA programs cor. trol the activities of the -
respective parties.10CFR21 has been invoked on GE. The primaryJ procurement documents applicable to the BNP NUMAC Leak Detection Monitor include the following:
- 1) Purchase Order 576260: GE supply of 11 NUMAC LDM systems (4 for each unit,2 spare,1 training)
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- 2) Contract ~ZM70020000/
- Work Auth ZS70020052: GE provision of de' sign, installhion, testing -
and training assistance .
l These documents are provided for your review as Attachment 8,1.1 and 8,1.2 to this letter. -
~
8.2 Questlom " Provide the mean-time-to-failure and the mean time-toirepair information for the NUMAC system." ,
Response: A mean time to fallure (MTBF) calculation based on data for NUMAC instrument failures in which GE has been involved is included as- .
Attachment 8.2 to this letter. The calculated MTBF is 7.21-years, or 6.16 '
- years with the RWCU option.
~
The mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) is a function of the failure causel the self-diagnostic features of the NUMAC, and the local BNP. operations- l maintenance interface, ' Under ideal conditions (lab environtrent), the time -
elapsed from a failure discovery until a bad module is replaced and self test .
'~
indicates there no longer is a failure could take less than thirty minuteso in -
tha plant, factors that will extend this time incluria a) - Work Request / Authorization (trouble ticket) processing.
b) Availability of maintenanc.e tedirilcians.
c) Whether module is replaced with the LDM in situ or with the LDM removed from its control room cabinet to a lab environn ent.' Most -
repairs will be done in situ. ,
d) Availability of replacement pa-ts. CP&L has purchased all of the spare parta recommended by GE and in add;!:on has purchased two complete spare systems.
y e) Need to exchange EPROMs and/or re-enter data into EAROMs -
Spare EPROMS are stocked. The instruction for re-entry of da:a into EAROMs is a simple task that will be defined and controlled by procedures to be issued within the Plant Operating Manual.-
f) Need to recalibrate. The extent of recalibration necessary will depend on the nature of the repair and will be defined by the maintenance planner on a case by case basis.
Technical Specifications prescribe a two hour Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) in which to restore an inoperable division of isolation logic prior to requiring an action to manually isolate the affected system. ' It is-anticipated that some repairs will be accomplished within the two hour LCO,,
but that most will take longer. Except in cases where either the problem proves unusually difficult to diagnose or the necessary replacement parts are-unavailable, most repairs should be achievable within one work shif t.
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- 8.3 - - Question: " Describe the audit and audit results of the vendor's OA program andf!
procedures for commercial grade dedication of the NUMAC system."
~
Response: This is not a commercial grade proccrement. 'Within the CP&L OA program,'
GE is maintained as an approved supplier forl safety related products. Eachi such supplier is evaluated yearly and is audited at least'once every three -
- years. :
i
8.4 Guestion
"What are the vendor's recornmendation and bases for the shelf life ofIthe NUMAC spare parts?"- ,
Response: The component parts of each replaceable spare item are reviewed to see if.
any are st. elf life sensitive (i.e., have a shelf life less than 40 years). .When a replaceable spare item containing one or more shelf life sensitive parts is manufactured, the date codes of the sensitive parts are examined and the remaining useable lives of the parts determined (shelf life minus time since manufacture). The useable shelf life of the replaceable spare item is equal to the minimum useable life of its component carts. ,
GE has notified CP&L of the nominal shelf life for each of the components :
E that we plan to stock as spares. The shipping package provHed with each individual spare assembly specifies the shelf life remaining for that assembly -
as of the date of shipment, ,
The CP&L stores inventory con'rol computer system tracks parts shelf life '
limitations and provides the process control necessary to disposition expired-- ,
items and to replenish inventories of those items as necessary.
Examples of some items with limited shelf life durations include:
GEDAC Module .10 years 16 Channel 1/0 Module 20 years Front Panel Display 10 years Power Supplies . 7 years Complete LDM Chassis 7 years '(example of limit based on most restrictive component);
A related subject is that of qualified life of components in service, Section 7.1.2 of the GE Design and Performance Specification' 23A5227 states that the design objective for the NUMAC system components is to have a qualified life of 40 years. Only two components are identified as not meeting that objective.
The qualified in service life for the Power Supply is five years. CP&L will include the required replacement of the power supplies in our preventative maintenance procedures.
l The usable life of the Electroluminescent Display will vary dependent upon the display's usage. Total service life is not defined. Since the safetyl related automatic trip functions of the NUMAC are not dependent on the operability of the display, any necessary replacement of this screen is
- planned to be performed on an "ps required" basis.
\<
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8.5 Ouestion
" Provide the standards and procedures used to dedicate the GE commercial:
grade NUMAC system." -
Response: : Question not applicable.
f 8.6- . Question: " Describe the criteria that governed the successful completion of the GE V&V commercial grade dedication of the NUMAC system."
Response:' . Question not applicable.
s
8.7 Ouestion
" Identify the methods and acceptance criteria for verifying the critical characteristics."
Response: Question not applicable. .
9.0 Desian Basis Consideration
9.1 Ouestinn
" Provide the assessme .t and documentation on the development ,1: the -+ -
design modification with respect to the design basis of BSEP "
Response: A copy of the pro'.ect design basis document DBD BG0051 1 is provided as Attachment 9.1.1 to this letter.-
The Safety Analysis prepared for the Unit 1 Plant Modification 91038 is provided as Attachment 9.1.2 to this letter.
Detailed discussion of design basis issues raised by the NRC specific to the ,
proposed use of digital technology is presented throughout the responses to:
the questions addressed in this letter. -
10.0 Power Suppjy
~
10.1 Ouestion: "Was the power supply independently tested for the ability to withstand power surges, spikes or fluctuations?"
Response: The outputs of the power supply have been measured for proper output -
under variations in input line voltage, in input line frequency, and in applied '
load.
The low voltage power supplies in the LDM have never been tested by.:
~
themselves for response to line surges and transients but only as parts of NUM AC instruments.
E1-20 i
'I
'10.22 Question: ' Provide the power requirements for the NUMAC system."
' Response: The NUMAC power requirements are defined in GE's Design and Performance Specification 23A5227 which specifies the following:
--_ Design Minimum . ; Center ; Maximum Voltage: 100 Vac 120 Vac 132 Vac - ,
Frequency: 47 Hz 00 Hz 63 Hz _
Power Drain: - 90 W -100 W >t 10.3 Question: "Are switching power supplies used, and if so, what provisions are made to - _
control harmonic distortions in the NUMAC system?"
Response: Switching power supplies are used. The maximum allowable noise outputs of the power supplies are specified and the NUMAC computer bus is ~
~ . designed to operate with this amount of supply noise._ Circuits that may be ~
especially sensitive to power supply noise contain additional local filtering.
, Power supply noise has not been a problem in NUMAC instruments to date, Measurements of the ripple and noise on the internal NUMAC power bus have resulted in typical observations of < 50 mV. Feedback to the external power supply bus is minimized by filter networks located on the ir':oming AC power feeds.
11.0 Fallu_re Mode 11,1 Question:
- Discuss the failure mode of a loss of a detector signal."
Response: Both thermocouple and flow input signals.are limit checked within the LDM Should opens'or shorts in the input signal lines occur this will be detected and the LDM will give an INOP alarm._ Trips will not occur, The NUMAC design includes features that monitor the incoming temperature and flow signals to detect open or out-of-bounds signals.
Ambient and Differenti3J Temocrature Monitorino Channels; On the leak detection ambient and differential temperature channels, each thermocouple input is monitored for an open condition. For these Type T th'ermocouple channels, an open input triggers a designated bias voltage into the measuring circuit that will be interpreted as an open input, This type of L condition will be detected within the channel response time ~and the channel :
Indication will then be driven hard downscale by circuitry within the NUMAC -
Thermocouple input Module.: This software design prevents the initiation of spurious system Isolations in response to a channel fault.~ The channel hard downscMe value will result in a self test fault. The self test fault will cause a t'est/ trouble control room annunciator to alarm, directing the operator to El-21
Investigate the NUMAC chassis (Jispby screens for. a specific message :
describing the fault. The fault will automatically. reset when the input is no
' longer within this range.
RWCU Differential Flow Flow Transmitter Channels:
The NUMAC processor will continuously monitor the three flow transmitter '
input signals for gross failures such as high or. low out-of range current -
signals. For these transmitter channels, with nominal operating ranges of 41 to 20 mA, any current input that is not between 1.00_and 2_1.00 mA will be interpreted as faulted. This tyise of condition will be detected within the, ,
channel response time and that channel's flow indication will display either_
up or down arrows corresponding to the existing upscale or downscale signal condition. The RWCU Differential Flow output trip will be inhibited ;
whenever a flow transmitter input self test limit is exceeded. ;This software design prevents the initiation of spurious system isolations in response to a channel fault. The flow transmitter input signalinput out of bounds condition be processed as a self test fault. The self test fault will cause a test / trouble control room annunciator to alarm, directing the operator to -
- inveistigate the RWCU NUMAC chassis display screen for a specific message' describing the fault, The fault will automatically reset when the input is no longer within this range.
RWCU Differential Flow Density Comnensation Thermocounle Channels:
On the three process temperature inputs that are used for this function, each thermocouple signalis monitored to detect an open condition. -For these Type T thermocoupls channels, an open input triggers a designated:
bias voltage into the r%uring circuit that will be interpreted as an open :
irput. This type of cordition will be detected within the channel response l
time and the channel indication will then be' driven hard downscale by -
circuitry within the NUMAC Thermocouple input Module.- This open/downscale protection and a corresponding high limit are established to-envelope the credible range of temperatures that may exist for each RWCU flow path.
This type of condition will be detected within the channel response time and that channel's flowing temperature indication will display either up or down _
arrows corresponding to the existing upscale or downscale signal conditionc The NUMAC software provides gross failure and "out-of-bounds" signal-checks for theso flow density compensation thermocouple input signals.
When either of those conditions exirts, the NUMAC trouble relay'will de-energize and will alarm via the "RCIC/RWCU STM LEAK DET TEST / TROUBLE" Control Room overhead annunciator. NUMAC will t.lsplay.
an error message identifying the affected channel and the nature of the .
failure. Simultaneously, the software algorithm will substitute conservative - _i values for the faulted inputs; i.e., the RWCU Differential Flow trip features -
will continue to function and will be conservative even in the presence ot :
faulted input temperature signals.
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(; -
1 1
. .- = .~ _
1
- 12.0 Fail Safe 12.1 Question: " Describe operation and design of any other NUMAC component used to
- place the system in its f ail safe condition."
Response: _ The computer _contains two watchdog timers:
- 1) The timer is a circuit containing a capacitor _'which, if allowed to '
charge to a predetermined voltage level, will cause a reset pulse to be sent to the functional computer. If, for some reason, software - -
becomes " lost" such a reset will enable the computer to restart in a specific, controlled way. Important parametura, such as setpoints .
and other channel parameters, will have been stored in the computer -
non-volatile memory (EAROM) and would not be lost during the.
restart process.
}
As long as software is executing properly (i.e., within pre-establishod limits), it will provide for pulses to be sent to the . ;j~
watchdog timer every 50 milliseconds or less (the interval between -
reset pulses is not fixed because of the event driven nature of _the.-
computer). Each tr, set pulse to the timer causes the capacitor to discharge and start recharging from zero volts. Thus, as long as pulses are received every 50 milliseconds, the capacitor will never +
t,harge to the predetermined voltage level and the computer will reset.
- 2) Another watchdog timer (50 msec reset) is found on the Open Drain 1/0 modulo which, under direction of the functional computer, .
physically controls the turning on and off of coil current to the trip relays.- If the voltage on the timer's capacitor is allowed to reach a predetermined voltage level, the module's circuitry will force the -
relays to their tripped sts.tes.
An additional protective feature is that there is no combination of user-kevs -
which can (in the operate mode) alter any parameters or safety function __
operations within the NUMAC.
13.0 proundina 13.1 Question: "Are the analog and digital grounds isolated?"
Response: The LDM contains separate grounds for analog and digital circuits. These -
grounds are both tied back to the power supplies within the NUMAC.'
13.2 Question: "During RFI testing, was the signal on the ground line monitored? Discuss -
the effects of the signal measure'l on the ground line in relation _to RFI testing."
Response: Ground lines were not monitored during RFI testing. GE test proceduros did not require such monitoring.
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p 1 .-
, d
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' 4 H 13.3 ' _Ouestion: " Discuss' the effects of lightning strike on the ground line and provisions'for system protection.
- Response: The ability'of equipment such as the LDM to withstand lightning strikes is translated into .' surge withstand" requirements.
Discussion of this topic will be provided via.a supplement to this RAI (as per .
response to Question 4.1).
14.0 Setooint Calculation 14.1 Question: " Discuss the methodology of calculating the analytical limit and allowable limit for the differential flow of the reactor water cleanup system isolation-function."
Response: Backaround:
The RWCU differential flow esolation function compares the value of the -
system inlet flow to the sum of the two system outlet path flows. _ Any positive difference is interpreted as system leakage.- The range of RWCU operating conditions includes a wide variety of flow combinations lincludmg.
situations where one, two or all three of the flows are in the extreme low:
- end of their channel's calibrated range. '
.An orifice plate is utilized as the primary sensor for each of the three flow -
channels. There is a high degree of uncertainty in the differential pressma-to-flow relationships for these plates when the differential pressure is below approximately 30% of the design range.- The square root factor in'the differential pressure-to-flow relationship then amplifies the already considerable low range uncertainties of each flow channel.
The existing RWCU differential flow instrumentation function consists of three Rosemount differential pressure transmitters, three GEMAC square root converters, a GEMAC summer, four GEMAC trip units'and two'Agastat - -
time delay relays. No compensation for density ve'lations is provided. The RWCU containment isolation actuation setpoint_for this loop is set at 43__
gpm and the associated delay timers are set at 43 seconds. These _ field.
setpoints are less than the current applicable Technical Specification Trip-Setpoint and Allowable Values of $53 cpm for the flow and s45 seconds:
for the delay timer.
With even one of the three flow channels operating in the low end of its range, which is common since the reject flow is zero during routine.
operations, the total loop uncertainty is very large. _The surveillance test for -
this function utilizes a combination of mid-range flow values for each of the =
~
three channels in order to consistently achieve surveillance test trips at less -
than the 53 opm Allowable Value.
The 45 second isolation delay timer has been a considerable obstacle to placing the RWCU system on line. System fill and vent operations, as well as delays in stabilizing flows, have routinely challenged the timer function .
El 24 -
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and often resulted in unnecessary l system isoiations.
- Analvtic Limit:
CP&L has utllized a setpoint_ methodology consistent with ISA Standard S67.04 "Setpoints For Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation-Used in Nuclear Power Plants" to establish the calibration setpoint andi Allowable Value for the NUMAC RWCU differential flow function. :In order '
to apply that methodology, it was first necessary'to establish an engineering--
basis for definition of an Analytic Limit.-
The change from GEMAC to NUMAC hardware and the addition of flowc density compensation 'will significantly improve the accuracy ant' stability of.
the electronic portion of this function. However, since the flow orifice plates will remain as the primary sensors for the three channels, it wasi understood that overall loop uncertainty will remain high whenever any of- ;
the channels operate in the low end of their respective ranges. That fact, in conlunctlM with operational difficuhles associated with the short delay .
timer setting, led us to scek a basis for establishment of a relatively high' Analytic Limit. We knew that General Electric had done previous calculations for other plants demonstrating that large cold RWCU leaks were acceptable from a safety perspective. We were also aware that other '
utilities had obtained approval for either longer delays or bypass options fora their isolation delay timers; At CP&L's request, GE prepared their report GE-NE 770-14-0592, as described in our original submittal, to provide the calculational basis for selection of a 300 gpm flow and a 30 minute delay as appropriate Analytic -
Limits for BNP. That report demonstrates that leaks of that magnitudo and duration will not result in unacceptable offsite or control room dose consequences. As per a previous verbal request, a copy of that report har recently been transmitted to you.
Allowable Value:
CP&L calculation ORWCU-0010 then established the loop uncertainty as per, the ISA Standard S67.04 methodology. Please refer to the Setpoint Diagram included as Attachment 14.1 to this RAl.
At the worst postulated flow rate combination'and when exposed to the:
worst case environmental conditions, this function has a maximum total-measurable and unmeasurable uncertainty of 141,88 gpm. Since there is no-operational advantage to increasing our current field calibratbn setpoint'of '
43 gpm, we plan to maintain that value as is.
The ORWCU-0010 calculation demonstrates that the measurable portion of" the total uncertainty applicable to the specific flow case established for use c in aurveillance testing is only 12.73 ppm. The Technical Specification Allowable Value was therefore set at a value high enough above the field calibration setpoint to accommodate those measurable uncertainties plus a -
nominal additional margin, inclusion of that margin is justifiable based on-the large overall margin that exists between the field calibration setpoint and the Analvtic Limit.
l El 25
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. a
- List of Attachmenini
- 8-1/2 x 11 Attachments
- 3.7.1 ' Accuracy & Drift for NUMAC Temperature Channels, excerpt from_ GE Design and Performance Specification 23A5227 (Section 5.4, sheets 20,21) _
3.7.2 ~ Accuracy & Drift for NUMAC RWCU Differential Fbw Function, excerpt from GE Design- i and Performance Specification 23A5227 (Section 5.6.6, sheets 34 through 371 8,1,1 Copy of Purchase Order 576260 (11 pp) .
8.1.2 Copy of Centract ZM70020000/ Work Authorization ZS70020052 (5 pp) 8.2.1 Calculation of Leak Detection _ Monitor (LDM) MTBF (Without AWCU Option) (1 pot-8.2.2 -Cale Atlon of Leak Detection Monitor (LDM) MTBF (With RWCU Option) (1 pg)- l 9.1.1 Project Design Basis Document DBD BG0051-1 (29 pp) 9.1.2. Safety Analysis for Unit 1 Plant Modification 91038 (34 pp) 14.1 -Setpoirt Diagram for RWCU Differential Flow (excerpt from CP&L Calculation ORWCU.
0010) (1 pg)
Oversized Attachments:
1.2.1 BNP Drawing F-07008 Control Building General Arrangement Plan (showing location of the -
1 H12-P614 and .?-H12-P614 panels in which the NUMAC Equipment wili be installed)-
1.2;2 Sketch SK-91038-Z-1034 Sh 1,1-H12 P614 Cabinet Arrangement Drawing (showing j -
NUMAC arrangement information) 1.2.3 Sketch SK-91038 Z 1034 Sh 2,1-H12-P614 Cabinet Arrangement D. awing (showing NUMAC arrangement information) _
1.2.4 Sketch SK-91038-2-1034 Sh 3,1-H12 P614 Cabinet Arrangement Drawing (showing NUMAC arrangement information) 6.5.1 ~ Sketch SK 91038-2 7001 Sh 1, Steam Leak Detection Elementary Diagrar (marked up to show non 1 E Interfaces) 6.5.2 Sketch SK-91038-2 7001 Sh 2 Steam Leak Detection Elementary Diagram (marked up to show non 1E interfaces)
'6.5.3 Sketch SK 91038-2 7002, Steam Leak Detection Elementary Diagram (marked-up to show non-1E interfaces) 6.5.4 Sketen SK 91038-Z-7006, Reactor Water Cleanup System Elementary Diagram (marked-up to show non-1E and cross divisional interfaces) -
El-26
~
NLS=TS-Cl1 l' l 23A5227 Su NO. 20
/%TT, 3.1. l (7. 9f) I REV 0 Or 55 l
5.4 Accuracy 6 Drift (Temperature Channels)
Definitions:
Accuracy error - the not contributions of accuracy (absolute),
accuracy errors due to internal references, and temper 6ture-induced e rrot s f rom NUMAC (excludes sensor and calibration errora) over the operating temperature range (5'c to 50*C) and input power range. .
Drift error - the net contributions of setpoint drift errors from NUMAC (excludes sensor errors) over 6 months at a fixed 25'C teinperature.
Typical error - the not errors f rom all components which contain statistically unrelated errors and can be added a the square toot of the sum of squares (SRSS).
Worst Case error - the total error contribution of absolute maximum component errors. .
The total accuracy for a temperature channel is given by:
2 2 1/2 ACCURACY = (ABSOLUTE ErrECTS + TEMPERATURE ErrECTS )
+ A/D RESOLUTION where ABSOLUTE ErrECTS = Square root of the sum of the squares of the contributions of the Thermocouple Input Unit Cold Junction Referenci, (0.51*r), the 6-Input Thermocouple Module ( 2. 3'r ) , and the Analog j Module (0.3'r). Net effect is +/-2.4't.
TEMPERATURE ErrECTS = Square root of the sum of the squares of the contributions of the Thermocouple Input Unit Cold Junction Referenc i (0.58'r), the 6-Input Thermocouple Module (0.8'r typical /2.3*r wors I case), and the Analog Modi:le (0. 3
- r) . Het effect is +/-l.0*r typic l
+/-2.4'r worst case. {
A/D RESOLUTION = Analog-to-digital resolution (0.2*r),
thus:
l l Accuracy l Drift l l------------------ .
l----------------l----------------l l Parameter I (5-50'C) I over 6 months ' '
l i specified I (25'C) l 1 environment I i
}--------------------------l---------------l----------------l l Temperature Channels l 1% of span I <0.7'r i i l(+/-2.8'r typ, I l l l+/-3.6*r worst) l l l l 1 .I J
I I 23A5227 SH NO. al '
or l REV 0 55 ;
1 The total span for temperature channels is 300'r. Therefore the i channel accuracy following calibration is approximately +/-11 at l both the NUMAC front panel and the trip outputs.
For the differential channels, the temperature determination is based l on a cold leg temperature of 75'r.
Setpoint resolution is provided to the nearest one 'r for either differential or ambient measurement points.
Paragraph 5.6.6 defines accuracy and drift for the RWCU flow channels 5.4.1 Power Supplies i HUMAC input power can be from 100 Vac to 132 Vac. riow transmitters are powered from the +15 V and -15 V supplies to provide a 28.6 Vde- ,
source (diode and fuses in bias path). Relay outputs are powered !
from the +5.00 Vdc supply.
~
The combined accuracy and drift of the combined NUMAC supplies when providing power to the Relay output Unit is as follows: ,
15.0 +/- 0.5.Vdc
+ 5.00 +/- 0.25 Vdc +15.0 +/- 0.5 Vdc -
5.5 outputs and output Trip runctions ERTIS Computer Points are re-transmitted via the GEDAC fiber-optic outputs as defined in specification 24A1741.' -t The assignment of output contacts to specific functions is programmable. These output signals are digital and are used in plant logic for isolation and alarm-functions.
Upscale trip points are adjustable over the. full positive range-including the capability to trip at the end points.
Trip response is isss than three seconds for a 10% ste?. function of t channel input from-5% below the setpoint to 5% above tie setpoint, measured from the application of-an electrical signal at the ampliff input to the change of state of the selected-output relay contact.
Four digital outputs for RWCU differential flow isolation are provided. One output is an alarm that operates when the HI setpoint is reached. Thr, second output is an alarm that operates when the HI-HI setpoint is reached and the timer starts. The third and fourth are the Division I and Division II isolation outputs that occur when the timer times out.
s 0
- t ,. -, y e -.---e ..,u, .u-,s . , - , , , , , ,
r., . - #- - , - Syy, - y ,.,- .- , y r -n ..m,- --
NL5 -9 3- Ol7 i l 23A5227 SH NO. 34 ATT. 3.1. 2. (4 PP) I aEv o or 55 l
5.6.4 RWCU Input Limits 5.6.4.1 RWCU riow Inputs RWCU Flow Input data are provided in Table 2.
5.6.4.2 Temperature Inputs Temperature Input data for density compensation are provided in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
5.6.5 Leak Detection runction (RWCU Differential Flow)
The NUMAC LDM is provided with the capability of interfacing
- to the RWCU flow signals. This configuration is intended to be used with the lower chassis designated B21-XY-59498. This is accomplished by installing an additional TC Module and a 16-Channel Analog output Module. Inputs are connected via a RWCU Intetface Unit. The TC .1odule receives the The temperature 16-Channel and flow signals from the RWCU for processing.
Analog output Module provides analog output signals for the user's application. If an instrument is configured via the set parameters function as chassis B21-XY-5949B, the hardware must se configured as discussed above and the function is available.
All other instruments will function fully without the additional RWCU hardware, but the RWCU Differential Flow function will not be available.
5.6.6 Accuracy and Drift (RWCU Flow Channels).
Hardware / software processing of the RWCU flows is similar to that of thermocouple channels. The principal contributor to flow vatiations is inaccutacy at low flov due to the square root characteristics of the process loop.
Flow variations fall into 3 categories:
- differential pressure (dP) processing (see 5.6.6.1)
- density compensation (DTL) processing (see 5.6.6.2)
- flow equation (square root extraction) (see 5.6.6.3) 5.6.6.1 Differential Pressure (dP) Processing The total dP accuracy for an RWCU channel is given by:
2 2 1/2 ACCURACY = (ABSOLUTE ErrECTS + TEMPERATURE ErrECTS )
+ A/D RESOLUTION Notes refer to section 5.4 for definitions.
_ __._ _._-__.__.____....._.___m._-. - _.__.-- _
1 1
-
- 1 23A5227 -SH No. 35 )
l REV 0 -
or 55 !
l 5.6.6.1 Differential Pressure (dP) Processing (continued) j iwheres s
ABSOLUTE ErrECTS = Square root of the sum of the squares of the dP error contributions of the RWCU Input Unit (0.15%), the mV conversionii (0.5%), and the Analog Module (0.1%). Net effect is +/-0.53% r.s. l TEMPERATURE ErrECTS = Square root of the sum of the squares of the dP>
error contributions of the RWCU Input Unit (0.10%), the mV conversioni, (0.18% typical, 0.30% worst case), and the Analog Module (0.11). Ne t '
effect i s +/_0.23% r.S. typicni, +/-0.33% r.S. worst case. l A/D RESOLUTION = Analog-to-digital resolution-(0.07%).
b thus:
1 l Accuracy l Drift l___________ ___________l___.__.____ ,
l 1 _____(_5_50*C) 1 over Six Parameter i specified '
Months environment (25'C) i l
dP1 l +/-1.25 "WC typ < 0.3 "WC *
+/-1,34 "WC worst J dP2 +/_1.05 "WC typ < 0.3 "WC 1 l +/_1.12 "WC worst dP3 +/_1.25 "WC typ < 0.3 "WC
+/-1,34 "WC'worstl I
5.6.6.2 Density compensation Processing b In a cimilar manner, the total-density (DTL)' accuracy-for an RWCU channel is calculated from the density tables by using a 7
+/- 3.6'r error (from the worst. case value from section 5.4).
i Accuracy Drift l l
___________\ _________________' ________________;
(5_50*C) 1 Over Six ,
Parameter specified l Months >
environment ! (25'C) l-
___________l_________________l 1+/- 0.24 lbm/ft3 <-0.05 lbm/ft3 l DTL1 -
+/- 0.21 lbm/ft3 . < 0.05.lbm/ft3 DTL2 -
DTL3 +/- 0.06 lbm/ft3 l < 0.01 lbm/ft3 l I
7 y,sv-- ..-w-. -ve-, ,_n,,-,n+,-e,g-n-. ,+,,.w,,-- . , , , . . , , , , --c n n,e-, .-.-.-,,,..-g--, -,ve-w,, ,-,--.-,,,----v+-,-n-- .
, -- . . - - ~ , , - - - , -
.c t
23A5327 SH 110. 36-
! REV 0 or FM ,
I . - . . , .
.i/
5.6.6.3 riow Equations The dP and DTL error values (sections 5.6.6.1 and 5.6.6.2.t #s t o - ,
substi tuted into the flow equations (Section 5.6.3.4) usirq: fa '
Brunswick typical operating conditions belows i
- 100,000.lbm/hr (100% rated flow or 264.8 gpm normalized flow t l
for inlet and return, 0.0 gpm for reject).
- Inlet D533 - 47.036-lbm/ft3
- Return D436 - 52.110 lbm/ft3
- Reject D125 - 61.633 lbm/ft3 ,
9 i
- Accuracy and drift for RWCU Plows are summarized belows Accuracy Drift 1
~ #
(5-FD'C) Over Six-Specified Months Parameter Environment (25'C)
Full-scale channel l +/- 1.4 gpm (0.3 gpm flow (300 gpm) 1 100% rated channel +/- 1.5 gpm i <0.4 gpm
. flow (265 gpm) {
l '
50% rated channel i +/- 2.8 gpm- I
< 1-gpm flow (132 gpm) 4 20% rated channel +/- 6.5 gpm < 2 gpm ,
flow-(53 gpm)
+/- 32 gpm.* < 7 gpm
- 0% rated channel i flow (0 gpm) l l l
\
Differential flow +/- 16 gpm *' '
<-3_gpm * -
(for Reject - 0 gpm) _
l
- NOTE: The above values ONLY include NUMAC contributions to flow
- errors, riow Elements and riow Transmitters contribute a.
more significant amount. Square root errors at low flows I account for these variations. .
i i
- , . - . . - . - , - - - . - - ~ , , - ,--,.-----,~.-,,_, 4.-r -% ,-m.. ,-,.--------,sm , , , - . , - . .4-.
r i
- l 23A5227 SH NO. 37 i REV 0 or 55 5.6.6.3 riow Equations (Continued)
.EWCU Differential flow - operating u .
Differential riow (dr) errors during typical-operation are ,
predominantly a function of reject flow errors (because reject flow i
- typically 0 gpm). Normalized inlet and riormalized returnThus, flowsthe are equal (about 270 gpm for typical operating conditions). 1 Brunswick typical Differential Flow (dr) is: ;
dr = 0 +/-16 gpm 5.6.7 RWCU Digital Outputs .
- - Setpoint resolution is provided to the nearest one 'r for either differential or ambient measurement points.
- riow value is displayed with a resolution of 1 gpm. .l
- Accuracy and calibration error-combined:
+/~1/2 the least significant digit f
- Drift-over 6 months: q
+/-0 5.6.8 RWCU Analog outputs The re-transmitted Analog riow outputs are given below:
- a. RWCU Normalized Inlet flow '
- b. RWCU Normalized Return Flow ++
- c. RWCU Normalized-Reject riow
- d. RWCU Normalized Differential riow Re-transmitted Analog Flow outputs have the same accuracies and -c drifts as shown in Paragraph 5.6.6.
ERTIS Computer Points are re-transmitted via the GEDAC fiber-optics -
outp'its as defined in specification'24A1741. - These have the.same-accuracies as parameters displayed on the NUMAC front panel.
Re-transmitted Analog riow-Outputs have 0.06K ohm +/ .1% output impedances. These are designed to drive'l mA r.S. panel meters.
See Table 6 for scale and current output values.
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o
(< 1. . i 5 gt ATC50.t.t 93-cq) .:.s .. CN~10f R UiPP PURCHASE .'sA.,'E '
@).C00NA PONER D LIGHT COMPANY P.O. BOX 15 51 R AltlG H. N.C. 27602 jgffn 4. gg; ,'57816ggD igt64l g ,, ,, ,,ggp, gg s.
sw to GE!!ERAL ELECTRIC-NUCLE!.E ENEECY ERUNEWIC): ETEAM ELE 7:RIT FL!.NT
-CE EE EEEVICE DEPT, y @1 WALEHOUEE H
}?5 CURTHER AVE. HIGHWAY f.7 130ETH SAN JOSE, CA 95100 EDUTHPOE7. NT OSM1 492.
TC Upon receipt of this material. send in Mater.al Received Report to Accc,wnts Payat te Urut. Raieig't N C If any matereal is receiveo ','
damaged f eovest f reight spent to ond+cate damage on f ace of original
'eeght bill and descotie entent of damage on Material Rece'ved Report Also state on esanai Received Reperiie repiecement is ces red MITwm c a.c .w#e.s %,.pe.n %%:i.Ta% co0s i as578TT513lTE g.47 un ut M I""
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- PREPt?T* "'e ITEM j ovaTiry j U/M j PEr Or PtOPOf f L otSCRIPTICN l UNIT PRICL l Pt GENEFJ.L ELECTRIC CCt!PANY "NUMAC" LEAL:
DETECTION MONITOR SYSTEM. CONEIETIN3 OF:
1 1 LT !;UMAC,'EHF !!!TEETACE DDOUME!:TE L1 1 EA UNIT 1 DEf.FT FLAUT MOTIFICATION PAC); AGE 2.0 1 EA UNIT 2 DEAFT PLA!'T MC:IF!CATIOt* PA l' AGE .
3 11 EA USEE MANUALE 42 4 EA UNIT 1 HAETWAEE SYSTEME 4.2 4 EA 'JN!T C HAEDWAF.E SYSTEME 43 2 EA SPAPI HARDWARE SYETEME 44 1 EA E1!f)LATCT. HARDWARE SYSTEM 01040.000.00 L EEE ATTACHEMENT #1 FOR FJETHER DETAILE.
DELIVERY SCHEDULE AND PAYMENT ECHEDULE.
ATTACHMENT #2 IS THE GE PROPOSAL 294-1BC5G-)BO, REV. 1.
NOTE: LDT. PRICE INCLUDEE ALL ITEME
-DELIVER T.0/W? N'MBEE: PM 91-03E/PM 91-039 b,. ,'
, -SPEC. NUMBEE & DATE:
N/A - TER GE FROPOEAL 2.94-1BC5G-):50. REY. 2
. t 0 i ~ ~-STORAGE F.EOUIFIMEHTE : ANS: LEVEL F rf Ji'*
Ew *4 IIIR ALL CCAR($PONQLNI. TO TELlPHONE NO AUTMO'tillD 5lGN AT VRE
- ** * ? r* 1' t ,,
',,.t* O i *'* , T. , . .? ? "" C #
.l A27ACHMENT il TO REQ. 030 91 NED TE!!
Continuntlen of 'Descrintion and Seeelfications' The NUMAC Leak Detection Honitor System line items described on
~~ the Purchase Requisition cover sheet represent the hardware and design documentation scope of CE Proposal No. 294+1BC5C KB0 Revision 1. ThoseitemsaretobeprovidedinaccordanceVIththe content of that proposal, except as modified by the details of' this Purchase Requistion. '
The associated field services scope of that CE proposal vill be t separately authorieed via Work Authorization ES70020052 against contract &M70020000. Procurement of the individual spare parts recommended by Table 1 in the proposal vill be initiated by_a separate Purchase Requisition and Order.
The total face value of the CE proposal is $1,300,000 with a discount to be applied in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
In response to CP&L's request that the design and nardware scope be priced separately from the field services scope, CE has agreed via telecon on March 28, 1991 that $1,040.000 of the total proposal pre discount price may reasonably be assigned to the design and hardware scope. The percentage disecunt stated in the Settlemeat Agreement will be applied to that amount.
The required material delivery dates and the associated pre-discount progress payment schedule shall be as follows:
- 1. Delivery of Unit 1 Interface $ 100,000 Fuy 91 Documents
- 2. Delivery of User's Manuals S 50,000 Tuly il
- 3. Delivery of Unit 2 Interface $ $0,000 Jan 92 Documents
- 4. Delivery of 4 Unit 1 Hardware $ 325,000 Feb 15 92 Sets and Final Unit 1 NUMAC Documentation
- 5. Delivery of Tirst Spare and $ 190,000 April 92 Simulator Hardware Sets
- 6. Delivery of 4 Unit 2 and the $ 323.000 Nov 92 second Spare Hardware Sets and Final Unit 2 NUMAC Documentation Total: $ 1.040,000
. w ~. .., .
[{ ch0 N >
Rev. 12/29/
VDSSR INETPUC* IONS THE I!GICATED INSTRUCTICNS AND/OR REQUIRDiDITS' AAE dip
- u . . . . ; . . . . a ; . ; .mnn,= ; . . ; ; : . ; . ; . ;;: . ; ., ; ; ;OSED ON THIS There CPR. shall be no changes in part numbers or item p descri ti.;.;;;;.a.......a......;.a letterhead addressing the interchangeability statement that the new part/part number serves the same fit or change of the p on his
- 1 the old part/part number.
art numbers and a '
- comply with the requireme Payment vill not be made for material that does**i no u nau..ureturned at hexpense. nts of the purchase order, and such material may be u.;.is *
..................u...;.;..u..;;.;;;;;u;..ua-+* w u ..;;..;.u..u..*-
All material to erevide shall be, as a minimum, securely tagged traceability by the te f*PR's erecurement deeunent , stenciled, or marked as appropriate fellevinel and vender turelied deeussantation.
- 1. Za,nder ? art number 2.
CP&L turehase order number The above is in additien te any trecifie *srkine raouired by steeffigt h Tor small parts not suitable for individual tagging or securely tagged or marked uith all required identificatienmarking, the container shall i
return freit,ht collect any material that is not correctly markedVendor authorizes promptly correct the marking discrepancy and return the material freigh
_k A t prepaid to CPE. ;
This item is important to nucisar safety.
documented quality assurance program which conferias to thThe Vandor e applicable Power Plants." 1971 edition (or later editionorimplem Nuclea; endorsing NRC Regulatery Cuide) or Appendix 5 of 10CTR50 ' n accordance with at Criteria-for Nuclear Power Plants and Tual Reprocessing . Quality Assurance Pl ants."
Supplier shall extend applicable QA requirements toer'lover .
ti suppliers.
i Surveillance vill not normally be conducted on replacem inspection and QA audit.shall have the right ofentaccess items, but CP&L to supplier f s for source This ites is subject to the provisions of 10CTR21 the appropriate Nuclear Project location shall be CP&L Nuclear Licemaing and---
reports made to the NRC pursuant to 10CTR21. concurrently notified of any Submit notification toi*
Carolina Power 6 Light Company Kanager . Nuclear 1.icensing Carolina Power & Light Company-Box 1551 Department Manager Raleigh. North Carolina Brunswick Nuclear Prcject 27602 NC Hwy 2 1/2 Mi. North Box 10429 ..
Southport, NC 28461 Carolina Power & Light Company Departoons Managsr Carolina Power & Li Harris:Nue% Paject - Department: Manager.ght Company _ __
mas
, _ Staten nood. ina;. Samiss; , _.. ..D M a - Mue&amn 2roj eet.- .
,. - New.H m Nt:~27562' ..L:.
~ ~ ~ ~ :.scmspii4sKd27,tsoc790' 3g Hartsviller SC* 29550 -
- S
...=a
._.,.s . .
Nonconformance to Purchase Order requiramente or CP&L of the recommended disposition: consist ofapproved one ordoountats more or appt vi of t
. 1.
Technical or material requirement is violated. t 2.
Supplier docuoents approved by CP&L are viciated .-
- 3. o Honconformance cannot be correieted b manufacturing process or by rework. y continuance of the original 4
The item does not conform to the original requirements n thoughofthe eve ;
can be restored function is unimpaired.to a e endition such that the capability e itea to -
th These submittals shall include Supplier's recommended di
- use.as.is* or
- repair *) and technical justification sposition (for examt the appropriate Nuclear Project .
Torvard submittals te
'B location (address listed above). -
This is a consumsbie item.
_L_ C This N45.2.2.
ANSI item shall1972be stored, packaged, ande shipp d i edition (or later edition implemn accordance with endorsing NRC Regulatory cuide or approved equivalentented in accord identify any special storage requirements imposed. .
The vender shall
_____ E This on Eneis considered Approved Suppliersa List.
- Commercial..Grade" The vendor item is not required to T . Vendor must have a QA system which satisfies th Pressure Vessel Description). Code Section VIII (edition as sp'ecified ia- requir
! n Extended C
This item is used in equipment that is im safety related equipment from fire. portant to the protection of nuclear Undervriter's Laboratory (UL) listing or Tactory a Mutu l (TM)If o approvali documentation of such listing or approval shall b e provided.
____. H Thts refsrenced. item must be provided in accordance with th e specification attached or I . Calibration must be accomplished under suitabl .
equipsett having valid tracsabilitygnized -
too nationally certified standards.
re A stacament of environmental conditis ns and copies and personnel qualifications shall be provided to theof calibratish proc purcha.ser or made available to the purchaser for review if requasted .
Purchaser shall have right of access to 'the calibr witness calibration of instruments and to review appration facility opriate documentation. -
The accuracy of calibration standards used must be four ti mes greater than the securacy of the equipment being calibrated.
J . Vandat.is m .
- not requirad to be on Approved .
Sup li p ers.Lisc. **'*"
pyga,e 4, , "*W- 9 2 of 6
+, .,. .-- , . - - . - - - , , ,-..g
. -- - ~ . . - .. - _- _ - .- .~ . ~ ,
. K I he item is List.
Suppliers a Replacement Part only.
Vendor is not required to b.i on Appr.
- s Surveillance will not normally be conducted on replacement ems, but CP&L it
- shall have inspection and the right QA audit. of access to supplier facilities andorQA at r ,
( his item is subject to the provisions c,f 10CTR21. ,
l the appropriate Nuclear Project location shall be c CT&L Huclear Licensin reports made to the NRC pursuant to 10CTR21. oncurrently notified of.
Submit notification to: 1 Carolina rower & Light company Manager . Nuclear Licensing Carolina Power 6. Light Company.
Box 1551 Department Mau gsr '
>- Raleigh North Carolina 27602 Brunswick Huclear Project '
I NC Hwy 2 1/2 Mi, North Box 10429 'j Southport. NC'_28461-Carolina Power & Light company Department Hansger Carolina Power & Light company j Harris Nuclear Project Department Manator State Road 1134. Box 165 Robinson Nuclear f. ject New Hill NC 27562 SC Hwy. 151 & 23. Brx 790 Hartsville SC -29550 Nonconformance to Purchase Order requirements or CP&L appr ,
consist of one ordisposition:
more of the following shall be submitted oved documents to CP&whi ;
of the recommended .
or appro' '
- 1. >
Technical or material requirement is violated.
2.
Supplier documents approved by CP&L are violated .
3.
(
manufacturing proctss or by rawork.Honconformance g nal 1
4 The ite:
i does not conform to the original requirements even thou5 '
.can function beisrestored unimpaired. to a condition such that ct.e capability ofe the - its These submittals shall include Supplier's recommended "use.as.is" or " repair") and technical. justification dispo or example the appropriate Nuclear Project location (address Forward ..
li submittals_to- '
sted above).
L . Vendor must have a OA system which satisfies the r$
831.1 for Boiler T.xt.ornal Piping (edition as specified Description). in Equirements xtended M
his item is used-in a radiation vaste control systa n.-
QA system which includes the following: ne vender must have a a.
. Measures shall be established to assure that purchased a and materi l equipment conform tc the procurament document.s.
b.
A program for inspection of activities affseting quality activity to verify conformance with the documen forming.the proemdures, and drawings for accomplishin5 the activity. .
,' Q
- 3 of 6
- - . -. - - , - . - _ . . . - - - . , - - - -- - - . - , ~
l
- c. l Measures shall be established to control the handling, ,
stora shippit t
d.
work and inspection instructions to preven .
)
. Measures chall be established to provide for the identificati es which have satistsetor$1v passed required inspections and tes
- e. .
Measures such as failures, shall be established malfunctions. to assure deficiencies, deviations that erse condition to qual
, defective material and corrected. equipment, and no'nconformances are promptly e and id, N
This item is important to nuclear safety. ' The Vender sh ll i a mplement documented quality assurance program which conforms e applicable to th a Description).
requirements of NCA 3800 of ASME Section III (edition asxtenc spe Supplier shall extend applicable QA requirements to lower tier-suppliers, Surveillance vill not normally be conducted on replacement tems, but CP&L i
shall have the rigne inspection and QA audit. of access to supplier facilities and-QA rec ords for sou
- This item is subject to the provisions of 10Cnt21 -
the appropriate Nuclear Prcject .
reports made; to the NRC pursuantlocation shall be concurrently notified o to 10CDt21.
Submit notification to:
Carolina Power & Light Company Manager . Nuclear Licensing Carolina Power & Light Company Box 1551 Department Manager Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Brunswick Nuclear Project NC Hwy, 2 1/2 Mi, North Box 10429
- Southport, NC- 28461 i Carolina Fover 6 Light Company Department Hansger Catolina Power. & Light Company Harris Nuclear Project Department Manager ,
State Road 1134, Box 165 Robinson Nuclear Project..
New Hill, NC 27562 SC Hwy. 151 & 23, Box 790 Hartsville. SC 29550 Nonconformance to Purchase Order requirements or CP&L e- of the recommended disposition: consist of one e or more to CP&L for approva,of the 1.
Technical or material requirement is violated .
2.
Supplier documents approved by-CP&L are violated .
3.
manufacturin' process or by rework.Nonconformance e original c 4
The item does not conform to the original requirements even though the itam function is unimpaired.can be restoren to a condition e itam such to that These submittala sM11 include Supplier's recommanded di
- usa.as.ia* or ' repair") and technicaLjustificationsposition-(for a = T =... 1 the appropriata Nuclear Project: location (add .
Torward s N ream listad above). N Jy*_%7 -
~v -, , -
0 . n is itas is importent to nuclear safety ,
documented quality assurance program which conforms tna Vender a o the. applicable t requirements Description). of NCA 4000 '.
of ASME Section III (edition e n F.vtan as sp Supplier shall extend applicable QA requiraner.ta to lower tier suppliers.
Surveillance will not normally be conducted on replacement i tama, but CP&L shall have inspection and the QA audit.right of access to supplier facilities and QA r ecords for set This igen is subject to the provisions of 10CTR21-the appropriate Nuclear.Prcject locativn shall be CP&1 Nuclear Licensing a .
reports made to the NRC pursuant to 10Cm21. ccucurrently notified lof- a' Submit notification tot -
Carolina Power & Light Company Manager Nuclear Licensing Carolina Power.& Light Company Box 1551 Department Manager Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 . Brunswick Nuclear Project NC Hwy. 2 1/2.Mi. North Box 10429 Southport. NC 28461 Carolina Power 6 Light Company Department Manager Carolina Power & Light Company Harris Nuclear Project Department Manager State Road 1134. Box l'3 Robinson Nuclear Project New Hill. NC 27562 SC Hwy. 151 & 23. Box 790 Hartsville. SC 29550 Nonconformance to Purchase Order requirements or CP&L of the recommended disposition: consist of approved one oorCLL documents whiel more for approva of the f
. i 1.
Technical or satorial requirement is violated.
2 Supplier documents approved by CP&L are violated .
3.
manufactur;ng process or by rework.Nonconformance _
g nal-4 The item does not conform to the original requirements even th can be isrestored function unimpaired. to a condition such that the capability ou5hof thethaitan it am to r
These submittals shall include Supplier's recommended di "use.es.is* or frapair') and technical justification sposition (for example.
the appropriate Hwlear Project location (addr .
Torvard submittala to-P ess listed above)
The team (s) provided by the supplier shall be . new repaired, altered, or modified.as new by the original manufacturer, e reworked.-
,. S This is considered a.* commercial grade' item the Approved Suppliers List. .
The vendor is required to be on
_ T Supplier shall extend applicable QA requiraments t o lover. tier suppliers.
U . sh=Llahave.
Survet11.anca vill.not normally be conhad on r access to; supplier-fe H i+4-- ,
A -*
a 6 audit. '
t ple===ne.
and QA:recordr for sod itausglsmeweg%,- 3:
R ,."'
. O C.
_ , , _ . .v. .r.m[.,w._, ,-.,-.-m_ ,,..,w r ,. , , ,- . ,,w. ~ . _._,. m ,e--~m-.;-_ - - - , - - , . , , -
l v . This itas is subject to the praisions of 10CrR21.- '
i V
notified of any reports nada to - the NRC pursuant to 10CTR21C Honconfotaance to Purchase Order requirements 1
. of tho' recommended dispositionconsist of one or more or app of th 4 1.
Technical or material raquirement is violated.
2 Supplier documents approved bf CF&L are violated .
3 ;
Honconformance cannot be corrected by continuance manufacturing process or by rework. original.
of the '
4 ,
The item does not conform to the original requirements .
can be isrestored functio) even thou6h to a condition such that the capability hoc impaired. of theth e itaa to -
These aubmittals shall include Supplitr's recommended di
- use.as is* or " repair *) and technical justification spos' tion (e.g.,
i I
e i
5 b
N s
!~
9 m t
. , _ , _ p-_-.,_e, , - __ ,m. ,. =
h 7h C b~ c'h ,
s DxtHrVTA'rION RE0ttiprvDrtS Rev. 5/02/90 Documentation vill be treated the as indicated below must be supplied with this material .
This docusenettior ;
suitable for microfilming.same as the hattrial for ~ payment purpose and shall be legible anc '
The following drawings shall be submitted for information GE Al Assembly drawings A2 Detail drawings A) outline uravings A4
,_. _ A5 Cross Section drawings l Viring diagrams A6 Schematic diagrams A7 Others, as listed in item description or specification -
The following process control procedures shall be submitted for approval ag. gt)
GE 1 B1 B2 Velding Repair Procedure. including qu Procedure a lificacion procedure B3 B4 Material Heat Hardfacing Procedure Treatment and/or Stress Relief Procedure BS Cleaning Procedure B6 Bending and Forming Procedure i
_ B7 Packaging Procedure B9 Painting Procedure :
B9 Description of Quality Assurance Program applicable to equipment on this order
_____ B10 Others, as listed in item description or specification ,
The following test or inspection procedures shall be submitted for approval . A Mitt gri C1 Radiographic Test Procedure C2 ,.
Liquid Penetrant Test Procedure C3 C4 Magnetic Particle Test Prouedura e-C5 Ultrasonic Test Procedure C6 Territe Control Procedure Hydrostatic Test Procedure
_ C7 Seat Leakage Test Procedure C8 Seal Leakage Test Procedure C9 Performance Test Procedure 27 C10 Calibration Procedure C11 Visus 1 Inspection Procedure C12 C13 Vall Thickness Heasurement Procedure C14 Seismic Test Procedura-CIS Environmental Test Procedure -i
_____ C16-Cauge and Instrument Calibration Procedure .,
Others, as listed in itsu description or specificacion 1 of 3 1 (over)
,e ,.e - - - - . . ~ . .n. , , . . + -,-.,-,r,-, e. m.-e ,_m- ---,-,,..-a , . . . - , , a n ,
i
)
The following data packages shall be submitted for approval at time of ship menet EMI D1 Certification of Compliance to ref renced specifications and/or P O .
specified by Purchaserspecify ASKE Code Edition (Addenda / .Case *C of C te '
/ (s)) to
/D2 ASKE Code Data Report, 3 PerforuAnce Curves and Dataincluding nameplate data and rubbing D4
/ 05 Calibration certification "
"As. built
- Draving D6 D7 Certified Haterial Test Reports Ultrasonic Test Report D8 D9 Kagnetic Particle Test Report 1.iquid Penetrant Test Report D10 Eddy Current Test Report D11 Radiograph Evaluation f* port 012 013 Final Radiographs with location Haps Hydrostatic Test Report 014 D15 Ferriteage Leak. Content of Austenitic Velds Certification certification D16 D17 Ferformance Test Certification Repair Reports D18 Heat treatment time and temperature Manufacturer) charts (if done by other than Mater D19 D20 Calibration Environmental Conditions Environmental Qualification Certification.Ho test report is required fromthe vendor, specifiedbut the vendor must certify that the equipment meets test report in description f [ 021 Product Quality Certification (PQC) (CE)
D22 D23 Vestinghouse Quality Release (VQR) yD24 Description this ordar of Quality Assurance Program applicable to equipcent or ser id D25 Service Hanual applicable to the specific equipment supplied Parts to allow listreorder applicable to the specific equipment supplied, sufficiently detaile D26 D27 Cartification of conformance to this purchase order
_ D28 Chemical certification to specified limits D30 blanket pressure limits, if presentApplicable special storage including requ inert gas D31 Certified Physical and Chemical Test Report D32 tot chemical Analysis Report
" Vall Thickness Report D33
/__ D34 Stress Report, including allovable nozzle loada Impact Test Report
. k( D35 Seismic Test Report 036 Pressure /Towperature Rating D37 D38 $sismic Qualification Certification .
_ D39 NDE personnel qualification certification and recortis D4D Valdin5 personnel qualification certification and records D41 Certificate h of Conformance to 1EEE 383 1974 vertical flame test D42 Vestin5 ouse Electronic Tube Division Certificate of Conformance
_ D43 QA/QC recorda storago location of subvendors and list of records stored Documentation of Undervriter's 1.aboratory (UL) Listing or Tactory Hutu approval
_ D44 Design Report b45 other, as listed in item description or specification 2 of 3 rev..a
1 046 A certificate of conformance shall be included with the shipment ng that certifyi the parts being supplied are equal to or exceed the originalaments requirof the
, ptres supplies reference specifjestions. on the referenced; purchase order and built to the requirements if the parts axceed the origins.1 requirements, the vendor shall include statement verify the change documenting that an evaluation and/or analysis has been aperformed has no effect report.
1his analysis shall be provided for CML Engineering reviewon the D47 .
b48 A Katarial Safety Data Sheet must accowpany the shipment Documentation shall be provided for the itan(s) a. of materi l establishes verifiable traceability from the on this purchase order which D50 subsequent purchasers and suppliera. original manufacturar through Documentation shall be furnished to establish that the ovided item (s) by the pr supplier must incineration. meet approved Scientific Ecology Group (SEC) guidatin N
eman 4
3 of 3 l
1
i
- N Ls Ol'1 ATI Be l . 't. (5 PP) Url No, M0110032 l
Carolina Powet & 1.lght Company,,. _ ... .
8
,ICN.I)
N T ,bV.'Z D Y00 Mr. Malcomb L. Ht.rtitall, Jr. "
General Electric Company l P. O. Box 10117 APR 3 0 t991 Southport, NC 28461 i Dear Mr. Hurstall* '
f Contract No. ZM70020000 '
Vork Authoritation No. ZS70020052 Effective April 1, 1991 Under the terms of the above referenced Contract CP&L offets the following work to your Company (hereinafter " Work"):
Contractor's Proposal No. 2941BC50.KBO, Revision 1, inclut ed in the CP6L/Ceneral Electric Settlement Agreement effective Oc tober 1, 1990, covers a scope of work which includes the design engineering, hardware, technical support, installation, testing, anc. training necessary to implement a NUMAC Leak Detection System for Brunswick Units 1 and 2. To comply with BNP administrative procedures, Purchase Order No. 576260M.CD was issued to cover the safety related hardware, and this Vork Authorization No. ZS70020052 is issued to cover the on. site services.
This Vork Authorization covers the on site field services associated with the attached Proposal No. 294 1BCSC.KBO, Revision 1, specifically including on site technical direction, installation, testing, and training services. These services are to be provided in accordance with the content of the subject proposal, except as modified herein.
The total face value of the CE proposal is $1,300,000, with a discount to be applied in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. ,
In response to CP&L's request that the field services scope be priced separately from the design and hardware scope, Contractor agrees that $260,000 of the total proposal pre. discount price may reasonably be assigned to the field service scope. The percentage discount stated in the Settlement Agreement vill be applied to trat a!Bount .
This Vork Authorization is las ed under Section IB of the Settlement Agreement effsetive Octc,ber 1,1990, between CP&L and Contractor which contains additional provisions relevant to this Vork Authorizatioa.
The awarded Vork shall be performed at CP&L's Brunswick Nuclear Project located near Southport, North Carolina, 411 FeyeneviHe $ trest
- P O Boa ISS) e moe.gn. N C 2 602 (1/1/90) N'N"""EMMA -
PACE 2 VA NO. 2S70020052 The Vork described above shall start upon Contractor's acceptance of this Vork Authorization, and shall be completed no later than March 31, 1993.
The provisionn of Part 21 of ' title 10 of the code of Tederal Regulations (10CFR21) shall apply to any Vork included within the definitions of " basic ,
components" in 10CFR21.3. CP&L shall be promptly notified of any reports made i to the Nuclesr Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.21.
Contractor shall comply in all particulars with CP6L's established "ALARA" program at the site which is in compliance with the Nuclear Regulatory Guide 8.8.
The Vork has been determined to be nuclear safety related. Accordingly, all Vork shall conform to the following Quality Assurance requirements:
Contractor shall perform all Work in accordance with Contractor's Quality Assurance program and procedures. Such program and procedures must be approved by CP6L and satisfy the _ requirements of ANSI N45.2 1971, ANSI N4$.2.9 1974, and AN$1 N45.2.11 1974, 1
CP6L, CP&L's Designated Representative, the NRC, or any. other parties authorized by CP6L shall be provided access to Contractor's facilities and records for inspection and audit. This right of access shall be provided by contractor at all tiers of procurement. -
The right of access shall be provided as and when requested by CP6L. '
Contractor shall incorporate all Quality Assurance requirements specified herein into any procurement or contract documents issued to suppliers or subcontractors.
The CP6L Designated Representative shall be immediately notified of any QA nonconformances to these requirements or to any CP&L approved documents which result in one or more of the following:
- a. Violation of technical or material requirement.
- b. Violation of requirements in contractor documents which-have been approved by CP&L. ,
- c. Nonconforuances that cannot be corrected by continuation ,
of the Work,
- d. Supply or offering of items by the Contractor or affected by contractor not in conformance with approved requirements, eve., though the item can be restored to a condition so as to function unimpaired.
CSN:VORK AUTH (1/1/90)
. . _ - - - _ - . . . ~ -_ . .. - .- - - - . , - . . - - . . . . - . .
b PACg 3, VA No, 2570020052 f
i No remedial Vork shall be undertaken by Contractor until CP&L's s Designated Representative has approved, in writing, the recommended action for disposition.
The following minimum QA records shall be submitted to CP6L's Designated Representative as indicated below.- The submission shall be 1er,1ble and suitable for microfilming. No payment for completed -i Vork, or portions thereof, will be required of CP&L until: the '
i fc11owing documentation has been received and accepted by the Designated Representative ;
submittal lum No. pacunent.ation Reauirements 1 Design Records 10 .atified by Upon CP&L request-Contractor's QA Program as QA records shall be maintained by contractor CP&L shall pay Centractor as full compensation for all Work performed under thie Work Authorization, an amount to be determined as follows:
- 1. Completion of Unit 1 installation, $ 35,000. April 1992 acceptance testing, and training
- 2. Completion of Unit 2 installation, 225.000 March 1993 acceptance testing, and training Total $260,000 Security screening is included in the Contract Lump Sum Price.
CET and Fitness for Duty training is included in the Contract Lump Sum Price. ,
When required, substance abuse screening in accordance with the sequirements of 10 CFR 26, Fitness for Duty, will be provided by CP&L at no cost to the Contractor.
Invoices for Vork performed under this Work Authorization should b.;, sent to Ms. F. Wortham, Carolina Power & Light Company, P. O. Box 1551 (OHS.5BS) .
Raleigh, NC 27602. '
Mr. R. N. Allen is appointed an = CP&L's' Designated Representative ~ for the - ,
administration of this-Vork Authorization.
All Contractor employees working-within the restricted security-area of
- CP&L facilities will be required to participate in CP&L's instructional program, which vill include attending a class in health physics held at the site and satisfactory demonstration by each employee of an acceptable understanding of ths training material.
CSN:VORK AUTH (1/1/90)
, , . - . - . - , ~ . , . _ .-.~% ,, , _ , . _,r.. _,,.__...,._.,,y.. . , . ,,m. . _ . . , . , , . _ . . , . . . . , . , , ,,_-w.- , . , , . , - - - . , - -
PACE 4. UA NO. IS70070053 i
contractor shall comply with CP&L's Security Screening & Health Physics and Quality check Program criteria as described in the contract.
As rsquired by the Insurance Section of the contract, before any Work is performed under this Work Authorization, written proof of compliance with the insurance requirements nust be furnished to CP&L or be on film on the certificate executed by an authorized representative of Contractor's insurer, and identified by the associated CP&L Contract number.
If any conflicts exist between the provisions of this Work Authorization and the provisions of the Contract under which this Authorization is let, or any Arsendment to this Contract, the provisions of this Work Authorization shall govern the Work described above. All other items in the contract or Contract Amendments remain unaffected by this Vork Authorization.
This Work Authorization and the Contract, as amended, and the Settlement Agreement between CP&L and Contractor dated October 1,1990, embody the entire agreement between CP&L and Contractor for the Work described above. The parties shall not be beund by or liable for any stateuent, writing, representation, promise, inducement or understanding not set forth within this docuisene, itself.
No changes, modifications, or amendments of any terms and conditions of this Work Authorization are valid or binding unless agreed to by both parties in writing and signed by their authorised agents.
(Next paragraph begins on the fo11owin6 page)
CSN:VORK AUTH (1/1/90)
PAGE 5 WA NO. ZS70020052 Please accept this Work Authorization by signing below and returning it unchanged to Mr. Tony R. Lineback, Nuclear Contracting, Carolina Power & Light Company, P. O. Box 1551, OHS 781 Releigh, North Carolina 27602, within fif teen (15) calendar days from receipt.
Sincerely, R.'
h A. Watson N
Senior Vice President Nuclear Caneration TRL/bh Acceoted GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY By: M QV
Title:
Manager. Customer Service-Southern Region Date: May 21. 1991 Should the person's title who is executing this document not indicate that he/she .
is a corporate officer, an affidavit signed by a corporate ' officer .shall be
-provided stating that the person whose name appears above is duly authorized to execute contracts on behalf of the firm.
Arl0 Ketcham Proiects Coordinator is appointed as the person (Contractor to fill in name and title) to whom all official correspondence to contractor conce rning this .Vork-Authorization should be directed.
(Note: Please execute both copies of this letter and return the copy initialed by CP&L personnel. If not initialed, return either , opy. The second-copy is provided to you for your files; do not return it to CP&L.)
CSN:VORK AUTH (1/1/90)
+ - 3 = w
DEC 16 '92 03107 FROM GE tO%C TO 09195462026 PAGE.009 ;
NL.$ - 9 3 -Ol'1
/4TT= 9.7. l ( l PP) ,
CALCULATION OF LEAK DETECTION MONITOR (LDM) MTBF (Without RWCU Option)
! Note: This calculation is for any failure and doca not take credit for redundant low voltage power supplies.
Module Fail Rato Fall Rate x No Used ligsluin 1 Failure 3JJiour) HILUg_qd Ig,1.luteallionr1 Analog 2.236E-6 1 2.236E-6 Chansis 0.476E-6 1 0.476E-6 Computer 0.952E-6 1 0.952E-6 Display Control 0.833E-6 1 0.833E-6 Front Panol 0.357E-6 1 0.357E-6 l
GEDAC Communications 1.160E-6 1 1.160E-6 Low Voltage PS 0.655E-6 2 1.310E-G Open Drain I/O 1.557E-6 1 1.557E-6 Thermocouple (1) 1.157E-6 6 6.942E-6 INS %UMENT FAILURE RATE 15.823E-6 INSTRUMENT MTBF 63,199 hours0.0023 days <br />0.0553 hours <br />3.290344e-4 weeks <br />7.57195e-5 months <br /> 7.21 years (1) In 864,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operation, 7 failures of the thermocouple Module, all due to defectiva input amplifiers (purchased item),
have been reported. The defect has been corrected by the l manufacturer and the improved version of the amplifier is now being used.
one failure inThe failure rate of the module is now assumed to be l
864,000 hours rather than 7 failures.
l l
DEC 16 '92 03:07 FVJ1 GE NJm0 TO 09195462026 PAGE.039 N L 5 - %- O l7 ATT. 6.2. 2. (.lP P)
CALCULATION OF LEAK DETECTION MONITOR (LDM) MTBF (With RWCU Option)
Noto This calculation in for any failure and doen not take credit for redundant low voltago povar supplies.
Module Fail Rote Fail Rato x No Uncd liodulq (Fallpres/Hourl No Uned Failurfs/Xg.gri Analog 2.236E-6 1 2.23GE-6 Chassic 0.476E-6 1 0.476E-6 Computer 0.952E-6 1 0.952E-6 Dicplay Control 0.833E-6 1 0.833E-6 Front Panel 0.357E-6 1 0.357E-6 GEDAC Communications 1.160E-6 1 1.160E-6 Low Voltage PS 0.65SE-6 2 1.310E-6 Opon Drain I/O 1.557E-6 1 1.557E-6 16-Ch Analog Out (1) 1.557E-6 1 1.S57E-G Thermocouple (2) 1.157E-6 7 8.101E-6 INSTRUMENT FAILURE RATE 18.539E-6 INSTRUMENT MTBF 53,940 hours0.0109 days <br />0.261 hours <br />0.00155 weeks <br />3.5767e-4 months <br /> 6.16 years-(1) No failures of the 16-Ch Analog Output Module havo been reported in 195,840 hours0.00972 days <br />0.233 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.1962e-4 months <br /> of operation. For purposes of estimation, the failure rato as the Open Drain I/O Modulo (similar in complexity and application) is used.
(2) In 864,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operation, 7 failurec of the thormocouplo Modulo, all due to defectivo input amplifiers (purchased item),
have been reported. The defect has been corrected by the manufacturer and the improved version of the amplifier is.now being used. The failure rate of the module is now assumod to be one failuro in 864,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> rather than 7 failures.
NLs 93-ol7 ATT 9.l,l (29 PP)
CONTROL NO, BG0051 1 (IF APPLICABLE)
DESIGN BASIS DOCUMEST PROJECT: Steam Irak Detection System Uorrade For IIPCI. RCIC. RWCU. and RilR.
PLAhT Hrtms.dek Nuclear Project CIIECK ONE: ,_. A DESIGN HASIS DOCUMENT IS NONAPPLICABLE TO THIS PROJECT. REASON:
_X. TIIE DESIGN llASIS DOCUMENT IS ATTACilED.
REY. ORIGINATOR /DATE VERIFIER /DATE PRIN. OR RES. ENO./DATE O /
'O et_lI*ffl)$ ' b*fy / bh kh 'h /dufe/
1 REASON FOR CRANGE 2
REASON FOR CRANGE
} 3 REASON FOR CRANGE
DBD-BG0051 1 Rev. No. O Page No. 2 *
?
i LIST OF EFe2CTIVE PAGES ;
11GE HEVISION 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 ,
6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 10 0 i1 0 12 0 13 -0 14 0 ,.
15 0 16 0 17 0 18 0 19 0 20 0 21 0 22 0 23 0 24 0 25 0 ,
26 0 27 0 28 0 29 0 At 0 A2 0 A3 0 A4 0 9
,..m.,,- .-.w-, %,.m v. ,.w.e w- .
0 4
DBD BG00511 Rev No. O Page No. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Eun Cover Sheet 1 List of Effective Pages 2 Table of Contents 3
- 1. Basic Function '4
- 2. Desired Performance 6 3 Codes, Standards and Regulatory Requirements 1
- 4. Der %n Conditions !!
- 5. Loads 12-
- 6. Environmental Conditions 12
- 7. Interface Requirements 12
- 8. Material Requirements 14 ,
- 9. Mechanical Requirements 15
- 10. Structural Requirements 15
- 11. Hydraulic Requirements 15
- 12. Chemistry Requiremenu 15
- 13. Electrical Requirements 16 14 Layout and Arrangement Requirements 16
- 15. Operational Requirements 16
- 16. Instrumentation and Control Requirements 17
- 17. Access and Administrative Control Requirements 22
- 18. Redundancy, Diversity and Separation Requirements 23
- 19. Failure Effects Requirements 23
- 20. Test Requirements 23
- 21. Operability, Accessibility and Maintenance Requirements 24
- 22. Personnel Requirements 24
- 23. Transportability Requirements 24
- 24. Fire Protection or Resistance Requirements 25
- 25. Handling, Storage, and Shipping Requirements 25
- 26. Other Requirements 25
- 27. Materials, Parts and Equipment Sultable for Application 25
- 28. Safety Requirements 25
- 29. PotentialInstallation Methods 26
- 30. ALARA Requirements 26
- 31. ASME See:lon XI Applicability '26.
32, 40CFR61 Applicability 26
- 33. Design Feedback System Requirements 27'
- 34. CP&L/ General Electric Design Interfsce 29 Attachments List 29 Attachmem 1: BNP I&C
- Maintenance Review of G0051 A (Project Planr. 12/23!90 .AI
DBD HG00511 Rev. No. O Page No. 4 1.0 liasic Function l 1.1 The :urrent functions of the Steam Leak Detectmn (SLD) mtem components aJJtewed bs this nreitet include:
1.1.1 Mon + tors ambient temperatures to the following loesitons:
1.1.1.1 Along the HPCI steam supply pipmg outboud of the Drywell. l 1.1.1.2 In the HPCI Turbme room.
1.1.1.3 Along the RCIC steam supply piping outboard of the Dryw+11.
1.1.4 Near the RCIC Turbine.
...l.5 la the general area contaming the RWCU Inlet. Retum and Reject piping outside of the RWCU rooms.
1.1.1.6 Inside the RWCU Pump Rooms and Heat Exchanger Room-1.1.1.7 Inside the Mam Stcom Tunnel ;
1.1.1.8 Near the RiiR Emergency Area Coolers .i 1.1.2 Monitors the vent air mlet/ outlet differential tempers'ure in the following beations: ,
1.1.2.1 HPC1/RCIC mini steam tunnel.
1.1.2.2 HPCI Equpment Area.
l.l.2.3 RCIC Equipment Area. ,
1.1.2.4 RWCU Pump Rooms and Heat Etchanger Room, l 1.1.2.5 Main Steam Tunnel. <
l.1.2.6 RHR Areas 1.1.3 Momtors the differential Dow between the RWCU system miet and the two system outlet paths.
1.1.4 Provides alarins when any oi the temperatures or the differential flow exceeds designeted-setpomts.
1.1.5 initiates closure of the following PCIS valve groups when the associated temperature or the differential flow exceeds established setpomts and any delay times. Isolation amtiation response times must meet the 13 second requirement of Tech Spec Table 3.3.2+3 aiid also assure compiiance with the basis and assumptions utilir.ed for the Rea: tor Buildmg Environmental Report.
1.1.5.1 HPCI Group 4 1.1.5.2 RCIC Group 5 1.1.5.3 RWCU Group 3.
The Main Steam and RilR channels associated with the H12 P614 panel are for alarm and.
indication only.
1.1,6 Provides control room indication for the temocrature locations morltved. Limited indication capability is provioed at panel H12 P614. The current value of one amtnent or dif ferential thermocouple channel temperartre at a time may be displayed. The Fenwal switch channels provide no indication capability.
l r
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- . . <' i DBD BG00511 Rev. No. . _0 Page No. 5.
1.1.7 Provides control room indication for the RWCU inlet, reject and differential flow (No return fiow indication exists.)
1.1 8 Provides input to ERFIS and the Procch Computer for selected kmperature .md ll,m channels.
1,2 Existme Hardware: '
l.2.1 The current hardware configuration utilir.ed to perform the temperature sensing portion of abcve function consists of a combination of local Fenwal temperature switches, local thermocouplea connected to Riley tnp ewitches tn' the control room and supporting relay logic.
Most of the control room components are located on and in H12-P614.
1.2.2 De hardware currently utthr.ed to perform the RWCU flow sensing portion et above function-consists of Rosemont. GEM AC and Agastat devices. The GEMAC and Agastat mstruments and titne delay relays are located in the H12-P612 and H12 P613 control room panels. ne mlet and reject flows are dos, layed on H12 P603 and the differential flow n displayed on H12 P613.
1.2 3 A desenption of the historical problems encountered at BNP and throughout the industry is included in the Plant Modificauon Project Summary.
1.3 Improvements Planned Per This Proiectt he followmg system con 0guration changes are planned:
1.3.1 Replace all of the Riley hardware and most of the associated components in Hl2 P014 with four GE NUM AC microprocessor units.
1.3.2 Replace the fifteen HPCI and RCIC Fenwat switches with thermocouples. Connect the>c new thermocouples to NUMAC momtormg/tnp channels.
1.3.3 Remove the GEMAC and Agastat components used for RWCU differential flow monitoring.
na existing flow transmitters will be connected to one of the above four NUMAC chassis.-
Connect RWCU process temperature thermocouple signals from each of the three flow paths to ~
the NUMAC system for use m density correction.
1.3.4 Move the RWCU dfferential flow indicator from H12 P613 to H12 P603. Add RWCU return-flow mdication to H12 P603.
1.3.5 Decrease the range of the RWCU reject flow loop from 250 ppm to 125 gpm compensated
- " (150 gpm normaltzed) in order to improve loop accuracy in the normal n.aximum operating range of less than approximately 90 gpm compensated.
1.3.6 Replace the existing separately wired individual ERFIS input signals with mdtsplexed mputs transmitted on fiber optic cables.
1.3.7 Submit a Tech Spec change to extend the RWCU differential flow isolation time delay from 4f seconds to 30 mmutes.
1.3.8 Subnut a Tech Spec change to extend the survetilance mterub for ali murbed hardware.
3 P
1 DBD BG00511 Rev. No. 0 Pate No. 6 1.4 Orerational Bene 6ts: The above changes will result m the followmg operational benetit>.
1.4.1 Eliminate the spurious isolations caused by Riley switch sensitivities.
1,4.2 Provido improved display of current values in each temperature channel. Provide display of-'
temperatures in the previously blind fifteen Fenwal channels.-
1.4.3 Provide improved display of RWCU now rate information. Flow rates for the mlet, return and reject now channels will be displayed in both temperature-compensated actual volumetnc units and in normalized (to 533*F) volumetne units on the NUM AC screen in Hl2 P614.
and on vertical mdicators on H12+P603, in addition 19 normalized ialues for those channels will be displayed on H12 P603. Differenual flow will oe displayed m normalized gpm on bothL H12 P614 and on H12-P603.
1.4.4 De NUMAC diF tal i procesetng wil' improve the instrument accuracy and dnft attnbutes for both the temperature and flow functions.
1.4.5 ne ERFIS fiber opue cable mstallation will help resolve 'an . ..stmg cable separation violation -
wuMn H12-P614 (Ref: NCR A-90-010 and EER 90-0199). i 1.4.6 Extension of the RWCU differential flow isolation time delay should greatly facilitate the process of placing RWCU m service, bv mmimitmg or elimmatmp spurious Sias pulanons caused by flow transients dunng system fill and startiny.
1.4.7 Deletion of the Fenwal switches will eliminate the need for monthly local access to each switch in order to perform the required MSTs. It will resolve a long standing personnel and equipment safety hazard associated with the climbing necessary for those tests.
1.4.8 Extensma of the Tech Spec surveillance intervals will save Maintenance manhours, 1.4.9 Eliminate the need for, and remove.-the existing
- temporary condition' capacitors mstalled on the RWCU differential flow transmitter power supply per Unit 1 EER 910014. Rev.1 (EER' .
Action item 1) and Unit 2 EER 90 0265. Rev.1 (EER Action item I k 2.0 Desired Performance 2.1 The following items numbers within the Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 establish minimum operstional requirements for the indicated leakage-related parameters:
- 3. Reactor Water Cleanup System isolation
- a.
- Flow - High
- b. Area Temperature a High
- c. Area Ventilation Temperature
- Temp High
(
DBD BG0051 1 -
Rev. No. O Page No. 7-
~
- 4. Cure Standby Cooling Systems isolation
- a. High Pressure Coolant injection System isolation
- 4. HPCI Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High
- 7. HPCI Steam Line Ambient Temp High
- 8. HPCI Steam Line Area a Temp High
- 9. Emergency Area Cooler Temp High
- b. Reactor Core isolation Cooling System isolanon
- 4. RCIC Steam Ltne Tunnel Temp - High
- 7. RCIC Steam Line Ambient Temp High
- 8. RCIC Steam Line Area a Temp High
- 9. RCIC Equipment Room Ambient Temp High
- 10. RCIC Equipment Room a Temp High 2.2 This project shall provide a design to ensure that:
2.2.1 The operabihty requirements as specified in Tech Spec Table 3.3.21. " Isolation Actuauon Instrumentauon.' can be routtnely sausfied with muumum anticipated LCO impact.
2.2.2 The Trip Serpomts and Allowable Values specified in Tech Spec Table 3.3.2 2. *l.solatinn Actuation lastrumentauon Setpoints,* are not exceeded dunng normal operations or cabbrauon -
conditions.
2.2.3 He isolanon response times specified in Tech Spec Table 3.3.2 3 *lsolatica Synem ' .
Instrumentauon Response Time,* are not exceeded.
2.2,4 ne surveillance tests specified in Tech Spec Table 4.3.21, " Isolation Actuation Instrumentauon Survettlance Requirements,' can be satisfied in as effective and efficicat a.
manner as is possible, with mmtmum impact on equipment operability and minimum ALARA and personnel safety liabilities. As part of this project, a Tech Spec change request submittal is planned to reduce the frequency of surveillance tesung.
3.0 Codes, Standards, and Regulatory Requirements
(*) Indicates that item is a specific NRC licensing commitment. A reference to the source of that comuutment is provided for such items. Other documents listed are for guidanw only or are invoked as currently applicable NED design procedures and practices.
3.1 ANSI Standards 3.1.1 ANSI 7-4.3.21982 Apphcation Cntena for Programmable Digital Computer Sy>tems m Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Genermung Stauens 3.2 IEEE Standards
- 3.2.1 IEEE 279-1971 ~ . Standard Application of the Single Failure Cntenon to Nuclear Power Gewatmg Station Safety Systems (UFSA.R 7.1.1.3. 7.3.1.2.m) -
- 3.2.2. IEEE 3081971 Critena for Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations (UFSAR T8.1.1.1 1)
- 3.2.3 IEEE 3231974 Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generaung Stations (UFSAR 7.1.2. 7.3.1.2.m, PLP 02)
DBD BG0051 l' Rev. No. .0' >
Page No. #
- 3.2.4 lEEE 3381971 Standard Cntena for the Periodic Surveillance Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems (UFSAR 7.3.1 ?.mi
- 3.2.5 lEEE 3441971 Recommended Practice for Seisnue Qualification'of Class IE Equipment 1 for Nuclear Power Generattng Station Safety Systems (UFSAR 7.3.1.2.m) 3.2.6 IEEE 379-1972 Application of the Smgle Failure Critena to Nuclear Power Generating Station Class IE Systems amentioned in UFSAR only for HVAC and GE' Analog Mods use for guidance only on this project)-
3.2.7 IEEE 3841981 Criten For Independence of Class IE Equipment and Circuits (mentioned' m UFSAR only for HVAC and GE Analog Mods use for guidance only on this project) 2.3 NUREGs
- 3.3.1 NUREG 0578 TMI.2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Repon and Short Term Recommendattons (TS B3/4.3.5.3)
- 3.3.2 NUREG-05SE Category I Qualification (PLP-02) 3.3.3 NUREG-0700 Guidelines for Control Room Design Review. (All) 3.3.4 NUREG 0737 TM1 Action Plan Requirements 3.3.5 NUREG4500 Standard Review Plan (guidance only)
Section 5.2.5 Recctor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Section 5.4.6 Reactor Core isolation Cooling System (BWR)
Section 5.4.8 Reactor Water Cleanup System (BWR)
Section 6.3 Emergency Core Cooling System 3.4 USNRC Regulatory Guides
- 3.4.1 RG 1.6 Independence Between Redundant Standby (on site) Power Sources and -
Between their Distnbution Systems (Safety Guide 6) (UFSAR T8.1.1 1) '
- 3.4.2 RG L45 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary I nbge Detection Systems (TS B 3/4.4.3.1.c)
- 3.4.3 RG 1.89. Rev 1 Environmental Qualification of Certain Electncal Equipment important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants (FSAR TS.I.1-1. PLP 02) 3.4.4 RG 1.100 Seismic Qualification or Electncal Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants 3.4.5 RG 1.105 Instrument Setpomis For Nuclear Safety Related Setpomts (DG Vill.50)-
3.4.6 RG 1.152 Critena for Programmmg Digital Computer System Software in Safety Related Systems of Nudear Power Plants (guidance only) 3.4.7 RG 8.8 Information Relevant to Ensunng That Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations Will Be As Low As !s Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)
- 3.4.8 Safety Guide 22 Penodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions (UFSAR 1.8.
7.3.1.2.m) 3.5 10CFR50 Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities 3.5.1 Appendix A: General Design Cntena for Nuci-ar Power Plants (Per UFSAR 3.1.2)
GDC 13 Instrumentation and Control .
- GOC 19 Control Room s
DBt> BG0051 1
- Rev. No. 0 ,
Page No. 9
- GDC20 Protecuan System functions ' ;
-
- GDC 21 Protecuan System Reliability and Testability
- GDC 22 Protection System independence
- GDC 23 Protecuan System Failure Modes
- GDC 24 Separauon of Protecuon and Control Systems ,
- GDC 29 Protection Against Anticipated Operanonal Occurrences 3.5.2
- Appendix R Fire Protecuon of Safe Shutdown Capabilities 3.5.3
- 10CFR50.49 Environmental Qualification of Electncal Equipment important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants (PLP 02) 3.6 BNP UFSAR 3.6.1
- Section 1.8 Conformance to NRC Regulatory Guides 3.6.2
- Section 3.0 Design of Sinactures. Components. Equipment anc Systems
- Section 3.10 Seisunc Qualificanon of Seismic Category i Instrument and Electncal Equipment Secuon 3.11 Environmental Qualification 3.6.3 Section 5.0 Reactor Coolant System and -nnected Systems-
- Detecuan of Leakage Througn Reactor Coolant Pressure Section 5.2.5 Boundary
- Reactor Core Isolation Coolmg System Secuen 5.4.6
- Section 5.4.8 Reactor Water Cleanup System
- Engineered Safety Features 3.6.4 Section 6.0
- Section 6.2.4 Cc.atainment Isolation System
- Section 6.3 Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)
- Section 7.0 Instrumentation and Controls 3.6.5 Section 7.1 A Instrumentauon Channel Sensors and Their Te3nr.g Requirements
- Identificauon of Safety Related Systems . -
Secuon 7.1.1
- Section 7.1.2 Identification of Safety Critena
- Section 7.3.1 Primary Containment isolation and Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System . _
- Systems Required for Safe Shutdow Section 7.4 -
- Section 7.5 Safety Related Display Instrumentation 3.6.6
- Section 8.0 Electne Power -
- Section 8.3.1.3 Independence of Redundant Systems
- Reacter Building Ventilation System -
3.6.7 Section 9.4.2
- - Section 9.4.3 Reactor Building Emergency Cooling System 3.6.8 Section 15.0 . Accident Analysis h ., 4 , ny. 4 , y-- -c ,
DBD-BG0051 l' Rev. No. O Page No. 10 3.7 CP&L Specifications 3.7.1 005-010 Virtal Weld Acceptance Critena for Structural Field Weldmg ~ '
3.7.2 005 011 Seismic Design Critena 3.7.3 048 001 Installation of the Electncal Raceway System 3.7.4 048-004 Design and Installation of Raceway System and Isolation and Separation !
of laterconnecitng Wire and Cable .
3.7.5 048-005 Specification for identification of Electncal Equipment. Wire, Cable Trays. Conduits, and Voltage Levels 3.7.6 048-012 Installation of Electncal Cables 3.7.7 111-001 Electncal Conduit Raceways- .
3.7.8 112-008 Procurement of AMP Nuclear Grade Insulated Type Terminal Lugs 3.7.9 113 025 Procurement Control Cable and Wire 3.7.10 118 003 Selecuan a ud Installation of Fire Barner Penetration Seals -
3.7.11 170 001 Human Factors Engineenng for Control Panel Suppons 3.7.12 252 012 Flow Elements and Restneting Orifices 3.8 GE Specifications 3.8.1 22A3010 Electrical quipment Sepa~ation for Safeguards Systems 3.8.2 22A1304 A12 Contamment isolation System. Design Recommendation 3.8.3 22A1359 Reactor Water Cleanup 4 3.8.4 22A1359 AC Eeactor Water Cleanup System . High Pressure (Data Sheets 3.8.5 22A1362 HPCI Design Specification 3,8.6 22A1362AN HPCI Design Specification. Data Sheet 3.8.7 22A1441 . Nuclear Boiler Leak Detection. Design Specification 3.8.8 22A2805 Main Control Room Pane 9 3.8.9 25A5133 Leak Detector instrunnt Aack-3.8.10 157C4896 HPCI Leak Detector inWument Rack 3.9 Design Guides 3.9.1- SDG 3 . Structural Design Guide for General Structural Design Criteria 3.9.2 NED DG V.4 Cable Sizing.
3.9.3 NED DG-V.10 E1cetncal Distnbution System Change Control 3.9.4 NED DG V.24 Selection of 120 VAC Control Circuit Wire Sizes and Maximum
- Length .
3.9.5 NED DG V.53 Selection of DC Control Circuit Wire Sized and Maximum Length 3.9.6 NED DG V.58 BSEP Design Guide on CASP Cable' Schedule Program 3.9.7 NED DG-V.60 Plant Modification Sketch Development for Electncal and 1&C '
Design a 3.9.8 NED DG VIfl.23 Requirements for Physical Wiring Diagrams 3.9.9 NED DG Vill.40 Interconnection Wiring Diagram (LWD).
3.9.10 NED DG VIII.50 Instrument Setpoints 3.9.11 NED DG VIII.53 BNP Human Factors Engineenng 4 3.9.12 NED DG Vill.58 Human Factors Evaluations for Plant Modifications 3.9.13 DG-001 Design Guide for Incorporating ALARA o
l' I DBD BG00511 Rev No. O Pace No, 11' 3.10 Other 3.10.1 - Alternate Safe Shutdown Capability Assessment Report. Apnl 1984 3.10.2 Calc 9527 0013 Voltage to HPCI and RCIC Inverters ED00-05 3.10.3 Calc PID S0033D4J1 Control Room HVAC Study (HED 0002), Ventilanon/ Air Conditioning Requirements 3.10.4 CQAM Corporate Quahty Assurance Manual 3.10.5 9527-058-5-MS-001 Reactor Building Environmental Report 3.10.6 7992.404-5-N-052 RWCU Break Analysis 3.10.7 ENP 12.4 Fuse Replacement Control Process 3.10.8 PLP-02 Program Document For Compliance With 10CFR50.49 Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electncal Equipment 3.10.9 SD 01 Nuclear Boiler System 3.10.10 SD 12 Primary Contamment Isolation System 3.10.11 SD 14 Reactor Water Cleanup System 3.10.12 SD-16 Reactor Core isolation Cooling System 3.10.13 SD 19 High Pressure Coolant Injection System 310.14 OP 01 Nuclear Boiler System 3.10.15 OP 14 Reactor Water Cleanup System 3.10.16 OP 16 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 3.10.17 OP 19 High Pressute Coolant lajection System 3.10.18
- Tech Spec 3/4.3.2 ! solation Actuanon lastrumentation LCO and Surveillance Requirements 3.10.19
- Tech Spec 3/4.5.1 High Pressure Coolant imection System LCO and Surveillance t
Requirements .
3.10.20
- Tech Spec 314.6.3 Primary Contamment Isolation Valves LCO and Surveillance Requirements .
3.10.21 UEC Study HPCI ar'd RCIC Cable Routing and Instrumentation Cabinet Study Unit No.1. issued 2/29180 3.10.22 UEC Study HPCI and RCic Cable Rouung and instrumentauon Cabmet Study -
Unit No. 2, issued 2/29/80 3.10.23 UEC Study HPCI and RCIC Mechamcal Systems Separation Study. issued 17/16/80 3.10.24 WP-201 Fire Seals / Stops 4.0 Design Conditions 4.1 RWCU process flow. temperature and pressure as per SD-14 and GE Specification 22A1359AC-4.2 In addition to the Tech Spec limitations, the system isolation response times must support the analysis documented in the Reactor Building Environmental Report, ,
u a
DBD BG0051 1--
Rev. No. 0-Pace No. 12 LO Loads 5.1. All equipment added per this DBD shall be Seisuuc Category I and Class .! and shall bn designed tog function durmg and after an operauonal and design basis earthquake. Sennue analysis cntena shall be -
in accordance with UFSAR 3.10 *Seistmt Quali6 cation of Seistruc Category i Instrumentauon and Electncal Equipment' and CP&L Spec 6 cation 005 011 " Seismic Design Cntena',
6.0 Environmental Conditions 6.1 nermocouple:;, cabling, lugs and splices for use within the Reactor Building shall meet the applicablei speci6 cations for use m tnat area.
6.2 UFSAR Secuon 3.11 provides a desenption of quali6 cation methods a Secondary.Contamment Service Condiuon tabulation.
10 Interface Requirements 7.1 The RWCU system mlet, return'and reject flow transmitter signal cables must be connected to the NUMAC differenual flow input ternunal board in H12 P614. These cables cunently connect to the GEMAC instruments to the H12 P613 cabinet. The retum and reject channels are routed as Division I cables and the inlet channel is routed as Division !!.
7.1.1 In the existing design, apparently due to the non redundant characier of the differential nowi function. there is no separation provided between this winng or ths ,onnecied instruments once the cables enter the H12-P613 cabinet. - Power Supply G31-K600, fed from a Division l-source, provides power to two Division I transnutters (G31 FT-N012 and G31.FT N041) and to two Division !! transnutters (G31 IT N036 and 031 PT-N005). Each of the three Square -
Root Converters, meluding the one associated with the Division !! inlet now channel, are powered through a single Division i 120 VAC fused circuit, Good design practice requires that these separation comprotmses be improved upon in the course of performing' a modi 6 cation.
7.1.2 The two Division s cablas berum the H21 P002 transmitter rack m the Reactor Building and the H12-P613 control room cabmet are each single pair cables.
7.1.3 The Division li cable between H21 P002 and H12 P613 is a three pair cable. The three pairs serve these functions:
Pair 1: RWCU inlet flow transnutter G31-FT Nc36 Pair 2. - RWCU inlet pressure transmitter G31 PT N005 Pair 3: Test Point 7.1.4 In order to improve the divisional separation, the following detailed design steps are '
anucipated:
7.1.4.1 Transfer the return and reject flow transmitters onto Pair' 2 and Pair 3 in the Division -
11 cable.
7.1.4.2 Transfer the RWCU inlet pressure transnuuer and the test point onto the two Division
! single pair cables.
7.1.'4.3 Utilize a Division II NUM AC chassis ic, perform the differential flow tuncuon.
DBD BG0051 1 Rev. No. 0-Pace No. 13 7.1.5 Theae actions will result in:
7.1.5.1 All three Cow signals will be carned by Division 11 cables and will connect to a -
Division !! NUMAC chassis. ne loop power is provided from withm the NUMAC.
7.1.5.2 The G31 PT N005 transnutter signal will be carned on a Division I cable and it will be powered from a Division I supply.
7.2 RWCU process temperatures must be made available at the Class IE NUM AC unas m order to melude density coinpensation m the RWCU differential flow calculation. The in ime thermocouples that -
currently measure these temperatures are non-Q. non-seistrue, as is the pipmg m which they are mstalled. He interconnectmg cables are run in divisionalized raceway, two m Division 11 and the other in Division 1. As discussed above. the non-redundant differential now function will be perfonged m a Division 11 NUM AC chassis.
7.2.1 These density compensation thermocouple cables will be connected directly to the NUMAC thermocouple and/or differential flow input termmal boards watbout use of isolation devices, on the following bases:
7.2.1.1 The NUMAC software features gross failure and 'out-of-bounds' mV signal checks for the now density compensation thermocouple input signals. When either of those -
conditions is sensed to exist, the NUM AC trouble relay will de energize and alarm via -
the *STM LK DET OFF NORMAIJSYS TROUBLE
- Control Room (preliminary legend) overhead annunciator. NUM AC will display an error message indentifying -
the affected channel and the nature of the failure. Simultaneously, the software algonthm will substitute conservative values for the faulted inputst i.e.. all trip functions will be conservative in the presence of faulted input signals. Therefore, the remaining separation-related critena of concern in this case is that a failure of any of the thermocouples or the interconnecting cables shall not physically damage the NUMAC system and prevent proper operation of it's safety related functions.
7.2.1.2 The thermocouple signallevel is of such low energy (mV) that failure either of the thermocouple or within the extension cable itself (open or intemal short) cannot physically damage the NUMAC hardware.
7.2.13 Two of the interconnectmg cables are run in Division 11 raceway, the same division as the NUM AC chassis that will perform the differential flow function. Dese two mputs are therefore subject to only those same failure modes involving adjacent cables as are assumed for the safety related cables in those raceways.
7.2.1.4 The one existing Division I thermocouple will be cross-tied to Division 11 in the following manner. In the H12 P603 cabinet, the divisional transition will be made directly at terminal pomts. There .is no credible event that could transtmt faults from either division to the other through that interface terminal point that would have the '
potential to affect adjacent cables in both Division raceway systems. A Specification -
Waiver will be prepared against 048-004 to justify this configuration.
7.3 Plant Modifications87-107 and 87-108 each installed four non-Q instrument channels to momtor the 20' and 50' Reactor Building general area temperature. Each loop consists of a local thermocouple connected to an alarm switch and to one of the two 2 pen recorders located in H12 P614. Those two recorders and to a lesser extent, the four swatches mterfere with the rearrangement of hardware that is necessary inside H12 P614 to accommodate the NUMAC equipment. In order to maximize the
DBD BG0051 Rey,No,. 0~
Page No. 14 uttlization of the NUMAC hardware capacity and to reduce the cornplexity of the cabinet internal rearrangement. the function of those loops will be absorbed into the NUM AC system.
7.3.1 The alarm switches and the recorders will be deleted. The thermocouple cables will be connected to NUMAC channels. The overhead controi room alarm wmdows will remain as-is, but will be initiated by NUMAC output relays. The indication function provided by the recorder will be available on the front of the NUM AC display screen. He ERFIS data inpats currently hard wired in parallel to the switches will be provided through the NUM AC GEDAC -
data Imk to ERFIS. The short and intermediate trending functions of the recorder will be superseded by the 30 mmute ad 30 day trending displays on the NUM AC. The long term : ,
hardcopy trendmg capability provided by the recorder chart paper is not currently.utihr.ed. .
smce the chart papers are not required to be stored. Equivalent short or long term data trending could be provided within ERFIS as the need anses.-
7.3.2 The PMs 87107 and 87108 were designed and built as non-Q. The portion of that mstallation which is intended to be reused includes the thermocouples and the cables. These -
thermocouples cables will be reconnected directly to the NUM AC thermocouple input boards, without use of isolation devices, on the following bases:
7.3.2.1 The 20' and 50' elevation temperature monitonng function is non safety' related..
Therefore, the pnmary separation entens in this case is that a failure of the thermocouple or the interconnectmg cables shall not damage the NUMAC system and prevent proper operation of it's safety related functions.
7.3.2.2 De thermocouple signal level is of such low energy (mV) that failure either of the-thermocouple or within the extension cable itself (open or sternal .short) cannot physically damage the NUMAC hardware.
7.3.2.3 The interconnecting cabling is run in divisionalir.ed raceway .and will be connected to NUMAC thermocouple boards of the corresponding division. 'These cables are therefore subject to only those same failure modes involving adjacent cables as are assumed for the safety related cables in those raceways.
7.3.2.4 The branch conduit runs that connect to the local thermocouples were installed as seismic, but not safety related. Since those non-Q branch conduits contam only the thermocouple cables being discussed, the only failure probabiiity mat is meressed by-that lack of Q-designation for the conduits is that of opens or shorts within the thermocouple cable itself. These failures are discussed in 7.4.2.1,7.4.2.2 and 7.4.2.3 above and are of no consequen;e to the safety related NUMAC functions, 7.3.2.5 The NUMAC software features gross failure and high ala-m inps for the thermocouple input signals. Downscale values (indicative of open or burnout) will -
initiate the *LDM Inop Alarm". Upscale values willinp the high alarm function.
s.0 Material Requirements 8.1 All equipment and matenals shall meet the referenced specifications (Section 3) and environmental conditions (Section 6).
8.2 Equipment to be added by this project is Q-ljst. ' Design, procurement, mstallation. and testing shall be in accordance with CP&L's Corporate QA Manual.
- ec *..
. DBD-BG0051 1:
Rev, No,-. 0
- Page No. - <15,
, S 3 ' All components includ'ing at a mimmum the thermocouples, wiring and wire lugs, that are IE be hdded,'
p or modified per this project that are to be located in a Harsh Environment (i.et -Reactor Buildmg) and ;_
are:
- Q-list, or-to be added to the EQ-List,' or - -
- - are otherwise required per _10CFR50.49 paragraphs d.e,and f. -
-, and/or .
associated equipment or materials (i.e., cables, terminal, lugs, etc.) required f to install / operate this equipment. .
shall have approved Qualification Data Packages in place to ensure compliance with 10CFR50.49 (Ref:
PLP42).
8.4 Components to be unlized in a Mild Environment (i.e., Control Room) do not require EQ qualification,:
but do require seismic qualification.
. The GE NUMAC equipment is qualified in accordance with IEEE 3441975.
9.0 Mechanical Requirements 9.1 The RWCU reject flow instrument loop will be reduced in range from the existing 0-250 gpm to 0-125.
gpm. His change better accommodates the operational restriction on reject flow of approximately 80 -
gpm._ Reduction in the channel range will improve the accuracy of that reject flow instrument channel-'
and, as a result, improve the accuracy of the differential flow leakage computation and trip functions? ,
10.0 Structural Requirements 10.1 All components, cables and raceway installed per this project shall be designed as Seismic Category I.
I1.0 Hydraulic Requirements 11.1 Since the RWCU process temperatures can vary over a wide design range, the effect of fluid density changes on the flow instnamentation shall be recognized and compensatation shall be providedi 11.2 The G31-FE-N011 orince plate will be resized to acco==nd u a reduced instrument range o(0125 :
gpm. It is expected that the new bore size will be slightly smaller than the current one.
11.2.1 The increased pressure drop that will result across the revised orifice must be evaluated to l assure that there is no unacceptable impact on the design hydraulic parameters in the reject -
flow path. Applicable mechanical system flow calculations should be updated as necessary.-
11.2.2 The new full range onfice plate differential pressure shall be established to be withm the.
differential pressure range of the existing Rosemount transmitter, in order to permit continued >
use of that mstrument.
11.2.3 i The orifice plate shall be sized to result in an acceptable beta ratio.
12.0 Chemistry Requirtsnents None.
1
DBD-IlG0051-1 '
Rev. No. 0-Pace No. 16 3.0 Electrical Requirements 13.1 Due to their overlappmg nature for this project the entena normally discussed m DBD Secuon 13
- Electncal Requirements
- and DBD Secuon 18
- Redundancy. Disersity end Separation Requirements
- have been consohdated toto Secuen 16 *lnstrumentauon and Control Requirements
- for this DBD, 14.0 Layout and Arrangement Requirements 14.1 Human Factors entena will be considered in layout of operatot mierface feanires such as location of controls, annunciators and indicators and m the style and content of equipment labels. Documented Human Factors Evaluauons mil be performed in accordance with DG Yhi.5f snd DG Vill.58.
14.2 The temperature-based portions of the LDS system addressed by this project will continue to be focused m the H12-P614 cabtnet. The NUM AC instruments will be installed in essennally the same location es ,
the Riley mstruments that are being removed. Human Factors attnbutee will be impraed due to the mcreased amount of temperature data displayed and the detailed system sta'us tnformanon that will be coctmuously asailable. The NUM AC display and control panels will be located withm the mounting height entena established in DG VIH.53 and in the GE NUMAC specification 23A5227 in order to opumaze operator and techmeian utihzauon.
14.3 The funcuan of the square root conveners. summers alarm tnp units anu time delay relays bemg _
removed from the H12-P612 and H12 P613 cabmets will now be performed withm the NUM AC system located m H12 P614. Since these signal processmg functions required no direct operator interaction. their relocation is of no consequence from a Human Factors perspective.
14.4 The RWCU return flow rate mstrument channel currently has no visual indicator. The return 11ow rates will now be available on the NUMAC display on H12-P614 and on a new mdicator that will be added on H12-P603 adjacent to the exisung RWCU inlet and reject flow mdicators. The RWCU differenual flow indicator that is currently located on H12-P613 will be removed. Differenual flow indication will now be available both on the NUMAC display on H12-P614 and on the H12 P603 control board adjacent to the three RWCU flow rates from which it is computed, nese enhanced display features and locanons will improve the Human Factors attnbutes of the system.
14.5 ALARA cnteria will be applied to the design and installation of electncal conduits and cabling in the Reactor Building. De replacement of 15 local temperature switches per unit with thermocouples will sigmficantly reduce the number of Maintenance group manhours spent m the Reactor Building to -
perform MSTs.
15.0 Operational Requirements 15.1 ne system is required to perform the basic functions descnbed in Section i " Basic Function" of this DBD.
15.2 Tech Spec 3/4.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1 defines the operability requirements for eacn of the mvolved isolation Actusuon lastrumentauon Trip Functions. RCI-02.6, in Appendtx A Table 3.3.2-1 and Appendix B Table 3.3.2-1, idenufies the specific instrument numbers that constitute the different Trip Functions.-
15.3 The isolation actuanon instrumentation channel inp setpomts shall be maintamed within the limits required by Techmcal Specificanon 3/4.3.2.
15.4 The isolation actuauon mstrumentation channels shall be designed to sausfy the response times required by Techmcal Specificanon 3/4.3.2.
DBD-BG0051 1 Ret,No. 0 Page No. 17 15.5 Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements are discussed in Section'20 *Testmg Requirements
- of this DBD.
15.6 The design of this tuodification shall not compromise the UFSAR Chapter 15 conclusion that the actions initiated by the pnmary containment isolation and NSS shutoff system are sutficient to prevent the release of radioactive matenal from exceeding the 10CFR100 linuts.
16.0 instrum'entation and ControFRequirements Note: Due to their overlapptng nature for this project, the entena normally discussed in DBD Section 13
'Electncal Requitetnents' and DBD Section 16
- Redundancy, Diversity and Separation Requirements" have been consolidated into Section 16 " Instrumentation and Control Requirements
- for this DBD.
Note: To interpret the followtng HPCI and RCIC cntena, it is necessary to distinguish between the system pnmary functional components and those that are part of the pnmary containment isolation feature.
Generally, references to the HPCI or RCIC
- system
- should be considered to relate to those electncal'and instrument components that are necessary to start and control the HPCI or RCIC system and do not include those that are associated with the tsnmary contaitiment nolation.
16.1 PCIS:
16.1.1 Upon lor,s of actuating power, the PCIS valves should take the position that provides greater ;
safety (per GDC 23). '
16.1.2 No stagle failure within this isolation control function shall prevent closure of the appropriate system isolation valves when required (UFSAR 7.3.1.2.g.1),
16.1.3 Any anticipated intentional bypass, maintenance, calibration, or test operation shall not imp;.ir i the functional ability of the control system to respond correctly to essential monitored variables (per UFSAR 7.3.1.2.g.2).
16.1.4 Power supplies for the pnmary containment and reactor vessel isolation control aptems shall ,
be arranFed so that loss of one supply cannot prevent automatic isolation when required (per UFSAR 7,3.1.2.g.5).
16.1.5 Once isolation has been initiated, isturn to normal operation requires deliberate operator action (per UFSAR 7.3.1.2.g.6)
(-
16.1.6 The control operstar shall have means to nanually initiate isolation of the pnmary containment and reactor vessel (per UFSAR 7.3.1.2.j).
16.1.7 The PCIS and NSSS shall provide the contro; operator with information pertinent to the status .
of the system (per UFSAR 7.3.1.2.kt 16.1.8 " Die power for the channels and logies of the PC'S and NSSS is supplied from the Reactor Protection System motor generator sets or emergency power sources (per SD-12,2.2.1) =
16.1.9 PCIS control power for all DC MOVs onginates from the station battery and from the same bus that supplies DC motive power to the valves tper UFSAR 7.3.1.1.lb l
i
.x 1
DBD BGOO51-1 Rev. No,- '0-Page No. 18 16.1.10 Inputs to annunciators, tndicators, and the process computer are arranged so inut no malfunction of the annunciatmg, todicating, or computmg equipment can functionally disablethe control systems. Signals from the isolation control system sensors are not used :
directly as mputs to the_ annunciattng or data logging equipmentc Isolation is provided between-
- the pnmary signal and each informauon output (per UFSAR 7.3.1).
16.1.11 The response time for' the isolatmn Actuation Instrumentation channels are speci6ed in Tech Spec Table 3.3.2-3. This includes a 10 second allowance for DG start after loss of AC power and leaves only 3 seconds for the actual channel. An additional response time consideration is that each specinc line break scenano must isolate within the time limits used m the reactor building environmental report analyses.
16.1.12 The closure times of PCIVs are established on the basis of minimizing the offsite radiological consequences of an accident within the limits of 10CFR100. Isolation time for.each power operated or automatic valve is speci6ed in Tech Spec Table 3.6,3-1. (per UFSAR 6.2.4, -
7.3.1.15.6.3).
16.1.13 A leakage rate of 50 galimm has been calculated to be the conservative mmimum liquid _-
leakage from a crack large enough to propagate rapidly (UFSAR 5.2.5.2.2).
16.1.14 Any relays or other devices added by this project will be analyzed for impact on the AC--
and/or DC load studies (DG V.10).
16.1.15 Since there is no change m valve hardware, power source hardware or power cabling. ENP-40
- 480 Volt MCC Computer Programs" is not affected.
16.2 IIPCI:
16.2.1 The HPCI system is not redundant within itself but smcc it is an integral part of the ECCS System the interaction of these systems provides redundancy. (per UFSAR 7.1.1.2).
16.2.2 Startup of the HPCI system is completely independent of AC power. - For startup to occur,-
only DC power from the plant battenes and steam extracted from the nuclear system are ,
required (FSAR Section 6.3.2.2.1).
16.2.3 The HPCI system shall be automatically isolated upon receipt of a high area temperature signal (HPCI equipment area and steam line tunnel) (per UFSAR 7.3,1.6.11).
16.2.4 Speci6 cation 048-004 provides requirements for separation between the HPCI and RCIC system cables and between the HPCI and RCIC PCIS cables.
16.2.5 The electncal and !&C portions of the HPCI system are safety related (per EDBS).
16.2.6 If the HPCI system is moperable, power operation can contmue provried the . ADS. CSS, and LPCI systems are operable (TS 3/4.S.1).
16.2.7 UEC performed two studies to assute that the HPCI system satis 6ed the plant separanon entena versus RCIC. Proposed modi 6 cations were ident:6ed but not implemented pending an NRC ruling on the importance to safety of the RCIC system (Ref: UEO Studies - *H PCI and RCIC Cable Routmg and Instrumentation Cabinet Study Unit No. I". issued 2/29/80. and
- HPCI and RCIC Cable Routmg and Instrumentation Cabinet Study Umi No. 2*, issued 2/29/80).
y n
(f DBD-BG0051 1 Rev. No. O Page No.- 19 16.2.8 HPCI discussion and summar):
16.2.8.1 HPCI
- system
- start up and control requires only DC battery power, However, portions of the HPCI pnmary containment isolation function require AC power, In those cases, it must be shown that loss of that AC power cannot block operation of HPCI.
16.2.8.2 - A description of the AC pewered components that exist in'the t're-modiGeation con 6curation, shag with a description of the itapact of power loss on each, follows:
16.2.8.2.1 The Riley temperature switches and the relays in H12 P614 that combine the Riley and Fenwal switch logie into the Div I and Div 11 high temperature isolation signals that tngger the initiation of the DC-powered HPCI logi:
relay that in turn send the actual *close-isolation
- signal to the isolation valve -
control circuits:
On loss of AC power, this logic will fail the isolation valves m the "as-;s' position. The B21B K4A and B21B K4B AC relays are designed such that they must be energized to provide the high temperature isolatian contact closure to the DC isolation logic. The intent of this non
- fail +
safe' design is that the HPCI isolation valves must stay open on loss of AC power in order to allow the DC powered HPCI system to perfom its .
function.
16.2.8.2.2 The inboard isolation valve E41 F002:
This valve cannot close on loss of AC power since it utilizes AC for both motive and control power. Furthermore, it would not receive an isolation command due to the logic failure mode desenbed in 16,2.8.2.1 above. It would therefore fail as-is.
16.2.S.3 A desenption of the AC powered components that will exist in the pg21:
modification confirurate, along with a desenption of the impact of power loss on -
each, follows:
16.2.8.3.1 The NUM AC chassis that will process the HPCI pnmary containment isolation logic and it's output relays will be powered from 120 VAC Emergency Busses:
On loss of AC power, this logic will work the same as it currently does.
The NUMAC output relays will be set up as ' energize-to-trip' and will continue to fail the isolation valves in the "as-ts" position upon loss of' AC.
16.2.8.3.2 The inboard isolation valve E41-F002:
No change per this project.
-;1 .
DBD-BG0051 1; Rev. No. 0-Pan No.- 20 >
16.3 HPCIIRCIC Interface issues:
'16.3.1 GE Document No. 22A3010 Rev. 3, in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.4; states GE's onginsienteria for the separation design of HPCI It designates HPCI as a Division i system which is -
funcuonally redundant to the Division !! automatic depressurization systemjADS), Specifici-entena are as follows:
= 16.3.1,1 Separation shall be such that no smgle failure can prevent operanon of an ,
engineered safeguard function (i.e., core cooling), Redundant (though dissinular)--
systems may be required to perform the required function _ to satisfy the single failure entena.
16.3.1.2 Interconnecting conduits are to be assigned to the same division as the power for ,
the contained circuits and separation between divisions is to be mamtained eacept ;
at tne immediate area of the entrance to the cabinet of the other division.'
16.3.1.3 The mboard HPCI isolation valve control sh'sil be independent of the outboard -
HPCI valve and all RCIC isolation valve winng (per 048 004; 2.2.3.3.a.2) 16.3.2 Item 16.3.1.3 above has been reevaluated by GE within thh scope of this project. As a result, they have provided CP&L with Revision 4 to their Specification 22A3010 that eliminates the -
requirement for separation between HPCI and RCIC isolation valve wiring w:sthin a separation division. The basis for this entena change is that RCIC is not considered redundant to HPCI.' s RCIC is not safety related and it's flow capacity is much smaller than HPCI.n neir_research' indicates that they have not imposed the RCIC/HPCI isolation valve separation requirement on any other plants. CP&L research determines that we are not specifically committed to such -
separation in the FSAR. The physical advantages of this change include:
16.3.2.1 The barnered companments that currently separate the HPCI components from'the RCIC components tn H12-P614 will no longer be required. This will facilitate a cleaner and more matrtamable arrangement of the NUM AC hardware and winng withm H12 P614.
16.3.2.2 - De DC pcwer supply and _ TOPAZ inverters thai cunently supply the RCIC Riley -
components 2.nd associated relays can be elimmated and be replaced by an-Emergency AC power supply. This change will also facilitate the H12.P614 cabinet arrangement. More importantly, it will help resolve the on-gomg problem related to obsolescence of the TOPAZ inveners BNP currently has no spares in -
stock. New TOPAZs cannot be purchased. No attemate models of a practical-size and/or capacity have been identified, implementation of this project on both units will release four TOPAZ units which could then be reconditioned as spares ,
for the four identical inveners that provide the HPCI and RCIC control and -
mstrument power. His action would allow either cancellation or scope reduction of the separate project intended to resolve the inverter issue.
16.3.3 This change has also been evaluated by NED as to its potentia l impact on the HPCIIRCIC .
Train A/ Train B designations specified in BNP's Appendix R SSD analysis. The barner removal inside the control room cabtnet hu no adverse impact since SSD procedures already
-exist for shutdown from outside the control room in the event of total loss of control room .
equipment anct access. Any cable modifications or additions m the HPCI or RCIC PCI circuits
DBD-BG0051 1 Rev. Nc, . O. -
Page No. 21 ,
would be subjected to the routme Appendix, R review that is performed for all NED cable changes. The required revision to Specification 048 004 will be suenutteo for Appendix R review.
16.3.4 CP&L speci6 cation 048-004 will have to be revised to reflect the change in GE specification 22A3010.
16.4 RCIC:
16.4.1 The RCIC system provides core cooling during reactor shutdown under conditions of loss of.
normal feedwater by mamtauung sufficient reactor water invemory until the reac or is .
depressunzed to a level where the shutdown cooling system can be placed in operation (per .
UFSAR 5.4.6.2.1).
16.4.2 The electncal components of the RCIC system required for system initiation shall be operated by de power (station battery systemi(per UFSAR 5.4.6.2.4),
16.4.3 If the RCIC system is inoperable, power operation can contmue provided the HPCI system is operable (TS 3/4.7.4) 16.4.4 RCIC discussion and summary:
16 A.4.1 RCIC
- system
- start up and control requires only DC battery power. However, portions of the RCIC pnmary containment isolation function require AC power.
In those casts, it must be shows that loss of that AC power cannot block operation of RCIC.
16.4.4.2 In the current conSguration, the Riley switches and the associated relays are powered from the TOPAZ DC inverters. The only AC powered compcsent that exists in the ore-modificatmn confirurat10n, along with a desenption of the impact of power loss, is as follows: ..
16.4.4.2.1 The inboard isolation valve E51-F007:
This valve cannot close on loss of AC power smce it utshzes AC for both motive and control power.
16.4.4.3 A desenption of the AC powered components that will cust in the um modifimion conficuration, along with a desenption of the impac^. of power loss on each, is as follows (see "HPCI/RCIC laterface issues
16 A.4.3.1 he NUM AC chassis (nat will process the RCIC pnmary containment isolatica logic and it's output relays will be powered from 120 VAC Emergency Busses:
This logic will be set up u " energize-to-tnp " such that on loss of AC power the inp cannot occur wid the isolation valves will fail in the "as-is' position upon loss of AC.
DBD-BG0051 1 Rev. No. O l' age No. 22 16.4.4.3.2 - The inboard isolation valve E51.F007:
No change per ttus project.
16.5 RWCUt 16.5.1 The existing RWCU isolation loF ic is fail safe; i.e., upon loss of power, the RWCU isolation -
valves will receive isolation closure signals. The outboard valve, G31 F004 is DC powered and would start it's closure stroke immediately. The inboard valve, G31 F001 is AC powered and would not start it's isolation closure stroke until the AC power bus is restored. (Ref: .
FP-55109, Sh 13 2 FP-50056, Sh 13).
16.5.2 The RWCU isolation logic desenbed above will be mamtained by ttus project; i.e., the NUMAC isolation relay will be set up as 'de-energize to tnp*.
16.6 Generni:
16.6.1 lastalianon of new components and wirmg will be Q-List, safety related. Seistrue Category 1 - ;
and Class 1E.
16 6.2 Divisionalized design is required:
16.6.2.1 Complete physical separation shall be provided between the components and wirinF of the two divisions.
Eteertion: See Section 7.2 for a desenpuon and justificanon of an eaception to this enteria for one RWCU flow compensation thermocouple input cable.
16.6.2.2 The 120 VAC and 12.5 VDC control power for one division shall be separated from that of the other division.
16.6.3 ne components shall be seismically qualified and the installation shall be seistnically designed.
Exception: See Secuans 7.2 ard 7.3 for desenpuons and justifications of two exceptions to this criteria for RWCU. flow compensation and Reactor Building ambient temperature thermocouple input cables.
16.6.4 he design shall provide fully independent redundant channels capable of accomplishing the objectives described above. The resultant design shall assure that no credible single failure can prevent accomplishment of the safety functmn defined for this control function.
Exception: The RWCU differential flow function is not redundant and may fail in response as a result of numerous potential single failures. .This i
configuranon was typical of GE's design on BNP's generation plant .
and existed at the time of BNP's onginal licensmg. There is no known regulatory requirement to retront redundancy to this function.
16.6.5 Diversity is assured in that the inboard and outboard valves are powered and controlled from..
separate divisions.-
17.0 Access and Administrative Control Requirements 17.1 No umque requirements.
DBD-BG0051 l~
Res. No, 0-Page No. - 23 1B.O Redundancy. Diversity, and Separation Requirements-
- 18.1 Due to their overlapptng nature for this project, the entena normally discussed in D110 Section 13'
'Electncal Requirements
- and Sectson 18 'Redund.ncy Diversity and Separation Requirements 1have been consolidated into Section 16 *1nstrumentation and Control Requirements" for_ this DBD.-
19.0 Failure Effects Requirtsnents 19.1 Failure analysis shall be performed for the following minimum conditions:
19.1.1 Totalloss of offsite power. sustamed or momentary; 19.1.2 Loss of one division of emergency AC power. sustained or momentary.
19.1.3 Loss of DC battery power, sustained or momentary.
19.1,4 Failure of an ambient or ventilation differential thermocouple element or cable.
19.1.5 Failure . a 6-input NUMAC module.
19.1,6 Failure of a differential flow input module.
19.1.7 Failure of one or both of the NUMAC low voltage power supplies.
19.1.8 Failure of NUMAC logic software.
19.1.9 Failure of a NUMAC output relay.
19.1.10 Failure of a RWCU flow transnutter or it's connecting cable to the NUM AC input board.
19.1.11 Failure of a RWCU process temperature thermocouple or it's connecting cabic to the NUM AC input board.
20.0 Test Requirtsucnts 20.1 Post-installation Acceptance Testine nunimum requirements shall be as follows:
4 20.1.1 Calibration of each new device : id each affected channel.
20.1.2 Functional test of all modified control and annunciation logic 20.1.3 Response time testing of channels as required by Tech Spec Table 3.3.2 3.
20.1.4 Demonstrate operability of any other associated non-modified components whose winng bad to be disturbed in order to accomplish the installation defined by this project.
20.1.5 These tests should be wntien in a format as close as is practical to that of the new MSTs that will be required for penodic surveillance of the new system contiguranon.
l:
I
7, : -.
DBD-BG0051 1 Rev. No. . 0-Page No. 24
!!.0. Operability, Accessibility, and Maintenance hquirements 21.1 Operability:
21.1.1 Techmc4 Specification 34.3.2 defmes the operability requirements fer the isolation Actuation fastrumentation. The system configurauon shall be desiF ned to assure maximum fleubility m -
sausfactwo of those requirements.
21.1.2 - One parucular feature available m the NUMAC is the ability to bypass selected channels without the need to tnstalljumpers or lift wires.
21.2 Accessibility:
21.2.1 The NUMAC hardware and associated supports and wiring shall be arranged so as to nunimite congestion wahin H12-P614. Accessibility for anticipated surveillance and maintenance-activiues shall be considered in the tar physical design.
21.2.2 Replacement of the local Fenwal temperature switches witn thermocouples will provide the technical basis for a potential Tech Spec change that would reduce the need to climb to the i device locatmos from once each month to as tufrequently as once per refuel cycle.
21.3 Maintenance:
21.3.1 The NUMAC will petform a complete self. test cycle every thirty mmutes and initiate appropnate alarms and er or messages as faults are identified.
21.3.2 Surveillance testing will be facilitated by use of the NUMAC internal signal source foi channel calibrations. Centrol for these channel calibrations is from " soft keys" located on the front of l the NUMAC.
21.3.3 Correcuve mamtenance will be optimized by the self-diagnostic features and error messages generated by the NUMAC software. Most corrective action will take the form of mc,dule replacements.
21.3.4 in their formal review of the G0051 A Proje'ct Plan, BNP 11C Maintenance he documented ~a'-
senes of recommendations relating pnmanly to testing enteria and methods. These comments will be accommodated to the. maximum extent possible. See DBD Attaenment I for det4:Is.
22.0 Personnel Requirements 22.1 No extraordmary personnel requirements.
22.2 Detailed traming will be required for the modification Acceptance Test crew and for BNP Mainteriance and Operations personnel pnot to their need to test, mamtain and operate the new hardware. General-Electnc will perfonn some of the applicable trainmg within the scope of a Work Authonzation issueo in conjunction with the NUMAC System Pt.rchase Order.
23.0 Transportability Requirements 23.1 No bulky, heavy or haurdous matenals are involved in this project.
DBD-BGOO51 1 Rev. No. O Pace No. 25 ,
24.0 Fire Protection or Resistance Requirements 24.1 ne routtng of penetrators (condutt, tray, pipe, etc) through any wall or floor penetration that breaches a 6te area or zone boundary shall be designed. installed, sealed and inspected in accordance with Spec
!!8@3 and Procedure WP 201.
24.210CFR$0.- Appendix R requirements shall be evaluated in accordance with NED Procedt:re 3.17.
- Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities *.
25.0 llandling, Storage, and Shipping Requiresnents 25.1 Matenals designated as Q-List on the modification Bills of Matenals must be controlled irhompliance with the Corporate QA manual.
26.0 Other Requirernents 40 prevent undue risk to the health and safety of the piv.ilic).
None.
27.0 Materials Parts, and Equipment Suitable for Application 27.1 The components and circuitry to be installed per this project serve a S.fety Related function. All "
components used thall be suitable for use in Q-list applications. All components and matenals shall be designated as Q except where a documented basis exists for use of non-Q or commercial grade matenals.
27.2 Electncal components to be located in a harsh environment (reactor building) will require full seismic and environmental qualification.
27.3 Mild environment components shall be seismically qualified and installed.
27.4 Appropnate quantities of spare parts will be identified. The imtial recommended quanitities will be procured as part of the project and the necessary input will be provided to Stores for establishment of those items in SIS. Shelf life limi'.ations for those parts will be identified where applicable.
25.0 Safety Requirements 28.1 Aspects of this project anticipated to require umque safety emphasis include:
28.1.1 Wiring work within the control room panels. All practical clearances will be obtained; however, it is probable that some tasks will have to be done adjacent to hot wiring. The job will have to be designed, planned and supervised to maximize personnel safety and minirmze the potential for disruption of adjacent circuits.
28.1.2 Replacement of the Fenwal Switches and the associated conduit and cable work will be performed at elevations that will require application of good practices for scatfolding and climbmg.
23.2 Otherwise, normal construction, matatenance and operations procedures and safe work practices shall be observed.
e
~ DBD BG00511 Rev. No, - 0 Page No. 26 29.0 Potential Installation Methods 29.1 An outage of sigmficant length will be required to implement this project. The plant cannot be in Modes 1,2 or 3 while the required clearances are in effect.
29.2 Raceway, raceway supports, and cable ,'alling tasks will be required in the Naetor Building at 17',
20' and 50' elevations and in the control ; ailding at 23' and 49' elevations: At the dmcretmn ut BNP-rnanagement, some of that bulk work coulo proceed pnor to the outage.
29.3 Other scope that uught be performed pre-outage %cludes:
29.3.1 Bench calibration of thermocouples, sertical indicators and the NUM AC hardware.
29.3.2 Fabrication of the various cover plates and inserts needed to patch holes in the H12 P612, H12-P613 and H12 P614 cabinet that will be left by deleted components.
29.3.3 Panel nameplate and annunciator window engraving.
He rest of the work will have to be performed dunng an outage due to the clearance and LCO requirements.
29.4 General Electric will be responsible for a limited part of the physical installation. They will provide the personnel to make the final installation of the new NUMAC components in H12 P614 and to make the required winng connections between the NUMAC components. CP&L will be responsible to ,
remove the existing components, fully prepare the panel for the NUMAC installation and then connect all external winng to the NUMAC after it is installed by GE.
29.5 Modification mstructions will prohibit work inside conuol room cabinets, final tie-ins and post-installation acceptance testing until after strict coordination with, and approval by, Operations.
30.0 ALARA Requiranents 30.1 Standard ALARA good practices shall be observed during the design and implementation of this project.
30.2 The resultant modifications will be subject to ALARA review for that portion of the work to be installed in the reactor buildbg, primanly instrument installation, conduit modifications and installations, and cable pulls.
30.3 Implementation of this project will result in reduction in dose received by the I&C Maintenance technicians dunng performance of MSTs on the Steam Leak Detection System.
31.0 ASME Section XI Applicability 31.0.1 No mechanical components or welds subject to ISI per the subject code will be affected by this project.
32.0 10CFR61 Applicability 32.1 The proposed extension of the RWCU high differential flow isolation time delay from 45 seconds to 30 tmnutes has the potential to slightly increase the rate of emission of airbome radionuclides.
_ i . _ . . _
DBD-BG0051 1 Rev. No. O Pace No. 27 -
32.2 He results of a generi: GE study being utilized u part of the technical basis fer pending EER 910143 todicate that catended RWCU cold leal. age will not result _ in offsite and control room doses in excess of -
the limits established by 10CFR20 and 10CFR100 linuts. Finalization of that EER will nrovide a basis for preparation of ti.e safety evaluation required to support the time delay extension.
33.0 Design Feedbs.i System information:
33.1 The Design Feedback System was researtbed on 7/31/91. Topics that were considered to be potentially relevant to this project are identified below, along v ith 'a statement of their ' applicability.
33.1.1 No. 049: Design of Trip Logic for High Pressure Cooling Synem.s (BWR) 33.1.1.1 INPO SOER 8113 made a senes of recommendations for imprownAnts to HPCI-and RCIC isolation logic, including one that consideration be given to modifying 1 the leak detecuon logic to reduce the frequency of unwarranted v :ations. The BNP response in 1981 was that spunous isolations due to ambient and differential -
temperature was not a sufficient problem to warrant modifications.
~
33.1.1.2 The increase in frequency of HPC1 isolations since that time however, reinforces 1 the need to upgrade the leak detection system.
33.1.2 No.128: Guidance for Hermocouple and RTD Applications 33.1.2.1 Duke Power Company's Feedback Guide 1.21 itemizes various recommendations and cautions regaroing temperature instrumentation. Items relative to this project include-33.1.2.2 Duke standardized on Iron Conr.antan for general usage.
33.1.2.3_ Recommends use of four wire 100 ohm platinum RTDs phere accuracy is desired or where the measured temperatures will be less than about 150'F.
33.1.2.4 Use of intermediate termmal blocks sbc.uld be minimized.
33.1.2.5 Extension cables should be shielded and grounded at one place, generally at the TC sensor head.
33.1.3 No.166: Setpoints for Safety Related instrumentauon
-33.1.3.1 Identifies the applicability of ISA-S67.04 for setpoint calculations.
33.1.3.2 DG-Vill.50 has since invoked ISA 567.04 for NED Design for BNP. Setpoint calculations will be developed for the post. modification leak detection configuration as part of this project.
33.1.4 No. 381: Termination of Hermoccuple Wire 33.1.4.1 Letter No. BESU.86617 documented provisions for use of lugs on solid
- thermocouple wire when two such wires must be terminated under the same terminal screw, it went on to state tha* *vhen a single wire is to be terminated, the previous practice of wrapptng the wire stor.ad the terminal screw should be continued.
DBD BG0051-1 Rev,No. 0-Page No. 28 33.1.4.2 Contrary to the above. in order to improve the matntainability of the NUMAC -
instaliation. lugs are gomg to twitpecif ied for ternunation of all involved :
thermocouple wires at the control room end. GE concurs with, and recommends, this acuon. Specification 048-012 will be waivered or revised accordingly.
33.1.4.3 This Design Feedback Item will be updated in conjunction with this project.-
33.1.5 No. 404: Panalarm Model 86 Thermocouple Monitor 33.1.5.1 IE Notice 86-69 desenbes a problem of spurious trips of these devices caused by.;
operrtion of it's READ / SET switch. It identifies addition of a one second time delay relay as a potent al fix.
33.1.5.2 This modification has not been implemented at BNP. Instead, the Model 86 '
monitors will be removed and replaced by NUM AC hardware within the scope of this project.
33.1.5.3 This Design Feedback Item should be updated in conjunction with this project.
33.1.6 No. 482: Test Switches for Plant Equipment 33.1.6.1 Letter NED-G-3698 documents a request by Pat Howe that testaSility features be built into new installations in order to mininuze the need for jumpers during periodic testing and calibration. It enuurages interface with Operations and Maintenance to evaluate the need for such features on each project.
33.1.7 No. 552: Test Switches for Electrical / Electronic Equipment 33.1.7.1 This item states that provision of appropriate test switches, buttons, jacks. etc.
should be considered to be a routine " Good Design Practice".
33.1.8 No. 536: Agastat Relays 33.1.8.1 IE Notice 85-49 describes a calibration problem with Agastat Series 7000 time delay relays related to differences between the tested and installed orientation.
33.1.8.2 No new Agastat time delay relays will be added per tius project. Two per unit will be removed (G31 R616C&D).
33.1.9 No. 643: Riley Temperature Switches and Ranges of Various Instrumentation 33.1.9.1 LER 2 88-020 describes a problem of spur aus actuations of these devices due to electrical noise. It identifies addition of a one second time delay relay as a -
potential fix.
'33.1.9.2 This modification has not been implemented at BNP. Instead, the Model 86 monitors will be removed and replaced by NUMAC hardware within the scope of this project.
33.1.9.3 This Design Feedback Item should be updated in conjunction with this project.
DBD-BG0051 1 +
Rev. No'. O <
Page No.- 29-33.1.10 No. 690: Installed Cabling Not Meetmg Separatior Requirements of BSEP Spec. No. 048 004 33.1.10.1 EER 90-0199 discussed separation violations between cables connectmg from H12-P614 to the ERFIS MUX cabinets that were identified by NCR A 90-010, 33.1.10.2 These cables will be removed within the wope of this project and will be replaced by appropriately separated ones.
33.1.10.3 nis Design Feedback Item should be updated in conjunction with this project.
34.0 CP&L/ General Electric Design interface 34.1 The design responsibility for this project will be shared between CP&UNED and General Electric.
He GE involvement is defined and authorued in accordance with Purchase Order 576260M CD and.
Work Authorization ZS70020052. An overview of the design scope responsibility division foilows:
34.1.1 General Electric responsibilities:
34.1.1.1 Design and Performance Specification for the NUMAC leak Detection Monitor system.
34.1.1.2 System User's Manual.
34.1.1.3 NUMAC Leak Detection Monitor Drawings. .
34.1.1.4 Draft Plant Modification Package, consisting of:
34.1.1.4.1 Replacement drawings for the Steam Leak Detection ystem Elementary-Diagram.
34.1.1.4.2 Replacement drawings for the H12 P614 Cabinet Arrangement.
34.1.1.4.3 Markups of all other affected Elementary Diagrams (HPCI, RCIC, RWCU).
34.1.1.4.4 Draft installation instruction.
34.1.1.4.5 Draft testing instructions.
34.1.1.5 ' Red Book' seimic report of the H12 P614 control room panel configuration that will exist after completion of the NUMAC hardware. His report shall document the analysis model, assumptions, techniques, and results in sufficient detail that CP&L may utilize this report as the basis for future calculations that may be -
necessary regarding H12-P614.
34.1.1.6 Revise GE specification 22A3010 to clarify the applicable separation criteria for the HPCI and RCIC PCIS valves and control logic.
34.1.1.7 Internal Design Verification for all above tasks.
34.1.2 CP&ldNED 34.1.2.1 Develop the Project Design Basis Document 34.1.2.2 Develop all non-GE scope design 34.1.2.3 ' Owner's Review' of GE acope products 34.1.2.4 Design Verification of of NED design scope.
34.1.2.5 Develop and Release the Plant Modification package for BNP review and approval-ATTACHMENTS LIST:
Attwhimmt 1: BNP 1&C
- Maintenance Review of G0051 A (Project Plan)* 12/23/90
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