ML20127G623
| ML20127G623 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 06/19/1985 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1422, NUDOCS 8506260001 | |
| Download: ML20127G623 (200) | |
Text
ORIGINAL dS5 """
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L.)
In the matter of:
ADVISORY COMMIyTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS Subcommittee of the Systematic Evaluation Program (San Onofre)
Docket No.
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Location: Washington, D. C.
Date: Wednesday, June 19, 1985 Pages: 1 - 167
\0
)-4 ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters
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\ 1625 I St., N.W.
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\ Washington, D.C. 20006 d,\ g.
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! jueWalsn 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR S AFEGUARDS 3
4 5 Subcommittee of.the
' Systematic Evaluation Program.
6 (San Onofre) 7 8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N. W.
9 Room 1046 Washington, D. C.
10 Wednesday, June 19, 1985 11 12 13 The meeting of the Subcommittee on San Onofre 14 Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, convened at 8:30 a.m. ,
is C. P. Siess, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
16 17 PRESENT FOR THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE :
is C. P. Siess, Chairman David A. Ward 19 Charles J. Wylie 20 DESIGNATED FEDERAL EMPLOYEE:
21 Herman Alderman 22 23 24 25 O
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1 PRggEEpigg{
2 MR. SIESS: I-am going to take judicial notice 3 that it is 8:30. The meeting will now come to order.
4 This is an open meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee 5 on the Systematic Evaluation Program. And I might add that 6 this will be the last meeting of the Subcommittee on the 7 Systematic Evaluation Program, because the follow-ups will a now be handled by the Plant Subcommittees, assuming there 9 are follow-ups. And, as we have already agreed, FTOL con-10 versions will be handled by the Plant Subcommittee.
11 I am C. P. Siess, Chairman of the Systematic 12 Evaluation Program Subcommittee, and there are two other 13 ACRS members present, David Ward and Charlie Wylie.
14 The purpose of this meeting is to review the 15 Integrated Plant Safety Analysis Report for San Onofre 16 Unit 1.
17 The assigned ACRS Staff member for the meeting 18 is IIerman Alderman, who is seated on my right.
19 A transcript is being kept, so I request that 20 each speaker first identify himself or herself so that your 21 name will be on the record. And I think everybody that will 22 be speaking is at the table. There are microphones at each 23 place. And if anybody is behind, they can sit over at that 24 tabic and use the microphone.
25 We have received no written statements from O
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(T g / 1 members of the public. And we have received no requests 4
2 for time to make oral statements from members of the public.
3 Dave, I think you have been through one of 4 these, haven' t you?
5 MR. WARD: Yes.
6 MR. SIESS: Charlie, you haven' t. It's almos t 7 a ritual, at least in the beginning. And I think I will a let the staff give us a little bit of that illumination 9 process and a little bit of the history just for the to record and for Mr. Wylie's benefit.
11 You may have read the first part of the report 12 there.
13 MR. WYLIE: Yes.
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\/ I4 MR. SIESS: But it has been our practice in the 15 past to concentrate on those items that did undergo the 16 integrated assessment and to look a little bit, as the case 17 may be, at how the limited PRA was used.
18 I assume the technique was the same as we have 19 seen on several of the others. But we don' t rule out 20 1 coking at those items that were satisfied on some other 21 basis, although most of those are f airly clean-cut and af ter 22 nine previous plants we have gotten the feel for those.
23 I still find the longest item under the integrat-24 ed assessment as GDC 54, 55, 56 and 57, as usual containment 25 isolvation valves which seems to get resolved the same ways.
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1 We've got the basis for a new set of GDC's ,
2 haven' t we? I don' t think there is a single plant that 3 didn' t have a number of those items.
4 MR. GRIMES : That's correct.
5 MR. SIESS: Incidently, every time I look at 6 that now I keep trying to look at containment isolation 7 valves in the context of a severe accident rather than the 8 LOCA. And I'm having a great deal of dif ficulty orienting 9 myself to containment leakage and a LOCA versus releases 10 and a severe accident.
11 But that's not a new situation. We reviewed a 12 new Appendix J last month. It's the same kind of problem. l
,-s 13 Do you have any issues you want to emphasize t /
's' 14 for the staff?
15 MR. WARD: I don't.
16 MR. SIESS: Charlie, anything in particular?
17 MR. WYLIE: No.
18 MR. SIE3S: Interrupt at any time. Chris, we 19 will turn it over to you.
20 MR. GRIMES : Thank you, Dr. Siess. My name is 21 Christopher Grimes. I am the Chief of the Systematic 22 Evaluation Program Branch.
23 And I have with me today to make the presenta-24 tions on the results of the integrated assessment for San 25 Onof re Unit 1, to my immediate right, Eileen McKenna, who (v
4
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(/ 1 is the Integrated Assessment Project Manager for San Onofre 2 Unit 1. To her right is WadterPaulson, who is the Operating 3 Reactors Project Manager at San Onofre Unit 1. To his right 4 is Richard Dudley, who will become the San Onofre Operating 5 Reactors Project Manager. There is a transition, Walt to 6 Dick, that is taking place right now.
7 MR. SIESS: The Project Manager is a dif ferent 8 Branch than SEP?
9 MR. GRIMES : That 's correct. They are in Operat-
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10 ing Reactors Branch 5.
11 MR. SIESS: 5.
12 MR. GRIMES : Eileen works with me in the Systema-
/~% 13 tic Evaluations Program Branch, and we both work for Mr.
Id Crutchfield who is the Assistant Director for Safety As-15 sessment.
16 MR. SIESS: Is this the first one you have done, 17 Eileen?
18 MS. MC KENNA: Yes.
19 MR. GRIMES: This has always been Eileen's project .
20 I have managed to hold on to her to this bitter end.
21 MR. SIESS: She has made a career of it.
22 (Laughter.)
23 MR. GRIMES: As an aside, Eileen got her Grade 15 24 in a competitive selection by the Operating Reactors Assess-25 ment Branch, and I managed to steal her back long enough to
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2 MR. SIESS: Which Branch?
3 MR. GRIMES : Operating Reactors Assessment Branch.
4 Jerry Hollahand's SWAT team.
5 We will go through our standard presentation, 6 focusing first on the results of the topic reviews for the 7 hundred and thirty-seven topics that were evaluated in SEP.
8 And then we will get into the results of the 9 integrated assessment.
10 ' MR. SIESS: First, let me say something to the 11 Subcommittee members. For the Full Committee, Chris usually 12 has a slide listing the items and then he has backup slides 7s la for each item explaining what the issue is and the resolu-t T
'- 14 tion of it.
15 And for the Full Committee meeting, the ones we 16 have done in the past is put that list up on the screen and 17 he made a few comments about each one and asked the members la if they wanted more information. Then, if they did we would 19 go back to the more detailed slide.
20 So, I think one thing we need to watch for here 21 is items that we would like to call to the attention of the 22 Full Committee. Now, my feeling would be that some of the 23 items are so similar to previous plants that the lack of 24 agreement with current specs or current regulations and the 25 resolution are so similar that if we could just say that, nv
7
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(_,) I it would help. But there are some unique ones here, the 2 salt water cooling system is certainly unique to San Onofre.
3 Juul then we have got to decide what we want to do about the 4 seismic issue.
5 ,
We did not take that to the Full Committee. There 6 was a Subcommittee on the seismic thing and got a complete 7 rundown on it. And since then, San Onofre sent in a plan 8 which the staf f is still reviewing.
9 MR. GRIMES : That's correct.
10 MR. SIESS: But, the seismic issue we do want, 11 at least, understand where it stands.
12 MR. GRIMES : We have made it a separate agenda 13 topic for today.
0 14 MR. SIESS: Yes.
15 MR. GRIMES : he are going to update you in terms 16 of the results of our revicw as far as the proposed plan 17 for long term service. They refer to it as a long term 18 service plan to be distinguished from a return-to-service l' plan that we talked about when we met with you in November.
20 MR. SIESS: Return-to-service is more limited 21 and the number of systems that were covered.
22 MR. GRIMES: That's correct.
23 MR. SIESS: And this is the additional systems.
24 MR. GRIMES: That's correct. And we will update 25 you on that. Today, Tom chang is going to give a presentatio n O
8
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i on that, the status of our review. And based on that pre-2 sentation, you can tell us to what extent you want that a covered with the Full Committee.
4 MR. SIESS: Okay.
5 MR. GRIMES: With that introduction, I would like 6 to turn the meeting over to Mark Medford to give you a brief 7 description of the plant and an overview of SCE's activities a before we get into the results of the integrated assessment.
9 MR. SIESS: Okay. That's a good idea.
10 MR. GRIMES : Mr. Medford. l 11 MR. MEDFORD: Thank you, Chris. Before I make 12 a presentation, I would like to introduce the people with 13 us today.
14 On my left is Ken Baskin, Vice President, Nuclear 15 Engineerging Safety and Licensing for Southern California .
16 Edison. On my right is Jack Rainsberry, who is the Super-17 vising Engineer for Unit i licensing for SCE. On his right 18 is Mike Short who is the Unit 1 Project Manager for SCE.
19 Also with us are Jerry !!ammond of the Unit 1 20 licensing group, again for SCE. And Tom Phillips , represent-21 ing San Diego Gas and Electric.
22 MR. SIESS: Thank you.
23 MR. MEDFORD: I know that some of you have been 24 to San Onofre. l 25 (Slide.) l O :
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'v) 1 This is a picture of Unit 1 as it looked when 2 initially constructed in the early 1970s.
3 (Slide.)
4 I am going to cover five topics today. A very 5 brief discussion of the plant history, a discussion of the 6 plant characteristics , the unique design aspects. I will 7 discuss the major outages which we have experienced on the 8 plant. And finally, a brief discussion on the unit capacity 9 factors.
10 (slide,)
11 Unit 1 is co-owned by SCE, which owns eighty per-12 cent; and, San Diego Gas and Electric, which owns twenty 13 percent.
id Southern California Edison is the operator. It is is located five miles south of San Clemente, or approximately 16 halfway between the cities of Los Angeles and San Diego on 17 the Southern California coast.
18 We applied to the AEC for a construction permit --
l 19 I don't believe it was called that at that time -- in February 20 1st, 1963. The construction started approximately one and one 21 half years later, July 15th,1964.
22 The provisional operating license was issued 23 March 27th, 1967. And the plant entered commercial operation 24 In 1976, we concluded a then record two January 1st, 1968.
25 hundred and eighteen consecutive days of operation.
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2 The licensed thermal power rating is 1347.
3 The approximate electrical capacity is 450 megawatts. It 4 is a three loop Westinghouse NSSS.
5 The architect / engineer was Bechtel Power. The 6 fuel is stainless fuel clad. The ultimate heat sink is 7 the Pacific Ocean.
8 The emergency AC power system, which as you will 9 see a little bit later, was installed in 1976. They are 10 redundant diesel generators.
11 The emergency core cooling system consists of 12 redundant low pressure safety injection trains and redundant gw ,
13 high pressure charging pumps.
V 14 The core average temperature is 550 degrees 15 Fahrenheit. And the operating pressure is 2050.
16 MR. SIESS: You are sticking with stainless 17 clad?
- 18 MR. MCDFORD: Yes, we are.
19 MR. SIESS: You are getting your fuel still from 20 Westinghouse?
21 MR. MEDFORD : Yes.
l 22 (slide,) ,
l 23 There are two major unique design characteristics 24 of the plant. One is that the safety injection system, as 25 initially designed, involves a transfer of the feed system O
11 (3 ~
i,s_,) i from the feed function to the safety injection function.
2 There have been a number of modifications to the system 3 through the years, principally involving the valves which 4 ef fect this transfer.
5 We have in our mod backfit plan a modification to 6 the system, not at the next refueling outage but at the one 7 af ter that, which would create an independent feed system.
8 The existing system will remain as a safety injection system.
9 Also, on the steam system, there are no main steam 10 stop valves. The accident analyses have been performed to 11 demonstrate acceptable consequences from a main steam line
'2 break without steam stops.
13 (Slide.)
(
' 14 As you can see, this plant has undergone a number 15 of fairly substantial outages through its history. In 1976-16 ' 77, we installed the diesel generators.
17 You will note the capacity there of 6 megawatts.
18 The diesels are actually rated at almost 9 megawatts. We 19 rely on only 6.
20 The sphere enclosure project was accomplished dur-21 ing that same outage. It was a result of a reduction and the 22 extent of the exclusionary boundary associated with the licen n-23 ing of San onofre Units 2 and 3.
24 MR. SIESS: That's the beach area?
25 MR. MEDFORD: That's correct.
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( ) i MR. SIESS: The beach is open.
2 MR. MEDFO RD : Yeah. The issue was the degree of 3 control that we have over the State beach areas which are 4 immediately up coast and down coast from the plant.
5 MR. SIESS: Is the bea'ch right opposite the plant e open to the public?
7 MR. MEDFORD: No. There is a transit. There is a what we call a beach walkway. But the seaward side of the 9 beach walkway is fenced, and then at either end of the beach to walkway that fence runs perpendicular into the ocean.
it It would be possible for someone to swim around 12 and come up. But there are signs marking that area, that 13 it is not to be inhabited. And also our security personnel 14 warn people who venture into the area.
15 MR. SIESS: The --
16 MR. MEDFORD: To my knowledge -- I'm sorry.
17 MR. SIESS : The question was exposure from thine, is wasn't it?
19 MR. MEDFORD: That's correct.
20 MR. SIESS: Yeah.
21 MR. MEDFORD: In 1980 '81, we conducted a sleev-22 ing project for approximately half of the tubes in the three 23 steam generators to mitigate the effects of intergranular 24 attack.
25 MR. SIESS : What's your tube material?
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s_j i MR. MEDFORD : Jack?
2 MR. RAINSBERRY : Incono.
- 3 MR. SIESS
- Incono.
4 MR. GRIMES : That was Jack Rainsberry.
5 MR. MEDFORD : And in 1982, February of 1982, we 6 initiated an outage which was primarily to accomplish TMI 7 modifications and some fire protection modifications. During 8 the course of that outage, we were also required to install 9 or to -- excuse me, to accomplish partial backfitting of the 10 plant, upgrading the plant to two-thirds G.
11 That outage was concluded in November of 1984.
12 MR. SIESS: There is one thing about this plant 13 that interests me, and that is in spite of its age it has l ,
l id a radial turbine orientation, which is not true for Units 15 I 2 and 3.
16 MR. MEDFORD's The reason why 2 and 3 don't have l 37 the radial turbine orientation is the size of the site.
18 MR. SIESS: Yes.
l
( 19 MR. MEDFORD: For that reason, and that reason 20 alone, dictated the orientation that we have.
21 MR. SIESS: But to compensate, they've got a 22 lot of stuf f out in the open.
23 (Laughte r. )
24 MR. MEDFORD: Although less as the years go by.
25 (Slide.)
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b,O 3 On this slide, I show several representative 2 capacity factors. The cumulative capacity factor prior 3 to the 1980 steam generator outage was seventy-two percent.
4 It was a good performing plant.
5 The cumulative capacity factor to date, because 6 of the two long outages, the sleeving outage and the seismic
. 7 backfit outage, is now fif ty-two point eight percent.
8 I think that the eighty-one percent capacity factor, 9 which we have achieved since the November 27th return-to-10 service date, is indicative of what the plant can do.
II MR. SIESS: Do you have loop isolation valves?
12 No.
MR. MEDFORD :
13 (Slide.)
' id This slide presents the capacity factor informa-15 As you can see, over the tion in a slightly different way.
16 Carly years there was a very good capacity factor achieved, 17 oven with the standby power additions of 1976-77 time frame.
18 And it was in the 1980-84 time frame which we l'
begin to experience difficulty.
20 For contrast, I would like once again to put up 21 this picture of what the unit looked like in the late 1960s 22 l and early 1970s.
23 l (Slide.)
24 And by contrast, just to show you what the plant 25 j looks like day.
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15
-'l (Slide.)
2 This is the sphere enclosure project. And with 3 that, I will turn it back over to Chris.
4 MR. SIESS: Thank you. Any questions?
5 (No reply.)
6 MR. GRIMES : Dr. Siess , if there are no questions 7 for SCE, then I will ask Eileen McKenna to give a presenta-8 tion on the results of the SEP review and the subsequent 9 integrated assessment for San Onofre Unit 1.
10 MR. SIESS: Okay.
11 MR. GRIMES : While Ms. McKenna is getting pre-12 pared, I will point out that the slides that are being hand-13 ed out right now are organized. As we have in the past, the 14 basic presentation slides are in the front and then the A 15 tailed slides for each of the integrated assessment subjet to is behind the colored page in your handouts.
17 MR. SIESS: Ukay. And, then again for the benefit 18 of the Subcommittee the staff has usually divided the fixes l' into hardware changes and procedural or tech spec changes.
20 And made a separate list for those. Those are separated I 21 believe.
22 MR. GRIMES : Yes, sir.
23 MR. SIESS: Okay, Eileen.
24 MS . MC KENN A : Okay. Good morning. My name is 2$ Eileen McKenna. I am the Integrated Assessment Project O
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'NsI I Manager at San Onofre Unit 1.
2 (Slide.)
3 First, I am going to put up a slide to give an d First, we will outline of how we intend to proceed today.
5 be looking at a summary of the various topics and issues.
6 A little later this morning, we will have a presentation on l
7 ;
the application of the PRA.
8 We will have a presentation by Tom Cheng on 9 the seismic upgrade program status and review.
30 And then we will go into the specific areas of
'I the integrated assessment and the dif ferent categories , the 12 ones where no action -- no further action was required, those I3
("'g that are procedural or tech spec changes, those where there V Id was hardware modifications and those which are still under is evaluation.
16 The last bullet is an area where a couple of
'7 issues that we would like to discuss in a little more detail.
'8 And then we have conclusions.
I' (Slide.) !
20 This slide summarizes the status and disposi-21 tion of the hundred and thirty-seven topics. There were 22 twenty-four topics that were deleted, as they were generic, -
23 either a USI or TMI action plan item was covering them. l 24 There were twenty-four that vare deleted on 25 a plant specific basis, that they were a boiling water topic, !
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( ,) i for instance. So that lef t a total of eighty-nine topics 2 that we looked at. And of those, during the topic review a fif ty-three were found to be acceptable, which lef t thirty-4 six to be addressed in the integrated assessment.
5i And of those, we subdivided them into various 6 issues under the different topics. And I counted a total of 7 eighty-six.
I 8J MR. SIESS: I didn' t count this time.
9 (Laughte r. )
10 MS. MC KENNA: Oh, okay. It is always depending it on how --
12 MR. SIESS: Ye ah .
- 13 MS. MC KENNA: -- you count them, you get a t )
\/ 14 slightly dif ferent number.
15 MR. SIESS: Of the generic topics deleted, does 16 that include Appendix R?
17 MS. MC KENNA: No. We didn't delete them.
18 MR. SIESS: You didn't?
19 FG . MC KENNA: And I will get into that a little 20 later.
21 MR. SIESS: Is -- because it effected too many 22 other things?
23 MS. MC KENNA: Yes , that's right.
24 MR. SIESS: That is, the Appendix P fixes were 25 integrated with the others?
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1a 1 MS. MC KENNA: Yes. Typically, the ones that were 2 deleted were the USI and the TMI, rather the fire protection 3 would all be multi-plan action items.
4 MR. SIESS: I notice a couple of TMI items got 5 mentioned in the lis t somewhere.
6 MS. MC KENNA: Yeah. We are not totslly --
7 MR. SIESS: Sometimes the --
8 MS. MC KENNA: -- clearcut.
9 MR. SIESS: -- fixes overlap.
10 MS. MC KENNA: Ye ah .
1I MR. GRIMES: Dr. Siess, I would like to point out 12 that we did not conduct the Appendix R review, nor did we 13 conduct the review for the TMI modifications.
14 But, wherever there was an interrelationship 15 with the two topics, we tried to accommodate that in the 16 relationship. And when we go through and discuss the re-17 solution of some of these issues we will point out where 18 we interface with some of those other reviews.
19 MR. SICSS: Does San Onof re have a living 20 schedule?
21 MR. GRIMES: Yes, sir. They have proposed a 22 living schedule.
23 MR. SIESS: With TMI items and SEP.
24 MR. GRIMES : That's correct.
25 MR. SIESS: Now, the combination of a living O
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I schedule and the SEP review seems to me to get awful close 2 to IS AP .
3 MR. GRIMES: Close. We did not judge in the 4 integrated assessment the specific corrective actions re-5 sulting from a TMI accident plan requirement or Appendix R 6 or any of the other,. or the multi-plan action review. That 7 would have Constituted an approach like ISAP.
8 MR. SIESS: Uh-huh.
9 MR. GRIMES: This is sort of like the Big Rock 10 approach where we tried to pick up those other things. It's 11 not quite what we achieved on Big Rock, but it is, as you 12 said, close to what we would hope to achieve in IS AP.
-w 13 MR. SIESS: But you didn't ignore, say, an
14 Appendix R change that would impact some SEP item?
15 MR. GRIMES : We didn' t ignore that, no.
16 MR. SIESS: You integrated where it was clearly 17 pertinent?
18 MR. GRIMES : If we felt that corrective actions 19 proposed for Appendix R or for any of the TMI modifications 20 could resolve the issues raised in the SEP topic assess-21 ments, then we tried to take advantage of those.
22 (Slide.)
23 MS. MC KENNA: I will just put these up if any-2d body has any questions on specific issues. This is the 25 list of those that I call generic, where wo have, you see, i
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20
() i ~ TMI and USI items. They overlap.
2 MR. SIESS: These are items, these are topics?
3 MS. MC KENNA: These are topics. The topic 4 numbers are listed on the side and then either the USI or
$_ TMI items that correspond to it. As an example, water 6 hammer, V-13, which was also USI A-1, so we did not look 7 at water hammer in the SEP.
e There is certainly some overlap. Down here, 9 there is an item-listed here in control room habitability, 10 which is listed here. But as you probably noticed going it through the IPSAR, we did get into that as well in SEP, 12 because there were some areas where there was overlap.
f-s ,
13 (Slide.)
\/ 14 This is the list of the plant specific issues.
15 You see, most of them are PWR type issues. Or, for instance ,
16 there is the ef fect of PWR loop isolation valve. Since 17 the plant does not havs loop isolation valves, it's not t
is applicable.
19 A Couple of these, down here on the radiological 20 monitoring systems , they are being handled under other 1
21 staf f programs. They were not looked at under SEP. !
22 (Slide.) .
23 I've put up next a list of the topics that 24 were -- and this is a three-page list. I will put up the 25 first page for a moment. Of those topics that were reviewed O
21 l
7" j y 1 ~ in the SEP but during the topic review were found to be 2 acceptable and there were no open items for further 3 evaluation in the integrated assessment.
4 MR. SIESS: Which -- there is a note that says:
5 5 These topics are identified by as'terisks. .
6 MS. MC KENNA: Yeah. These were a question of 7 whether they met current criteria or acceptable on another 8 defined basis.
9 MR. GRIMES: Dr. Siess , if you will recall, 10 there --
l 11 MR. SIESS: What does the asterisk refer to?
12 MS. MC KENNA: Oh, okay. We have --
13 MR. SIESS: Other defined basis?
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16 MR. 31EsS : - Okay. It's not' clear. -
- s 17 MS. MC KENNA:, OkEy. Sorry. , ,[
w l 18 . MR. SIESS: Only one asterisk in the,whole -- .
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.MS.~.MC kENNA:- Thehe are 'a couple of orAss.
,, n 20 The tectonic', th'e'seismi~ city -- .*
21 MR. SISGS: Oh,Ybah. Historical --
22 MS. MC1:ENNA: The areas that were really the s .
23 main areact-- ,
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\/ 1 MS. MC KENNA: Well, we used a lot of the 2 and 3 2 information within the geological area, but there was a 3 site specific spectra developed.
4 MR. SIESS: Okay. This is the basis for the 5 site specific spectra that is .67?
6 MR. GRIMES : That's correct. If you recall, 7 the design basis for San Onofre Units 2 and 3 was .67 G 8 . modifiedNEW MARK spectra. For San Onofre Unit 1, they 9 applied the uniform hazard methodology described in NUREG 10 CR-0098 to develop a site specific spectra for the San 11 Onofre Unit 1 reevaluation.
12 MR. SIESS: I forget how much dif ference , but I 13
' /~N can' t get excited.
b 14 I remember where the .67 came from. Halfway is between the staf f and the applicant --
16 MR. B ASKIN : Actually , two-thirds --
17 MR. SIESS: As I recall, the applicant wanted 18 .5 and the staff wanted .75 and the ACRS suggested .67.
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19 And so I think we are responsible for the .67.
20 MR. WARD: Profound.
21 I think I can find the letter that MR. SIESS:
22 says it. It wasn' t as arbitrary as averaging. We did have 23 some pretty good geological / seismological consultants that 24 could not buy the .75 at San Onofre.
25 MR. B ASKIN : My point was that .6 7 isn ' t halfway ,
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2 MR. SIESS: No, no.
3 MR. B ASKIN: It's towards the upper end.
4 MR. SIESS: That figures.
5 (Laughte r. )
6 (Slide.)
7 MS. MC KENNA: This slide is a continuation of 8 the topics that were completed during the review, the topic 9 review.
10 MR. SIESS: Wait a minute. Which, that was the 11 second page?
12 MS. MC KENNA: The second page of the topics.
13 MR. SIESS: Now, if anybody on the Committee wants b("'N Id to look at some of those, as to how they met current criteria, 15 I'm sure the staf f will be willing to address this.
16 MR. GRIMES : I believe , Dr. Siess , that we have 17 also provided copies of all of the topic SERs so that you 18 would have them available to you.
19 MR. SIESS: Yes, drse have been available for 20 some of us, but it would be unrealistic to assume they have 21 been read.
22 (Laughter . )
23 MR. GRIMES : I didn't mean to suggest that.
24 MR. WARD: I mean, what is -- can you tell me 25 what Topic XV-20 is there , the radiological --
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1 MS. MC KENNA: All right. This is the fuel 2
handling kind of accidents, where in the process of refuel-3 ing, removing the fuel and it drops or something drops off 4
of them and whether that meets current criteria for of f-5 site --
6 MR. SIESS: That's a Chapter 15.
7 MS. MC KENNA: Yes , that's a Chapter 15.
8 MR. SIESS: What was the original Assue on it?
9 MS. MC KENNA: I'm sorry? On all these Chapter i
10 15 topics --
11 MR. SIESS: That was looked at and met?
12 MS. MC KENNA: Yes. In fact, on the radiological 13 f-~g topics, the staff did some independent calculations of what
\~] Id the consequences would be.
15 And, let's see , I may have here -- I don ' t happen 16' to have the results of that one.
37 MR. SIESS: It met the criteria.
18 MS. MC KENNA: It met the criteria. Yes.
19 MR. SIESS: And the only ones that met it on 20 another defined basis were the two seismicity and that was the 21 uniform hazards thing?
22 MS. MC KENNA: Right.
23 MR. SIESS: A pretty good list.
24 MS. MC KENNA: I think'that is fairly typical of 25 l previous reviews, as well.
i Ob
'~
25
/~T _
V 1 (Slide.)
2 I put together a section at this point to 3 describe some of the modifications that were made to plant 4 that were related to SEP topics that has already been com-5 pleted before the integrated assessment was done.
6 Mark mentioned some of the plant modifications.
7 These are ones that are closely tied to the particular 8 issues.
9 (Slide.)
10 The first two items relate to the seismic re-11 evaluation program that has been ongoing. An upgrade to 12 structure and equipment for the .67 G modified Housner f-%s ,31 event. I believe at the November meeting we discussed a t .
14 little bit the issue of the soils in certain areas, that 15 there was a modification made under some pieces of equipment 16 to span the backfill soil.
17 MR. SIESS: Eileen, I believe there is a state-18 ment that none of these modifications completely resolve 19 the issue.
20 MS. MC KENNA: That's right.
21 MR. SIESS: I know that on the first two they 22 are still open items.
23 MS. MC KENNA: Yes. In the others , the topic 24 may have had several sub-issues and while this item might 25 have --
O
1 26 i
l
/~'s _
h I !!R. SIESS: Involved resolved issues but not the conplete 2 topic, that's the distinction?
3 MS. MC KENNA: Yes.
4 MR. WARD: On the seismic reevaluation, if the --
5 I mean, the modified Housner spectrum was used and that's 6 a less, I guess one way of putting it, rigorous spectrum 7 than the reg guide spectrum; is that right?
8 MS. MC KENNA: I believe that would be -- yes --
9 a fair way to characterize that.
10 MR. WARD: So the combination of -- what was the - -
11 what was the basis for that? Was there some specific in-12 formation that --
<x 13 MR. GRIMES : Mr. Ward, the seismic reviews, the 14 site specific reviews, to develop site specifics spectra for 15 SEP were generally conducted the same way they are for a 16 new plant.
17 Wherever there was an opportunity to take advantage 18 of the statistical variation and the geological features ,
19 there was an approach to a best estimate as opposed to 20 conservative bounds on the energy content of the earthquake 21 question.
22 There is a fairly substantial record that supports 23 this seismic design basis for Units 2 and 3. And we added 24 to that an additional detailed review of the site characteris-25 tics in order to come up with this modified Housner spectrum, nv
27 e' _
k ,T) i MR. WARD: Okay. Well, was this same spectra 2- used for Units 2 and 3?
3 MR. GRIMES : No. For San Onofre Units 2 and 3 4 design basis was . 6 7 G modi fied NEW MARK .
5 At specific frequencies, there can be large 6 dif ferences but on the whole there is less energy in the 7 modified Housner than there is on the modified --
8 MR. SIESS: The reasoning is that for a re-9 review in using site specific uniform hazards spectra, io you have used that on all the SEPs , as I recall.
11 MR. GRIMES : That's correct.
12 MR. SIESS: Which is more of a best estimate, s 13 and somewhat less conservative than what you would do if
\- 14 you were designing the plant new.
15 MR. GRIMES: Correct.
16 MR. SIESS: Okay. That's what it amounts to.
17 MR. WARD: All right.
18 MR. SIESS: Less , but probably acceptable.
19 But new plants are using uniform hazards or reg guide?
20 MR. GRIMES: New plants use the reg guides.
21 MR. SIESS: What would you do for a new applica-22 tion?
23 MR. GRIMES : For a new application, we would 24 likely develop a site specific spectra that is more conser-25 vative , that is greater than the 84th percentile.
O L) .
28 1 73 _
b I But I would like to point out that in OL applica-2 tions, there has been a trend towards going to the uniform 3
hazards methodology that we've had, looked to a best estimate d
- of the driving force and then try and demonstrate the code 5
margins and the actual response of the structured systems 6
encompassed.
7 MR. SIESS: I'm getting ahead. But in the seismic 8
re-review with the new spectra, are they taking advantage 9
of the PVRC damping factors?
10 MR. GRIMES: We will get into that. Yes.
Il MR. SIESS: Which would probably more than 12 offset any difference in spectra?
13 Q
MR. GRIMES : Why don ' t you wait until we get 14 into that part of the presentation?
15 MR. SIESS: Right.
16 MR. MEDFORD: Dr. Siess, this is Mark Medford.
I' I would like to mention one thing.
'8 In a high seismic area -- excuse me, in a site that has a high seismic design, as does this, the benefits 20 derived from very extensive site specific reviews , including 21 the response spectrum, the benefits to design are warranted, 22 whereas for a site with a .1 or .2 G zero period accelera-23 tion going through that same effort may not be worthwhile.
24 That's one of the reasons why for both of these 25 projects, Unit 1 and 2 and 3, we have site specific response
,C
29 7-(,) i ~ methods.
2 MR, SIESS: Okay. We will come back to seismic.
3 Go ahead.
4 MS. MC KENNA: Okay. A couple of other areas 5 would be either physical plant modifications or tech spec 6 or procedural issues, changes were made.
7 For instance , we have containment coatings ,
8 organic materials inside containment. During the last 9 outage, there was an inspection and where necessary touch-io up of the paint in certain areas.
11 And in the integrated assessment itself, we talk 12 about periodic inspection program for -- or reinspection f-4 13 program to confirm that they maintained --
t 3-
14 MR. SIESS: Are there lessons to be learned on is that paint business? Here is a plant sixteen years old.
16 Is this just aging effects or --
17 bE . MC KENNA: Maybe somebody who was --
18 MR. GRIMES: Dr. Siess , I think the biggest 19 lesson to be learned is that the documentation trail to 20 establish the qualification and condition of coatings could 21 have been better and it would have resolved a lot of problems 22 that came up as questions were raised.
23 In most cases, on all of the SEP plants the issue 24 has been whether or not the coating will survive the accident 25 environment. And in trying to reassemble a basis to draw l (3 O
l l
l -
30 b
~
i that conclusion, where we could not establish direct docu-2 mentation that the coatings were qualified then we looked !
3 to inspection programs to check the condition of the coat-4 ings and to try and establish their type for the purpose 5 of developing a qualification.
6 MR. SIESS: There wasn't any deterioration of 7 the paint?
8 MR. GRIMES: Deterioration of the paint is 9 involved in the inspection process from the standpoint of to whether or not the procedures establish appropriate repair 11 procedures for coatings that are flaking away or --
12 MR. SIESS: But was there any paint flaking 13 away?
14 MR. GRIMES : Jack?
15 MR. RAINSBERRY: This is Jack Rainsberry. My 16 recollection of the results of our inspection we did with the 17 last outage was that it was mainly in areas where constructio n 18 type -- or just things banging into the paint, chipping 19 of that type. There was no overall case of flaking paint.
20 MR. SIESS: So the staf f concern was really what 21 happened under accident conditions, which haven't happened.
22 And as I understand it, temperatures went up, did they, on -
23 the steam line break?
24 MS. MC KENNA: I'm sorry?
25 MR. SIESS: Wasn't there a new calculation for O
i 31 I
I i
( ) i ~ temperature for main steam line break?
2 MR. GRIMES: That's correct. It establishes a a different environmental envelope for qualifying all equip-4 ment.
5 MR. SIESS: Thank you. Go ahead.
6 MS. MC KENNA: I think we had mentioned in the 7 November meeting some substantial changes to the auxiliary a feedwater system, installation of a new tank, new piping 9 from the tank to the pumps, and somewhat earlier it had to been new piping from the pumps to the feedwater lines. So, 11 that there has been a lot of modifications and upgrades to 12 the feedwater systems.
7_ 13 MR. SIESS: Now, I think I asked before, Livermore (As') 14 was supposed to do some sort of a PRA on the feedwater is system but they never did it; is that right?
16 MS. MC KENNA: That's right. They never finished 17 it.
, 18 MR. GRIMES: They did an analysis but the analysis 19 was never finished. There were some flawed assumptions at 20 the beginning of that analysis and there were some questionab le 21 areas about whether or not the analysis was conservative 22 or best estimate or substantiated.
23 And so the evaluation was started as sort of a 24 lead-in study to the TMI action plan requirements related 25 to aux feed capabilities. That basically was overwhelmed by px d
32 I
the subsequent TMI studies that eventually derived specific 7
requirements.
3 MR. SIESS: Were these changes to the aux feed-d water system probabilistically based or deterministically 5 based?
6 MR. GRIMES : My recollection is they were 7
determinis tically based. It was basically to provide an 8
aux feed capability independent of that provided by the 9
safety injection system.
10 MR. RAINSBERRY: Jack Rainsberry again. The 13 modifications to the aux feed system, while if it were 12 done this last outage were mainly to upgrade in seismic
'3 (N) t capability the suction side of the feedwater pumps and the Id feedwater pump foundations themselves.
15 In so doing, we also looked at other issues 16 related to the aux feedwater system. We put in redundant
'7 suction paths , for example, with capability of crossover
'8 to the two lines. And earlier we had also put in new discharge lines.
20 MR. SIESS: Okay.
21 MS. MC KENNA: This is an area where there is 22 certainly overlap with the TMI action plan item on aux 23 feedwater reliability. The change Jack was mentioning about 24 the suction pathways was partly out of that action.
MR. SIESS: Okay.
O V
33
(
( ,) 1 MS. MC KENNA: I mention down here on the bottom 2 about the salt water cooling system. There have been 3 some modifications made to that system, including puttdag duck 4 valves in the discharge lines and removing the air operators 5 on the valves.
6 There have been some problems with the reliability 7 of the air operators operating the system. And by instal-8 ling the check valves it's possible to remove the operators 9 from those valves.
10 (Slide.)
11 I will just mention here the switchgear and 12 cable spreading rooms. There have been new ventilation 7s 13 systems installed. This is apparently an area where in the l l
'# 14 past the room was open. There was not really a requiremen*
15 for ventilation.
16 But when fire protection came along and they 17 sealed everything up, all of a sudden you had a problem 18 under certain circumstances and you might need increased 19 ventilation. So, a new system was installed.
20 MR. SIESS: Why was it possible to remove the 21 Tsunami gates?
22 MS. MC KENNA: Okay.
23 MR. SIESS: Did Tsunami go away, or was there --
24 (Laughte r. )
25 MS. MC KENNA: I think what happened was they A
I v)
34
- L i
.r~j _
'k /
m 1 took another look at what would happen if you got a
- 2 Tsunami and balanced that against the benefits of not i
3 having the Tsunami gates there; in terms of, if you have 4 the Tsunomi, where does the water go? The f act that it's 5 not going to inundate the site and effect any safety-related 6 equipment in the buildings. There is enough drainage paths 7 for it to be accommodated.
- 8 So that it's not necessary to close the gates to '
f 9 protect the plant.
~
10 MR. GRIMES : Let me make sure that you clearly 11 understand that, becouse that question came up when we first
- 12 heard the solution to this problem that they were removing 13 the Tsunami gates. And my immediate reaction was, why did 14 you need them in the first place.
15 The original design basis would appear to have to been predicated on, l'et's try and keep the Tsunami of f the 17 site. That creates a problem with regard to the service
!. is water supply system.
19 We had done a number of -- [
l' 20 MR. SIESS: These were gates that closed of f the 21 end of the service water bay?
22 MR. GRIMES : Yes , sir, f rom the -- I can' t think
! 23 of a good way to describe it. You almost have to see it to 24 unde rs tand. The Tsunami gates would keep the water of f the l
25 site, and it also keeps the water out of the service water !
l 3
t r , ' -
wew , gww r---_.-.-.,-+.,v-,--a -,,,-..g-,m m_m,y-..p-y _,----,_.-,_,,____.ww,7, - - - , nn,.,,,,,,, - - - - , - , - - - - - ~ - ,-
35
.f
' I system, so that they remove the Tsunami gates. And in the 2 hydrologic studies of site flooding, the water level comes 3
up to a point where it does not endanger systems required d
for safe shutdoen.
5 MR. SIESS: You have a wall there , haven' t you?
6 MS. MC KENNA: There is a wall, yes .
7 MR. GRIMES: There is a seawall, yes.
8 MR. SIESS: But anything that got up to the sea-9 wall would flood the service water structure, wouldn' t it?
10 MR. GRIMES : The service water structure is on Il the inside.
12 MR. SIESS: Oh, it is on the inside of the sea-p 13 wall?
'd MR. GRIMES : Yes.
15 MR. SIESS: Okay. I'm sorry.
16 MR. GRIMES: Yes. And then there are ducts l7 that run down under the beach to the pickup point.
I8 MR. SIESS: Okay.
I' MR. GRIMES : There will be flooding of the site 20 with the Tsunami gates removed. It's just that the flood-21 ing will not endanger the safety-related systems.
22 MR. SIESS: In other words, the service water 23 structure being inside the seawall provided a path through 24 the seawall for high water. And the question was whether 25 that path would allow you to get enough water in to flood the O
r 36
(_) I site. It turns out --
2 MS. MC KENNA: I have a slide up here.
3 (Slide.)
4 This gives a little bit of --
5 MR. SIESS: You made them in color?
6 bE . MC KENNA: We didn' t have any clear ones.
7 I'm sorry. This is the seawall. The ocean is out here.
8 MR. SIESS: Go higher with the slide. Tha t 's 9 good.
10 MS. MC KENNA: Okay. The intake structure is il marked. I think these are -- are those screens that are 12 drawn on there, would you say? Or, is that really where
,e's 13 the gates are?
U 14 MR. RAINSBERRY: The gates.
15 MR. WARD: Where was the gate now?
16 MS. MC KENNA: Right here , those little boxes 17 on the intake and discharge lines. This is the seawall, 18 the ocean out here, and the intake structure is here.
19 (Pointing.)
20 The pumps sit in here. Water comes in under-21 neath.
22 MR. SIESS: It turns out that the water that 23 gets in would do less damage than inadvertent closure of 24 the gates?
25 l
MS. MC KENNA: Right.
O
37
(~
' I MR. SIESS: Okay.
2 (Slide.)
3 MS. MC KENNA: As I said, the modifications that d
have been made during the course of the SEP review. This 5 slide will show how we -- how the eighty-six issues that 6
evolved from the thirty-six topics came out.
7 There were forty-one issues based on the integrat--
8 ed assessment review determined that there were no further --.
no additional action required. There were five where there 10 were hardware modifications identified. Twelve with pro-
" cedural or tach spec changes. Twenty-six which fall under 12 the further evaluation category. And these two that we will 13 q discuss a little more this af ternoon.
D 14 MR. SIESS: The five with hardware, does that is include all the seismic?
16 MS. MC KENNA: The seismic at this point is
'7 listed under the further evaluation, because we have not is identified the specific modifications. We know basically I'
what kinds of things they are going to be but have not 20 lis ted --
21 MR. SIESS: There must have been some hardware 22 modifications made under the return-to-service.
23 MS. MC KENNA: That's right. That's what I 24 showed you on the previous lines.
MR. SIESS: Right.
O
38
()
(,,/ 1 MR. GRIMES: When the Commission first establish-2 ed SEP, they required that as things were resolved during 3 the course of topic evaluation we had to keep track of those 4 so that our conclusions were not -- did not reflect all of the 5 ef fort that went into the project and that we didn' t vary 6 conclusions like fixing things on the topic evaluation.
7 And in the San Onofre seismic review, I think 8 that it has been clear to all who followed what we have been 9 doing, there has been a lot of ongoing plant modifications lo to the seismic and there will be more before it's finished.
il But in terms of the way that we have categorized 12 these things, in order to keep the bookkeeping straight rx 13 because there is still a lot of analysis associated with b Id seismic, we put in the further evaluation category for is convenience.
16 MR. SIESS: Yeah.
17 MR. WARD: Other than the seismic, are those 18 twenty-six for further evaluation, are those likely to --
19 are most of those involved with plant modification, hard-20 warc?
21 MS. MC KENNA: At least some of them I expect 22 will. For instance, wind and tornado loads is one of the 23 areas under further evaluation.
24 MR. SIESS: Tornado missiles may well --
25 MS. MC KENNA: At the moment, we have tornado
39 g
(,) i ~ missiles down here because we want to talk about that a 2 little more this af ternoon. But that's another area 3 certainly where it may be plant modifications here.
4 And, then I might point out, too, on some of 5 these further evaluations there are areas where licensee 6 has provided an analysis to the staff. But the staf f hasn' t 7 finished its review yet.
8 These also fall in that category. And in some 9 of those, if the staff reaches the same conclusion as the io licensee there would not be any modifications. So that there ii is sort of a mixed bag. Some will expect modifications and 12 others won't.
i3 MR. SIESS: When something requires a tech spec
[s)
\~ / 14 change, is the SEP program working with the tech spec improve-is ment program at all?
16 Or, are you guys putting in tech spec items that 17 they are going to come along and take out later?
18 MR. GRIMES: The tech spec improvement program 19 basically was started af ter we finished nine of the ten plants .
20 We have tried to work with them to identify areas where we 21 think toch specs can be improved.
22 In general, whenever an issue was identified 23 during the course of the SEP topic reviews , where the staf f 24 suggested that a tech spec should be required we usually 25 would resolve the issue with procedures where we could. The O
v
l 40 m
/ ~
( ,,) i only time that we recommended that tech spec changes be 2 made was in the area which involved operability of safety-3 related systems. For example, operability or surveillance 4 requirements for the reactor protection system.
5 In those cases, the resulting tech spec changes, 6 as the IPSAR points out, would not be unde until after the final 7 report is issued. In those cases , we have worked with ORB-5 a to review the proposed tech spec changes and we have tried 9 to make them consistent with the current version of the io standard tech specs where it is practic~able.
11 MR. SIESS: Since your tech spec changes were 12 evaluated on the basis of safety, they are the kind of 7-~3 13 i things that you would like to stay in tech specs, but --
14 MR. GRIMES : It's difficult now to judge what 15 the results to the tech spec improvement program might be, 16 but we have tried to concentrate on those things that would 17 ensure operability to safety systems.
18 So that we, you know, if the judgments that we 19 have put into those are good, then we vould expect the tech 20 spec improvement program would probably focus on those 21 things where we have suggested that tech spec changes should 22 be made.
23 MR. SIESS: Okay. Now, we are ready to look 24 at the individual issues?
25 MS. MCKENNA: Yes.
,q
\ h l \/
l l
t
41 I
, (Slide . )
l-2 We have -- well, anothe r --
3 MR. SIESS: I am looking for a place for a 4
bre ak , and I think this is as good a spot as any. I usually 5
- like-to have a one hour break --
6 (Laughter. ) ,
7 i Af ter one hour.
8 (Laughte r. )
Come back in about ten minutes.
10 l (Whereupon, a recess is taken at 9 :25 a.m. ,
Il to reconvene at 9 :47 a.m. , this same day.)
12 MR. SIESS: All right. Okay, Chris.
I3 p MR. GRIMES: Dr. Siess, Eileen is not going to 14 go through the list of issues that were addressed by a 15 probabilistic risk analysis. As in the past, we have done
'6 a probabilistic risk assessment for specific issues raised
'7 in the integrated assessment, using generic insights from
'8 a probabilistic analysis.
The procedures that we used for that technique 20 are the same as we have used in the past. We have with us 21 from the staff Mark Rubin, from the Reliability and Risk Assessment Branch, who can describe the features of that 23 process. But unless you feel a need to do that, we will 24 go right into the specific issues.
25 San Onofre Unit 1 does not have a plant specific b
V
42
(,)
, ~
i PRA. And so the insights were derived on a generic basis, 2 and they are described in Appendix B to the Integrated Plant 3 Safety Assessment Repo rt.
4 MR. WARD: What was the plant, the closest plant 5 PRA that you had that you used primarily?
6 MR. GRIMES: Mr. Rubin, can you answer that 7 question?
8 MR. RUDIN: Which question?
END #1 9 MR. SIESS: What surrogate did you use?
10 MR. GRIMES: What is the closest plant, PRA, 11 that was analogous to San Onofre?
12 MR. RUBIN: Mark Rubin from the staf f. Generally ,
7s 13 the ones that were closest would be Surry. Generally, that N- 14 was it. There was no plant close to identical to the San is Onofre unit.
to MR. GRIMES: In general, we used insight develop-17 ed from PWRs and BWRs, and then we had to tailor those to la the specific plant conditions that we were trying to 19 consider.
20 I would also like to point out that with Mr.
21 Rubin are two gentlemen from SAI, who were the contractors 22 supporting that review.
23 MR. SIESS: I think we've heard the technique, 24 and if it's no different here than it was in the others 25 I don' t really see any reason to repeat it.
(D l
U 1
l l
43 t'^N
(,,)
1 But, let me ask a question. The issues that l
2 were addressed by the PRA, were those issues that were 1 3 capable of being addressed by the PRA; is that right?
4 MR. GRIMES: That's correct.
5 MR. SIESS: Was it triggered by the issue or o by the capability?
7 MR. GRIMES : It was triggered by the capability.
8 MR. SIESS: So that any issue that you thought 9 that you Could address by PRA, you did?
10 MR. GRIMES: That's correct.
11 MR. RUBIN: Let me add there that there was a 12 constraint on the researchers in the time available and fy la issues that would have been theoretically possible for PRA 14 treatment but through some advancements of the state-of-the-15 art or a great amount of time and ef fort it took to --
16 external deficit, for example.
17 MR. SIESS: We ll , ye ah . There are some people 18 that think they are not capable of being treated by PRA 19 anyway.
20 (Laughte r. )
21 okay. Now, as I think has been typical, most 22 of them turn out to be low. But you had two highs and four 23 mediums, five mediums.
24 Do you want to say anything about those now or 25 wait until you come to a particular item?
/3
44 l
[/
(, 1 MS. MC KENNA: Well, I think we want to go 2 through some of these while we have the people here to help us 3 with the risk perspective.
4 (Slide.)
5 And what I have on this slide is a list of all 6 of those that were addressed by the PRA risk perspective.
7 The slide is a little too long apparently for your screen.
8 What I have over here is the rank as shown in 9 Appendix D, the low, medium or high. It continues on the 10 next page. Ix j 11 As you said, most of them are low, a couple of 12 mediums and a couple of highs.
fN 13 MR. SIESS: Are any of these unique to San
' U 14 Onofre , or came out with' a dif ferent result on San Onofre 15 than they did on some of the other plants?
i l 16 MS. MC KENNA: Some of the specifics maybe are 17 a little dif ferent and there was some different perspective la in a couple of areas.
19 One we do want to talk about a little bit is 20 the ESF switchover from injection to recirculation, where 21 there is a little different thinking in the resolution of 22 that issue.
I 23 MR. SIESS: That's one where the staff had some f
24 exception, didn't you?
25 MS. MC KENNA: That's right. And I think this O
45
() i ~would be a good time to talk about that a little bit.
2 MR. SIESS: Got into the human factors.
3 MS. MC KENNA: Yeah, some of the risk perspective 4 of the human reliability.
5 MR. SIESS: Wouldn't it be better to talk about 6 that when we get to the issue?
7 MS. MC KENNA: The only thing is that we have a some people-here --
9 MR. SIESS: Okay.
10 MS . MC KENNA: -- and if we' have them participate l 11 now they wouldn't have to hang around all day.
l 12 MR. SIESS: Okay. Go ahead.
i
,3 1 MS. MC KENNA: Okay, Mark, did you want to say j 14 some thing?
l 15 MR. RUBIN: I just have a few additional thoughts to to the way the analysis was carried out as opposed to the i 17 staff conclusions. The analysis was done the same as -- ,
18 MR. SIESS: Let me get something straight. The 19 difference of opinion is between you and the other people?
20 MR. RUBIN: It's really not a dif ference of 21 opinion.
( 22 MR. SIESS: Well, but I mean the dif ference.
23 It wasn't between this Branch and you?
24 MR. RUBIN: No.
25 MR. SIESS : The staf f remarks came f rom you?
O
46 1 MR. RUBIN: Yes.
2 MR. WARD: I still don' t understand. It's not 3 a difference of opinion, but it's a difference of something.
4 MR. RUBIN: It's a supplement to the risk 5 assessment. You see in Appendix D --
6 MR. SIESS: If you look in the Appendix D on the 7 first page, there are two topics where the staff -- and a that's Rubin -- came up with some additional recommenda-9 tions over and beyond what came out of the SAI study, look-10 ing at some more characteristics of the plant I think.
11 And that's where it's covered. Two issues.
12 And that's the -- one of them is the safety injection, and f- 13 the other is the time available for manual switchover.
-/ 14 , Okay. Go ahead, Mark, f
15 Charlie, did you find what we are talking about?
16 It's the first page of Appendix D.
17 MR. RUBIN: The risk assessment was done is approximately two years ago. At that time, some prelimi-19 nary information was used, some of which has been superseded.
20 And all of the areas that have been superseded, of course, 21 have been reflected in Eileen's final integrated assessment.
22 One area where we thought the SAI assessment 23 was perhaps not representative or perhaps did not lean 24 towards the side of conservatism was on the recirculation 25 switchover analysis. We thought the time available to trip O
47 J
l) i the main feedwater pumps involving a postulated large LOCA 2 would be very short. From the low level alarm point, the single alarm point, something on the order of a couple of 3
i 4 minutes, perhaps ninety seconds, or the water would be down 5 to the suction pipes.
6 Because of that, we thought human error pro-7 7 bability would be very large, and we thought the risk would 8 be somewhat higher than reflected in the Appendix, the 9 analysis. And we recommended that the issue be considered to essentially as high.
i 11 Subsequent to that, as you will hear in the 12 topic discussion a little later, the applicant I believe 13 has proposed that only one charging pump will be aligned.
14 Those pumps are used for the recirculation; therefore, if 15 a draining of the tank did occur and if the alarm light i 16 pumps were cavitated, both the recirculation pumps would i
17 not be damaged.
18 In addition, we have recommended that the high i
19 flow feedwater pumps do have an automatic trip signal on low ,
l l 20 level to protect the pumps that are on line, as well as 21 keeping some water in the tank.
i 22 These recommendations were transmitted to the i i
l 23 SEP Branch. i
- i. ,
- 24 MR. SIESS
- Would you say you thought it was t 25 high? It is listed here as medium. .,
i
MS. MC KENNA: As I indicated, this is the (x_-) i 2 rank. The footnote, which is on the other page -- I 3 apologize here.
4 (Slide.)
5 These are ranked in the Contra 6 tor, Appendix D.
6 MR. SIESS: This is SAI's ranking?
7 MS. MC KENNA: Yes. Yes.
8 :. SIESS: And you thought that VI-7.B should 9 be high?
io MS. MC KENNA: That's right. Or, medium high.
11 MR. RUBIN: The distinction between the medium 12 and the high is somewhat artificial. Medium and high were 7s 13 the categories of issues we thought warranted close atten-( )
N/ 14 tion by the SEP Branch. There is no action distinction 15 between the two.
16 MR. SIESS: Okay. That's high, or I'll say i7 higher.
is The other one that the staf f looked at I thought 19 was interesting, it had to do with the reactor coolant 20 system pressure on a lower pressure system.
21 MS. MC KENNA: That was another area where be-22 cause of --
23 MR. SIESS: It turned out the lower pressure 24 system is designed for 1400.
25 MS. MC KENNA: Sort of a medium pressure system.
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3., of that nature was subjected to reactor coolantipressure x 47 i .and nothing happened.
5
. \ MS. MC,KENN A,: Catawba, yes. ,
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, MR.\ SYESS: At least,,th6 14st I heard,nothing \
s 3 7 . happened. -They are still looking at;it. s t
8 l' MS. MC KENNA!' That's right. _
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^ Well,,,it.'wasn' t a 1400 pound system .
yg s MR jWARD: ,
j , t ' , '- y .,- ' '
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, .t a x 15 No.' It4was a 600 pound system.
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/ {., g MR. SIESS:' A 600 pound, system. ,And I think *
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12 y the assumption %
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A 13 it says Sthat 'you thought the chance of' f ailure of a ,1400 I]
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a w,' s abou.t one in two.
\l 15 1MS . , MC KENIM: Well, that'was sort of bearing
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We thought 'ita w asfclearly no greater than that.' '
' l' 7 17 Certainly, we could put a number muc.,h lower than that. ;
i' 18 , ; 'MR,l SI5SS : Clearpynogredterthanthat. I O,
3 19 think tho'probabilitylis damnilow with the code design that '
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(_ / 1 I think it suggests something very important, 2 that PRA was not applied blindly. It was looked at very 3 carefully to see what it meant.
4 Is this item on the automatic trip of the feed-5 water safety injection pump an issue still?
6 MS. MC KENNA: Yes . That's one of the two items 7
that we want to talk about later.
8 MR. SIESS: Okay. We will come back to --
9 MS. MC KENNA: We wanted to address it now while 10 we had Mr. Rubin here to get the perspective on some of the 11 reasons for the staff recommendation.
12 l MR. WARD: Would you remind me what these rank-i fs . 13 ings mean?
\
'"'h 14 MR. SIESS: Quantitatively? Dc you want 15 numbers or --
16 MR. WARD: No, no. Not how they are derived 17 but what it means. You 'said medium or high is -- there 18 is going to be some action taken. So that --
19 MS. MC KENNA: Well, medium or high means it 20 will be looked at a little more closely f rom the point of 21 view that there is some feeling that there is some contri-22 bution. Yes.
23 MR. RUBIN: Let me refer you to Page 6 of 24 Appendix D. I will give you a thirty second capsule of 25 the description of it. Basically, a low ranking was where we
- - -. .= . _ .
l 51 l
) 1 ' determined that the SEP proposed modification of the upgrade 2 to licensing basis would essentially have no impact on the 3 system performance / system reliability.
4 And then it was generally thought not to be 5 worth any additional risk assessment. Where the issue did 6 have some impact on the operation liability, the effective-7 ness of the system, .it was then subjected to additional 8 analysis to see if the component had changed in fact the v system level performance, and was that system additionally 10 .important from a risk perspective.
11 Additionally a qualitative assessment of how 12 large the impact on the system performance was and how l
13 important that system was in performing a safety function, 14 rated medium or high.
15 But there was no distinction in our recommenda-16 tion for action, medium or high findings. We referred it 17 to the SEP Branch for consideration.
18 MS. MC KENNA: I might add that the low ranking 19 did not automatically mean that no action was taken. There 20 might have been other reasons why we would take some action.
21 That was jus t one part of the evaluation.
22 MR. RUBIN: 'That was solely the risk perspective.
23 MS. MC KENNA: The risk perspective. Right.
24 MR. SIESS: Anything else on this? Questions?
25 (No response.)
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52 G '
k ,) 1 MS. MC KENNA: Okay.
2 (Slide.)
3 This continues on the following page, the 4 additional topics, I believe seventeen in all, and they 5 were considered in the risk assessment.
6 I might note here --
7 MR. WARD: Let's see. This implies that the 8 Tsunami gate closure was considered from a risk perspective --
9 MS. MC KENNA: It was looked at from the 10 perspective of the inadvertent closure and the effect on 11 the reliability of the system.
12 MR. WARD: Okay.
13 MS. MC KENNA: Not from flooding probabilities
\- 14 and flooding equipment but more from --
15 MR. WARD: Okay. I guess it's hard for me to 16 see how those two could be separated. But --
17 MS. MC KENNA: Well, I would say that that 18 aspect, I don't think could be treated in the kind of risk 19 perspective that was being done. You could look at it from 20 the point of view of the unavailability of the system by
.21 cutting of f water supply.
22 But you really couldn' t look at what's the likeli-23 hood of the Tsunami, where is the water going to go, is 24 it going to flood equipment in a generic kind of review.
25 Certainly you couldn' t treat that --
3
53 L
i MR. GRIMES: Mr. Ward, I would like to clarify 2 that. Wherever we could get any possible insights to under-3 stand the issues as we could, we did. If we couldn' t treat 4 the matter completely in a probabilitistic sense or in a 5 deterministic sense, we would treat it as best we could in 6 any sense and then collect that information and use that as 7 the basis for drawing a judgment.
8 And quite of ten, system reliabilities or un-9 availabilities was an important consideration in trying to io judge whether or not any corrective action was necessary.
11 MR. SIESS: But from what you said previously, 12 if this says that inadvertent Tsunami gate closure had 13 low risk significance, then can I assume that flooding from
'Y /f-~) 14 failure to close the Tsunami gate had even lower risk is significance?
16 Is that --
17 MS. MC KENNA: Yes. That's probably a fair 18 characterization. Yes.
19 MR. GRIMES : Yes. I would say that's a fair 20 characterization.
21 MR. SIESS: Both- of them were low. But --
22 MR. WARD: But I guess the latter was a judgment 23 made not on the basis of some estimate or the probability of 24 the Tsunami but just the consequence of a Tsunami, you decid-25 ed was not particularly important.
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54
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1 MS. MC KENNA: No. It was more of a deterministic 4
2 basis.
3 MR. RUBIN: That's correct. There was no 4 quantitative modeling.
5 MR. SIESS: If you don' t need it, take it out.
6 (Laughte r. )
7 MS. MC KENNA: In essence, yes. I might point 8 out here there are two areas where the risk perspectives 9 indicated a high were in some of the ventilation areas.
10 And what this was intended to point out is that 11 the systems in those rooms are of high safety significance.
12 They are switchgears associated with AC and DC systems which fx ,
- 13 are important factors in the risk, which basically meant an t] 14 area that the staf f should be looking at to see whether the 15 equipment requires the ventilation to function.
16 It doesn' t necessarily mean that you had to make 17 modifications, but that 'since those areas were important you la should be sure that the ventilation was as reliable as you 19 needed to ensure operability of the equipment.
20 MR. SIESS: Andit's f ailure of the equipment at 21 a high significance --
22 MS. MC KENNA: Yes.
23 MR. SIESS: -- but whether the equipment would 24 fail --
25 MS. MC KENNA: That was not part --
O
55 i
I l3 (s,) i MR. SIESS: -- was not part of that?
i 2 MS. MC KENNA: That's right.
3 MR. SIESS: It could not be extended that far.
l l
4 They got too detailed in the plant --
5 MS. MC KENNA: Right.
6 MR. SIESS: -- to be able to evaluate the l
7 probability of f ailure.
8 MS. MC KENNA: That's very plant specific action
! 9 where your contribution to risk of the DC system, we have 10 a little better handle on it from previous reviews.
l 11 MR. SIESS: I think that's a good example of 12 why it is called a limited PRA. It really points out areas
<-sss 13 significant to risk that require a further look at. And t
V 14 the look frequently then was deterministic.
15 MR. GRIMES: That's correct.
16 MR. SIESS: If you can open doors and cool the 17 room, that's pretty clearcut.
( 18 MR. GRIMES: Yes. This is a good example of l
19 a place where an issue is identified as being important and 20 then the resolution of that issue can be simple.
l l 21 MR. SIESS: And the staff uses a term in here 22 of being significant to risk, not contributed to risk. If l
l 23 I'm not mistaken, the language is usually of low significance 24 to risk.
l l
25 MR. GRIMES: Yes.
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s 1 MR. WYLIE: Well, you are going to go back to l 2 these resolutions?
3 MR. GRIMES: That's correct. We will discuss 4 them again when we go through the specific actions.
5 MR. SIESS: We are just trying now to cover the 6 PRA philosophy while we have got the people here.
7 FS. MC KENNA: Yes.
8 MR. SIESS: But I believe I am right that you 9 usually use that terminology, of significance to risk rather 10 than contribution to risk because you don't really know the il contribution unless you have done a complete reliability 12 analysis.
f-~
13 MR. GRIMES: In a strict sense, we do not have r
'~'
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14 We do not have a complete risk picture a plant specific PRA.
15 for the plant.
16 We know, based on experience with other pro-17 babilistic analyses and in some cases plant specific design 18 modeling and an event tree where an event sequence occurs, 19 that an issue is sign'ificant and it's significant because 20 either the system or the consequences have been shown in 21 other similar PRAs to be dominant contributors to overall 22 plant risks for other plants.
23 And, therefore, we will presume that they are 24 going to be dominant contributors to risk for San Onofre.
25 l
MR. SIESS: Any further questions on the risk PRA O
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57 -
e
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i
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i application here?
2 (No response.)
3 Well, thank you. Stick around if you can but if ,
- '4 you have to go that's all right.
5 Does that bring us down to the status report l
6 on the seismic? !
7 MS. MC KENNA: Yes, it does.
- 8 MR. SIESS
- All right. You have a chance to sit ;
i 9 down.
10 MS. MC KENNA: Okay. Tom Cheng, also of the 11 Systematic Evaluation Program, will present this.
12 MR. SIESS: Mr. Cheng, do you want to come up
-s 13 here or do you want to speak from there?
14 MS. MC KENNA: You have some slides , don' t you, 15 Tom?
1 16 MR. CHENG: Yes.
! 17 MR. SIESS: Will you come up to the podium and j
is hang a microphone?
19 MR. CHENG: Yes.
20 MR. SIESS : What happened? Did you guys run out 21 of clear transparencies?
22 MS. MC KENNA: Yes. '
4 23 MR. Cl!ENG: I apologize. We have all kind of 24 Colors.
25 MR. SIESS: Yeah. I'm going to send a memo to i
d f
I
.- i 58 i I the EDO and tell them to ban that stuff.
2 MS. MC KENNA: The boxes come multi-colored.
3 MR. SIESS: Somebody had multi-colored a few 4 months ago, and only every other paragraph was readable.
5 (Laughte r. )
o MR. CHENG: Okay. Should I start?
7 MR. SIESS: Yes, go ahead.
8 MR. CHENG: My name is Tom Cheng from the staff 9 of Systematic Evaluation Program.
10 (Slide.)
11 Today I will cover the San Onofre reevaluation 12 status for the long term service program.
13 On last November 27 or 8, the staff present our review O 14 results of Unit I return-to-service program. As a result 15 of that review and the completion of that program, it can 16 be assured that the plant does have the capability to main-17 tain its hot standby condition following a .67 G earth-18 quake.
19 The staff joined in a conclusion as based on our audit review 20 and confirmatory analyses for the selected piping and the 21 equipment systems.
22 Earlier this year, we had a meeting with the 23 licensee and also through a letter dated on March 12th of 74 '85, the licensee proposed its long term service program 25 and the criteria and the method, analysis method.
O
59
) i Now, according to the licensee the program will 2 assure that the plant will possess the capability for i 3 the cold shutdown and accident mitigation. To date, the ,
4 staff review has concentrated on the acceptance of the 1 5 Proposed reevaluation criteria and analysis method.
6 Now, in addition to this review the staff will 7 conduct an audit review and how this criteria and method are t
8 implemen ted. And also the staff will perform a confirmatory 9 analysis by selecting on a sampling basis, 10 (Slide.)
! 11 And this slide will show the area of analysis 12 method and acceptance criteria which are being reviewed by !
13 the staff. l 14 As you can see, a load generation method, a 15 large bore piping, small bore piping and tubing, pipe supports ,
16 secondary steel structures.
s 17 And mechanical equipment, they include pumps 18 and heat exchangers, valves, tanks, refueling water storage ;
l l
19 tanks, penetrations, containment penetrations , electrical 20 raceways.
l l
21 (Slide.)
22 The significant area of staff review of long 23 term service program are highlighted on this slide. The 24 first item is the soil structure interaction analysis applied 25 to the containment building. The licensee proposed a new O
r I
l L_
60 i computer code, SASSY, which is elastic, half space, three 2 dimensional finite adamant program. They want to use this 3 program to calculate the imputed function of the soil founda-4 tion. And then apply the CLASSY computer code to perform the 5 analysis.
6 The staf f's review, we start review their theory 7 and computer codes and how this model put together. In 8 addition to that, the staff also developed a test problem.
9 We required the licensee to calculate all the responses.
to And also the staff performed an independent it analysis. The results are compared. As a result of staff 12 review, the licensee's approach is acceptable, i3 The next item is the floor response spectra 14 generation for the turbine building. Originally, licensee 15 proposed so-called a direct generation method. It's a new 16 computer code called FLORA.
i7 This computer code considered the piping te structure interaction effect. Later on, the licensee found 19 out the turbine building model, analysis model, too big.
20 The computer cost would be very expensive and also time 21 consuming.
22 So they changed their proposal and tried to use 23 the elastic half space lump parameter method and the time 24 history analysis. approach to calculate a full response backup.
25 MR. GRIMES: If I might interrupt, Tom, this is O
61 (O,) 3 a good exa:aple of an area where, when you are doing a re-2 evaluation of an existing plant design, there are a number 3 of alternatives that arc open in terms of methode to perform 4 better calculations for -- to balance the analysis methods 5 that are available versus the criteria that are being used.
6 In this case, the application of an advanced 7 computer code technique to try and get a refined floor a response calculation to then apply to the uystems and com-9 ponents turns out to ba economically prohibitive, and so io it's easier to go back to lump parameter techniques and look it at more refined anal 2 sir for their systems and components.
12 The general approach in long term 1ervice has
<~ i3 been to use more refined techniques where it is feasible to
14 do so, to take advantage of thinga like the PVRC damping l$ and other things Tom is going to get into next.
16 And we are basically reviewing all of these 17 things from an overall perspective to ensure that there is is suf ficient margin in these calculations to of fset the un-Up certainties in the calculational procedure.
20 MR. SIESS: In the case of soll structure inter-21 action, as opposed to the response of piping systems, what 22 evidence is there to suggest that a more refined technique 23 is any closer to the truth than the lump parameter spring 24 and dash?
25 MR. Cl!ENG: I have slides to show you an example, i
/ .
~n - . - - - . - . - - - ,
62 1 how the results -- one thing I would like to add, the 2 staff's independent analysis to the test problem was based 3 on both CLASSY computer -- computer CLASSY analysis and 4 time history analysis. You will see the difference. It's 5 , ve ry, ve ry minimal . I will show the slide.
6 MR. SIESS: Yeah, but this is again the staff 7 comparing one analysis with the other. And if the two 8 analyses agree, they say they are correct.
9 And my question was closeness to the truth, which 10 is a physical phenomena. It seems to me the only test for 11 an analysis is comparing it somehow with reality and not 12 compare it with another analysis.
13 I mean, what experimental data do you have as 14 the basis for deciding that one computer code gives a better 15 representation of what will happen than another computer 16 code?
17 MR. GRIMES: Dr. Siess, in all of the work that is we have done in seismic analysis, both within and without 19 SEP, I think it's generally recognized that our capability 20 to calculate a plant's response to a seismic event is 21 generally limited.
22 It would seem, based on the seismic uxperience, 23 that the predicted points of failure don't seem to occur as 24 a rule. Because of that limitation, we have taken an assump-25 tion, and I will admit that it's an assumption, that a time O
63 m
k-) I history analysis basically is about as close to the reality 2 as we can get. And our comparisons of methods or the 3 acceptability of methods are compared to time history analysis 4 to make thoso judgments.
5 MR. SIESS: But you are getting away from soil 6 s tructure interaction.
7 , MR. GRIMES: Yes, I am. What I'm saying is that 8 wo establish a baselino at the timo history calculation.
9' MR. SIESS: I think there is evidence that a time H) history analysis will give you a bottor representation.
11 People have tested and measured responses.
12 But I was specifically asking, I think FLORA is 13 a soil structuro interaction?
Id MR. CllENG : No. It's the floor responso back-15 ground generation of --
16 MR. SIESS: Oh, okay. I'm sorry. I saw it 17 listed somewhero.
18 MR. GRIMES : CLASSY and SASSY is used for the 19 reactor building and the containmont. ' FLORA is used for 20 the turbino building.
21 MR. SIESS: As a floot responso spectra?
22 MR. Cl!ENG: Okay. Lot me explain a little bit i
23 more about a FLORA program. Tho FLORA program, you can 24 apply by using existingdynanic paramators. 11or examle, like the 25 frequoncios from any calculations. For examplo, like lump l
a l
t
{
64 i i
i parameter methods. And they input this dynamic parameters 2 to the FLORA and also the floor response spectra input to 3 the program. It can direct the generation to floor response 4 spectrum at any lo' cation, which is interesting. l
$ MR. SIESS: Okay. I understand. Go ahead.
6 MR. CilENG: The next item is PVRC damping. As 7 you all know, this PVRC damping is five percent for all a size piping from zero frequencies to ten hertz. And this l 9 linear decreased to twenty hertz, to two percent. At higher !
10 than twenty hertz, two percent across the board. Higher l it than thirty-three hertz, then wo require une of Reg Guide 161.10.
{
12 The staff's concern about this application, it i 13 is acceptable for envelope response spectrum analysis !
O 14 approach.
is The staff do have concern if the application to ,
16 combino floor response spectrun and the PVRC damping. And l t
17 for this case, the staff will review on a case-by-case basis.
is And when the so-called piping structure inter- i e
19 action offect being considered, the PVRC damping cannot bo {
go used. I i
21 The next item is large bore piping. First, I l 22 try to explain' tho' stress and the strain criteria. The 23 licenseo proposed by using the equation nine to calculate 24 the stress, the piping stress, and the use allowable two l 25 timos S over Y for straining. And than if the piping stress l O
b i
r 65 l
l l
7 V 1 cannot satisfy two S over Y and then they are going to apply i 2 some kind of strain critoria.
3 The strain critoria they proposed, it's a one 4 percent allowable for carbon stool piping. Two percent for 5 stainless stool piping.
6 Af ter the ataf f's review, the staf f required 7 the licensoo to use the SEP guideline which is ono point 8 cight S over !! for Class 1 pipelino, and at two point four 9 S over 11 for Class 2 or 3 piping for strain critoria.
10 As far as the strain critoria, the staff accepts 11 one percent for all carbon stool and stainless stool piping.
12 The next item is talking about small boro piping.
13 tin. SIESS: You skipped the item that says 14 non-linear analysis.
15 MR. Cl!ENG: Oh, I'm sorry. Okay. The next to item I will talk about analysis method. For the linear 17 analysis method, the licensoo proposed the envolopo responso 18 spectrunanalysis and multi-floor loval responso spectrum analys:.s 19 and the timo history analysis. And also the similarity 20 analysis factor.
21 The first three methods the staf f accepted except 22 the similarity approach because the definition of similarity 2J is no much uncortainty favolved.
24 But a non-linear analysis mothod, what they 25 proposo are timo history analysis and enorgy balanco method.
O
n 66 i
(3
/
.s / i The time history analysis, to my knowledge, at this point is (
! 2 the best for non-linear analysis because you can considor 3 as small of the timo increment as possible. Of course, as (
4 you know, it is very costly.
5 As alternativo, the licensee proposed an onorgy i
6 balanco method which I would like to highlight the background
! 7 of this method. The licensoo will maximizo the kinetic 8 anorgy and also minimizo the strain and the capacity of tho l 9 piping. If the kinotic onorgy is smaller than the strain to and the capacity the piping would be passed. Otherwise , the 11 more sophisticated analysis should be dono. -
12 The next item, the small boro piping.
S 13 HR. SIESS: Defore you leave the largo boro --
- 9) id MR. CilENG: Yes.
15 MR. SIESS: -- is this roanalysis of those new to noismic inputs and difforont critoria likely to load to a 17 adffor piping system or a more floxible piping systom?
18 MR. CllENG: Docauso we allowed some portion of to piping to go to linear clastic rango, as you know once the 20 matorial go to linear clastic rango it will absorb more onorgy, ,
21 I would say to loavo the piping -- the piping to 22 more floxible, accept moro rigid.
23 MR. GRIMES: Thoro in a very caroful balance that 24 wo havo to do horo. As I mentioned beforo, our ability to 25 try and predict reality with computer codon was limited. l
()
67 i We tried to be as flexible as possible, no pun 2 intended, in developing methods and critoria that would 3 minimizo a number of piping supports, additional piping sup-4 ports, that might be required. But wo still want to have a s firm basis for saying that thoro is an adequato amount of 6 capability in the piping to withstand the earthquako.
7 And that's not an easy thing to do, given the a tools that are available.
9 MR. SICSS: You would like to get a good system, to but you would also like to be able to provo that it satisfios it the regulations?
12 (Laugh te r. )
13 MR. GRIMES: Yos. And that's why methods liko la the onorgy balanco approach and the timo history analysis is can be used as oconomic limitations of doing clasto plastic 16 analysis to demonstrate that the piping can withstand a 17 two-thirds G design basis.
is It may requiro that the systems be moro rigid 19 than wo would othorwiso like.
20 MR. SIESS: Do wo havo any assuranco that if wo 21 havo more than two-thirds G that it will be the supports 12 that fail and not the piping?
23 MR. CRIMES: That's embodied to a cortain oxtont 24 in the methods that aro proposod, becauso when supports aro 25 calculated to bo overstressed thoro is an innor loop that O
68
() 3 you have to go through to calculate the piping response.
In general, I would say yes, we believe for larger oarth-2 3 quakes that wo wo'lld expect the piping supports to go well 4 before the piping.
MR. RUDIN: Lot me add a little insight from the 6 GESSAR period, gonorally large boro piping has much higher 7 than two-thirds G.
a MR. SIESS: From the GESSAR you got that?
9 MR. RUBIN: That was drawn f rom generic data, n3 but our consultants tell us that the largo piping is general-ii ly pretty ronistent to soismic accolorations.
i2 MR. SIESS: A lot of things toll us that largo i3 piping never fails in earthquakes. And I would just liko 14 to koop it that way.
is MR. WARD: Lot's noo, who in the staf f using i6 an a consultant on the structural noismic roviuw?
if MR. CllENG: For structuro', it's Livermoro. And is for equipmont and piping, EG&G Idaho.
ig MR. SIESS: If somobody raison tho quantion of 20 noinmic margins, assuming wo know what that moann for a 21 California plant, would you say that the noismic margins 22 for Unit 1, af ter wo got through with this, would bo comparabi's 23 to the soinmic margins for Unit 2, which was initially do-24 nigned for two-thirds G with nomowhat dif foront critoria?
25 MR. GRIMES: That's an intorosting quantion. i O
F 69 i
( i Let me provido a little background. I work on the seismic 2 Margins Working Group, and the export panel recontly pre-3 sented to us the results of their efforts thus far in trying 4 to establish gonoric -- a generic understanding of seismic 5
margins, which I understand will be prosented to the Commit-6 too lator in this year.
7 They specifically excluded the western plants, e
because they felt there wasn't a solid foundation to make
, a judgment regarding west of the Rockies for oarthquakes.
10 But they did develop some interesting insights about the is accident sequencos associated with noismic ovents that were 12 derived from export probabilistic analysos that focus on i3 the systems required to shut down the plant in the event of U i4 a soismic event.
is And from that kind of information, I would say 16 that the seismic margins for San Onofro Unit 1 are going to 17 be comparablo, that there is a qualitativo comparablo be-is causo we can' t go through the system functions and show that in we'vo got margins against failure the way you roview in a 20 now plant analysis.
21 But, based on the backfitting work that has boon 22 dono on San onof ro Unit 1 thus f ar, the extensivo analysos .
23 that havo boon dono, including tho application of thoso 24 techniques that aro being proposed right now, I would say 25 that in the way that wo talk about noismic margins that San I
70 i Onofre Unit I would be comparable.
2 MR. SIESS: Would you make a distinction between 3 piping and other components?
4 MR. GRIMES : Yes. When I talk about seismic 5 ,
margins, I'm talking about in a functional senso, that is the 6 systems that havo --
7 MR. SIESS: Yeah.
8 MR. GRIMES: -- to shut the plant down will re-9 main functional. But I would expect that perhaps we would io soo more support failuros, for examplo, in San Onofre Unit 1 it than wo might aupact in Units 2 and 3. But, than that gets 12 back to tho issue of, are you more comfortable with flexible i3 piping systems or with rigid piping systems.
14 MR. 81ESS: Well, of course, the PRAs on is eastern plants usually show that it took three to four times to the SSE to got you into much trouble. And I guess I have a
! 17 little problem visualizing two to two and two-thirds G oven la in California on earthquako.
19 I think their exclusion of the wastern plants 20 was basically on that high confidence / low probability --
21 PR. GRIPES: That'n correct.
22 MR. SIESS: -- throo-tonths type thing which 23 corresponds to something also in the medium and they
! 24 didn't try to ovaluato plants that woro designed for two-25 thirds G or throo-quarters G.
O
71 t
i
( ,, 1 MR. GRIMES: That's correct. The categorios 2 that they defined were point three and ooint five, and a when the design basis is above point five it's difficult to 4 relato.
5 MR. SIESS: But those point throes and point 6 fivos don't relato to SSEs. They -- those are high confidence /
7 low probability.
l 8 MR. GRIMES: But they are peak ground accelera-9 tion 8, so it's difficult to relato to.
10 MR. SIESS: But it's a ninoty-five/ninety-fivo 11 probability of failure which is not what the other PRAs have i
l 12 boon banod on. p 13 MR. GRIMES: That's correct. ;
14 MR. SIESS: Yeah. No, I think you've got a I
15 point thoro, becauso it is my fooling that if we have some- ;
16 thing fail in an carthquako it's not going to be because it l 17 was undordosignad. It's going to be because somobody goofod. ,
la And by the timo a plant has been looked at throo to timos, the probability that something has really boon ovor-l 20 lookod, whether it's design or a construction orror, has <
21 cortainly boon reduced.
22 MR. GRIFES: One of the recommandations that 2J sooms to bo ovolving f rom the noismic margins work is that 24 plant walkdowns should be dono to look for the vulnorablo :
i l
25 arons for noismic ovents. And I can assuro you that this l
()
I
l 72 plant has been walked down for seismic related issues more ,
j 2 than twice. !
3 So, we have a high confidence that the seismic 4 capability for San Onofre Unit I has been well established.
$ MR. SIESS: Incidently, I would not think that 6 the soismic margin, however you define it, need be as large i for Unit 1 as for Unit 2 or 3, as a historical background.
t e And it's a question of how far you want to backfit something. j i
9 But, okay, go ahead.
10 MR. CllENG: Okay. The small bore piping tubing.
j ti Based on the judgment, the tests performed by the industry l j i2 and also the path of the carthquake experience, the licensee 13 developed a so-called walkdown criteria. !
O d 14 Af ter the staf f review, the staff required them i
7 j is to perfom by a sampling basis, to perform confirmatory to analysos to be sure the walkdown critoria will help them i it to fulfill their walkdown.
7 is Today, the confirmatory analyses result has
- 19 not boon rocoived by the staf f vot. So wo still have that
, 20 as an open.
- i.
21 The next itom is the anchor bolt critoria. Tho 1
22 licensoo proposed the safoty f actor of four for wdp typo 23 anchor expannion bolts. And the safety f actor of fivo for 24 the shall typo expansion bolt, which is acceptable to tho :
i 25 staff.
O ,
4 l
l i
73 1 Ilowever, for some of existing pipe support some 2 of the anchor bolt safety f actor might go down slightly 3 higher than two. The staff required as a group of anchor 4 bolts the safety factor still maintain higher than four.
5 MR. SIESS: Don't get them too strong now.
6 MR. CIIENG : Thank you.
7 MR. GRIMES: I would like to point out that we a used as a procedent for this review the criteria that were 9 developed by I&E Bulletin 80-11. The proceduro that wo 10 would like to go through is that we uso that as a first pass 11 scroon, and than wo will look at the ones that don't pass 12 a factor of safety of four or five in terms of the overa'll 13 capability of the pipo support.
14 And if thoro is a factor of safety greator than IS two, and wo are confidant that the support will still 16 func, tion, then we would not expect the*. modifications would 17 be requirod.
Is MR. SICSS: Okay. Tom.
19 MR. CilENG: For the gang support, the gang 20 support wo defined as you have a more than two-pipo support 21 by one type support. Our concern is how the licansoo will 22 combino the soinmic loading on that support.
23 What liconsoo proposed for the modon, it's not 24 just follow the rog guido critoria. If tho modos are not 25 couplod togethor it will bo tho SRSS approach will be appliod.
O
74 O
h i For those close modos, the absoluto sum will 2 be applied, which is acceptable to the staff. However, l
3 during the audit review the staf f will select some samplo d to soo how this combination approach is being implomonted.
l 5 !!R. SIESS: Okay.
6 MR. CllENG : The next item I will talk about is l
7 comprohonsivo system ovaluation. Since the staff realized 8 the ovaluation critoria is being relaxod significantly the staf f 9 required the licensco to select some piping. For examplo, 10 somo pipo support that allowed to go to a sizo three. So, the 11 staf f would like toask the licensoo to perform piping analysis 12 as a system to uoo still havo margin retained in the piping p)C' 13 14 sys tem or not.
This tost would be reviewod by Professor Itall of 15 the University of Illinois. This will and my prosentation.
16 MR. SIESS: I havo ano genocal question. Do thoso 17 critoria apply only to a'long term servico program, or doos 18 it mean to go back and look at the things that woro dono in l'
the roturn-to-norvico program?
20 MR. GRIMES: Return-to-norvico ovaluation. Wo 21 pointed out cortain arons whorn wo. felt they needed to bo looked 22 at further, and thoy will bo addressed in long term servico.
23 MR. SIESS: And thoso critoria, are they signifi-24 cantly difforent from those that wo used in the roturn-to-25 norvice program?
O _
75 l
.[D l \ ,) i MR. GRIMES: For examplo, in the return-to-l 2 service program, we allowed a piping critoria of two S of Y 3 as a basis for judging the piping stressos. Wo want to --
4 MR. SIESS: The PVRC damping?
$ MR. GRIMES: Yes. Wo want to scroon those using 6 the SEP critoria and look at them again in the long term 7 servico. Also, the walkdowns that were dono for the small l
[
s boro piping in the return-to-service will be repeated in the 9 long term neevico, using a more refined walkdown approach ;
io plus the confirmatory analysis to support the walkdown it critoria that are being used.
12 MR. SIESS: Okay. Ono moro question. Is the !
s 13 masonary wall insuo all settled now?
)
i4 MR. CllENG : Pnrdon, pleaso?
is MR. SIESS: In the mmmany wall issue all to nottled?
17 MR. CllENG: Our consultant, Franklin Instituto, is completed an ovaluation report which in bein; reviewed by i i9 the staf f -- I moan staf f in the Structuro Engincoring Dranch, 20 and it will be transmittod to us within a short timo.
t 21 Banod on the proliminary discussions with the 22 reviewer, the conclusion is positivo.
23 MR. SIESS: Thank you. Any quantions of Tom? .
t 24 (No responno. )
2$ Thank you.
([]) l 1
1
r 76
) i (The speaker stood asido.)
2 My agenda says lunch. But we are ahead of 3 schedule. I guess we are back to you, Eileen. And we are i
4 going to go issue by issue, right?
5 FG. MC KENNA: Yes. The only question would be 6 of the particular order. And I might suggest that we switch 7 and take up the issues which are the areas we wanted further a discussion. For instance, the ESP switchover, since we still 9 have our risk assessment people with us. And maybe also look lo at the tornado issue now if we have time and then como back 11 to the others after lunch.
12 MR. SIESS : Okay. Now, let me just look ahead 13 a little bit.
14 MS. MC KENNA: Just to rearrango your slides 15 a little bit would be the only problem with that.
16 MR. SIESS: I would suggest that the members of 11 tho subcommittoo might look at the issues that were resolved is by proceduro or toch spec chancos and soo if there are any to of thoso they want to* hear more about.
20 And what wo do nood to haar about though, as 21 Eileen said, are tho issuos that are at issuo --
22 MS. MC KENNA: Yos.
23 MR. SIESS: -- and thoso involving further 24 ovaluation. No nood to undcratand thoso. Those woro the 2s hardware changos. It's a short list. And wo will tako that
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2~ DW you want to start with further evaluation or
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3 the ones at ishud? . -
4 -
The ones at issue. I think it MS . i MCs KENNA: s
/
4, ,
z 5 would be just before phe blue page in your list. \
6 MR. WARD': Let's see, what are you going to cover 7 now? .
8 MR. SIESS: There are tw'o areas where the , licensee s 9 and the staff hed'not reached agreement on what needs' to be
~
to done. \
11 MR. WARD: Okay. ,
, .s 12 MR. SIESS: And they are the page just before the m 13 blue page.
14 MR. WARD: Okay. You asked'us also to look at '
15 the procedures and tech specs.
16 .
MR. SIESS: She thought you might just look at 17 those, and see if' there are any of those that you wantL to take 18 up. If.not, we could skip 'them.- '
- s. % '
19 MR. WARD: All right.
20 MR. SIESS: But I want to concentrate in order
! 21 on these issues, and then there is a fairly long list of things 1
I-22 that will require further evaluation and we have an outcome 23 that isn't certain at this' point. -
24 MS. MC KENNA:
Righ t. Since we are doing every
- 25 thing backwards, I will-:take the second of these two issues O k s
-\ <
w k
- 3 4
78
( 1 first.
2 (Laughte r. )
3 We touched on this a little bit earlier this i 4 mo rning.
t 5 (Slide.)
6 This is the ESF switchover from the injection mode 7 to the circulation mode. First, before we get into what the i
8 staff says and what the licensee says, I thought it might !
9 be appropriate to give you a little flavor of what this pro-10 cedure is that we are talking about, what's involved.
11 I have some pictures that were taken from the 12 Appendix D. Unfortunately, it's probably not going to fit 13 on the screen.
73 14 (Slide.)
15 MR. SIESS: You can move the whole thing a little 16 closer to the screen and it will probably fit.
17 MS. MC KENNA: Yes. This slide shows the ECCS 18 configuration for the plant. And up here the refueling water 19 storage tank. And this would show that there are two trains 20 of what I would call " low pressure injection." I think that 21 shutof f head is somewhere around 1200 pounds in the feedwater 22 pump, so maybe you want to call it medium. But these are the 23 high volume pumps that you would be relying on in the event of 24 a large break loss of coolant accident.
25 The configuration or safety injection pumps, which
.m L)
79 c ~
k ,x[ t essentially serve as booster pumps to the feedwater pumps here, 2 what I have indicated here is when you are using it in the a feedwater mode water would come through the pump, then it goes 4 off to another direction and there are valves here and valves 5 here.
6 (Pointing.)
7 And when the safety injection signal comes in, 8 these valves would close. These valves open to direct water 9 in this direction. There are three valves ~here on each of 10 these legs , two to three coldlegs.
11 In addition, we have two refueling water pumps 12 which were used for the containment spray, also drawing water 1
13 here, coming in to go to the spray system.
\'- 14 Down here are the charging pumps which is the 15 high pressure injection capability. Again, in the injection EOCS xx3 16 they would be drawing suction on the refueling water storage 17 tank. And in the initial mode , they are going into the normal 18 charging path.
19 MR. SIESS: Now, the top is that low pressure or 20 high pressure?
21 MS. MC KENNA: Okay. This relates back to the 22 question of medium pressure. These are the lines that are 23 the 1400 pound design pressure.
24 Are you talking about the pumping capacity or --
25 MR. SIESS: This is HPCI or LPCI? Or, there isn't rs L .
80 2 - p_
-( 1 a'ny?
2 MS. MC KENNA: Well, we don't really have that 3 kind of terminology. We have charing pumps and we have these, 4 which is sort of a combination. It covers the range from 3 the low pressure up to about 1400 pounds or 1200 pounds, I 6 guess.
7 The charging pumps, of course, go up to 2700.
8 MR. SIESS: And the feedwater pumps are medium?
9 MS. MC KENNA: Like 1200 pound shutof f, something to like that. So they cover the lower pressure range, whereas 11 these would be high pressure.
12 MR. SIESS: Okay.
MR. WARD: Okay.
(g 13 So, I guess this plant can' t
~
14 feed and bleed, then, through PORVs?
15 MS. MC KENNA: Yeah. We would use the charging 16 pumps for that.
17 MR. WARD: But is the capacity of those suf fi-18 cient to remove --
19 MS. MC KENNA: The analyses that have been done 20 indicates that it is. I believe there are like 300 single t
21 pumps.
22 MR. WARD: Oh, it is. Okay.
23 MR. GRIMES: Feed and bleed was an issue that was 24 reviewed on this plant under SEP. It was an alternative the 25 licensee proposed to some other action that was required of O
- 'O
81
-(y ) i them.
2 MR. WARD: Does the plant have procedures in 3 place to provide feed and bleed cooling?
4 MR. GRIMES: I believe they do. Is that right, 5 Jack?
6 MR. RAINSBERRY : I believe they do. Yes.
7 MR. SIESS: Go ahead.
8 MS. MC KENNA: Okay. The situation we are talk-9 ing about, as I said, the feedwater pumps are used for the 10 injection. These are very large capacity, ten thousand GPM 11 per pump. So that if you are in the large break LOCA situation 12 where you have had a rapid depressurization on the primary
- 13 side and pumps come on and start pumping, they are going to (sN -) 14 be drawing water from the tank at a rapid rate.
15 The question comes up then, when the level of the 16 tank gets to a Certain point you need to realign to establish 17 some suction. And then a two part process , if you will, for 18 this to be performed.
19 When you reach a level in the tank, these pumps 20 are shut of f and the charging pumps and the spray pump continue 21 while you do the realignments and then you continue the switch-22 over to establish the suction path. And you will just continue 23 using the charging pumps. These are only used in the injection 24 mode.
25 MR. SIESS: The charging pumps take suction from the
/^Ti t
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82
/ \
Q 1 sump, then?
2 MS. MC KENNA: Yes. I have another slide to give 3 you sort of the later mode. I will put that up for a moment.
4 (Slide.)
5 Okay. To reorient you, I've taken off the safety 6 injection feedwater pump from this slide. These are the re-7 fueling water spray pumps. Again, the charging pumps with 8 the tank suction coming here. Here is the sump suction.
9 (Pointing. )
to It comes this way and comes in here.
11 MR. WARD: Le t's see , are those charging pumps, 12 are those centrifugal pumps?
13 MS. MC KENNA: Yes.
[s ;
'/ 14 MR. WARD: They are centrifugal?
15 MS. MC KENNA: Yes. Another thing I might point 16 out here for this, there'are a couple of different places 17 that the charging pump can inject.
18 As I indicated, in the injection mode they are 19 going through the normal charging path. For the long term 20 recirculation, there are three to each -- going into each 21 loop, three separate paths , from the charging pumps which is 22 established af ter the very initial -- excuse me , initiation 23 of the safety injection.
24 MR. SIESS: You can choose which loops?
25 MS. MC KENNA: Yeah. I think normally you would n
v
83 (D
(_) i use all three, but if you had a broken loop, yes, you could 2 select what you wanted to do.
3 Okay. Let me go back for a minute to the other 4 one.
5 (Slide.)
6 As I have indicated, the basic concern that was 7 raised in looking at this issue is relying on the operator a action, that to accomplish the switchover based on what is 9 happening with the tank level and the rest of the things going to on in the plant, one of his immediate actions when you reach 11 that low level would be to terminate the main -- the feedwater 12 injection to allow more time to complete the rest of the 13 manipulations.
(3
('~'l I4 Concerns are that in the stressful situation of 15 the large break LOCA going on that there may be potential for 16 the operator not to perform these actions in a timely manner, 17 and that if the injection continues too long from these pumps 18 that you would drop the level of the tank down too low and 19 damage your charging and your refueling water pumps.
20 MR. SIESS: You are not worried about the feed-21 water?
22 MS. MC KENNA: No. You are not worried about 23 these pumps. They only take suction on the refueling water 24 storage tanks.
I 25 MR. SIESS: You are not going to use them anyway?
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84
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i MS. MC KENNA: Anyway.
2 MR. SIESS: But you are worried about the other 3
two?. Damaging the other two?
4 MS. MC KENNA: Yes.
5 MR. WARD: In evaluating this, is it just the 6 time that -- the fact that you've only got, what, five point 7 eight, a minute, instead of an arbitrary twenty?
8 Or, has someone looked at the details of the 9 control room, where the controls are and where the indications no are?
ii MS. MC KENNA: We haven' t done that complex of 12 an analysis.
s 13 MR. WARD: Have you looked at all?
)
N i4 MS. MC KENNA: We have looked. We have visited 15 the site and seen the situation.
16 I might draw a parallel to another plant that 17 had a similar kind of sit-uation where again they did not meet is the twenty minute time. And we went through the exercise.
pp We went to the site and walked through the procedure with 20 the operators to see where the instruments were located, the
. 21 actions that were required to be performed.
22 And we concluded that in that situation that -- they 23 had made some modifications, they had redundant alarms -- that 24 the time available was acceptable. It was a somewhat longer 25 time than we have here. And there were also some dif ferences ,
O
85 4
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(s,/ i in terms of pumps that were being used. They had some pumps 2 they only used in recirculation which were not on during in- ;
3 jection, so that you didn' t have the potential of damaging 4 the pumps.
5 So there were some different factors in that case.
6 As I say, the main concern we had here was that time is quite 7 short.
8 MR. SIESS: Now, let me get straight. From what 9 I'm reading at the twenty-one percent level in the refueling 10 water storage tank, there is an alarm.
11 MS. MC KENNA: That's right.
12 MR. SIESS: And the operator is supposed to re-
, ,S 13 spond to that alarm by turning of f the feedwater pumps?
b 14 MS. MC KENNA: Edght.
15 MR. SIESS: And if he doesn't turn them off in 16 about two minutes you could lose suction.
I'7 MS. MC KENNA: Right. You reach the NPSH level.
18 MR. SIESS: And there is no automatic switchof f 19 on those feedwater pumps?
20 MS. MC KENNA: No. That's what the proposal is 21 right now.
22 MR. SIESS: And if they are switched off, you 23 have how long, then? If they are automatically switched off 24 at twenty-one percent you've got several minutes; is that 25 right?
(~\
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86
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\ /- 1 MS. MC KENNA: Yes.
2 MR. SIESS: Okay.
3 MS. MC KENNA: Okay.
4 (Slide.)
5 This is a slide that is not in your packet. But 6 it is on this specific issue.
7 This is what we looked at, the concerns that we 8 have for the topic review, that it was only the single alarm 9 and that the' time for operator action was short.
10 As I indicated on safety injection, you have the 11 two trains, the feedwater, the two refueling water pumps and 12 the one charging pump automatically sequenced. .This is ap-w 13 proximately 22,000 GPM flow rate.
\J' 14 And here is a case where we don' t take a signal 15 failure of the pumps. We consider a failure of the events.
16 We are assuming here that all the pumps function. They are 17 all drawing suction from the tank and back to capacity for 18 this kind of analysis.
19 When you g'et to the twenty-one percent level where 20 the alarm is, the feedwater puups are to be tripped and the 21 charging flow realigned, as I indicated earlier. Then, there 22 is another point when you get down to twelve percent, which 23 there is not an alarm but it's an indication you have to read 24 to establish the suction for the sump, and then approximately 25 a seven percent level in the tank is where you would want to
(~)
L)
87 i *
( ,I 1 have the suction stopped in the tank. So that you won' t have 2 .a potential for damaging your pumps.
3 I'm trying to give you a little flavor of the 4 timing, some of which you've seen. And it takes approximately 5 eight minutes from the time the pumps come on at the 22,000 6 GPM to reach the twenty-one percent level.
7 If you say that they take prompt action and trip 8 them in thirty seconds, or if there is an automatic feature 9 to trip them, that probably then in about five minutes --
10 some variation, depending on what you postulate in terms of 11' your flow rate -- you would reach the twelve percent level.
12 MR. SIESS: What happens at twelve percent?
13 MS. MC KENNA: The twelve percent, you start 7S
\- 14 establishing the suction-for the sump.
15 MR. SIESS: No alarm?
16 MS. MC KENNA: No alarm, just procedure.
17 MR. SIESS: Okay. Procedure?
18 MS. MC KENNA: Right. Procedure. If you have 19 promptly tripped off the feedwater pumps up here from the 20 time you reach the twelve percent where you are establishing 21 the sump suction to the seven percent where you want to be 22 of f of the tank , that's about ten minutes. Eight to ten 23 minutes, depending on flow rates.
24 If you don' t, when you get to the twenty-one 25 percent and for some reason they are not tripped then you are
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88 i
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i going to be down to seven percent in about two minutes.
What it boiled down to was, we had 2 MR. GRIMES:
3 a choice of if you don't fix it the operator has got to 4 respond in two minutes. If you do fix it, he has got ten 5 minutes.
6 From the human reliability point of view, there 7 was no detailed analysis of what steps he has got to go 8 th rough . But just intuitively we felt two minutes was too 9 short.
10 MR. WARD: Yes , or whether ten minutor is enough.
11 MR. GRIMES : Ten minutes is comparable to what 12 we have found in other SEP plants. It is, you know, a
, _ . 13 reasonable period of time.
/\
> 14 MS. MC KENNA: There is also an additional time 15 at this point. As I indicated, we are not going strictly --
16 the ANSI says we are supposed to have twenty minutes. We are 17 not taking that blindly. We are using some judgment as to is what are appropriate times.
19 But with this kind of time frame and with the 20 situation we are in, I think all of the human reliability 2i information that we received was that that's just too close.
22 MR. SIESS: Now, what about the proposal to have 23 the alarm at the thirty percent level?
24 MS. MC KENNA: That would increase these times.
25 I don't recall specifically. Maybe it's three or four. It O
O
89
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( ,) i may be three or four. It does increase it some.
2 But we felt it wasn't enough.
3 MR. SIESS: So, you are asking for two things.
4 One is the automatic trip that you don't care at what level; 5 well, twenty-one percent or higher?
6 MS. MC KENNA: Thirty percent. Twenty-one percent.
7 Whateve r, there are dif ferent alternatives.
8 MR. SIESS: You are concerned also that the 9 single level alarm is subject to single failure?
10 MS. MC KENNA: These may well be combined, too, ii depending on what happens here. If there is an additional 12 channel, you have to have certain redundancy.and requirements.
13 So, they might get combined in together.
,f ,5
- 14 MR. SIESS: Your concern is if the alarm f ails ,
He has got procedures ,
15 l the operator doesn' t do anything?
16 he has got something.
17 MS. MC KENNA:- Certainly he has procedures, and IB he is aware if there is a need to do that.
19 MR. SIESS: He has got an indicator of- the 20 level?
21 MR. RUBIN: But the time is extremely short to 22 recover.
23 MR. SIESS: Now, is that the whole story from 24 your point of view?
25 MS. MC KENNA: Yes, I think so.
O G
90
(_) 1 MR. SIESS: I guess maybe we ought to hear from --
2 let's see what questions there are, and then I think we ought 3 to hear from the licensee as to why he feels he --
4 MR. WARD: I would like to ask another question 5 about this system, but it doesn't relate to the timing. So, 6 let's go ahead.
7 MR. SIESS: Go ahead.
8 MR. WARD: I mean, the charging pumps are, they 9 are centrifugal pumps but they are high pressure pumps with 10 a mechanical seal, I presume.
11 In the review e have you looked at whether there 12 J s any particular vulnerability of the pump seals, let's say ,
13 or the pump operability in taking from the -- sucking from 14 the sump?
15 I mean, there is a higher probability having, 16 you know, dirty water.
17 MS. MC KENNA: There are strainers.
18 MR. WARD: Well, there are out those are imperfect.
19 There is a certain amount of --
20 MS. MC KENNA: Well, yeah. I agree with you.
21 It wasn' t something we particularly looked at.
22 MR. WARD: That's really my question. Have you 23 in particular looked at that?
24 MS. MC KENNA: No.
25 MR. SIESS: Are the containment sprays the only b
v
. -- - . _ , _ _ = _ - _ _ _ . _ - - . _ _ _ _ - -
91 r
kg s ) 1 means of cooling containment?
2 MS. MC KENNA: They are the only safety-related, 3 if you want to call it that. There are f an coole rs , but the s 4 safety analysis does not rely on them.
5 MR. SIESS: They are not Category 1 or something?
6 MS. MC KENNA; Right. They don't meet all the 7 power supply and --
8 MR. SIESS: Well, this then is a hypothetical 9 question. If you didn't have your containment sprays how 10 much more time would you have?
> 11 MS. MC KENNA: There, a total capacity I think is 12 like 1800 GPM. So, it's certainly going to buy you a little f 13 bit. But, you know, another couple of minutes , a minute or
\
14 tWo.
15 But I don' t know if it's going to make a signifi-16 cant difference.
17 MR. SIESS: The reason I mention it is that some i
18 years ago we were talking with the Germans and they were l'
against containment sp'r ay simply for the reason that it re-20 l quired an early switchover from the RWST to the sump. And 21 they liked the additional time.
- 22 I thought it was an interesting reason.
l 23 MR. GRIMES: It's conceivable that some other 24 combination of sequencing for the pumps could be developed.
25 But, still we are talking about -- l 4
i
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92
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f '1 _
(_,) 1 MR. SIESS: This is a time element that's 2 really a function of a couple of pretty big pumps.
3 MR. GRIMES: That's right.
4 MR. SIESS: Do both those pumps operate all the 5 time, the big ones?
6 FG , MC KENNA: Yes. They would be going, providing 7 t7edwater to the generators.
8 MR. SIESS: Let's hear from the' licensee as to 9 why he thinks this is not necessary and just otherwise doesn't 10 want to do it.
11 MR. RAINSBE RRY : This is Jack Rainsberry. We 12 have been talking with the staf f on this issue for some time
- 13 now. We have had the operators walk through the procedures,
, )
14 stopwatch in hand, and identify the time to take steps.
15 We've also -- this is also stressed in the train-16 ing and in the procedure, the fact that they must watch the 17 level indication of the RWST in the event gf the safety injection type 18 event.
19 They are instructed to constantly watch the RWST 20 level indication, such that whether or not they get that alarm 21 they are aware of what is happening to the RWST level.
22 We have, in considering the staf f's recommendations ,
23 alternatively also been looking at whether or not we can use 24 the containment, the new containment sump level indication, 25 to provide a correlation of what the RWST level indication is
- "'8 U/
93 i doing.. That may be an alternative to a redundant RWST level 2 indication located in the control room.
3 The other aspect is , we do have a redundant RWST 4 level indicator. It happens to indicate in the technical 5 support center, which is immediately adjacent to the control 6 room, at the moment and there is no redundant readout in 7 the control room. That's another alternative to look at.
8 We have looked at what it might cost to do this 9 work, and it -- in a very quick and short and dirty cost 10 estimate that we've done recently, it's upwards of three 11 hundred thousand to automate the switchover. I' m sorry , to 12 put an automatic trip on the feedwater pumps. We have not
<- 13 looked at what the downside of doing- that would be. There
(]s-14 has been no detail design such that the cost, the basis for 15 the cost estimate, is not firmed up.
16 We would be Concerned about other things that 17 that trip of the feedwater pump might do. It's failure in 18 a manner to trip the pumps earlier, could be more devastating 19 I think than a delay in the operators tripping the pumps 20 late r.
21 We also would indicate that a detailed review of 22 this nature, what the operator is going to be doing in carrying 23 out all of our emergency procedures, especially this one, will 24 be part of our control design review which we are initiating 25 now and will go into the latter part of next year.
O
94 7~
(,,) i We would suggest that this item in particular 2 would be something that we would call out specifically to a be monitored and evaluated for human factors deficiencies 4 as part of that process. But we believe that the existing 5 attention given in the procedures and in the training of our 6 operators suggests that they are well cautioned to monitor the 7 RNST level in the event of safety injection.
8 MR. SIESS: This is strictly a large LOCA question.
9 MS. MC KENNA: Yes.
10 MR. RAINSBERRY: Yes, it is.
11 MR. SIESS: At this point in time, following a 12 large LOCA, now is that the only thing an operator has got to is worry about, watching that RWST level? '
14 MR. RAINSBERRY : I'm mentally trying to go' over --
15 or go over the procedure --
16 MR. SIESS: I mean, it takes him two minutes to 17 read some of those procedures.
18 MR. RAINSBERRY : But the fact that he needs to 19 monitor RNST level isn't something that he needs to read 20 again. That is something that is a caution to him up front.
21 One of the things that we've talked about -- and 22 I'm not sure if it's implemented -- is to dedicate, put an 23 operator in front of the level indicator and have him watch 24 it while the other individuals in the control room might be 25 taking care of looking at the other alarms that are happening.
O
95 p
\ss 1 MR. SIESS: What do you -- what is your position 2 on the reliability of the level indicator?
3 MR. RAINSBERRY: The fact that one level indicator 4 is -- I don't think we have a strong position that one level 5 indicator is sufficient. You can't argue that.
6 But once we have looked at the containment sump 7 level indication to have that correlation, I believe that with 8 those redundant instruments we will have a very high reliability.
9 MR. SIESS: That means you would be looking at 10 two instruments?
11 MR. RAINSBERRY: Yes.
12 MR. SIESS: And deciding which one is the worse.
13 That's another decision that has to be made in that two 1d minutes?
15 MR. RAINSBE RRY : No, in eight minutes.
16 Not in the ten minutes , the eight MR. SIESS:
17 minutes.
18 MR. WARD: Do you have a -- is there a training 19 simulator for this unit?
20 MR. RAINSBERRY: For San Onofre 1, there is not.
21 We use the Zion simulator for training the operators. The
.22 other aspect is the Unit 1 control room is a very -- it's a 23 small control room. The instruments we are talking about are 24 relatively closely located.
25 You see everything?
MR. SIESS:
O
96 1 MR. RAINSBERRY: Yes.
2 MR. WARD: Is everything you need for this 3 situation, you know, in the front of the panel?
4 MR. RAINSBERRY: Yes, absolutely. And I believe 5 all of the instruments are on one panel.
6 MR. SIESS: Let's see, your technical support 7 center is right next door to your control room, isn' t it?
8 MR. RAINSBERRY : That's correct.
9 MR. SIESS: With a glass between them?
10 MR. RAINSBERRY: Yes.
Il MR. WYLIE: Is this training part of your 12 emergency procedure training?
13 MR. RAINSBERRY: Yes.
\- 14 MR. GRIMES: Needless to say, it's a pretty close 15 call on this issue. We have been in the control room and, 16 you know, looked at the instruments.
17 We have looked at the procedures. This was one is issue where we felt we just needed to come down on the side 19 of conservatism. And if the utility decides that they want 20 to fight the issue, we will continue to pursue it.
21 But as a minimum, we would at least want to go 22 through a much more detailed human reliability analysis to 23 determine to what extent we are relying on the operator to i 24 react in this situation and to look at other alternatives; 25 perhaps that might minimize the impact.
( o%>
l L
97 i
," >i
(/ _
1 Previous procedures that we have looked at for 2 ESF switchover generally have shown the operator can reliably 3 react to this. To asimple procedure under these conditions ,
4 in about three to four minutes; and with an allowable time 5 of two minutes we can't say, you know, it's absolutely wrong, 6 it's absolutely right.
7 What it indicates to us is, if we were to make 8 these modifications the problem would be resolved.
9 MR. SIESS: At thirty percent trip, enunciation 10 at thirty percent level, does that give any more time?
11 MS. MC KENNA: Certainly, it gives you more time.
12 It's a difference between going --
13 MR. SIESS: Chris, if the licensee does not
('N
' 14 ag ree , en do you have to go through a backfit procedure?
15 MR. GRIMES: Well, we would go through a back-16 fitting procedure. We Would want to evaluate it further.
17 MR. SIESS: But, actually in this case you've 18 got FTOL hanging over our heads. But, let's assume you have 19 to go through a backfit procedure and do a cost benefit 20 analysis. Now, three hundred thousand dollars' cos t plus --
21 I doubt if there is much man rem exposure for the r.odifica-22 tion , what do you think the benefits would show, since the 23 probability of a large LOCA is small?
24 How would you do a cost benefit on this thing?
25 MR. WARD: Let's see, is it definitely tied -- the p
V
. - . - - - . ~ - _ . - _ - . _ - _ . . - - -. - -. -__ - --
98
() I whole evolution here is timing and everything is definitely 2 tied to the large break LOCA, I guess; is that right?
3 MR. GRIMES : I don' t know down to what level.
4 MR. SIESS: You don't need to put that much 5 water in.
6 MR. WARD: Well, you can't put that much water 7 in unless --
8 MS . MC KENNA: That's right, unless you depres-9 surize substantially.
H) MR. WARD: As big as the capacity of those big 11 pumps or something.
12 MS. MC KENNA: Right.
p, 13 MR. SIESS: If you had to do a cost benefit, do
'\ - 14 you have any idea how it would come out?
15 MR. GRIMES: Roughly we guessed that it would go 16 in our favor. Or, we wouldn' t have pursued this position.
17 The bottom line is, right now our position is 18 we know the problem is solved by the plant modification. If 19 the utility feels that we haven' t given enough attention to 20 that, then we will carry it to the next step, to a detailed 21 cost benefit evaluation as a minimum. We want that anyhow 22 before we would let go of this issue.
23 MR. SIESS: Do you think a cost benefit would 24 show the three or four hundred man rem it would take?
l I
25 MR. GRIMES: Let me put it a different way. We l
l l
99
/^)
'ss ,) I didn' t get a cost estimate before either. I know we typical-2 ly see figures like fif ty thousand dollars to string a cable.
3 So, intuitively we felt maybe we are talking fifty or a 4 hundred thousand dollars. And we felt that we get man rem 5 averted if we were to do a detailed plant specific calcula-6 tion for this.
7 We haven't done that, because our first approach 8 to this was to take the position that these plant modifica-9 tions ought to be made.
10 MR. SIESS: I think it's more than running cable, 11 isn' t it?
12 MR. GRIMES: It is. But I say generally as a 7s ,
13 rule of thumb, we would say about fif ty thousand dollars to 14 string a cable you've got to at least string the cable to 15 get this automatic trip. So, we are roughly looking at a 16 number in that ballpark.
17 MR. SIESS: r don't know how to look at numbers.
18 I just saw an estimate of two hundred and fif ty thousand 19 dollars to put a motor-operated valve on a three inch line.
20 MR. WARD: Let's see, there was a statement that 21 the automatic trip has a safety downside.
22 MR. GRIMES : Could have. Tha t 's true .
23 MR. WARD: Does your rough cost benefit analysis 24 include an estimate of what that might be?
25 MR. GRIMES: No, sir. We have not done a detailed O
100 g( ,j i
~
evaluation of what the upside and downsides are. We expected 2 that as a result of this issue, we would either, you know, 3 get it fixed. We would not expect the utility to just roll 4 over and fix things because we suggested it.
5 We raised this as a proposed corrective action to 6 resolve this issue. And if there were downsides , we would be ,
7 you know, expecting the utility to say: Hey, we don't want a to do this because of the negative impact from some other 9 side.
to MR. WARD: So, you are really looking for them to - -
11 MR. GRIMES: We were looking for them to come 12 back with an alternative proposal or an alternative recommenda-13 tion to resolve the issue.
\-sl 14 Right now, I think we have got this categorized 15 somewhere between hardware raodification and further evalua-16 tion. We would certainly be willing to look at this in some 17 more detail.
18 But, as I said, the results of the integrated 19 assessment were that this was close enough to call, that 20 something has got to be done. And that something might be 21 a more detailed evaluation or perhaps even proced'Iral changes.
22 But if the procedures are still relying on, you 23 know, operator reaction times, two minutes, then what it l 24 boils down to is a cost benefit that basically is predicated 25 on the probability of a large break LOCA. That's typically w
101
() i how these things fall out.
2 MR. SIESS: Well, the P RA doesn ' t try to get a quantitative on these things, does it?
4 MR. HAMMOND: Page 60 has the probability numbers 5 on --
6 MR. SIESS: I can't hear you.
7 MR. HAMMOND: Page 60 of Appendix D.
8 MR. SIESS: Oh, Appendix D.
9 MR. HAMMOND: D.
10 MR. RUBIN: I would like to say that the staf f it would have used a much larger human error rate for the
~
12 assessment to switchover. 'Ihat's our note to the PRA. So, the 13 core melt would be maybe a factor of ten.
14 MR. WARD: But since this is so completely tied is to a large break LOCA -- and I guess it uses the WASH 1400, 16 ten to the minus four; is that it? Which I don't think any-17 body really believes anymore.
18 MR. RUBIN: It's used even today. That's the 19 problem. Even if you do a plant specific analysis today.
20 MR. SIESS: Well, this says a core melt frequency 21 of two and a half times ten to the minus six, and you can 22 take it down a factor of ten with redundant indicators and 23 another f actor of ten with automatic -- now, automatic 24 switchover. Does that mean automatic --
25 MR. GRIMES: Automatic termination.
O
102 O)
(, 1 MS. . MC KENNA: I believe in the analysis that 2 automatic switchover was talking about more than just the 3 trip. It was automating the whole thing.
4 MR. SIESS: But if I believe two and a half times 5 ten to the minus six, I look at the safety goals which say 6 any single thing has a cutoff point at ten to the minus five.
7 MR. RUBIN: That -- which number are you reading a from? Okay. That's the analysis results assuming a very 9 good human performance, and we don' t accept that.
10 MR. SIESS: Okay. That was SAI's value?
11 MR. RUBIN: Righ t.
f 12 MR. SIESS: And you would lower that because 13 you didn't believe the two minutes was good enough?
O 14 MR. RUBIN: That's correct.
15 MR. SIESS: So you would get it down to what, a 16 factor of ten?
17 MR. RUBIN: Ten, perhaps even more.
18 MR. SIESS: Okay. Now, I can see the staff's 19 concern that two minutes 'is well below what you usually 20 think of.
21 I think the issue is f airly clear. Any other 22 questions?
23 MR. BASIN: Dr. Siess, could I make a comment?
24 MR. SIESS: Yes.
25 MR. BASKIN: I think Chris said it but let me just O
103
() i- reemphasize. This issue isn't at the point where I would say 2 we are loggerhead with the staf f and we've decided not to a do it, and they are pushing us to do it.
4 It has been identified. As Chris said, there are 5 things that have been mentioned I think that have to be looked 6 at further, one additional factor is independent of this 7 program,' we have made a commitment to redo the safety in-8 jection system, as was mentioned earlier, with separate pumps 9 that f actored potentially into this" decision.
10 So , I think from our perspective it's at the 11 point that, you know, they said: This is the way to solve 12 the problem. We don't feel that we could immediately agree r~s 13 to that. We've just got to look a little bit further. We i
la are not at the point where we are saying no.
15 MR. SIESS: You are not at this point saying you 16 don' t have a problem?
17 MR. BASKIN: That's correct.
18 MR. SIESS: And the staff is not absolutely sure 19 you do have a problem?
20 MR. GRIMES : I would like to point out here that 21 we call the category of this thing, disagrees or licensee 22 doesn' t have a position.
23 We have basically identified for both of these 24 topics an issue that needs to be resolved. And the utility 25 has not yet developed its position on how it would resolve O
104 f 1 these things. So, we have offered up our recommended actions.
2 And, clearly we need to carry these things further and decide 3 how to resolve them.
4 And Mr. Baskin is correct, that if as a result of 5 their other plans to modify the safety injection system they 6 Can figure out a dif ferent way to make us feel Comfortable 7 that the procedures don' t overstress the operator, then that 8 could .1 a resolution to this issue.
9 MR. WARD: Yeah. If they go to separate pumps lo for low pressure injection, I guess that's going to simplify 11 the whole thing.~
12 MR. GRIMES: That's correct. But it still depends 13 on the sequencing of suction from the RNST and the time 14 that it takes for the RNST to drain down to a point where you 15 jeopardize all of the pumps.
16 MR. SIESS: Right. Well, are those large pumps 17 something that you find at other plants?
18 one of the problems, it seems to me, if those 19 pumps are really drawing down --
20 MS. MC KENNA: These might be probably larger 21 than you see at most plants. I would say in general the 22 plants that we've looked at in the SEP, the low pressure i
23 safety injection pumps were maybe in the four to six thousand 24 GPM, total maybe eight thousand.
25 Whereas, here we have a total of more like 20,000 0
,. \
105
" f 1 1
1 1
s s
.f i N I GPM. They probably -- you don ' t need . that much' capacity . It's 2 just that thece pumps, can'put that much out. So, that's what 3 you get. i 4 This is the only plant that I know of that has l l
S. this particular configuration.- It is a little dif ferent in .
s< ,
6 that regard.
3- .
7 MR. SIESS: Any other questions?
8 (No response.) N - ,
9 Okay. I think we' understand the situation, ~ and.
10 we will probably want some presentation on this to the Full 11 Committee although it obviously has to be shorter. m.
12 'S.
M MC KENNA: The proplem is that it's an
('sg 13 involved issue.
14 MR. SIESS: Maybe you can figure out how to 15 shorten it.
16 MS. MC KENNA: We will work on it.
17 MR. SIESS: I can summarize it very briefly and 18 inadequately and then let them ask questions, at which point 19 that won' t make it any' shorter either. But they will ask 20 questions even if it isn't short, so it doesn' t make any ?
21 difference. If you understand that.
~
t
+
22 Okay. Le t ' s talk about tornado missile protection.
23 I MS. MC KEN 3A: 0kay. , This is another area where 24 it is listed fas disagreement. But I don' t know if, I really +
l r 25 necessarily a, gree. I don' t think we disagree on tth .need for
('~>h
~- } .
106
,e
( ,y) tornado missile protection. I think we are looking at 2 different alternatives for accomplishing that.
3- One area. where there is always disagreement is i i
4 what is the appropriate hazard function for the plant.
5 (S lide - )
6 What I did on this figure was try to show some of 7 the dif ferent numbers that have been calculated by people as a to the probability of -- these curves are wind, and then the 9 lower ones are tornado.
10 MR. SIESS: And we are in the right area now, we 11 are in Zone 3 or whatever it is called?
12 MS . MC KENNA: Yes, that's right. These were site specific curves that were developed.
7- 13
'- 14 The first one, this is the Mcdonald curve with is straight wind and tornadoes. The mean or expected value, 16 whatever you call it, developed also an upper 95th percent, 17 and the lower is five percent curve.
18 As well, staff did some independent calculations 19 of the hazard and that essentially falls on the wind curve, 20 an upper 95th, identical, and then it comes like this. It 21 follows very closely the upper 95th Mcdonald.
l 22 MR. SIESS: When you said the staff did an in-23 dependent, was that inhouse or have you got another set of I
}. 24 consultants?
25 MS. MC KENNA: Inhouse.
O b
107
() j MR. SIESS: Mcdonald was a staff consultant, as 2
I re call .
3 MS. MC KENNA: That's right.
4 MR. SIESS: Now, the staff has gotten smart 5
en ugh to disagree with him; is that right?
6 MS. MC KENNA: Well, disagree to some degree.
7 Originally, the staff had done some earlier work and the 8 curve had been lower. Then, they revised it with some more 9 recent data and it changed.
io so, I think it just shows there is an awful lot g of variability in the way people do.
12 MR. SIESS: There isn't enough difference there 13 to talk about.
.i ,- )
\-) i4 MS. MC KENNA: The licensee independently did 15 perform a calculation of the hazard, and that's this curve 16 here.
j7 MR. SIESS: And who was the licensee's consultant?
18 MR. RAINSBERRY : We used CYNGA Corporation and 19 they subcontracted with Dr. Fujida to actually do the --
20 MR. SIESS: Fujida?
21 MR. RAINSBERRY : Yes.
22 MR. SIESS: Now, we are getting up to a real i
23 authority.
24 MS. MC KENNA: This curve shows the straight 25 wind and then this other curve coming down here is on the f~h)
's .
108 fv
() I tornado.
2 MR. SIESS: Was Fujida the consultant on straight
-3 wind? I wouldn't think so.
4 MR. RAINSBERRY : Yes, he was.
5 MR. SIESS: I didn' t think that was his business.
6 MS. MC KENNA: This is our starting point anyway fo' r var:m 7 predictions of what the tornado might be.
8 MR. SIESS: As far as the missile protection is 9 concerned, the missile protection is a function of the tornado 10 velocity.
11 MS. MC KENNA: Certainly, the degree -- the kind 12 of damage you can get from a missile is dependent on the
- f, 3 13 velocity.
I 4
\- # 14 MR. SIESS: You are assuming the velocity of the 15 missile is some ' function of the velocity of the tornado?
16 MR. GRIMES : Yes, sir, that's correct.
I'7 MR. SIESS: For the kind of things that are 18 outside of that plant, it would seem that that would only
~
19 be an issue in providing a protection.
20 I mean, if there is a pump sitting outside or a 21 valve sitting outside, I suspect that it will be damaged for 22 quite a range of velocities if a telephone pole hits it.
23 How sensitive is the missile protection to the 24 velocity? I wouldn't think it would be too sensitive.
25 MR. RAINSBERRY: This is Jack Rainsberry. One O)
<.v a
v
109 j'
4 ,)f 1 thing that would be affected by that is the missile itself.
2 And some wind speeds, some missile can' t be lif ted.
3 MR. SIESS: I thought the staf f had a standard ' set 4 of missiles by now.
5 MR. GRIMES: For the SEP reviews , what we have 6 been doing is using two typical missiles, the telephone pole 7 and a steel pole because they are fairly representative.
8 And if you get into a detailed evaluation -- and 9 this was an issue that we tried to explain with Oyster Creek --
10 if you are going to look on a component-by-component basis for 11 each of the things that you are relying on for safe shutdown, 12 you really need to go back to look at full spectrum missiles, 13 both through the full range of probabilities and that certainly
']
-- 14 is an alternative to designing hardened protection.
15 You can look at the capability of the specific 16 components and as opposed to the spectrum of missiles that 17 are being applied.
18 And, then another consideration is that this 19 again is a beach site. If you have got a tornado kicking up 20 sand you don' t want to be relying on~ pumps or motors that are 21 exposed, because they are likely going to be clogged.or other-22 wise effected by the sandstorm that would be accompanying the 23 missiles that are coming at it.
24 MR. SIESS: Any record of sandstorms? They must 25 have had tornadoes out in California, in that there is a whole p
b
110 m
-(,) i lot of beach out there. Is there any. record of damage from 2 blowing sand?
3 MR. GRIMES : If I recall the data that were used 4 to develop the hazard functions, I don' t know that they had 5 a tornado that passed over a beach. I know they have hsd 6 tornadoes over water that were hard to include in the data, 7 And they've got a large area of tornadoes that a were used to develop the probability f unction, the hazard 9 functions.
10 MR. SIESS: Now, Chris, right now they have not 11 selected a tornado level. They are supposed to do sort of a 12 cost benefit analysis and come up with a level at which the 13 cost for design isn't excessive, and that's for structures 7-.
t
\ ') . and things like that.
14 That's not for this one.
15 But usually it seems that the plants have come 16 out with something in the neighborhood of ten to the minus 17 five; am I right?
18 MR. GRIMES : We asked them to evaluate in the 19 range, the range of ten to the minus four, ten to the minus 20 five. I promised Dr. Oakron that if it was cost effective to 21 go beyond ten to the minus five, ten to the minus six, or 22 ten to the minus seven that we would do that.
23 MR. SIESS: Okay. Now, if I've got a tornado 24 with a probability of ten to the minus five, do we then assume 25 that the probability that that tornado will pick up a missile A
k
111 y.
k,,,) i and hit a critical plant component is one?
2 MR. GRIMES: That's one way to approach it but 3 that's not the only way. We can use -- there is an EPRI 4 methodology that we have developed for doing missile analysis 5 that goes through -- from the hazard function to the wind, 6 the probability of picking up any missile, the missiles 7 available to pick up, and eventually goes down to the pro-a bability of the specific component will be knocked out.
9 MR. SIESS: I would assume that if San Onofre io were like other plants , you look at the protection of a ii safe shutdown system, at least one path, right? That's what 12 you are calling for?
f-~g 13 MR. GRIMES: That's correct.
( !
i4 MR. SIESS: I assume they- have got more than one 15 path?
16 MR. GRIMES: Yes, they do.
17 MR. SIESS: And I suspect all of them are is vulnerable, because it's an awful lot of stuff sitting out-19 side.
20 MR. GRIMES: Probably.
21 MR. SIESS: So, we are now taking the probability 22 of a tornado, the probability of a pickup of a missile and 23 hit component A, pick up another missile and hit something
- 24 in train B.
l 25 And if there are three systems, it will also hit t
(~'8 1 i
\ m- /
l
112
(
\- / 1 something in train C. Now, there is no way in the world I 2 can apply one to everything past a tornado.
3 So, what is your situation? You haven' t had a 4 commitment to the EPRI approach?
l 5 MR. GRIMES : We haven' t had a pogrsal yet from the 6 licensee as to how they want to demonstrate adequate pro-7 tection against tornadoes.
8 Have you bought the EPRI approach on MR._SIESS:
9 the plant?
10 MR. GRIMES: Yes, we have, i
l 11 MR. SIESS: And at what level do you find it 12 s atis f actory? Ten to the minus seven?
rS 13 MR. GRIMES: No, it's along the range --
\.
Id MS. MC KENNA: You are down to ten to the minus is six, ten to the minus seven, in that range.
16 MR. SIESS: It's the usual external ten to the 17 minus six or ten to the minus seven, depending on where your is conservatisms are.
19 MS. MC KENNA: Depending on what locations and to 20 what degree. I think in some cases , maybe ten to the minus 21 six is okay.
22 I believe the licensee is prepared today to 23 present some information on what they are doing in this area.
24 MR. SIESS: Okay.
l 25 MR. WARD: Let me ask, this thing about the sandstorr O
113
,,y
() and vulnerability of external equipment is new to me. I mean, 2 are you dealing with that in some explicit way?
3 What sort of damages or what sort of wind speeds 4 are important?
5 MS. MC KENNA: I don't know if we've really looked at 6 that in a comprehensive way. I think Chris has only mentioned 7 it because there is equipment located outside where you would 8 have to at least consider that, whereas at other sites they 9 are maybe all in buildings where you don't have the same --
10 MR. GRIMES: There again, it's an issue associated 11 with relying on external equipment, that if you are going to 12 look at the functional capability of the equipment you want 7-s 13 to relate it to the event of interest.
(
k ') 14 Tornadoes produce high wind speeds that put a 15 pressure load on structure systems and components. They also 16 produce missiles, you know, of a range of sizes.
17 And for ocean sites, we would expect more than is for an inland site, that there might be more dust and debris 19 associated with the wind event th~an you might expect with --
20 MR. WARD: Okay. What I was asking, is there a 21 methodology that has been developed for assessing whether 22 this is important or not?
23 MR. GRIMES: No, there has not. It's just that 24 it is a consideration that you would take into account when 25 you are deciding what things are vulnerable. And, for example --
10 V
i 114 ;
'((3,) 1 MR. WARD: Are you expecting the licensee to 2 develop something?
3 MR. GRIMES: We would expect the licensee, as 4 part of their evaluation of what needs to be protected, if :
5 they are going to rely on an external pump motor, for example, 6 if the motor windings are exposed, then they are either going 7 to have to do an evaluation and show that if sand or debris or 8 dust is being carried by the wind that the motor can still 9 ' function, to protect it against that ' kind of thing.
10 The same thing is true with the missiles. As I 11 said before, one approach is you can arbitrarily assume that 12 the missile strike probability is one given the missile 13 generation probability and simply demonstrate these components t
\ 14 can withstand that strike. That's one approach. The other 15 approach is to go to the probability of strike and demonstrate 16 that the probability of strike is low enough that you can 17 tolerate it.
18 MR. SIESS: Multiples, right?
19 MR. GRIMES : Multiple strikes.
20 MR. SIESS: It's more than one system there?
21 MR. GRIMES: It's a system-wide evaluation for 22 the missiles. There is a specific analysis technique for 23 looking at the range of systems and missiles that could impact 24 those systems.
25 So far as I know, that methodology doesn't extend O
115 l
?\
( ,)-
t i to dust and debris considerations. That is still involved in l
2 a, keep the thing closed, kind of approach.
3 MR. SIESS: This plant does have a lot more 4 stuf f outside than we normally see.
5 MR. WARD: Yes.
6 MR. SIESS: Not just the turbine. Do you want to 7 hear from the licensee now?
8 MR. RAINSBERRY : I think it's f air to say in 9 this issue that we are not in disagreement with doing an 10 evaluation of not only tornado winds but also tornado missiles
- 11 for this particular site to establish a cost benefit level of 12 which we are to be protected from tornadoes.
fx 13 As Eileen's slide , which she just removed there, t
14 shows there is -- we have developed different values for 15 the probability of various tornado levels in California. And 16 we have Craig Kelo from CYNGA here today to outline what r
17 Fujida did in developing that particular number.
i 18 He also will go into very briefly the program l 19 that we have underway 'to do the evaluation of tornado wind I
20 and missile effects at the site. And if it's appropriate at i 21 this time, we can ask Craig to go through that.
22 MR. SIESS: Well, I'm jus t wondering how appro-
!~ 23 priate it is for this Subcommittee to hear the discussion 24 on methodology. This is something that has been explored 25 by Dr. Oakron's Subcommittee on Extreme External Phenomena at
. v'n
_-_....-_.._,.__,.x-_ ,-... ,- - - . - _ - . -
116
,r)
(_,l 1 a couple of sessions with Mcdonald and so forth. And I don't 2 _ feel like I have the background and expertise, or the con-3 sultants, to really go through that and look at the differences 4 between Fujida's approach and Mcdonald's approach, which both 5 of -them I am sure are complex.
6 I think that the EEP Subcommittee might be in-
'7 terested in hearing that, although the question of tornadoes 8 in California clearly has a limited applicability once we 9 get past this plant.
10 MR. GRIMES : I would like to point out --
11 MR. SIESS: I expect that if there are basic 12 differences they might apply to tornadoes elsewhere.
,f
13 MR. GRIMES: I would like to point out that
'# 14 based on experience that we had with Ginna and the considerable 15 controversy that seemed to surround the development of the 16 hazard function that rather than debate the hazard function 17 for San Onofre, we felt that it would be easier and more 18 judicious of us if we simply let the licensee go ahead and 19 do their evaluation using their own hazard function and then 20 compare it to the hazard function that we had developed from 21 SEP, which already has had considerable airing with the 22 External Events Subcommittee.
23 And if we can conclude using the two different 24 hazard functions that an eventual resolution is the same, 25 then we would not have to get into the hazard function. And Q
o
117
~f3 I
(\_) I that was the position that we've taken in the draf t report.
.2 If it turns out that the hazard function seems 3 to be a critical parameter in this, then it would appear that 4 we may have to go back and visit Dr. Oakron again.
5 MR. SIESS: You mentioned the two hazard functions.
6 If I recall, doesn' t Twisdale have still a dif ferent --
7 MR. GRIMES: I believe Dr. Twisdale's hazard 8 function is implicit in the EPRI approach, and he does have 9 a somewhat different way of --
10 MR. SIESS: It's based on Mcdonald, but I thought 11 it went further than Mcdonald. Some dif ferences.
12 So we have really got three, haven' t we?
13 MR. GRIMES: I'm not sure whether it's a direct 14 part of the EPRI methodology or whether it's an input to it.
15 As I said before, we are comparing whatever action is taken 16 based on the hazard function developed by Mcdonald that we 17 have confirmed.
18 And I think that Dr. Twisdale's methodology is 19 at least referenced in the EPRI approach. But whether or 20 not you have to use that in order to develop the --
21 MR. SIESS: For the missiles.
22 MR. GRIMES : I'm not quite sure.
23 MR. SIESS: But they've already committed to do j 24 that study on tornado winds and tornado frequency?
25 MR. GRIMES: I believe they've already done this l'
l
_ . . _ . - .-_.-,c. _. . . . _ . _ , ,_, . _ . , . _ . _ , . . . _ _ _ ,,.
r i 118 1- study.
2 MR. SIESS: But we've got the Fujida hazard curve; 3 we've got a staff hazard curve; we've got a Mcdonald hazard 4 curve. And I assume we could get a Twisdale hazard curve, 5 right?
6 MR. GRIMES: Yes.
7 MR. SIESS: That's four of them.
8 MR. GRIMES : And I believe CYNGA would make five.
9 . MR. RAINS BERRY : CYNGA is Fujida.
10 MR. GRIMES : I'm sorry.
11 MR. WARD: That's enough to establish a distribu-12 tion, isn't it?
13 (Laughte r. )
/\-)T 14 MS. MC KENNA: There is not much more room on 15 this graph.
16 MR. RAINSBE RRY : Just by way of clarification, 17 Chris, the Twisdale EPRI approach does not -- is not limited is to his approach for development in the tornado probability.
19 And he is, in fact, doing a missile study for San Onofre 20 Unit 1, and he is using Dr. Fujida's tornado hazard as i. ..c 21 into this code.
22 MR. SIESS: And you say Twisdale did not have a 23 hazard curve?
24 MR. RAINSBERRY : For the San Onofre site, he did 25 not have a hazard curve.
O
119 O
\ ,) 1 MR. SIESS: He has done work on hazard curves 2 elsewhere?
3 MR. RAINSBE RRY : That's right. He has volunteered 4 to do one for the site. But we didn' t want to further muddy 5 the waters.
6 MR. SIESS: I would recommend to the Subcommittee 7 that we not get involved in the hazard curves at this point.
8 It may be a resolution that doesn' t involve it. And, frankly 9 I don't think we will ever resolve questions of hazard curves.
10 The resolution tends to be, take the upper bound when 11 in doubt, which doesn' t make a whole lot of sense either.
12 But that doesn' t make it right.
13 And I personally would like to hear Professor 14 Fujida's approach, as I think he is one of the world's experts 15 on tornadoes. And if he comes up with something that much 16 different, I suspect it's a significant basis to it.
17 But I don't think this is the proper forum. And 18 I would suggest that we not hear that part. Now, if there 19 are other aspects of the study let's go ahead with those.
20 MR. RAINSBERRY: The other aspect we had was 21 briefly a status report on the tornado wind and missile 22 evaluation that we are doing, a very brief discussion of that.
23 And maybe I can summarize that for the Subcommit-24 tee.
25 MR. SIESS: Take however much time you wish.
O
I .
120
) i MR. RAINSBERRY : We are doing a detailed review 2 of the plant site, the plant systems. We are doing a detailed 3 structure evaluation of what wind speed they can take. And a for various wind speed probabilities, we also have,like I 5 mentioned, contracted with Dr. Twisdale to do a missile 6 evaluation for the site based on plant specific evaluations 7 of what missiles are there.
8 This will all be factored into an overall cost 9 benefit type relationship where we will identify cost of 10 modification to meet a specific probability of tornado. And 11 once we have that information in hand, then we will be in a 12 position to make some assessment of what is cost beneficial 13 to implement at this site with respect to tornado protection.
7-ss
- 14 MR. SICSS: What would you consider the benefits, is simply the dose reductions or the benefits to the Company in to terms of its investment in plant?
17 MR. RAINSBERRY : Dose reduction, offsite dose la reduction.
10 MR. SIESS- Do you think the probabilities would 20 be so low that you would never be concerned about it from 21 pure economics? I'm talking about damage to the plant, not 22 necessarily to core molt.
23 MR. RAINSBERRY : I understand. The probability of 24 a tornado in the California coast we believe is so low that 25 the Company is not concerned about that damage to the plant.
O>
121 l
/'N
( ,) i MR. WARD : Is that based on this estimate? I 2 mean, the Fujida estimate. Or, is that based on subjectively - -
3 MR. RAINSBERRY : The Fujida estimate, recognizing 4 where he has assigned conservatisms in there. And also the 5 subjective limited to California and the frequency with which 6 we see tornadoes on the coast of California, or the lack of 7 frequency.
8 MR. SIESS: So, what you would be doing then in
<9 terms of wind loading is looking at your capacities, finding 10 the weakest one to see what probability that comes out, and ti then working up in stepc to see how far you can afford to go 12 in strengthening?
-~g 13 MR. RAINSBERRY : Yes.
\-- 14 MR. SIESS: And that's mainly from the point of l$ view of structures, not so much components?
16 MR. RAINSDE RRY : Ne will also look at components,
, 17 given that we have, as you mentioned, a large number of i
l 18 things outside. We will assess the wind speed and --
l 19 MR. SIESS: What about missiles now?
I l 20 MR. RAINSBERRY : Missiles will be evaluated using 21 the EPRI methodology, the and result of which gives a probabili ty 22 of damage and extent of damage.
l 23 MR. SIESS: How many systems do you have for 24 safe shutdown?
25 I assume hot shutdown or cold shutdown. What O
(V
-,----,..-----,-~n -w,- -<-,,-,,w w , - . - - , , , . _ . , _ ,- , , . - - - - - - -
122 O
k._,) i were you talking about? What is your requirement, hot or 2 cold?
3 MR. RAINSBERRY : We would propose that that be 4 based on the cost benefit assessment.
5 MR. SIESS: You look at hot first and then --
6 MR. RAINSBERRY : Yes.
7 MR. SIESS: How many systems do you have to take 8 you to hot shutdown?
9 MR. RAINSBE RRY : We have primarily -- we have 10 the normal systems. Then, also as backup, the auxiliary 11 feedwater system and then into the feed and bleed scenario.
12 MR. SIESS: Are there any common features to these 13 like service water or salt water cooling system?
g-~
"' 14 MR. GRIMES: For indefinite hot shutdown and 15 ultimately for cold shutdown, you have to rely on some kind 16 of connection to the ultimate heat sink, which is typically the 17 service water system to the salt water cooling system.
18 It might be that as a result of cost benefit 19 evalrTtions we might get back to an approach like that 20 take for seismic, where you look at cost benefit for short 21 te rr. .ot shutdown capability and then procedures to get you 22 to cold shutdown in a recovery kind of way. 1 23 That would only be considered if the cost for 24 achieving indefinite hot shutdown or cold shutdown are 25 extremely prohibitive.
123 0)
(, i MR. SIESS: Then, what I guess I have got a ,
2 little problem with here is why the missile protection is 3 characterized as a dif ferent type of item than the basic 4 tornado.
5 MS. MC KENNA: It's somewhat arbitrary. You 6 could have lumped them together with the wind and tornadoes 7 in terms of staff's and the licensee's assessment of what j e the appropriate hazard is. j 9 MR. SIESS: It seems to be that there is a commit-io ment to do an analysis and a cost benefit analysis for both 11 tornado winds and missiles.
12 And why isn't this an evaluation item?
, 13 MR. GRIMES : It is an evaluation item. But we !
l 14 highlight this, because at the time that we wrote the draf t is and made the assessment report we did not have a commitment to to that ef fect from the licensee, and also because of the 17 rather novel approach that we've taken, that we will let is them use their hazard function and we will judge it with our 19 hazard function.
l 20 We felt that it should be highlighted and i
21 brought to the Committee's attention.
t l 22 MR. SIESS: When I look at the confidence limits -
23 on those hazard functions, I have a great deal of trouble l
t 24 worrying about one or another. ,
25 MS. MC KENNA: This was an area where again the (22) !
i j
I
124
() i terminology we used in the past was disagreement, and it was probably not very good.
2 3 MR. SIESS: It's not complete agreement.
4 MS. MC KENNA: That's probably better, yes.
5 MR. SIESS: Well, it seems to me that both of 6 these issues fall into a category where the staff has a 7 concern. The concern is not denied by the licensee. And a there has been some sort of a commitment by the licensee to 9 pursue it, to come up with a proposal to alleviate the etaff's to concern, at which time there may or may not be agreement on 11 the proposal.
12 Now, with that maybe we ought to look at some ia of the other evaluation items which I suspect are even more 14 significant than these, is MR. GRIMES: We would be happy to go through the 16 rest of the evaluation, further evaluation, issues.
17 MR. SIESS: I think we need to at least have is them summarized and get the picture, because I can visualize 19 some of those as leading to the need for more significant 20 changes than either one of these.
21 MR. GRIMES : That's particularly true for seismic, 22 I think.
23 MR. SIESS: So I think maybe these we have given 24 adequate attention to at this time, maybe more than adequate.
25 And I would suggest that we take up next then O
125
) I those items that are under evaluation so that we have some 2 understanding of what is involved and what might be involved.
3 Does anybody have any special desire to break 4 at 12 for lunch? That's not a very good time to go out.
5 MR. WARD: Why? As opposed to six minutes of?
6 MR. SIESS: How long do you think it might take 7 you to get through this?
8 MS. MC KENNA: I would think if you want to go 9 into the further evaluation items , that may well take more l
10 than half an hour because there are several of them, depending 11 on the extent of discussion.
12 I don't think we could get through the whole 13 thing. We could probably start.
7-sg
- 14 MR. SIESS: Let me wait until I can find the 15 list. Further evaluation. This is one of them that we 16 have discussed.
17 I don' t see how we can possibly take that long.
! 18 But --
19 MS. MC KENNA: Well --
20 MR. SIESS: About three-fourths of them are the 21 same ones that we have seen on every other plant. Keeping 22 that in mind, do you want to -- let me find out. Do you 23 guys want to break for lunch now?
24 MR. WARD: Yes.
7 25 MR. SIESS : Okay. It's a consensus of the O
i 126 i Committee. We will. break for lunch and we will be back-I 2 at five minutes to one.
3 MR. HERNDON : Dr. Siess, Ron Herndon from the 4 staff. It's my understanding that the Full Committee pre-5 sentation of this issue will be in August, the Full Committee.
6 MR. SIESS: No. We've got you scheduled for 7 July.
8 MR. WARD: Well, we are fumbling around with the 9 schedule.
10 MR. SIESS: Okay.
11 MR. HE RNDON : Okay. We have been trying to 12 determine which items can be deferred, . and the NRR has 13 agreed that this could be deferred to the August Full A 14 Committee meeting.
15 MR. SIESS: Because of what?
16 MR. HE RNDON :' Because of too many other items.
17 MR. WARD: We are going to spend. about four 18 hours on the safety goal, and we have got some new issues 19 that have come up.
20 MR. SIESS: Okay. I don't care. These guys 21 have waited sixteen years for a full term license.
22 (Laughte r. )
23 MR. RAINSBERRY : We are in no rush.
24 (Laugh te r. )
25 MR. SIESS: I'm just anxious to get the last SEP lO
E 127 i
i I No, that's no problem. !
1 plan.out of the way. I don' t
- 2 know whether you've been informed, but it will be August.
4
- l l 3 But everything. will be settled by August. !
t l 4 MR. WARD: Yeah.
5 MR. SIESS: Okay. We will be back about one.
t 6 (Whereupon, the meeting is recessed at-11:55 a.m. , ;
7- Wednesday,. June 19, 1985.)
1 8-1 4
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128 l 1 AFTERNOON SESSION (1:00 p.m.)
\
2 MR. SIESS: Let's get started. Where were we? I 8 bet Eileen will know where we were.
4 MR. WARD: May I make one comment?
5 MR. SIESS: Sure.
6 MR. WARD: It is on the issue of the switch over of 7 ECCS. I just happen to 64 reading the minutes of our meeting 8 on the Braidwood operating license review and in that review 9 the licensee made the statement that Braidwood and Bryon have 10 in the pRA's that have been done, they have estimated that 11 Braidwood and Byron have significantly lower core melt ps 12 probabilities than Zion mainly because they have eliminated
( )
18 the source of human error associated with ECCS switch over to 14 recirculation.
15 I have forgotten exactly how they did that and I 16 don't know what the details are. But in those otherwise very 17 similar plants, Braidwood, Bryon and Zion, they claim that 18 that made a big difference in what they calculated for core 19 melt probabilities.
20 MR. SIESS: A factor of ten might be significant.
21 MR. WARD: Yes, I don't know what it was.
22 MR. SIESS: What that doesn't tell you though is 23 where it was to begin with.
m) 24 MR. WARD: That's right.
25 MR. SIESS: All right. We were going to do further
129 (O,,) I evaluations.
2 MR. WARD: You know where Zion was to begin with.
3 Everybody knows where Zion was.
4 MR. SIESS: Yes, but not only on seismic.
5 MR. WARD: it wasn't very high.
6 MR. SIESS: Eileen, would you like to begin?
7 MS. MCKENNA: We will start off this afternoon 8 looking at the issues requiring further evaluation. This is a 9 two-page slide so we will start with the first page. A lot of 10 these issues will I am sure seem familiar to those who have 11 been on previous SEp reviews, the wind and tornados, for
[\s \ 12 example, the groundwater, I think has come up in previous ones 18 and some of the pipe break issues.
14 MR. SIESS: Roof ponding is familiar 15 MS. MCKENNA: Yes. In the area of roof ponding, the 16 licensee has submitted an analysis of the capability of the 17 roofs to take the ponding load. The analysis concludes that 18 they are capable of withstanding it and the staff is reviewing 19 that right now.
20 MR. SIESS: What does the PMP come out for San 21 Onofre?
22 MS. MCKENNA: The staff estimate was like a five 23 minute, fourteen and a half inch.
24 MR. SIESS: Fourteen and a half Inches in five 25 minutes?
/x 130 5
(j 1 MS. MCKENNA: Yes.
2 MR. SIESS: That is about the size of the cooling 3 water in the system, isn't it?
4 MS. MCKENNA: There are sufficient flood control 5 features on the site so that it can accommodate that PMP 6 except for these couple of buildings, the scuppers and drains 7 may not be adequate to keep the depth below what the capacity 8 is and we are in the process of reviewing that analysis right 9 now.
10 MR. SIESS: There is not anything on that list that 11 hasn't been on every plant we have looked at, is there?
(AI
\.
i 12 MS. MCKENNA: I think maybe the first item is x.s la something.
14 MR. SIESS: That is because of what, the highway 15 nearby?
16 MS. MCKENNA: The highway and the railroad both 17 which run alongside the plant 18 MR. SIESS: That's right.
19 MS. MCKENN4: I think it is mainly the highway that 20 is contributing to that.
21 HH. SIESS: The foundation settlement is a little 22 different than anything?
("w3 23 MS. MCKENNA: That is a function of this backfill 04 soils condition that we have talked about before.
E5 MR. SIESS: It is a very minor modification of k - _ _ _ - - - ..- __
l i
4 131
{
1 Midland. ,
2 (Laughter.)
i I
l 3 MR. SIESS: Very minor. Have you been monitoring 4 the settlement'to date? There are two issues there. One is 5 settlement and one is liquifaction and liquifaction has been 6 resolved, I believe.
7 MS. MCKENNA: Yes. We were talking about things 8 that were just settlement over time and then there is 9 earthquake Induced settlement.
10 l think settlement over time, there was some record 11 on, wasn't there?
12 MR. RAIN 8 BERRY: We have done a survey of the 18 settlement. We have done inspections of the various concrete i
14 type structures to see if there is any evidence of gross 15 settlement.
l 16 There is nothing like that. We have had various I
j 17 settlement measurements. There doesn't seem to be a 18 consistent base benchmark for all fo the settlement 19 recordings. There is no trend. There is nothing that really 20 came out of re-doing that. We re-did that last year, i
21 MR. SIESS: But the question of settlement now is l
22 usually differential movement on a pipe or a pipe that goes i
23 through an opening type situation, right?
t
)
24 MR. RAINSBEHRY: Right. We haven't observed any 25 problems associated with that type of situation.
132 1 MR. SIESS: I have seen people get worried about 2 clearance around a pipe that goes through a wall and I never 3 could understand that because all you have to do is go look at 4 it every few months and see.
5 i don't have to do a leveling job. I just look at l
6 it and see if I can get my finger in there. But you have had 7 a settlement monitoring program?
i 8 MR. RAINSBERRY: We haven't had what I would call an 9 official program. We have specifically gone out and 10 reevaluated settlement data that has existed, that has been 11 taken over the years for a couple of different reasons.
( 12 We have re-looked at settlement and took new data 18 about a year ago to see if there were any obvious settlement 14 problems and again, there are none.
15 MR. SIESS: Then you put new footings under places.
16 MR. RAINGBERRY: Yes. In the switch gear room and 17 underneath the auxillary feedwater pumps to span the backfill 18 soils areas, in addition, in some of the seismic 19 modifications to the turbine building, we incorporated that ,
20 4spect of the soil into the design of those modifications so 21 that they took that into account.
22 MR. SIESS: Where does the staff stand on this now?
28 it says here that it will be reported in the final lpSAR.
24 MR. GRIMES: Right now the geological engineers have 25 contracted with the Corps of Engineers to do some more site
9 &
133 (s, 1 studie$. So far'is I can tell, this is more a matter of just 2 amassing the 'nformation i that exists and presenting it.
3 MR. SIESS: It is on long term settlement 4 MR. GRIMES: It will address long' term settlement, 5 liquifaction, basic geologic features of this site.
6
- MR. SIESS: I can understand liquifaction because we 7 haven't'had an earthquake of much size.but on long term 8 settlement, if the foundation is sand, you don't get any long 9 term settlement and if it is clay and you haven't got it in 15 l (
10 years, you are into secondary by now. 4 11 MM. RAINSBERRY: It. i t. not clay. The s Lt e is sand,
'12 uniform, sand to a depth of about a thousand + bet . 7
) f 13 3 MR. GlESS: I am just a little puzzled because
\
14 settlement on sand occurs when you put the load on it. There 1
15 is no long term settlement on a sand foundation. At least 16 there wasn't when I studied sol' mechanics.
17 MR. GRIMES: The issue is not settlement but 1 .*
18 backfill and so I P. conditions.
i 19 MR. SIESS: It is all earthquake related?
20 MR. GRIMES: Yes, sir.
21 MR. SIESS: All right it is not under lll-6 but is 22 listed under here? The reference is 111-6. ,
g 23 MS. MCKENNA: There is.a relationship there. i 24 1
} MM. S I E S S': There i s a peculiar s't a t ement . Th9 +
25 staff is continuing its review of the potential long term
_ ..C_.___.________________...__. -
134 p
(, 1 settlement non-seismic related.
2 MR. GRIMES: I think that relates to the backfill 8 soil conditions and whether or not there is any settlement 4 potential there.
5 MR. SIESS: But if it is granular material and you 6 haven't had it in 15 or 16 years or more, I don't know. Send 7 me that Corps of Engineers Report when you get it, will you?
8 MR. GRIMES: I will do that.
9 MR. SIESS: I would like to see what they say about 10 it. The concern then is basically the seismic potential.
11 MR. GRIMES: Yes, sir.
O 12 MR. SIESS: Quality group classification is our old
( j 18 friend.
14 MS. MCKENNA: Right, the usual subjects of fracture 15 toughness and valves.
16 MR. SIESS: pre-modern GA.
)
17 MS. MCKENNA: Right. We don't always have all the 18 paper to trace from start to finish.
19 MR. SIESS: There was an interesting comment there.
I 20 1 thought somewhere that the staff did not identify any 21 inadequate components. I got a great deal of assurance. The 22 paper is inadequate but the components so far aren't.
, 28 MR. GRIMES: That is correct and that is consistent t
/
24 with the other SEp review findings. We typically have not 25 identified any inadequate components with the exception I ,
l
> l l
135
h 1 might note that typically we have found in the older plants 2 cast iron piping which is not --
3 MR. SIESS: Which is not very good.
4 MR. GRIMES: Thank you.
5 (Laughter.)
6 MR. GRIMES: That is true here but the resolution of 7 the cast iron pipe for San Onofre is again embedded in the 8 seismic upgrades.
9 MR. SIESS: If we continued the SEp of whatever the 10 next stage would be, would you still include this item or 11 would it sort of disappear once we got up to the next C 12 generation of plants?
(
18 MR. GRIMES: We would still include it and it would 14 become a smaller activity as we got to the newer plants. The 15 reason that we continue to pursue this issue is because we 16 think it is useful to go out and put together paper for all of 17 the safety related components and equipment for future 18 reference.
19 We started an effort under SEP that identified some 20 areas where information was missing and to make it easier in 21 the future for somebody to go back and find the paper trail if 22 you will of the quality of the equipment that is in the plant.
g-wg 23 We feel that it would be useful to do that now so U 24 that it will be available in the future.
25 MR. SIESS: Now lil-7.8 is relatively clear, isn't
136 (h
1 it?
2 MS. MCKENNA: I am sorry.
8 MR. SIESS: Design codes.
4 MS. MCKENNA: Oh, design codes. We are on the next 5 page here.
6 MR. SIESS: As I recall, that is topic lil-7.B, I am 7 sorry. I have trouble with this mixed notation.
8 MR. GRIMES: As we promised, in the future we will 9 not use such mixed notation.
10 (Laughter.)
11 MR. SIESS: I like the section headings because they (n) 12 are easy to deal with, 18 MS. MCKENNA: In the follow-on reviews in the IPSAR, 14 we have abandoned the topic notation and we tried talking 15 section 4.2 or whatever to get around that.
16 MR. SIESS: That one is all clean, isn't it?
17 MS. MCKENNA: That one is sort of the last thing you 18 do once you figure out what all your loads are. Then you can 19 put them together and make sure that you have appropriately 20 considered the combinations and the margins that might exist 21 in the structures.
22 it is a little hard to totally close that one out
) 28 until you have finished all the others from the load m) 24 combination point of view.
25 MR. SIESS: While I have that subject in mind, could
137 m
%- 1 I ask a question? I am looking at the IpSAR pages 4.12 and 2 4.18 and on 4.13 and this is under containment structural 8 Integrity tests and it says that the fracture mechanics 4 evaluations show that the double-ended main steamline rupture 5 is not a credible event.
6 There is a concern on page 4.12 about the high 7 compressive hoop stress in the containment for a steamline 8 break.
9 If it is not credible, why is there concern?
10 MS. MCKENNA: That is one of these historic 11 combinations that staff has always considered which is the SSE fa 12 plus LOCA or in this case main steamline breaks since thermal 18 pressure loads are worse for that than they are for the LGCA 14 as a defense-in-depth kind of approach.
15 MR. GRIMES: Dr. Siess, perhaps our presentation of 16 both of these issues could have been stated better. Basically i
17 at the time the plant was designed, the design basis was LOCA 18 plus SSE.
I 19 MR. SIESS: Yes. i l
l 20 MR. GRIMES: In fact, the code load combinations 1 21 include LOCA plus SSE. (Je noted in lll-7.0 under the 22 containment structural integrity tests that as a result of new 28 information we now believe that the double-ended, 24 instantaneous double-ended guillotine break, is not a credible 25 event.
138 r
1 It nevertheless is the original design basis. This 2 section on load combinations for the containment points out 8 that the licensee provided that analysis which is more now of 4 historical significance.
5 MR. SIESS: All right.
6 MR. GRIMES: It also establishes a basis for the 7 capability of the containment structure.
8 MR. SIESS: So under the original basis, it is okay 9 for buckling or probably will be. You are still reviewing it.
10 MR. GRIMES: that is correct.
11 MS. MCKENNA: One of the difficulties we are having
) *12 is nobody really seems to have a good criteria.
18 MR. SIESS: In the containment integrity tests, you 14 have decided it is acceptable.
15 MR. GRIMES: Y_e s , sir.
16 MR. SIESS: All right. As I look at that list, the 17 only items that are sort of specific to San Onofre are the 18 first two, aren't they?
19 MS. MCKENNA: There is one other i think or a couple 20 of others maybe on the next page.
21 MR. SIESS: Is there a next page?
22 MS. MCKENNA: Yes. There is a second page.
[~'% 28 MR. SIESS: Oh, I am sorry. Well, the first one 24 sure isn't.
25 MS. MCKENNA: At Isast the particulars of the issue l l
i 1
- _ _ . ~ . __
_ ._. .1
139 I
s 1 I think in most plants we have had open issues on seismic 2 design in the IPSAR but they may have been a little different 8 in extent. We just talked about the load combinations issue.
4 A couple of these others are a little different.
5 MR. SIESS: The ECCS is different.
6 MS. MCKENNA: Yes, that one is different and I think 7 the salt water cooling system maybe is a little different.
8 MR. SIESS: That is what we discussed earlier, the 1
9 possible different injection systems may come out of this.
10 MS. MCKENNA: Not specifically. We will come back 11 to-that one in a minute. That is related certainly but there
) 12 are some other issues under that one. Maybe we can see if 18 there are any of these others you want to talk about and then 14 come back to that one.
15 ,
MR. SIESS: Do you think that the failure mode 16 analysis on ECCS systems is likely to come up with any 17 requirements for changes?
18 MS. MCKENNA: Let me give you a little background on 19 that one to maybe refresh your memory on what we had on the 20 IPSAR. Several years ago followli.J Appendix K and issuance, ;
21 there was a lot of studies that were initiated on looking at i 1
22 failure modes of the emergency core cooling systems and power 28 plants.
3 b 24 Although as we said this morning, this plant has i 25 stainless steel clad, nevertheless did conduct the same kind i
140 0
N 1 of reviews of the failure modes only not against Appendix K 2 criteria.
3 During those reviews there was some very extensive 4 reviews of failure modes other than just the single active 5 this pump fails to start. They looked at I think some 6 separation questions, environmental qualification, a lot of 7 sort of F.M.E.A. kind of approach and from that review there 8 were various recommendations that were developed for further a 9 consideration of modifications that should be done of 10 switching power supplies with certain things, separating some 11 trains by more distance, that kind of thing.
12 Those were the kinds of issues that we are talking 13 about here.
14 MR. SIESS: These are the 16 items that are listed.
15 MS. MCKENNA: Yes. As you may note, some of those 16 fall under other SEp or other staff programs. For instance, 17 there was an item abo'ut obtaining environmental qualification 18 data on certain components. While we have an extensive 19 program that is considering environmental qualifications, we 20 certainly would not be pursuing that independently under SEp.
21 One of them was also thermal overloads on a couple 22 of valves which is a separate SEp topic. There was some i
23 question about the missile protection of some of the pumps, 24 the internal missiles and whether the pump itself could ;
25 generate a missile and cause damage. That was looked at under
141 p
i
\
% 1 another topic so some of those nave been routed out but we are 2 left with a set of them that relate to physical and electrical 3 separation of certain components.
4 That issue comes up in other areas, for instance, on 5 the pipe break. You have cabling that runs throughcut the 6 plant and maybe in the vicinity of high energy lines so that 7 is one area we have been trying to see whether we can pull 8 together pieces of fire protection and high energy line break 9 and this issue to solve several problems at one time.
10 MR. SIESS: These issues are at such a level of 11 plant specificity that PRA doesn't do you any good, does it?
12 MS. MCKENNA: They are certainly very specific. You
}
13 might be able to treat some of them in a probabilistic 14 approach but you couldn't use the generic PRA to look at them, 15 no.
16 MR. SIESS: On some of them it looks to me wouldn't 17 even be covered in a plant specific PRA.
l l
18 MS. MCKENNA: You have to look at the individual 19 items.
20 MR. SIESS: Because they don't get to that level of 21 detail 22 MS. MCKENNA: Right.
28 MR. SIESS: They look at reliability of systems and
's 24 not at particular breakers and so forth. On these, the 25 licensee is going to look at each one, evaluate it and come T
-s 142 V 1 back.
2 MR. GRIMES: That's correct and decide whether or 3 not there is a need for any corrective action or whether any 4 other alternatives might be considered..
5 I think the simple answer to your question, 6 Dr. Siess, is that there may be some plant modifications that ,
7 result from further consideration of this collection of 8 recommendations.
9 MR. SIESS: All right. On the load combinations for 10 containment, it is just that question of reviewing the Buckley 11 analysis.
12 MS. MCKENNA: Yes.
)
la MR. GRIMES: That is correct.
14 MR. SIESS: You have it and somebody is looking at 15 it.
16 MR. GRIMES: That's right.
17 MR. SIESS: All right. I am trying to follow the 18 portions of the ECCS that is under 4.32.
19 MS. MCKENNA: All right. The ones that are under 20 4.82 are sort of a subset of issues I was talking about. On 21 4.82 we were looking particularly at the salt water cooling 22 and the component cooling water system and as a part of this failure modes analysis, those systems as they interact with
("" 23 V
24 the ECCS were looked at so that this question that had been 25 raised on looking at the component cooling as to the degree of
143 q
1 physical independence of a couple of valves was already 2 covered by the review of this failure mode. So we just S referred it to that review.
4 MR. SIESS: All right. Now 4.82.2 it says that l
5 there is a report under staff review.
6 MS. MCKENNA: That is the same report.
7 MR. SIESS: All right, and 4.82.4 says it is 8 resolved.
9 MS. MCKENNA: Let me see which one this one is here.
10 MR. SIESS: Salt water cooling system supply water 11 failure.
) 12 MS. MCKENNA: That is a different section, I think.
13 I have to get my list here.
14 MR. SIESS: Are you looking at your slides?
15 MS. MCKENNA: .Yes. I am trying to figure out what 16 your question is.
17 MR. SIESS: In the IpSAR on page 4-49 it says, "This 1
18 issue resolved." It is concerned with the common intake bay 19 and the tsunami gate or motor-operated valves.
20 MS. MCKENNA: Maybe I have the wrong section number I l
21 down here on the side.
22 MR. GRIMES: I believe that should be 4.82.3, the
/"'g 23 component cooling water system passive failure. l 24 MS. MCKENNA: It might be 4.82.5 actually.
25 MR. SIESS: I believe 32.3 is also resolved.
144 I
. \ j 1 MS. MCKENNA: I think it is 32.5.
a 2 MR. SIESS: I believe 82.5 is resolved or I am a sorry, will be resolved in a related topic.
4 MS. MCKENNA: I think that is an error on the 5 slide. I just got the wrong digit. I apologize for that.
6 MR. SIESS: All right. Let's see, 4.92.5 says that 7 this will be resolved under another topic.
8 MS. MCKENNA: That is this one we were just talking 9 about, the Ul-7.C topic with the ECCS failure modes analysis.
10 MR. SIESS: All right.
11 MS. MCKENNA: That was a slipped digit there.
i 12 MR. SIESS: Now the voltage monitoring program, that 18 is DC?
14 MS. MCKENNA: That is the grid and switch yard.
15 Just so you don't get confused, it will show up on one of the 16 other lists. There are a couple of parts to it. There was a 17 concern about over voltage under certain conditions and there f
18 was a modification made to the auxillary transformer tap 19 settings to attempt to alleviate that concern and then a 20 voltage monitoring program to measure the success of that 21 modification.
22 That is what was being referred to here.
1
- g 23 MR. SIESS
- The study is just to determine the
\_
24 optimal tap settings?
i 25 MS. MCKENNA: That's right.
145
\
1 MR. SIESS: That is all that is left?
2 MS. MCKENNA: On that part of it. The other part 3 has to do with under voltage protection for the 41.60 volt 4 buses where you have an over voltage concern and an under i 5 voltage concern where there is present under voltage relays 6 but the topic resolution was that that should be replaced by a 7 coincidence logic with a couple of different sub-points for 8 degraded grid voltage protection.
9 It is another one of these multi-plant action items 10 that overlaps with an SEp topic.
11 That part is under the hardware, the under voltage 12 logic, in hindsight, it might have been better if I had split 13 this topic into two sections and it would have been a little 14 less confusing.
15 MR. SIESS: Why change now?
16 (Laughter.)
17 MR. SIESS: Let's look at the last one and then come 18 back to the salt water cooling system.
19 MS. MCKENNA: All right. Let me get the other slide 20 up there.
21 MR. SIESS: This is the steam generator overfill?
22 MS. MCKENNA: That is correct. As we discussed 23 earlier, since the feedwater pumps are also used in safety O5 24 injection there are features that would terminate the 25 feedwater flow when the conditions got such that you have a
146 m
s 1 safety injection, you would get the termination of feedwater.
, 2 The question is whether that comes before you have any other 3 problems and that is what we are looking at.
4 MR. SIESS: All right. Now the salt water cooling 5 system reliability, the staff has recommended a reliability 6 evaluation. Has this been agreed to?
7 MR. GRIMES: The only thing I think that remains to 8 be resolved is what kind of an evaluation are they going to l 9 perform. What we had envisioned at the time that we prepared i
10 the integrated assessment was a basic either failure modes and 11 effects analysis on a component basis or a reliability i
12 analysis using basic pRA techniques in order to identify where i
13 the vulnerable parts of the system were.
4 14 1 don't think that the licensee has yet worked 15 through in his own mind what kind or how detailed an analysis 16 could be performed but I think they basically agree that an 17 evaluation is warranted.
d 18 I will ask SCE to say whether or not I have captured 19 our position.
20 MR. RAINSBERRY: I believe that is correct, Chris.
21 Exactly what we would do along these lines, we are still 22 considering. We believe that with the removal of the air
"} 23 operator valves, the replacement with check valves, that the 24 main reliability concern with respect to subwater cooling 4
25 system has been addressed but where we go from here with
147 m ;
' 1 respect to detailed evaluation, we have not established.
2 MR. SIESS: Now the salt water cooling system at San S Onofre, does that correspond to service water?
4 MS. MCKENNA: Yes.
5 MR. SIESS: That is your secondary cooling system 6 for a lot of things?
7 MS. MCKENNA: Yes.
8 MR. SIESS: You have had a lot of problem with 9 that. I assume you have done some corrective work along the 10 way?
11 MR. RAINSBERRY: Yes, we have. Over the years we 12 hsve done a number of things. Some later changes have j/
13 actually changed some intermediate stops in the process. The i 14 one I mentioned, the replacement of the discharge POU's with 15 check valves has been the most recent change and I think one 16 that addresses one of the recurring areas of problems.
17 Another area associated with that system is in our 18 auxillary salt water cooling system. There was a problem 19 related to the priming system of that and during this last 20 outage we did some basically reliability improvements to that 21 syst'em to insure that it will function when required.
22 MR. SIESS: Any questions?
"h 23 (No response.)
s j 24 MR. SIESS: I have sort of run through the list, l
25 Eileen, and is there anything you want to elaborate on? !
i I
l
t 148 p
\,
% 1 MS. MCKENNA: I think those are the main areas where 2 there was something different than what we have seen in 8 previous plants.
4 MR. SIESS: Is steam generator overfill, has that 5 come up before?
6 MS. MCKENNA: It has come up in some cases, yes, in 7 terms of whether thore is a high steam generator level trip, O for instance.
9 MR. SIESS: All right, in connection with the pipe 1
10 break studies, are they going to take advantage of some of the
, 11 recent changes in terms of arbitrary break locations?
12 MR. GRIMES: I would expect them to. The position 18 that we may have overly concisely presented here is that we 14 would permit them to use the same fracture mechanics 15 techniques to isolate the more likely break locations and 16 evaluate them from there.
17 MR. SlESS: And get rid of the arbitrary and 18 immediate break?
19 MR. GRIMES: That is correct.
20 MR. SIESS: Any questions on the items for further 21 evaluation?
22 (No response.)
( 23 MR. SIESS: It looks like a long list but I have a 24 feeling that it is comparable to most of the other plants of 25 this vintage.
149 O)
(, 1 MS. MCKENNA: I think it really is. Sometimes if 2 you look at the number of sections, it looks like a lot but a a lot of them go together, too. In my list of further 4 evaluation items, for instance, I counted this is seven items 5 because there were seven section numbers and it is not really 6 seven different topics.
7 MR. SIESS: What would you like to take up next?
8 MS. MCKENNA: There are three other categories of 9 issues, those where we have determined there were no actions 10 necessary, those where we identified hardware modifications 11 and those procedural or technical specification changes.
12 MR. SIESS: Why don't we do the hardware?
13 MS. MCKENNA: All right. These are the hardware 14 modifications that have been identified. This first item is 15 an additional motor-driven auxillary feedwater pumr and 16 associated piping and valving necessary to implement.
17 At present, there is a turbine-driven and a 18 motor-driven auxillary feedwater pump. This issue has come up 19 and will go toward addressing many different issues including 20 TMI issue in addition to some of the SEp issues.
21 We feel this will be an improvement in the 22 reliability of the auxillary feedwater system and I guess it
~s 23 is the next outage that it is intended, not this one in the i 1 24 (all but the following one, that will be implemented.
25 MR. SIESS: It is really a TMI issue, isn't it? j l
i 150 im
~- 1 MR. GRIMES: That is correct, 4
2 MS. MCKENNA: The roots, I think, of that are there, 3 yes.
4 MR. GRIMES: As i mentioned before, Dr. Siess, 5 wherever an action was taken as a result of some other 6 activity and in this case specifically TMI requirement, where l
7 it resolved SEP issues, we tried to point that out.
8 MR. SIESS: So the action was taken in connection 9 with TMI.
10 MS. MCKENNA: But it also addresses a concern we had 11 under safe shutdown and the steamline breaks.
! 12 MR. SIESS: Yes. Any questions?
13 (No response.)
14 MR. SIESS: All right.
15 MS. MCKENNA: The second item was one I mentioned a 16 little earlier about the under voltage logic which also is 17 coming out of the mul'ti-plant action which was essentially 18 identical to the part of the SEP topic on the degraded grid 19 voltage.
20 MR. SIESS: The hardware change there was replacing 21 relays?
22 MS. MCKENNA: Yes.
23 MR. SIESS: That is all?
%)
24 MS. MCKENNA: Yes, the logic with them and the 25 associated technical specifications.
151 1 MR. SIESS: What is left is to look at the tap 2 settings? No, that has already been one?
8 MS. MCKENNA: That is why I say it is confusing.
4 This part is looking at the degraded grid under voltage. The 5 tap setting is looking at the other half of that which is the 6 over voltage question, if your grid is overpowering the 7 equipment.
8 The third item here is again an issue that is 9 related to a multi-plant action item on fire protection where 10 there is going to be a dedicated diesel generator and 11 associated switch gear and transfer switches installed to (O) 12 provide capability for plant shutdown independent of certain la fire areas such as cable spreading room and there are certain 14 again overlaps with SEp concerns.
15 MR. SIESS: That is a dedicated diesel, is that 16 right?
17 MS. MCKENNA: Yes.
18 MR. SIESS: Controls and power supplies, are they 19 separated?
20 MS. MCKENNA: There is going to be a new separate 21 little structure to house.
22 MR. SIESS: How does that system stand in terms of 23 seismic and tornado resistance?
\O 24 MS. MCKENNA: It would not be a seismic system other 25 than a seismic event could not disable any other equipment.
152 7s
\s- 1 MR. SIESS: But you have seismically qualified 2 equipment for shutdown anyway?
3 MS, MCKENNA: That's right.
4 MR. SIESS: What about tornado?
5 MS. MCKENNA: The diesel generators for this plant 6 are already in a tornado protected building since they were 7 installed in 1976 and the structure was designed for the 8 260 mile per hour tornado.
9 MR. SIESS: I would have to assume since tornado is 10 still an issue that there must be parts of this system that 11 are not tornado protected. Am I right?
l 12 MS. MCKENNA: parts of which system?
d 13 MR. SIESS: Whatever system this is that provides 14 for safe hot shutdown?
15 MR. RAINSBERRY: Dr Sless, this system will use a 16 lot of existing systems and where those systems are not 17 tornado protected, this also would not be. The new diesel 18 generator and switch gear is being designed at the moment and 19 tornado protection is not part of the design. We are not 20 closing our eyes to its potential use in that event.
21 MR. SIESS: So the only thing that is new hardware 22 is just the diesel generator then and switch gear?
23 MR. RAINSBERRY: Yes, transfer switches and cables.
O 24 MR. WYLIE: This basically uses plant equipment for 25 shutdown and decay heat removal, the fluid system.
I J
l 153 l N/ 1 MR. RAINSBERRY: That is right.
2 MR. WYLIE: It is not a separate fluid system.
3 MR. RAINSBERRY: That is correct.
4 MR. SIESS: When you do your tornado cost benefit 5 study, I assume you will be looking for what train of 6 equipment would be the easiest to protect against tornadoes, 7 is that correct?
8 MR. RAINSBERRY: That is correct.
9 MR. SIESS: You will be doing ~ that study before you 10 get this thing built? You know, it is a lot easier to build 11 in tornado protection than to add it later.
[
g *12 MR. RAINSBERRY: The study is ongoing now and the N
13 design of the system is ongoing now. They are going off in 14 parallel independent paths. However, when we are locating 15 this we are keeping in mind that some day it might be our 16 solution and it is situated such that we might be able to beef 17 up its walls rather than something else.
18 MR. SIESS: That seems prudent.
19 MR. WYLIE: The assumption of this system is that if 20 you have had a fire that wiped out all of the electrical 21 system, you could fall back on this one?
22 MR. RAINSBERRY: That is correct.
23 MR. WYLIE: This would power then the service water s
24 necessary for the cooling of the diesel and so forth?
25 MR. RAINSBERRY: For this new dedicated diesel, yes.
i 154 T
1 MR. WYLIE: That is what I mean.
2 MR. RAINSBERRY: Whatever service water it needs.
S MR. WYLIE: All its support function would be 4 powered off this train?
5 MR. RAINSBERRY: That is correct.
6 MR. SIESS: What is section 4.84?
7 MS. MCKENNA: That is section IX-6, general fire 8 protection.
9 MR. SIESS: That is where the dedicated diesel is.
10 MS. MCKENNA: The remaining two categories we have 11 are procedural and technical specifications.
MR. SIESS: We go back for those right?
( 12 18 MS. MCKENNA: Yes. That will be going backwards.
}
14 We seem to be doing a lot of that.
15 MR. SIESS: You might want to rearrange your 16 handouts for the full committee presentation but it probably 17 will not make any difference. What would help though is if 18 you numbered the pages. Then it would be easy to tell the
?O people where to look.
20 MS. MCKENNA: That is a good point.
21 MR. SIESS: Let's just pause briefly while people 22 look at this list of procedure and tech spec changes to see if 28 there are any that they want to ask questions about.
24 (ACRS members reviewing document.)
25 (PAUSE.)
155 1 MR. SIESS: Those look familiar, too.
2 MS. MCKENNA: They are a lot of the same issues.
3 MR. SIESS: Do you have any questions to ask on this 4 list?
5 MR. WYLIE: No, I don't have any.
6 MR. SIESS: Dave.
7 MR. WARD: Just kind of a minor one, on the RPS 8 response testing. I guess what you are asking the license to 9 do is to take some requirements that are now in the procedures 10 and put them into the tech specs. -
11 MS. MCKENNA: Yes. That is the approach we have f%
/ 12 taken on the SEP plants.
}
I 18 MR. WARD: In going back to-the questions raised 14 this morning on the program to overhaul simplified tech specs, 15 I am trying to recall -- is this the sort of thing that will 16 remain in those? Do you know enough about the program to know 17 whether this is the s'o r t of thing that will remain in the new 18 tech specs?
19 MR. GRIMES: Based upon what we know about the 20 program, we would believe that these would remain in the tech 21 specs. The tech specs would be focused on concentrate on 22 operability and surveillance of your front line safety
(~T 23 systems. Your reactor protection system certain is a front 24 line safety system.
25 MR. SIESS: Any others?
I l
j 156 l
, m. !
. 1 (No response.)
2 MR. SIESS: All right. What else do we have?
1 3 MS. MCKENNA: The other category is those issues 4 that are discussed in the IpSAR but there were no 5 modifications or further evaluations identified with them.
6 This slide doesn't quite fit on the slide here.
7 MR. SIESS: Let's see, no action.
8 MR. WARD: Is it ahead of the colored paper or 9 behind?
10 MR. SIESS: It is ahead of it about six or seven 11 pages, it is headed, "No action."
) 12 MS. MCKENNA: There is a cover page for it.
%J 13 (ACRS members reviewing document.)
14 MR. SIESS: There are three pages of them.
15 (PAUSE.)
16 MS. MCKENNA: Have you found it now?
17 MR. SIESS: Yes, I think we have found it.
18 MS. MCKENNA: We will definitely number the pages 19 when it is final.
20 MR. SIESS: Chris, the next thing I wanted to do was 21 to run down table 4.1 and clear up a couple of points. V-11.4 22 is GDC's, isn't it?
fg 23 MS. MCKENNA: pardon me.
4 /
N/
24 MR. SIESS: The one that is labeled V-II.A --
25 MS. MCKENNA: No. Those are the high/ low pressure
157 (m)
N 1 interface issues.
2 MR. SIESS: All right. I am sorry. That's right.
S MS. MCKENNA: Or high/ medium pressure in one case.
4 MR. SIESS: Yes. Ul-4 is the isolation?
5 MS. MCKENNA: That is right. That is on the second 6 page of the set.
7 MR. SIESS: It always come out the same, doesn't it?
8 MR. GRIMES: That is correct. There is a method in i
9 that madness and that basically is when we first started to 10 categorize these issues, we basically laid the foundation an'd 11 established precedents that we then applied to all the SEP 12 plants.
18 As we progressed through each of the plants, our 14 confidence in the capability of these resolutions increased.
15 MR. SIESS: When we get through the severe accident 16 stuff, we will go back and change some GDC items.
17 MR. GRIMES: Dr. Siess, you noted earlier that just 18 last week you reviewed the proposed changes to Appendix J 19 which are very closely related to those GDC requirements.
20 I would like to point out that I was involved in 21 early efforts to re-write Appendix J in 1975.
22 MR. SIESS: The only reason we suggested that they 28 put it out for public comment was because so much time had 24 been spent on it and we figured it would be another five years 25 before they got the revision based on severe accidents.
158 N 1 We might as well have something correct in the 2 meantime but it really doesn't make much sense now.
3 (ACRS members reviewing document.)
4 (PAUSE.)
5 MR. SIESS: I would suggest that if people want to 6 come back to that we can. We can always come back. In a 7 rather simplistic fashion I went through table 4.1 looking for 8 absence of yes's in the third to last column which says, 9 " Licensee agrees" and I find a number of cases where i don't 10 see a yes but it is not listed under "To be evaluated" or 11 something else.
) 12 Could you explain it on the first page of 4.4.1 13 and 4.4.2?
14 MS. MCKENNA: I think if you look back at the text, 15 you will see that we hav.e identified these specific areas in 16 the topic that says that you should be looking at these 17 concerns and in the text it is identified that there is a 18 combination of approaches you can look at. You can do some 19 screening on a basis of safety significance of the component 20 to try to identify areas that are going to be of some more 21 concern so that we didn't really have all the pieces together 22 to say that yes, this is exactly the approach that was going 23 to be done. That is the main reason why there is not a "yes" N
24 there.
25 MR. SIESS: But you think there will be a "yes" when
159 Or 1 they understand what you want?
2 MS. MCKENNA: I don't think we have a disagreement 3 about looking at this issue, it is just whether you verify 4 that they have all been radiographed or you sort them out in 5 another way and then those that are left, you do something 6 with.
7 MR. SIESS: All right.
8 MR. GRIMES: In preparing the integrated assessment 9 report, we put licensee agrees in where we felt that we had an 10 established position from them that we could refer to. In 11 preparing for this meeting, we tried to refine on that and 12 understand where we felt that the licensee had agreed
(
13 regardless of whether or not we had some document that we 14 could refer to to bind him to that commitment.
15 MR. SIESS: So the way I can interpret this is that 16 as far as the item on classification of structures, the 17 licensee has agreed to reevaluate that but there has been no 18 specific agreement on these sub-items?
19 MR. GRIMES: That is correct. '
20 MR. SIESS: It is just what is included.
21 MR. GRIMES: Yes. , /
22 MR. SIESS: All right. I find an absence of a "yes"
, 23 under 4.6.1 on page 56, " evaluate short-term hydrostatic load 24 at grade."
25, MS. MCKENNA: That was one that i think in our
160 s_ , 1 review had sort of slipped through the cracks until the very 2 and. Then when we were going back and putting together the 3 IPSAR, we found oh, we really should have flagged this earlier 4 in our differences. The licensee at the time that we put the 5 IPSAR together really had not had the opportunity to know what 6 our concern was in this area so they had not had time to 7 respond.
8 MR. SIESS: Can the licensee tell us what the 9 position is on the groundwater issue? Are you going to 10 re-evaluate that?
11 MR. RAINSBERRY: How this is written in the IPSAR, 12 is that we should evaluate groundwater at ground surface 13 basically.
14 MR. SIESS: That has always been one alternative.
15 Tne other alternative was to establish a measuring program to 16 find out where it was.
17 MR. RAINSBERRY: We have established data where we 18 believe that it is normal and maximum levels are and clearly 19 at those levels, there has not been any problem in the past.
20 I guess it is fair to say that we haven't looked into whether 21 or not we want to do an evaluation at ground level for the 22 groundwater evaluation or not.
23 So I would say that we are in an unknown at this 24 point.
25 MR. SIESS: Am I right that there are two
.,. I ;
161 Q 1 aIternatives?
l 2 MS. MCKENNA: Yes. t 3 MR. GRIMES: Yes, sir. ; j 4
l 4 MR. RAINSBERRY: There might,be a third and that is l
5 to estabitsh a more probable maximum high groundwater level t'
6 and evaluate it at that level.
i l
7 MR. SIESS: Yes. Now the IpSAR says that the '
8 licensee will submit the results of this evaluation and I j
t 9 don't have the final. j i
,o 10 MS. MCKENNA: In the draft reports, we have g 11 generally not fiIIAd in alI the dates and schedules because
- 12 they have not aIways been estabIished.
18 MR. SIESS: What bothered me was that the draft 5
14 report said that the Iicensee wiiI and thero Js not a "yes* by 15 that.
16 MS. MCKENNA: There is a little inconsistency 17 there. We will take care of that in the final 18 MR. SISSS: So that shou'M ou a yes. He is 19 responding to your concern ir t 's a ishion?
l 20 MS. MCKENNA: Right. I think at this point we
\
I 21 pretty much have "yes's" in everything.
22 MR. SIESS: Now, t,ornado missiIes does not have a 1
23 "yes" but t tia t we have I discussed.
(
, , :r
(
24 r
MS. MCKENNA. E R i g'i t .
..~J /
25 MR, SIESS: On page 59 ), item 4.21.2, t
P
162 1 overpressurization protection for RHR system.
2 MS. MCKENNA: We have since agreed on a "yes" for 3 that one. That was another one where we didn't have the 1
l 4 written commitment but in discussions, we reached agreement on 5 that one, yes.
6 MR. SIESS: On the next page under the containment 7 isolation, there were two questions about administrative 8 procedures, 4.23.7.1 and 4.23.7.2, refueling water lines and 9 main steamlines, provide administrative procedures or provide l
l 10 procedures.
11 MS. MCKENNA: This again was an area where we didn't 12 have a written reference to refer to but I don't believe there 13 is any disagreement.
14 MR. SIESS: Those are just procedures and not even l 15 tech spec changes?
i 16 MS. MCKENNA: That's right.
l 17 MR. SIESS: On page 61, that is the switch over, l
18 that is the one we have discussed.
19 MS. MCKENNA: Right.
20 MR. SIESS: On page 62, include tests for 21 containment spray actuation in the tech specs.
22 MS. MCKENNA: That was again in that category of not 23 a written reference but we have basic agreement, i
24 MR. SIESS: All right. Salt water on the next page, 25 4.82.7, reliability evaluation of salt water cooling system,
163 r%
( e) w 1 we have discussed.
2 MS. MCKENNA: Yes.
S MR. SIESS: On the last page, under 4.38.3, an 4 administration building, develop a procedure for room cooling 5 and hydrogen dispersion without a tech spec change.
6 MS. MCKENNA: Right.
7 MR. SIESS: That is agreed to now?
8 MS. MCKENNA: Yes.
9 MR. SIESS: All right. I just wanted to be able to 10 explain that to somebody who reads stuff like that.
11 Now where do we stand?
MS. MCKENNA:
( 12 The only thing would be on any of 18 these items identified as the "no action" if there are any 14 items you would like to discuss?
15 MR. SIESS: Di.d anyone come up with anything that 16 the staff decided did not meet current regulations but didn't 17 need fixing that they would like an elaboration or an 18 explanation of why they didn't need fixing?
19 (No response.)
20 MR. SIESS: Those are more interesting .to explore 21 than those that did need fixing. I don't have any problem 22 because most of the items look pretty familiar.
28 (ACRS members reviewing document.)
24 MR. SIESS: We have plenty of time, gentlemen.
25 (PAUSE.)
l 164 O)
(, 1 MR. SIESS: I really don't want to keep you here any l
2 longer than necessary? l 8 Does the licensee have any last words that he would 4 like to say?
5 MR. BASKIN: You make it sound so ominous. I guess 6 1 just have one or two comments that'I would like to make kind 7 of in a general sense. One, in the case of San Onofre when 8 you look at the overall context of the SEP program, clearly we 9 were overwhelmed, I think is the proper word, from the 10 standpoint of the seismic backfit issue. That by far and away 11 was orders of magnitude in terms of effort, cost to us and
[\ 12 this sort of thing more than the rest of the program put QY 18 together.
14 It may be of interest that non-seismic backfit to 15 date, we have spent about $125 million dollars and expect to 16 spend about $50 million dollars more in this outage just on 17 seismic backfit so you can see in comparison to the rest of 18 the program, it is very, very significant and overwhelming.
19 Other than that, we have mixed emotions on the 20 program. I think it provided some benefits and looked at some 21 things that otherwise would not have been looked at and in 22 hindsight, you can always obviously find some things that you es 28 would do differently and improve upon.
( 24 Just the last thing, for your information I would 25 like to point out that in the case of San Onofre-1, we have
165 i
( 1 probably and I don't have any accurate figures on it but I am 2 pretty sure 1 am right in this, that we have spent more money 3 on backfitting this plant than probably any other plant in the 4 country and maybe the world.
5 MR. SIESS: That is including the seismic part.
6 MR. BASKIN: That is including the seismic but we 7 are up on the order over the years now of somewhere between 8 $450 and $500 million dollars.
9 MR. WYLIE: What did it cost you originally?
10 MR. BASKIN: Originally, it was $87 million dollars, 11 $98 million if you add the transmission lines so we are a 12 factor of five above the original cost. It is still from our O./
m IS standpoint a very important and reliable operating resource to 14 the company.
15 So there is certainly no intent on the part of 16 the company to retire the unit or anything like that. We are 17 having some difficult *ies with our public Utilities Commission 18 in terms of establishing what the maximum backfit costs are 19 going to be but we think we have those as well under control 20 as one can be in a situation like this so we look forward to 21 the operation of San Onofre through its life time, whatever 22 that may be at this point.
23 MR. SIESS: In terms of dolfars per installed 24 kilowatt, how does it compare with units "2" and "S" after all 25 of the upgrades?
166 D
\- 1 MR. BASKIN: If we are talking $600 million, that 2 would be about $1,200.00 per kilowatt. San Onofre-2 and "3" 3 is right around $2,000.00 per kilowatt so it is still a 4 bargain.
5 MR. WYLIE: It is still a bargain.
6 MR. BASKIN: Still a bargain, yes. That is really 7 all I want to say unless there are some other questions 8 anybody had.
9 MR. SIESS: Charlie.
10 MR. WYLIE: No.
11 MR. SIESS: Dave.
'12 MR. WARD: No.
13 MR. WYLIE: Of course, all these backfits were 14 excessive because you couldn't just go in and do them when you 15 wanted to. If you did them initially, probably it would not 16 have cost you that much. I mean with the original design it 17 would be at least half that, I am sure.
18 MR. BASKIN: Probably less than half that.
19 MR. WYLIE: At least, yes.
20 MR. BASKIN: One of the things we find is that 21 generally speaking estimates prepared by other people for the 22 costs of backfit tend to be considerably lower than the actual
[~ 23 costs turn out to be.
\_/
24 MR. WYLIE: Yes. That is so true.
25 MR. SIESS: You have heard us previously that we f
\
167 I won't have you before the full committee in August and I think 2 Chris can tell you pretty much what will go on. It won't be a S whole lot different from your point of view than here. It 4 will be somewhat abbreviated and questions might be on any 5 area. You seem to have handled any that came up so I don't 6 think we will have any problem.
7 MR. WYLIE: I think it is interesting that PRA 8 showed a couple of high areas but they were very easily 9 resolved.
10 MR. SIESS: Thank you. The meeting is adjourned.
11 (Whereupon, the subcommittee meeting was adjourned 12 at 2:00 o' clock p.m.)
IS 14 15 16 17 l
18 l 19 20 l l
21 22
/"' 23 a
24 25
i l
l 1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 2
3 4
l 5 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6 before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 7 matter of. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS S
9 Name of Proceeding: Subcommittee of the Systematic Evaluation Program (San"Onofre) 10 11 Docket No.
12 Piace: Washington, D. C.
13 Cate: Wednesday, June 19, 1985 14 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original 16 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commissidn.
13 (Signature)
,g (Typed Name of Reporter) Myrtle E. Walsh 20 21 22 23 Ann Riley & Assoclates. Ltd.
24 25
1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 2
3 4
5 This is to certify that the attached proceedings 6 before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 7 matter of: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS e
9 Name of P roceeri i ng : Subcontittee of the Systematic Evaluation Program (San Onofre) 10 11 Docket No.
12 Place: Washington, D. C.
13 Date: Wednesday, June 19, 1985 14 15 were held as herein appears and that this is the original 16 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission.
13 (Signature) yg ig - --]-
(Typed Name of Report 4r) Marilynn Nations 20 l
21 1 22 23 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
1 24 25
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1 PLANT OVERVIEW 4
I. PLANT HISTORY II. PLANT CHARACTERISTICS III. UNIQUE DESIGN ASPECTS IV. MAJOR OUTAGES AND BACKFITS V. UNIT CAPACITY FACTORS O
f l
+
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.~,-.~-.,,,,-___e . , , . , , . . . , . , , ~ , . _ , , . , . ._.__,__.,.,.__,---,,-____,_,,_,,y,_.,.__,, , _ _ _ , . , , , , , , _ , , , , , , ,
PLANT HISTORY OWNERS: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDIS0N - 80%
SAN DIEGO GAS AND ELECTRIC - 20%
OPERATOR: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON LOCATION: 5 MILES SOUTH OF SAN CLEMENTE, CA.
AEC APPLICATION FILED FEBRUARY 1, 1963 CONSTRUCTION STARTED JULY 15, 1964 PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE MARCH 27, 1967 DPR-13 ISSUED COMMERCIAL OPERATION JANUARY l', 1968 RECORD 218 CONSECUTIVE DAYS OF JANUARY 26, 1976 OPERATION O
O
PLANT CHARACTERISTICS U 1347 MWT LICENSED POWER RATING:
NSSS: 3 LOOP WESTINGHOUSE ARCHITECT / ENGINEER / CONSTRUCTOR: BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION FUEL: STAINLESS STEEL CLAD URANIUM DIOXIDE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK: PACIFIC OCEAN EMERGENCY AC POWER SYSTEM: REDUNDANT DIESEL GENERATORS EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM: REDUNDANT " LOW PRESSURE" SAFETY INJECTION TRAINS REDUNDANT HIGH PRESSURE CHARGING PUMPS CORE AVERAGE TEMPERATURE: 5500F RCS OPERATING PRESSURE: 2050 PSIG l
O
I 1
O UNIQUE DESIGN ASPECTS 0 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM 0 STEAM SYSTEM 4
l l
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.. . -_ , , _ -,- ,_,,.w,,w -, - , . , , , ., --, - - - - - - - - - ,,, . - - , - - . . - - - -
MAJOR OUTAGES AND BACKFITS O STANDBY POWER ADDITION: 1976-1977 0 INSTALLATION OF REDUNDANT HIGH CAPACITY DIESEL GENERATORS (6 MW)
SPHERE ENCL 0sURE PROJECT: 1976-1977 0 CONCRETE ENCLOSURE OF CONTAINMENT SPHERE INSTALLED DUE TO REDUCTION IN EXTENT OF EXCLUSION AREA B0UNDARY STEAM GENERATOR SLEEVING PROJECT: 1980-1981 0 LEAK LIMITING SLEEVES INSTALLED IN APPROXIMATELY 6500 0F 11,400 TUBES TO MITIGATE EFFECTS OF CORROSION TMI MODIFICATIONS: 1982-1984 0 PASS, RADIATION MONITORING, HYDROGEN MONITORING AND CONTROL, EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES, RCS VENTS, PLANT SHIELDING, '
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM UPGRADES, ETC.
SEISMIC MODIFICATIONS: 1982-1984 0 SYSTEMS UPGRADED TO 0.67G HOUSNER CRITERIA TO ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN A SAFE HOT STANDBY CONDITION O
+
O UNIT CAPACITY FACTORS CUMULATIVE CAPACITY FACTOR PRIOR TO 1980 STEAM GENERATOR OUTAGE: 72%
CUMULATIVE CAPACITY FACTOR TO DATE: 52.8%
CAPACITY FACTOR FROM NOVEMBER 27, 1984 RETURN-TO-SERVICE THROUGH APRIL 30, 1985: 81%
O l
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0 Figure 1 SONGS UNIT 1 CAPACITY FACTORS
=o- 2"#C:i:02%ect M5"E$has F p 1,.. e-,, r ..,i
- pf ic_e 7
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j x x i - <,_,,, ,_ ., c 9 9, l l l l llll l, ,lylyglnni 1968 1969 19)O 19'71 1952 19) 3 19i4 19i 5 19}6 19i 7 19E8 19h9 19b0 19'81 19b2 19b3 1954 19b5 Year of Operation I ,
ft1'Ifm NRR STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE e
SUBJECT:
SEP INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT - SAN ON0FRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 DATE: JUNE 19, 1985 i
i PRESENTER: E. MCKENNA I
PRESENTER'S TITLE /DIV: SENIOR PROJECT MANAGER i DIVISION OF LICENSING i
j PRESENTER'S NRC TEL. N0.: 49-27468 SUBCOMMITTEE:- SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM
- O i
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-- ..,,-,,--an-. , , - - , - ,__ ,_...,,,-,,,_-n_,_,_. , , , , , . - -
4 l
SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1 !
SUMMARY
TOPICS DELETED COMPLIANCE WITH CURRENT CRITERIA MODIFICATIONS COMPLETED INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT ISSUES I
APPLICATION OF PRA SEISMIC UPGRADE STATUS INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT RESULTS N0 ACTION REQUIRED O PROCEDURAL OR TECH SPEC CHANGES FURTHER EVALUATION REQUIRED HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS ISSUES OF DISAGREEMENT CONCLUSION m
O
SilMMARY O
PHASE II TOPICS - 137 GENERIC TOPICS DELETED 24 PLANT SPECIFIC TOPICS DELETED 24
. TOPICS REVIEWED 89 TOPICS ACCEPTABLE 53 INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT TOPICS 36 ISSUES - TOTAL 86 O
GEWEF.IC TONCS DELETED sgP # m1, U51, or SEP Title SEP No. TMI, U51, or SEP Title TopfC No.
Onsite Meteorological Measurements TMI !!.F.3 Instrumentation for Monitoring Accident 11 2.8 Conditions y1 Program TMI !!!.A.1 Improve Licensee Emergency Preparedness -
Short Term Availability of Meteorological TM1 11.F.3 Instrumentation for Monitoring Accident -
!! 2.0 Conditions Data in the Control Room TM! !!!.A.1 Improve Licensee Emergency Preparedness -
Short Tere TM1 1.D.1 Control Roon Design Reviews Core Supports and Fuel Integrity US1 A 2 Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on Reactor Primary
- 11 8.0 Coolant Systee Support Integrity U$1 A-12 Fracture Toughness of Steam Generator and
!!!*9 Reactor Coolant Pump Supports
- U51 A 7 Mark 1 Containment Long-Term Prograe USI A 24 Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Equipment U51 A 46 Seismic Qualification of Eouipment in Operating Plants SEP !!! 6 Seismic Design Considerations [
SEP V-1 Comp 1tance with Codes and Standards (10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.55a)
Component Integrity U51 A-46 Selseic Qualification of Equipment in Operating
!!! 11 Plants US1 A 2 Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on Reactor Primary
- - Coolant SEP !!! 6 Seismic Design Considerations
!!! 12 Environmental Qualifications of US1 A-24 Qualification of Safety-Related Equipment Overpressuritation Protection U51 A-26 Reactor vessel Fressure Transient Protection V-3 Piping and Safe End Integrity U5! A-42 Pipe Cracks in Boiling Water Reactors V4 Steam Generator Integrity U51 A 3, westinghouse, Combustion Engineering, and V-8 A-4, A-5 Babcock and Wilcon Stone Generator Twee Integrity tp}
\
b#
Water Maaper U51 A-1 Waterhanper {
V 13 US1 A 7 Mark I Containment Long-Tere Program VI-2.A Pressure-Suopression-Type 8vR Containments Subcompartment Analysis U5! A 2 Asyumetric Blowdown loads on Reactor Primary VI 2.B Coolant Systee TM! !!.B.7 Analysis of Mydrogen Control VI 5 Comoustible Gas Control ,,
Hydrogen Control Measures and Effects of U51 A 48 Hydrogen Burns on Safety Equipment U5! A a3 Containment Emergency Sump 8eliability V! 7.E Emergency Core Cooling Systee Sumo Design and Test for Recirculation Mode Effectiveness Control Room Habitability TMI 111.D.3.4 Control Room Maettacility #eoutrements V! 8 Ef fects of Failure in Monsafety- U51 A-47 Safety luglications of Ce trol Systee .
VI!*4 Systees Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants Related Systems on Selected U51 A 17 Fanineered Safetv Features V!! 5 Instruments for Monitoring Radia- TM! !!.F.1 Instrumentation Additional Accident Identification of andMonitoring'From Recovery Conditions tion and Process VariaDIes During TMI II.F.2 Accioents Leading to Inadeouate Core Cooling TM! !!.F.3 Instruments for Monitoring Accident Conditions IX 2 Cverhead Handling Systems (Cranes) U$1 A-36 Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel Pool Auniliary Feedwater System TM! !!.E.1.1 Aust11ary Feeowater System Evaluation j X
XI!!*1 Conduct of Operations TM! 1.C.6 Procedures for verification of Correct Performance of Operating Activities TM1 !!!.A.1 Improve Licensee Emergency Preparedness -
Short Ters TM! !!!.A.2 Improving Licensee Emergency Precaredness -
Long Toro
(
v) XV-21 IV 22 Scent Fuel Cask Orop Accident U5! A 36 Anticipated Transients Without Scram U$1 A*9 Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel Pool Anticipated Transients without Scram XV 23 Multiple Tube Failures in Steam U51 A 3 Westinghouse, Comeustion Engineering, and Generators A 4, A 5 and Wilcon Steam Generator Tube Integrity USI A-9 Anticipated Transient without Scrae XV-24 Loss of All AC Powee USI A 44 Station Blackout
PLMT SPECIFIC TOPICS DELETED f
MicNo. SEP Title ElNe9 Reason For Deletien of Topic
!! 4.E Dam Integrity 11/16/79 Not applicable to site.
Structural and Other Consequences Not applicable to site because site does y)
( m !!! 3.8 (e.g.. Flooding of Safety-Related Equipment in Basements) of Failure of Underdrain Systems 11/16/79 not have a system whose function is to lower the groundwater table,
!!!-7.A Inservice Inspection. Including 05/07/81 Not applicable to this facility's design.
Prestressed Concrete Containments with Either Grouted or Ungrouted Tendons
!!!-7.C Dela61 nation of Prestressed 11/16/79 Not applicable to this facility's design.
Concrete Containment Structures
!!!.8.8 Control Rod Drive Mechanism 10/01/80 Not applicable to Pressurited Water Reactors Integrity (PWRs).
!!!-10.C Surveillance Requirements on BWR 11/16/79 Not applicable to PWRs.
Recirculation Pumps and Discharge Valves IV 3 BWR Jet Pug Operating Indications 05/07/81 Mot applicable to PWRs.
V1 Compliance With Codes and Standards 11/2'/81 Reviewed under Inservice Inspection / Inservice Test Program.
V2 Applicability of C0de Cases 11/16/79 Not applicable to PWRs.
~ V9 Reactor Cor'e Isolation Cooling 11/16/79 Not applicable to PWRs.
System (EWR1 v 12.A Water Purity of 8WR Primary Coolant !!/16/79 Not applicable to PVRs.
VI 2.C !ce Condenser Containment 11/16/79 Not applicable to this unit's containment design.
V! 7.A.2 Upper Plenum Injection 05/07/81 Not applicable to this facility's design.
V! 7.A.4 Core Spray Nozzle Effectiveness 05/C7/81 Not applicable to PWRs.
V! 7.C.3 Effect ce PWR Loop Isolation Valve !!/16/79 Not applicable to this facility's design.
Closure During a Loss-of Coolant Accident on Emergency Core Cooling System Perfomance V!-7.F Accumulator Isolation Valves 11/16/79 Not applicable to this facility's design.
Power and Control System Design 8 V!-9 Main Steam Line Isolation Seal 11/16/79
- Not applicable to PWRs.
System (8WR) v!! 7 Acceptability of Swing Bus Design 11/16/79 Not applicable to PWRs.
on SWR 4 Plants
!!-l Appeedia ! 12/04/81 8eing resolved unde geeerte activity A-02
" Appendix !.* and 8 35. "Confimation of Appendiz ! Models." (See " Basis for Deletion"
, in Appendix A under Topic Il-1.)
Il 2 Radiological (Effluent and Process) 12/04/81 Being resolved under generic activity A 02 Monitoring Systems ?Apoendix !.* (See " Basis for Celetion' in Appendix A under Topic Il 2.)
IV 11 Inadvertent Leading and Operation 10/01/80 Not applicable to PWRs.
of a Fuel Assembly in an Imroper Position (BWR) xy 13 Spectrum of Red Drop Accidents (BWR) 11/16/79 Not applicable to PWRs.
IV 18 Radiological Consequences of Pain 10/01/80 Not applicable to PWRs.
Steam Line Failure Outside Centainment IV! Technical Specifications 11/05/80 Will be addressed after crepletion of the
- integrated assessment.
l O
TOPICS WHICH MEET CURRENT CRITERIA OR ARE ACCEPTABLE ON "ANOTHER DEFINED BASIS" O
/
T4ESE TOPICS APE IDENTIFIED BY ASTERISKS O
TOPIC TITLE O II-1.A Exclusion Area Authority and Control V
II-1.8 Population Distribution II-2.A Severe Weather Phenomena II-2.C Atmospheric Transport and Diffusion Characteristics for Accident Analysis II-3.A Hydrologic Description II-3.B.1 Capability of Operating Plant To Cope With Design-Basis Flooding Conditions II-3.C Safety-Related Water Supply (Ultimate Heat Sink [ UHS])
II-4* Geology and Seismology II-4.A* Tectonic Province II-4.8 Proximity of Capable Tectonic Structures in Plant Vicinity II-4.C* Historial Seismicity Within 200 Miles of Plant II-4.0 Stability of Slopes O III-4.8 Turbine Missiles V
III-4.C Internally Generated Missiles III 4.0 Site-Proximity Missiles (Including Aircraft)
III-8.C Irradiation Damage, Use of Sensitized Stainless Steel, and Fatigue Resistance IV-1.A Operation With less Than All Looos In Service V-6 Reactor Vessel Integrity .
V-7 Reactor Coolant Pump Overspeed V-10.8 Residual Heat Removal System Reliability V I-2'. D Mass and Energy Release for Postulated Pipe Break Inside Containment VI-3 Containment Pressure and Heat Removal Capability VI-6 Containment Leak Testing 4 VI-7.A.1 Emergency Core Cooling System Reevaluation to Account for Increased Reactor Vessel Upper-Head Temperature VI-7.A.3 Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation System
TOPIC TITLE
('s VI-7.C Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Single-Failure Criterion and Requirements for Locking Out Power to Valves, Including Independence of Interlocks on ECCS Valves VI-7.C.1 Appendix K--Electrical Instrumentation and Control Re-Reviews VI-7.0 Long-Term Cooling Passive Failures (e.g., Flooding of Redundant Components) .
VI-10.8 Shared Engineered Safety Features, Onsite Emergency Power and Service Systens for Multiple Unit Facilities
, VII-1.8 Trip Uncertainty and Setpoint Analysis Review of Operating Data Base VII-2 Engineered Safety Features System Control Logic and Design VII-6 Frequency Decay
~
VIII-2 Onsite Emergency Power System (Diesel Generator)
VIII-3.A Station Battery Capacity Test Recuirements
! IX-1 Fuel Storage IX-4 Boron Addition System (PWR)
XIII-2 Safeguards / Industrial Security XV-3 Loss of External Load, Turbine Trip, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve (BWR), and Steam Pressure Regulator Failure (Closed)
XV-4 Loss of Nonemergency AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries XV-5 Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow XV-6 Feedwater System Pipe Breaks Inside and Outside Containment (PWR)
XV-7 Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor Seizure and Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Break XV-8 Control Rod Misoperation (System Malfunction or Operator Error)
XV-9 Startup of an Inactive Loop or Recirculation Loop at an Incorrect Temperature, and Flow Controller Malfunction Causing an Increase in BWR Core Flow Rate XV-10 Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction That Results in a Decrease in Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant (PWR)
XV-12 Spectrum of Rod E,iection Accidents (PWR)
C
- - , _ . . . _ . _ , -----.____---y,.. , _ _ , ,
TOPIC TITLE XV-14 Inadvertent Operation of Emergency Core Cooling System and Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction That Increases Reactor Coolant Inventory XV-15 Inadvertent Opening of a PWR Pressurizer Safety / Relief Valve or a BWR Safety / Relief Valve XV 16 Radiological Consequences of Failure of Small Line Carrying Primary Coolant Outside Containment XV-17 Radiological Consequences of Steam Generator Tube Failure (PWR)
XV-19 Loss-of-Coolant Accidents Resulting From Spectrum of Postulated Piping Breaks Within the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary XV-20 Radiological Consequences of Fuel-Damaging Acciden.ts (Inside and Outside Containment)
XVII Operational Ouality Assurance Program O
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I MODIFICATIONS MADE DURING SEP PEVIEW.
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l m TOPIC ISSUE MODIFICATION
. II-4,F SETTLEMENT - BACKFILL S0ILS GRADE BEAMS UNDER 480V ROOM AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS III-6 SEISMIC REEVALUATION UPGRADES TO SAFETY-RELATED STRUCTURES EQUIPMENT PIPING AND SUPPORTS NEEDED FOR HOT STANDBY CONDITION FOR 0,67 MODIFIED HOUSNER SPECTRUM EARTHOUAKE
~
V-10 A ' RADIATION MONITORING OF TS ON COMPONENT C0'0 LING CCW WATER RADIATION MONITOR I
V-11 A SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF VALVE POSITIONS AFTER O TESTING VI-1 CONTAINMENT C0ATINGS INSPECTION AND REPAIP 0F PAINTS INSIDE CONTAINMENT VI-4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION - TS TO MAINTAIN PURGE VALVE PURGE LINE CLOSED DURING OPERATION VII-3 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER INSTALLATION OF NEW TANK AND PARALLEL SUCTION PATHS VIII-1,A VOLTAGE MONITORING MODIFICATION OF TAP
. SETTINGS IX-3 SALT WATER COOLING INSTALLATION OF CHECK DISCHARGE VALVES, REMOVAL 0F AIR OPERATORS O
f 2-O TOPIC- ISSUE MODIFICATION j IX-3 SWC WATER SUPPLY TSUNAMI GATES REMOVED i- IX-5 VENTILATION SYSTEMS INSTALLATION OF NEW
- VENTILATION SYSTEM IN SWITCHGEAR AND CAPLE t
SPREADING ROOMS O
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mu a u uuu mimi n DISPOSITION OF ISSUES O
CATEGORY J NUMBER OF ISSUES NO ACTION ,, 41
/l HAPDWARE j, ,5 PROCEDURES OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS .I 12 FURTHER EVALUATION 26
- - UNRESOLV.ED . 2j 86'
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.. ISSUES ADDRESSED BY PRA O
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ISSUES ADDRESSED BY STAFF PRA TOPIC TITLE RANK I III-8.A LOOSE PARTS MONITORING LOW
. III-10 A THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION FOR MOTORS LOW 0F MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES IV-2 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES LOW V-10 A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM HEAT LOW EXCHANGER TUBE FAILURES V-11.A PEOUIREMENTS FOR ISOLATION OF HIGH-AND LOW-PRESSURE SYSTEMS
- CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL LOW (V 3 - SAFETY INJECTION MEDIUM
- LONG-TERM RECIRCULATION LOW V-11.B RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM LOW INTERLOCK REQUIREMENTS VI-4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM LOW VI-7 B ESF SWITCH 0VER FROM INJECTION . MEDIUM TO RECIRCULATION VI-7.C.2 FAILURE MODES ANALYSIS - ECCS
- VOLUME CONTROL TANK ISOLATION MEDIUM
- CONTROL POWER F0P FLOW CONTROL MEDIUM j VALVES VI-10.A TESTING OF REACTOR TRIP SYSTEMS AND LOW l p ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES, INCLUDING V RESPONSE TIME TESTING
' ~
TOPIC TITLE RANK I l VII-1,A ISOLATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM LOW FROM NON-SAFETY SYSTEMS .
l VII-3 SYSTEMS REQUIPED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN LOW
-(CCW SURGE TANK LEVEL)
VIII-3.B DC POWER BUS MONITORING AND ANNUNCIATION MEDIUM VIII-4 - -
ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS LOW IX-3 STATION SERVICE AND COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
- PASSIVE FAILURES LOW
- TSUNAMI GATE CLOSURE LOW f]
IX-5 VENTILATION SYSTEMS
- REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING LOW
- 480V SWITCHGEAR LOW
. - 4160V SWITCHGEAR/ CABLE SPREADING POOM HIGH
- BATTERY AND INVERTEP ROOMS HIGH -
XV-2 SPECTRUM 0F MAIN STEAM LINE BREAKS LOW 1
< RANKED AS LOW, MEDIUM OR HIGH IMPACT OF TOPIC DIFFERENCE ON RISK FROM THE PLANT IN CONTRACTOR REPORT.
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- ISSUES NOT REQUIRING MODIFICATIONS AS A RESULT OF SEP REVIEW O
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F0 ACTION IPSAR TOPIC ISSUE SECTION II-1.C OVERPRESSURE FROM EXPLOSIONS 4.1.1 FREQUENCY OF SHIPMENTS 4.1.2 III-7 D CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TESTS 4.13 III-8.A LOOSE PARTS MONITORING 4.14 III-10 A THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION FOR 4.15 MOTORS OF MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES III-10 B PUMP FLYWHEEL INTEGRITY 4.16 IV-2 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 4.17 V-5 TESTABILITY - LEAKAGE DETECTION h.JP.1.4 INTERSYSTEM LEAKAGE 4.18.2 V-10.A RADIATION MONITORING 4.19.J SAMPLING 4.19.7 TESTING OF RECIRCULATION HEAT EXCHANGEP 4.19.3 V-11.A CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE 4.20.1.1 LETDOWN 4.20,],2 p., SAFETY INJECTION 4.20.2 V
LONG-TERM RECIRCULATION . 4.20.3
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IPSAR TOPIC ISSUE SECTION V-11.B RHR INTERLOCKS 4.21.]
VI-4 PURGE LINES 4.23.1.1 ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW DESIGN 4.23.1.3 AUTOMATIC LOADING OF DIESEL 4.23.1.4
_- . . GENERATOR FANS OVEPRIDE CAPABILITY OF SAMPLE LINES 4.23.1.5 4.23.?
VALVE TYPE 4.23.3 VALVE LOCATION 4.23.4 SPARE PENETRATIONS 4.23.8 AIRLOCKS AND HATCHES 4.23.9 VI-7.C.2 REDUNDANT VALVE FOR VOLUME CONTROL 4.25.]
TANK ISOLATION CONTROL POWER TO FCV-1115 D, E, F 4.25.2 HOT-LEG RECIRCULATION 4.25.3 VI-10 A TESTING OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS 4.26.3
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O IPSAR TOPIC ISSUE SECTION VII-1.A REMOTE METERS AND PECORDEPS 4,27,1 DATA LOGGER 4,27,2 FEEDWATEP CONTROL 4,27,3 f
VII-3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER 4.28,1 SEISMIC CATEGOPY I WATER SUPPLY 4.28,2 FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATEP VIII-3.B DC POWER BUS MONITORING AND 4,30 ANNUNCIATION VIII-4 ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS 4.31 IX-3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) 4.32.1 SYSTEM TEMPERATURE SWC SUPPLY FAILUPE 4,32,4 LOSS OF BEARING FLUSH 4,32.6 IX-5 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING 4.33.1 O
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CONTROL STRUCTURES V-5 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR OPERABILITY 4,18,1,2 0F LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS .
SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OR PROCEDURES 4,18,],3 V-11.B RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL - OVERPRESSURE 4.21,2 PROTECTION TS VI-1 CONTAINMENT COATINGS - INSPECTION PROGRAP 4,22 VI-4 SEQUENCER TEST PROCEDURES 4,23.1.2 LOCKING DEVICES / PROCEDURES FOR REFUELING 4,23,7,1 WATER LINE BRANCHES PROCEDUPES FOR ISOLATING MAIN STEAM 4,23.7.2 DRAIN LINES VI-10,A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR RPS 4,26.1 CHANNELS TESTING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR CONTAINPENT 4,26,2 SPPAY ACTUATION LOGIC IX-5 TEMPERATURE PONITORING PROGRAF - CABLE u,33.2 SPREADING ROOM AND 480V ROOM A
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WIND AND TORNADO LOADINGS 4.5 4.12.1 III-3.A GROUNDWATER HYDROSTATIC LOAD 4.2.4
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III-6 SEISMIC DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 4.11 4.12.1 4.23.5 4.23.6
- III-7 B LOAD COMBINATIONS FOR CONTAINMENT 4.12.2 VI-7 C. 2- -
FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS (ECCS SYSTEMS) 4.25.0 4.32.2 4.32.4 l l
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. XV-1 INCREASE IN FEEDWATER FLOW 4.35 l
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ST FF E' VALUATING LICENSEE'S ASSESSMENT OF SETTLEMENT 1
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PRESSURE VESSEL FATIGUE ANALYSIS FRACTURE TOUGHNESS EFFECT UNDER CYCLIC LOADS OF GROSS DISCONTINUITIES ON USAGE FACTOR FOR PIPING VALVE STRESS LIMITS PUMP DESIGN STANDARDS STRESS REQUIREMENTS FOR STORAGE TANKS f
LICENSEE TO EVALUATE THESE ISSUES, AND IDENTIFY ANY REQUIRED CORRECTIVE MEASUPES f
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1 III-2, WIND AND TORNADO LOADING / TORNADO MISSILES O iii-a.a IPSAR SECTIONS 4,5 AND 4,8 LICENSEE TO PERFORM COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS TO IDENTIFY WIND-SPEED FOR MODIFICATIONS STAFF POSITION IS THAT LICENSEE SHOULD PROVIDE A SINGLE PROTECTED TRAIN FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IN THE EVENT OF A TORNADO (MISSILES)
LICENSEE HAS NOT AGREED O
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CRITEPIA SPECIFIES FACTOR OF 1.1 PRESSURE / PEAK CALCULATED " '
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PRA RESULTS SHOW LOW SIGNIFICANCE ISSUE CLOSED O
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9' III-10,B, PUPP-FLYWHEEL INTEGRITY O IPSAR SECTION 4.16 i
' ISSUE sAS NEED TO INCLUDE FLYWHEEL TESTING IN INSERVICE ,
INSPECTION PROGRAM OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION !
INSPECTIONS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED ON FREQUENCY SPECIFIED TEST PROCEDURE SATISFIES R G. 1,14 GUIDANCE ISSUE CLOSED O
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- GROUP, BANK OR TWO BANK MOVEMENT
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- ROD, GROUP OR BANK MAY FALL INTO CORE TWO BANK WITHDRAWAL HAD NOT BEEN EXPLICITLY CONSIDEPED REACTIVIfYINSERTIONRATEWITHINRANGECONSIDEREDINR0D WITHDRAWAL ANALYSIS ISSUE RESOLVED O
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DETECTION IPSAR SECTION 4,18 I ~*
SEVERAL SYSTEMS PROVIDED, INCLUDING THE THREE RECOMMENDED L IN R.G. 1.45 LEAK DETECTION SENSITIVITY NOT 1 GPM IN ONE HOUR TS ON OPERABILITY TO BE PROVIDED SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OR PROCEDURES
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MECHANICS EVALUATIONS FOR PIPE BREAK ASSESSMENT 4
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- SAMPLING COVERED BY PROCEDURES
! RADI ATION MONITOR PROVIDED FOR CCh' SYSTEM i
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- ISSUE CLOSED A
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, CHARGING PUFP SUCTION LINE OVERPPESSUPIZATION
- CHECK VALVE TESTING
- SEVERAL FAILUPES REQUIRED LETDOWN ISOLATION
_- SAFETY INJECTION-SYSTEM
- MOV AND CHECK VALVE IN SERIES
- CHECK VALVE HAS TS LEAKAGE LIMIT.
+ () - PIPING DESIGN PRESSURE IS 1400 PSIG LONG-TERM RECIRCULATION
- SEVERAL VALVES IN SERIES
- CHARGING PUMP SUCTION (SEE ABOVE) i e
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ONE SET WITH PRESSURE-INTERLOCK
' ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS PROVIDED J
RHR SYSTEM TOTALLY INSIDE CONTAINMENT TS FOR OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION TO BE IN OPERATION
- - WHENEVER.RHR SYSTEM IS 1
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- IPSAR SECTION 4.22- l
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IPSAR SECTION 4.23
. PURGE LINES LOCKED CLOSED DUPING MODES 1 THROUGH 4 i
- PROCEDURE CHANGES FOR SEQUENCER TESTING TO BE MADE 1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CONFIGURATIONS i - BOTH VALVES OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
- CHECK-VALVE INSTEAD OF AUTOMATIC VALVE
- SEISMIC QUALIFICATION PROCEDURES / LOCKING DEVICES FOR TEST, INSTRUMENT CONNECTIONS PROCEDURES TO ISOLATE MAINSTEAM DRAIN LINES IF PEQUIRED 4
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IPSAR SECTION 4,24 TANK INSTRUMENTATION IS LEVEL ALARM AND LEVEL INDICATION MANUAL SWITCH 0VER TWO-PART PROCEDURE
- REDUCED INJECTION
- RECIRCULATION TIME FOR OPERATOR ACTION IS SHORT IF FEEDWATER FLOW NOT
_- REDUCED PROMPTLY STAFF POSITION AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF SAFETY INJECTION FLOW
!O BACKUP TO RWST LEVEL INSTRUMENT LICENSEE HAS NOT YET AGREED I
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- NITROGEN SUPPLY FOR FLOW CONTROL VALVE
- HOT LEG. RECIRCULATION l OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS ,
i 1, - ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION a
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VI-10.A, TESTING OF REACTOR TRIP' SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY Q FEATURES, INCLUDING RESPONSES TIME TESTING IPSAP SECTION 4.26 TS FOR RPS CHANNEL TESTING, CALIERATION (MANUAL, STARTUP RATE, SAFETY INJECTION)
TS FOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION LOGIC ALREADY INCLUDE SUFFICIENT TS TO ENSURE OPERABILITY OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS O
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O IPSAR SECTION 4.28
- COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUPGE TANK LEVEL INDICATION
- LOCAL-GAUGE CPECKED ONCE PER SHIFT AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS
- NEW STORAGE TANK
- NEW PARALLEL SUCTION LINES TO PUMPS THIRb(MbTOR-DRIVEN)AUXILIARYFEEDWATERPUMPTOBE INSTALLED O
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.VIII-1.A, ADEQUACY OF STATION ELECTRICAL VOLTAGE DISTRIBUTION tO IPSAR SECTION 4,29 j BUS UNDERVOLTAGE PROTECTION i'
- COIFCIDENCE LOGIC
, - TS -
GRID OVERVOLTAGE
- TRANSFORMER TAP SETTINGS OPTIMIZED 1 _
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l L'0W VOLTAGE PENETRATIONS EXCEED DESIGN TEMPERATURE IN EVENT OF LOCA FAULT CURRENT PLUS FAILUPE OF PRIMARY CIRCUIT INTERRUPT DEVICE SEALED CANISTER PENETRATIONS
- ' LOW RISI' CONTPIPL' TION ISSUE RESOLVED O
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IPSAR SECTION 4,32 PASSIVE FAILUPES NOT SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTOR TO SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY SALT WATER COOLING SYSTEM PELIABILITY
- CHECK VALVES INSTALLED
- AIR OPERATORS REMOVED
- EVA.LUAT. ION OF NEED FOR OTHER CHANGES T'UNAMI 5ATES REPOVED l
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- NEW VENTILATION SYSTEMS TEMPERATUPE MONITORING PROGRAM / PROCEDURES FOR LOSS OF VENTILATION BATTERY /I.NVERTER P00MS
- HYDROGEN DISPERSION / ROOM COOLING PROCFDUPES
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C l NRR STAFF PRESENTATION TO THE O ACRS ,
SUBJECT:
SAN ON0FRE 1 SEISMIC RE-EVALUATION June.19 DATE: JRY-19/1985 PRESENTER: T CHENG PRESENTER' TITLE /DIV: STRUCTURAL ENGINEER DIVISION OF LICENSING PRESENTER'S NRC TEL N0,: 49-28393 SUBCOMMITTEE: SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM O
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SAN ON0FRE UNIT 1 SEISMIC RE-EVALUATION 0,67G MODIFIED-HOUSNER GROUND RESPONSE SPECTRUM RETURN TO SERVICE (RTS) PROGRAM HOT-STANDBY CAPABILITY STAFF AUDITS AND CONFIRMATORY ANALYSES CONTINGENT RESCISSION OF SUSPENSIO.N LONG-TERM SERVICE (LTS) PROGRAM COLD SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY O
- ACCIDENT MITIGATION CAPABILITY RTS CONFIRMATORY EVALUATIONS STAFF AUDITS AND CONFIRMATORY ANALYSES MODIFICATION SCHEDULE - ONE CYCLE O
O LTS SEISMIC RE-EVALUATION
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- f. ANALYSIS METHODS AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA r
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SMALL-BORE P! PING AND TUBING PIPE SUPPORTS SECONDARYSTEELSTRUCTURESfSUPPORTELEMENTS)
' MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT r PUMPS HEAT EXCHANGERS VALVES TANKS RWST ,
l PENETRATIONS ELECTRICAL RACEWAYS CABLE TRAYS ,
CONDUITS . s i
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O LTS SEISMIC RE-EVALUATION SIGNIFICANT AREAS S0ll-STRUCTURE INTERACTION ANALYSIS CONTAINMENT FLOOR RESPONSE SPECTRA DIRECT GENERATION
- TURBINE BUILDING PVRC DAMPING LARGE-BORE PIPING
- STRESS AND STRAIN CRITERIA
- LINEAR ANALYSIS METHODS
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- NON-LINEAR ANALYSIS METHODS I SMALL-BORE PIPING
- WALKDOWN PROCEDURES AND CONFIRMATORY ANALYSES ANCHOR BOLT CRITERIA GANG SUPPORTS COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM EVALUATION
- OVERALL MARGIN e
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