ML20010H972
| ML20010H972 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1981 |
| From: | Pilmer D SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010H843 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8109290459 | |
| Download: ML20010H972 (8) | |
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
BEFORE THE ATOMIC GAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD D
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In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-361 OL 6 ) 50-362 OL SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA )
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g (San Onof re Nuclear Generating )
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n, n s2& 3) )
9 10 11 D
13 14 15 16 17 DIRECT TESTIMONY AND EXHIBIT OF MR. DAVID F. PILMER 18 S
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1 S 8109290459 810921 PDR ADOCK 05000361 T PDR I
O TESTIMONY OF DAVID F. PILMER 2
O Q. Mr. Pilmer, have you appeared previously on the emergency planning issues presented in this case?
A. Yes. I 5
l O Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this portion of the i 6 1 proceeding? I 7 i A. My testimony is in support of Applicants' Alternative Motion 8
O for Fuel Loading and Low Power License for SONGS Unit 2. ay 9
testimony demonstrates that based on the limited potential 10 for an accident with offsite consequences, the current state O of emergency preparedness at SONGS Unit 2 is adequate to 12 protect the public health and safety during fuel load and low 13 power testing.
O Q. Please describe the onsite emergency planning and implementa-15 tion that will be available during the fuel loading and low 16 power testing period at SONGS Unit 2.
3 17 A. The Emergency Plan for SONGS Units 2 & 3 (Exhibit No. 51,)
18 will be in effect prior to the first fuel loading 19 activities. This plan will be implemented, including the D 20 complete set of implementing procedures and the 21 accomplishment of all required training.
22 Q. What emergency response personnel will be available during 3 23 fuel loading and low power testing at SONGS Unit 2?
24 A. Chapter 5 of the Emergency Plan for SONGS Units 2 & 3 sets 25 forth the organizational control of emergencies. The h 26 D
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1 imm: dicto responso to cmargancies would b3 parformtd by SONGS 2 Unit 2 on-shift operations personnel. The key emergency 3 response organization positions are assumed by the same l 4 people who would respond to a SONGS Unit 1 emergency. These 5 key people include '.he following:
6 1. Emergency Coordinator
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7 2. Emergency Advisor 8 3. Engineering Leader 9 4. Administrative Leader
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10 5. Radiation Protection Leader 11 6. Security Leader, and
) 12 7. Emergency Support Leader 13 The SCE Emergency Support Organization ("ESO") is 14 the same as that which would be used for emergencies at SONGS
) 15 Unit 1. The key people listed above and the'ESO have 16 exercise experience and have received training in emergency 17 recponse at SONGS Unit 1 which is directly applicable to Unit
) 18 2 operations.
19 Q. Has there been an examination by the NRC of SCE's emergency 20 response capability?
) 21 A. Yes. The NRC's office of Inspection and Enforcement 22 conducted an inspection of SONGS Unit 1 emergency 23 preparedness during the period of May 11-15, 1981. This
) 24 inspection included observations by the NRC team members of 25 the May 13, 1981 exercise, interviews with SCE personnel, and 26 examination of procedures nnd various records. An inspection
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O 1 report was issued by the NRC Region V Office dated July 1.0, 2 1981 with the result that no items of noncompliance with NRC m 3 requirements were identified. A copy of this inspection a
4 report is provided as Exhibit DFP-6, " Letter of July 10, 1981 5 fr m NRC, Region V to Southern California Edison Company".
Q. How is this NRC inspection relevant to onsite emergency O 6 -
7 preparedness for the fuel load and low power testing period 8
for SONGS Unit 2?
O 9 A. The inspection is not applicable to the on-shift operating 10 personnel at SONGS Unit 2, but it is directly applicable to 11 .
the key Unsite management, supervisory, and senior technical
- O 12 personnel that make up a large portion of the onsite l
13 emergency response.
14 0 During the period of fuel loading and low power testi4g
,0 15 activities at SONGS Unit 2, what emergencies with offsite 16 consequences should be planned for?
17 A. The answer to this question varies according to the O yg activities being conducted. Mr. Rosenblum has described the 19 range of activities contemplated during this period. He has 20 estimated that the initial criticality of the SONGS Unit 2 0 re tor will occur on or about the eleventh week of the 21 program. During the period preceding initial criticality, 22 23 the fission product inventory is exceedingly small (caused by O naturally occuring spontaneous fissions and subcritical g
multiplication of the installed neutron sources) and can not 25 26 p ssibly cause offsite doses in the PAG range from any O
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1 conceivable scenario. Furthermore, accidental criticality is 2 essentially precluded during this period because of the large 3 3 shutdown margia (i.e., margin below criticality), which is 4 imposed for these activities.
5 The next activities consist of initial criticality D 6 and zero power reactor physics testing. This testing 7 requires approximatley three weeks to accomplish during which 8 time the reactor is critical. The fission rate and, i
D 9 consequently, the fission product generation during this 10 period is sufficiently low that a significnat fraction of -
i 11 these fission raoducts would have to be released to the l
3 12 atmosphere to create offsite doses in the PAG range. M r '.
13 Buttemer's testimony indicates that a core-melt is not 14 physically possible because of the limited decay heat 15 generation associated with this testing which is all 16 conducted at less than 0.1% power (approximately 3 MWt).
17 Therefore, I have concluded that there can not 18 exist a set of conditions that could constitute a General 19 Emergency as defined by section 4.1.4 of the Emergency Plan 20 during the period of these activities which Mr. Rosenblum has 21 estimated will require approximately 14 weeks to accomplish.
22 Furthermore, planning to deal with accidents that 23 are classified as a " site emergency" or less, should be in O
24 effect during the 14 week period that ends with completion of 25 the zero power physics testing.
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'O 1 The last period of testing occurs during the final 2 two weeks. Such tests require reactor power levels generally
- O 3 between 3-5% (sustained power levels up to 170 MWt) . For the f 4 first time the reactor will accumulate sufficient quantities 5 f fission products such that a Class-9 accident sequence, 6 although highly improbable, would be possible (although the 7 range of possible consequences is greatly reduced compared to full p wer). The necessity for taking protective actions 8
'O g offsite could arise, although a much longer time period would g "be required to culminate in significant core damage and g containment failure.
O For the two weeks of turbine testing and reactor 3
lant system natural circulation testing, planning to respond to an accident classified as a " general emergency" should be in effect. This planning is given in the Emergency Plan for SONGS Units 2 & 3. The requirements for rapid notification and response on the part of offsite agencies is
! clearly not important because of the long periods of time l 18 necessary for Class-9 accident sequences to develop. By way of comparison, the Reactor Safety Study presents the results of calculations of the time required for radionuclide release 21 i . for full power (including time for core melt) as follows:
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1 Class-9 Accidents 2 Category Time of Release 3 (Hours) 4 PWR 1 2.5 5 PWR 2 2.5 6
R3 5.0 PWR 4 2.0 7
8 PWR 5 2.0 9
10
, 11 Consideration of the above Class-9 accident J
categories is the basis of the current emergency planning regulations. With a time period on the order of a day or so for a Class-9 accident sequence to develop to the point of generating the radionuclide release, and with the reduction in possible offsite consequences discussed above, minimal offsite planning should be sufficient.
Q. Does the longer time requirec'. for the development of the Class-9 accident sequences provide a basis for expecting 19 successful intervention by operator action in preventing a J 20 core melt accident?
21 A. Yes. The longer time periods allow for successfully 22 restoring cooling to the core by repairing equipment or J 23 making temporary alignment of other equipment to deliver 24 cooling water to the reactor. Probability Risk Assedsments 25
, for full power such as the Reactor Safety Study, do not take
_J 26 k
O 1 into account the ability, of emergency response personnel to 2 take innovative action to fulfill the required safety g 3 function by alternative means. With several hours to work on 4 the problem, action could be taken to provide the relatively l 5 small amounts of cooling water required in this case to 1
6 Prevent the core melting.
0 7 Q. In your opinion, what would be the minimim state of 8 Preparedness to adequately protect public safety in the event g 9 of an accident during the low power testing program?
10 A. The onsite organization should have received the training'and 11 otherwise be properly qualified to carry out all of its O 12 responsibilities set forth in the Emergency Plan for SONGS 13- Unit 2 & 3. As a minimum, the means to communicate with 14 offsite authorities is required in the event the accident may O 15 Produce offsite consequences. However, because of the length 16 of time available, offsite authorities for SONGS are well 17 able to carry out any recommended protective actions even C) ig without further detailed procedures or special training.
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O 1 i
j WITNESS: David F. Pilmer 4
l EXHIBIT NO. , (DFP-6)
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- DATE
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i, j LETTER OF JULY 10, 1981 FROM NRC, REGION V, TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY I
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UNITED STATES
! c. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I REGION V e I 1900 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARD
'O oE SulTE 202, WALNUT CREEK PLAZA
) e...e WALNUT CREE K. CALIFORNIA PtW July 10,1981 Docket No. 50-206 3
Southern California Edison Company P. O. Box 800 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 3 Attention: Dr. L. T. Papay, Vice President Advanced Engineering Gentlemen:
Subject:
NRC Inspection - San Onofre Unit 1 This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. R. F. Fish Team Leader, and other NRC team members on May 11-15, 1981 of activities authorized by NRC License No. DPR-13, and to the discussion of our findings held by Mr. Fish with Mr. Robert Dietch and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection, including Mr. Fish's telephone call to Mr. Jerry Haynes on 3 June 2, 1981.
Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclosed inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the NRC team menbers.
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No items of nonconpliance with NRC requirements were identified within the scope of this inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Consnission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the
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NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any inforvation that you believe to be exempt from disclosure under 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4), it is necessary that you (a) notify this office by telephone within ten (10) days from the date of this letter of your intention to file a request for withholding; and (b) submit within 25 days from the date of this letter a written application
, to this office to withhold such infonnation. If your receipt of this letter has been delayed such that less than seven (7) days are available for your review, please notify this office promptly so that a new due date may be established. Consistent with section 2.790(b)(1), any such application must be accomparied by an affidavit executed by the owner of the information which identifi% the document or part sought to be withheld, and which D contains a fc'il statement of the basis on which it is claimed that the infonn:ttn should be withheld from public disclosure. This section further requires the statement to address with specificity the considerations listed
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Southern California Edison' Company July 10, 1981 O
in 10 CFR 2.790(b)(4). The infonnation sought to be withheld shall be incorporated as far as possible into a separate part of the affidavit.
If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above, the mport will be placed in the Public Document Room.
O Should you have any questions conceming this inspection, we will be glad to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
- etlH H. E. Book, Chief Radiological Safety Branch
Enclosure:
O IE Inspection Report No. 50-206/81-19 cc w/o enclosu m:
Mr. R. Dietch, SCE O
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8 DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted J. Curran, Plant Manager K. Barr, Manager, Health Physics J. Schram, Watch Engineer S. Mc Mahan, Supervisor, Plant Maintenance D. Bennette, Nuclear Engineer 3 5. Medling, Chemical and Radiation Protection Engineer E. Bennett, Foreman, Health Physics J. Comings, Reactor Operator D. Pilmer, Supervising Engineer ..,ealth Physics & Emergency Planning)
G. Allen, Nuclear Engineer (Emergency Planning) 3 Other licensee personnel and contractor health physics technicians participating in the emergency plan exercise wem also interviewed.
- 2. Emercency Exercise Plan The emergency exercisa plan was developed by Southern Ca'lifornia Edison 3 Company (SCE) Health Physics innd Emergency Planning Group in concert with the several participating offsite jurisdictions. The plan document provided information on the objectives of the exercise, the guidelines to be used by the various participants during the exercise, the duties of the observers, the contents of reports prepamd by designated controllers and observers and applicable references. The second volume of the '
3 plan document, which had a restricted distribution, described the scenario to be used during the exercise' and the expected responses for each event. The scenario was initiated by informing the contml room operator that a sample from the reactor ecolant system showed a high concentration of iodine-131. During the next eight (8) hours various events occurred that required classifying the emergency as 3 an alert (initial event, high concentration of iodine-131), a site and a general emergency situation. The events included releases of
- airborne radioactivity under changing meteorological conditions so that the several offsite jurisdictions could inglement their emergency l plans. The objective of the exercise was to evaluate a major portion of the basic elements existing within the emergency preparedness plans 3 and organizations of the several involved offsite jurisdictions and SCE. The ability to provide a coordinated response by all participating l
parties was also appraised. This emergency plan exercise was intended to comply with the requicement for an exemise to be conducted within l the first year'of emergency plan implementation as required by Section lg III.F. Appendix E, 10 CFR Part 50.
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! 3. Observers Three groups of observers were involved in the exercise evaluation. :
l The licensee provided observers for all onsite areas when exercise activities took place. Some SCE observers were also used at offsite
!O locations. In addition soae of the SCE observers served as controllers.
The function of the controller was to provide cue cards and data packages at the appropriate times and, if necessary, certain controllers could alter the course of the exercise or provide needed guidance. The various offsite jurisdictions also provided observers for their portions of the exercise. The NRC observers represented a second gmup. The NRC observed activities in the Control Room, Technical Support Center fO (TSC), Operations Support Center Emergency Support Center (ESC) and nehr-site Emergency Operations Facility. The SCE medical response and radiological /
environmental monitoring teams were also observed by the NRC. A team of observers under the direction of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IX were present to evaluate the portions of the exercise O that involved local, state ano federal agencies as_well as the. interfaces ___.
with those responsibilities under the jurisdiction of the NRC (e.g.
the Emergency Operations Facility / Emergency Operations center at t.w San Clemente Civic Center Building).
00 May 11, 1981 SCE held a briefing for all controllers. This meeting O provided an opportunity for discussions on the schedule of activities, the role of the controllers, personnel identification system and telephone ntsnbers for controller connunications. The packages containing cue -
cards and scenario related data were distributed. There was confirmation that the attendees had all necessary materials, including the scenario and anticipated responses, and they were invited to ask questions.
O The controllers (and observers) were required to complete an evaluation form at the end of the exercise.
l' 4. Exercise The exercise was initiated at about 6:' ..m. on May 13 and continued O until about 2:45 p.m. The exercise involved the following locations dest-ibed in the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Unit '.
Emergency plan: Control Room; Technical Support Center; (Onsite) Sperations Support Center; Emergency Support Center; Station Assembly Area (Administration l and Warehouse Bd1 ding); Media Center and near-site Emergency Operations ,
l 1 Facility (San Clemente Energency Operations Center). According to O the SONGS Unit 1 Emergency Plan, the on-site Emergency Support Center and the near-site Emergency Operations Facility constitute the interim Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The exercise included a simulated injured SCE employee who was transported to South Coast Comnunity Hospital for treatment. Radiation monitoring by SCE at onsite and near-site locations was perfonned as part of the exercise activities.
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) Other locations were involved in the exercise; however, these were all offsite. The activities at these various offsite locations will be covered by a separate report issued by FEMA Region IX.
- 5. Critiques Shortly after the temination of the exercise, SCE held a critique session to review the sequence of events and identify any items that may require some fom of corrective action. Controllers, observers, participants and management attended the critique. The results of the critique were to be documented. The Health Physics and Emergency Planning group in Nuclear Engineering and Safety (Rosemead) has been
) assigned the responsibility for implementing any corrective actions identified during the critique process.
On May 14 a second critique was held to provide preliminary conmants to SCE from the various participating offsite organizations. SCE requested the attendees to submit a chronology of important events and coments -- -- -
3 on items the exercise disclosed needed improvement or change, SCE intends to publish a critique document covering the exercise within the near future. The offsite organizations will be given an opportunity to review the document when it is in draft fom. The following items were discussed during the May 14 session:
J (a) Comunications ,
There is a need to better coordinate the use of the telephone system that connects the several Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) with the San Onofre site. At the time a " general emergency" was declared by SCE the City of San Clemente was not listening
) to the notification; however, SCE became aware of this situation before the notification was completed and took corrective action.
The foms used by the various organizations and SCE need some modification (s) to assure better transmission and recording of infornation and data. The California Office of Emergency Services 3
(Sacramento) could receive more current infomation if they were also connected to the telephone system that connects the E0C's to the site.
(b) Metet rol.og There was some confusion regarding wind direction. ,d the foms
) used by the various organizations should clarify wh"ther the direction being reported is "from" (this is the normally usec direction) or "to". The use of sectors along with wind direction resulted in some difficulties. The potential problem resulting from the dfference between tme and magnetic north was also identified.
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- O lO (c) Dose Assessment The offsite dose assessment team (rcoresentatives of State Radiologic Health Section and Orange County) ex;mssed a need for more data including source terms. There was a problen relative to the ,
O adequacy of data in connection with the reported " puff release". I It was also reported that the media (center) had some difficulty handling the reported puff release. The dose assessment team also experienced a time problem because of the changing conditions.
SCE noted that this was done to involve the several offsite organizations and the identified problem may have been caused by the scenario.
l0 (d) Response to Declaration rJ General Emeroency l
Following SCE's declaration of a general emergency, discussions .
were held at the San Clemente EOC regarding the sounding of the l warning system that satisfies criteria E.6 of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-lo REP-1, Rev.1.. . Supposedly SCE was having similar discussions; _ ..
however, a question was raised during the critique whether these separate groups were also talking to each other on this matter.
- 6. Exercise Sunwary
- o On Thursday afternoon, May 14, a sumary of the exercise results was presented at the San Clemente City Hall. This presentation was open to the public and media. The Leader of the FEMA Region IX observers y chaired this session. Representatives of the following organizations sumarized the exercise findings from their standpoint: FEMA Region IX, Nucisar Regulatory Comission, City of San Clemente, City of San lO Juan Cr.pistrano, Orange County, San Diego County, California Parks i and Baaches, California Office of Emergency Services and SCE.
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- 7. Exit Interview On May 15, at the conclusion of the inspection, an exit interview
!O was held to discuss the NRC findings. Attachment A is a list of those persons attending this meeting. The licensee was informed that there were no items of noncogliance or deviations. The following items were specifically discussed during this meeting:
(a) Two aspects of the handling of the simulated injured employee O may require some corrective action. Improvement in the response time of the emergency team is possible. The team knew the injury was major, but there was a review of the response procedures before they went to the injured person. Also it did not appear that proper attention was paid to a possible shock condition.
In addition the injured person was placed in a plastic carrier 10 0
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- aid care (e.g. check of pulse, check of breathing or administration i of oxygen) cannot easily be accomplished when it is closed. It j was possible that the specifics of the scenario had an impact
- on this part of the exercise.
!O i (b) Some items needing improvement were identified during observations l of the SCE monitoring team. At times the monitoring team had to alter their communicator's location in order to be heard by the j intended mceiver. The importance of regular maintenance of the portable comunications equipment and training on its proper use was also mentioned. A more pemanent means for storing the fO emergency equipment needs to be established. The monitoring i team should record their results at the time of the measurements and the records should be in the units actually measured.
l (c) The exercise disclosed some procedures could be igroved through o changes. Some of the monitoring procedures appeared to.need expansion _ . _
of the " Procedure" section. Also the proper fom of the data and l appropriate record keeping should be addressed in the procedures.
l The procedure covering dose projections appears to include mathematical i s steps that may not be proper or correct.
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- o (d) The operation of the EOF during the exercise did not appear to <
fully accoglish its intended functions. By letter dated April 25, 1980 the NRC clarified the requirements for the interim Emergency -!
Operations Facility. The E5C, with the support of the TSC, provided overall managament of the licensee's emergency response. Dose projections and recommended public protective actions were prepared O in the TSC, but the ESC decided whether the latter were acceptable and could be comunicated to the offsite organizations. It was
, not obvious that the EOF was involved in the coordination of emergency response activities with State and local agencies.
In addition there was a lack of coordination on the part of the EOF in the area of radiological and environmental assessment.
O Radiological and environmental data collected by SCE apparently was not being provided to the off;ite organizations.
The licensee provided the following responses and coments to the above discussed items. The same identification relates licensee response to NRC consent:
O (a) There will be a review of the handling of the injured person during the exercise to assure a minimum delay in responding to an injury during an emergency situation. In addition there will be a review of the first aid treatment provided during the exercise O
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e to make sure that in an actual situation injured personnel will 3 receive proper first aid attention.
(b) For this exercise the emergency equipment was kept in temporary storage containers. A more permanent system, involving the use of seals, is planned for the future. Also they were aware of the comunications problems and intended to see if some action 3 could be taken to alleviate the difficulties. With respect to the preparation of records by the monitoring team, the SCE observer /
controller had copies of the records made by the monitoring team in his possession.
3 (c) An SCE contractor has been writing and rewriting many of the radiation safety procedures that are being used or will be used at the SONGS site. Presently these procedures are in the process of being examined and used on a trial basis by SCE personnel.
l They have already ider.tified some changes in these procedures j that will be necessary. __They are aware of some. modifications .. . . . _ .
that will have to be made to the procedures relating to dose projections.
O SCE intends to factor in the above NRC connents concerning procedure impronments.
(d) The licensee expressed their opinion that the interim EOF was ,
i involved in the t.cordination envisioned by the NRC for this emergency o response facility. They stated that they were aware of the discussions by the local agencies concerning possible evacuation of San Juan .
Capistrano before San Clemente, but they did not participate because a satisfactory resolution was reached by these agencies.
To show that they could participate if necessary, they said they became involved in the discassion when Camp Pendleton decided to evacuate some of their areas even though SCE had only recomended o sheltering. According to tre licensee the ESC was aware of the i
- . offsite monitoring results raported to the San Clemente EOC and
! these were in agreement with the results of the SCE monitoring
- team. Because they were monitoring the Interagency Telephone System on a continuous basis, the ESC became aware of the wind o direction problem and that alI intended parties were not on the i
system during one of the important SCE offsite notifications.
They believe the ESC took corrective action on a timely basis.
The NRC observed in the TSC that corrective action had been taken with respect to wind direction and providing all offsite organizations with notification information. The licensee also stated that
'O during the exercise it was necessary for the ESC to contact an i
SCE representative at the near-site EOF, using a dedicate telephone established specifically for this purpose, to provide the latter with clarifying infomation.
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O The NRC Team Leader held a follow-up discussion of the exercise findings with Jerry Haynes, SCE, by telephe.ne on June 2,1981. Based upon the above described May 15 discussion of the EOF activities during the exercise and a subsequent review of the requirements for the interim EOF, as identified in an enclosure to the February 18, 1981 generic letter (no. 31-10,
Subject:
Post-TMI Requirements for the Emergency O Operations Facility) that D. G. Eisenhut sent to all licensees of
! operating plants, it appears that SCE met the established requirements.
! The communications capabilities between the ESC and near-site EOF made
! it possible for the two locations to accoglirh the objectives of the
! EOF. SCE appears to have been involved in the coardination of emergency response activities with State and local agencies to the extent that
'O their participation was necessary for satisfactory decisions. Also SCE appeared to have current offsite radiological and environmental data developed by the offsite jurisdictions; however, there still remains a need for correctite action to assure that such data obtained by SCE
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is provided to the dose assessment group at the near-site EOF / San Clemente
- EOC. Mr. Haynes was infonned that the.. SONGS Unit _1_Imergency .P_lan "O should be modified to better describe the operations of the ESC and near-site EOF to show how they accoglish the requirements assigned to the interim EOF. Mr. Haynes stated that SCE would agtee that the plan could better describe the operations of the ESC and near-site EOF and this will be done.
1 O The licensee had been informed that if significant deficiencies preventing
- appropriate protective measures were identified during the emergency -
plan exercise, they would be notified in writing and given an opportunity
' to correct them within a four (4) month period. None of the items needing corrective action were considered by the NRC to be significant because they did not prevent appropriate protective measures from being
- O taken. With respect to those areas being evaluated by FEMA, the NRC would also notify SCE in writing of those matters that needed to be
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corrected within a succeeding four month period. Separate correspondence may be used to provide the FEMA findings.
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT g REGION Y Report No. 50-206/81-19 Docket No. 50-206 License No. DPR-13 Safeguards Group Licensee: Southern California Edison Company 3
2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 3 Facility Name: San Onofre Unit 1 Inspection at: Camo Pendleton, California Inspection conducted: May 11-15, 1981 Inspectors: 4# M R. F. Fish, Radiation Specialist - Team Leader lhf7/
D&te Signed k.taL,' dk)
M. Cillis, Radiation Specialist Date Signed 3
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'K. Scown, Onergency Preparedness coordinator
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/Date/ Signed i
bJ. Sears $ NSenio'r b2Nuclear Engineer ~
7l9bf'l Dite'Signeo
[g Approved By: A 7//o/[/
Dhte / Signed f F. A. Wenslawski, Thief, Reactor Radiation Protection l Secti n Approved by: . - bC L 7/O/[/
Date Sig>J.i IO ,
H. E. Book, Chief, Radiological Safety Branch ,
Sura.2 y-Insoection on May 11-15, 1981 (Report No. 50-206/81-19) l b Areas Inspected: Announced inspection of the emergency plan exercise and associated critiques. The inspection involved 99 hours0.00115 days <br />0.0275 hours <br />1.636905e-4 weeks <br />3.76695e-5 months <br /> onsite by seven (7) NRC inspectors and observers. ,
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
., f RVForm219(2)
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ATTACHMENT A
!O Southern California Edison R. Dietch, Vice President l J. Haynes, Manager, Nuclear Operations H. Ottoson, Manager, Nuclear Engineering and Safety
!O D. Nunn, Manager, Quality Assurance D. Pilrner, Supervising Engineer (Health Physics & Emergency Planning)
J. Curran, Station Manager H. Morgan, Assistant Station Marager, Operations K. Barr, Manager, Health Physict J. Dunn, Project Quality As:;urance Supervisor
!O B. Katz, Station Supervising Engineer D. Liennette, Nuclear Engineer e, Briggs, Cor@liance Engineer E. Gault, Compliance Assistant J. Willis, Tr 'ning Manager G. Allen, ' Mr Engineer (Emergency Planning)
O S. Garry, Hea. 31 Physicist - - --- - - - - - - - -
SCE Contractors G. Beatty, Health Physicist, NUS J. Massey, Radwaste Consultant, ATI to NRC ,
l R. Fish, Radiation Specialist, Region V R. Pate, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. Sears, Senior Nuclear Engineer, Emergency Preparedness Licensing Branch
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