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Insp Rept 50-354/85-17 on 850415-18.Violation Noted:Numerous safety-related Preventative Maint Activities Not Performed Per Schedule for Sys & Equipment from Bechtel Const for Startup/Operations Past Due
	ML20127E302
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	06/13/1985
From:	Anderson C, Phelan P, Schaeffer M, Woodard C; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20127E294	List: ML20127E291; ML20127E298; ML20127E302;
References
	50-354-85-17, NUDOCS 8506240512
	Download: ML20127E302 (11)
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 85-17

Docket flo. 50-354

License No. CPPR-120 Priority -

Category B

Licensee: Public Service Electric & Gas Company

80 Park Plaza - 17C

Newark, New Jersey 07101

Facility Name: Hope Creek Unit #1

Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, N.J.

Inspection Conducted: April 15-18,1985

Inspectors:

C. HT Woodard

/ M/3/fW

I dite

Reactor Engineer

1 25

P. H. Phelan dite

Reactor Engineer

01J.'A.

M.

ScDbs/

Schaef fer

6 h Is'

' d6te

Reactor En n

Approved by: . . 4 J #I

C. J/ Anderson, Chief date

Plant Systems Section, DRS

Inspection Summary: Inspection on April 15-18, 1985 (Report No. 50-354/85-17)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of safety related (IE)

4160 volt switchgear, 480 volt unit substations, 480 volt motor control

centers, 125 volt d-c switchboards, emergency diesel generators, 125 volt d-c

batteries, inverters, cables and wire terminations. The scope of the

inspection covered procurement, receipt, installation, Q-C inspections, and

maintenance. The inspection involved 112 hours0.0013 days <br />0.0311 hours <br />1.851852e-4 weeks <br />4.2616e-5 months <br /> on-site by three region-based

inspectors.

Results: One violation and 4 unresolved items were identified.

8506240512850g8

DR ADOCK 05 34

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DETAILS

1.0 Persons Contacted

1.1 Public Service Electric and Gas Company

A.E. Giardino, Manager Quality Assurance Engineering &

Construction

A.D. Barnabei, Principal Quality Assurance Engineer,

Construction

J.C. Logan, Site Manager

S.L. Bruna, Assistant Site Manager

R.S. Salvesen, General Manager

R.T. Griffith, Quality Assurance Engineer, Operations

R. Donges, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer,

J.L. Fisher, Supervising Quality Assurance Engineer

A. Meyer, Senior Staff Construction Engineer

R. Hilditch, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer, Construction

J. Montgomery, Maintenance and Staff Engineer

K. Petroff, Start-Up Engineer

M. Shedloff, Senior Nuclear Maintenance Supervisor

T. Wysocki, Senior Nuclear Maintenance Supervisor

K. Suomi, Nuclear Maintenance Engineer

W.E. Mokoid, Senior Maintenance Planning Supervisor

1.2 Bechtel Corporation

D. Little, Project Superintendent

E.R. Nelson, Manager, Quality Assurance

G.L. Goldsmith, Resident Engineer

R. Cole, Lead Site Quality Assurance Engineer

J. Russell, Lead Electrical Quality Control Engineer

K. Saylor, Lead Maintenance Engineer

J. Miller, Quality Control Cable Engineer

D. Williams, Electrical Field Engineer

G. Young, Quality Assurance Electrical Engineer

1.3 Stone and Webster Corporation

R. Donelon, Construction Maintenance Engineer

J. Rucki, Supervisor Construction Maintenance

1.4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

A.R. Blough, Senior Resident Inspector

S.K. Chaudhary, Senior Resident Inspector

P.H. Phelan, Reactor Engineer

M.J. Schaeffer, Reactor Engineer

C.H. Woodard, Reactor Engineer

Attendees at exit interview.

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2.0 Facility Tour

2.1 The inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work

and plant status in several areas during a general inspection of the

site. The inspector examined work items for obvious defects of

noncompliance with NRC requirements or licensee commitments.

Particular note was taken regarding the presence of quality control

inspectors and indications of quality control activities through

visual evidence such as inspection records, material

identifications, nonconformance and acceptance tags. In addition,

the inspector interviewed craft and supervisory personnel

encountered in the work area.

2.2 The inspector toured the emergency switchgear room (Channel D,

Orange Train) in the D/G Building elevation 130', which contained

the 4160 Volt Emergency Metal Clad Switchgear, No. 10A404, 480 Volt

Unit Substation, No. 108440, 480 Volt Motcr Control Center (MCC),

No. 108441, and the 20 KVA Inverter 10D482 on elevation 163'.

The inspector observed that inverter IDD482 filters were dirty and

that " LOW AIR FLOW" local alarm indicator lights were on. The

Licensee was notified of this condition on April 15, 1985. On April

16, 1985, the inspector observed that the filters and low air flow

annunciation for Inverter 1DD482 were in the same condition as

previously identified. The inspector met with the Licensee's

maintenance supervisor on April 17, 1985, to discuss why Inverter

10D482 was not being maintained in accordance with PSE&G's Control

of Station Maintenance SA-AP.ZZ-009 (Q) revision 1, dated February

19, 1985, which states "Each station department shall be responsible

for entry of the required information into the computer data base in

a timely manner." The inspector reviewed the compoter generated

Nuclear Department Work Order which covered thirteen inverters

(cleaning of filters), however, it did not cover Inverter 1DD482.

The licensee told the inspector that this particular inverter had

been inadvertently left off the work order.

The inspector informed the licensee that this was a violation of

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, which states, in part, that:

" Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented

instructions.....and shall be accomplished in accordance with these

instruction...." (354/85-17-01)

2.3 The inspector toured the 125 and 250 volt d-c battery rooms and

observed that all four of the 125 VDC safety related battery room

doors were blocked open. This is contrary to PSEG Access

Authorization Process, Site Directive H-SDP-141, Rev. O, February

19, 1985.

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As safety related equipment, it is important that the rooms remain

closely controlled.

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The doors should remain locked to prevent any inadvertent damage

caused by local construction activities.

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Hydrogen is generated and released as part of the chemical

process through which a battery undergoes. A stray spark in

the presence of a hydrogen accumulation could lead to a rapid

burn and degradation of the battery. The type of work being

done in the area on April 17, 1985, involved both burning and

welding. The inspector observed stray hot slag dropping into

the blocked open door of battery room #5539. The battery rooms

are ventilated with a temporary system until the permanent

system can be installed. The air is drawn through a filter in

the battery charger rooms and piped into the battery rooms.

With the doors blocked open the temporary ventilation system

becomes ineffective in keeping out dust.

This item will remain unresolved pending licensee assurance

that the rooms will be more closely administered to prevent the

blocking of doors and potential degradation of the batteries.

(354/85-17-02)

3.0 Electrical (Components and Systems) - Specifications, Procedures,

Drawings and Record Review

3.1 The inspector reviewed safety-related (Q) equipment specifications,

procedures, drawings and records to verify that FSAR commitments

have been transcribed into lower tier documents and that the

equipment was procured, installed and inspected in accordance with

these documents.

3.1.1 The following equipment specifications were reviewed by

the inspector.

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E-109 (Q), Technical Specification for Metal-Clad

Switchgear,

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E-117 (Q), Technical Specification for 480 Volt Unit

Substations,

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E-118 (Q), Technical Specification for 480 Volt Motor

Control Centers,

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E-154 (Q), Instrument Alternating Current Power

Supply.

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3.1.2 The following procedures were reviewed by the inspector.

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SWP/P-14, Material Receipt, Storage, and Handling,

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SWP/P-15, Maintenance of Material in Storage,

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SWP/P-E-33, Installation of Electric Control Boards,

Control Complex Equipment, Switchgear, Motor Control

Centers, Loadcenters and Distribution Panels,

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PQCI, R-1.00, Project Quality Control Instruction

Receiving Inspection,

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PQCI, E-4.0, Project Quality Control Instruction

Installation of Cables,

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PQCI, E-6.0, Project Quality Control Instruction

Installation of Electrical Equipment.

3.1.3 The following drawings were reviewed by the inspector.

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E-0006-1, Single Line Meter And Relay Diagram 4.16KV

Class IR Power System,

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E-4048-1, Cable Block Diagram Diesel Generator,

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E-4079-1, Class 1E 4.16KV STA. PWR. Switchgear Unit

Substa. IFMR. FDR. CKT. BRKR 152-40410,

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E-4083-1, Class IE 4.16KV STA. PWR. Switchgear Unit

Substa. XFMR. FDR. CKT. BKR. 152-40403,

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E-4097-1, Cable Block Diagram Unit Substation 480 V

System,

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E-4119-0, Cable Block Diagram 125V DC System.

l 3.1.4 The inspector reviewed vendor documentation receiving,

installation and associated cable pull records for the

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following.

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4160 Volt Emergency Metal Clad Switchgear, No. 10A404

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480 Volt Motor Control Center, No. 10B441

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20 KVA Inverter, No. 1D0482

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3.1.5 The inspector reviewed the following cable pull cards

associated with equipment interfaces to verify compliance

with procedures cited in 3.1.2.

DCIA0329A

DC1G0604A

DCIA0325A

DCIG0604P

DF180166A-A

DF180166B-B

DF180168B

DL100583G

3.1.6 Findings. The components were procured in accordance with

the procurement specifications, installed and inspected in

accordance with prescribed procedures, and the cable pull

card attributes were signed off in accordance with the

quality control instructions.

No violations were identified.

3.2 The inspector made a review of applicable specifications, drawings,

procedures and records for the 125 and 250 VDC safety related (Q)

batteries to verify licensee compliance.

3.2.1 Documents reviewed are the following:

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Preoperational Test Procedure, "125 VDC class IE

Power System" Proc. No. PTP-PK-1, Rev.1, February

24, 1985

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Generic Work Procedure, "250 VDC Weekly Battery

Surveillance (MD-ST. PJ-001 (Q))" Procedure No.

GWP-MDPJ-001, Rev. O, October 13, 1983

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Generic Work Procedure, "125 VDC Quarterly Battery

Surveillance (MD-ST. PK-002 (Q))" Procedure No.

GWP-MDPK-001, Rev. 1, October 13, 1983

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Generic Work Procedure, "125 VDC Weekly Battery

Surveillance (MD-ST. PK-001 (Q))" Procedure No.

GWP-MDPK-001, Rev. 2, October 13, 1983

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Technical Specification for Battery Chargers, Spec.

No. 10855-E-151 (Q), Rev. 6, September 12, 1984

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Technical Specification for Batteries, Spec. No.

10855-E-151 (Q), Rev. 5, March 15, 1984

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Hope Creek Operations - Initial audit, audit No.

HC-84-50, January 21, 1985

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Access Authorization Process, Site Directive

H-SDP-141, Rev. O, February 19, 1985

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C & D Stationary Battery Installation and Operating

Instructions,12-800, 1981

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IEEE 450, " Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of

Large Lead Storage Batteries",1980

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IEEE 380, " Standard Criteria for class IE Power

Systems", 1980

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Startup Deviation Report, SDR No. PJ-0040

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Inspection Record for " Installation of Batteries and

Racks" QCIR No. 1DD410-E-6.7

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Inspection Record for " Installation of Electrical

Equipment, class IE Channel D 1250. Battery Chargers"

QCIR No. 1DD444-E-6.0

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Quality Control Inspection Record, Job No. 10855

R-1.00, Rev.13, " Battery Racks"

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Maintenance Action Card, " Batteries" Identification

No. IE 1500-3150022, September 21, 1983

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Drawing No. M-8004, " Battery Arrangement" C & D

Batteries, Rev. 1, January 18, 1984

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Access Authorization Permit / Request No. F146-0001-04,

April 17, 1985

3.2.2 The inspector found that on September 5, 1984, the

specific gravity of cells 34 and 58 of bank D were below

1.200. Other examples of cells below 1.200 were also

found. Section 5.6, Acceptance Criteria and Actions of

the 125 VDC Weekly Battery Surveillance (MD-ST. PK-001

(Q)), Procedure No. GWP-MDPK-001, requires that the Shift

l Supervisor be notified if the corrected specific gravity

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for each cell is not between 1.200 and 1.220. In the

l above instance, the Shift Supervisor was not notified and

l no corrective action was taken. It was explained to the

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inspector, by members of the maintenance staff, that the

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Shift Supervisor was not notified because the readings

were not indicative of the conditions of the battery. The

battery had recently been given an equalizing charge, at

which time electrolyte stratification occurred. Unless

the electrolyte sample is drawn with considerations to

this effect, the specific gravity readings will be low.

This item will remain unresolved pending additional

training provided to the individuals assigned to do the

surveillance so that timely representative readings can be

obtained. (354/85-17-03)

3.2.3 The inspector found that on July 12, 1984, and on many

occasions, the battery charger float voltage was not

recorded, as required by the 125 VDC Weekly Battery

Surveillance (MD-ST. PK-001 (Q)) Procedure No.

GWP-MDPK-001. Section 5.3. C & D Station Battery

Installation and Operating Instructions,12-800 states

that a battery receiving either float current or float

voltage which is less than prescribed will result in a

battery in a partially charged condition. If this

condition continues, the individual cells will experience

both voltages and specific gravities which are erratic.

Ultimately, tha ; M es will become sulfated reducing the

batteries capability to provide rated capacity. Without

the float voltage data, positive assurance as to the

condition, or possible degradation, of the battery can not

be provided. The licensee was not able to explain the

reasons for the float voltages not being recorded.

This item will remain unresolved pending effective

implementation of the licensees procedures as verified by

subsequent inspections. (354/85-17-04)

3.2.4 The inspector found inadequate battery surveillance

acceptance criteria. The 125 VDC Quarterly Battery

Surveillance (MD-ST. PK-002 (Q)), Procedure No.

GWP-MDPK-002 refers to Hope Creek Technical Specifications

for the acceptance criteria for the battery terminal

voltage limits obtained during the battery surveillance.

The Hope Creek Technical Specifications have been

submitted to the NRC and are currently going through the

review process. The fact that the Technical

Specifications have been submitted by PSE&G but, as of

yet, not approved by the NRC, has created some ambiguity

for the site personnel. For example, quality assurance

personnel have been reluctant to sign off the completed

quarterly surveillance reports, because they felt adequate

acceptance criteria was not provided. The 250 VDC Weekly

Battery Surveillance CMD-ST-PJ-001 (Q)) Procedure No.

GWP-MDPJ-001 has a similar Technical Specification

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reference for the acceptance criteria. However, in this

case the maintenance department generated a Startup

Deviation Report (SDR No. PJ-0040) which specified the

acceptable surveillance limits independent of the

Technical Specification limits. Attempts have been made

to incorporate the specific acceptance criteria in the

procedures themselves. However, to this date, little

progress had been made. The licensee has shown no

effective mechanism for the making of timely changes to

their procedures.

This item will remain unresolved pending NRC review of the

licensees evaluation of their procedural charge process

i and corrective actions taken. (354/85-17-05)

3.3 The inspector reviewed PSEG preventive maintenance procedures,

preventive maintenance records, and inspected the Emergency Diesel

Generator Systems for evidence of proper preventive maintenance.

3.3.1 The following procedures were reviewed:

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SA-AP ZZ-010 (Q) Station Preventive Maintenance

Program, Rev.1, February 19, 1985

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MD-AP. ZZ-010 (Q) Preventive Maintenance, Rev. O,

February 8,1985

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MD-AP-ZZ-009 (Q) Control of Station Maintenance,

Rev. O, January 29, 1985

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Bechtel Construction, Hope Creek Generating Station,

In Storage Maintenance System, IMR8580, April 18, 1985

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Bechtel Construction, Hope Creek Generating Station,

In Storage Maintenance System, IMR 8060, April 11,

1985.

3.3.2 The inspector found unacceptable delays in implementing

operational preventive maintenance of systems and

equipment after construction turn-over to PSEG. PSEG

procedures SA-AP.ZZ-010 (Q) defines the criteria for

start-up and operations phases preventive maintenance and

makes the requirements mandatory for all "Q" systems and

equipments. The procedure permits the continued use of

the construction phase preventive maintenance scheduling

system (MAC) per procedures MD-AP.ZZ-009 (Q) and

GWP-MD.ZZ.010 by Bechtel until the PSEG Scheduling is

entered into the operational phase and is functional for

the required maintenance. The emergency diesel generator

systems were turned over from Bechtel Construction to PSEG

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Operations during early February,1985. In accordance

with the MAC procedure, Bechtel continued to produce the

maintenance scheduling but did not continue maintenance.

PSEG did not pick up the maintenance; therefore no

maintenance or pick up of maintenance scheduling has been

performed by PSEG since turn over of the diesel generators

until this inspection date. Inspection of the equipment

revealed that generator heaters were energized as required

and a review of the inspection / preventive maintenance

items required by IMR 8060 did not disclose items which

would be considered detrimental to the equipment / system as

installed in the plant.

PSE&G's Station Preventive Maintenance Program

SA-AP.ZZ-010 (Q) states in part "all station department

heads shall be responsible for ....... ensuring the

timely completion of required preventive maintenance on

plant equipment ........"

The inspector reviewed Inspection Maintenance Report IMR

8580, which revealed that there are approximately 400 past

due preventive maintenance activities for "Q" equipment

and systems. Examples of these activities are the following:

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Meggering of RHR pump motors.

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Physical rotation of reactor feed pump shafts.

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Confirmation of heaters energized in the diesel

generators.

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Cleaning of air filters for Channel D Vital Bus UPS

Inverter.

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Visual inspection of emergency diesel generators skid

mounted components.

The inspector informed the licensee that the above

constitutes a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion V, which states in part, that: " Activities

affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented

instructions, procedures, ... and shall be accomplished

in accordance with these instructions, procedures, ...

(354/85-17-01)

4.0 Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is needed to

determine whether it is acceptable or a violation. Unresolved items are

discussed in Paragraph 2 ard 3.

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5.0 Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee and construction representatives (denoted ,

in Paragraph 1.0) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 18, 1985,

at the construction site. The inspector summarized the findings of the

inspection and the licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.

The inspector also confirmed with the licensee that the documents reviewed

by the team did not contain any proprietary information. The licensee

agreed that the inspection report may be placed in the Public Document

Room without prior licensee review for proprietary information (10 CFR

2.790).

At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the

licensee by the team.

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ML20127E302

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