ML20127E302
| ML20127E302 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1985 |
| From: | Anderson C, Phelan P, Schaeffer M, Woodard C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20127E294 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-354-85-17, NUDOCS 8506240512 | |
| Download: ML20127E302 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000354/1985017
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 85-17
Docket flo.
50-354
License No. CPPR-120
Priority
-
Category
B
Licensee:
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
80 Park Plaza - 17C
Newark, New Jersey 07101
Facility Name:
Hope Creek Unit #1
Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, N.J.
Inspection Conducted: April 15-18,1985
Inspectors:
/
M/3/fW
C. HT Woodard
I dite
Reactor Engineer
1 25
P. H. Phelan
dite
Reactor Engineer
01 A. ScDbs/
6 h Is'
M. J.' Schaef fer
' d6te
Reactor En n
4 J #I
Approved by:
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C. J/ Anderson, Chief
date
Plant Systems Section, DRS
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 15-18, 1985 (Report No. 50-354/85-17)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of safety related (IE)
4160 volt switchgear, 480 volt unit substations, 480 volt motor control
centers, 125 volt d-c switchboards, emergency diesel generators, 125 volt d-c
batteries, inverters, cables and wire terminations. The scope of the
inspection covered procurement, receipt, installation, Q-C inspections, and
maintenance. The inspection involved 112 hours0.0013 days <br />0.0311 hours <br />1.851852e-4 weeks <br />4.2616e-5 months <br /> on-site by three region-based
inspectors.
Results: One violation and 4 unresolved items were identified.
8506240512850g8
DR
ADOCK 05
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DETAILS
1.0 Persons Contacted
1.1 Public Service Electric and Gas Company
- A.E. Giardino, Manager Quality Assurance Engineering &
Construction
- A.D. Barnabei, Principal Quality Assurance Engineer,
Construction
- J.C. Logan, Site Manager
- S.L. Bruna, Assistant Site Manager
- R.S. Salvesen, General Manager
- R.T. Griffith, Quality Assurance Engineer, Operations
- R. Donges, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer,
- J.L. Fisher, Supervising Quality Assurance Engineer
- A. Meyer, Senior Staff Construction Engineer
R. Hilditch, Lead Quality Assurance Engineer, Construction
J. Montgomery, Maintenance and Staff Engineer
K. Petroff, Start-Up Engineer
M. Shedloff, Senior Nuclear Maintenance Supervisor
T. Wysocki, Senior Nuclear Maintenance Supervisor
K. Suomi, Nuclear Maintenance Engineer
W.E. Mokoid, Senior Maintenance Planning Supervisor
1.2 Bechtel Corporation
- D.
Little, Project Superintendent
- E.R. Nelson, Manager, Quality Assurance
- G.L. Goldsmith, Resident Engineer
- R. Cole, Lead Site Quality Assurance Engineer
J. Russell, Lead Electrical Quality Control Engineer
K. Saylor, Lead Maintenance Engineer
J. Miller, Quality Control Cable Engineer
D. Williams, Electrical Field Engineer
G. Young, Quality Assurance Electrical Engineer
1.3 Stone and Webster Corporation
R. Donelon, Construction Maintenance Engineer
J. Rucki, Supervisor Construction Maintenance
1.4
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- A.R. Blough, Senior Resident Inspector
- S.K. Chaudhary, Senior Resident Inspector
- P.H. Phelan, Reactor Engineer
- M.J. Schaeffer, Reactor Engineer
- C.H. Woodard, Reactor Engineer
- Attendees at exit interview.
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2.0 Facility Tour
2.1 The inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work
and plant status in several areas during a general inspection of the
site. The inspector examined work items for obvious defects of
noncompliance with NRC requirements or licensee commitments.
Particular note was taken regarding the presence of quality control
inspectors and indications of quality control activities through
visual evidence such as inspection records, material
identifications, nonconformance and acceptance tags.
In addition,
the inspector interviewed craft and supervisory personnel
encountered in the work area.
2.2 The inspector toured the emergency switchgear room (Channel D,
Orange Train) in the D/G Building elevation 130', which contained
the 4160 Volt Emergency Metal Clad Switchgear, No. 10A404, 480 Volt
Unit Substation, No. 108440, 480 Volt Motcr Control Center (MCC),
No. 108441, and the 20 KVA Inverter 10D482 on elevation 163'.
The inspector observed that inverter IDD482 filters were dirty and
that " LOW AIR FLOW" local alarm indicator lights were on.
The
Licensee was notified of this condition on April 15, 1985. On April
16, 1985, the inspector observed that the filters and low air flow
annunciation for Inverter 1DD482 were in the same condition as
previously identified.
The inspector met with the Licensee's
maintenance supervisor on April 17, 1985, to discuss why Inverter
10D482 was not being maintained in accordance with PSE&G's Control
of Station Maintenance SA-AP.ZZ-009 (Q) revision 1, dated February
19, 1985, which states "Each station department shall be responsible
for entry of the required information into the computer data base in
a timely manner." The inspector reviewed the compoter generated
Nuclear Department Work Order which covered thirteen inverters
(cleaning of filters), however, it did not cover Inverter 1DD482.
The licensee told the inspector that this particular inverter had
been inadvertently left off the work order.
The inspector informed the licensee that this was a violation of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, which states, in part, that:
" Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented
instructions.....and shall be accomplished in accordance with these
instruction...." (354/85-17-01)
2.3 The inspector toured the 125 and 250 volt d-c battery rooms and
observed that all four of the 125 VDC safety related battery room
doors were blocked open. This is contrary to PSEG Access
Authorization Process, Site Directive H-SDP-141, Rev. O, February
19, 1985.
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As safety related equipment, it is important that the rooms remain
closely controlled.
The doors should remain locked to prevent any inadvertent damage
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caused by local construction activities.
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Hydrogen is generated and released as part of the chemical
process through which a battery undergoes. A stray spark in
the presence of a hydrogen accumulation could lead to a rapid
burn and degradation of the battery. The type of work being
done in the area on April 17, 1985, involved both burning and
welding. The inspector observed stray hot slag dropping into
the blocked open door of battery room #5539.
The battery rooms
are ventilated with a temporary system until the permanent
system can be installed. The air is drawn through a filter in
the battery charger rooms and piped into the battery rooms.
With the doors blocked open the temporary ventilation system
becomes ineffective in keeping out dust.
This item will remain unresolved pending licensee assurance
that the rooms will be more closely administered to prevent the
blocking of doors and potential degradation of the batteries.
(354/85-17-02)
3.0 Electrical (Components and Systems) - Specifications, Procedures,
Drawings and Record Review
3.1 The inspector reviewed safety-related (Q) equipment specifications,
procedures, drawings and records to verify that FSAR commitments
have been transcribed into lower tier documents and that the
equipment was procured, installed and inspected in accordance with
these documents.
3.1.1
The following equipment specifications were reviewed by
the inspector.
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E-109 (Q), Technical Specification for Metal-Clad
Switchgear,
E-117 (Q), Technical Specification for 480 Volt Unit
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Substations,
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E-118 (Q), Technical Specification for 480 Volt Motor
Control Centers,
E-154 (Q), Instrument Alternating Current Power
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Supply.
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3.1.2
The following procedures were reviewed by the inspector.
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SWP/P-14, Material Receipt, Storage, and Handling,
SWP/P-15, Maintenance of Material in Storage,
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SWP/P-E-33, Installation of Electric Control Boards,
Control Complex Equipment, Switchgear, Motor Control
Centers, Loadcenters and Distribution Panels,
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PQCI, R-1.00, Project Quality Control Instruction
Receiving Inspection,
PQCI, E-4.0, Project Quality Control Instruction
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Installation of Cables,
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PQCI, E-6.0, Project Quality Control Instruction
Installation of Electrical Equipment.
3.1.3
The following drawings were reviewed by the inspector.
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E-0006-1, Single Line Meter And Relay Diagram 4.16KV
Class IR Power System,
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E-4048-1, Cable Block Diagram Diesel Generator,
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E-4079-1, Class 1E 4.16KV STA. PWR. Switchgear Unit
Substa. IFMR. FDR. CKT. BRKR 152-40410,
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E-4083-1, Class IE 4.16KV STA. PWR. Switchgear Unit
Substa. XFMR. FDR. CKT. BKR. 152-40403,
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E-4097-1, Cable Block Diagram Unit Substation 480 V
System,
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E-4119-0, Cable Block Diagram 125V DC System.
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3.1.4
The inspector reviewed vendor documentation receiving,
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installation and associated cable pull records for the
following.
4160 Volt Emergency Metal Clad Switchgear, No. 10A404
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480 Volt Motor Control Center, No. 10B441
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20 KVA Inverter, No. 1D0482
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3.1.5
The inspector reviewed the following cable pull cards
associated with equipment interfaces to verify compliance
with procedures cited in 3.1.2.
DCIA0329A
DC1G0604A
DCIA0325A
DCIG0604P
DF180166A-A
DF180166B-B
DF180168B
DL100583G
3.1.6
Findings. The components were procured in accordance with
the procurement specifications, installed and inspected in
accordance with prescribed procedures, and the cable pull
card attributes were signed off in accordance with the
quality control instructions.
No violations were identified.
3.2 The inspector made a review of applicable specifications, drawings,
procedures and records for the 125 and 250 VDC safety related (Q)
batteries to verify licensee compliance.
3.2.1
Documents reviewed are the following:
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Preoperational Test Procedure, "125 VDC class IE
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Power System" Proc. No. PTP-PK-1, Rev.1, February
24, 1985
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Generic Work Procedure, "250 VDC Weekly Battery
Surveillance (MD-ST. PJ-001 (Q))" Procedure No.
GWP-MDPJ-001, Rev. O, October 13, 1983
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Generic Work Procedure, "125 VDC Quarterly Battery
Surveillance (MD-ST. PK-002 (Q))" Procedure No.
GWP-MDPK-001, Rev. 1, October 13, 1983
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Generic Work Procedure, "125 VDC Weekly Battery
Surveillance (MD-ST. PK-001 (Q))" Procedure No.
GWP-MDPK-001, Rev. 2, October 13, 1983
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Technical Specification for Battery Chargers, Spec.
No. 10855-E-151 (Q), Rev. 6, September 12, 1984
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Technical Specification for Batteries, Spec. No.
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10855-E-151 (Q), Rev. 5, March 15, 1984
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Hope Creek Operations - Initial audit, audit No.
HC-84-50, January 21, 1985
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Access Authorization Process, Site Directive
H-SDP-141, Rev. O, February 19, 1985
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C & D Stationary Battery Installation and Operating
Instructions,12-800, 1981
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IEEE 450, " Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of
Large Lead Storage Batteries",1980
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IEEE 380, " Standard Criteria for class IE Power
Systems", 1980
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Startup Deviation Report, SDR No. PJ-0040
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Inspection Record for " Installation of Batteries and
Racks" QCIR No. 1DD410-E-6.7
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Inspection Record for " Installation of Electrical
Equipment, class IE Channel D 1250. Battery Chargers"
QCIR No. 1DD444-E-6.0
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Quality Control Inspection Record, Job No. 10855
R-1.00, Rev.13, " Battery Racks"
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Maintenance Action Card, " Batteries" Identification
No. IE 1500-3150022, September 21, 1983
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Drawing No. M-8004, " Battery Arrangement" C & D
Batteries, Rev. 1, January 18, 1984
Access Authorization Permit / Request No. F146-0001-04,
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April 17, 1985
3.2.2
The inspector found that on September 5, 1984, the
specific gravity of cells 34 and 58 of bank D were below
1.200. Other examples of cells below 1.200 were also
found.
Section 5.6, Acceptance Criteria and Actions of
the 125 VDC Weekly Battery Surveillance (MD-ST. PK-001
(Q)), Procedure No. GWP-MDPK-001, requires that the Shift
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Supervisor be notified if the corrected specific gravity
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for each cell is not between 1.200 and 1.220.
In the
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above instance, the Shift Supervisor was not notified and
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no corrective action was taken.
It was explained to the
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inspector, by members of the maintenance staff, that the
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Shift Supervisor was not notified because the readings
were not indicative of the conditions of the battery. The
battery had recently been given an equalizing charge, at
which time electrolyte stratification occurred.
Unless
the electrolyte sample is drawn with considerations to
this effect, the specific gravity readings will be low.
This item will remain unresolved pending additional
training provided to the individuals assigned to do the
surveillance so that timely representative readings can be
obtained.
(354/85-17-03)
3.2.3
The inspector found that on July 12, 1984, and on many
occasions, the battery charger float voltage was not
recorded, as required by the 125 VDC Weekly Battery
Surveillance (MD-ST. PK-001 (Q)) Procedure No.
GWP-MDPK-001. Section 5.3.
C & D Station Battery
Installation and Operating Instructions,12-800 states
that a battery receiving either float current or float
voltage which is less than prescribed will result in a
battery in a partially charged condition.
If this
condition continues, the individual cells will experience
both voltages and specific gravities which are erratic.
Ultimately, tha ; M es will become sulfated reducing the
batteries capability to provide rated capacity. Without
the float voltage data, positive assurance as to the
condition, or possible degradation, of the battery can not
be provided.
The licensee was not able to explain the
reasons for the float voltages not being recorded.
This item will remain unresolved pending effective
implementation of the licensees procedures as verified by
subsequent inspections.
(354/85-17-04)
3.2.4
The inspector found inadequate battery surveillance
acceptance criteria. The 125 VDC Quarterly Battery
Surveillance (MD-ST. PK-002 (Q)), Procedure No.
GWP-MDPK-002 refers to Hope Creek Technical Specifications
for the acceptance criteria for the battery terminal
voltage limits obtained during the battery surveillance.
The Hope Creek Technical Specifications have been
submitted to the NRC and are currently going through the
review process. The fact that the Technical
Specifications have been submitted by PSE&G but, as of
yet, not approved by the NRC, has created some ambiguity
for the site personnel.
For example, quality assurance
personnel have been reluctant to sign off the completed
quarterly surveillance reports, because they felt adequate
acceptance criteria was not provided.
The 250 VDC Weekly
Battery Surveillance CMD-ST-PJ-001 (Q)) Procedure No.
GWP-MDPJ-001 has a similar Technical Specification
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reference for the acceptance criteria. However, in this
case the maintenance department generated a Startup
Deviation Report (SDR No. PJ-0040) which specified the
acceptable surveillance limits independent of the
Technical Specification limits. Attempts have been made
to incorporate the specific acceptance criteria in the
procedures themselves. However, to this date, little
progress had been made. The licensee has shown no
effective mechanism for the making of timely changes to
their procedures.
This item will remain unresolved pending NRC review of the
licensees evaluation of their procedural charge process
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and corrective actions taken.
(354/85-17-05)
3.3 The inspector reviewed PSEG preventive maintenance procedures,
preventive maintenance records, and inspected the Emergency Diesel
Generator Systems for evidence of proper preventive maintenance.
3.3.1
The following procedures were reviewed:
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SA-AP ZZ-010 (Q) Station Preventive Maintenance
Program, Rev.1, February 19, 1985
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MD-AP. ZZ-010 (Q) Preventive Maintenance, Rev. O,
February 8,1985
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MD-AP-ZZ-009 (Q) Control of Station Maintenance,
Rev. O, January 29, 1985
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Bechtel Construction, Hope Creek Generating Station,
In Storage Maintenance System, IMR8580, April 18, 1985
Bechtel Construction, Hope Creek Generating Station,
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In Storage Maintenance System, IMR 8060, April 11,
1985.
3.3.2
The inspector found unacceptable delays in implementing
operational preventive maintenance of systems and
equipment after construction turn-over to PSEG.
procedures SA-AP.ZZ-010 (Q) defines the criteria for
start-up and operations phases preventive maintenance and
makes the requirements mandatory for all "Q" systems and
equipments.
The procedure permits the continued use of
the construction phase preventive maintenance scheduling
system (MAC) per procedures MD-AP.ZZ-009 (Q) and
GWP-MD.ZZ.010 by Bechtel until the PSEG Scheduling is
entered into the operational phase and is functional for
the required maintenance. The emergency diesel generator
systems were turned over from Bechtel Construction to PSEG
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Operations during early February,1985.
In accordance
with the MAC procedure, Bechtel continued to produce the
maintenance scheduling but did not continue maintenance.
PSEG did not pick up the maintenance; therefore no
maintenance or pick up of maintenance scheduling has been
performed by PSEG since turn over of the diesel generators
until this inspection date.
Inspection of the equipment
revealed that generator heaters were energized as required
and a review of the inspection / preventive maintenance
items required by IMR 8060 did not disclose items which
would be considered detrimental to the equipment / system as
installed in the plant.
PSE&G's Station Preventive Maintenance Program
SA-AP.ZZ-010 (Q) states in part "all station department
heads shall be responsible for ....... ensuring the
timely completion of required preventive maintenance on
plant equipment ........"
The inspector reviewed Inspection Maintenance Report IMR
8580, which revealed that there are approximately 400 past
due preventive maintenance activities for "Q" equipment
and systems.
Examples of these activities are the following:
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Meggering of RHR pump motors.
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Physical rotation of reactor feed pump shafts.
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Confirmation of heaters energized in the diesel
generators.
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Cleaning of air filters for Channel D Vital Bus UPS
Inverter.
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Visual inspection of emergency diesel generators skid
mounted components.
The inspector informed the licensee that the above
constitutes a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, which states in part, that:
" Activities
affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented
instructions, procedures, ... and shall be accomplished
in accordance with these instructions, procedures, ...
(354/85-17-01)
4.0 Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is needed to
determine whether it is acceptable or a violation. Unresolved items are
discussed in Paragraph 2 ard 3.
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5.0 Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee and construction representatives (denoted
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in Paragraph 1.0) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 18, 1985,
at the construction site. The inspector summarized the findings of the
inspection and the licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
The inspector also confirmed with the licensee that the documents reviewed
by the team did not contain any proprietary information. The licensee
agreed that the inspection report may be placed in the Public Document
Room without prior licensee review for proprietary information (10 CFR 2.790).
At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the
licensee by the team.
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