ML20116M497
| ML20116M497 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1995 |
| From: | Karavoussianis, Tseng T STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20116M418 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR C-016, C-016-R00, C-16, C-16-R, NUDOCS 9608200177 | |
| Download: ML20116M497 (176) | |
Text
,O Client Wisconsin Electnc Power Company Calculation No.
'wJ
Title:
USl A-46 / IPEEE, Equipment Fragilities for 1 A-05,1 A-06,2A-05 and 2A-06 Project Point Beach Nuclear Plant i
Method:
Conventional Engineering Hand Calculations.
Acceptance Criteria:
"A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin" EPRI NP-6041 Revision 1, August 1991 i
Remarks:
J f
l
!O I
l REVISIONS 1
No.
Description By Date Chk.
Date App.
pate
- h. 5 -
I/L//15 WT IfWl%
f$)
hofh 0
InitialIssue ai j
1 i
CALCULATION CONTRACT NO.
COVER SHEET O
91C2696 FIGURE 1.3 sw-a hm 9608200177 960815 PDR ADOCK 05000266 p
PI)R
i I
JOB NO. 91C2696 Calcul tien C-016 Sheet 1 of 10
SUBJECT:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/21/95 USl A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation 1
Os Revision 0 g
Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USl A-46 / IPEEE, Equipment By: A. Karavoussianis a structural mechanical Frag'ilities for 1 A-05,1 A-06, ec seng consulting engineering firm 2A-05 and 2A-06 Table of Contents Objective.
2 l
l Analytical Approach.........................
2 Summary........................................................................................
2 References...
3 Calculation..............
4 1
t 6
\\
JOB NO. 91C2696 Cricuintisn C-016 Shsst 2 of 10
SUBJECT:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/21/95 USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Rev..ision 0
- ()/
[
Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USI A-46 / IPEEE, Equipment By: A Karavoussianis a structural-mechanical Fragilities for 1 A-05,1 A-06' Check: T. M. Tseng consulting engineering firm 2A-05 and 2A-06 Objective The objective of this calculation is to document the weld capacities used in the A-46 anchorage evaluation and compute the fragilities for the 4.16 KV Bus Switchgears; 1 A-05,1 A-06,2A-05 7
and 2A-06. The A-46 anchorage evaluations are attached to each of the switchgear's Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS).
]
Analytical Approach i
The switchgears, for the most part, are plug welded to embedded steel. The embedded steel's shear capacity is adequate, but its tensile capacity may need to be evaluated. Hence, the calculation will start by determining the possibility of subjecting the welds to tensile forces. This is accomplished by computing the acceleration which is required to overtum the switchgear and comparing the computed acceloration to the demand.
Then, the capacities of the plug welds and embedded steel (if required) will the determined.
The plug weld capacities are computed by using the results of both a Liquid Penetrant Examination and an Ultrasonic Test (ref. 3). Also, for the plug welds which were not tested, the calculation will estimate their capacity based on the results of the tested population.
i Finally, the HCLPF for each switchgear will be computed by ratio of the spectral accelerations used in the A-46 anchorage evaluation to the spectral acceleration due to an earthquake with a reference peak ground acceleration (PGA) of 0.4 G. The Minimum Safety Factor from the SEWS is divided by the ratio and then multiplied by the referenced PGA (0.4 G) to yield the switchgear's HCLPF. The goveming HCLPF is the lesser of the anchorage HCt.PF and the overtuming HCLPF and the fragility is calculated by multiplying the goveming HCLPF by 2.1.
l Summary This calculation shows that the switchgears have an A-46 anchorage safety factor of 1.69 j
against overtuming. Also, the calculation evaluated the plug weld test reports and computed
]
the equivalent 1/8" fillet weld length per plug weld (see pages 6 to 9).
Finally, the calculation computed a HCLPF of 0.49 G and a fragility of 1.03 G, which are 4
govemed by the uplift capacity of the embedded channel.
JOB NO. 91C2696 Cricuintisn C-016 Sheet 3 of 10
SUBJECT:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant 3
Date: 3/21/95 USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Revision 0 Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USI A-46 / IPEEE, Equipment By: A. Karavoussianis a structural-mechanical Frag'llities for 1 A-05,1 A-06' eck T. M Tseng consulting engineering firm 2A-05 and 2A 06 References
- 1. " Point Beach SSI and IPEEE Floor Response Spectra", S&A Calc. No. 91C2096-C-001, Rev. O, App. Date 12/17/93.
- 2. H. V. Metal-Clad Switchgear, Installation procedure, l.B. 32-150-4A pages 19 to 34.
- 3. " Liquid Penetrant Examination Record (Switchgear)", WEPCo NDE 451 Rev.10,
& Ultrasonic Test (UT) Results, S&A Log No. 91C2696-DC-079.
- 4. " Generic Implementation Procedure for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant 1
Equipment", SQUG, Revision 2, 6/28/91.
A
- 5. Wisconsin Electric Power Company - Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Screening l
Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS), ID: 1 A-05,1 A-06, 2A-05 & 2A-06.
4
)
- 6. " Point Beach Response Spectra Summary", Point Beach Correspondence No NPM 93-0547 Dated Sept. 3/93, S&A Log No. 91C2696-DC-057.
- 7. " Turbine BLDG - Class l Structure, Ground Floor Plan Elev. 8'-0"*, Bechtel Dwg.
C-196 Rev. 5.
- 8. " Concrete Typical Details", Bechtel Dwg. C-103 Rev. 4.
- 9. " Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment Anchorage (Revision 1),
Volume 1: Development of Anchorage Guidelines *, EPRI NP-5228-SL, Revision 1, Volume 1, Project 2925-1, Final Report, June 1991.
- 10. " Structural Design Criteria for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant", Bechtel Corp.,
Revised July 1967, S&A Log Number 92C2696-DC-049.
r 4
4
- O
JOB NO. 91C2696 Cricul tisn C-016 Sheet 4 of 10
SUBJECT:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/21/95 4
USl A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Rev..ision 0 Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USl A-46 / IPEEE, Equipment By: A. Karavoussianis a st uctural-mechanical Fragilities for 1 A-05,1 A-06, Check: T. M. Tseng consulting engineering firm 2A 05 and 2A-06 Calculation The four switchgear are located in the Control Building on elevation 8'-0* and are arranged in j
two rows. Each of the rows,1 A 1 A-06 and 2A 2A-06, consist of 10 bays which are interconnected. Each bay is 26" wide x 70' deep x 90" tall, therefore, the rows are about 260*
long. Also, the Seismic Review Team (SRT) estimated the switchgear's fundamental frequency to be at least 8 Hz. (ref. 5)
Each switchgear is anchored to two embedded channels by a combination of plug welds and fillet welds (ref. 5). The embedded channels are embedded into grout pockets, which are not positively anchored into the concrete floor (ref. 7 & 8). Therefore the required tensile capacity of the embedded channels must be investigated.
The switchgear's weight can be estimate at about 31 pcf.
(ref. 4)
Q Way = 26 x 79 x 90 G
x 31 = 3316 lbs
.. say, 3300 lbs per bay j
This is a good estimate, because a 5 Kv Heavy Duty switchgear of 1200A (type of switchgear according to Mr. Tim Dykstra of WEPCo, tele-con. on 3/20/95) weigh 3000 lbs per bay. (ref. 2) l Therefore, conservatively use 3300 lbs per bay.
4 Calculate the seismic acceleration which will subiect the embedded channel to tensile loads:
Consider that the center of gravity of the switchgear is centrally locatedat its mid-height. Also, the switchgear is consider rigid in the vertical direction, hence, the spectral acceleration in the vertical direction is 2/3 the horizontal ZPA.
Svcue3 = 2/3 x S (Me).ZPA = 2/3 x 0.1886 = 0.13 G; Control Building @ Elev. 8'-0" (ref. 6)
H Ss(ue),,a m = 0.49 G @ 8 Hz 1
Sv(ipege) = 2/3 x S <ipeEE).ZPA = 2/3 x 0.398 = 0.27 G; Control Building @ Elev. 8'-0" East-West H
Ss(ipess),,a m = 0.68 G @ 14 Hz PGA of 0.4 G (ref.1)
Since the vertical seismic acceleration doubles between the A-48 and IPEEE spectrum and the horizontal IPEEE acceleration is less than double the A-46, use the IPEEE spectra to determine the acceleration which will cause the embedded channel to be subject to tension.
e i
l JOB NO. 91C2696 Celculitlen C-016 Sheet 5 of 10
SUBJECT:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/21/95 USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Revision 0 Project f
STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USl A-46 / IPEEE, Equipment By: A. Karavoussianis a structural-mechanical Fragilities for 1 A-05,1 A-06, Check: T. M. Tseng consulting engineering firm 2A 05 and 2A-06 4
Overturning Moment due to Horizontal Acceleration = Mn = x x 0.68 x W x 90
= 30.6 Wx 1
Overturning Momentdue to Vertical Acc.:leration = My = x x 027 x W x 79
= 10.7 Wx j
SRSS Overturning Moment = h(Maf +(My/ = d(30.6 Wx)2 +(10.7 Wx)2 = 32.4 Wx Resisting Moment = W x 79 = 39.5 W = SRSS Overturmng Moment = 32.4 Wx x = 1.22 ; the acceleration *which will cause tension = 1.22 x 0.68 = 0.83 O Hence, the HCLPF due to the Embedded Channel = 1.22 x 0.4 = 0.49 G Since, the A-46 horizontal acceleration (0.49 G) is less than the acceleration which will cause tension (0.83 G), the embedded will not be evaluated and the weld will be subject only to shear loads.
l Caoacity of Plug Welds:
The switchgear row 1 A 1 A-06 is anchored by 9 plug welds to the embedded channel located at the front of the switchgear (east side) and 7 plug welds to the embedded channel located at the center of the switchgear.
(ref. 5, field sketch)
The switchgear row 2A 2A-06 is anchored by a combination of plug and fillet welds to the embedded channels. There are 4 plug welds and 6 fillet welds (all complete circumferential) to the embed located at the front of the switchgear (west side). Also There are 3 plug welds and 6 fillet welds (3 complete and 3 partial circumferential) to the embed located at the center of the switchgear.
(ref. 5, field sketch)
Weld hole area is 1" long by 3/4' wide and ellipticalin shape.
(ref. 3 & 5)
Plug Weld Shear Area = Length of Complete Circumferential Weld
= 0.75 x n + 2 x (1 - 0.75) = 2.86 in
+
Length of Partial Circumferential Weld = 2.86 / 2 = 1.43 in (assume halfway around) l A Liquid Penetrant Examination was performed on all plug welds at the front of the switchgears and an UT was performed on front plug welds of switchgear row 1 A 1 A-06. By examining both report simultaneously, conclusions of the plug weld adequacy can be drawn. These j
conclusions are in term of estimates on the percentage of good weld area.
(ref. 3) n
i l
JOB NO. 91C2696 Ccicul:ti::n C-016 Sh2;t 6 of 10
SUBJECT:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/21/95 USl A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Revision 0 Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USl A 46 / IPEEE, Equipment By: A. Karavoussianis a structural-mechanical Fragilities for 1 A-05,1 A-06, 1
seng consulting engineering firm 2A-05 and 2A-06 1
Switchgear Row 1 A 1 A-06; UT Estimated ear Weld
% of Good Observations y
g*
No.
Weld Area i
1 A52-58 50 %
Both the underfill and hole are located at about the same place. Also, the UT indicated that the hole is about half of the weld area. Therefore, it is estimated that 50% of the weld area is good.
2 A52-59 60 %
Although, most of the weld area is underfilled, the UT found that the underfilled area is of proper depth. Also, pits were found in the weld area and the UV shows that at the location of the pits the weld is shallow. Since, the shallow area is less than half of the weld area, estimated that 60% is good.
O 3
A52-60 80%
The plug weld has some undereutting and is partially underfilled, but the UT shows that the weld has good depth except for hole on one side. If diagonal lines were drawn (from opposite comers) on the weld area, the hole would not fill the quarter, therefore estimate that 80% is good.
4 A52-61 85%
The plug weld has a small incomplete fill hole, which was not found on the UT. On the other hand, the UT did find a small hole close to the center of the weld area (not at the incomplete fill hole). This leads to the conclusion that the small incomplete fill hole is outside the weld area, hence, based on the UT estimate that 85% is good.
5 A52-62 40%
This switchgear bay has no bottom base, the top base is welded directly to the embed by two plug welds (UT plug weld numbers 5 and 6).
Half of plug weld number 5 is shown to be 100% underfill and about half the weld area has welded sidewall. Also, the UT shows that credit may be taken for the weld area which is not underfilled. Since, no more than half of the weld area perimeter is welded, it is conservative to estimate that 40% of the area for plug weld 5 is good.
6 0%
The UT showed that plug weld number 6 is no good, hence, this plug weld will not be used.
Also, the UT found an 1/8" by 1' long fillet welds, above qQ each of the plug welds in this bay (credit will be taken for these fillets).
JOB NO.91C2696 Calcul tlan C-016 Sheet 7 of 10
SUBJECT:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/21/95 g
USI A 46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Revision 0 Q
Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USI A-46IIPEEE, Equipment By: A. Karavoussianis a structural-mechanical Fragilities for 1 A 05,1 A 06, Check: T. M. Tseng consulting engineering firm 2A-05 and 2A-06 UT Estimated ear I
% of Good Observations y
g' No.
Weld Area 7
A52-63 75%
The plug weld has some underfilling and a small pit. Also, in the middle of the underfilled area, where the fill seem to be normal, there is a small hole. The hole is oval shaped, 1/2' long and 5/16' width (approx. hole area,1/2 x 5/16 =
0.156 in ). Tnerefore, good weld area can be estimated at, (1 - 0.156/0.629) x 100 = 75%.
8 A52-64 75 %
About half of the plug weld area is underfilled and has a small pit (about 3/32" in diameter). The UT shows a hole in the part of the underfilled area where the pit is located.
If diagonal lines were drawn (from opposite comers) on the weld area, the hole would fill almost all of one of the quarters, therefore, it is estimated that 75% is good.
D 9
A52-65 100 %
This plug weld has a small underfill area, small pit (about d
1/16' in diameter) and very slight porosity. Also, the UT shows a slight notch in one of the weld area comers, but it is not a hole, therefore, all of the plug weld area can be considered good For the most part the small underfill areas were shown by the UT to be good. Also, the UT found holes in large underfilled areas, non-uniform underfilled areas and areas with substantial pits and incomplete fill. Therefore, the small underfilled weld areas without imperfections shown in the Liquid Penetrant Examination of switchgear 2A-05 will be considered good.
Switchgear Row 2A-05 2A-06 (Only switchgear 2A-05 has plug welds and only a Uquid Penetrant Examination was performed);
Estimated Switchgear
% of Good Observations BayNo.
Weld Area A52-76 (South)
Switchgear bay A-52-76 has two plug welds in the front of the bay.
100 %
The south plug weld is slightly underfilled about 7/8' along one edge and has no other imperfections, therefore, it can be consider to be 100% good.
(
(North)
The plug weld in the north has absolutely no imperfections, hence it 100 %
is 100% good.
JOB NO. 91C2696 CriculttlI:n C-016 Sheet 8 of 10
SUBJECT:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/21/95 USl A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Revision 0 Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USl A 46IIPEEE, Equipment By: A. Karavoussianis a structural mechanical Frag'ilities for 1 A-05,1 A-06, Check: T. M. Tseng l
consuhing engineering firm 2A-05 and 2A-06 Estimated Switchgear
% of Good Observations Bay No.
Weld Area A52-75 100 %
The plug weld has a pore which is about 1/8" in diameter. The pore 2
area is, n x (1/8)* / 4 = 0.012 in (probably small enough to ignore),
therefore, estimate that, (1 - 0.012 / 0.629) x 100 = 98%, say 100%
is good.
A52-74 80 %
The plug weld has a hole filled with slag which is about 3/8" in z
diameter. The slag area is, x x (3/8)* / 4 = 0.110 in, therefore, estimate that, (1 - 0.110 / 0.629) x 100 = 83%, say 80% is good.
The Average Estimated Percentage of Good Weld Area
= (50 + 60 + 80 + 85 + 40 + 0 + 75 + 75 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 100 + 80) /13 = 73%
Therefore, assume that the plug welds to the center embed, which were ndt tested, are at least p(,./
73% good.
The weld capacity for a 1/8" fillet = 1/8 x 0.707 x 30.6 = 2.70 kiplir.
T Switchgear Bay No.
Total Weld Capacity d
A52-57 None A52-58 2 Plugs - 50%
Fillet Length for 50% = 2.86 x 0.50 = 1.43'
& 73% good Fillet Length for 73% = 2.86 x 0.73 = 2.09'-
Weld Capacity = (1.43 + 2.09) x 2.7 = 9.50 kip 1 A-05 A52-59 2 Plugs - 60%
Fillet Length for 60% = 2.86 x 0.60 = 1.72'
& 73% good Fillet Length for 73% = 2.86 x 0.73 = 2.09' Weld Capacity = (1.72 + 2.09) x 2.7 = 10.29 kip A52-60 2 Plugs - 80%
Fillet Length for 80% = 2.86 x 0.80 = 2.29'
& 73% good Fillet Length for 73% = 2.88 x 0.73 = 2.09' Weld Capacity = (2.29 + 2.09) x 2.7 = 11.83 kip A52-61 2 Plugs - 85%
Fillet Length for 85% = 2.86 x 0.85 = 2.43'
& 73% good Fillet Length for 73% = 2.86 x 0.73 = 2.09" Weld Capacity = (2.43 + 2.09) x 2.7 = 12.20 kip I
l JOB NO. 91C2693 Ccicul tirsn C 016 Sheet 9 of 10 l
SUBJECT:
Point Beach Nucles Plant Date: 3/21/95 USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Rev..ision 0 l
Project USl A 46IIPEEhquipment By: A. Karavoussianis j
STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES
}
a structural-mechanical Frag'ilities for 1 A 05,1 A-06, e
seng j
consulting engineering firm 2A 05 and 2A-06 i
I Switchgear Bay No.
Total Weld Capacity A52-62 2 Plugs - 40%
Fillet Length for 40% = 2.86 x 0.40 = 1.14' i
& 0% good Fillet Lengths = 2' i
2" - 1/8' fillet Weld Capacity = (1.14 + 2) x 2.7 = 8.48 kip l
A52-63 2 Plugs - 75%
Fillet Length for 75% = 2.86 x 0.75 = 2.15' f
& 73% good Fillet Length for 73% = 2.86 x 0.73 = 2.09' l
Weld Capacity = (2.15 + 2.09) x 2.7 = 11.45 kip 1A-06 A52-64 2 Plugs - 75%
Fillet Length for 75% = 2.86 x 0.75 = 2.15*!
& 73% good Fillet Length for 73% = 2.86 x 0.73 = 2.09" l l
Weld Capacity = (2.15 + 2.09) x 2.7 = 11.45 kip -
~
A52-65 2 Plug 5 -
Fillet Length for 100% = 2.86*".
l 100 % & 73 %
Fillet Length for73% = 2.86 ic 0.73 = 2.097 j
good Wold Capacity = (2.86+ 2.09) x 2.7 = 13.37 kip A52-66 None i(
A52-76 3 Plugs Fillet Length for 100% = 2.86* x 2 = 5.72 l
2 - 100 % &
Fillet Length for 73% = 2.86 x 0.73 = 2.09' l
73% good Weld Capacity = (5.72 + 2.09) x 2.7 = 21.09 kip A52-75 2 Plugs -
Fillet Length for 100% = 2.86*
i 100 % & 73%
Fillet Length for 73% = 2.86 x 0.73 = 2.09' good Weld Capacity = (2.86 + 2.09) x 2.7 = 13.37 kip 2A-05 A52-74 2 Plugs - 80%
Fillet Length for 80% = 2.86 x 0.80 = 2.29"
& 73% good Fillet Length for73% = 2.86 x 0.73 = 2.09"-
Weld Capaaty = (2.29 + 2.09) x 2.7 = 11.83 kip =
l A52-73 2 - Complete Fillet Length = 2.x 2.86 =.5.72's.
~
Weld Capacity = 5.72 x 2.7 = 15.44 kip 2 l
A52-72 1 - Complete Fillet Length = 2.86 + 1.43 = 4.29".-
l
& 1 - Partial Weld Capacity = 4.29 x 2.7 = 11.58 kip '
l A52-71 1 - Complete Fillet Length = 2.86 + 1.43 = 4.29" i
& 1 - Partial Weld Capacity = 4.29 x 2.7 = 11.58 kip A52-70 2 - Complete Fillet Length = 2 x 2.86 = 5.72 e
Weld Capacity = 5.72 x 2.7 = 15.44 kip 2A-06 A52-69 1 - Complete Fillet Length = 2.86 + 1.43 = 4.29"-
& 1 - Partial Weld Capaaty = 4.29 x 2.7 = 11.58 kip :
A52-68 2 - Complete Fillet Length = 2 x 2.86 = 5.72g Weld Capacity = 5.72 x 2.7 = 15.44 kip i A52-67 None O
JOB NO. 91C2696 Cnicul:tlen C-016 Sht:t 10 of 10
SUBJECT:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/21/95 USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Revision 0 Project j
STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USI A 46 / IPEEE, Equipment By: A. Karavoussianis a structural-mechanical Fragilities for 1 A-05,1 A-06' Check: T' M. Tseng consulting engineering firm 2A-05 and 2A-06 The anchorage analysis in the SEWS will use the three most critical bays of each switchgear, which are shaded in the above table. Also, only the weld shear capacities are calculated in the above table and used in the SEWS anchorage analysis, because the welds are only subject to shear (as shown on page 5).
(ref. 9)
Therefore, the actual A-46 minimum safety factor is the lesser of the SEWS A-46 anchorage safety factor and the scale factor between the A-46 input spectral acceleration and the acceleration which will cause tension (page 5). This scale factor = 0.83 / 0.49 = 1.69.
Since, these safety factors are primarily due to shear, the IPEEE safety factor is equal to the SEWS A-46 anchorage safety factor multiplied by the scale factor between the horizontal A-46 and IPEEE spectral accelerations. This scale factor = 0.49 / 0.68 = 0.72 (page 4).
Then, the shear anchorage HCLPF is equal to the IPEEE sahty factor multiplied by the IPEEE spectral PGA (0.4 G). The goveming HCLPF is the lesser of the shear anchorage HCLPF and O
the embedded channel HCLPF (0.49 G, page 5). Finally, the fragility is equal to the goveming HCLPF multiplied by 2.1.
I SEWS Shear Goveming SF eses
'9 i
SFw HCLPF HCLPF i
l 1A-05 2.256 1.624 0.65 G 0.49 G 1.03 G 1A-06 2.265 1.631 0.65 G 0.49 G 1.03 G I
2A-05 4.603 3.314 1.33 G 0.49 G 1.03 G 2A-06 2.261 1.628 0.65 G 0.49 G 1.03 G l
The above table shows that all,*F Jr switchgears have the same goveming HCLPF of 0.49 G and fragility of 1.03 G. The goveming HCLPF and fragility is due to the embedded channel's inability to resist uplift. Since, the embed's grout pocket is not positively anchored to the i
concrete floor, it was conservatively assumed that the embed has no uplift capacity.
4 e
- 6. Discussions in the seismic-fire interr.ctions assessment, pertaining to inadvertent seismic actuation of fire suppression systems and to seismic degradation of fire suppression 4
j systems, do not adequately address all relevant concerns. For spuriors actuations, the i
potential for relay chatter and dust effei:ts on Cardox, fire water, and Halon systems i
needs to be discussed. The discussion of seismic degradation of fire protection systems (FPSs) focuses only on potentialinteractions of FPS components with essential j
equipment. The evaluation should also include an examination of potentialloss of FPS
^
capability itself, due to a seismic event. Examples of related items found in past studies j
include (but are not limited to):
Unanchored CO2 tanks or bottles Sprinkler standoffs penetrating suspended ceilings e
l Weak or unanchored 480V or 600 V (non-safety related) electrical cabinets (as e
l potential fire sources) in close proximity to essential safety equipment (e.g., cables in cable spreading room)
Fire pumps unanchored or on vibration isolation mounts e
Mercury or " bad-actors" relays in fire protection system (FPS) actuation circuitry) e Use of cast iron fire mains to provide fire water to fire pumps e
NUREG-1407 suggests a walkdown as a means ofidentifying any such items.
I j
Please provide the results of your seism'ic-fire interaction study perta'ining specifically js to seismic degradatio~ of FPS capability and the guidelines given to walkdown n
l personnel for evaluating the foregoing issues (if they exist).
The following is an excerpt from the " Internal Fires Analysis" portion of the PBNP IPEEE:
i i
I l
4.8 TREATMENT OF FIRE RISK SCOPING STUDY ISSUES 1
The six issues raised in NUREG/CR-5088, " Fire Risk Scoping Study," (Reference 9-42) were reviewed at Point Beach Nuclear Plant for their potential impact on the Point Beach j
Fire PSA and IPEEE submittals. This evaluation was performed using the guidelines in i
the EPRI-FIVE Method and applicable NRC documents on each of the issues. The following provides a summary of our findings regarding each of these issues.
l
\\
4.8.1 Seismic /FireInteractions
(
4.8.1.1 Seismically Induced Fires Anchoring, support, and location of flammable gas and liquid piping and storage vessels j
were reviewed during walkdowns for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Seismic Safety
}
Assessment. This evaluation found all flammable gas lines and liquid storage vessels
. s adequately supported and located where they would not present a vulnerability that would 2
compromise the plant's safe shutdown capability following a seismic event.
The j
following were walked down:
2 l
O
- 1. Turbine Lube Oil Reservoirs 5
- 2. Boiler Day Tanks
- 3. Hydrogen piping for the geneutors
- 4. Hydrogen Side Drain Regulator Tanks
- 5. Flammable Liquid Storage Tanks
- 6. Steam Generator Feed Pump Lube Oil Reservoirs
- 7. Lube Oil Storage Tank
- 9. Diesel Generator Day Tanks 4.8.1.2 ~ Seismic Actuation of Fire Suppression Systems Inadvertent fire suppression operation and discharge onto safety-related and safe shutdown equipment resulting from seismic activity was considered in the Point Beach Seismic Safety Assessment and the Internal Flooding Analysis from the Point Beach IPE,
" Point Beach Nuclear Plant Individual Plant Examination Summary Report,"
(Reference 9-2). These analyses considered the potential for both the direct spray and indirect flooding of safe shutdown equipment and components located near fire suppression systems. All safe shutdown equipment was walked down using standard seismic walkdc.vn methods in the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedures (GIP) and the EPRI Seismic Margins Approach detailed in EPRI Report NP-6041. The seismic
~
walkdown methodology, criteria, and notes are included in the Point Beach Seismic Safety Assessment. This evaluation included the review of generic fire protection system root cause actuation scenarios and potential attemative resolutions identified in NUREG-1472, " Regulatory Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 57: Effects of Fire Protection System Actuation on Safety. Related Equipment," (Reference 9-44),
NUREG/CR-5789, " Risk Evaluation for a Westinghouse PWR, Effects of Fire Protection System Actuation on Safety-Related Equipment," (Reference 9-43) and NUREG/CR-5580, " Evaluation of Generic Issue 57: Effects of Fire Protection System Actuation on Safety Related Equipment," (Reference 9-45).
i i
This evaluation concluded that the potential discharge of suppression systems installed at Point Beach resulting from seismic activity had no impact on safe shutdown equipment.
4.8.1.3 Seismic Degradation of Fire Suppression Systems Point Beach fire protection systems were reviewed during the walkdown of the Point Beach Seismic Safe:y Assessment. This evaluation considered the survivability of fire suppression systems in close proximity to the seismic safe shutdown components during plant design basis seismic events. The term " survivability" means the suppression system would not fall onto and disable safe shutdown equipment possibly compromising the plant's safe shutdown capability.
The evaluation did not consider continued fire suppression operability after a seismic event.
O
A-Any fire protection piping installed above safe shutdown equipment was noted. and V
further evaluated for adequate support. Fire suppression systems were determined to have no impact on safe shutdown components.
To amplify on section 4.8.1.2 " Seismic Actuation of Fire Suppression Systems", we would like to point out that during the course of our plant walkdowns we looked explicitly for interations that could cause inadvertant actuation of the fire supression system onto each piece of our IPEEE equipment and identified none.
Finally, based on the results of these same walkdowns, it has been determined that there is no potential for a seismically induced fire at Point Beach, therefore the question of the survivability and operability of the Fire Protection System following a seismic event is not
)
--levant.
l O
I v
e
l 7,
()s and the RLE spectrum (i.e., the NUREG/CR-0098 median spectrum for soil, anchored to a PGA value of 0.3g) on the same graph. Use the same value of damping for all plots.
l l
\\
i PBNP Seismic Spectra Curves (5% Damped)
(EPRl/LLNL Spectra are Anchored to PSNP Plant HCLPF = 0.25g) 0.70 ;
i'i
/
N
' O.60
/
\\
-e-PBNP SSE
[
{
i l
0.50
-e-New LLNL
/
\\
-*- EPRI I
l y
/
b
-o--NUREG/CR-0098 I
_ A
\\
g 0.40
/
f 0.30
/
\\7 N
l A
(~
I
//I 0.20 I
l I
/
v
!)
/
'M
~~
0.10
,1
-f
/
~
~
r O.00 F
O.1 1.0 10.0 100.0 Frequency (Hz)
The EPRI and LLNL spectra are shown anchored to a plant HCLPF of 0.25g instead of the base case result of 0.16g reported in the IPEEE submittal. The 0.25g level, also reported in the PBNP IPEEE submittal, represents a more realistic measure of the plant HCLPF since it results from consideration only of components and structures that can fail seismically; thus, providing a measure of the seismic integrity of the plant. The notion of a HCLPF is based on the seismic structural capacity of a component; similarly, the assessment of a plant HCLPF should be based only on the structural and not on human or random failures.
I Note also, that the Review Level Earthquake (RLE) spectrum represents a " generic" demand
(
spectrum.
e
In Section 4.1.1 of the submittalit can be inferred that the results ofinternal flood analysis are utilized to arrive at the first screening of the fire areas. In a typical j
flood analysis,it is assumed that cables are not susceptible to flood effects. Since the l
most susceptible item to fire in a power plant is electrical cabling, how could the 4
results of the flooding analysis be useful to the fire analysis? Please provide a i
discussion clarifying how the flood analysis results were utilized and demonstrating that the results are indeed applicable to fire conditions.
The results of the flooding analysis were not used for the first screening of fire areas.
Actually, the plant fire zones were used to describe plant location for the flood analysis.
This is a list of fire zones at the plant and did not involve any reduction in numbers based on whether or not flooding in the area would cause a reactor trip.
The culling of the list occurred when the expert panel reviewed the list for applicability to fires. As you have indicated there were several fire zones which coul,d cause a reactor q
trip or force a plant shutdown in the event of a fire which were unaffected by flooding.
V The effect of cables was picked up in two ways. The first was a review of the cable and raceway schedule (CARDS) for each fire zone. The panel reviewed the cables in the area and the equipment affected and their own judgment on what other items would be affected and determined whether or not a fire would cause a reactor trip in that fire compartment. The second was to have the expert panel look at the technical specification requirements which would require plant shutdown if tech spec equipment were disabled.
If the tech spec required plant shutdown in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with the equipment disabled, then the compartment was considered as causing a plant trip. For example, if there were a fire in a compartment which would disable both low head SI pumps on a given unit, the tech specs require the unit be shut down in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. This would not directly cause a plant trip, but since the plant would have to be shut down in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, it was counted as a compartment which caused a plant trip.
The expert panel consisted of a Fire Protection Engineer with more than 10 years of fire protection experience, an electrical engineer with more than 20 years of experience at Point Beach, a Duty Shift Superintendent with more than 10 years of Point Beach experience and a mechanical modification engineer / PSA engineer with more than 20 yearsof nuclear plant experience,14 years of the experience acquired at Point Beach.
O
4 l
I 2.
Offsite power is allowed to remain available during a fire if the associateu electrical equipment and cables are unaffected. This is a valid method. However, the submittal does not indicate that indeed the equipment (i.e., electrical cabinets, transformers, etc.) and cables associated with offsite power have been identified in a systematic fashion, and whether the possibility of this initiating event has been 4
established for some of the compartments. Please provide information regarding the possibility ofloss of offsite power from a fire within the piant.
i l
The cable and raceway schedule was reviewed to identify any possible fire which would j
disable all offsite power. No fire compartments were identified that would disable all j
4 offsite power. The equipment was also reviewed based on location to see if there was a fire compartment which contained equipment that would cause a total loss of offsite power. None were identified. There is a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire wall between the redundant offsite i
power transformers, which supply electrical power to safe shutdown equipment. The cables are not cross-connected. A walkdown was performed to verify that cable routing j
l would not cause a LOSP to the site.
3.
From the submittalit can be inferred that the licensee has not considered hot shorts as a failnre mode for control or instrumentation cables. Please provide a discussion j
regarding the treatment of hot shorts in the fire analysis portion of the IPEEE.
Appendix R considers hot shorts. FIVE is dependent on the Appendix R analysis.
Therefore, hot shorts are considered.
l 4.
The submittal does not include a separate discussion regarding the possibility of 4
occurrence ofinitiating events (those defined as part of the internal events model of the PSA) from a fire within the plant. From discussions provided in the submittalit may be inferred that reactor trip has been considered as the only viable initiating event in case of a fire. Power-operated relief valve (PORV) or steam dump valve opening from a hot short in its control cable has not been addressed in the IPEEE submittal. Please provide a discussion regarding the treatment ofinitiating events other than reactor trip in the fire analysis, and the possibility of their occurrence from a fire.
A review was performed to identify viable initiating events in case of a fire. The IPEEE submittal identified and analyzed fire compartments which could cause a reactor trip.
Following the RAI for the IPEEE a review was performed to identify other viable plan.
trip initiators and their impact on core damage frequency.
The method used was the same as was used for the IPEEE reactor trip initiators. Two additional viable initiating events were identified, fire induced small LOCA through a hot short opening of a PORV with the associated block valve disabled by the fire and steam line/ feed line break outside containment by a hot short opening an atmospheric steam dump valve.
l The small loss of coolant accident event tree and steam / feed line break inside containment event trees were used for the quantification. A copy of the event trees is attached. The safety injection, high head safety injection and feed and bleed functions were set to fail.
First, CARDS runs were made to identify which fire compartments could cause the above conditions to occur. These compartments are listed below. Next, the total fire initiating.
event frequency for each compartment was obtained from FIVE (F1). PSA runs were l
performed on the small LOCA and steam / feed event trees with the affected equipment set l
to fail (P2). These were multiplied together to get the annual core damage frequency for a fire in the identified compartment (F2). This was multiplied by the probability that fire l
suppression would fail giving the probability that a compartment would lead to core j.
damage (F3).
If the value of F3 was less than 1.0E-06, the compartment was screened and not considered further. Compartments 156,162,166,524 and 596 were screened at this step.
Walkdowns and FIVE fire modeling for compartments 142,159 and 238 found these compartments to have the target cables above the critical height. The critical height is the height at which the energy in the plume from the fire source will no longer damage the target. In other words, there is not enough heat created by the fire to damage the target cables because they are high enough above the fire. For example, if you hold your hand
, O high enough above a campfire, it will not get hot enough to be uncomfortable. The lower l
your hand gets, the warmer it feels, until at the critical height, your can damage your hand.
l The only fire in compartment 155 which would damage the target cables is a transient source. From FIVE, the individual ignition frequency for only a transient fire in this compartment is 1.33E-04. The probability that if a fire occurs in this compartment, it will i
lead to core damage is 9.84E-04. The probability that a fire will occur and subsequently lead to core damage is the product of these two numbers or 1.31E-07. Therefore, l
compartment 155 is screened and will not be considered further.
t lO l
l
e FIRE INDUCED SMALL LOCA (S2) b i
AREA COMPARTMENT DESCRIPTION F1 P2 F2 PCCL F3 A01 142 CCW PUMP ROOM 1.29E-02 8.32E-03 1.07E-04 2.00E-02 2.14E-06 A01 155 VALVE GALLERY 1.27E-03 9.84E-04 1.24E-06 1.00E+00 1.24E-06 PIPEWAY #1 A01 156 MOTOR CONTROL 8.29E-03 2.03E-03 1.68E-05 2.00E-02 3.37E-07 CENTER 1B32 ROOM A01 159 HVAC EQUIPMENT ROOM 1.27E-03 9.99E-04 1.26E-06 1.00E+00 1.26E-06 A01 162 VALVE GALLERY 5.49E-04 9.84E-04 5.40E-07 1.00E+00 5.40E-07 PIPEWAY #4 A01 166 MOTOR CONTROL 8.65E-03 9.84E-04 8.51 E-06 2.00E-02 1.70E-07 CENTER 2B42 i
A01 187 MONITOR TANK ROOM 2.61 E-02 2.58E 03 6.72E-05 1.00E+00 6.72E-05 Note 4 A30 318 CABLE SPREADING ROOM 9.21 E-03 5.00E-02 4.61 E-04 5.00E-02 2.30E-05 Note 3 Note 4 Auto strit P38A or manual start P38B or IP29 and refill CSTs. Operator not threatened by fire. HEP = 2.58E-03 Note 3 Alternate shutdown only. Operator action Required. HEP = 0.05 ADJUST OTHER HEPs
- 2 FIRE INDUCED STEAM BREAKS (TFB)
I AREA COMPARTMENT DESCRIPTION F1 P2 F2 PCCL F3 V
A01 187 MONITOR TANK ROOM 2.61 E-02 2.58E-03 6.72E-05 1.00E+00 6.72E-05 Note 4 j
A01 238 GAS STRIPPER 7.83 E-04 2.34E-03 1.83E-06 1.00E+00 1.83E-06 EQUIPMENT ROOM 46 FT ELEVATION A30 318 CABLE SPREADING ROOM 9.21E-03 5.00E-02 4.61 E-04 5.00E-02 2.30E-05 Note 3 A31 326 CONTROL ROOM 2.69E-02 5.00E-02 1.35E-03 3.40E-03 4.58E-06 A01 524 UNIT I FACADE 1.34E-05 2.34E-03 3.14E-08 1.00E+00 3.14E-08 A01 596 UNIT 2 FACADE 1.41 E-05 2.34E-03 3.29E-08 1.00E+00 3.29E-08 The three remaining compartments are the monitor tank room (187), the cable spreading room (318) and the control room (326). The initiating event frequency will be divided equally between each of the events. There is no preferential initiating event for these compartments. A split fraction of.34 will be assigned to each of the initiators for the compartments which contribute to all three initiators. A split fraction of 0.5 will be used for the control room (326) because it contributes to two of the initiators. Because all the equipment and cables in the fire compartment are assumed to be damaged for a fire and because fires in each of the compartments are dominated by HEPs, the probability of core damage (P2) will be the same for each initiator in the compartment.
i Compartment Fire Model Split Fraction Failure Frequency (from Probability Section 4.6.5 of IPEEE Submittal) l Fire Induced Small LOCA l
187 4.86E-06 0.34 1.65 E-06 318 2.63E-06 0.34 8.94E-07 Total 2.54E-06 Fire Induced Steam Line Break l
187 4.86E-06 0.34 1.65E-06 318 2.63 E-06 0.34 8.94E-07 326 4.58E-06 0.50 2.29E-06 Total 4.83E-06 Fire Induced Standard Transients l
151 3.562E-09 3.562E-09 l
156 8.073E-07 8.073E-07 166 1.071E-06 1.071E-06 187 4.860E-06 0.34 1.65E-06 245 3.496E-07 3.496E-07 246 2.404E-07 2.404E-07 304 1.041E-07 1.041E-07 305 2.510E-06 2.510E-06 308 5.518E-06 5.518E-06
(
309 5.840E-06 5.840E-06 318 2.630E-06 0.34 8.94E-07 319 3.697E-06 3.697E-06
]
326 4.581E-06 0.5 2.29E-06 681 2.042E-05 2.042E-05 Total 4.54E-05 Total CDF due to 5.28 E-05 fire There is no change in the overall core damage frequency due to fires by including other possible initiating events.
v
a Y
CN EUO ER l
F
/
E
- PDs,
(
D S
O S
S 0
S s
S S
S S
R M
A L
K L
E x
L E
E E
E E
E T
Y T
N N
A E
R P
T V
EO M
CT O N E
A NP C
EI L
T UR R P N
E QC E
R D
ES C
C 8
C i,
W C
g F
O A
I SE L
L F
I s
s s
s R
L s
A O
A P E C
D 0
0 F
F F
1 t
I I
T 0
0 A
A A
5 s
L C
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 y
a 2
a P
C C
A s
s S
s 5
5 S
S s
5 s
5 S
U I
N T
R t
2 3
s 5
6
?
8 0
i 21 3
- SEO, e
0 o
o 0
e N
l 0
o 0
1 s
1 T
H A
C C L
E A
O L
E O
E B C
E GL N
T F
NB I
Ge N
O tIA Nf S
OEOI t
N I S
LL LTUA L
O O P
S CV C
A S
O e
L I
S 8
C' l
L C
C L
L LA N
S RTuW ON D
EA TAT E 8 CLSDE YELF AO FOSEB RC F
se F
NE YOL DTIR m
TA AE 0
Ct p
LMFAElI Ja S Nv S
IA e
is
~
'j lmNE
~
OL aIB LIA C
/
N LCL MEI A
U1 A
C4V CIA A
s CA EZ RI Y
0RRM UAE 1A5MT EERIS n
RS Y
8 0
0 0
0 YRE RER AT IAA F
Lwt tdt A
SEA uEv AFA S
A FA NE vOL IB sDT eAETA I
Ct S
swr u
AEi Ja S Nv IA 0
rs m P iCI T
R A
m1 R
A T
A
)
T T
N tS N E
A tSF D
aOCLI p
m O C sL O S
C C A 3_
g g
E ? y a*< 8 # 5 E;]e hET f *gE U s.
eb u[
5E E.%o-E.d WW 3$4 EK $ u ;
r!
g i5 6
YCN M
E E
R E
F R
T T
E E
E E
m s
E N
PDSy K
K L
i K
L T
E K
L L
E K
T 1
E O
O S
Z O
S 2
a O
S S
S O
2 2
S T
V E
Y N
T
~
A N
R P
T E
M EO O N M
CT A
N C
NP L
I R P A
EI M
M u
I 5
S i.s 1R
,e wR N
UR T
. QC E
s F
O S
C B
C c
F.
M I
s.
8 s,
ES k
A A
O F
L f
R L
SE F
f F
S S
S s
R Ia i.
Is 8
B R
R R
3 1
i R
P v
E C
"8 5
D A
'A L
a 8
8 e
g g
e B
e C
E t
T T
fr F
p y
r f
r F
F F
F
,,r C
r F
F T
f T
f T
T 1
T T
T 1
T T
U D
IR N I
SEGy 01 2
3 A
5 6
7 s
9 0
i 2n 3
4 s
6 es C
S 0
0 D
0 0
0 O
0 1
s 1
1 i
1 T
H N
~
C I
E A
L E
K E
B A
E GL N
E T
R NB I
GMILL NH S N B
A I
Ol c
N OE O
E LIDa L
O Cv C P N
I A
S S
S S
L C
E C
l L
L L
w D
E EF e
/
RIMp N
D 0NEA 7A15DE E
E B A
CL F
A0 L
vE 3
SEB T
E0 4C S
F e
8 e
8 r
F E
2 Rt Y M OnR u
E TAsM
}
A T RsI$
r EERY O
psp $
OP ED YRE REL Afe iaa F
tut IDt A
xEa uEv aFa a
B r.
A F
i D
E D2t E1aK CRmC UUR)M C
DSNSWS R
IEIR a
F -
C R
D ME M
MSO M
S I
g t
t s
s u
LA
]
U EuP f
C E
UD I
S R NO C
eE TsL tB I
EIA I
CL S
sA EI SJA NV IA c
is ROP tI Y
taR u1 R
s e
r A
I oK N EA E
EEE tRDM m
Se
/BIl a
aENai r
e w
IiIm I
Et r
o t
SL C
E r
l f.!'
a~s. I?'
E a a-3 pi;E8 v
T.
9 6 ttI k
Ee s{ 0
~.
S.
From the discussions provided in the submittalit is not clear how the list of safe I
shutdown equipment have been established. From the discussion in Section 4.1.1. It can be inferred that Appendix R equipment and cables have been used to establish the safe shutdown equipment and cables for various compartments. Loss of offsite power, LOCA and containment cooling and isolation are not included in Appendix R. However, these elements of a power plant are addressed in a PSA model. Please l
provide a discussion as to whether or not Appendix R equipment and cables were augmented, which components have been added to the list, and what was the basis for omitting some of the components and equipment included in the PSA internal events model.
i Appendix R' equipment and cables were only augmented by offsite power. All of the equipment modeled in the PSA is not required to safely shut down the plant following a fire. For example, safety injection and recirculation is not required unless the fire can create a LOCA. No fires were identified which would create a LOCA and therefore SI and RHR were not included. In addition, no fire created a main steam line/ feed line break inside containment. Therefore, fan coolers are not required to control containment pressure. In some cases, redundant equipment was not modeled for the fire analysis, which was included in the PSA. For example, reactor coolant pump seal cooling j
assumed only charging was available. However, the component cooling system is also available for seal cooling but was not modeled. Another case is removal of decay heat.
The only method credited in the fire PSA for decay heat removal is auxiliary feedwater,
)
even though Reactor Coolant System bleed and feed is another method for decay heat k
removal.
6.
On page 2 of 110 of Section 4.0 of the submittal the term " acceptable" is used for i
compartment boundaries and no definition is provided as to what constitutes an acceptable boundary. Please provide a definition of this term.
1 From EPRI TR-100370, Project 3000-41, Final Report, April 1992," Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE):
"2.4 Fire Comnartment - A space bounded by non-combustible barriers where heat and products of combustion from a fire within the enclosure will be substantially confined."
Fire compartments (fire zones) in most cases are determined by room boundaries. Most are bounded by concrete walls which are considered to provide significant resistance to the spread of fire but are not necessarily fire rated by definition.
Select Screening Criteria 1.
Compartments that would have no adverse effect on safe shutdown capability.
2.
Boundary is 2-hour or 3-hour rated fire barrier on the basis of barrier effectiveness, G
3.
Boundary is 1-hour rated fire barrier with CCL <80,000 Btu /sq. ft. in exposing O
compartment.
I 1
4.
Exposing compartment has low CCL (<20,000 Btu /sq. ft) and automatic fire j
detection.
5.
Exposing and exposed comparunent have low CCL (<20,000 Btu /sq. ft.).
i 6.
Automatic suppression is installed over combustibles and will prevent spread to 1
adjacent compartments.
t The Point Beach FIVE analysis did not take credit for 20 ft separation as an acceptable fire barrier even though this is acceptable separation criteria for Appendix R.
7.
Active fire barriers (e.g., fire dampers and normally open doors) have not been addressed in the submittal. Please provide sets of adicent fire compartments linked with active fire barriers that contain cables sh i equipment from multiple safety trains. It should be noted that the failure rate of such devices can be as high as 0.2 per demand.
Active fire barriers like fire dampers are not required to be addressed per the NRC approved FIVE methodology. (See Section 5.2 of EPRI TR-100370, Project 3000-41, Final Report, April 1992, " Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE)") as follows:
5.2.1 Fire Barrier Availability The Phase I Screen takes credit for fire area boundaries (see Definitions 2.1 and 2.2)
O' being effective in controlling a fire from spreading to the other side of a fire barrier. This is based on an assumption that the plant can demonstrate that the fire barriers and their components (i.e. fire doors, fire dampers and fire penetration seal assemblies) are being inspected and maintained on a regular basis in accordance with established plant surveillance procedures and that appropriate compensatory measures are being taken when discrepancies in the barriers are found. This plant fire barrier surveillance program should be able to satisfy the intent of the guidelines in Item II of the Sandia Fire Risk Scoping Study Evaluation (Attachment 10.5).
The Point Beach fire barrier surveillance program was reviewed as part of the fire analysis and was found to meet the intent of the guidelines in Item II of the Sandia Fire Risk Scoping Study Evaluation.
8.
FCIA should consider fire brigade accessing the fire area through adjacent fire zones that contain cables and equipment from an opposite safety train. Please provide fire scenarios that involve this situation, and describe how they have been considered in the IPEEE submittal.
The NRC-approved FIVE methodology does not require identification of opposite trains of safety equipment and cables which the fire brigade will access. Prefire plans, trained operators and attack plans all serve to prevent fire from spreading to adjacent areas. For example, operators are trained to come into the affected zone with a hose stream.
i Manual suppression is credited in only 5 zones in the PBNP Fire Analysis.156 (MCCIB32 area),166 (MCC2B32 area),245 (Unit I rod drive room),246 (Unit 2 rod J
drive room), and 318 (Cable spreading room).
It is beyond the scope of FIVE and will not be considered further.
9.
The results of Step 5 of Phase I (page 2 of110 of Section 4.0) are not presented. The submittal wrongly refers to Table 4.1.1-1, which apparently presents the results of l
Step 4 of the analysis. Please provide a tabulation of the results of Step 5.
The results of Step 5 of Phase I are presented in Table 4.1.1-1. Step 5 of the analysis performs the fire area vs. safe shutdown function evaluation. The fire areas not screened in this table are considered significant fire areas that will require further evaluation.
10.
From the information provided in Table 4.6.4-8 and statements made in Section 4.6.4.8, it is concluded that transient fuels have not been considered in the analysis (.e.g.,it is stated that "Only fixed source / combustible configurations are modeled"), and optimistic measures have been taken to model the possibility of cable damage in the cable spreading room (e.g., damage time from transformer oil 2
fire is 1,871 seconds). Please provide a drawing that shows the locations of critical cables, the transformers and the electrical cabinets in the cable spreading room.
Also, provide further information supporting the P2 and Pccl values used for the cable spreading room.
Only fixed ignition sources were considered after the walkdown. The walkdown did not identify any location where a transient source would cause a fire to spread throughout the room. This is because all cables in the room are enclosed in metal covered cable trays or conduits.
We did not take " optimistic measures" to model the possibility of cable damage. As mentioned in the report all cable trays are enclosed and covered with KAOWOOL. The calculation is based on the FIVE fire modeling for the compartment.
The time to cable damage for the qualified XPE/ neoprene bare exposed cable is 415 to 1386 seconds. Additional time to cable damage is considered, since the cable is enclosed in a metal enclosure with KAOWOOL blanket covering the cables inside this metal enclosure. None of the critical cable trays are directly above the transformer.
The P2 values for Scenario 1 and 3 in the cable spreading room are the probability the operator will fail to switch to the attemate switchgear. This probability dominates since random failures of equipment are small by comparison.
The P2 value for Scenario 2 in the cable spreading room is dominated by random equipment failures since operator actions are not required to prevent core damage.
c l-l l
W15 CON $1N ELECTRIC 80WER Co.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT (v)
FIRE 20NE 318 t
BF/PL. EQUIP 1 Description............
1 IC3-480V $wCR BUS 1 804 480V $WCA BUS 1 0Y01
$fAflC INVERTER 1 DYO2 STATIC INVERTER 1 X13 STAflON SERVICE TRANSFORMER 1 X14 STAfl0N SERVICE TRANSFORMER 1 Y203 120V AC BUS (NORMAL) 1 Y204 120V AC DIST SUS 1A52 57 0FF stfE 4KV 84EAKER l
1A52 63 0FF $1TE 4KV BREAKER 1503 Es A
$ WITCH, 1803 ALTERNATE SUPPLY 1803 KS N SWlfCH, 1 803 NORMAL SUPPLY 10C4 K5 A SWITCH, 1804 ALTERNATE SUPPLY 1804 KS N SWITCM, 1804 NORMAL
$UPPLY 1852 10A BREAKER 1852 11C BREAKER 1852 12A BREAKER 1852 13A BREAKER 1852 138 BREAKER 1852 13C SREAKER 1852 148 5AFEGUARD MCC 1832 BREAKER 1852 14C MCC 1831 BREAKER l
(1 X13) BREAKER j
1852 16C Sus TIE BREAKER IB52 178 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(1 x14) BREAKER 1852 2CA BREAKER 1852 20C BREAKER 1852 21A BREAKER 1852 21C MCC B43 BREAKER 1852 23B BREAKER 1852 23C SAFIGUARD Mct 1842 BREAKER 1852 24C BREAKER 1852 3212M BREAKER 2 803 480V sWca BUS 2 804 480V SWGR BUS
~
2 0Y01 stAtlC INVERTER 2 DYC2 STAf!C INVERTER l
2*x13 STAfl0N $ERVICE l \\f TRANSFORMER 2 X14 STATION SERVICE l
EQUIPMENT l
4 W!$ CON $lN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
PotNT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE ZONE 318 BF/PL.E0u!P1 DescH pt i on..............
I i
i i
1 1
o O
O EQUIPMS.T
O MAR 1993 PAGE 1 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CD.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE MA2ARDS EVALUAfl0NS REPORT
\\
SAFE SMUTDOWN CA8LES i
"FOR FIRE ZONE 318'"
Cable.....
Raceway...
Egipment.
E pipment...........
Description 1327JC CT01 1 MOV1299 EXCESS LETDOWN VALVE CTOS CT06 OK04 DK05 DK04 DK07 DK08 DK09 DECT DE04 DN04 DN05 DN04 R10 1327J0 CT01 1 MOV1299 EXCESS LETDOWN VALVE CTOS CT06 DK04 DK05 DK06 DK07 DK08 DK09 DE07 DE06 DWO6 DN05 DN04 Rio 1327JE CT01 1 MOV1299 EXCELS LETDOWN VALVE CT05 CT04 DK04 DK05 DK04 DK07 DK08 OK09 DE07 DE04 DN06 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
~ -
k 04 MAR 1993 PAGE 2 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
l Po!NT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTDOWN CABLES 4
- "FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
i Cable.....
Raceway...
E wipment.
E @lpment...........
3 Description I
l DN05 DN04 R10 j
1B03PTA GQO1 1 P11A CCWS PWIP, MOTOR DRI VEN t
G402 1852 13A BREAKER 5
1852 135 BREAKER 1852 14C MCC 1831 BREAKER 1852 16C BUS TIE BREAKER j
P32A BW PUMP l
P38A AUX. FEED PtMP (MOTO R DRIVEN) l Go03 1 P10A RNR PUMP, MOTOR DRIV EM GQC4 1 P2A CMARGING PUMP, PC$lf IVE DISPLACEMENT
]
1B03 6 P325 SW PtMP 1ET11 1ET12 Rio 1804PTA GRO1 1 P118 CCVS PUMP, MOTOR DRI VEN CR02 1952 16C sul TIE BREA E R 1852 20A BREAKER B43 480V MOTOR CONTROL C ENTER CR03 1 P10B RHR PtMP, MOTOR DRIV 2
EN ca04 P32C SW PLMP 1804 6 DV04 q
DV03
{
DV02 DW1
]
R31 114265 1JB-R 1 LT426 PRESSURIZEt LEVEC TR ANSMITTER XA01 1 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR i
j ANSMITTER l
1AR 1 RB08 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MAkACEMENT, INC.
I
08 MAR 1993 pagg i
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
l PQINT BEACH IRJCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZAADS EVALUATIONS REPORT
(
SAFE $NUTD0hti CABLES l
"FOR FIRE ZONE 318'"
j l
Cable.....
Raceway...
E gipment.
Epi pmen............
Description 1327JC CT01 1 MOV1299 EXCESS LETDOWN VALVE CTOS i
CT06 DK04 DK05 j
DEC6 DK07 DK08 I
DK09 DECT DE06 DN06 DN05 DM%
R10 1327JD CT01 1 MOV1299 EXCESS LETDOWN VALVE CT05 CT06 DK04 DK05 DK06 DK07 DK08 DK09 DEQ7 DE06 DN06 DN05 0N04 Rio 1327JE CT01 1 MOV1299 EXCESS LETDOWN VALvt CTOS CT06 DK04 DK05 DK04 DK07 I
DK08 DK09 i
DECT
)
l DE06 i
DN06 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
O I
04 MAR 1993 PACE 2 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
Po!NT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT BAFE $NUTDOWW CABLE 5
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
EeJipment.
Equi pment...........
Description DN05 0404 R10 1803PTA GQQ1 1 P11A CCWS PWIP, MOTOR DRI YEM 0002 1852 13A BREAKER 1B52 138 BREAKER l
1B52 14C MCC 1831 BREAKER
)
is52 16C BUS TIE BREAKER P32A SW PLMP P38A AUX. FEED PUMP (MOTO R ORIVEN)
G003 1 P10A RNR PWIP, MOTOR DRIV EN G004 1 P2A CMARGING PWIP, POSIT IVE DISPLACEMENT 1503 6 P32B SW PWIP 1ET11 itT12 R30 1804PTA GRC1 1 P118 CCVS PUMP, MOTOP. CRI VEN GR02 1B52 16C SUS T!E BREAKER 1B52 20A BREAKER 843 480V MOTOR CONTROL C ENTER CR03 1 P108 RMR PUMP, MOTOR DRIV EN CIO4 P32C SW PW4P 1504 6 DV04 Dv03 i
DV02
)
DV01 R31 1!4264 IJS R 1 LT424 PRESSURIZER LEVEt TR ANSMITTER XA01 1 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR ANSMITTER 1AR 1 RBOS ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
NN PACE 3 f
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
PolNT SEACM NUCLEAR PLMT FIRE MAZARDS EVALUATICMS REPORT SAFE SNUTDolm CASLES
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
Equfpment.
EgJfument...........
l Description R809 1R110 Il426C 1R110 1 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEvtL TR MSMITTER RB09 1 LT426 rRESSURIZER LivtL TR MSMITTER RB10 R811 RO12 RB13 RB14 RB15 XLO2 XL01 XK05 XK06 O
R06 11427B 1JB W 1 LT427 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR M SMITTER XT01 XC01 XCO2 1AW 1 R808 RIO9 1R110 II427C 1R110 1 LT427 PRES $URIZER LEVEL TR MSMITTER RB09 R310 R811 RB1*
RB13 RB14 RBIS XLO2 XLO1 XK05 XK06 R06 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MulACEMENT, INC.
e
PAGE 4 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT SEACH NUCLEAA PLANT
)
FIRE MAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CABLES
" FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
R ac eway...
E @lpment.
E @lpment...........
Description 1!429H 1R110 1*PCV430 PRESSUR!2ft POWER OP ER. RELIEF YALVE,A0V X804 X$03 X802 X301 M02 XP01 XQ07 XQ06 X005 XQ04 XQ03 N002 XQQ1 RS2 1!430E 1R110 1 PCV430 PRESSURIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,A0V X504 X503 X502 XS01 XRC2 XR01 XQC7 XQC6 2005 XQ04 XQ03 XQQ2 XQQ1 RS2 1!4313 1R110 1 PCV431 PRESSURIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,ACV XSO4 Xs03 XS02 X501 XR02 XR01 XQQ7 XQ06 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
_~... -.....
PAGE 5 i
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POW R CO.
PolNT MACM IRJCLEAR PLANT e
l FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE 84RJT00lRI CABLES i
's
- FOR FIRE 20mE 318 m Cable.....
Raceway...
EtpJlpment.
E gipment...........
j.
Description l
N005 j
1 X004 N003 j
N002 t
X001 i
RM l
11449F
-1R110 1 PCV431 PRE 55URIZER PCWER OP j
ER. RELIEF VALVE,A0V j
XSO4 j
XS03 j
X$02 XS01 i
XR02
}
XRot X007 XQ06 XQ05 XC04 X003 XQQ2
)
X001 RS2 i
i 114695 1JB W 1 PT469
'A' STEAN GEN. PRESS URE TRAN$MITTER(W.R.
)
XYO1 X:01 i
X:02 l
1AW 1 as08 l
R309 R810 l
1R107 1
l 11469C 1R107 1 PT469
'A' STEAN GEN.' PRESS LRE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
Rato i
RB11 RB12 4
j RB13 A314 ENDINEERINO PLANN!NG AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
i a
4
08 MAR 1993 PACE 6 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
P0thT BEACM NUCLEAR PLMT FIRE MAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- Cable.....
Racewey.. '.
E @lpment.
E @lpment...........
Description RB15 XLQ2 XLC1 XK05 XK06 l
XK07 XK08 i
R14 l
114838 1JB R 1 PT483
'8' STEM GEN. PRESS UAE TRMSMITTER(W.R.
)
XA01 1 PT483
'8' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
I 1AR 1 R308 XH05 XH04 XH03 XH02 XF07 XF06 XF05 1R127 114f.3C 1R127 1 PT483
'B' STEAM CEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
XF05 1 PT483
'O' STEAM GEN. PRESC URE TRANSNITTER(W.R.
)
XF04 XF03 XF02 XF01 XK02 XK03 XK04 XK05 XK06 XK07 XK08 XK09 ENGINEERING PLMNING AND MAXAGEMENT, INC.
e
. ~. _. -
.m_.
i i
M MAR 1993 P ACE 7 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
POINT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT 3
FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
1 Coi......
R _,...
E. -,.
E.,-8...........
Descriptim i
R16 18483F 1JB R 1 PT483 88' BTEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
{
XA01 1 PT483
'B' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
i 3
XA02 1AR 2 X$04 XS03
]
XSO2 j
XS01 XR02 l
XR01 g
X008 DJ08 DJ07 R07 11483G 1R127 1 PT483
'B' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
XF05 1 PT483
'8' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
XF06 XF07 XF08 XF09 XF10 1RO8 1J105A R06 1*V296 ISCLATION/ RELIEF VAL VE Dx04 Dx01 CX02 DX03 cv01 cv02 h)
Cv03
%J ENGINEERING PLANN!NG AND MARAGEMENT, INC.
08 MAR 1993 PACE 8 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACH MUCLEAA PLANT FIRE NUMDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318
- Cable.....
Raceway...
EspJipment.
Equipment...........
Description 1J11A R23 CY2839 CONTROL VALVE C01 CO OLING OLO1 DLO2 DLQ3 DLO4 DLOS DLO6 DLOT DLO8 DLO9 DL*1 1ET07 1ET06 1ET05 9
1ET04 1J110 R23 CV2839 CONTROL VALVE C01 CO OLING DK01 DK02 DEC3 DK04 1
DK05 DK06 DK07 DK08 DK09 R35 DJO9 xc05 xo06 R85 iJ11E R85 CV2839 CONTROL VALVE Col CD OLING DN 2 XP01 XP02 1
x001 x002 XQO3 RS4 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
- - - ~ - -
08 MAR 1M3 PAGE 9 WISCONStu ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM WCLEAA PLANT O
FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SWTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE 2ONE 318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
E @lpment.
Egal pment...........
Description IJ37L R23 1 NCV625 RNR MX FLW CONRTOL VALVE, ADV 2DA12 j
2DA11 0401 l
Cn02 l
f 1J37M R24 1 NCV625 RNR NX FLOW CONRTOL I
VALVE, ADV I
CR01 CRC 2 CR03 j
j 1J37N R24 1 NCV625 RNR NX FLOW CONRTOL f
VALVE, ADV l
CRO1 l
CR02 j
CR03 i
1J38G R22 1 NCV624 RMR KX FLOW CONTROL i
VALVE, A0V DF03 I
DFC2
{
2DA11 j
CM01 CM02 1J38N R22 1.FCV626 RHR NXS BYPASS !$0L.
VALVE, A0V 0F03 DF01 2DA12 R21 DJ02 DJ03 C801 CS02 1J82A R16 1 CY2015 ATM, STM DUMP VALVE (1=KX1B), A0 DM03 DMC2 C.
DM01 CR02 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
" " I"3 PACE 10 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
PolNT BEACN NUCLEAR PLANT l
FIRE HAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
E gipment.
E wipment...........
Description CR03 1J828 R16 1 tv2016 ATM, $TM DWP VALVE (1*NX1A), ADV DN03 DN04 DN05 DN06 C107 DK09 R01 OLC9 DLC8 DLC7 DLO4 DLC5 DLO4 CUQ1 CUC2 1N0001A 1NY 1 1 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM l
ENT XF03 R80 R814 R815 XLC2 XLO1 RC3 1N00024 1NT 1 1 N32 s0URCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT XF03 R60 RB14 R815 XLC2 XLot R03 1N2001A 1W 1 1 N32 SOURCE *RANCE INSTRUM ENT XF02 XF03 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
... -..... ~.
i i
08 MAR 1993 pagg jg 1
WISCONSIM ELECTRIC POWER CD.
j PCINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT
{.
FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUAT10NS REPORT SAFE $NUTOCWW CABLES
" FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- i Cable.....
Racewey...
EcpJlpment.
E pipeant...........
j Description
/
A80 Rate
~
R815 KLQ2 XLO1
'1 R03
/
f 1N3001A 1NR 1 1*N31 source t wCE INSTRtst ENT KF02 l
XFC3 R80 R814 RB15 9
i XLO2
)
XLC1
!O
~
tuA0040 R14 1 MOV4001 ATW REGULATION VALVE l
(1*P19), MOV I
DF05 f
DF06 j
DF07 i
0F08 j
1AJ06 j
2DA15
)
c5 I
DJ09 15005 1Nt0030 R13 1 MOV4000 AFW REQULATION VALVE (1 P29), MOV OK05 DKM DK07 DK04 DK09 DECT DN06 R34 Dm06 1$006 170511A A71 CV2839 CONTROL VALVE G01 C0 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
08 W im PACE 12 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWR CO.
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUAfl0NS REPORT SAFE SHUTDOWN CASLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
Recomey...
Epipment.
E wipment...........
Description OLING 1Y05 3 CUQ1 DLQ3 DLC2 R21 2DA12 DF01 R24 2327JC CK01 2 MOV1299 EXCESS LETDOWN CXQ3 Cx%
C205 Cx06 Cx07 C205 CD06 CDOS CD04 R53 2327JD CK01 2 MOV1299 EXCESS LETDOWN CXC3 CXM Cx05 CXO4 CXO7 CKOS C205 CD06 cc05 CDM 153 2327JE CK01 2 MOV1299 EXCESS LEfDOWN Cx03 Cx%
Cx05 CXO6 Cx07 CXO8 C205 CD06 ENCINEERING PLANNING AJtD MANAGEMENT, INC.
. _ - - ~
2t M PACE 11 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE MAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTOOWN CA8LES i
I
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318
- Cable.....
Rac ewey...
Ew!pment.
E pipment...........
Description (3 05 N
r A53 l
2A70C 2EWC3 2A52 70 0FF SITE 4KV BREAKER l
36 2EWOS 2EWO4 j
2EWQ7 uws l
- 2EWo, R39 2803PTA GS01 2 P11A CCWS Ptste 2803 5 2 831 480V MOTOR CONTROL C ENTER BUS j
2352 37A BREAKER 2e52 373 3REAKER 2852 38C MCC 2831 BREAKER 2052 40C SUS TIE BREAKER 533 480V MOTOR CONTROL C ENTER BUS 2EWC8 2 P10A RNA PUMP, MOTOR DRIV EN 2EWC9 2 P2A CMARGING PtBIP, Pos!T IVE DISPLACEMENT R38 P32F SW PtMP 2004PTA GT01 2 P118 CCWS PLMP CTC2 2 P2C CWARGING PtstP, P081T IVE O!$ PLACEMENT l
2852 40C SUS TIE BREAKER P32D sW Ptsap P340 AUX. FEED PtBIP (NOTO E DRIVEN)
GT03 2 P100 RNA PLSIP, MOTOR DRIV EN GT04 P32E SW PWMP 2904 5 2EK02 2EK:*
D S;i.
0$03 CS02 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
l 1
~.
08 MAR 1993 PAGE 14 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC PCWER CO.
POINT SEACH NUCLEAR PLANT F!kt NAZARDS EVALUAT!0NS REPORT SAFE $NUTOCWN CABLES a
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
E@lpment.
E gipsent...........
Description 0$01 R37 214268 2JB R 2 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR MSMITTER YA01 2 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR MSMITTER 2AR 1 YNOS YN04 2R110 2142ec 2R110 2 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR MSMITTER KR09 2 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR ANSMITTER KRio KR11 0 12 KR13 KRio KR15 YLC2 YLot TECS YK06 R60 2!4273 2JB W 2 LT427 PRES $URIZEE LEVEL TR ANSMITTER TC01 2AW 1 TN05 YN04 2R110 21427C 2R110 2 LT427 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR MSMITTER KR09 KRio KR11 KR12 KR13 0 14 ENGINEERING PLANNING MD MANAGEMENT, INC.
l 08 MAR 1993 PACE 15 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CD.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTD014 CABLES
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318
- Cable.....
Racewey...
Ewipesnt.
E gipment...........
Description ER15 YLO2 YLO1 YK05 YK06 R60 2!429H 2R110 2 PCv430 PRESSURIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,A0V TSO4 Y803 YS02 YS01 I
YR02 l
YRQ1 l
YG07 l
YQ06 l
YG05 l
YQO4 l
YQO3 YQQ2 Y001 992 l
21430E 2R110 2 PCV430 PRESSURIZER POWER OP l
ER. RELIEF VALVE,ADV l
YSO4 YS03 YSO2 7801 I
YR02 YR01 l
Y007 Yo06 7005 7004 Y003 7002 Y001 R92 214313 2R110 2 PCv431 PRES $URIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE, AO
(
V ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
{
__m
.m.._
l
" " l"I PACE 16 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CD.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2AA08 EVALUATIONS REPORT 1
SAFE $NUTDQWN CABLES
" FOR FIRE ZONE 31B
- l Cable.....
Raceway...
E wipment.
E pipment...........
Description YSO4 Ys03 YS02 YS01 Yt02 YR01 Y007 YG06 YQ05 YQ04 Y003 YQO2 YG01 R92 21449F 22110 2 PCV431 PRESSURIZER POWER OP j
ER. RELIEF VALVE, A0 V
Ys04 YS03 YS02 YS01 YA02 YROI YCOT YQ06 YC05 YQC4 7003 YG02 Y001 A92 21468N R47 2*CY2016 ATM, STM, OlMP VALVI (2 NX1A), ADV YLM YLOS YLO4 D13 0 12 KR11 KR10 KR09 i
KA08 EN0!NEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
k 08 W i m PACE 17 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POE R CO.
i Po!NT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMUTOUWN CABLES i
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318'**
i l
Cable.....
Raceway...
E gipment.
E gipment...........
)
Description t
l YN05
(
2AR 1 YA01 YA02 YA03 2T448 21499 2J8 W 2*PT449
'A8 BREAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
YC01 2AW 1 YN05 YH04 YH03 2A107 21469C 2R107 2 PT469 8A8 SREAM GEN. PRESS 3
URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
YM03 YH02 YM01 YLOS R49 21478M R47 2 CY2015 ATM, STM, DUMP VALVE (2 HX15), ADV i
.06 YLO5 YM01 YH02 YF07 7
YF04 YF09 YF10 2AS 1 TE01 YE02 YE03 YG01 YG02 YG03 YG 1 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
~ _.
08 MAR I M j
PAGE 18 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
PolNT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CABLES
- FORh! REZONE 318***
Cable.....
Racewey...
Equipment.
ESiipment...........
Description 214838 2J8 R 2 PT483 8B' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANIMITTER(W.R.
)
YA01 2 PT483 858 STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRMSMITTER(W.R.
)
2AR 1 YH05 YH04 YF09 YF08 YF07 YF06 YF05 2R127 21483C 2R127 2 PT483
'88 STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRMSMITTER(W.R.
)
YF05 2 PT483 858 STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
YF06 YF07 YH02 YN01 YLOS YLO6 R t.7 214837 2Js R 2 PT483 83' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRMSMITTER(W.R.
)
YA01 2 PT483 85' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
YA02 2AR 2 YSO4 YS03 T502 YS01 YR02 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND 8MMAGEMENT, INC.
08 MAR iM3 PAGE 19 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
POINT SEACN NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CASLES
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
E@lpment.
Equi pment...........
Description TRO1 Y004 CCOS R5)
II483G 2R127 2 PT483
's' STEAN GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
YF05 2 PT483
'O' STEAN GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
YF06 TF07 YF08 YF09 i
YF10 2RQ8A 2J105A R60 2 %296 ISCLAT10N/ RELIEF DTC2 DT01 1AJ13 1AJ14 1AJ15A 1AJ158 1AJ15C 1AJ150 CS01 C802 CS03 2J11A R28 CY2838 CONTROL VALVE G02 CO OLING J02 CF 1 0$01 0502 0$03 0$04 2EK01 2EEC2 2J110 R28 CV2838 CATROL VALVE G02 CO CLINTs ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MAXAGEMENT, INC.
O
~
08 MAR 1993 PAGE 20 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CASLES
- FOR f!RE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
E @lpment.
E gipment...........
Description CF02 CF 3 CC02 CC03 CC04 CC05 CC06 YG05 YQ04 YQO3 Y002 YQO1 R93 2J11E R93 cv2838 CONTROL VALVE CO2 C0 OLING YQQ1 YQO2 Y003 Y004 7Q05 Y006 YG07 j
A95 1
2J37L R27 2 NCV625 RHR MX FLOW CONTROL VALVE, ADV Cx01 CX02 C101 2J37M R26 2*NCV625 RNR XX FLOW CONTROL VALVE, AQV C701 CF02 CF03 CC03 2J37N R26 2 NCV625 RNR XX FLOW CONTROL VALVE, ADV CF01 CF02 CF03 CC03 ENGlWEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
I PACE 21 f
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
PotNT BEACN NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE MAZARDS EVALUAT!QNS REPORT SAFE SIRJT00hRI CABLES i
l
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
l 1
i' Cable.....
Recewey...
Egalpment.
EgJi pment...........
Description f
l 3
i 2J34G R24 2 NCV624 RNR 10( FLOW CONTROL.
VALVE, ADY CF01 CF02-CF03 l
M2 a
l 2J38N R24 2 FCV626 RNR NXS SYPASS ISCLA T10N VALVE, ADV j
CF01
}
CF02 f
C703 i
2J82A R47 2 CV2015 ATM, STM, InsIP VALVE (2 NX18), A0V
}.
CD03
- f CDC2
!\\
CD01 S
CC03 1
2J828 R47 2 CV2016 ATW, STM, D W VALVE (2 NX1A), A0V CDC3 CCO2 Ccci CC03 i
2N0001A 2NY 1 2 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRW i
ENT YF02 YF03 f
YF04 YF05 j
YN02 j
TN01 YLO4 YLO3 YLO2 I
YL01 R59 i
j ENGINEERING PLANNING Am MANAGEMENT, INC.
i
G8 ut 1993 pagg g W!sCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT F!RE NA2ARD$ EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CASLES
- FOR' FIRE ZONE 318
- Cable.....
Raceway...
EgJf; ment.
Ecpalpment...........
Descrlption 2N0002A 2NY*1 2 N32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT YF02 YF03 YF04 YF05 YF06 YF07 YM02 YN01 YLO4 YLC3 YLO2 YLQ1 R59 2N2001A 2NV 1 2 W32 SOURCE RANOE INSTRUM ENT YF03 YF04 YF05 7706 YF07 YMC2 YH01 YLO4 YLC3 YLO2 YLC1 R$9 2N3001A 2NR 1 2 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT YF03 YF04 YF05 YF06 YF07 YM02 YH01 YLO4 YLQ3 YLC2 YLO1 ENGINEERING PLONING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
1
)
l 08 MAA 1993 PAGE 23 l
W!$CENat!N ELECTRIC PetAt CO.
1 POINT BEACM IRJCLEAR PLANT FIRE IIAZAast EVALUATION $ REPORT j
SAFE SWTOOWN CASLES i
- tFOR Fitt 2011E 318***
I l
l Cable.....
Recousy...
Estpment.
E pigment...........
Description l
I M9 i
2MA0040 152 2-MOV4001 AFV REEAATING VALVE I
(2 P29), NOV i
aa5 i
CWO6 j
i CWor CWO4 I
23006 2NS0030 2$005 2 leDV4000 AFW REQULATING VALVE (2 P29),leDV I
CC06 CC05 l
CC04
)l CCO3 R49 4
!b 2Y0511A R73 CV2838 CONTROL VALVE G02 Co
)
l OLING i
2T05 5 a
A 1
CE01 i
CEC 2 R43 CD01 l
CHQ3 j
CH02
)
CN01 R26 j
i 01111A 011 5 1 A06 4.16KV sWGR sus 01112A 011 6 2 A06 4.16KV SWCA BUS 01119A 011 8 1 804 480V SWGA BU$
1BS2 21A BREAKER 1852 234 stEAsIt 1852 20C BAEAKER 01120A 011 10 P388 AWK. FEED PUMP (MDT0 i
R Ot!VEN) 2352 20s BREAs2R 2s52 29A BREAKER l
2 304 480V SWGA gut ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMNT, INC.
08 MAR IM3 PACE 24 W!$CONStu ELECTalc POWER Co.
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLM T FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CA8LES
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318***
Cette.....
R ac ewey...
Ecpipment.
Equipment...........
DeserIption 2352 27C 480V SREAKER D1213A 012 5 C75 12SV DC TRMsFER PM EL C78 125V DC TRMSFER PM EL D1309A D13 5 1 A05 4.16KV svCR sus 01310A D13 6 2 A05 4.16KV svCR Bus 01317A 013 7 P38A Aux. FEED PUMP (MoTo R DRIVEN) 1 B03 480V SWGR SUS 1852 10A BREAKER il52 12A BREAKER 1852 13A stEAKER 1852 11C BREAKER D1318A c13 9 2 303 480V suct sus 2B32 34A BREAXER 2352 36A BREAKIR 2352 37A BREAKER 2852 348 480V BREAKER D1413A 014 5 C79 125V DC TRMSFER PAN EL C79 125V DC TRMSFER PM EL D3102A CA02 H52 10 BREAKER N52 11 BREAKER 04102A CA02 N52 10 BREAKER N52 11 BREAKER 0 02 2A132138C CT01 1 LCV1128 RWIT ISOLAfl0N VALVE
, SUPPLY TO PtDF,MOV CTOS CT06 DK05 DK06 DK07 ENGINEERING PLMNING MD MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
08 MAR 1993 Pact 25 WISCON81M ELECTRIC PCWER CO.
POINT St.ACN WCLEAA PLANT FIRE M2ARDS EVA.uATIONS REPORT SAFE Sid/TDfd CASLES
- FOR FIRE 2ONE 318***
Cable.....
Recewey...
E@lpment.
E pipment...........
Deecription R09 ZA1321380 R09 1 LCV112s Rus. Is0LAT!Du VALW
, '.UPPLY TO PWF,MOV DK07 '
DK04 DK09 R03 DJ 1 RS2 2A1321FC Cfot 1 Mov85?s.
RNR INJECTION ISOL.
VALVE, MOV CTOS CT06 DK04 DK03 O.
DK02 R23 2A1321FD R23 1 Mov852A RNR INJECTION ISOL.
VALVE, MOV DJ02 DJ03 DJOA DJ05 DJ06 D J0' DJ' 8 F.08 aC07 1:06 R85 2A1323CC CT01 1 Mov851A CONTAINMENT SW W SUC TION CTOS CT06 DK04 DK03 DK02 DK01 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND IWulAGEMENT, INC.
4
" " #3 PACE 26 WISC1stSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PL4lli FIRI NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SitJTDOWel CABLES
- FOR FIRE 20stE 318 "
l Cable.....
ascoway...
Eg 1pment.
Equipment...........
Description ZA13237C Cf01 1 McV856A ANA IIOTOR QPERATED V ALVE CTO5 CT06 DK04 i
DK03 DK02 DK01 RU ZA1324JC CT01 1 MOV738A CCVS 70 RNA NX ISOL.
VALVE, IIOV CTOS CT06 DK05 R13
)
ZA1324MC CTQ1 1 MOV700 RNA/ACS BobJCAAT ISO L. VALVE, MOV CTOS CT06 DK05 413 ZA1320c a13 1 McV700 RNR/act 30uw0Aaf Is0 L. VALVE, NOV DJ05 DJ06 DJCT DJ08 DJo9 02 1 R82 ZA1325JC CT01 1 LCV112C VCT ISOLAT!0el YALVE, SUPPLY TO PWW, IIOV CTO5 CT06 DK05 DK06 DKOT R09 ZA1325JD a09 1 LCV112C VCT !$0LATIQli VALVE, ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
" " I"3 PAGE 27 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
POINT SEACM IRJCLEAR PLANT FitE MAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT d
.AFE..TD CAu.
- "FOR FIRE 20NE 318"*
Cable.....
Raceway...
ESilpment.
E W pmer.t...........
Description 1
SUPPLY TO PutP,le0V DK07 DK08 DK09 R03 DJ 1 RS2 l
l ZA1325JE CT01 1 LCV112C VCT ISOLATION VALVE, 1
SUPPLY TO PWIP, le0V CTOS CT06 i
DKQ5 DK06 DK07 R09 2A1A573 1ET04 1A52-57 0FF SITE 4KV BREAKER 1ETC5 1ET06 1ET07 1ET08 1ETQ9 1ET10 itTil I
DRot l
ZA1A57C 1ET04 1A32 57 0FF $1TE 4KV SREAKER 1ETQ5 l
1ET06 j
j 1ET07 1ET08 1ET09 1ET10 1ET11 i
l DROI c4 2A1A58A 1.x13 STATION SERVICE TRAN SFORMER l
2A1A588 1ET04 1A52 58 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
I (1 x133 sREAKER ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
q
_. ~. - -.-.~
08 MAA 1993 PAGE 28 WISCONSIN ELECit!C POWER CO.
POINT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPCdf SAFE SHIJTDOW CASLES
- FOR F!RE ZONE 318"*
Cable.....
Racewey...
Esp 1pment.
Espai sement...........
Description 1ET05 1ET06 1ET07 IETOS 1ET09 1ET10 1ET11 0R01 R34 ZA1A38C 1ET04 1A52 58 STA. SERV!CE TRANS.
(1-X13) SAEAKER 1ET05 1ET06 1ET07 1ET04 1ET09 1ETto 1ET11 1ET12 R30 ZA1A618 1ET04 1A52 61 Bus TIE GREAKIA 1ETC5 1ETC6 1ET07 1ETC8 1ET09 1ET10 1ET11 DR01 134 ZA1810AA 1 P11A CCVS PUMP, MOTOR Ot!
YEN ZA1810A8 0004 1852 10A BREAKER 1803 1 DJO9 DJ04 DJ07 DJ06 813 ENGINEtt!NG PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
1
- M #3 PACE 29 1
WISCONSIN ELECit!C PCWR CO.
POINT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT IO' Flat NAZARDS EVALtJATIONS t[PonT SAFE $NUTDCWW CABLES i
i
- Fon F!tt ZONE 318'**
i i
3 4
Cable.....
Recovey...
E@lpment.
8 @ipment...........
Description ZA1810AC 213 1852 10A stEAKER DJ05 1 P11A CCVS PWMP, NDTOR Dal i
WW l
DJ06 i
DJ07 DJ04 i
i DJO9 DJ=1 l
882 i
i 2A1810AE 1 P11A CCVS PWIP, NOTOR DRI j
YEN 2A1812A8 Ge%
1852 12A stEAKER i
1803 1 l
DJo9 l
DJ08
- i DJ07 l
DJ04 j
213 1
1 ZA1B12AC R13 1852 12A BREAKER DJC5 DJ06 j
DJ07 DJ08 XQ08 i
XQ07 A86 l
i ZA1813AA FP06 1 P2A CNARG1NG PW4P, PCS!T Ivt DISPLACEMENT LAtt13As FP%
1852 13A BREAKER 4
2A1813AC CS02 1852 13A BREAKIt CS01 DJ%
DJ05 DJ04 DJ07 4
i SM i
ZA1513AF FP06 il52 13A BREAKER J
ENGINEtt!NG PLANNING AND MANAGOIENT, INC.
i i
1
~
1 04 MAR 1993 PAcg jo WISCONSIM ELECit!C POWER CO.
4 i
Po!NT BEACM NUCLEAR PLMT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMUTDOWN CABLES j
" FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- 4 Cable.....
R ac eway...
E gipment.
E@ipment...........
4 Description i
2A18134A FP06 113138 283 CHARGING PUMP CROSST 375 II PMEL 153138 283 CMARGING MMP CROS$7 37B IE PMEL 283375 1B3 CMARGING PUMP CROS$7 j
138 IE PMEL 2A1813aB FPO4 1E*2 138 BREArER ZA18138C CS02 1852 13s BREAER CS01 l
DJM DJ05 DJ06 0207 A09 ZA18138F FPO4 1952 138 SREAGR i
i ZA1B14BA 1 832 480V MOTOR CONTROL C ENTER SUS 1853 148 SAFEGUARD MCC 1832 B REAE R 1
ZA1514BB CQO2 1*B32 480V MOTOR CONTROL C ENTER SUS 1852 148 SAFEGUARD MCC 1832 8 l
REAE R GC03 GCM l
1803 5 1
1ET06 1ET07 1ET08 1ETL1 1ET10 4
1ET11 DRQ1 4
}
E3' 2A1814C8 GCO2 1 B31 480V MOTOR CONTROL C 4
ENTER BUS 1852 14C MCC 1831 BREA n t
)
ENGINEERING PLMNING MD MANAGEMENT, INC.
s
i l
" " lE PACE 31 WISCO. SIN ELECTRIC PCWER Co.
1 (
POINT SEACN NUCLEAR PLANT
\\
fitt NAZAADS EVALUAT!QNS REPORT i
SAFE $NUTOOWN CABLES "7dtFIREZONE318***
l Cable.....
Racemey...
Ewipment.
E wipment...........
l Description G003 0004 1803 5 4
1ET06 3
1ET07 1ET04 j
1ET09 1ET10 l
1ET11 0401 R34 ZA1814CC 1852 14C MCC 1831 BREAKER ZA181688 1ET04 1852 168 STA. SERV!C) TAANS.
4 (1 X13) StEA.12 1ET05 a
1ET06
]
1ET07 1ET08 1ET09
)
1ET10 l
1ET11 ttT12 130 ZA18168C CC01 1852 168 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
j (1 X13) BAEAKER G 02 G003 0004 1803 5 1ET06 1ET07 1ET08 1ET09 1ET10
}
1ET11 j
1ET12 130 2A181680 1803A 1852 168 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(1*X13) BAEAKER E..,.EE.,.0. _,..
,.C.
4 04 MAR iM3 PAGE 32 W!$CONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
1 POINT SEACN NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMUTDOWN CABLES 9
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318"*
Cable.....
Raceway...
E @lpment.
E wipment...........
Description ZA1816CS GQO1 1BS2 16C SUS TIE BREAKIR Ge02 C003 C004 1803 5 iti11 1ET12 R30 ZA1816CC GQ01 1852 16C BUS T!E 8REAKER G002 G003 GC04 1503 7 ZA1816CD Goot 1852 16C BUS T!E BREAKER GCO2 GC03 GQ04 1503 7 ZA1J136A R09 1 PCV431 PRES $URIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,AQV DJ07 DJC6 DJ05 DJ04 CS0s CS02 KFC2 ZA1J1364 R09 1 PCV431 PRES $URIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,A0V DK07 DK06 DK09 R03 DJ 1 RM ZA1J1488 R09 1 CY200A LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V D207 DJC6 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
.____..m__
i 1
j 08 NAR 1M3 pAgg 33 WISCCNSIN ELECTRIC POWR CO.
+
I POINT BEACN NUCLEAA PLANT f
FIRE MA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT l
SAFE SMUTDOW CABLES s
1 "FOR FIRE 2ONE 318"*
I Cable.....
Racewey...
E @ fpeant.
E @lpment...........
Description i
j DJ05 i
DJM C801 C802 KF02 ZA1J148 R09 1 CY200A LETDOWN ORIF. SLOCK l
VALVE, ACV l
DJ07
)
DJ04 X004 j
E007 i
X006
{
R85 s
1 2A1J148F il03A1 1 Cv200A LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V
,x i
j ZA1J148G FP06 1 CV200A LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V l
ZA1J1499 R09 1 CV2006 LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK I
VALVE, A0V I
DJ07 l
DJ06 l
DJ05
]
DJ04 l
CS01 i
C502 KF02 1
ZA1J149C FP06 1 CV2000 LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK l
va n,A0V 2A1J1490 809 1 CV2005 LETDOWN ORIF. SLOCK va n,A0V DJ07 l
DJ04
)
X404 X007 l
XQ06 RSS fl\\
ZA1J149F 1803A1 1 CV2000 LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEM NT, INC.
1 1
i N
04 luA 1993 pagg 34 WISCON11N ELECTRIC POWER CO.
PCINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZAA05 EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNLITDOWN CAALES O
"*FOR FIRE ZONE 318*
1 Cable.....
Racewey...
Eglipment.
Equipment...........
Cescription VALVE, A0V ZA1J149G FP06 1 CV2006 LETDOWN QRIF. BLOCK VALVE, ADV j
ZA1J150s R09 1 CV200C LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V DJ07 0J06 DJ05 DJ04 C501 C102 KF02 ZA1J150C FP06 1 CV200C LETDOWN QRIF. BLOCK VALVE, ACV ZA1J1500 R09 1 CY200C LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V DJ07 DJ08 XQ08 XQ07 XQ06 R85 ZA1J150F 1803A1 1 CV200C LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V ZA1J150G FP06 1 CV200C LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V ZAINA004C R11 1 Mov4001 AFW REGJLATION VALVE (1 P29),it0V DC06 CK07 OK08 Ot09 135 DJo9 15005 O
ZAINA005C 18005 1 MOV2019 AN PUMP (1 P29) STE ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
m l
i i
i 08 MAR 1993 PAGE 35 3
VISCONSIN ELECTRIC POW R Co.
POINT BEACN NUCLEAR PLANT Fitt NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $44170014 CASLES
"*IQR FIRE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
E @lpment.
E@l pment...........
Description AM SUPPLY VALVE,le0V DJO9 DJ08 j
DJ07 DJ06 811 ZAINA0050 R11 1 se0V2019 AFW PtMP (1 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, le0V DJ06 DJ07 DJ08 DJ09 XQ05 1U*1 o
ZA1NA006C CUC2 1 CV2017 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES, PISTON CUQ1 DLM DLCS DLc4 DLOT DLCS DLO9 203 XQ08 X007 XQC6 R85 ZAINA0060 CUO2 1 Cv2018 MAIN STEAM ISCLATIDM VALVES, P!$ TON CUQ1 DLM DLOS DLO4 DLOT DLOS DLO9 R03 2008 X207 XQ06 EN0!NEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
s
~
08 MAR 1993 FAGE 34 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC F0WER CO.
4 Po!NT SEACM MUCLEAR PLANT l
FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATICWS REPORT SAFE SNUTDOWN CABLES 1
'"FOR FIRE ZONE 318*
Cable.....
Raceway...
E gipment.
E@l pment...........
Descriptlen R85 2A1NA012A R11 1 MOV2019 AFV PLSEP (1=P29) STE j
DLOS DLM s
)
M1
]
M2 1C1558 1C151A I
1 ZA1NA0128 R11 1 MOV2019 AFW PUMP (1 729) STE j
DJ06 i
DJ07 DJCS DJO9 j
2005 I
YU 1 2AINA012C R11 1 MOV2019 AFW PUMP (1 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, MOV DJM DJ07 1
DJ08 j
DJO9 X:05 YU 1 ZA1NA012E R11 1 MOV2019 AFV PtMP (1 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, MOV DLOS DLM CUO1 CUC2 1C1558 1C155A ZA1NC0058 R11 1 CV4002 AFW PWIP RECIRCULATI CN (1 P29), Acv DLM DLOS DLM CUQ1 ENGlWEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
r
i M MAR 1M pggg 37 i
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT SEACN NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2AR08 EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTD0lAl CASLES f,
" Fdt FIRE 20NE 318
- 1
{
Cable.....
Raceway...
Equipment.
Egal pment...........
l Description l
M2 l
CU 2 1
1 2A1NC005C R11 1 Cv4002 AFW P W RECIRCULATI CN (1*P29), ADW OLM OLOS j
l DLM j
M1 i
CUC2 CU 2 2A1NC0050 til 1 Cv4002 AFW Ptse RECIRCULA:
)
ON (1.r;;3, Aoy i
DLO4 I
DLC5 DLO4 V
CuC1 CUQ2
)
CU 2
)
)
ZA1NC005E R11 1 CV4002 AFW..MP RECIR..LATI
{
ON (1 P29), A0v i
DLO6 DLD5 DLC4 li CUC1 CUQ2 l
FJ 1 FJ04 120208 l
2A1NC005F R11 1 Cv4002 AFW PUMP RECIRCULATI ON (1 P29), ADV 1
DLO4 f
OLOS DLO4 CUQ1 M2 FJ 1 l
FJ04-i j
ZAD1109A 011 5 1 A05 4.16KV SWGR BU$
j 1 A05 4.16cv SWGR Sus ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
6
i 04 MAA 1993 PACE 38 WISCONSIN ELECit!C POWER Co.
PolNT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT Flat NAZAADS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMUT 00WW CABLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- Cable.....
Racewey...
Egalpment.
E eJ I phent...........
Description ZAD1117A 011 7 1 803 440Y swat SUS 1832 10A SAEAKIt 1852 12A BREAKER j
"P32 13A BREAKER I JLA AUX. FEED PLMP (MOTO 4 ORIVEN)'
1852 11C BAEArER ZAD1204A 2 CV4002 AFW P MP REC!tCULATI CN (2 829), ACY ZA01206A 012 7 1 MOV2019 AFW Pu e (1 P29) STE AM SUPP6Y VALVE, MOV ZA0121CA 012 9 1 M0Y4001 AFW REGULATION VALVE (1 P29), MOV i
ZAD1216A 012 11 1 CV4002 AFW PUMP REClfCULATI CN (1 P29), A0*
ZAD1219A 012 1 1 0701 STATIC INVERTER ZAD12198 1701 1 1 T01 120V AC BUS IJB1782 1T01 2 ZAD1701A 017 1 1 CV2017 MAIN STEAM ISOLAT!0N VALVES, PISTON 1 CYi 's NAIN STEAM ISOLAT!DN VALVES, PISTON DLQ7 1 CV2:15 ATM, STM Ot.MP VALVE (1 Nx18), ADV 1 CY2016 ATM, STM OtMP VALVE (1 NX1A), A0V OLO6 OLO3 OLO4 DLQ3 OLC2 CUO1 CUO2 ZAD1705A RTO 1 MOV2019 AFW P.mp (1 P29) STE ENGINEERING PLAMMING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
- _ _. _ ~
1 08 MAR 1993 pAgg 39 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CC.
O POINT $1ACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CA8LES
- h0RFIRE20NE318***
Cebte.....
Recewey...
E gipment.
Egi pment...........
Description AM SUPPLY VALVE, NOV D171 DLO7 DLO6 DLOS R13 ZAD1707A R70 1 CV200A LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0Y i
1 CV2008 LETDOWN ORIF. SLOCK VALVE, ADV 1 Cv200C LETOCWN OR!F. BLOCK VALVE, ADV 1 PCV431 PREtsuRIZER PCWER OP ER. RELIEF YALVE,A0V 1 V296 ISOLATION / RELIEF VAL 017 1 DLO7 A09 281421FC CQO3 1 MOV8528 RNR INJECTION ISCL.
VALVE, NOV C002 CC01 R24 281421FD R24 1 MOV8528 RNR INJECTION ISOL.
VALVE, MOV CRh D'401 0602 Dm03 DM04 DN05 XP01 XP02 X001 X002 XQQ3 R54 251423CC Cc03 1 MOV8518 CONTAIMMENT SLMP SUC T10N ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
i 08 MAR 1993 PACE 40 WISCONSIM ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT SEACM HUCLEAR PLANT j
FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SHUTDOWN CA8LES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- Cable.....
Racewer...
E@f pnent.
Ew1pment...........
l Description CQQ2 l
C001 R24 l
2B1423FC C003 1 sev8568 RMR MOTOR OPERATED V ALVE
{
C002 CQO1
)
R24 i
181424JC CS03 1 MOV7388 CCWS TO RHR NX ISOL.
I VALVE, NOV CQO2 C001 CN01 DN02 CNO3 314 4
2B1424MC C003 1 MOV701 RHR/RCS BOUNDARY 180 L. VALVE, NOV i
C002 CQQ1 DN01 1
DN02 DNO3 R14 1
ZB1428FC CR03 1 MOV4006 SVS BACI:UP WATER SUP l
PLY 70 (1 P29), NOV CR02 CR01 DM01 DM02 DM03 Rio Z81A638 1EM02 1A52 63 0FF SITE 4EV BREAKER 1EMO*
Dv04 Dv03 Dv02 Dv01 DH01 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
08 MAR 1993 PAGE 41 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
g POINT BEACN NUCLEAR PLANT
)
FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT d
SAFE $NUTDOW CABLES
- 10R FIRE 20NE 318 "
Cable.....
Racewey...
E gipment.
E@fpment...........
Description R33 281A&3E 1EM02 1A52 63 0FF BITE 4KV BREAKER 1EM01-DV04 DV03 DV02 Dvol DM01 R33 Z81A64A 1 X14 STATION SERVICE TRAN 8FORMER 2B1A448 1EMC2 1A32-64 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(1 X14) BREAKER A
1EM01 DV04 DV03 DV02 Dv01 DN01 R33 2B1A64C 1EM32 1A52 64 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(1 X14) BREAKER 1EM01 Dv04 DV03 DV02 DV01 R31 25151758 1EM02 1852 17B STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(1 X14) BREAKER 1EM01 DV04 DV03 DW'd Dv01 R31 281817BC 1804A 1852 17B STA. SERVICE TRANS.
\\
(1 X14) BREAKER ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
l WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
Po!NT BEACM NUCLEAA PLANT FIRE NAZAADS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE BNUTDOWN CASLES i
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318 =
1 Cable.....
Raceway...
E wlpment.
E wipment...........
Description 1
0 GRO1 GR02 l
GR03 EM 1B04 5 1EM02 i
1EM01 Dv04 DV03 l
DV02 DV01 R31 1
ZS181750 GR04 1852 17B STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(1 R14) BREAKER 1804A j
2B1817BE GRO1 1852 17B STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(1 X14) BREAKER GR02 GR03 GR04 1504 5 1EM02 1EM01 DV04 DV03 DV02 DV01 R31 Z81820AM CNO3 1852 20A BREAKER CN02 DP01 DP02 DP03 DPO4 R08 Z81820AJ 1P2C 5 1-P2C CMARGING PUMP, Pos!T IVE DISPLACEMENT ZB1BiCAK 1P2C-5 1852 20A BREAKER ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
4 -._.... _
l 08 W 1M3 pagg 43 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUAT!0NS REPORT SAFE $NUTD04f CABLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- J E W peent.
E pipment...........
l Cable.....
Racewey...
l Description Zs1820AL 1P2C 5 1852 20A taEAKER l
281820AM CNO3 1852 20A BREAKER CN02 0P01 DP02 1
DP03 DPO4 ROS l
281821A8 GR03 1852 21A BREAKER GR02 GRO1 1804 1 DN02 DM03 l
R14 l
Zs1821AC R14 1852 21A BREAKER DM03 DN04 DM05 XP01 XPU2 x001 j
RM ZB1821AD R24 1852 21A BREAKER C001 CN01 DN02 DNO3 R14 251821AE CNO3 1 P10s RHR PtmP, MOTOR ORIV EN Z81B21AG CNO3 1 P100 RNR PWIP, MD10R DRIV EN Zs18235A 1 P115 CCWs PUMP, MOTOR DRI VEN 2B152388 GRC3 1B52 238 BREAKER ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MAXAGEMENT, INC.
-s
-_-.4.'
,,_A_a.
Am ss.,.a
,.-4 a_a_.m.m.
4s..:
4 A.
.r-
-4..-
e 4
1 PACE 44 4
ld!SCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
l PCINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVA.UATIONS REPORT SAFE SIRJTDOW CABLES
)
"FdAFIREZONE318***
j i
l Cable.....
Racewey...
E @lpment.
E@lpeont...........
Description 1
GR02 l
GR01 1804 1 LN02 DNO3 i
1 R16 2818238C R16 1 P118 CCWS PUMP, MOTOR ORI VEN l
DNc3 l
MM DMOS I
XP01 XPC2 Z8182380 R22 1852 238 BREAKER DN01 DW02 DNO3 l
R16 281823BE 1 P118 CCVS PUMP, MOTOR ORI v!N i
281823CA 1 842 430V Motot CONTROL C 3
j ENTER BUS j
1852 23C SAFEGUARD MCC 1842 8 REAKER i
Z81823CB GR04 1 542 480V MOTOR CONTROL C ENTER BUS 1
1852 23C SAFEGUARD MCC 1842 B REAKER j
1804 6 l
1EMC2 1EM01 DV04 I
DYO3 j
DVQ2 Dv01 2
DH01 R33 Z81J135A R10 1 PCY430 PRESSURIZER POWER OP ENGlWEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
9 i
i
G MARIM3 PAGE 45 WISCON11N ELECTRIC POWER CO.
1 Po!NT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZMtDS EVALUAT!0NS REPORT SAFE SNLJTDOWN CASLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- Cable.....
Racewey...
Etquipment.
E pipasnt...........
Description ER. RELIEF VALVE A0V Dm04 Dm03 DN02 s
DM01 CR02 CR03 Zs1J1358 Rio 1 PCV430 PRESSURIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,ACY DM05 XP01 XP02 ZSINB003C 1$0%
1 MOV4000 AFW REGULATION VALvt (1 P29}, NOV 4
Dm06 DM05 g
DN04 DM03 R14 281N8004C R14 1 MOV2020 AFW PtmP (1 P29) STE AM SUPPLT VALVE, NOV DM03 DM04 DM05 DM06 15006 Z81NB0040 R14 1 MOV2020 AFW PLMP (1 P29) STE AM SUPPLT VALVE, MOV DM03 DN04 DN05 DMM x004 X003 TU 2 ZB1N8005C CR03 1 CV2017 MAIN STEAM ISCLATION VALVES, PISTON CR02 DM01 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLMT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATl0NS REPORT.
SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE 2ONE 318***
Cable.....
Racewey...
E@lpment.
E@ipment...........
Description DM02 DM03 DM04 DMC5 XP01 X001 XQC2 AS4 Z81NB005D CR03 1 CV2018 MAIN STEAM ISOLAT!0N VALVES, PISTON CR02 DM01 DM02 DM33 DM04 DM05 XPCI XQO1 XC02 R84 Z81NB012A R14 1 Mov2020 AFW PUMP (1 P29) STE AM $UPPLY VALVE, MOV DNO3 DWO2 DNC1 CCO2 cc03 1C161A 281NB0128 R14 1 MOV2020
.AFW PWIP (1 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, MOV DM03 DM04 DM05 DM06 XQ04 X003 YU 2 ZB1NB012C R14 1-MOV2020 AFW PUMP (1 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, MOV DM03 I
ENGINEERINC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
l l
I i
i 08 MAR M 3 past 47 WISCON81N ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTDOWI CABLES
- FtNt FIRE ZONE 318" Cable.....
Raceway...
E gipunent.
E gipment...........
i Description i
DM04 MM I
DM06 l
Mo04 2003 TU 2 l
281Nt012E R14 1 MOV2020 AFW PtsIP (1 P29) STE j
M SUPPLY VALVE, NOV DNO3 i
DN02 DN01 1
CQQ2
{
CQQ3 1
1C164A 1C165A
)
2001311A 013 5 1 A06 4.16KV sWCR sus 1 A06 4.16KV SWCR Bus 2801319A 013 8 1 B04 480V SWCR BUS i
1852 21A BREAKER 1852 238 BREAKER 1 B04 480V sWCR sus 1852 20C BREAKER f
2801406A 2 le0V2020 ATW PUMP (2 P29) STE M SUPPLY VALVE, NOV 2301408A 014 7 1 le0V2020 AFW PtmP (1 P29) STE M SUPPLY VALVE, MOV 2501412A 014 9 1 MOV4000 AFWRE0VLATICINVALVE (1 P29), MOV 2801419A 014 1 1 0f02 STATIC INVERTER 23014195 1T02 1 1 702 120V AC SUS 1702 2 2801905A 019 1 1 leW2020 AFW PtstP (1 P29) STE M SUPPLY VALVE, MOV O
D19 4 DP06 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
08 MAa 1993 PAGE 43 WISCONSIN ELECTt!C POWER C0.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR F!tt ZONE 31B***
Cable.....
Recovey...
Egalpment.
EspJ i pment...........
Description DPOS DPO4 DP03 R14 2801907A 019 1 1 PCV430 PRESSURIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,ADV D19 4 DP06 DP05 DPO4 R10 2B02102A 021 1 1 CV2015 ATM, STM CtMP VALVE (1 HX15), ADV 1 CY2016 ATM, STM CtmP VALVE (1 Nx1A), ADV D21 5 1 CV2017 MAIN STEAM ISOLAT!0N VALVES, PISTON 1 CV2018 MIN STEAM ISCLATION VALVEn, PISTON DP06 R36 DM06 DM05 DM04 DM03 DM02 DM01 CA02 CR03 ZC23210JC CK01 2 LCV1128 RWST ISOLAT10N VALVE
, SUPPLY TO PtBF,MOV CK03 Cx04 cx05 Cx06 RS6 2C23210J0 a92 2 LCV1123 avsf ISCLATION VALVE
, SUPPLY TO PtmP,MOV TPQ2 iP01 ENQ!NEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMCNT, INC.
e
08 MAa 1993 PAGE 49 WISCON8!N ELECTilC POWS Co.
POINT SEACN NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE MAZAADS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CABLES l
- POR FIRE ZONE 318 *
{
Cable.....
Racewey...
E gipment.
E@tpuent.
l Deserfptis CWCT l
Cvo6 RS6 i
l 2C2321FC CJ01 2 MOV852A sua INJECT..= 100LAT l
ION VALVE, MOV CWC2 i
CWC1 R27 2C2321FD R27 2 Mov852A ANa INJECTION 880LAT f
ION VALVE,800V l
M1 CWC2
)
M3 l
ce
]
CWQ5 C*
j M7 YP01 YPC2 YG02 R93 2C2323CC CJ01 2 Mov851A CONTAIMMENT SW4P CWC2 CWO1 R27 ZC2323FC CJ01 2 Mov856A RME MOTOR OPERATED V ALVL M2 CWOI R27 2C2324JC CJ01 2 McVT38A CCVS TO RNR NX ISOLA fl0N VALVE, NOV CWO3 CWO4 CWOS RS2 ZC2324mc CJ01 2 MOV700 RNR/RC$ BOUNDARY 180 LATION VALVE,MOV ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
y
- # #3 PACE 50 i
WISCON$1N ELECTRIC POW R CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT 4
i SAFE SNUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318 =
l Cable.....
Recewey...
Espalpment.
Espal pment...........
Descrlption M3 CWO4 4
l CWQ5 R52 l
2C232480 RS2 2 MOV700 RNR/RCS SOUNDART !$0 3
LATION VAtVE,MOV M5 4
cv06 Cvo7 YP01 2
YP02 R92 2C2325JC CKQ1 2 LCV112C VCT ISOLATION VALVE, SUPPLY TO PtMP, MOV Cx03 4
Cx04 Cx05 tx06 R56 j
2C2325JD R$6 2 LCV112C VCT ISCLATION VALVE, SUPPLY TO PG4P, MOV j
CWO7 YP01 YP02 YP03 R92 s
2C2325JE CK01 2 LCV112C VCT !$0LATION VALvt, SUPPLY 70 PW4P, NOV j
CXO3 QM i
CX05 Cx06 R56
]
2C2A728 2EWO3 2A52 72 Bus TIE BREAKIR '
21Wx 2EWQ5 2EWO4 2EWO7 2EWO8 ENG'WEER!NC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
4
- ~ - _..-
N i
08 m W PAGE $1 WISCON$1N ELECTRIC Pol 4R CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE M2ARDS EVALUATION $ REPORT EAFE $NUTDOWN CASLES I
- FdR FIRE 20NE 318
- i Cable.....
Racemey...
E@lpment.
E gipment...........
Description l
2EWO9
(
R42 1
2C2A75A 2 X13 STATION SERVICE TRAN 5FORMER 2C2A755 2EWO3 2A52 75 BTA. SERVICE TRANS.
(2 X13) BREAKER 2EWO4 2EWO5 2EWO6 2EWQ7 2EWO8 2EWO9 R38 2C2A75C 2EWC3 2A52 75 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(
(2 X13) BREAKER 2EWO4 UA5 2EWO6 2EWC7 HW8 l
2EWO9 R38 2C2A768 2EWO3 2A52 76 0FF s!TE 4rV BREAKER 2EWO4 2EWO5 2EWO6 2EWO7 2EWO4 2EWO9 Ru 2C2A76C 2EWO3 2A32 76 0FF BITE 4tV BREAKER 2EWO4 2EWQ5 2EWO4 2EWQ7 2EWOS 2EWO9 R38 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND NANAGENFMT, INC.
t a
1 08 MAR 1993 PACE 52 W18 CON 8tN ELECTRIC PotAR CO.
4 Po!NT BEACM buCLEAR PLANT I
FIRE NAZARDS EVAltlATION$ REPORT SAFE SIRJT00nm CASLES l
- F0Et FIRE 20NE 318***
4 r
I Cable.....
Racewey...
E @fpment.
E gipment...........
i Description h
2C2334AA 2 P11A CCWS MMP 2C2834A8 2 P11A CCWS MMP 1
1 2C2834AC Gs04 2852 34A BREAKER i
CS03 2803 3 CWC8 CWO7 CWO6 M5 R52 j
2C2834AD R$2 2852 34A BREAKER CWO5 CWO4 i
CWO7 TP01 i
YP02 R92 i
j 2C2834AE R52 2852 34A BREAKER i
Cx05 Cx04 j
CXO3 f
CXO2 Cx01 l
R27 2C2836As CS03 2352 34A BREAKER C302 2803 4 CWOT CWO6 CWOS I
R52
]
i i
2C2836AC R52 2052 36A BREAKER k
M5 cwa CWOT YP01 YP02 YQQ1 l
1 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
\\
08 NAR IM3 PAGE $3 WISCONSIM ELECTRIC Pol 4R CO.
POINT SEACM MUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMUTDQbal CABLES
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318
- Cable.....
Asceway...
Egipment.
Egi pment...........
Oescription Y002 R94 2C2836AD R27 2s52 36A BREAKER CX01 Cx02 CXQ3 Cx04 cx05 R$2 f
2C2837AN CK01 2352 37A BREAKER Cx03 Cx04 Cx05 Cx06 R56 2C2837AK 2352 37A BREAKER 2C2837M CK01 2852 37A 3REAKER Cx03 Cx04 Cx05 Cx04 R56 2C28375H CK01 2352 375 BREAKER Cx03 Cx04 Cx05 Cx06 R56 ZC2837BJ 183138 283 CHARGING PUMP CROSST 37B IE PANEL 233375 153 CNARGING Puer CRossi 138 IE PANEL 233375 153 CHARGING PUMP CRossi 138 If PANEL 2C28375K 2s52 373 BREAKER 2C28375L 2852 375 BREAKER ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
08 MA 1993 PACE 54 WISCCNSIN ELECTRIC PohER CO.
POINT SEACM IRJCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT i
SAFE SNUTDOWW CABLES
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318* "
Cable.....
Racewey...
E @lpment.
E pi m t...........
Description l
2C2837BM CK01 2352 375 BREAKER QM CXO4 i
CX05 CXO4
)
i R56 l
2C28388A 2 832 480V N0 TOR CONTROL C ENTER 2852 384 8AFEQUARD MCC 2832 8 I
REAKER l
{
l 2C283888 C102 2 532 480V N0 TOR CONTROL C ENTER 2352 388 SAFEGUARD MCC 2832 3 REAER 2803 6 j
2EWc8 j
2EV09 R42 2C2538CA FTC3 2 831 480V MOTOR CONTROL C l-ENTER SUS 2852 38C MCC 2831 BREAGR 2C2838CC Cs02 2-831 480v MOTOR CONTROL C I
ENTER BUS i
2852 34C MCC 2:31 BREAKER 2803 6 ZEWO4
.j 2EWO9 j
u8 2C254088 Clot 2852 404 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
4 (2 X13) sREAut 2803 5 2EWO8 2EWO9 R38 2C2840$C 2EWO3 2352 40s STA. SERVICE TRANs.
(2 X13) BREAKER 2EW04 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
i I
i l
l i
08 NAR 1 M PAGE 55 1
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
f Po!NT BEACM NUCLEAA PLANT f(
FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTD0bRl CASLES
- F5RFIRE20NE318*
i I
I i
Cabto.....
-Raceway...
E@lpeent.
E@lpment...........
Description
{
I j
i 2EWO5 MM 2EWO7 j
i 2EWO4 l
l 2EWO9 a
,i R38 f
2C284080 2803A 2352 408 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(2 X13) BREA E R 2C2840CB GS01 2352 40C sul TIE tREAG R j
t 2003 5
==
d 2EWO9 i
A42 I
2C2840CC 2803 7 2852 40C SUS TIE BREAGA 2
2C2840CD 2803 7 2352 40C sul TIE BREAG R 1
j 2C2J136A R56 2 PCV431 PRESSURIZER POWER OP l
ER. RELIEF VALVE, A0 V
I f
l j
Cx06 3
Cx05 CX04 9
a Cx03 CK01 l
2C2J1368 R56 2 PCV431 PREStuRIZER POWER OP i
ER. RELIEF VALVE, A0 V
I CWO7 CWO4 YP01 YP02 YP03
+
f 392 2C2J1446 RS6 2 Cv200A LETOOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, ADV Cx06 Cx05 CX04 j
ENCINEERING PLANNING Am NAMAGEMENT, INC.
j I
i i
l
4 d
08 MAR 1993 PAGE 56 W!$CONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT j
FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPati SAFE $NUTD014 CASLES
" FOf FIRE ZONE 318***
i Cable.....
R ac eway...
E gipment.
E pipeent...........
Oescription Cx03
{
CK01 2C2J144C Gs02 2 CY200A LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK i
a vE A0v 2
Clot
{
2803 2 j
M5 R50 Cx05 i
OM j
Cx03 j
CK01 i
i 2C2J1480 RS6 2 CV200A LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, ADV W
l 1
1 YP01 YP02 YP03 YC01 R93 ZC2J1487 2803B 2 CV200A LETDOWN ORIF. SLOCK VALVE, ADV ZC2J148G 2 CV200A LETDOWN OR F. BLOCK VALVE, A0V 2C2J1695 R56 2 CV2006 LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, ADV CXO6 Cx05 Cx04 l
Cx03 CK01 ZC2J149C CS02 2 CV2000 LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V GS01 j
2803 2 Cvo5 R50 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT. INC.
i i
l
08 NAR 1M3 pAgg $7 W18 CON 8tM ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTD0bal CA8LES
- Fttt FIRE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
Rac ewey...
E gipment.
E gipment...........
Description Cx05 CX06 Cx03 CK01 2C2J1490 RS6 2 CY2004 LETOOWN GRIF. SLOCK VALVE, ADV.
CWO7 YP01 YP02 TP03 7001 R93 j
2C2J149F 28038 2 CV2005 LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, ADV
(
2C2J149G 2 CY2000 LETOOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V 2C2J150s RS6 2 CV200C LETDOWN ORIF. SLOCK VALVE, ACV Cx06 CXC5 Cx04 cx03 CK01 ZC2J150C C102 2 CV200C LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V GS01 2803 2 CWOS R50 Cx05 Cx04 cx03 CK01 2C2J1500 R56 2 CV200C LETOOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, ADV CWO6 CWOT YP01 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
08 ut 1993 Pact 58 WISCONt!N ELECTRIC POWER CO.
PolNT SEACH NUCLEAA PLMT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS AEPORT SAFE SElTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
Ecpalpment.
Ecpal pment...........
Description YP02 TP03 Y001 A93
)
2C2J150F 28038 2 CV200C LETDOWN ORIF. SLOCC VALVE, ACV
)
2C2J150G 2 CY200C LETDOWN ORIF. SLOCK VALVE, ACV j
2C2uA004C R$2 2 M0Y4001 AFW REGULATING VALVE (2 P29), MOV CWO5 CWC6 CWOT CWC8 2$006 ZC2MA005C 2$006 2 MOV2019 AFW PtMP (2 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, MOV CWC8 CV07 CWO6 CWC5 R52 2C2kA0050 R52 2 M0Y2019 AFW PUMP (2 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, MOV CX05 CXO6 CXQ7 CX08 R40 CV08 Y004 7003 70 1 2C2NA006C R93 2 CV2017 MAIN STEAM !$0LAT'!ON VALVE, PISTON 7001 YP02 YP01 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
I C4 MAR 1993 Pact 59 i
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
PCINT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT 1 >
f SAFE ONUT00hRI CABLES
" FOR FIRE 20NE 318***
j Cable.....
Receway...
E w1pment.
Ewi mment...........
Description RM CYo8 l
CiC7 l
}
CT04 i
un I
CLC1 2C2NA0060 R93 2 CV2018 MAlu STEAM !$0LAT10N i
VALVE, PISTON j
YG01
)
YPC2 E
TP01
{
R62 i
CTO8 1
CYO7 l
CYO4 CYC5 l
CYO4 CYC3 CLO1 2C2NA012A R52 2 Mov2019 AFW PUMP (2 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, NOV CWO5 CWO4 CWO3 CJ01 CJ 1 XWO4 2RPW 7 2C2NA012C R52 2 MOV2019 AFW PUMP (2 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, MOV CWOS CWO6 CWO7 CWO8 Y004 T003 Yo 1 2C2NA012D R$2 2 MOV2019 AFW PLMP (2 P29) STE ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
PACE 60 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POW R Co.
PCINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT
}
FIRE MAZARDS EVALUAT!0NS REPORT SAFE SMUTDOWN CASLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
R acewey'...
Epipment.
1 E W pment..........,
Description AM SUPPLY VALW, le0V CVOS CWO6 CWOT CWO4 i
Y004 7003 Yo 1 Y002 2C2NC0058 RS2 2 CV4002 AFW PW4P RECIRCULATI ON (2 P29), ADV
)
CWOS CWO4 CWQ3 CJ01 O
2C2NC005C R52 2 CV4002 AFW PUMP RECIRCULATI ON (2 P29), ADV CWQ5 CV04 CV03 l
CJ01 2C2NC0050 R52 2 CV4002 AFW PUNP REclRCULAfl ON (2 P29), A0V CWO5 i
CWQ3 CJ01 2C2NC005E R52 2 Cv4002 AFW PUMP RECIRtalLATI l
I ON (2 P29), ADV CxCS Cx04 cx03 CK01 FTQ3 t
f 2C2NC005F R52 2 CV4002 AFW PtMP RECIRCULATI CN (2 P29), A0V 3 05 l
Cx04 Cx03 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
08 NAR 1M3 PAGE 61 WISCCN81N ELECTRIC POwR Co.
p POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318***
J Cable.....
Recomey...
Egipment.
Equipment...........
Description CK01 FT03 2CD1110A D11-6 2 A05 6.16KV SWGR sus 2 A05 6.16KV SWGR Bus 2CD1118A D11 9 2 803 680V BWGR tus 2852 34A SREAKER 2852 36A BREAKER ts52 37A BREAKER 2852 348 680V SREAKER 2CD1204A D12 8 2 NOV2019 APW PL89 (2 P29) STE AN SUPPLY VALVE, NOV 2CD1212A D12 10 2 NOV4001 AFW REOULATING VALVE (2 P29), NOV 2CD1220A 012 2 2 DYO1 STATIC INVERTER 2CD12208 2Y01 1 2 YO1 120V AC BUS 2Y01 2 2CD1710A RTO 2 CV200A LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V 2 CV2008 LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, A0V 2 CV200C LETDOWN ORIF. BLOCK VALVE, ACV 2 PCV431 PRESSURIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE, A0 V
2 V296 180LATION/ RELIEF D17 2 CYO4 R$6 2CD2201A D22 1 2 CV2015 ATM, STM, DLar VALVE (2 NX18), A0V -
2 CY2016 ATM, STN, DLar VALVE (2 NX1A), A0V 2 CV2017 NAIN STEAN ISCLAT!0N VALVE, PISTON 2 CV2018 MAIN STEAN ISOLATION ENGINEERING PLANNING AND ENAGEMNT, INC.
~
OS MAA 1993 Pact 62 WISCONSIM ELECTRIC POWEL CO.
PolWT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMUTDOWN CABLES "FOR FIRE ZONE 318"*
Cable.....
Raceway...
E pipment.
E gipment...........
Description i
VALVE, PISTON D22 5 CYO4 CYO7 CYO6 CY05 cv04 CYO3 CLO1 2D2421FC Cc03 2 MOV8528 RHR INJECTION ISOLAT ION VALVE, MOV CCO2 R28 202421FD R28 2 M0V8523 RHR INJECTION ISOLAT 10N VALVE, NOV CFC2 CC01 CCO2 CCC3 CC04 CC05 CC06 Yo05 Y006 YQ07 R95 2D2423CC CCC3 2 MOV8518 CONTAINMENT sump CC02 228 2D2423FC CCO3 2 MOV8564 RNA MOTOR OPERATED V ALVE CCO2 R28 2D2424JC CM03 2 MOV7388 CCvs 70 ana lot tsotA TION VALVE, MOV CE01 CEC 2 CE03 249 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
- _. -, =.
1 4
08 MAR 1993 PAGE 63 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE MAZARDS EVALUAfl0NS REPORT q
SAFE SNLITDOWN CABLES
- FbtFIRE20NE318***
i Cable.....
Raceway...
EcpJipment.
EcpJ!pment...........
Description 2024244ec CNO3 2 M0V701 RNR/RCS BOUNDARY ISO LATION VALVE, NW CE01 CEC 2 CE03 R49 2D2427NC CN03 2 M0V4006 SWS BACKUP WATER SUP PLY TO 2 P29, MOV CE01 CE02 CE03 R49 CEOS ZD2Aa9A 2 X14 STATION SERYlCE TRAN O
SFORMER ZD2A698 2EK02 2A52 69 STA. SERV!CE TRAks.
(2 X14) BREAKER 2EK01 DSO4 0503 0502 0$01 R39 ZD2A69C 2EK02 2A52 69 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(2 X14) BREAKER 2EK01 D504 0503 0502 0501 R37 ZD2A700 2EK02 2A52 70 CFF SITE 4KV BREAKER 2EK01 D504 D503 0502 D501 R39 ENGlWEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
08 MAR 1993 Pact 64 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 310
- Cable.....
Raceway...
E gipment.
E wfpment...........
DeserIptIon 202B2588 GT01 2852*258 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
(2 X14) BREAKER CTC2 GT03 GT04 2804 6 l
2EK02 j
2EK01 j
D504 DS03 0802 I
D801 G7 i
i ZD2823BC 2EK02 2352 258 3TA. SERVICE TRANS.
(2 X14) BREAKER 2EK01 3
l 0504 0503 D502
)
D501 l
07 202B2580 2852 258 STA. SERVICE TRANS.
I (2 X14) BREAKER t
{
2D2828AA Fvo7 2 P2C CHARGING PUMP, POSIT
]
IVE DISPLACEMENT l
CF03
)
CCO3 l
CC01 I
CCO2 i
CCC3 i
CC04 i
CC05 R55 1
l ZD2828A8 FYO7 2 P2C CMARG!NG PLar, POSif IVE DISPLACEMENT ZD2828AC CF03 2 P2C CMARGING PUMP, POSIT IVE DISPLACEMENT j
CF02 l
ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANA0EMENT, INC.
M
08 MAR i m PAGE 65 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
I PCINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE RAZARDS EVALUAT10NS REPORT SAFE SWTDOWN CASLES
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- Cable.....
Racewey...
E@lpeent.
E st;nent...........
Description CC01 CC02 CCO3 CC05 R55 ZD2328AF GT02 2 P2C CNARGING PUMP, PO$1T IVE O!$ PLACEMENT 2804 3 CC05 CC04 CC03 CCO2 CC01 CC03 CF03 FV07 ZD25288A 2 P115 CCVS PUMP 2D282848 2 P118 CCVS PUMP ZD2828sc GTC2 2852 28s BREArtR 2004 3 CC04 CC05 CC04 CCC3 R47 2028288D R47 2*P11B CCVS PUMP CC03 CC04 CC05 CC06 CC 1 2D2328st R47 2352 28s stEAnt CE03 M02 CE01 CH02 R28 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
04 m 1M3 PAGE 66 WISCON3IN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACN NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2AADS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NLJTDOW CA8LES
^
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
J i
Cable.....
Racevey...
Equipment.
E gipment...........
i Description 2
ZD2829AS GT02 2352 29A BREAKER
)
2304 3 CC05 CC04 CC03 l
i 1
ZD2829AC R49 2552*29A BREAKER CCO3 CC04 CC05
)
YQC8
]
YQ07 j
YQ06 R96 i
ZD2829AD R28 2352 29A BREAKER i
CHQ2 i
CE01 l
CEC 2 R43 i
l E2829AE FV07 2 P108 RHR PtMP, MOTOR DRIY Er i
ZD2829AG FYO7 2 P10s RNR PtMP, MOTOR DRIV EN ZD2032CA 2 842 480Y MOTOR CONTROL C I
ENTER Zs52 32C sAFEcwut0 MCC 2s42 s l
REAKER ZD2832Cs GT04 2 842 480V MOTOR CONTROL C I
ENTER 2352 32C SAFERIAAD MCC 2842 B REAKER 2304 5 4
2Et02 2EK01 l
DSO4 0503 DSC2 f
D501 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
i i
e
1 j
08 MAR M 3 PAGE 67 WISCON8tN ELECit!C POWER CO.
l POINT BEACM IRJCLEAR PLANT
(/
Fitt RA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE titlTOCWN CABLES
- FdtFIREZONE318*
I f
Cable.....
Recewey...
E@lpment.
Egipment...........
Description R37 l
32J135A E55 2 PCV430 PatssuRIZEt POWER OP i
ER. RELIEF VALVE,ADV i
MM CE04 I
I CE03 l
CEC 2
{
CE01 I
CNO3 ZD2J1355 R55 2 PCV430 PRESSURIZER POWER OP ER. kELIEF VALVE,A0V CC05 CC04 CC 1 E2Ns003C 25005 2 le0V4000 AFW REGLlLATING VALVE (2 P29),le0V CC04 CC05 CC04 CCO3 249 ZD2Ws004C 25005 2 MOV2020 AFW PVMP (2 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE,le0V CC06 CC05 CC04 CCO3 R49 2D2MB0040 R49 2 MOV2020 AFW PueP (2 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, MOV CC03 CCO2 CC01 CCO2 CG 4 2D2N8005C 295 2 Cv2017 MAIN STEAM Is0LATION VALVE, PISTON ENGINEERING PLANNING Ale MANAGEMCNT, INC.
08 W 1 M PAGE 68 i
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACN NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT
^
SAFE SNUTDOWN CABLES
- "FOR Fitt ZoWE 310"'
Cable.....
Recomey...
Ecpsipment.
Equf pment...........
Description Y008 R55 I
GM CD04 2 03 (2 02 CD01 CCO3 d
I 2D2N8005D 895 2 CV2018 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION 3
VALVE, PISTON Y007 Y008 j
R55 CDO5 i
CD04 CDQ3 CD02 CD01 Cc03 202MB012A R49 2 MOV2020 AFW PUMP (2 P29) STE t'
AM SUPPLY VALVE,neov CC03 CC02 CC01 CCO2 2C161A ZD2NB012C R49 2 le0V2020 AFW PWIP (2 P29) STE d SUPPLY VALVE,le0V CCO3 CCO2 CC01 CC02 CG 4 ZD2NB012D R49 2 le0V2020 AFW Ptse (2 P29) STE AM SUPPLY VALVE, MOV CC03 CCO2 CC01 CGC2 CG-4 ENGINEEt!NG PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
1 4
08 NAR 1993 PACE 69 WISCONBlu ELECTRIC POWER CO.
}
PCINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT Fitt NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT BAFE SNUTDolm CABLES 3
- "FOR FIRE ZONE 318'"
i i
I i
Cams.....
Raceway...
Ew1pment.
Epipment...........
j Description
]
i
\\
l
)
DD1312A 013 6 2 A06 6.16KV SWGR BUS I
2001320A 013 10 2 506 A40V IWGR BUS 2852 28s 3REAEER 2852 29A BREAKER P348 AUK. FEED PWP (NOTO R DRIVEN) 2 304 480V SWGR SUS 2852 27C 440V SREAKER 2DD1410A D14 8 2 NOV4000 AFW RECRJLATING VALVE (2 P29), NOV 2D01420A 014 2 2 DTC2 STATIC INVERTER 20014208 2T02 1 2 T02 120V AC BUS 2YO2 2 2001901A D19 2 2 CV2015 ATM, STM, DUNP VALVE (2 NX10), ADV 2 CY2016 ATM, STN, DWF VALW (2 NX1A), ADV 2 CV2017 NAIN STEAN ISCLATION 1
VALVE, PISTON 2 CV2018 NAIN STEAN ISCLATION VALVE, PISTON D19 5 l
CE04 R$1 CD04 CD03 CD02 CD01 CG03 20019018 D191 2 CV2015 ATM, STM, DWP VALVE (2 NX18), ADV 2 CV2016 ATN, STN, DWF VALVE (2 NX1A), ADV D19 5 CE04 R53 CD04 ErGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
i i
e
i 06 MAR 1993 PACE 70 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
POINT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT
)
FIRE NAZARDS EVALuAfl0NS REPORT l
SAFE SHUTDOWN CASLES I
I
- FOR FIRE 20ht 318
- Cable.....
Racewey...
E@fpment.
Equipment...........
Description i
i CD03 CD02 CD01 CCO3 a
2001910A D19 2 2*PCV430 PRESSURIZER POWER OP j
ER. RELIEF VALVE,A0V
,f 019 5 CEM R53 ZE13212HC CLQ1 183212M LOCAL CONTACTOR CYO3 CYM CTO5 CYO4 i
CYO7 CYo8 5003 ZE13280C CT01 MOV4009 SVS BACEUP WATER SUP PLY TD (P38A), NOV CTOS CT06 DK04 OK03 CK02 R21 ZI1328FC CT01 MOV4023 AFW SUPPLT NEADER VA LVE (P38A), Nov CTOS CT06 DK04 DK03 DK02 R21 ZE1329MS CT01 P70A FUEL O!L TRANSFEk PU MP CLC1 CYO2 CY01 R27 EN0!NEER!NO PLANNING ANO MANAGEMENT, thC.
. ~. -.. -
04 m 1M3 PAGE 71 WISCON81N ELECTRIC PGER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT O
FIRE NAZAR08 EVALUAfl0N8 REPORT SAFE SNUTDOW CABLES
- F'OR FIRE 20NE 31a
- Cable.....
Racemey...
E gipment.
Epipment...........
Descriptlen IE1391C 28WO3 1 5391 480V NAGNETIC CONTAC T0R 2EWO4 2EWOS 2EWO6 2EWQ7 8001 ZE1391E 2EWO3 183212N LOCAL CONTACTOR 2EWO4 1 8391 480V NAGNETIC CONTAC TOR 2EWOS 2EWO4 2EWO7 8001 IE1A&OC 1ET04 1A52 60 ENERGENCY GENERATOR BREAKER 1ET05 1ET04 1ET07 1ET08 1ET09 1ET10 1ET11 DR01 R34 ZE1A60E R34 1A32 60 ENERGENCY GENERAT E SREAKER OR01 1ET11 itT10 1ET09 itT08 1ET07 itT06 1ET05 1ET04 ZE1810CA P32A SW PWP
\\
ZE1810C8 N01 1 1852 11C stEAKER ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
04 IWt 1993 PAGE 72 WISCONtlN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
MINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMUTDOWN CABLES
'"FOR FIRE 2ONE 318*
Cable.....
Racewey...
E @lpment.
E pipment...........
Description C001 0002 g
0003 0004 ZE1810CC N01 5 1852 11C BREAG R R23 ZE1810CD P32A SW PLMP ZE1510CE R23 1852 11C BREAER j
DJ01 DJ02 DJ03 DJM DJ05 DJ06 DJ07 DJ08 XQC8 XQ07 R86 ZE1810CF R23 1852 11C BREAn t OK01 CK 1 Cx01 1
Cx02 Cx03 C104 CX05 Cx06 Cx07 CXD4 260 CWO4 T004 Y003 T002 R94 ZE1811C8 0003 P328 SW PUMP GQC2 GC01 ENGINEERING PLANNINO AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
08 W 1 M PAGE 73 W18 CON 8tM ELECTRIC POWER CC.
Po!NT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT p
FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $4 Elf 00WN CABLES
- $ORF1 REZONE 318***
Cable.....
Rac ewey...
E wipment.
Egipment...........
Description N01 1 2E1811CC N01 5 P328 W PueP ZE1811CE R23 P32s W PUMP DJ01 DJ02 DJ03 DJM DJ05 DJ06 DJ07 DJ08 x008 XQ07 O
o ZE1811CF R23 PJ28 SW PUMP DK01 DE 1 Cx01 CX02 CX03 Cx04 cx05 Cx06 Cx07 CX08 R60 Cvo8 YQM Ye03 YG02 RM ZE1812CA P38A AUM. FEED PWF (NOTO E DRIVEN)
IE1812C8 0002 Cv4007 AFW PWIP RECIRCULATI ON (P 344), Amf P34A aux. FEED PutP (MOTO R DRIVEN)
G403 Ge04 th J PING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
04 MAR I M 1
FACE 74 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC P M R CD.
PolNT BEACN NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2AR38 EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $ NUT 00WW CABLES
- FOR FIRE Z.NE 318***
Cable.....
Racewey...
E@lpment.
E gipment...........
Description N01 1 ZE1512CF R21 P38A
. AUX. FED PWP (MOTO R ORIVEN)
DLO1 DL 4 CY01 CYO2 CYO3 CYO4 CYO5 CYO6 CT07 R64 CWC8 7004 YQO3 7002 R94 ZE1812CG N01 4 CV4007 AFW PLMP RECIRCULATI ON (P 38A), A0V P38A AUX. FEED PUMP (M070 R ORIVEN)
R21 ZE1812CH R21 P38A AUX. FEED PWP (MOTO R ORIVEN)
DJ02 DJC3 3
0J04 DJ05 DJ06 DJ07 0J08 X004 l
MQ07 R86 ZE1812CJ R21 P38A Aux. FE D PWMP (MOTO R ORIVEN)
DJ02 DJ03 l
DJ04 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, C.
Os MAR 1993 pagg 75 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC PC W R CO.
POINT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOW CABLES
- [0RFIRE20NE318*
Cable.....
Racewey...
E pfpment.
Ew f peent...........
Description DJ05 DJ06 DJ07 DJ04 x004 Xo07 M006 R85 ZE1812CK R21 P38A AUX. FEED PUMP (NOTO A DRIVEN)
DEC2 DK01 DE 1 Cx01 Cx02 Cx03
\\
GM Cx05 Cx04 Cx07 CXO8 R40 CWC8 Y004 7003 7002 R94 ZE1812CL R21 P34A Aux. FEED PtmP (m70 R DRIVEN)
OK02 DK01 DK 1 Cx01 Cx02 Cx03 CxM Cx05 Cx07 CXO4 R40 CV08 7004 ENGINEERING PLANNING Am MANAGEMENT, INC.
08 W i m PAGE 76
^
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POAR CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CA8LES a
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318"*
Cable.....
Racewey...
Espalpment.
E cpJ1 pment...........
t Description 4
Y003 7002 i
YQ01 R93 ZE1812CM R21 P38A AUX. FELD Ptse (NOTO R DRIVEN) j l
DK01 DK02 DK03 DK04 DK05 j
OK06 R11 ZE1812CN R21 P38A AUX. FEED PUMP (MOTO R DRIVEN)
DJ02 DJ03 i
c20A DJ05 DJ06 DJ07 DJ08 I
x008 x007 x006 x005 Yu 1
)
i ZE1812C0 R21 P38A Altt. FEED PtmP (NOTO R ORIVEN)
DJ02 3
DJ03 DJ04 DJ05 I
DJoe DJ07 DJ04 x004 x007 j
x004 XQ05 TU<1 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT,.NC.
j l
i 08 MAR 1993 PAGE 77 l
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
)
f POINT BEACM NUCLEAA PLANT l
Fitt NA2ARDS EVALUAfl0NS REPORT j
SAFE 8481TD0bal CABLEB 1
" FOR FIRE Zout 318
- l J
i Cable.....
ascewey...
E@lpment.
E gipment...........
i Description
}
IE1812CA A21 P34A
' AUX. FEED PLN (NOTO I
a onlWN3 i
oJ02 I
DJ03 DJ%
i OJ05 DJM DJ07 DJ08 M004 i
x007 i
X006 x005 YU 1 1
ZI1812CT R21 P38A Aux. FEED PWMP (MOTO
{jG B DRIWN) j DJ02 DJ03 i
DJM 4
DJ05 DJ04 j
DJ07 l
DJ04 X004 N007 XQ04 x005 Yu 1 i
zsistacu n21 P34A Aux. FEED PUMP (MOTO I
a DRIWN) l DLo2 I
OLO1 DL*4 i
CT01 1
{
CT02
~
CYO3 j
{
CTM CTOS A52 ZE1813Cs 1 s39 680y sus I
ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
1 a
4 d
l
08 MAR i m PACE 78 WISCON8!N ELECTRIC POWER CD.
POINT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZAADS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SHUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR' FIRE ZONE 31t
- Cable.....
Raceway...
Egipment.
E gipment...........
Description l
2E23210MC CK01 MOV3930 VALVE CXQ2 Cx01 827 ZE23212MC CLO1 183212N LOCAL CONTACTOR 233212H LOCAL CONTACTOR CYC3 CYO4 CY05 CYO6 CY07 CYC8 8003
^
ZE23212ME 2EWO3 2 8391 480V MAGNETIC CONTAC TOR 233212M LOCAL CONTACTOR 2EWO4 2EWO5 2EWC6 2EW7
$C01 ZE2328CC CK01 MOV4022 AFW SUPPLY NEADER VA LVE (P38A), Mcv Cx02 Cx01 DK 1 DK01 R21 ZE2391C 2EWO3 2 8391 480V MAGNETIC CONTAC TOR 2EWO4 2EW05 2EWO4 MW7 8001 ZE2A501F 1ET04 C01 DIESEL GENERATOR 1ET05 1ET06 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MAXAGEM NT, INC.
__m 08 MAR 1993 PAGE 79 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
Po!NT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUAfl0NS REPORT SAFE $ NUT 00W CASLES
- F'R FIRE 20NE 318***
O Cable.....
Receway...
E Wipment.
E Wipment...........
Description 1ET07 1ET08 1ET09 IET10 '
1ET11 0801 R34 ZI2AT3C 2EWO3 2A52 73 EMERGENCT GENERATOR BREAKER 2EWO4 2EWO5 2EWO4 2EWQT 2EWO8 2EWO9 134 212AT3E R38 2A52 73 EMERGENCY GENERATOR BREAKER 2EWO9 2EWO8 2EWOT 2EWO4 2EWO5 1ET 2 1ET10 1ET09 1ET04 itT07 it106 1ET05 1ET04 ZE2834tc Gs04 2852 348 480v BREAKER N01 3 ZE283400 N01 5 2352 348 440V BREAKER R23 ZE2s34tf R23 2s52 34s 480v sREAKER DLO1
' O ENGINEERING PLANNING Jue MANAGEMENT, IMO.
08 NAA 1993 PA2 80 W18 CON 8tN ELECTRIC Polder CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAA PLANT FIRE NAZAADS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTDOWN CABLES
- "FOR FIRE 2ONE 318***
Cable.....
Racewey...
E @lpment.
Epi gment...........
Description OLO4 DLOS DLO6 OLOT DLO8 CLO9 R35 DJ09 1905 j
x006 2007 R86 ZE28348F R23 2352 348 480V BREAKER DK01 DK 1 Cx01 Cx02 Cx03 Cx04 cx05 CX06 Cx07 CX38 CWC8 CW 2 ZE2836Cs 2 539 480V sus ZE2837CA B33 480V NcTOR CONTROL C ENTER SUS 2E2837CC GSO4 833 480V m TOR CONTROL C ENTER BUS 2303 4 CWO7 CWO8 340 Cx07 Cx06 Cx05 CX04 CX 1 R34 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MAXAGDIENT, INC.
08 NAR 1993 PAGE 81 WISCONSIM ELECTt!C POWER CO.
PC!NT BEACN NUCLEM PLMT FIRE MAZARDS EVALUAfl0NS REPORT SAFE SNUTDOWN CA8LES
- FOR Fitt IONE 318
- CeDie.....
Raceway...
Espalpment.
EspJi pment...........
l Description f
I j
IED0105A 001 2 D12 125VOC DISTilBUTION j
PMEL ZED 010GA 001 3 Ott 125vDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ZED 1128A 011 16 C78 125V DC TRANSFER PAN
(
EL l
EL ZED 1129A D11 17 017 125VDC DISTRIBUT!0N PANEL 1
EM ZED 1131A D11 17 D16 125VDC DisfalluTION j
\\
PMEL i
RTO ZE01132A D11 18 D22 125VDC Disf alBUTION PMEL J81001 4
022 1 ZED 1201A D12 4 CTS 125V DC TRMSFER PM El I
2ED1211A D12 5 C78 125v DC ftMSFER PAN EL C78 125V DC ftMSFER PM EL ZE01217A D12 17 DT0A STATIC INVERTER ZE01703A R70 NOV4021 AFW SUPPLT NEADER VA LVE (P388), NOV NOV4023 AFW SUPPLY NEADER VA LVE (P3&A), NOV i
P70A FUEL CIL TRM5fER PU M9 P7DS FUEL OIL TRMSFER PU ENGINEEllNG PLANNING A S MANAGEMENT, INC.
1
e 04 NAR 1 W3 PACE 82 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
Po!NT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $ NUT 00WW CABLES
- FOR' fitt ZONE 318"*
Cable.....
Raceway...
E@lpment.
E w1pment...........
Description MP D17*1 DLO7 DLO4 DLOS DLO4 DLQ3 DLC2 R21 ZEG01010 1ETM C01 DIESEL GENERATOR 1ET05 1ET04 1ET07 1ET04 1ET09 iti10 1ET11 i
0R01 n34 ZEG0101E 1ET04 G01 DIESEL GENERATOR 1ET05 itT06 itT07 1ET08 1ET09 itT10 1ET11 CR01 R34 ZEC0101N R85 C01 O!ESEL GENERATOR XQ07 N004 DJ04 R09 DLOT CLOS CLO9 DL 1 1ET04 1ET05 1ETM GNGINEERING PLANNING AND NAMAGEMENT, INC.
e
4 08 slAA 1993 pggg g3 1
WISCON8!N ELECTtlC POWEA CO.
f PO!NT REACN IRJCLEAR PLANT i
Flat NAZAR0s EvAtuAfl0Ns aEP0af j
is SAFE $ NUT 00WW CASLES
- f OR F!RE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
Recomey...
Egilpment.
Ega l pment...........
Description ZEG0101J R34 G01 O!ESEL GENERATOR OR01 1ET11 iti10 1ET09 1ET08 1ET07 DL 3 R35 DJo9 XQ05 Rood R85 ZEG0101N 1ET04 G01 DIESEL GENERATOR 1ET05
(
1E106 1ETC7 1ET04 1ET09 1ET10 1ET11 0801 R34 2EG01012 R34 C01 O!ESEL GENERATOR ORC 1 1ET11 1ET10 1ET09 1ET04 1ET07 1ET06 1ETOS 1ET04 ZEG01018 R34 G01 DIESEL GENERATOR OR01 1ET11 1ET10 1ET09 1ET08 O
1ETC7 EioGINEEBING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
. =. _.
... ~. -... - -
1 08 NAR M 3 PAGE St.
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAA PLANT FIRI MALARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTOCWN CABLES
- F0d FIRE ZONE 31g***
Cable.....
Racemey...
Egalpment.
EgJipment...........
Description 1ET06 1ET05 1ET04 ZIG 0101T IC157A C01 DIESEL GENERATOR 2ENA010A R27 P70A FUEL O!L TRANSFER PU MP P708 FUEL O!L TRANSFER PU NP CY01 CYC2 CYO3 21W 2 21WO9 2W0s i
21WOT 21WO4 2EWO5 21WO4 2fwC3 ZENA010s R27 P70A FUEL CIL TRANSFER PU np P708 FUEL CIL TRANSFER PU NP CYO1 CYC2 CYC3 2KV 2 2EWO9 2EWO4 2EWOT 2fwoe 21WOS 2EWO4 21WQ3 ZF14210MC CM03 NOV3931 FUEL O!L TO DAY TANE VALVE CM02 CM01 R26 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
08 MAR 1993 PAGE 85 WISCON5tu ELECTRIC POWER CO.
PolNT BEACM MUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT O
SAFE BNUTDOW CABLES
- Fpa FIRE ZONE 31B
- Cable.....
Racewey...
EcpJipment.
Equipment...........
Description 17142110C CNO3 164211D LOCAL CONTACTOR CE01 CE02 CE03 i
CE04 CEOS 3%
8004 ZF1428CC CR03 MOV4021 AFW SUPPLY > @ER VA LVE (P388), *0V CR02 CRO1 R24 ZF1491C 2EK02 1 8491 480V MAGNETIC CONTAC TOR 8002 ZF1491E 2EK02 1 8491 480V MAGNETIC CONTAC TOR 1842110 LOCAL CONTACTOR
$002 ZF1A66C 1EM02 1A52 66 EMERGENCY GENERATOR BREAKER 1EM01 DV04 DV03 DV02 DV01 DN01 R33 ZF1AME R33 1A52 M EMERGENCY GENERATOR BREAKIR DN01 DV01 DV02 DW3 Ov04 1EM01 1EM02 i
ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
- ~..
08 MAR 1993 PAGE 86 WISCON$th ELECTRIC POWA Co.
l POINT BEACM NUCLE.AR PLANT FIRE NA2AADS EVALUAT!0NS REPORT SAFE SNUTCOWN CASLES
- FOR' Fitt 20NE 318***
i Cable.....
Raceway...
Ewipment.
E pipment...........
Description ZF1820C4 GA02 1852 20C BREAKER GA03 l
MM i
N02 1 ZF1820CC N02 4 1852 20C SREAKER RU 271820CE R22 1852 20C BaEAKER CM01 DM02 CM03 DM04 DM05 MP01 1902 x001 XQO2 R&3 2F1820CF R22 1852 20C BREAKER DW01 CG 3 CC01 CCO2 CD01 CCO2 cc03 C004 C005 CD06 R41 CC06 7005 7006 R96 2F1821CA 843 480V MOTOR CONTROL C ENTER 2F1821C8 GA01 843 480V MIT
- CONTROL C ENTER CA02 CA03 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
l l
.i 04 MAA I M PAGE 87 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
j i
POINT SEACN INCLEAlt PLANT i
FIRE NA2AA05 EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTD0lAl CABLES 4
- "FOR F1RE ZONE 310"*
Cable.....
Racemey...
EcpJipment.
EspJl peant...........
Description eM 1BM 6 DV04
)
i DV03 l
DV02 DV01 l.
DN01 133 ZF1821CC R22 S43 480Y MOTOR CONTROL C j
ENTER DN01 l
l CR01 j
R24 I
Ovat ZF182&C8 1 849 480 V $Us d
'j ZF242128A CM03 0109 SATTERT CMARGER 2842128 LOCAL CONTACTOR ZF242128C CM03 2842128 LOCAL CONTACTOR CE01 CEC 2 i
CE03 CI04 CE05 CE06 s004 ZF242128E 2EK02 2842128 LOCAL CONTACTOR 3002 2 8491 440V MAGNETIC.CONTAC TOR ZF2428CC CR03 MOV4016 BWs RACxuP WATER SUP PLY T0 (P348), MOV CR02 CR01 R24 ZF2428FC CR03 MOV4020 AN SUPPLY NEADER VA LVE (P388), NOV CA02 s
CA01 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
.. - ~..
i 08 MAA 1993
,3g gg WISCONSIM ELECTt!C P0bEA CO.
POINT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT istE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTOOWN CASLES 1
e
- "FOR' Fitt ZONE 318*"
Cable.....
Racewey...
E pigunent.
E w1pment...........
Description J
j R24 ZF2429W8 CNO3 P708 FW L O!L TRANSFER PU MP CN02 CN01 l
R24 ZF2491C 2EK02 2 8491 440V MAGNETIC CONTAC 1
I TOR I
$002 i
ZF2A60W 2EK02 CO2 DIESEL GENERATOR
{
2EK01 0$04
]
0503 0$02 0$01 R37 i
ZF2A47C 2EKC2 2A52 67 EMERGENCY GENERATOR BREAKEA 2EK01 0$04 0$03 1
0$02 0501 R37 ZF2A47E R37 2A52 67 EMERGENCY GENERATOR SAEAKER 0801 0802 0503 0$04 2EK01 2EK02 ZF28275A P32D SW MmP ZF282788 P32D SW MMP ZF2827BC GT01 P32D SW PUMP GT02 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, IMO.
. - _ ~ _. -..
" "A" I M PAGE 89 l
idlSCCNSIN ELECTRIC PCER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT d
FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUAfl0NS REPORT 5
SAFE SNUTD0bal CABLES i
" F'OR FIRE 2ONE 318**
4 i
Cable.....
Racemey...
Epipment.
E@lpment...........
i j
Description GT03 j
GT04 l
N02 5
)
1F282750 NO2 4 P32D W PWIP EU l
ZF2827BE R22 P32D W PueP Dm01 h
Dm02 DM03 DM04
[
DM05 XP01 XP02 XQQ1 XQC2
\\
20 2F2827bF R22 P32D sv PUMP DN01 CQQ1 CG 3 CC01 CC02 CD01 CDC2 CD03 I
CD04 CDOS CDM R41 CCM Y005 YeM l
l R96 2F2827CC GT01 2352 27C 480V BREAKER GT02 j
GT03 GT04 j
N02 5 l
O l
ZF2827CD N02 4 2852 27C 480V SREAKER ENGINEERING PLANN!NG Ale NAMAGEM NT, INC.
l l
=
1 N "AE lN3 PACE 90 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POW R CO.
f POINT BEACN NUCLEAR Pt. ANT FIRE NAZAADS EVALUAT!0NI REPORT SAFE SNUTDOWN CASLES j
" FOR' FIRE ZONE 318
- i Cable.....
Raceway...
E @lpment.
E@lpment............
Description i
1 E22 ZF2827CE R22 2352 27C 480V SAEAKER DM01 DM02 Ma3 DM04 DMOS XP01 K902 2001 2002 A83 2F2827CF R22 2852 27C 480V SREAKER DN01 CQO1 CG 3 CC01 CG02 CD01 CD02 CD03 CD04 C205 CD04 R41 CC06 7005 7004 R96 2F2831AA 2 849 480V Bus ZF2831CA P384 AUX. FEED PUMP (NOTO R DRIVEN) 272831CB GT04 CV4014 AFW PtBIP RECIRCULAfl CN (P340), ADV P388 EL FEED PUMP (NOTO R DRIVEN)
NC2 5 ZF2831CF N02 3 P388 AUX. FEED PUMP (MQTO ENGINEEtlNG PLMNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
_ _ _. ~ _ _ - -
" " #3 J
PAGE 91 i
WISCON5!N ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM 1RJCLEAA PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $ NUT 00W CASLES i
" FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- A
{
Cable.....
Racewey...
E@lpment.
E @fpment...........
Description f
}
E ORIVEN)
R22 ZF2831CG N02 3 CV4014 AFW PL W RECIRCULATI CN (P388), ADV f
P380 AUX. FEED PLMP (NOTO R ORIVEE)
R22 ZF2831CH R22 P388 AUX. FEED PtmP (MOTO l
R ORIVEN) 0#01 DN02 DN03 DM04 DM05 4
XP01 XP02 XQC1 No02 R83 2F2831CJ R22 P388 AUX. FEED PtmP (M070 A DRIVEN)
DM01 i
DMC2 DM03 Duol DM05 XP01 l
XP02 XQQ1 X002 l
X003 R84 j
ZF2831CE R22 P388 AUX. FEED PLMP (MOTO j
R ORIVEN)
DN01 C001 CG 3 i
CG01 R26
\\
CF01 ENGtkEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
4 O
i
1 Os MAR 1993 PAGE 92 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT SEACM WCLEAR PLANT I
FIRE NAZAADS EVALUATIONS REPORT i
SAFE SWTDOWN CASLES
- FOR FitE 20NE 318***
Cable.....
Racewey.'..
EgJlpeant.
E gipment...........
Descriptlen CF02 CC01 CCO2 CC03 CC04 i
CC05 MM
't Yo05 l
Y006 RM 2F2831CL R22 P388 AUX. FEED PWP (NOTO j
R ORIVEN) l DN01 C001 CG 3 CC01 CCO2 CD01 CD02 G03 CD04 CDC5 CD06 R61 CC06 YQC5 YQ06 Y007 895 2F2831Cm R22 P38 auM. FFJ PWP (MOTO R DRIVEN)
DN01 DN02 DNO3 R14 2F2831CN R22 P348 AUX. FEED PUMP (MOTO R OtlVEN)
DM01 DM02 DM03 DM04 ENGINEttlNG ?LANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
08 MAA 1993 PAGE 93 W18 CON 81N ELECTRIC POWEA CC.
Po!NT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT F!tt NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTDobst CABLIS i
- FOR Fitt 20NE 318***
Cable.....
Racewey...
E pipment.
Egipment...........
Description DM05 Dm06 mom Xe03 TU 2 ZF2831CG R27 P383 AUX FEED PueP (180f0 R DR!vEN)
DNot DM02 DNC3 Dm04 i
DN05 DM06 XQ04 X403 Yu 2 V
ZF2831ta R22 P388 AUX. FEED PWIP (180f0 t DRIVEN)
{
DM01 DN02
]
DNO3 DM04 DM05 DMM XQ04 Mo03 TU 2 2F2831CT R22 P388 AUX. FEED PWIP (M0f0 E DRIVEN)
I DM01 DM02 Dm03 DnN Dn05 DnN X404 2003 TU+2 I
2F2831CU R22 P388 AUX. FEED PW F (NOTO 8 DalVEN)
ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
4 j
08 MAR 1993 pacg 94 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CD.
POINT SEACM WCLEAR PLMT FltE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMUTDOWN CABLES
" FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- 4 1
Cable.....
Raceway..'.
E@lpment.
E gipment...........
Description DW01 CN01 CG 3 CC01 CG02 I
G01 CD02 CD03 R49 IF00205A 002 2 014 125VDC DISTRIBUTION 1
PMEL ZF00208A D02 3 D13 125VDC DISTRIsuTION 4
PMEL ZF01328A D13 14 C79 125V DC TRMSFER PM C79 125v DC TRMSFER PM EL ZF01329A 013 17 D21 125VDC DisTRIBUT10N PMEL ZFD1330A D13 16 D19 125VDC DISTRIBUTION 2
PMEL 2F01332A 013 15 D18 125vDC D!siktsuT10N PMEL ZFD1401A 014 4 C79 125V DC TRMSFER PAN EL C79 125V DC TRANSFER PAN EL i
j ZF01411A 014 4 C79 125V DC TRMSFEB PM EL C79 125V DC TRMSFER P,AN EL i
i ZF01417A D14 17 DYOB STATIC INV!tTER 2FD1903A D19 1 M0V4020 AFW SUPPLY HEADER VA i
LVE (P388), MOV ENGINEft!NG PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
j
-.... ~ _
00 NAR 1993 pAgg 95 W!$CONSIM ELECTA!C POWER CO.
POINT BEACM MUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAIARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT 8AFE $ NUT 00W CASLES
- FOR FitE ZONE 318
- Cable.....
Rac ewey...
Egipment.
E gipment...........
Description NOV4022 AFW SUPPLY MEADER VA LVE (P34A), Nov P70A FUEL DIL TRAN8FER PU W
P704 FUEL CIL TRANSFER PU W
019 4 DP06 0P0$
DPO4 DP03 DP02 DP01 CN01 R24 ZFG02010 2EK02 G02 DIESEL GENERATOR O
2EK01 0$04 Os03 0$02 0801 R37 ZFG0201E 1EMC2 CO2 OlESEL GENERATOR 1EM01 DV04 R64 0001 R65 0$03 0$02 0801 R37 -
ZFG0201N 2EK02 002 O!ESEL GENERATOR REK01 0$04 0$03 0802 0801 CF 1 CF02 O
CF01 EN0!NEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
O " I"3 PAGE 96 l
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTDOWN CABLES
- "FOR' FIRE ZONE 318"*
l Cable.....
Raceway...
E pipment.
Egipment...........
1 Deseriptien 1C167A 2FG0201J G02 DIESEL GENERATOR l
ZFG0201N 2EK02 G02 DIESEL GENERATOR 2EK01 D504 D$03 0802 0801 R37 ZFCO201R R37 G02 DIESEL GENERATOR Ds01 D502 D$03 0804 2EK01 2EKC2 ZFG02013 R37 CO2 DIESEL GENERATOR Cs01 D$02 CSO3 D$04 2EK01 2EK02 ZFCO201T R84 C02 DIESEL GENERATOR iC167A CF01
)
R26 CHQ1 J
CH02 CE01 M02 CE03 CE04 l
CE05 R59 Y008 j
l Y007 R95 i
ENGINEERING PLANNING AND NANAGUENT, Ikt.
\\
l 08 MAR 1993 pA;g 97 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
I PCINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLMT
[
FIRE NAZARDB EVALUAfl0NS REPORT l
SAFE $NUTDonal CABLES 2
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
E pfpeant.
Epfpment...........
Description ZFN0009A R28 P70A FUEL O!L TIMSFER PU MP PTOS FUEL O!L TRMSFER PU W
CF02 CF 1 0801 Ds02 0$03 0$04 2EK01 2EK02 ZFN80095 R28 P70A FUEL CIL TRMSFER PU MP P708 FUEL O!L TRMSFER PU
[
CF02 CF 1 D801 D502 0503 0$04 2EK01 2EK02 ZK10T018 1$068 1 Y101 120V AC SUS
]
1*T101 120V AC SUS 2K11426A XA03 1 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR ANSN!TTER XA02 1 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR MSMITTER XA01 1JS*R ZK11429A 1J8 R 1 PCV430 PRESSURIZER POWR OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,A0V XA01 XA02
~
MA03 ZK11468N 11468 1*CV2016 ATM, STN DWIP VALVE (1*NX1A), ADV ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MAXAGEMENT, INC.
i 1
08 MAR IM3 pagg 9g WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE MAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT 1
SAFE SMUTDOWN CABLES
"*FOR' FIRE ZONE 318"*
Cable.....
Racewey...
EcpJlpment.
Equipment...........
Description l
1Js R XA01 XA02 XA03 1T444 l
ZK11483A XA03 1 P1483 888 STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRAN5MITTER(W.R.
i
)
XA02 1 PT483 888 STEAM GEN. press URE TRANSNITTER(W.R.
)
XA01 1JB R ZK1N3043A iPVC R 1 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT ZK1u3044A 1PVC R 1 N31 source RANCE INSTRUM ENT ZK1N3045A 1PVC R 1 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT ZK1N3046A INISR1 1 N31 SOURCE 4ANGE INSTRW ENT ZKIN30468 1NISR1 1 k31 SOURCE RAM 2 INSTRUM ENT ZK1N30475 1PVC R 1 N31 source RANGE INSTRtm ENT ZK1N30484 1PVC R 1 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT ZKlu30498 1N!$ R 1 M31 30ttCE RANGE INSTRi.M EMI ZK1N3050s 1N!t R 1 N31 touRCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT ZK1N3051B 1PVC R 1 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
08 MAR 1993 PAGE 99 WISCONSIM ELECTRIC PO RA CO.
PolNT BEACM NUCLEAA PLANT FIRE RAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SIRITDQW CABLES
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318"*
Cable.....
Racewey...
Egipment.
E pipment...........
Description IK1N30525 1PVC R 1 N31 SQURCE RMGE INSTRts:
ENT IK170105A 1Y01 3 1 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR MINITTER 1J81752 1 7T483 88' STEM GEN. press URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
1T01 4 1 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR MSMITTER 1 PT483
'B' STEM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
12A ZK1Y01055 1 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR O
MSMITTER 1 PT483
'B' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRM8MITTER(W.R.
)
1 LT426 PRES $URIZER LEVEL TR MSM'TTER 1 PT483 88' STEM GEN. PRESS URE TRMSMITTER(W.R.
)
ZK1Y0110A 1Y01 2 1 N31 SCURCE RMGE INSTRUM ENT 1J81782 1Y01 4 1JB1783 1 14A 1 148 1 14C 1 140 1 14E 1 14F 33A ZE170114A 1Y01 5 1 N31 SOURCE RMGE INSTRUM ENT ZKDYOAC 13069 1 Y101 12CV AC SUS ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
+
I
08 MAR 1M3 PAGE 100 l
W!SCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
MINT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT j
SAFE SMUTDOWN CA4LES J
- FOR FIRE ZONE 318
- Cable.....
Recomey...
E wfpment.
E g1pment...........
3 Description ZL10T03A 18216 1 7203 120V AC SUS (NORMAL)
ZL11427A 1Jt W 1 LT427 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR ANSMITTER XY01 XC01 XCO2 X801 X802 ZL11430A IJS W 1 PCV430 PRESSURIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,A0V XT01 XC01 XCO2 XB01 X802 2L1!49A XC01 1 PT49 8A' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
XC02 Xs01 XB02 ZL1N2037A 1PVC W 1 N,2 BOURCE RANCE INSTRW ENT ZL1N2038A 1PVC W 1 N32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT ZLIN2039A 1PVC W 1 E32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT ZL1N2040A 1 K32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRW ENT ZL1N20400 1 N32 SOURCE
- RANGE INSTRW ENT ZL1N20418 1PVC W 1 N32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRtM ENT ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
j.
" " IM PACE 101 WISCON8tN ELECTRIC POWER Co.
l PolNT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NA2AR05 EVALUATIONS REPORT i
i SAFE SNUTDOWN CABLES
- F6R FIRE IGNE 318
- Cable.....
Racewey...
Egipment.
Egipar 1...........
Description
(
IL1N20428 1 Nit W 1 N32 SOUR M RANGE INST M ENT 2L1N20438 1N!s W-1 N32 30utu RAmcE INSTRLet ENT b
ILIN20448 1PVC W 1 N32 SOURG RANGE INSTRLal ENT ZL1N20455 iPVC W 1 N32 source RANGE INST M ENT i
2L1N2044R 1PVC W 1 N32 SOURCE AMGE INETRtat i
ENT ZL1YC305A 1YO3 3 1 LT427 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR 3
ANIMITTER j(
1 PT469 8A8 STEM GEN. PRESS j
URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
4
)
1YO3 4 l
14A
{
ZL1YC3058 1 LT427 PRES $URIZER LEVEL TR MSMITTER ZL1Y0306A 1Y03 3 1 N32 SOURCE RANCE INSTRLat ENT 1YO3 4 1
1 34A l
1 34B m
2L1YO309A 1Y03 5 1 N32 source RMu lusTRun ENT 5
ZL1Y203A 15071 1 YC3 120V AC BUS 1Y03 1 1 YO3 120V AC BUS 1Y03 2
}
l ZL1Y2038 15077 1 Y103 120V AC BUS 1 Y103 120V AC SU$
ZLDYOCA 19218 Y203 120V AC sus (ALT)
ENGINEERING PLANNING A m MANAGEMENT, INC.
j
i PAGE 102 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
POINT BEACM NUCLEAA PLANT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOW CABLES
- F5RFIREZONE318***
Cable.....
Raceway...
EcNipment.
E qui pment...........
Description i
]
ILY203A 15072 1 YO3 120V AC BUS 1703 2 ELY203C 18078 1 7103 120V AC sus i
2M10YO28 18070 1 Y102 120V AC OUS 1 Y102 120V AC bus ZM11431A 1JB B 1 PCV431 PRES $URIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE.A0V XE01 XE02 XE03 XG01 NG02 j
XG03 J
XG 4 X507 ZM11478M 11478 1 Cv2015 ATM, STM DWP VALVE I
(1 NX15), AQV 1J8 B XE01 3
XE02 XE03 I
XG01 XG02 XG03 XG 4 X807 ZM1N4001K 1C204 9 1*N40 SOURCE RANGE INSTRW ENT
]
XM06 1 N40 saJRGE RANGE INSTRW ENT XM05 AN04 I
XH03 XN02 XH01
(
XLO4 i
XLO3 XLC2 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND NANAGEMENT, INC.
04 MAR 1993 PAGE 103 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC PCWER CO.
Po!NT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SNUTDOWN CABLES
- FOR FIRE 2GNE 318
- Cable.....
Racewer...
E gipment.
E gipment...........
f Beecription XLO1 XK03 XK04 XK05 R02 ZM1W4001L 1C208 9 1 N40 SCURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT XN06 1 W40 scuRCE RANGE INSTRLM ENT XHOS XM04 XM03 XH02 XM01 XLO4 XLC3
/
XLQ2 XLo1 XK03 XK04 XK05 R02 ZM1Y0206A 1Y02 3 1 N40 scuRCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT 1Y02 11 1 N40 SOURCE RANCE INSTRUM ENT IN11649A 1JR Y 1 PCV431 PRESSURIZER PCWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,A0V XD01 XD02 XD03 XD04 XD 1 XDOS 272DY018 2S068 2 Y101 120V AC SUS 2 Y101 120V AC BUS '
2721426A YA03 2 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR ANSMITTER YA02 2 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR ENGINEERING PLANNING AIS m m MENT, INC.
OS MAR 1993 pAgg 104 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
j PCINT SEACM NUCLEAR PLANT -
FIRE NAZARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SIRJTDOWN CJALES
- FOR' FIP2 2 M 318
- Cable.....
Racewey...
E pipment.
E gipment...........
Description AN8MITTER TA01 2JS R 2721429A 2JS R 2 PCV430 PRRSSWIZER polar OP l
ER. RELIEF VALVE,ADV YA01 YA02 TA03 2721483A TA03 2 PT483
'S' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
TA02 2 PT483 88' STEAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
TA01 2JS R ZP2N3043A 2PVC R 2 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRW ENT ZP2N3044A 2PVC R 2 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRW ENT ZP2N3045A 2PVC R 2 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT ZP2N3046A 2PVC R 2 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT ZP2N3044a 2PVC R 2 N31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRW i
ENT ZP2N30475 2PVC R 2 N31 source RANGE INSTRW ENT ZP2N30488 2PVC R 2 K31 SOURCE RANGE IKSTRUM ENT ZP2N30498 2NIS R 2-W31 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT ZP2N3050s 2NIS R 2 N31 source RANGE INSTRW ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MAkAGEMENT, INC.
1
" " IE PAGE 105 W!$ CON 81N ELECTRIC PMS CO.
Po1NT BEACN IRJCLEAR PLANT Flaf NAZAR08 EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SIRITDGAI CABLES
- ion F!RE 20NE 318***
Cable.....
Racewey...
E gipment.
E gipment...........
Description i
ENT ZP2N30518 2PVC R 2 N31 OcuRCE RANGE INSTa m ENT ZP2N30528 2PVC R 2 N31 00URCE EMGE INSTRtst ENT ZP2Y0105A 2701 3 2 LT426 PatsSURIZER LEVEL TR MSMITTER 2701 4 2 PT483
's' STEAM GEN. PRESS LRE TRMSMITTER(W.R.
)
122 2 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR MSM11'TER 2 PT483 8B' STEAM GEN. PRESS LAtt TRANSMITTER (W.R.
ZP2Y01058 2 LT426 PetsSUR11Et LEVEL Ta MSMITTER 2 LT426 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR MSMITTER ZP2YO110A 2YO1 2 2 N31 SOURCE RMGE INSTRUM ENT 2Y01 4 2 14A 2 148 2 14C 2 140 2 14E 2 14F 30Z 2021427A 2J8 W 2 LT427 PRESSURIZER LEVEL ft MSMITTER TC01 TCO2 7801 7802 2021430A 2JB W 2 PCV430 PRESSURIZER POWER OP ER. RELIEF VALVE,ADV ENGINEtt!NG PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
l N
08 m 1M PAGE 104 WISCON8!N ELECTRIC POWER CO.
Po!NT BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT j
FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SMITDOW CA8LES
- Fod FIRE ZONE 318"'
I Cable.....
Racewey...
Equipment.
E qui pment...........
Description i
TC01 TC02 7801 T802 I
2021449A 2JI W 2 PT 49
'A8 SREAM GEN. PRESS URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
3 TC01
)
TCO2 7B01 j
T802 i
202N2037A 2PVC W 2 N32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM 4
1 ENT 4
i 202N203RA 2PVC W 2 k32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRW j
ENT i
l ZQ2N2039A 2PVC W 2 N32 source RANGE INSTRW j
ENT l
i I
202N2040A 2PVC W 2 N32 ScuRCE RANGE INSTRW j
4 ENT i
j 202N2040s 2PVC W 2 N32 source RANGE INSTRUM j
ENT i
ZQ2N2041B 2PVC W 2 N32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT 202N2042B 2NIS W 2*N32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRW ENT 202N20438 2N!s W 2 N32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRW ENT 202N20448 2PVC W 2 N32 00URE RANGE INSTRW ENT i
202N2045B 2PVC W 2 N32 SOURu RANGE INSTRW ENT 6i 2Q2N20464 2PVC W 2 N32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRW ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
" E #3 PAGE 107 W18CONSIN ELECTRIC POWR Co.
POINT SEACN NUCLEAR PLANT
>(
FIRE NA2AA08 EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE SIRITDOW CABLES
- f0R FIRE 2ONE 318
- Cable.....
Racewey...
E @lpment.
E gipment...........
Description INT 202YO305A 2YO3 3 2 LT427 PRElsuRIZER LIvtL TR
]
ANSMITTER 2 PT469
'A' SRIAM ets. PRIst i
URE TRANSMITTER (W.R.
)
l 2Y03 4 j
142 f
I ZG2Y0305B 2 LT427 PRESSURIZER LEVEL TR
}
ANSN!TTER i
ZG2Y0304A 2Y03 3 2 N32 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT 2YC3 4 2*34A
.O 2 348 l
322 i
ZG2Y203A 2$071 2 YC3 120Y AC SUS 2Y03 1 2 Y203 120V AC SUS (NORMAL) j 2Y03 2 2*YO3 120V AC BUS l
202Y2038 23077 2 Y103 120V AC sus i
2 Y103 120Y AC Bus 20Y2038 2$072 2 Y03 120V AC sus 2Y03 2 j
ZQY2030 2$078 2 Y103 120V AC BUS
- l l
ZR2DY023 2$070 2 Y102 120V AC sus j
2 Y102 120V AC BUS ZR21431A 2J8 B 2 PCV431 PREtsuRIZER POWER OP j
ER. REutF VALVE, Ao V
1 YE01 YE02 YE03 j
7C01 i
YCO2 Y003 4
ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e i
l 04 MAR 1993 PAGE 104 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC PCE R CO.
j PolNT BEACM NUCLEAR PLMT FIRE NA2ARDS EVALUATIONS REPORT SAFE $NUTDOWN CA4LE8
" FOR FIRE ZONE 313
- Cable.....
Raceway...
E pipment.
Egipment...........
Description TG 1 1
ZA244001E 2C208 9 2 N40 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT C802 2 N40 00URM RANGE INSTRtst ENT C801 1AJ150 l
1AJ15C 1AJ158 1AJ15A 1AJ14 1AJ13 DT01 R64 ZR2N4001L 2C208 9 2 N40 SOURCE RANGE INSTRUM ENT C802 2 N40 SOURCE RANGE INSTRtat ENT l
l C801 1AJ150 l
1AJ15C j
1AJ155 1AJ15A I
1AJ14 1AJ13 0f01 R64 i
ZR2Y0206A 2YC2 11 2 N40 30URCE RAN*.E INSTRUN I
ENT 2Y02 3 2 N40 SOURCE RANGE INSTRtst l
ENT l
2ADTotD 2$069 2 7102 120V AC Bus ZS21449A 2JB Y 2 PCv431 PRIssut!!!R PCWER QP ER. RELIEF VALVE, A0 V
YD01 YD02 YDC3 YD04 ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, INC.
e
08 MAA 1993 pAgg 109 i
WISCOW81N ELECTRIC POWER Co.
PCIbf BEACM NUCLEAR PLANT Fitt NAZARDS EVALUATIQWS REPORT 1
4 sArt s m oowu CASTES
- FOR FIRE 20NE 318***
Cable.....
Racewey...
E gipment.
E gipment...........
Description YD 1 7D05 ees ENGINEERING PLANNING AND MAKAGEMENT, INC.
e
a-,
s-.m-a-a--m
.._as--._
.m m
---w a
w-
=
w a
a s
a m
4 d
4 h
S A
e 1
I I
f a
b i
t t
i f
4 d
o
)
t, I
ej
.i i
d e
4 i
6 1
k 4
4 k
)
i 4
4 I
e
l0 OVERSIZE l
DOCUMENT e
PAGE PULLED
~
l SEE APERTURb CARDS e
NUMBER OF OVERSIZE PAGES FILMED ON APERTURE CARDS
]f03236gqvo O.
04/5
.o q v APERTURE CARD /HARD COPY AVAILABLE FROM MECORDS AHD REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH O64 06 8 OF3
@ f' 073 6
dB O
l
\\
Pcci for Scenario 1 is 0 since the Q actual is less than the Q critical which means the
[]
target will not ignite at all. For scenario 2 it is 1.0 because cable damage occurs within 1 W
second. For Scenario 3 the probability of fixed combustible exposure damage is 5.0E-3.
Attached Bechtel Drawings 6118 E-1l8 Sheets 1 through 7 provide location of cables, transformers and electrical cabinets in the cable spreading room. Also attached is a list of the equipment in the room and the cable routing for Appendix R equipment.
11.
The control room is not discussed as part of the important fire scenarios in Section l
4.6.4. Ilowever, as part of containment isolation discussions and in Section 4.6.5.14, the possibility of control room fire is mentioned, and a core damage frequency of l
4.58X10-6 per year has been presented. This core damage frequency is not j
supported by the information provided in Tables 4.1.2-1 through 4.1.2-3. Please l
provide details of this analysis arriving at the reported core damage frequency, as i
well as supporting information including a layout of the control room showing the location of various panels, and especially those panels that contain safety-related controls and instrumentation.
METHOD FOR FIRE ANALYSIS IN THE CONTROL ROOM l.
In the control room P2 is 0.05 to reflect success of remote shutdown panel operation.
l 2.
Critical cabinets are main control board cabinets C01, IC03 and 2CO3. C02 is not critical since this is an AC power panel and AC power will not be lost because of l
a fire in this panel. No remote operation is required. Each cabinet has an l
initiating event frequency of 2.0E-5 which represents a cabinet without circuit cards or relays, the principal source of control room fires.
3.
Assume fire spreads to adjacent cabinets. Assume 1.0. This is conservative. In l
several cases, the fire would not likely spread to adjacent cabinets because of two metal walls with an air gap in between. But 1.0 is still assumed to be conservative.
l 4.
Assume fire takes equipment in cabinet and adjacent cabinet out. Assume 1.0.
l This is also conservative because it assumes every fire that starts in a cabinet destroys all the equipment in the cabinet and the adjacent cabinet.
1 5.
Determine if fire suppression works. The smoke exhaust fan will remove i
adequate air to allow at least 15 minutes before the operators would be required to abandon the control room. Realistically, more than 15 minutes would be available. NOTE: Control room fires are usually self extinguish between 30 A
minutes and I hour. Control room cabinets were not screened even if they did
,b not damage adjacent cabinets. This makes the F1 in the control room 9.3E-3.
This means for the cabinets which will not disable all equipment requiring remote
operation F3 A = Probability that a fire will occur
- probability that remote l'
shutdown will fail
- probability that fire will not be suppressed in 15 minutes.
F3A = 9.3E-3
- 0.05 '3.4E-3 = 1.581E-06.
6.
For the other cabinets (control boards) F3B = 3 (# of cabinets)
- 2.0E-5 (initiating event frequency per cabinet)
- 0.05 (failure of remote shutdown). F3B = 3.0E-6.
The. total core damage frequency for the control room is the sum of F3 A and F3B.
F3T = F3A + F3B, F3T = 4.581E-6.
7.
Fire extinguishing equipment is available in the control room. Particularly noteworthy is the large CO2 cart extinguisher which enables operators to extinguish large cabinet fires.
8.
Smoke exhaust fan and damper controls are located outside the control room.
' This enables the operators to operate the smoke exhaust fan and damper controls even if the control room needs to be evacuated. Breathing apparatus are available for operators in the control room.
The ventilation for the control room and computer room normally draws 1000 cfm of outside air. The smoke exhaust fan draws 12,650 cfm through the control room. The dimensions of the control room are 82 feet X 47 feet X 16 feet high, for a total volume of 61,664 cubic feet. 50,000 cubic feet of this space is estimated to be free space. The rest O
is occupied by equipment and ductwork. This means the smoke exhaust fan results in about 15 air room changes per hour. The flow rate is based on Bechtel drawing C-144 sheet 2. The room dimensions are based on Bechtel drawing C-44.
There are several conservatism's which need further discussion.
It is assumed that the vertical cubicles with combustible loads less than 1E+6 BTU will not self-extinguish prior to control room evacuation. Many of the cabinets are lightly loaded (e.g. less than 125,000 BTU) and would therefore either self extinguish in less than 15 minutes or take much longer to cause evacuation.
No credit is taken for the smoke exhaust fan which does have the capability to remove adequate smoke such that the control boards are visible.
Detection is available in the control room cabinets which provides early warning for the l
operators. Manual suppression is very fast in the control room. Operators are also the trained fire brigad6 and are trained on the use of fire extinguishers making it likely they l
will be able to keep the fire damage to one cabinet.
llO 4
O
- f. "M"I"I I,
I I
.I
.I
.I I
I
,I I
,I.I,I
,I.,I,
,I,,I,
,I.
(o) l @
c
)
[ smou s m osr 3 11, 5" l
WSTEM PANF.t.
z i'- e' __ =
s o-2+' 7"
[
24' - 7 a e 4'. 7" id-e-c CONTINU ATION SE E DW Q.E.. M-4 AND M-2b 3rHRv>d 3 - Ha.-i E.
n.
' MCC E S 31 ji g
e 9$_,,
'fcYo7!,#u's 2Cil5 THRU 2Cl33 l
- fo*
N OPERUlm CON 7 EOL 2 Clo47
- 9.. -1
-=
/
t
$ ',,/ 7 2 C1031 OFFICES 2 Clos THIRV 2Cll4l ggp
[
(
g j
,0 I
6 8
9 F.R STA-, 2 CO4
- 1 i
//
I
,1'07 c
f aere,e qeia //. N d:
voi 9
I o
e y
e c
1m to IE 5'
5 l
ak / A
_ d clolJ
{Af out lIl I
x
>'*4----
tYoS h(f[-
l O
g
~~
~
~~
~
I ii i
q '.65,{J h
09
.j y~~
a g j g u. " p-o sto a.
f_wis
..i.
li ;,
u o
E L. 44'- O" N g.W g g3 t
s l
CABLE tou 0
'. I g3
'j l
wAv
,,5 n
1 l l \\,. l. l.g suw.( h l.CO9 j
h V
o
~1 i
w s
ll l '.j j'.' i BAR l- ""5 o 9)
T, i.yes v, /, ' r.L.' l
'S,f". ",,,, N._
q
'I.
, u #
p ( # M ;] hp1 y p m.
o3!
77 4..
~
k
~
k p '~~N y om g(E b
M r RK 468 Nk
% 'O
't
[I
/
l \\vaLL su
~4 f
6
[.T !b6 i T 6C 3
]
0 17 3
.'O y/
A s p,R sg i CIO4 s
,Q
^d .
g
' T s
.,0 21 Otto j
//
N %A N,\\,
- ]
ICIOS THRU ICil4 l K'03 M
%/
I2'-2
5 iO? C.' ( t_ l'z'- S*
.mslJ 6' 'oj.
~~
Icil5 THRU IC 133 l
9 CCIES$1 2
g I
i f~N _
g_
MM g ]
7 l
R I
seaq 4
~si j
QUIPMENT RodM i
j iwi ll.~.\\
A. s
~-
e
12.
Related to the preceding RAI, several compartments have been addressed in Sections 4.6.5 (unscreened comnartments through Phase H Sten 31 and 4.7 (Analysis ofContainmentperformance), that have not been analyzed in Section 4.6.4. The core damage frequencies provided in Section 4.6.5 cannot be traced back to the frequencies and probabilities provided in Tables 4.1.2-1 through 4.1.2-3. Please provide a discussion regarding the relationship between the frequencies provided in Tables 4.1.2-1 through 4.1.2-3 and the frequencies used in Tables 4.6.4-1 through 4.6.4-8. Similarly, provide a discussion regarding the relationship between the frequencies provided in Tables 4.1.2-1 through 4.1.2-3 and the core damage frequencies provi< led in Section 4.6.5.
Zone 151 P2 used in table 4.6.4-1 is 3.0E-4, whereas the value used in FIVE is 3.0E-2.
Charging pumps P2A and P2B are both failed in the fire analysis because all cables in area are assumed to fail. However, only cable for one of the pumps is in plume of fire (target). The P2 for I charging pump failed is 3.81E-4. That is why this number was used for this analysis. This removed FIVE conservatism (i.e., looked at actual targets affected instead of assuming entire room is destroyed).
Zones 156,166. F1 is reduced to reflect that only 8 of the 57 electrical cubicles will be affected for a given fire. Many fires in this area result in a total loss of charging. This reduces F1 from 8.27E-3 to 6.85E-4 per modeled fire. Only fires which affected Plant Trip Initiators (PTI) or Safe Shutdown System (SSD) equipment or cables were
(]
analyzed. This results in a P2 value of 1.0. Credit is also taken for manually initiating L
fire suppression for fires where there are more than 15 minutes available. See Tables 4.6.4-2 and 4.6.4-3 for details.
Zones 187,245,246. F1 is reduced to reflect that only a limited number of electrical cubicles are involved in a given fire. The rest of the comments are the same as Areas 156, and 166.
All other zones listed in Section 4.6.5 had the frequency calculated directly from FIVE and are the F3 values from table 4.1.2-3.
Zones 308 and 309 are incorrectly listed as 0.00 for F3 in table 4.1.2-3. Section 4.6.5 has the correct values. The table incorrectly reported results because no detailed fire modeling was done on these areas. No detailed fire modeling was performed since it was assumed a fire in the diesel generator room would destroy all equipment and cables in the room. For these rooms the F3 = F2.
Area 326 was discussed in response to Question 11.
The core damage frequencies provided in Section 4.6.5 are based on the calculations i
performed in Section 4.6.4.
O E
d e
l 13.
It is difficult to follow the results of the FCIA as presented in the submittal. Table 4.1.1-2 presents combined frequency compartments. For example, compartments 101 and 109 are shown as combined frequency compartments. However,in Table 4.1.2-2, separate frequencies are presented for these two compartments. Also,in Table 4.1.1.-2, compartments 101 and 109 are shown as combined frequency l
compartments, and compartments 101,104 and 109 are shown as combined frequency compartments. It is not clear what is being represented by these groups of compartments. In addition, the combined frequency groups are not used in the i
later stages of the analysis. Please provide an explanation regarding the interpretation of the combined frequency compartments an how they have been used in later stages of the analysis.
Section 5.3.6 of EPRI TR-100370 describes the fire compartment interaction analysis which was used to evaluate the potential for fires spreading between compartments at Point Beach.
Table 4.1.1-2 shows that a fire in compartment 101 could possibly cause a fire in compartment 109 and vice versa. Table 4.1.2-2 lists fire frequencies for each l
compartment but they are the same frequency. The probability of a fire in either compartment 101 and 109 is the sum of the probability of a fire in 101 and 109. For compartment 104, a fire in compartment 101 or compartment 109 could possibly spread to compartment 104. However, compartment 104 does not have enough combustibles to O
cause a fire in 101 or 109. Therefore the fire initiating frequency for compartment 104 is the sum of 101,104 and 109. The initiating event frequency is multiplied by the probability of core melt given there is a fire in the compartment to determine the F2. F2 is the probability of core damage from a compartment in a year.
14.
When the frequencies F3 (Table 4.1.2-3) and F2 (Table 4.1.2-2) are compared, for several cases, a Pcci much smaller than 0.01 is obtained. This value is acceptable only if redundant trains of cables and equipment are sufficiently far apart. The submittal does not provide any justification regarding these small numbers. Also, it is not clear whether the licensee has multiplied several suppression unavailabilities to obtain the small numbers. It should be noted that if redundant trains are located close to one another, critical damage may occur before successful suppression.
l Under such conditions, suppression system effectiveness is minimized and diverse suppression activities may not increase the likelihood of successful suppression before critical damage has occurred. Please provide some discussion regarding the basis for using small Pccl values and whether those areas where redundant trains are in close proximity have been screened out based on small F3.
In general, where Pcci is much smaller than 0.01 it is because it is the value for transient l
combustibles. This is calculated in FIVE. An example is attached. The exception is fire l
zone 156 which has a target conduit 28 feet from the fire source MCC 1B32. This is low
)
because credit is given for both automatic suppression (0.02) and manual suppression
(
(0.10) because there are 721 seconds available to respond before fire damage (12 l
minutes). Damage is caused by hot gas layer and 721 seconds is based on screening
file Edit Define Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults Help 4
. ~,,...
g.,..,..
- 7.,
- w.. -..., '
s.%hy.y N,.' ' '.
.<s 9A..
.,;m.
3
.lf
- p...
- ;gy;.c.
, I g}.
jj,'h,M,.
I[ [t;-[
]f l
.h(( ' -' '
.. ;,.... [, ' ' 4; ;.~ '. '. _ '
4 j'Q'lnf, ^ :
u...w..
=
{%','," I,'.
,e_t.
et. o.
r w.e
,m..
y p T; ~;. 4,. - '
i ' S.",.;Gxidh
. (l
.H:...'
,.'v
,.u L.RQ'f,l;l_:[;L 3_',_,',,,);74;;T M* DV.1 ^jh4%k[l; U@%%
-=-_ %
4, iYi$M$$h:.
a=__-=== =_.
- m.e., v
~%
% %W h ea
.,e e
.,w4 gg
,9,
'+
j 61 gf u.
U gg w
. i,ni! i,s: '..
,m.
O '
E E
k.j '
ff..
O i
i I
e t
26 J
(' ', ' '
..-......k.....
t
.j
.i l
4 e
- - - =
=
l 4
vd.1
==
F1VE GVlU_ DATA \\NIVPTOOLS)
'I FIVE8)lPE E E TS2)lPEEETS2.PFU j
Elle Edit Qefine Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults ticip
. w,
~.
~...v.,...,
a s'*
- ='
af ih
..i*4.
9 y:
..g j
ym'
- q... ;
g we.,e m - Yg g.#
.v g<y m..
q l
gg5{..
y;
.$,.'9...-.,..
- g ;,,
i G's,
,.,,'++':,.
9. < A( '-3.w ft;f,;.,b,q
?; :' ' e
. =*'
~
44';..
1 1
y, i,'.
,. 8 i
-. +
4 t
l i. i,.} ((
h M, _._... 1 +,.,,,
h4
....l.)
7sg u.
sa : j
- 1
' g p'. '(,
j
.m..
n x x{;3 D SE$
l fixed
' E::,
rmftp nm w,.
c zw f d(e '
...._.,..-_,..'nA
.[10 i
X i
.OdIsom IPI Fexed i uel Ud Heavy
{
7;5.
1 9,
. ;~_ _
l
'o,,.f.).
,)
t' 8
j
.O b
/,+,' $91
..j
.Y
=
.;4r d '..
{.*'
45 e
j
'y;...'v.. 7.
J*
/
y,,..,; ;
N-i i
.,3, w:- /-
7 j
l.
I i
5 J
l e
j
.;c.p I
- s-t
. 773; -
p: 4 l
2 r-A i
- i..E,.
( 4,.
.1 f
l 4
4 I
e f
l l
ii
)
i 0
h i
Y
\\
li I
h 4
i 1
J d
4 l
i d
J l
9
==
FIVE G:\\BU_ DATA \\NFV PTOOLS\\WINFIVE 8\\lPE EE TS2\\lPEE E TS2.PFU e
file Edit Define Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults tielp i
q u :'p~..f... f..ffe,,;. - -
. c$ty*
g," W c 4:*}.. " x. ;
-^ - -.
. ' a. :. N '. 3-y 3 t
- w.
..:.a...xa r p.~LL.
..%)++w.uIT G.
,s a -
3._.
. m y,,...
}
s.
rv <
g; o - -.1
. m. g.
Q;w, %.\\ ~ :-
'. ~<- ^ ' -.
- y. <. ;.-
L',--.1 R3 yg:., _..
4e
)
k.
^
^
}
i
, ps f.c, y w. m.
r*
.e r,.m, l
iT Q'~
Aw _....
_...m...4
..L.
}
%na
, g,_
v; e j
-ec.
'tiMOL w:s h..xgLv-(..
.-w j
Sousce IPISA 10 sq ft ud fese taeget is 1p7c 3 condust total usi 1 gal Catsle tsays atxive pussip H ?'
N-j i
,1
..c.,......
- t
, #~
4
.....4.
4c
! '. Js' e64: s n'.'
f
..s
+ -
-'. [
4
. gq p.a.
3
'- c..
'. kM
, 4
.x j
4
.. i...
4 j
?
f l
s ?,
u i
a-l i
d 3
e 1
l 1
=
% E m+.a-.e.+.s.
m..,......-w..
- +,,. - -
l 6..
1 v.~:
W i
i l,
l
{
l i
4 1
I
,1 4
e i
I d
i I
}
f
+
e k
ll
i A
l 1
HVE G \\BU_ DATA \\NFV PT 00LS)WINFIVE 8\\lPE E E TS2)lPE E E TS2.PRJ
,1 r-=
t i
Elle Edit Define Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults tjelp
- 7. e _.;:, '.,..._... _.--
. +- - -. ; M4' y
vh : ; ;d(_ ;ii '".,oq _..,;-..-..
.m...
_.l<
d'l 'l *
}-
, +f
-. A c h M.
2.
.ii11 1L h."'.
.g.
- q O,.,.. ;..m...,:., J. c
.2 +,g, / t i
ty,n..
Wl 1
7 +:.
-s y
.y S &#,,a' g :3 :.. c; c-
~
rf
- !Q i y,
~.. e: -'
,w..,'
liaT
.....l. L....
?,, ' 42 E5%) $2 h 'sou.ce IP15A 10 sq 16 oil fue target is ip2c 3 condust. total osi i gal C i
- %. s~.
~
1t%. -
..y.
- M.
1
,t.
I
,'*$,tf Aq.
4
_f.
-,, : - ' g 3,,4 A.{
s.. 4 g
's".'.
4L e y pg s &,.rc;.7',c o 7 -
7 m. -
,,...,,..~
.y.'.m.
., 7;,..g
,,q.-
g'
....,a
_, ;,.y,. ~
n t
s tb M'
4 e,
, W,Adat '
_ w..cL..
J
<,,lq
%r4".y
...' q m*,..
2 2...wr! *.1', yy.
- .w w'[%W. d _.m;. ' '
p% a.+.. ;,
r
..;..> y
_ %.u c. r 1 n i i.m..t..
_L__g L'
J. I i 1
v j
e g.
m j
n
.;7 j
?.!
}
i,.
1 e,,
(
Y.4 j
h j
M.
j, f te l
$U a 1
.f.('
~'
j
' O i
r k:J s.z.,
M.,
.o
_J ' e Jn 7 n o.
4.u :.g v
{
} *l.<
f,{..
.)
y. ;.
r.' :, >., ' '
s..
l
$(
. ]
I
'..k.
r i
i,z e
f '.; '
s l
- .). -.
=>s-l n..
.,g 9
l P
i l
l 1
i l
I I
I l
i i
l 4
a l
i e
)
J j
k.
A 4
l 4
1
'I t
1
ll 1
~s FIVE G ABU_ DATA \\NIVPTOOL S\\WINFIVE 8tlPE EE TS2\\lPE EE TS2.PRJ a
Eile Edit Qefine Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults Help
.v,.n.pn
., +..,
7 m y:::,, p.n,
[
el* 1. s'
.; :_... m :d @ 'F D 0.A ' E i'E N U I O n C I '
- N M '.-'.'$ M * ' y.. -D I'.
.: y.y.
.. : :.. g%,
~.
~
.I m m e.' l 3.
).~.
m.-
,.... _. g
.m.
f
.,.v ww
,,c.1,
,j,,lcgSc&. -
e.
- ..g..i..,y, g,.
1 y..a
___.t u ac,..
7.......,.,.
_.. __ u %.
,g 4,;...
os a>,,.
J
- k)$
.. w r.' +.
i
. 95
.... s ;.: -
fc.L_1,q. ::. : -
ll J
f l
'4. y 1,
.. T...
t 1
i l
4 e
{
t
)
5B y.e b.
P i
1, 0
4
'*'*Y
.; y e 1
1 b l.;r - -
" ' ' " ~ ' ' ' ' ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
J
-u.
I.-,
l ye. ' y....,_ g,.g l
1 l
if I
i l
l l
l t
i 6
}
)
4' 1
, m.
{
FIVE G:\\HU_ DATA \\NPgf PTOOL S\\WINI IVE 8)lPE E E IS2)lPE E E TS2.PRJ Elle Edit Define Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults ticip i
1 n>
. E h. }.....*4%. f:'3}?j;rg
- .me 91, _
, L:.. - _..h. ' (. 'v.d b.L.;
- ., ';Qi.
i
%_ eges.,
Fh ?i v.:r JMfg.
9W.-
cf
. m.g-w-
.,.....,,. C' mv -
, 7'?,,4 Wi l7 3,...........
' f :f?[ fr i
2 gj Sousce IP15A 10 sq ft oji fue tosget is lp?c 3 condust told usi I gal Cable tssys above pussip f E 3.
.uy.
.- s -_r 1. % _
aw.
.r,- v--
e.
a-
..-w.
,,e..
[ ATf[,j?3 ' -
- >. ' t s.f;.
.-,.i.,
w..-
a., j i / i. ; L, 7 -y 1'.'..
3;;n.o r i
j
'S;elQ* ~..,'
- v..
c - -
.,..,.1..2 m....~.
..a.: w o
-4 g. j
.e - [,. ' y,. _. )..,.
[_...._....,,,.,.'..'.
[
- y---.
..-.-3 g..
<.. ; ;.y..,
@ g-
.; :. ; 3 ;.
i g
- 9. v
.- a c ; -,.
2
. g n p u. m, ' -...
'g 4
[kS'b M l( )(*I
'I*:is".
I i I '..
e g'
. [j
( h -
.4'..'.et j[..
I
. :g #-
4
- 1
~ < -
.. x n-.
- 3.,
...,e...
,m....
. e.
w
..'m v,, h -' % ' y h. '.
- $ ' k ' 8 *'
I
i 4 I
9'l'-
-r
(,I'*
.a l
+
~
t i
. b i '.5
".,, A a -
m:gv w i 7a v
U..?.er s -S eq,,
'r:
E jy g
i p 4 (.,4 -
,,., i r -,.
=,..
,ji;'...
.e r
i g.,
V..
.. ',;7 c
g h,
to l
~
t g.
c,
.g
....I.
fa4
.t..*
t
@u.
4 5
8 G
O
1 1
4 i
a 3
FIVE G:\\HU_ DATA \\NIV PI OOl SiWINFIVF 8)lPE E E IS?\\lPE E E TS2.PFU i
Elle Edit Define Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults Help i
runn:,
W: ' gs..
,~..
........... w L:w..a enw l-f
'Y.t N
gmtm,.
- ~
m.~x m s....
'- m
- 4
? 9,t 4CT W Xg;* in
%.- U.a...i
.;. n....
4 g
l_
,'l
- ' ! ' ' a l ' s...
$.C.
. k. L nG_........
^;
....x..-
..on.
,lh.
^
g i.-mA v
.-w.
py, Y-Q),;.
' Af f.K'f.-.
j
- f:;. 4
..'}$w.. r
. c 4, peg. v ag...
N N
s w.
. If pkg
~
f
.h.*
--T pg.'.;. p.r
- I m' v' m'.* b,f..g.,. '3..
$4 1
.l
' e*.. y,.
,'.11 -
.3 5
I pwg
-q r
- v..M...
- g 4
,e.
- f. w". -
s l
t ga
,4 I
i
.t2 -
g.
7
.f
- A
l -..
d
- i i
- -
' ']
[
.,[ ].
t't 7 h k,','
3 68 rr.
e e
,*l g
9 s
I Sn
.v, l
yn
.:.L....
j 3,.
v.
l i
i t
I a
i I
f h
l i
b 1
4 e
i i
}
_ _. _ _ _ _ _ ~..
-==
FIVE G:\\BU _ DATA \\NIV PTOOL S\\WINF IVE 89PE E E IS2)lPE E E TS2.PFU l
file Edit Define Reference Iables Evaluate Fire Modeling Besults Help KN.'~
?' [QS
~
A..
qw
. :.,~ c m
3%,..
cl
~"
-3 w-n".ew - - -."_in: L.
L. 5 ? s+
._. m '".'a...
-z.
,,i
,.9
.m.-
. e'It r
[.,,.,. * ' -
.w
,b
- e'
,8
'S
'A*
- N r
,.;#y'{.,,
.. e' e.,
- w. < :.
n u:,.L '
u 7.Ji;'f...;'if$ E: '. - Ce. 4$$.:
~
77s
&:#;& 41.. e :. 2.
-L.-
4 l,/...Lf,....
..f.'..,',;
h
' h k-" ~$9: g <'
I
. m. s.} w.
. y :. :-
i
>gy; A *f;,,e gc j a, ~. -
Of - Mfd',kAL ':l.t4 h = 1 Lh.
..e_..._
--..J.
-. g #.,...
'./.s p d y Wyjguy??,^4." d,'
Q[ ' \\'
' 13. ~ ^'.T...
die @
e D'b. g' A
.. cy r,
a.,
a
. ft
,x.;
- p-r, ;; _ : % ;:-,
. cj,.
~.
E~,,,...
m.
?
.t,.
a-
- i..e 7-
/
..i,.
g.
/
s
,,N Fl
..Fl t
4>
'e h 3.~
s
'L+.
jh-; ';e.
,y '.
.. ;.. :.g 6Y
~,.
%).,' '
{N ?
PE..
N-If a
- - _. ~.
i l
i i
G FIVE G:\\B [ DATA \\NFVPIOOLS\\WINFIVE8\\lPEEEIS2)lPEEETS2.PRJ l
Elle Edit Qefine Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults ticip
.'f..
. u_. ma c.a A' ' po-., s a u a' u...
.y
- . r,...-
4 9
e.
.ap q
.m f
. ~ s.
~... '.
- n..,
gyr:fr..,...
,.T. ?:h.
l
- m m
...i..
~.
a4 g
%w.m f l
'.((
kkf'kI;'
yig ?
, 4 +,, ~ mosi.
. g.
g 1
I l
8 i
NF i
I s -
L n
.,: 3,...
.4 5
)'
~
i DJ l
f g4
,..,___.,_m..
'5da' y
p *,
' ~.
4%.;
w.
l i
l i
e i
I, J
1 i
4 0
l I
f
(
i.
,i i
l l
G FIVE G:\\B U _ DATA \\NFVPT O OL S\\ WIN FIVE 8\\lPE E E T S2\\lPE E E TS2.PFU File Edit Define Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults Help.
.,. T. y*+ y',. g I
M, T,,y,c. r.b -..
,........ -., - m..
'm w, :,. 'r y,-. + - ;"'
,^
- s.
- d.s>
,.%. y '
s.' '-
,~?
- 9. " (g,'
~
~
... <\\ s
..M.'
2.Id
~
I' " I ' ' -
I.
l''
f i
i' i fy,
\\...,
?
. ~.
.. ~.....
.,.c +.. mn N' $,
x,Y...
A
?'
$iI
^ ?*
,.c.m,ww
,(
,e
+ u.
[
y n; a.m..
n
- NN.....'- ig[-
. ) @ C P N U -7.3..~, 2.W' e,y *. p * *. i ' - - H. M.. vg?./.t '4 ' xt 4
i
~
t.
-r n'
u, A*
,.j.
.i g.r;g... -'
l
,7
.~
i a
i l
I 12 4
l g
r 1
s l
l t
k.w...
...._....___b4-p,
'i~
h i
l I
s r
I i
i F
4 J
i f
1; 1
1 1
a I
1
)
j E
FIVE - GSU_ DATA \\NP\\FPT00LS)WINFIVE8)lPEEETS2\\lPEEETS2.PRJ Elle Edit Define Reference Iables Evaluate Fire Modeling Besults ticip t
,X' W:., w;.. v,e %....
=...
,.,..m..%.
...-m.4
~ ~ }3 +.....,
pq9.fy. w.I on -
.a-:.-
v : :s a
Ali stMEvj,.
. 1. K.
g
.m.'.
- a
. nwr,w...,f.
C*
m......,,.y "v*'
- d. 4.f=...
4-S r;.,sg: qw;g. -.
A01 4
3c.""' ""
i
. " ' M--w t ';Re
/s;i p fg ;........;... ;
' - >> 5.
J._7ts'{ S k,
.,~
'~
?b i
~
. x ut.e... n 2._.
_..-_.......__,...,m._...
y.s ggvL.
U gi;g-v I
fj@
(Ter@' k ' ~'.,
l g..
4
.L,'.,. ; >.
syyt><s-'
%;qg,4,
.- w
,g er. '
g;
- k..
d c
8 g
. $,..s.y.
\\
t I
p...
j t
t.
l
\\
/
j t.-
l y
.~1 1
,F-g, m
t V
bi.:.
_ p pa w..
i i
f i
l l
l l
i r
l i
i
'l N
t
(
]
1 l
l e
I
I
\\
l I
l i
I FIVE G S U _ DATA \\N FVPT OOL S\\ WIN FIVE 8)lPE E E TS2\\lPE E E TS 2.PFU I.
==
i l
Elle Eidit Define Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults Help j
l
.M om
-uce 4.pi.w m
f I
+-l' ;t r
. 5h
- 6v%
fl,_ *(&,^&b.w --- - -
- ce ; ski 24&lM1Li%
I
)
hh' i
7h
.e T
ld i
i
't 12 i
d i
l 1
5 l
e i
I l
5.
(
1 i
i i
I s
(
l i
j l
l 4
b
\\
d I
1 i
e a
i 1
4 l
l
}
l
=
FIVE G:\\BU _DA T A\\NIV P T OOL S)WINF lVE 8VPE E E TSSVPE E E IS2.PFU l
Eile Edit Qefine Reference Iables Evaluate Fire Modeling Besults ticip l
'w.
t, u..
3 b,f(f'.
,y.,'
M *1 I.iii.Lklii.,.
7
... s g
2..',__
t j
d --
AHI j*h'f
{ '.'
f' y y'.' 'e
+*
.m 1
l
' i *.
.( ' $ a i. '.1 A.'.- - '
g i
.f., ' ' '
' ~ -,
'[
' ,.g l
) <. l eq 4 Q.e, (i, l- ^
- L.
"y~
-m^
_ A' _ ', '
& p }s s.
k'$ ;
n
,b.+
As l
l,
?
.l I
1 e
4 Y.d'$5 '?
\\
s.
'IS I:,'-
i
{
.g
,. 4 /.,.a,.
i,., % - (..
t
)
.,3..
.. f. q.......
r
.g 4,
g tw #
l ggy y.
.m..._.....
. m' t n
'-!jV***
- ,t' f. ;,,"
'g 1 Jt wy
..m
{~ k:t.:h, n, '. ~ '. '..
)
.. :, N-.. -
., 54 g
L
' ~ ^
. :n
.. ' b b.hs.:. : 1.,, ;.
kg.
.g l'.
, _..,b
.b f
3
....s 4.,
l l
[.
l w
-me
,i.T $' '
4.
Ia.c-*y, h -....
4,,.' r' g
a s
e f " i' '. '.
f
. ~. 2 ~
y.
.e_'.%
e
[p,
,: - [; q.. ',:~ n,.
l
~
v ' '..
- +
~
i I
p -
{ '..
)
4..'
.b/
.g '4 5,
i W^.
Y'h.,' $
l i
1, 8
t i
1 1
J v
i l
1 4
i e
b I
4 i
1 4
1 1
a' I
'l 1
1 d
j a
t l
i 1,
i
.am FIVE G :\\BU DAT A\\NP\\F PT 00LS) WIN FIVE 8\\lPE E E TS2\\lPE E E TS2.PFU i
i Elle Edit Define Reference Iables Eyaluate Fire Modeling Besults Help 1.
1
.,3.,
' - + -
{g i.p ]
'q[,,. 4 '
... ;,'.. 7
,,'.J.'
p.
'* i l
$.,(?..
lk T l.(' '
^U' r -
?-
t t;N h...
";7,'j spt - 7,'
c %.. m. m...
.m.;_
lM t$'4
{
,.jti '.r l.'..
4 4
)
- ,'i.....
..., -,a
....,_,.,..}',.
.' :t.;. v
- 4 a
- .v.
- n. g.
~
(.:. 3...
e,.., _4,.
1
./ p,
'- 1
('
,,.n'.^
/ :y W.*
^
y-
^
y
,4'.-
g.
e' ;
?
[, l *
^
?k..
I 1
%.:7 -
....... (/\\
j
- p. :
. 4,4 Msg.
.y.
.l.
I r,r -
.,_ r,;; _ -
1 p
g l
w--
j g
i 4
n l
l I
w 6
1 t$.
-l f ',< p l. l -.,
i.
t s
s 4
1 T
a l
l lis, L_.. e
- .a.;.m.
. :.y.,' :.
l i
Li. - -
^
go.
d.%'
p:: -
e
\\
1 a
e 4
j e
4 J
7 i
l 1
t 1
4 1
.l,
value for cable from Table 1E, Damage Threshold Criteria, which is 700 degrees F. The most immediate action is to power down MCCIB32.
15.
In Section 4.6.2 it is stated that "The cable spreading room fire and vital switchgear room fires have alternate shutdown as the only power supply." Please provide a description of this alternate shutduwn capability. Is it a power supply or a control point? What functions are supporteil from these alternate shutdown points?
The basic function of the Altemate Shutdown System is to provide power and control to all equipment necessary for altemate shutdown during a postulated fire in the 4160 Volt switchgear room.
The following is a description of the components which comprise the Alternate Shutdown System and each of their basic functions:
- 1. A 480 volt secondary unit substation (SUSS) supplied independently of the existing 4160 volt switchgear including control power. The SUSS is made up of a 2500 kva,13,800 volt to 480 volt, transformer (X-08). Power is supplied to the SUSS from 13.8 kV bus H-01.
The SUSS is divided into two bus sections B-08 and B-09 which are utilized to feed all loads having a rating 200 hp/kva or greater in addition to the 1/2P-002A charging pumps. The SUSS is designed to allow the future addition of a reserve transformer (X-09) which could be supplied by a proposed diesel generator. The
)
SUSS is supplied with 125 volt de control power from batteries D-105/106. The l
control power complies with the independence requirements.
- 2. A 480 volt motor control center (B-81) is supplied from the SUSS.
- 3. An attemate shutdown control panel (C-045) provides the operator with a single work station to remotely operate and monitor the status of the safe shutdown (Appendix R) loads. The control panel provides a mimic representation of the electrical one-line of the alternate shutdown system.
- 4. Seventeen 480 volt switches perform as manually operated double throw switches, disconnect switches, or manual transfer switches depending on their respective applications.
- a. The double throw switch shall be utilized to dedicate (transfer) the alternate source to a specific load (i.e. - P-032B or P-032F).
- b. The transfer switch is utilized to select either the normal or the altemate source from which the respective load will be supplied.
OO
j
- c. The disconnect switch is used as a local means for connecting a power cable to the component cooling water pumps in the event of a fire in the CCW pump area.
The cables have been routed and the existing cables have been rerouted to comply with the Appendix R requirements for a postulated 4160 volt vital switchgear room fire. In addition the alternate shutdown ensures that a source of 480 volt power will be available to the safe shutdown loads in the case of a postulated fire in the following fire zones: 305 (4160 volt vital switchgear room),318 (cable spreading room), and 326 (the control room).
The following equipment can be supplied by the alternate shutdown system:
4 Service water pumps P-32B, P-32F, P-32E, P-32C 1
Charging Pumps 1P-002A,2P-002A Component Cooling Water Pumps IP-011 A, IP-OllB,2P-011 A,2P-01IB (not 4
hard wired)
Residual Heat Removal Pumps IP-010A, IP-010B,2P-010A,2P-010B Swing Battery Charger D-109.
16.
From the discussions in the submittalit can only be inferred that both units share the same cable spreading room, control room, and vital switchgear room (i.e. 4160 f
VAC power supply). Please provide a brief description of these rooms and describe any other areas or compartments that are shared between the two units. For each of these rooms or areas, provide either the justification for screening, or an analysis of dual unit fire-induced core damage scenarios, including core damage frequency contribution.
The cable spreading room contains both trains of 480 VAC safeguards buses for both units and their associated transformers. It also contains DC distribution panels, inverters, and cables. The room has concrete walls, floor and ceiling. It is 79 feet long,47 feet wide and 17 feet high. Photoelectric smoke detection and reate compensation heat detection is provided in this zone. Automatic fire suppression is provided by a single-active failure proof, automatic Halon 1301 total flooding suppression system tested to provide a 5% concentration. The cable spreading room shares a smoke exhaust fan with the control room.
The control room contains the main control boards, DC distribution panels and instrument racks. The room has a carpeted floor, drywall for walls and ceiling tiles. 25%
of the ceiling tiles were removed to allow for natural circulation cooling with the concrete ceiling above. The control room is 82 feet long,50 feet wide and 16 feet high. There is no automatic fire suppression. Smoke detectors are located in the control room and in the control boards. The control room shares a smoke exhaust fan with the cable spreading O
room. There is one control room for both units at Point Beach.
d
4 i
The vital switchgear room at the time of the submittal contained both trains of 4160 VAC l
switchgear for both units. It has been modified so only Train A of safeguards for both units are in the vital switchgear room. There are also safeguards battery chargers and DC distribution panels in the room. The room is 67 feet long,26 feet 10 inches wide and 17 feet 2 inches high. The walls, ceiling and floor are all concrete with the exception of the j
north wall which is hollow concrete block. Fire detection is provided by photoelectric j
smoke detection and rate compensation heat detection. Automatic fire suppression is provided by a single active failure-proof, automatic, total flooding Halon 1301 gaseous l
suppression system, tested to provide a 6% concentration for 10 minutes. At the time of the submittal there was one vital switchgear room for both units at Point Beach.
j The PBNP fire PSA considered the effects of fire on dual unit operations. Compartments l
which are common to both units are listed in column 2 of the following table. Column 3 of the table provides a brief description of the area. Column 4 provides the phase or step l
at which the compartment was screened if appropriate. Where the fire compartment did not screen, the core damage frequency is listed in column 4.
Area Fire Description of Fire Reason Screened or Compartment Compartment Core Damage Frequency A01 General Plant Note 1.
Areas 101 RHR Valve Pit / Sump Phase II Step 2 Pump Room 113 RHR Access Corridor Phase 11 Step 3 Elevation -5 ft i17 Sump Tank & Pump Phase II Step 2 i
Room 122 Water Treating Phase II Step 2 Equipment Area 123 Water Treatment Acid FCIA Tank Room 124 Water Treatment FCIA Caustic Tank Room 128 Holdup Tank Room FCIA T8A 129 Holdup Tank Room FCIA T8B 130 Holdup Tank Room-FCIA T8C 131 Holdup Tank Pump Phase II Step 2 Room O
138 Boric Acid Evaporator Phase 11 Step 3 Room North
Area Fire Description of Fire Reason Screened or Compartment Compartment Core Damage j
Frequency 139 Borie Acid Evaporator Phase II Step 3 Room South 141 Aux. Bldg. 8 ft Phase II Step 3 Corridor North 142 CCW Pump Room Phase II Step 3 142A Condensate Return Phase II Step 3 Pump Room 4
143 Aux. Bldg. 8 ft Phase II Step 3 Corridor South 4
148 Waste Holdup Tank Phase II Step 3 room 149 Waste Evap. Pump Phase 11 Step 3 Room 150 Waste Evap. Cond.
Phase II Step 3 Tank Room 151 Containment Spray and Safety Injection 3.562E-09, Pump Room O
\\
158 Laundry Tank Room Phase II Step 2 159 HVAC Equipment Phase II Step 2 Room 167 Cryogenics Equipment Phase II Step 2 Room 168 Decay Tank Room Phase II Step 2 184 Aux. Bldg. 26 ft Phase II Step 3 Corridor South 185 Chem. Mixing Tank Phase II Step 3 Room 187 Monitor Tank Room 4.860E-06 190 Gas Strip. Equipment FCIA Room North 191 Gas Strip. Equipment FCIA Room South 192 Valve Gallery FCIA 193 Unit 1 Mixed and FCIA Deborate.
Demineralizer Room 194 Unit 1 Non-Regen.
FCIA
/~
Demineralizer Room 195 Ion-Exchanger Room Phase II Step 2 North
i l
Area Fire Description of Fire Reason Screened or Compartment Compartment Core Damage l
Frequency L
196 Borie Acid Equipment Phase II Step 3 Room 197 Ion-Exchanger Room FCIA South l
l 203 Transfer Canal FCIA 204 Transfer Canal FCIA 205 North Spent Fuel Pool FCIA 206 South Spent Fuel Pool FCIA 207 Radwaste Drum FCIA Storage Room 208 Radwaste FCIA Solidification 209 Truck Access Area FCIA 213 Conc. Holding Tank Phase II Step 3 Room 215 Conc. Transfer Pump Phase II Step 3 Room 217 Aux. Bldg. 26 ft Phase II S,tep 3 e
Corridor North 222 Water Treatment FCIA Chemical Storage Room 223 Water Treatment FCIA Hopper Area 224 Emergency Shutdown Phase II Step 2 Room 231 Operations Group FCIA Office 232 Operations Group FCIA Office 233 Office Phase 11 Step 2 234 Office Phase II Step 2 235 Office FCIA 236 Office Phase II Step 2 237 CCW HX and Boric Phase II Step 2 Acid Tank Room 238 Gas Stripper Phase II Step 2 l
Equipment Room El.
l 46 n j'
239 Spent Fuel Pool and FCIA j
Boric Acid Filter Room
l Area.
Fire Description of Fire Reason Screened or Compartment Compartment Core Damage Frequency f
240 Waste Gas Equipment FCIA l
Room 241 New Fuel Storage FCIA l
244 Drum Preparation Area FCIA j
271 Aux. Bldg. Service Phase II Step 2 Area El. 66 ft 274 Fuel Handling Phase II Step 2 Platform -
302 Electrical Shop Phase 11 Step 2 317 Instrument Shop FCIA 319 Non-Vital Switchgear 3.697E-06 Area
]
320 Condensate Storage Phase II Step 3 Tank Area 325 Telephone Equipment Phase II Step 2 Room 338 Elevator Machine Phase II Step 2 Room 365 Corridor and Service FCIA Bldg. Offices s
382 Corridor and Service Phase II Step 2 Bldg. Offices 26 ft.
397 Foyer and Service FCIA Bldg. Offices 40 ft.
554 Pumphouse FCIA Passageway 555 Pumphouse Valve FCIA Gallery 576 Fuel Oil Storage Tanks FCIA 587 Turbine Hall 26 ft.
Phase II Step 2 Toilet 666 Manhole No.10 FCIA 680 Station Aux.
FCIA Transformers 682 Manhole No. 3 FCIA 683 Manhole No. 4 Phase II Step 2 684 Manhole No. 5 Phase II Step 2 685 Manhole No. 9 Phase II Step 2 689 Manhole No. 20 Phase II Step 2 698 Main Transformer Unit Phase II Step 2
Area Fire Description of Fire Reason Screened or Compartment Compartment Core Damage Frequency A01A Fire Area A01 Outlying Areas-Switchyard 671 Manhole No. 7 FCIA 672 Manhole No. 8 Phase II Step 2 673 Switchyard Control Phase II Step 2 House 674 Manhole No. 6 Phase II Step 2 A01B Fire Area A01 Outlying Areas-13.8 KV Switchgear Building &
Vicinity 675 13.8 KV Switchgear FCIA Building 676 13.8 KV Switchgear Phase II Step 2 Building p
677 13.8 KV Switchgear FCIA t
Building 686 Manhole No.17 FCIA 687 Manhole No.18 Phase II Step 2 688 Manhole No.19 FCIA 695 Manhole No.14 FCIA 696 Manhole No.15 FCIA 697 Manhole No.16 Phase II Step 2 A01C Fire Area A01 Outlying Areas-Gas Turbine Building 681 Gas Turbine 2.0423-05 A01D Fire Area A01 Outlying Areas -
North Yard 693 Manhole No.12 Phase I 694 Manhole No.13 Phase I 751 Bechtel Building Phase I l
A01E Fire Area A01 Outlying Areas-(
South Yard 557 Manhole B FCIA 577 Manhole No. I1 Phase II Step 1 i
Area Fire Description of Fire Reason Screened or (g
Compartment Compartment Core Damage Frequency A09 Unit 1 Fan Rooms 160 Aux. Bldg. Stack Phase I Exhaust Fan Room
.161 Filter Exhaust Fan Phase I Room A16 D106 Battery Room 225 D106 Battery Room Phase 11 Step 2 A17 Electrical Equipment Room 226 Electrical Equipment Phase II Step 2 Room A18 Electrical Equipment Room 227 Electrical Equipment Phase 11 Step 2 Room A19 D105 Battery Room j]
228 D105 Battery Room Phase II Step 2 (J
A20 Heating Boiler Room 221 Heating Boiler Room Phase I A21 Heating Boiler Day Tank Room A 252 Day Tank Room A Phase I A22 Heating Boiler Day Tank Room B 253 Day Tank Room B Phase 1 2
A23 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room 304 Auxiliary Feedwater 2.510E-06 Pump Room A.24 Vital Switchgear Room 305 Vital Switchgear 2.510E-06 4
Room
^
D06 Battery Room
^-
j 306 D06 Battery Room Phase II Step 2 A26 D05 Battery Room 307 D05 Battery Room Phase II Step 2 A27 3D Diesel Room
Area Fire Description of Fire Reason Screened or Compartment Compartment Core Damage Frequency 308 3D Diesel Room 5.518E-06 q
A28 4D Diesel Room i
309 4D Diesel Room 5.840E-06 A29 Air Compressor Room 310 Instrument and Service Phase II Step 2 Air Compressor Room A30 Cable Spreading Room 318 Cable Spreading Room 2.630E-06 l
A31 Control Building Elevation 44 326 Control Room 4.581 E-06 328 Snack Bar Phase II Step 3 1
329 Toilet Phase II Step 3 i
330 HVAC Passage Phase II Step 3
- ' (n) 331 Cable Passage Phase II Step 3 A32 Control Building Elevation 60 333 Office FCIA 334 Office FCIA 335 Computer Room FCIA 336 Instrument Rack Room Phase II Step 2 A33 Control Building HVAC Equipment Room 337 HVAC Equipment Phase 1 Room A34 Office Building 340 Corridor and Office Phase I Building Offices 450 Technical Support Phase I Center A35 Maintenance Building O
430 Maintenance Shop Phase I A37 Unit i Facade Stairway I
i
Area Fire Description of Fire Reason Screened or Compartment Compartment Core Damage Frequency 526 Stainvay 1 Phase I A38 Circulating and Service Water Pump House 550 Manhole No.1 Phase II Step 2 551 Manhole No. 2 Phase 11 Step 2 552 Service Water Pump Phase II Step 2 Room 553 Circulating Water Phase II Step 2 Pump Room A39 South Gatehouse 558 South Gatehouse Phase I Offices A40 Fuel Oil Pump House 578 Vestibule FCIA 579 Transfer Pump Room Phase II Step 2 580 Electrical Equipment FCIA p
Room Closet
()
A41 Flammable Dispensing Room 581 Flammable Dispensing Phase I Room A42 Lubricating Oil Storage Room 582 Lubricating Oil Phase I Storage Room A43 Blowdown Evaporator Building 591 Blowdown Evap.
Phase I Building A44 Gas Stripper Building
~
592 Gas Stripper Building Phase I i
A45 Unit 2 Facade Stairway 597 Stair No. 57 Phase I A47 Extension Building 620 Extension Building Phase I
\\
Offices
Area Fire Description of Fire Reason Screened or Compartment Compartment Core Damage Frequency A48 Warehouse No.1 and Garage 667 Warehouse #1 Phase I 668 Garage Phase I A49 Well Water Pumphouse 669 Well Water Phase I Pumphouse A50 Warehouse No. 2 691 Warehouse No. 2 Phase I A51 Warehouse No. 3 692 Warehouse No. 3 Phase I A52 North Service Building 700 North Service Building Phase 1 Offices A53 Sewage Treatment Plant p
575 Sewage Treatment Phase I
(
Plant A54 D305 SR Battery Room 321 Battery Room Phase II Step 2 A55 Swing Batteries Charger Room 323 Charger Room Phase I A56 D205 NSR Battery Room 324 NSR Battery Room Phase I Note 1 Phase I - Screened area because no reactor trip and no safe shutdown equipment affected.
FCIA - Screened compartment because all boundaries of compartment were acceptable and the compartment did not contain safe shutdown components or plant trip initiators.
Phase II Step 1-Screened compartment if the combined fire initiator event frequency was less than 1.0E-06.
Phase II Step 2 - Screened compartment if combined fire initiator event frequency times unaffected safe shutdown equipment unavailability was less than 1.0E-06.
Phase II Step 3 - Screened compartment if combined fire initiator event frequency times unaffected safe shutdown equipment unavailability times probability of failure to
/b' suppress fire was less than 1.0E-06.
If area was not screened, dual unit core damage frequency (Section 4.6.5) was given in the last column.
17.
From the submittal, it is not clear which areas contain cables or equipment associated with both trains of safety systems. Specifically, there is no mention of cable tunnels or cable shafts. Please provide a description of such areas, and a discussion on the significance level that was assigned to these areas.
There are no cable tunnels or cable shafts at Point Beach. Point Beach uses an alternate shutdown method of plant control rather than protecting redundant safety trains of cable and equipment because there are so many common areas of the plant. Point Beach has identified and protected shutdown path of equipment for plant control.
18.
In Section 4.6.3 a discussion is provided regarding dominant contributors.
However, there is no discussion regarding which fire scenario leads to the dominant contributors. Please provide a discussion relating the dominant contributors and fire scenarios.
The dominant fire scenarios are provided in tables 4.6.4-1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8. These tables also identify major contributors.
19.
From the discussions in the IPEEE submittal it is concluded that only secondary side cooling via the Auxiliary Feedwater System has been credited to prevent core damage after a fire. It appears that no credit is given to bleed and feed or safety injection. Please provide clarification as to which event trees, and which functions 7(d for modeling core damage sequences resulting from a fire event have been used.
As stated in section 4.6 a systemic event tree was used to quantify the results. It is correct that only auxiliary feedwater was credited for decay heat removal even though bleed and feed would also work. Also, only charging is used for success in cooling reactor coolant pump seal cooling, even though component cooling water can also provide this function.
These other systems were available but were not further evaluated. Therefore, we consider the approach and results conservative since these other systems may be available but were not verified. The third function modeled was reactor trip. Core damage was conservatively assumed to occur if any one of the three systems failed.
Because we used the FIVE method which concentrated on protected Appendix R equipment. Other systems may be available, but didn't verify separation from fire. That is why we believe this method is conservative.
p
'J
20.
For inter-zone fire propagation,it is argued that the fire barriers are adequate and
(
that fire compartment interaction analysis screening criteria are, therefore, satisfied. This line of thinking may be acceptable if there are no active fire barriers (e.g., dampers, louvers, or normally open doors). It should be noted that the failure rate of such devices can be as high as 0.2 per demand. Please identify if any adjacent fire compartments linked with active fire barriers that contain cables and equipment from multiple safety trains exist. Also, assuming a failure rate of 0.2 per demand, how will the conclusion that inter-zone fire propagation and its effects are of minimal risk significance be affected?
Active fire barriers like fire dampers are not required to be addressed per the NRC-approved FIVE methodology,if these components have a surveillance program. (See Section 5.2 of EPRI TR-100370, Project 3000-41, Final Report, April 1992, " Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE)") as follows:
5.2.1 Fire Barrier Availability The Phase I Screen takes credit for fire area boundaries (see Definitions 2.1 and 2.2) being effective in controlling a fire from spreading to the other side of a fire barrier. This is based on an assumption that the plant can demonstrate that the fire barriers and their components (i.e. fire doors, fire dampers and fire penetration seal assemblies) are being inspected and maintained on a regular basis in accordance with established plant (V9 su veillance procedures and that appropriate compensatory measures are being taken when discrepancies in the barriers are found. This plant fire barrier surveillance program should be able to satisfy the, intent of the guidelines in Item II of the Sandia Fire Risk Scoping Study Evaluation (Attachment 10.5).
The Point Beach fire barrier surveillance program was reviewed as part of the fire analysis and was found to meet the intent of the guidelines in Item II of the Sandia Fire Risk Scoping Study Evaluation.
I 21.
Please provide an analysis of the effect on fire-induced CDF if the potential for cross zone fire propagation is considered for high hazard areas such as the turbine building, diesel generator rooms, switchgear rooms, and lube oil storage areas. In addition to these general areas, also analyze compartments 245,246 and 318 for cross zone fire propagation.
I With the exception of the turbine hall, the other a eas mentioned are all fire areas, by definition. In accordance with Section of the FIVE methodology a fire is assumed to spread only to the fire area boundaries and not propagate beyond fire area boundaries.
Therefore, consideration of cross zone fire propagation is not appropriate.
In the turbine building, cross zone propagation was considered where fire compartments are open to one another where there is a potential for fire to spread.
i i
22.
In Table 4.1.1-2 it is not clear what is represented by the entries in the third column (i.e., " Potential PTI and SSD"). Please provide an explanation on how to interpret the compartment numbers listed for each compartment in the third column.
Column 3 is a list of the compartments which can cause a plant trip (Plant Trip Initiator, PTI) or loss of safe shutdown system (SSD), if there is a fire in the compartment listed in column 1.
The compartments listed in column 3 are the compartments that could potentially be affected by fire propagation between compartments within a fire area and cause a plant trip or affect a safe shutdown system. This is per the FIVE methodology. This fire compartment interaction analysis (FCIA) follows the method prescribed in the FIVE methodology Section 5.3.6.
23.
Table 4.1.2-1, why are fire frequencies not assigned to some of the compartments?
l The compartments which were screened in the fire compartment interaction analysis (FCIA) are not considered further because a fire in these compartments will not create a demand for plant trip or shutdown (PTI or SSD). Therefore, there is no value added in recording fire frequencies in this table. This follows the prescribed method in the FIVE methodology Section 5.3.6.
24.
In Table 4.1.2-3, for compartments 308 and 309, F3 is equal to 0.00. Please provide an explanation for how this value was obtained.
F3 for compartments 308 and 309 was incorrectly listed as 0.00 in table 4.1.2-3. Section 4.6.5 has the correct values. The table incorrectly reported results because no detailed fire modeling was done on these areas. No detailed fire modeling was performed since it i
was assumed a fire in the diesel generator room would destroy all equipment and cables in the room. For these rooms the F3 ' F2 (i.e., for 308,5.518E-06 and for 309,5.840E-06).
25.
In Section 4.2.1.2,it is stated that " Fire compartments which had initiators that would not damage other equipment had the initiators removed from the database."
This may lead to optimistic results. What were the criteria and analytical basis for such action?
if a piece of equipment can catch fire but damages no other equipment, it will not cause fire spread. It will not be an initiator for a fire in the compartment or adjacent compartments.
4 The damage to the single piece of equipment is already included in the IPE as either the cause of an initiating event, random equipment failure or component maintenance N
(d unavailability depending on the consequences of that equipment failure. Since the IPE component failure data includes all causes of equipment failure, the risk associated with such fires has already been calculated and included in the IPE.
2 1
_ _ ~ _.
26.
In Section 4.2.5,it is stated that " Discrepancies between CHAMPS and general location drawings were resolved by the plant walkdown." From a simple interpretation of this statement,it is not clear how one can verify the location of a specific cable without hand-over-hand tracing of specific cables in the field. Please provide further explanation on how CHAMPS data was verified durirg the l
- walkdown, l
CHAMPS does not contain the cable and raceway schedule. CHAMPS is an equipment list for all of the equipment in the plant. It does not include cables. There were cases i
where safe shutdown components or potential plant trip initiators were shown in one area on the plant drawings, but were listed in a different area of the plant in CHAMPS. These equipment location discrepancies were resolved during the plant walkdowns.
I i
27.
In applying the criteria provided in Section 4.3.2, did the analysts include the 4
possibility of presence of transient fuels? If yes, how was transient fuels loading determined? If transient fuels have not been included, please provide an assessment of the change in IPEEE submittal results when transient fuels are included.
i The Point Beach transient combustible control program provides control of the type and quantity of transient combustibles in the plant. This was accounted for in the FIVE methodology Section 6.3.4.
'O If there were stored combustibles exposed, they were modeled. If not, transients were i
modeled as trash bag fires. This is consistent with the FIVE methodology as approved by the NRC.
i 28.
Table 4.3.2-1 is difficult to interpret. Also, there are references to numbered i
comments in the last column that have not been provided. Please provide an l
explanation of the entries in Table 4.3.2-1.
l The definition of the numbers under criteria as described in the FIVE methodology l
Section 5.3.6 are as follows:
Select Screening Criteria
- 1. Compartments that would have no adverse effect on safe shutdown capability.
- 2. Boundary is 2-hour or 3-hour rated fire barrier on the basis of barrier effectiveness.
- 3. Boundary is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated fire barrier with CCL <80,000 Btu /sq. ft. in exposing cmpartment.
- 4. Exposing compartment has low CCL (<20,000 Btu /sq. ft) and automatic fire detection.
- 5. Exposing and exposed compartment have low CCL (<20,000 Btu /sq. ft.).
- 6. Automatic suppression is installed over combustibles and will prevent spread to adjacent compartments.
O
These are the criteria that were used to screen compartments for fire spread to adjacent compartments. If one of the screening criteria was identified by number in the criteria J
column, fire spread from the initiating compartment in column 1 to the adjacent compartment listed in column 2 was not considered further.
The definition of the numbers under the comments column are as follows:
1.1-Hour Fire Barrier separates compartments
- 2. 2-Hour Fire Barrier separates compartments
- 3. 3-Hour Fire Barrier separates compartments
- 4. Very low combustible loading in exposing compartment (<l/4 hr. EFS)
- 5. Low combustible loading in exposing compartment (<1 hr. EFS)
- 6. Moderate combustible loading in exposing compartment (>l hr. <2 hr. EFS)
- 7. High combustible loading in exposing compartment (>2 hr. EFS)
- 8. Automatic fire detection in exposing compartment
- 9. Automatic fire suppression in exposing compartment
- 10. Very low combustible loading in exposed compartment (<l/4 hr. EFS)
- 11. Low combustible loading in exposed compartment (<1 hr. EFS)
- 12. Moderate combustible loading in exposed compartment (>l hr. <2 hr. EFS)
- 13. High combustible loading in exposed compartment (>2 hr. EFS)
- 14. Automatic fire detection in exposed compartment
- 15. Automatic fire suppression in exposed compartment i
O This table presents the results of the potential for fire propagation between compartments.
v These results determine the fire frequency for a given compartment given fires can spread to the compartment from adjacent compartments unless the adjacent compartment has been screened. The table provides the results of the screening.
29.
It is not clear what is represented by Table 4.6.1-1. Please provide an explanation of the entries in this table, and their relationship with the fire events / compartments presented in the preceding tables.
Table 4.6.1-1 is generated as a result of Phase 2 Step 2 of the FIVE methodology described in Section 6.3.2 of the FIVE methodology.
Table 4.6.1-1 provides the core damage probability for a fire with the identified equipment affected by the fire. The probability of failure of each of these items of equipment is provided in column 2 under unavailability. The unavailability is multiplied by the fire initiating event probability to determine the probability that in a year for a given compartment there will be a fire which will result in core damage. Additional multipliers are provided later such as failure of fire suppression.
t i
G
30.
' The statement is made in Section 4.6.2 that "Long-term local actions required in less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> also used the IPE screening values for HEPs." Please provide a detailed description of how fire event recovery actions were assessed, including how factors such as sequence timing and elevated environmental stressors (e.g., reduced visibility, impaired communications, and impaired accessibility) were accounted for.
IfIPE values were assumed, were they adjusted to reflect reduced reliability during a fire event and, if so, how were they adjusted? IfIPE values were used directly, please provide a justification for not having adjusted the values.
The human reliability analysis (HRA) for the fire area / compartment screening was derived from Appendix B of the EPRI Fire PRA Implementation Guide, dated January 31,1994. These criteria, and their basis are described below:
Control room actions performed entirely within the control room used the IPE screening values. Actions performed from within the control room should generally be unaffected by a fire outside the control room. Since a January 1989 Oconee event showed that smoke generated outside the control room could increase the stress of the control room operators if the smoke reaches the control room, it is prudent to use the more conservative screening value for the HEP, rather than the actual IPE value. IPE screening values are conservative estimates that are meant as upper bounds on actual predicted human error rates. By using these upper bound values rather than best-estimate values, the increased failure probability due to the adverse fire conditions are taken into account.
O Long-term local actions required in less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> also used the conservative IPE screening values.
Long-term local actions where 4 or more hours are available use the IPE values.
Unless precluded by the fire itself, it is assumed that damage from the fire will be mitigated in a relatively short time frame. Thus, long-term actions will not be inhibited by the fire. Operator stress due to the fire should also be at a minimum.
Short term local actions where the action must be performed in the fire compartment used an error probability of 1.0.
For short-term actions where more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> but less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is available used a value of 0.1 if the person performing the action must go through the fire compartment and that person is normally assigned to the fire brigade. If a pre-fire plan existed, the conservative IPE screening value was used.
The above guidance is from the EPRI report.
Based on the above rules, the following HEPs were developed.
O
4 Event ID Description IPE FIVE 3
Value Value HEP-AF--EOP-0-08 Failure to manually start auxiliary feedwater pump after auto 7E-4 7E-4 start fails. (>4 hours available)
HEP-SW--EFOLDOUT.
Failure to supply service water backup to auxiliary feedwater 4E-4 4E-4 i
pump suction (>4 hours available) l HEP-AF--ECA00-XX Failure to control steam generator flow. No longer valid 2E-1 0
l because valves are pre-positioned at the correct position to j
properly control steam generator flow.
HEP-AF--EOP-2-08 Failure to isolate TDP flow to faulted steam generator. Not 8E-3 0
valid. Fire will not cause faulted steam generator.
i HEP-CS--EFOLDOUT Failure to supply hotwell water backup to auxiliary 4E-3 1
i feedwater pump suction. Condensate not an Appendix R
{
fire analysis system. Therefore, assume it always fails.
1 HEP-HHR-EOP13-23 Operator fails to align system for high pressure recirculation.
9E-3 2E-2
[
(Note 1) l HEP-RCS-CSPH1-13 Operator fails to establish bleed and feed. (Note 1) 2E-2 4E-2 HEP-RHR-EOP13-23 Operator fails to align system for low pressure recirculation.
IE-2 2E-2 l
(Note 1) l Note 1: HEP only used in quantification of fire induced small LOCA and fire induced steam line break. These I
events have approximately 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> available for operator
]
action and include both control room and local actions, i
Rather than use the IPE screening values (for control room i
actions) or the IPE values (for local actions) an intermediate criteria of simply doubling the IPE value was used.
j The cable spreading room fire and vital switchgear room fires have alternate shutdown as the only power supply. It was assumed that the operator failing to switch will dominate j
the failure of this sequence (P ) since random equipment failures are small compared to 2
the HEP of 0.05 used in these areas. This same logic applies to control room fires where l
the HEP for the operators successfully avoiding core damage is 0.05 by using the remote l
shutdown panels.
Finally, a detailed analysis was performed on the HEP for the operators to locally open j
MOV LCV-112B, RWST to charging pump suction isolation valve. If the fire was in the same compartment as LCV 112B, the HEP was 1.0. If the fire was in an adjacent i
compartment such that the operator might feel threatened, the HEP was 0.038. Ifit was a j
non-threatening compartment, the HEP was 0.018. No credit was taken for the operator opening the manual bypass valve around LCV-112B or emergency boration through j
valve CV-350.
These are all the operator actions which showed up in the fire analysis cutsets as major contributors.
31.
On pages 32,62, and 75 of Section 4 of the submittal,it is stated that EPRI's Fire PRA Procedures Guide has been used. It should be noted that the FIVE methodology has been approved by the NRC, whereas EPRI's Fire PRA Procedures Guide has not yet been approved. The following specific issues have been mentioned in the submittal:
Heat release rate Equipment damage "Certain FIVE conservatism's" e
For these issues, please specify what information, different from FIVE, has been used in the IPEEE submittal. How do these modifications impact the CDF and final analysis results?
The EPRI fire PRA procedures guide was only used as a guide as support of the implementation of the FIVE methodology. Heat release rates from the guide were used when FIVE did not have them available. FIVE also does not address temperature required to damage equipment. Therefore, the implementation guide.was used to (3
determine the temperatures required to damage equipment. This method of addressing V
these two issues merely provided information required by, but not available in the FIVE methodology.
The last issue on FIVE conservatisms were addressed by using EXCEL spreadsheets developed by SAIC. The FIVE conservatisms were: any fire in the compartment disabled all cables and equipment in the compartment and if automatic fire suppression does not actuate, it cannot be initiated manually. The final step was to perform detailed fire modeling in the compartments, which were significant contributors to fire core damage frequency. These spreadsheets were provided in the IPEEE submittal in Tables 4.6.4-1 through 4.6.4-8. This approach did reduce the fire CDF by " sharpening the pencil" on some of the significant CDF contributors in FIVE.
32.
On page 66 of the submittal a value of 0.02 is specified for wet-pipe sprinider system failure probability. Such high system reliability is acceptable for systems that have been designed, installed and maintained in accordance with the appropriate industry standards, such as those published by the NFPA. Please provide the basis for the assumed failure probabilities for the automatic detection and suppression systems (other than Halon) at Point Beach.
The Point Beach automatic detection and wet pipe sprinkler system has been designed, installed and maintained per the applicable sections of the NFPA standards.
v e
1 k
i l
33.
On page 74 of the submittalit is stated that "For short term actions where more than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> but less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is available,... " It is not clear if the operators can be 90% reliable in conducting plant control duties while fighting the fire. Please i
provide the rationale for using the probability values across all fire scenarios.
The 0.1 value is a bounding value which assumes the following worst case conditions:
)
- 1. All fires progress immediately to cable fires requiring suppression by the fire brigade.
- 2. Operator actions in the fire area or those normally performed by members of the i
fire brigade will not be able to be performed.
2
- 3. The Point Beach fire brigades are composed of plant operating personnel who are intimately familiar with plant layout and the location and operation of plant safe shutdown equipment.
This analysis does not assume that operators will be 90% reliable while suppressing a 3
fire, rather it assumes that they will not be able to perform the plant control duties.
4 Because the manual suppression value is the dominant failure probability, the bounding i
suppression value is substituted for the operator failure probability.
l 34.
Both fire-induced damage and automatic suppression system activation titres for j
one of the fire scenarios are so short as to be physically unrealistic. While it can be j
reasonably assumed that predicted short times to fire damage are bounding, the i
i combined effect of short times for both critical damage and automatic suppression system activaticn may not be bounding. For example,in Table 4.6.4-1 time to cable j
damage and time to automatic detection and suppression are 35 and 9 seconds, respectively. Based on the uncertainties associated with the time for automatic j
suppression system activation, please provide a sensitivity analysis for fire induced core damage frequency if automatic suppression system activation times are i
uniformly increased.
In this case, there is a wet pipe sprinkler located 5 feet above the base of the pump which is the source of the fire, a oil fire with I gallon of oil. The time to suppress and time to j
damage were calculated from the fire modeling module of FIVE. The target cable height j
is 11 feet above the source. The wet pipe sprinkler, a wet bulb type is located 5 feet 1
above the source in the plume. The time to cable damage is 78 seconds. So, even if the time to automatic actuation were increased by a factor of 8, the results would be i
unaffected. A copy of the calculation is attached.
l We used the numbers from the fire modeling to provide a relative idea for the potential for fire spread and not an exact damage threshold. They were used for applying engineering judgment as to the potential for fire spread or ignition of combustibles.
O
35.
Unrealistic manual suppression times have been used. Time to suppress must include detection time, brigade assembly time and the time that it takes to effectively suppress the fire. For those areas where manual suppression prior to critical damage is credited, please provide a sensitivity analysis for the fire induced core damage frequency using more realistic manual suppression times.
i Manual suppression is used in five fire zones. Zones 156 and 166 have 1137 seconds to l
cable damage. Zones 245 and 246 have >l500 seconds to target damage and Zone 318 has 1871 seconds to target damage. Using manual suppression times up to about 19 minutes has no effect on the adysis since target damage does not occur before this.19 minutes is considered a more conservative suppression time.
This is considered adequate considering the conservatism in the fire modeling method provided in the FIVE methodology. For example, the FIVE fire model assumes maximum fire heat release at time 0.
O i
I i
O I
l j.' g Attachment C U
NRC RAI Concerning PBNP IPEEE HIGH WINDS. FLOODS AND OTHERS (HFOs) OUESTIONS:
1.
Please provide a list of any significant changes, with respect to plant design against flooding and transportation and nearby facility accidents, that have taken place since the time the plant Operating License (OL) was issued.
4 The Point Beach IPEEE factored in the existing as-built condition of the plant for flooding and transportation and nearby facility accidents. Since the IPEEE examination for HFOs did not specifically credit any original analysis for the OL, the extensive effort i
of evaluating all changes to the plant over the past 25 years for their impact on resistance to HFOs is not warranted.
~
2.
Please provide the details of the quantification (and explanation of scenarios) for arriving at your CDF for a tornado-induced loss of offsite power. Include in your response the identification of any recovery actions considered in the analysis.
The details of the quantification and explanation of the scenarios is provided in Appendix lp G of NUREG/CR-4458, " Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Analysis of a Westinghouse 2 Loop Pressurized Water Reactor."
N i
j 3.
Please provide the results/ findings of the walkdown effort, as they relate to flood events and transportation and nearby facility accidents.
l The results/ findings of the walkdown effort as they relate to transportation and nearby I
facilities is provided in sections 5.3.2,5.4.1 and 5.4.2 of the Point Beach IPEEE 1
submittal. The walkdown for flooding events found all roof drains and heights of roof walls to be adequate. The walkdown also identified the storm drains outside the circulating water pumphouse to be pluggable. Therefore, these storm drains were not credited in the external flooding analysis.
4 4.
Please provide a discussion of the effects of flooding the Turbine Building given that
).
a substantial amount of water enters the building. Please include in your discussion a description of the possible effects that such a flood might have on the ability to L emove decay heat via feed and bleed cooling.
Emergency procedures are in place that call for sandbagging the turbine building doors if there is a high lake level. Appendix F of the USI TAP A-45 study assumes that once the flood level exceeds the height of the sandbags, a substantial amount of water enters the turbine building. The probability exceeding the height of the sandbags is 2.8E-06 events O
per reactor year.
J e
l 1
Once the turbine hall for each unit is breached, the condenser pits for each unit will fill up. The condenser pit for each unit holds 180,000 gallons of water. This would bring the water level up to the floor elevation of the turbine building. As the water level rises in the turbine building it will eventually reach a height where it will fail the doors from the turbine building to the auxiliary building. The safety injection, RHR, charging, CCW and containment spray pumps are all located on the 8 fi elevation of the auxiliary building. The external flooding analysis assumed once the turbine hall is flooded the equipment in the adjacent areas at the 8 ft elevation will fail with a probability of unity.
This results in a failure of both instrument and service air compressors, auxiliary l
feedwater pumps, and two diesel generators. Without air compressors the PORVs cannot l
be opened to depressurize the RCS. This coupled with the loss of auxiliary feedwater removes all methods for RCS depressurization. Without depressurization the resulting failure probability of bleed and feed cooling is unity.
l Therefore, the core damage frequency as a result of external flooding is equal to the probability of exceedence of the flood protection elevation times unity. The core damage frequency is equal to 2.8E-06 per reactor year.
OG v
.. -..