ML20116M419

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USI Ipeee,Equipment Fragilities for 1B-03,1B-04,2B-03, 2B-04,1C-151-155,1C-156-157,1C-161-165,2C-161-165 & 2C-166-167
ML20116M419
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach, 05000310  
Issue date: 04/10/1995
From:
STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES
To:
Shared Package
ML20116M418 List:
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR C-017, C-017-R00, C-17, C-17-R, NUDOCS 9608200149
Download: ML20116M419 (55)
v • d • e


Text

i JOB NO. 91C2696 Calculttien C-017 Sheet 1 of 8

SUBJECT:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/31/95 USl A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Rev..ision 0 Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USlIPEEE, Equipment Fragilities for By: A. Karavoussianis a structural-mechanical 1B-03,1BW, 2B43,2B44,1C-151-155,

//. E.

consulting engineering firm 10-156-157,1 C-161 -165, 2C-151 -155, Check: K. B. Mehta 2C-161-165 and 2C-166-167 M

i Table of Contents obiective......

2 i

Summary...............................................................................

2

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Analytical Methods and Calculations...........

3 j

R e fe re n ce s..............................................................

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9608200149 960015 PDR ADOCK 05000266 PDR p

JOB NO. 91C2696 Calculation C-017 Sheet 2 of 8

SUBJECT:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/31/95 1

USl A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation

/(~'s Revision 0

)

Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USIIPEEE, Equipment Fragilities for By: A. l$aravoussianis a structural mechanical 18-03,1B'-04, 2B-03,2B 04,1C-151-155, 4

consulting engineering firm 1 C-156-157,1 C-161 -165, 2 C-151 155, Check: K. B. Mehta 2C-161-165 and 2C-166167 h

i Objective l

{

The objective of this calculation is to document a median fragility for the following cabinets; 1B-l 03,1B-04, 28-03,28-04,1C-151-155,1C-156-157,1C-161-165,2C-151-155,2C-161-165 and 2C-166-167. These cabinet have similar anchorage details. The anchorage consists of welding

}

the base of the cabinet to the perimeter steel of the grout pads (ref. 2). There is no positive anchorage between the perimeter steel and concrete.

j The median fragility will be establish by examining the stability of the free standing cabinets on 4

flat surfaces, based on kinetic energy balance (ref. 4).

1 IQ tg Summary This calculation shows that the cabinet anchorage is controlled by friction between the grout l

]

pads and the concrete floo. All of the above cabinets have a median fragility of 0.45 G and pc is 0.23.

i f

JOB NO. 91C2696 Criculaticn C-017 Sheet 3 of 8

SUBJECT:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/31/95

p USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Revision 0 i

Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USlIPEEE, Equipment Fragilities for By: A. Karavoussianis a structural-mechanical 1B-03,1844, 28-03,28-04,1C 151-155, N.#.

consulting engineering firm 1 C-156-157,1 C-161 165, 2C-151 -155, Check: K. B. Mehta l

2C-161-165 and 2C-166-167

/MR Analytical Methods and Calculations According to the study by Housner (ref. 4), the stability of a rocking of a rigid structure may be estimated by comparing the energy input with the energy required to overtum the structure. If the energy is computed from the velocity response spectrum, Sv, of the earthquake ground i

motion, the requirement for overtuming is I

c.g.

G R pV o

S,,

IMR*

""Qyla where, M is the mass and lo is the rotational mass moment of inertia of the block, or for slender 2

structures or simplification, MR /lo has a value close to unity (conservative assumption) so that; a = h ; Hence, the capacity is ; Sr.ca. = GM The demand will be derived from the IPEEE floor response spectrum, which has a reference peak ground acceleration of 0.40 G (PGA). Since, all of the cabinets are located in the same building at the same elevation, they will have the same demand. Hence, the peak S,, ocu. is equal to 9.64 in/sec at 4.2 Hz for the Control Building at elevation 28'-0" north-south direction at 5% damping (ref.1). The median fragility for a slender rigid block can be calculated by; GM Median Fragility = Sy,ogy.Sr.ca' x PGA = 9 64 x 0.40 G

JOB NO. 91C2696 Cilculation C-017 Sheet 4 of 8

SUBJECT:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/31/95 USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation Rev..ision 0 Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USilPEEE, Equipment Fragilities for By: A. Karavoussianis a structural-mechanical 18-03,18-04, 2B 03,28-04,1C 151-155,

  1. 2 I

conselting engineering firm 1 C-156-157,1 C-161 -165, 2C-151 155, Check: K. B. Mehta 2C-161-165 and 2C-166-167 M

i J

For the series of cabinets covered by this calculation, the cabinet widths are greater than their depths and the individual bays are interconnected (ref. 2), therefore the governing direction fnr stability is axis about the front and rear of the cabinets.

'D'

' D'2 g

r 32 d

Where: H is height and D is depth of the cabinet i

Also, a. = tan <lls & R -

<2>+<2>

Using the above equation and references 2 & 3, the following table is computed; Height Depth Fragility ID RM H (in)

D (in)

(G) 1 B-03 90.375 60 0.586 54.24 3 52 18-04 90.375 60 0.586 54.24 3.52 28-03 90.375 60 0.586 54.24 3.52 F\\

28-04 90.375 60 0.586 54.24 3.52 (V

1C-151-155 92 30 0.315 48.38 1.79 1 C-156-157 92 30 0.315 48.38 1.79 1C-161-165 92 30 0.315 48.38 1.79 2C-151-155 92 30 0.315 48.38 1.79 2C-161-165 92 30 0.315 48.38 1.79 2C-166-167 92 30 0.315 48.38 1.79 The walkdown team observed a height of 92" for cabinets 1C-151-155,1C-156-157, 1C-161-165,2C-151-155,2C-161-165 and 2C-166-167. These cabinets rest on steel surrounding a grout pad. (ref. 2).

Since, the cabinets are welded onto either an edge angle or a perimeter channel surrounding a grout pad, it is not possible for the cabinets to slide off the pad. The limiting acceleration due to shear is bounded by either the capacity of the welds in shear or the coefficient of friction between the grout pad and concrete floor.

Shear Caoacity Between Concrete Pad and Concrete Floor-The median coefficient of friction of concrete placed against hardened concrete which has been roughen is 1.0, hence, the shear capacity between the grout and concrete floor is 1.0 G (ref. 5).

The peak IPEEE floor response acceleration is 0.89 G, due to motion in the north-south direction, hence, the median fragility equals 1.0 / 0.89 x 0.40 = 0.45 G.

f JOB NO. 91C2696 Calculttisn C-017 Shn t 5 of 8

SUBJECT:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/31/95 USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation ewsion 0 O

Project G

i STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USlIPEEE, Equipment Fragilities for By: A.

aravoussianis a structural-mechanical 1B-03,18-04, 28-03,2B-04,1C 151 155,

.K.

l consulting engineering firm 1 C-156-157,1 C-161 -165, 2C-151 -155, Chec : K. B. Mehta 2C-161-165 and 2C 166-167

  1. 4M.

Shear Caoacity of Welds Between Cabinet Bases and Perimeter Steel:

Check to see if the weld capacity is greater than the friction (sliding) capacity of 1.0 G, assuming, there is no shear in the weld due to uplift, because of lack of load path in the vertical direction.

Shear Demand due to a 1.0 O force in each of the horizontal directions = d(W)* + (0.4 W)*

/. Shear Demand = W dl.16 = 1.08 W Cabinets; 18-03,18-04,28-03 and 2B-04:

The welding details of these cabinets are similar. They consist of at least 4 fillet welds in the front and 4 - 1/2" diameter plug welds in the rear. The fillet welds range in size from 1/8' to 3/8" (but the cabinet is assumed to be 1/8" thick) and 3 of the welds are 2' long and the 1 is 1.5'long, yielding a totallength of 7.5". Also, all of the welds are evenly distributed through out the cabinet. (ref. 2)

Weld Capacity = 7.5 + 4 x x x g x 1 1

x 0.707 x 30.6 = 373 kip (ref. 7) 1B-03 and 28-03 are the heaviest switchgears with approximate weights of 18690 lbs, say 18.7 kip (ref. 6)

Shear Demand = 1.08 x 18.7 = 20.2 kip < 37.3 kips, hence the friction for these switchgears will govem.

Cabinets; 1C-i51-155 & 1C-161-165 These cabinet are welded to a perimeter channel by a total of 12 - 1/8' fillets,1.5" long (6 in the front and 6 in the rear).

(ref. 2) 1 Weld Capacity = 12 x 1.5 x g x 0.707 x 30.6 = 48.7 kip (ref. 7)

The cabinets consist of 5 bays and each bay is estimated to weight 1281 lbs (ref. 2),

therefore, the total weight of the cabinets is 5 x 1281 = 6405 lbs = 6.405 kip Shear Demand = 1.08 x 6.405 = 6.92 kip < 48.7 kips, hence the friction for these cabinets will govem.

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i JOB NO. 91C2696 Calculation C 017 Sheet 6 of 8

SUBJECT:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/31/95 USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation f

Revision 0 i

Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USIIPEEE, Equipment Fragilities for By: A. Karavoussianis 1B-03,1B'04, 28-03,2B 04,1C 151-155, fl.. K.

a structural-mechanical consulting engineering firm 1 C-156 157,1 C-161 -165, 2C-151 -155, Check: K. B. Mehta 2C-161-165 and 2C-166167 W

Cabinet; 1C-156-157 & 2C-166-167 This cabinet is welded at each outside comer by an 1/8' fillets,1.5" long, to a perimeter 4

channel.

(ref. 2)

Weld Capacity = 4 x 1.5 x 1 x 0.707 x 30.6 = 16.2 kip(ref. 7)

The cabinet total weight is estimated at about 1695 lbs = 1.695 kip (ref. 2) l d

Shear Demand = 1.08 x 1.695 = 1.83 kip < 16.2 kips, hence the friction for these cabinets will govem.

Cabinet; 2C-151-155 This cabinet is welded to a perimeter channel by a total of 5 - 1/8" fillets,1.5" long (one weld per outer comer and one in the middle).

(ref. 2)

Weld Capacity = 5 x 1.5 x 1 x 0.707 x 30.6 = 203 kip (ref. 7)

(~N The cabinet consist of 5 bays and each bay is estimated to weight 1281 lbs (ref. 2),

\\

therefore, the total weight of the cabinet is 5 x 1281 = 6405 lbs = 6.405 kip Shear Demand = 1.08 x 6.405 = 6.92 kip < 20.3 kips, hence the friction for these cabinets will govem.

Cabinet; 2C-161-165 This cabinet is welded to a perimeter channel by a total of 4 - 1/8" fillets,1.5" long (one weld per outer comer).

(ref. 2)

Weld Capacity = 4 x 1.5 x 1 x 0.707 x 30.6 = 162 kip (ref. 7)

The cabinet consist of 5 bays and each bay is estimated to weight 1281 lbs (ref. 2),

therefore, the total weight of the cabinet is 5 x 1281 = 6405 lbs = 6.405 kip Shear Demand = 1.08 x 6.405 = 6.92 kip < 16.2 kips, hence the friction for these cabinets will govem.

O

JOB NO. 91C2696 Cricul ticn C-017 Sheet 7 of 8

SUBJECT:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/31/95 I

USl A 46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation i

f-Rev..ision 0 t

Project

{

STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USilPEEE, Equipment Fragilities for By: A. K ravoussianis a structural-mechanical 1B-03,1B-04, 28 03,28 04,10-151 155,

.k.

consulting engineering firm 1C-156-157,1C 161 165,2C-151-155, Check: K. B. Mehta 2C 161-165 and 2C-166167 N

i Comoutation of (L HCLPF o = A e' U#D"); where A is the median fragility 3

p, = dp,2, p,,2 ; when p, = p,, the most conservative HCLPF value is computed.

50 HCLPF50 = A e**"'" & pc = 8 p, => p, =

.. HCLPF = A e#

50 CDFM HCLPFu = HCLPF e

.. pn = 038 => HCLPF = HCLPFu D

=

50 50 1.2 1.2 l

' l.2 A '

in(CDFMs CDFM 1.2

-2ap,.

p*~

i 23 1

O As a lower bound the coefficient of shear may be considered to be 0.7 which is a conservative i

V value (CDFM) as oppose to the more realistic coefficient of 1.0 (median).

Therefore:

Median Fragility = A = 0.45 G CDFM = (0.7 /1.0) 0.45 = 0.32 G pc = 0.23 Results:

The median fragility of the cabinets is limited by the friction that can be generated between the concrete grout pad and the hardened concrete floor under it. The median fragility for all of the cabinets mentioned in this calculation is 0.45 G (see page 4) and pc is 0.23.

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JOB NO. 91C2696 Criculttinn C-017 Shzt 8 of 6

SUBJECT:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant Date: 3/31/95 USI A-46/IPEEE Seismic Evaluation f

Revision 0

(

Project STEVENSON & ASSOCIATES USlIPEEE, Equipment Fragilities for By: A. Karavoussianis l

a structural-mechanical 1B-03,1B-04, 28-03,2B 04,1C-151-155,

/f. A consulting engineering firm 1C-156-157,1C 161-165,2C-151 155, Check: K. B. Mehta j

2C-161-165 and 2C-166-167

  1. 4M f

i References i

1. " Point Beach SSI and IPEEE Floor Response Spectra", S&A Calc. No. 91C2696-j C-001, Rev. O, App. Date 12/17/93.

t

2. Wisconsin Electric Power Company - Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Screening Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS), ID: 1B-03,1B-04,28-03,28-04,1C-151-155, j

1C-156-157,1C-161-165,2C-151-155,2C-161-165 and 2C-166-167.

1

3. "480v SWGR - Floor Plan & Front Views', Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Dwg. EDSK 323167-8, Sheet Nos. 4 & 6 to 9.
4. "The Behavior of Inverted Pendulum Structures During Earthquakes', George W.

Housner, Bulletin of the Seis,nic Society of America, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 403-417, February 1963.

i

5. " Seismic Design of Reinforced Concrete and Masonry Buildings", by T. Paulay &

M. J. N. Priestley, A Wiley Interscience Publication.

4 J

6. " Low Voltage Metal Enclosed SWGR - Floor Plan - 1500 KVA', Westinghouse l

Electric Corporation, Dwg.141D225.

}:

7. " Generic implementation Procedure for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant j

Equipment", SQUG, Revision 2, 6/28/91.

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O Safeguards Relay Cabinets O

I Wi;cen:In E12ctric Pcw:r Camp:ny. Pcint B;rch Nucl:ar Pl:nt GIP Rev 2, Corrtetsd 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 1 of 2 ID : 1C-156-157 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A RELAY CABtNETS

'Q Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 l

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could a.

not be satisfied.)

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Capacity vs. Demand Caveats X

Anchorage X

Seismic Interaction Other g #p b.

Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories N

would consider this item of equipment to be venfied for seismic adequacy).

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2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Optional)
a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.

b.

Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e g., estimate of fundamental frequency).

3. SEISMIC OPERABILITY EVALUATION:

The cabinet group is considered an outlier because it has an unknown anchorage detail. There is no drawing information on how the raised grout pad, that the cabinet group is mounted on, is anchored to the concrete floor.

Since the cabinet does have anchorage, as originally designed, the cabinet is considered seismically operable.

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Wi:c:nsin El:ctric P:w:r Ccmpany - Pcint B ach Nucl:ar Plant GIP Rev 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 2 of 2 i

ID : 1C-156-157 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets P

Description : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A RELAY CABINETS I I Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3

4. CERTIFICATION:

The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be venfied j

for seismic adequacy:

j Approved by:

Date:

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Wi:ctnsin El:ctric P;w;r Ccmpany - Paint Brch Nucl:ar Plant GIP Rsv 2, Correcttd,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 1 of 4

/

10 : 1C-156-157 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer. Model. Etc.

SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND 1.

Elevation where equipment receives seismic input 26.00 2.

Elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade (grade = 8.00)

N/A 3.

Equipment has fundamental frequency above about 8 Hz (est. frequency = 11.00)

N/A 4.

Capacity based on:

1.50

  • Bounding Spectrum 5.

Demand based on:

1.00

  • Conservative Design Floor Response Spectra 2.000 Y

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LOG

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i i i i 1.00 LOG Hz 100.00 Capacity... Demand File Record Capacity H:\\ GIP \\ GIP \\ spectra des LabellBounding Spectrum Demand 1 H.\\ GIP \\PROJ002D\\ spectra des PLANT l Point BeacnlBUILDINGIControl Building lE LEVATIO N126{ DIR ECTIO Nl Horizontal Demand 2 H.\\ GIP \\PROJ002D\\ spectra. des PLANTIPoint Beach lBulLDINGl Control Building lE LEVATIO N J26 lDIRL CTIONl Honze ntal Does capacity exceed demand?

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i Wl;c:nsin Electric Pawir Campany - Print Brach Nuct:ar Plant GIP Rav 2, Corrected,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 2 of 4

' C 10 : 1C-156-157 ( Rev. 0 )

[ Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Description : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model Etc.

i CAVEATS - BOUNDING SPECTRUM I&C/BS Caveat 1 - Earthquake Experience Equipment Class.

Yes I&C/BS Caveat 2 - Computers and Programmable Controllers Evaluated Separately.

Yes j

j l&C/BS Caveat 3 - Strip Chart Recorders Evaluated.

Yes

]

I&C/BS Caveat 4 - Structural Adequate.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 5 - Adjacent Cabinets or Panels Bolted Together.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 6 - Drawers or Equipment on Slides Restrained.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 7 - Doors Secured.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 8 - Sufficient Slack and Flexibility of Attached Lines.

Yes j

I&C/BS Caveat 9 - Adequate Anchorage.

No*

I&C/BS Caveat 10 - Potential Chatter of Essential Relays Evaluated.

Yes 4

I&C/BS Caveat 11 - No Other Concems.

Yes I

is the intent of all the caveats met for Bounding Spectrum?

Mg ANCHORAGE Yes

1. The sizes and locations of anchors have been determined.

Q

2. Appropnate equipment characteristics have been determined (mass, CG, natural freq.,

Yes damping, center of rotation).

3. The type of anchorage is covered by the GIP.

Yes

4. The adequacy of the anchorage installation has been evaluated (weld quality and length, Yes nuts and washers, expansion anchor tightness, etc.)

5 Factors affecting anchorage capacity or margin of safety have been considered: embedment Yes length, anchor spacing, free-edge distance, concrete strength / condition, and concrete cracking.

6. For bolted anchorages, any gaps under the base are less than 1/4.

Yes

'7, Factors affecting essential relays have been considered: gaps under the base, capacity Yes reduction for expansion anchors.

8. The base has adequate stiffness and the effect of prying action on anchors has been Yes considered.
9. The strength of the equipment base and the load path to the CG is adequate.

Yes

10. The adequacy of embedded steel, grout pads or large concrete pads have been evaluated.

No*

11. The anchorage capacity exceeds the demand.

No*

Are anchorage requirements met?

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E Wi2ctnsin Electric P w r Campany - P: Int Mach Nucimr PI:nt GIP Rzy 2, Correct 5d,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 3 of 4 ID : 1C-156-157 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets

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'j Description : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model, Etc.

INTERACTION EFFECTS

1. Soft targets are free from impact by nearby equipment or structures.

Yes J

2. If the equipment contains sensitive relays, it is free from all ir.1 pact by nearby equipment or Yes structures.
3. Attached lines have adequate flexibility.

Yes

4. Overhead equipment or distnbution systems are not likely to collapse.

Yes*

4

5. No other adverse concerns were found.

]4 is equipment free of interaction effects?

2.g3 MCALLY.AD.EiQUAIE2 No COMMENTS The SRTs are S. R. St Amour and W. Djordjevic - 10/25/93.

Capacity vs Demand:

The seismic demand exceeds the capacity at a low frequency, but it is acceptable because the demand is (O) enveloped at and above the estimated frequency._,,_,

Anchorage:

The cabinet is welded to an edge channel by an 1/8" fillets,1.5"long, at each comer. The channels run along the perimeter of a grout pad and anchored to the concrete floor by expansion anchors. These expansion anchor are located intermittently e.ong the channel. The bolt shank was measured at 2.25"__and the channel height at 1.75".

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interaction:

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.ge The overhead lights and cabletrays are well secured, hence, there is no seismic interactions.

Other-The following items are sub-components of 1C-156-157 :

1C-156 SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A CHANNELS 1 AND 3 RELAY RACK 1C-157 SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A CHANNELS 2 AND 4 RELAY RACK Evaluated by:

Date:

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Attachment:

Pictures

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Wisconsin Elactric Powsr Compsny - Point Basch Nucisar Plant GlP Rev 2, Corrected,2/14/92 j

SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No j

Sheet 4 of 4 l

10 : 1C-156-157 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Description : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A RELAY CABINETS

[

Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 l

Manufacturer, Model. Etc.

PICTURES i

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l Fig.1: Cabinet Base w/CEA to Raise Grout Pad Fig.2: Cabinet Raised Grout Pad w/ U-channel Edge I

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Wl:ctnzin Elxtric Pcw:r Crmp ny - Print C ach Nucirr Plant GIP Rav 2, Correct d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 1 of 2 ID : 1C-158/166/167 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets

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Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS

'V Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment a.

Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

Capacity vs. Demand Caveats X

Anchorage Seismic Interaction Other I

Describe all the reasons for the ou'Jier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues w b.

would consider this ittm of equipment to be venfied for seismic adequacy).

69

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Cabinet IC 158/166/167 is not bolt {o the adjacent inverter DY-0A and the cabinets knocking may cause essential relays to chatter, therefore it is an outlier.

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2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTI IFR RESOLUTION (Octional) h)
a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.

G b.

Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).

l

3. SEISMIC OPERABILITY EVALUATION:

The cabinet is identified as an outlier because it contains essential relays and it is mounted directly adjacent to a static inverter and the two are not fastened together. No " bad actor" relays were located in the cabinet. The relays that are in the cabinet have a seismic capacity of at least 4 g's. Therefore, they are considered seismically operable.

O

Wisctntin Electric P w;r C:mpany - P Int B ch Nucl:ar Plant GIP Rev 2, Correct d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 2 of 2 ID : 1C-158/166/167 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets f'

Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS

\\

Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3

4. CERTIFICATION:

The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:

Approved by:

Date:

]A-Ak

=

O O

Wisc nsin El:ctric Pow r C:mpany - P: int B :ch Nuclear Plant GIP Rtv 2, Corrcct:d,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 1 of 12 O

ID : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets V

Description : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model Etc.

SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND 1.

Elevation where equipment receives seismic input 26.00 2.

Elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade (grade = 8.00)

N/A 3.

Equipment has fundamental frequency above about 8 Hz (est. frequency = 11.00)

N/A 4.

Capacity based on:

1.50

  • Bounding Spectrum 5.

Demand based on:

1.00

  • Conservative Design Floor Response Spectra 2.000 N

l G

LOG

~

p l

b i

i il 0.100 i

i i

i i i i i

i i

i i i ii 1.00 LOG Hz 100.00 Capacity.. Demand File Record Cacacity H:\\ GIP \\ GIP \\ spectra des Label l Bounding Spectrum Demand 1 H:\\ GIP \\PROJ002D\\ spectra. des PLANTIPoint Beach lBulLDINGIControl Building lELEVATIONj26lOIRECT10NIHorizontal Demand 2 H:\\ GIP \\PROJ0020\\ spectra. des PLANTIPoint BeacnlBulLDINGIControl Building l ELEVATION l26]DIR E CTIONl Horizontal Does capacity exceed demand?

YJul 0

4

Wicc:n:In El:ctric Pr.wcr Ccmpany - Pcint Bxch Nucl:ar Plant GIP RLv 2, Corr:ct d,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 2 of 12

,A ID : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets

(

Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room. Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model Etc.

CAVEATS - BOUNDING SPECTRUM

~

l&C/BS Caveat 1 - Earthquake Experience Equipr'n'ent Class.

Yes I&C/BS Caveat 2 - Computers and Programmable Controllers Evaluated Separately.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 3 - Strip Chart Recorders Evaluated.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 4 - Structural Adequate.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 5 - Adjacent Cabinets or Panels Bolted Together.

No*

l&C/BS Caveat 6 - Drawers or Equipment on Slides Restrained.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 7 - Doors Secured.

Yes I&C/BS Caveat 8 - Sufficient Slack and Flexibility of Attached Lines.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 9 - Adequate Anchorage.

Yes I&C/BS Caveat 10 - Potential Chatter of Essential Relays Evaluated.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 11 - No Other Concems.

Yes is the intent of all the caveats met for Bounding Spectrum?

No ANCHORAGE

1. The sizes and locations of anchors have been determined.

Yes

(

2. Appropriate equipment charactenstics have been determined (mass, CG, natural freq.,

Yes damping, center of rotation).

3. The type of anchorage is covered by the GIP.

Yes

4. The adequacy of the anchorage installation has been evaluated (weld quality and length, Yes nuts and washers, expansion anchor tightness, etc.)
5. Factors affecting anchorage capacity or margin of safety have been considered: embedment Yes length, anchor spacing, free-edge d' stance, concrete strength / condition, and concrete cracking.
6. For bolted anchorages, any gaps under the base are less than 1/4.

Yes

7. Factors affecting essential relays have been considered: gaps under the base, capacity Yes reduction for expansion anchors.
8. The base has adequate stiffness and the effect of prying action on anchors has been Yes*

considered.

9. The strength of the equipment base and the load path to the CG is adequate.

Yes

10. The adequacy of embedded steel, g out pads or large concrete pads have been evaluated.

Yes

11. The anchorage capacity exceeds the demand.

Yes Are anchorage requirements met?

Y.ful v.;

Wi:c n:in Elsctric Power Company - Pcint Brach Nucirr Pl:nt GIP Rav 2, Corr,cted,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 3 of 12 q

ID : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets

)

P~.cription : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS

~ [ M$ng : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room Row / Col: AREA 3 og ufacturer, Model. Etc.

'MT:1 ACTION EFFECTS

1. Soft targets are free from impact by nearby equipment or structures.

Yes

2. If the equipment contains sensitive relays, it is free from all impact by nearby equipment or Yes structures.
3. Attached lines have adequate flexibility.

Yes

4. Overhead equipment or distnbution systems are not likely to collapse.

Yes

5. No other adverse concerns were found.

Yes is equipment free of interaction effects?

10.3 IS_EQU12MENI. SEISMICALLY ADEQUATE 7 Nn COMMENTS The SRTs are S. R. St Amour and W. Djordjevic - 10/25/93.

REF: Point Beach Calculation N-92-080, " Structural Support Calcs for Misc. Relay Racks (MRR) 2C158 and 1C158" and SK-ELEC-013/MR 91-163, dated 8/20/91 Capacity vs Demand:

l The seismic demand exceeds the capacity at a low frequency, but it is acceptable because the demand is l

enveloped at and above the estimated frequency.

Capacity:

BSCav.5: Cabinet 1C-158/166/167 is not bolt to the adjacent inverter DY-0A and the cabinets knocking may cause essential relays to chatter, therefore it is an outlier.

' Anchorage:

The cabinet is mounted on C3x5 base channels. The base channels are bolted to steel angles,4" x 3" x1/4", in the f ont and back of the cabinet by 6 - 3/8" cap screws (each side). Each angle is anchored into the concrete floor by 6 - 3/8" HKB-Il anchor bolts. (ref.)

The cabinet consists of 3 bay, each bay is 24" wide x 30" deep x 92" tall and each bay weighs approx. 456 lbs.

(ref.) According to GIP table C.1 1, use a mass c',3 x 456 = 1068 lbs, say 1400 lbs per bay in the anchorage analysis.

Also, since the load path is offset at the expansion anchor by 1.75", conservatively, use a reduction factor of 0.5 for prying action.

Other-The folloviing items are sub-components of 1C-158/166/167 :

1C-166 SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B CHANNELS 1 AND 3 RELAY RACK 1C-167 SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B CHANNELS 2 AND 4 RELAY RACK 1C-158 MISCELLANEOUS RELAY CABINET pJ

Wi':c nrin Electris Pcwcr Camp:ny - P int Uccch Nuclear Plant GIP Rtv 2, Corrected,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 4 of 12

(]/

t ID : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model, Etc.

Evaluated by:

Date:

/

f[

c#

v(p eb.lau

Attachment:

ANCHOR Report o

0 w)

Wi cznsin Electric P w:r Company - Print B:ch Nuclxr PIInt GIP Rcv 2, Correctid,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 5 of 12 10 : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS y

Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model. Etc.

  • ANCHOR Report Earthauake :

1 Response Spectrum : Instructure Conservative Frequency : User - 11.00 Percent Damping : User - 5.00 Spectral Values :

Direction Acceleration (g's)

North - South 0.32 East - West 0.32 Vertical 0.17 Angle (N-S Direction makes with the X Axis): 0.00 Combination Criteria : SRSS Weights :

Number of Weights : 3 No Weicht X

Y Z

1 1406.00 12.000 15.000 46.000 O

V 2

1400.00 36.000 15.000 46.000 3

1400.00 60.000 15.000 46.000 Forces :

Number of Extemal Forces : 0 Moments :

, Number of Extemal Moments : 0 Allowables :

Anchor:

Number of Anchor types : 1 Tension Shear Ultimate Ultimate Inter Inter Saf No.

Dia Manufact Product Tension Shear Coeff Coeff Fact 1

3/8 Hilti Kwik-Bolt 1460.00 1420.00 1.00 0.30 1.00 (N)

Concrete :

Ultimate Stress : 3000.00 psi.

Reduction Factor : 0.85 i

Weld :

Wircan:In El:ctric Pcw:r CcmpIny - P: int Beach Nucl:cr Pl:nt GIP Rav 2, Correct d,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 6 of 12 ID : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS s

l Building : CB

{ Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer Model. Etc.

Allowable Stress : 30600 psi.

Surfaces :

Number of Surfaces : 1 Surface Orientation Direction Direction Direction Comp Comp Comp No Nx Ny Nz 1

0.000 0.000 1.000 Anchor Pattern for Surface # 1 j

e e

e e

e e

.I r r,r r s-4 X

Legend for Anchor Pattems Anchor Bolts :

Concrete Unes:

4 Concrete Points: [..

Weld Unes:

Geometry :

Anchor:

[

Number of Anchors : 12 i

Wl:ctnsin Electric P wer C:mp:ny - Print B:ach Nucl:cr Plant GIP R:V 2, Corrected,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 7 of 12 10 : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets

-~

Description : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model. Etc.

Anch X

Y Z

Surf No.

Id Coord Coord Coord Id 1

1 6.000

-1.750 0.000 1

2 1

18.000

-1.750 0.000 1

3 1

30.000

-1.750 0.000 1

4 1

42.000

-1.750 0.000 1

5 1

54.000

-1.750 0.000 1

6 1

66.000

-1.750 0.000 1

7 1

6.000 31.750 0.000 1

_8 1

18.000 31.750 0.000 1

9 1

30.000 31.750 0.000 1

10 1

42.000 31.750 0.000 1

11 1

54.000 31.750 0.000 1

12 1

66.000 31.750 0.000 1

Concrete Lines :

  1. of elements per line : 5 Number of Concrete Lines : 2 Start Start Start End End End Sf Line

(/

No X-Coord Y-Coord Z-Coord X-Coord Y-Coord Z-Coord Id Width 1

0.000 1.000 0.000 72.000 1.000 0.000 1

2.000 2

0.000 29.000 0.000 72.000 29.000 0.000 1

2.000 Concrete Points :

Number of Concrete Points : 0 Weld Lines :

'# of elements per line : 4 Number of Weld Lines : 0 Determination of Reduction Factors :

Reduction Factor input for Anchor # 1 Adequately installed : Yes Embedment Length : ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

j Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

1 Edge Distance - Edge 1 : 3.75 in.

j Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately installed : Yes Reduction Factor input for Anchor # 2 j

p}

Adequately Installed : Yes

Wi;c::nzin Electric P:wcr Ccmpany - Print Bxch Nuclear Pl nt GIP Rsv 2, Correcttd,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 8 of 12 ID : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets

(

Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model. Etc.

Embedment Length : ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Edge Distance - Edge 1x 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor # 3 Adequately Installed : Yes Embedment Length : ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Edge Distance - Edge 1 : 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor input for Anchor # 4 Adequately installed : Yes Embedment Length : ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Edge Distance - Edge 1 : 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor input for Anchor # 5 Adequately Installed : Yes Embedment Length. ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Edge Distance - Edge 1 : 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor input for Anchor # 6 Adequately Installed : Yes Embedment Length : ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

O' Edge Distance - Edge 1 : 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts

Wisc:nsin El:ctric Psw;r Camp ny - Print G=ch Nucirr Plint GlP Rav 2, Correct d,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 9 of 12 O

ID : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets V

Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS

+

Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room. Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model. Etc.

Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately installed : Yes Reduction Factor input for Anchor # 7 Adequately Installed : Yes Embedment Length : ( 1.63 in.. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Edge Distance - Edge 1 : 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes l

Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor Input for Anchor # 8 Adequately installed : Yes Embedment Length : ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

q Edge Distance - Edge 1 : 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Q

Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor input for Anchor # 9 Adequately Installed : Yes Embedment Length : ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Edge Distance - Edge 1 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately installed : Yes Reduction Factor input for Anchor # 10 Adequately Installed : Yes Embedment length : ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Edge Distance - Edge 1 ' 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes j

Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes

1 Wi:censin Electric Pcw:r C:mp:ny - Paint Rccch Nucl:cr Plant GIP Rev 2, Correctid,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 10 of 12 Q

ID : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets V

Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room. Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer Model. Etc.

Reduction Factor input for Anchor # 11 Adequately Installed : Yes Embedment Length : ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Edge Distance - Edge 1 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts l

Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes Reduction Factor input for Anchor # 12 Adequately installed : Yes Embedment Length : ( 1.63 in. Min Reqd. to achieve full capacity) := 1.63 in.

Gap at Threaded Anchor : 0.00 in.

Edge Distance - Edge 1 : 3.75 in.

Crack Size : 0.000 in. - Cracks Affect <= 50% Bolts Essential Relays in Cabinet : Yes Adequate Equipment Base Strength and Structural Load Path : Yes O Embedment Steel and Pads Adequately Installed : Yes b

Reduction Factors Data Current : Yes Anc Pall /

Pallr/

No ld Vall Vallr RT RN RL RG RS RE RF RC RR RP RB RM 1

1 410 63 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0 50 1.00 1.00 1011.75 N/A 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 2

1 410 63 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 75 1.00 0.75 0.50 1.00 1.00 1011.75 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 3

1 410.63 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.50 1.00 1.00 1011.75 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 4

1 410 63 N/A 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.50 1.00 1 00 1011.75 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1 00 5

1 410 63 N/A 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1 00 0.75 0 50 1.00 1 00 1011.75 N/A 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 95 1.00 0 75 1.00 1 00 1.00 6

1 410 63 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0 50 1.00 1.00 l

1011.75 N/A 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 95 1.00 0.75 1 00 1.00 1.00 7

1 410 63 N/A 1 00 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 1 00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0 50 1.00 1.00 1011.75 N/A 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 95 1.00 0 75 1.00 1.00 1.00 8

1 410 63 N/A 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0 50 1.00 1 00 1011.75 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 95 1.00 0 75 1.00 1.00 1 00 9

1 410 63 N/A 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.50 1 00 1.00 1011.75 N/A 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 10 1

410 63 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0 50 1 00 1.00 1011.75 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 11 1

410 63 N/A 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.00 0.75 1 00 0.75 0.50 1.00 1 00 1011.75 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 12 1

410 63 N/A 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.75 0.50 1.00 1.00 1011.75 N/A 1 00 1.00 1 00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 I

Wi:cIn in Electric P?w:r Company - Print Bxch Nucl:ar Plint GIP Rsv 2, Corrteted,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 11 of 12 ID : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets

(

Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model. Etc.

N/A

= Not Applicable Pall

= Allowable Pull without Reduced Inspection Vall

= Allowable Shear without Reduced Inspection Palir

= Allowable Pull with Reduced inspection Vallr

= Allowable Shear with Reduced Inspection

= Outlier X

= Reduction Factor Not Used RT

= Reduction Factor for Type of Anchorage RN

= Reduction Factor for installation Adequacy RL

= Reduction Factor for Embedment RG

= Reduction Factor for Gap at Anchors RS

= Reduction Factor for Spacing RE

= Reduction Factor for Edge Distance RF

= Reduction Factor for Concrete Strength RC

= Reduction Factor for Concrete Cracks RR

= Reduction Factor for Essential Relays RP

= Reduction Factor for Base Stiffness and Prying Action RB

= Reduction Factor for Base Strength and Load Path RM

= Reduction Factor for Embed. Steel and Pads f

?%,

Analysis Results :

Analysis Performed : Yes Type of Analysis : Regular Spectral Accelerations (G's)

No N-S E-W Vertical Safety Factor 1

0.318 0.127 0.067 3.725 2

-0.318

-0.127

-0.067 4.601 3

-0.318 0.127 0.067 3.725 4

0.318

-0.127

-0.067 4.601 5

0.318

-0.127 0.067 3.725 6

-0.318 0.127

-0.067 4.601 7

0.318 0.127

-0.067 4.601 8

-0.318

-0.127 0.067 3.725 9

0.127 0.318 0.067 2.057 10

-0.127

-0.318

-0.067 2.337 11 0.127

-0.318 0.067 2.057 12

-0.127 0.318

-0.067 2.337 13

-0.127 0.318 0.067 2.057 14 0.127

-0.318

-0.067 2.337 15 0.127 0.318

-0.067 2.337 16

-0.127

-0.318 0.067 2.057 17 0.127 0.127 0.167 3.910

(

18

-0.127

-0.127

-0.167 9.099 19 0.127 0.127

-0.167 9.099

Wisc:nsin Electric Pcwor Company - P: Int Beach Nucl:ar Plant GIP Rzy 2, Corriet:d,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 12 of 12 10 : 1C-158/166/167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets g

Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B AND MISC RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. ; 26.0000 l Room. Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer. Model. Etc.

~20

-0.127

-0.127 0.167 3.910 21

-0.127 0.127 0.167 3.910 22 0.127

-0.127

-0.167 9.099 23 0.127

-0.127 0.167 3.910 24

-0.127 0.127

-0.167 9.099 Minimum Safety Factor:

2.057 The Anchorage Capacity is 2.057 times greater than the Demand e

0 $

x I

Wl:c: nsin El ctric Psw r C:mpIny - Peint B:ach Nucl:ar Plant GIP Rev 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 1 of 2 ID : 2C-156-158 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets G

Desenption :

V Butiding : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room. Row / Col: AREA 3

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical Eauloment a.

Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

Capacity vs. Demand Caveats X

Anchorage Seismic Interaction Other b.

Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).

(/hg th 6t

[ \\b Cabinet 2C-156-158 is not bolty the adjacent inverter DY-0B and the cabinets knocking may cause essential relays to chatter, therefore it is an outlier.

p

2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Optional)

O

a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.

O b.

Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).

)

3. SEISMIC OPERABILITY EVALUATION:

The cabinet is identified as an outlier because it contains essential relays and it is mounted directly adjacent to a static inverter and the two are not fastened together. No " bad actor" relays were located in the cabinet. The relays that are in the cabinet have a seismic capacity of at least 4 g's. Therefore, they are considered seismically operable.

l

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Wi:ctnrin El:ctric Pcw r Ccmpany - Pcint tcach Nuct:ar Plant GIP Rsv 2, Correctsd 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 2 of 2 10 : 2C-156-158 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Desenption :

(j Building : C8 l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3

4. CERTIFICATION:

The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous pag 3 will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:

Date:

Approved by:

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l Al~

O, 4 6

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Winctnsin Electric Pcw r Company - Paint B;ach Nucl:ar Plant GIP Riv 2, Corr:cted,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 1 of 4 ID : 2C 156-158 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets y)

Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.00 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model, Etc.

2 SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND 1.

Elevation where equipment receives seismic input 26.00 l

2.

Elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade (grade = 8.00)

N/A 3.

Equipment has fundamental frequency above about 8 Hz (est. frequency = 11.00)

N/A 4.

Capacity based on:

1.50

  • Bounding Spectrum 5.

Demand based on:

1.00

  • Conservative Design Floor Response Spectra l

2.000 y

~

G

,t

.--+---%,

LOG l

1 0.100 i

i i

i i i ii i

i i

i i e i i 1.00 LOG Hz 100.00 Capacity... Demand File Record f

Capacity H3GIPNGIP\\ spectra. des Label l Bounding Spectrum Demand 1 HAGIP\\PROJ002D\\ spectra. des PLANT l Point Beach l BUILDING l Control Building l ELEVATION 126lDIRECTIONIHonzontal Demand 2 HAGIPiPROJ002D\\ spectra. des PLANTjPoint Beach l BUILDING l Control BuildinglELEVATIONj26lDIRECTIONIHorizontal Does capacity exceed demand?

Y.fui O

4 0

Wisc n:In Electric P;w:r C::mprny - Print B:ach Nuclxr PI:nt GIP Rav 2, Correcttd,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 2 of 4 p

ID : 2C-156-158 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets

(

Desenption :

Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room. Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer. Model. Etc.

CAVEATS - BOUNDING SPECTRUM l&C/BS Caveat 1 - Earthquake Expenence Equipment Class.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 2 - Computers and Programmable Controllers Evaluated Separately.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 3 - Strip Chart Recorders Evaluated.

Yes I&C/BS Caveat 4 - Structural Adequate.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 5 - Adjacent Cabinets or Panels Bolted Together.

No*

l&C/BS Caveat 6 - Drawers or Equipment on Slides Restrained.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 7 - Doors Secured.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 8 - Sufficient Slack and Flexibility of Attached Lines.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 9 - Adequate Anchorage.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 10 - Potential Chatter of Essential Relays Evaluated.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 11 - No Other Concems.

Yes Is the intent of all the caveats met for Bounding Spectrum?

Mg ANCHORAGE

1. The sizes and locations of anchors have been determined.

Yes g)

2. Appropnate equipment characteristics have been determined (mass, CG, natural freq.,

Yes

('

damping, center of rotation).

3. The type of anchorage is covered by the GIP.

Yes

4. The adequacy of the anchorage installation has been evaluated (weld quality and length, Yes nuts and washers, expansion anchor tightness, etc.)
5. Factors affecting anchorage capacity or margin of safety have been considered: embedment Yes length, anchor spacing, free-edge distance, concrete strength / condition, and concrete cracking.
6. For bolted anchorages, any gaps under the base are less than 1/4.

Yes

7. Factors affecting essential relays have been considered: gaps under the base, capacity Yes reduction for expansion anchors.
8. The base has adequate stiffness and the effect of prying action on anchors has been Yes considered.
9. The strength of the equipment base and the load path to the CG is adequate.

Yes

10. The adequacy of embedded steel, grout pads or large concrete pads have been evaluated.

Yes

11. The anchorage capacity exceeds the demand.

Yes Yea Are anchorage requirements met?

,E a

Wiscin:in Electric P:w:r C:mp:ny - Print 8:rch Nucl:ar Plant GIP Rsv 2, Corr:;ctId,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 3 of 4

~}

ID : 2C-156-158 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets (V

Desenption :

Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model, Etc.

INTERACTION EFFECTS

1. Soft targets are free from impact by nearby equipment or structures.

Yes

2. If the equipment contains sensitive relays, it is free from allimpact by nearby equipment or Yes structures.
3. Attached lires have adequate flexibility.

Yes

4. Overhead equipment or distnbution systems are not likely to collapse.

Yes

5. No other adverse concerns were found.

Yes is equipment free of interaction effects?

Yes IS EQUIPMENT SEISlWilCALLY ADEQUATE?

No COMMENTS The SRTs are S. R. St Amour and W. Djordjevic - 10/25/93.

I REF: Point Beach Calculation N-92-080," Structural Support Calcs for Misc. Relay Racks (MRR) 2C158 and O

1C158" and SK-ELEC-013/MR 91-163, dated 8/20/91 V

Capacity vs Demand:

The seismic demand exceeds the capacity at a low frequency, but it is acceptable because the demand is enveloped at and above the estimated frequency.

Capacity:

BSCav.5: Cabinet 2C-156-158 is not bolt to the adjacent inverter DY-0B and the cabinets knocking may cause

  • essential relays to chatter, therefore it is an outlier.

' Anchorage:

The cabinet is mounted on C3x5 base channels. The base channels are bolted to steel angles,4" x 3" x1/4", in the front and back of the cabinet by 6 - 3/8" cap screws (each side). Each angle is anchored into the concrete floor by 6 - 3/8" HKB-ll anchor bolts. (ref.)

For additional anchorage notes and analysis see 1C-158/166/167.

Other:

The following items are sub-components of 2C-156-158 :

2C-156 SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A CHANNELS 1 AND 3 RELAY RACK 2C-157 SAFEGUARDS TRAIN A CHANNELS 2 AND 4 RELAY RACK 2C-158 MISCELLANEOUS RELAY CABINET l

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. V

Wisc n:in Electric Pcw:r Ctmp:ny - Paint B:Oth Nucl:ar PI:nt GIP Rav 2, Corrected,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 4 of 4 1

ID : 2C.156-158 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Desenption :

Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model Etc.

Evaluated by:

Date:

l.

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Wl:ctn:In Electric Pcwxr C mp:ny - Print 8:ach Nucirr Plint GIP Rev 2, Correctsd 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 1 of 2 ID : 2C-166-167 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B RELAY CABINETS

'\\

Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room. Row / Col: AREA 3

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Mechanical and Electrical EaulDint.D1 a.

Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

Capacity vs. Demand Caveats X

Anchorage X

Seismic Interaction X

Other b.

Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).

1.

~^^~-

d-""

~- ^-'" --t* ' r;;M- ' rd 'rrd :':r ';_i, tu..; up ;' "x;_, trdr : : a e..i

2. There is an overhead floor light supported on an open S-hook.

sa c.. ur g. au.1 p< s sm J.,.

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2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTt IFR RESOLUTION (Octionall y

p Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlie [

a.

The open S-hook needs to be closed.

b.

Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).

3. SEISMIC OPERABILITY EVALUATION:

2C-166 - 167 is considered an outlier because it has an unknown anchorage detail and an overhead light above the cabinets has an open S-hook. There is no drawing information on how the raised grout pad that the cabinet is mounted on is anchored to the concrete floor. Since the cabinet does have anchorage, as originally designed, and there is nothing definite that indicates the light will fall and impact the cabinet, the cabinet is considered seismically operable.

O

Wisc:n:In Electric P w r Ccmpany - Paint 8:cch Nucl:cr Plant GIP Rcv 2, Corr;ct:d 2/14/92 OUTLlER SElSMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 2 of 2 ID : 2C-166-167 (Rev. 0) l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets fh Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B RELAY CABINETS V

Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room Row / Col: AREA 3

4. CERTIFICATION-The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:

Approved by:

Date:

jk lw 2 )~, 4 O

Wis;tnrin Electric P;wer Company - Print Be:ch Nucle:r Plint GIP Rav 2, Corrccted,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 1 of 3 1D : 2C-166-167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room. Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer. Model. Etc.

SEISMIC CAPACITY VS DEMAND 1.

Elevation where equipment receives seismic input 26.00 2.

Elevation of seismic input below about 40' from grade (grade = 8.00)

N/A 3.

Equipment has funoamental frequency above about 8 Hz (est. frequency = 11.00)

N/A 4.

Capacity based on:

1.50

  • Bounding Spectrum 5.

Demand based on:

1.00

  • Conservative Design Floor Response Spectra j

2.000 l

f j

~

l G

l j

LOG

,/

,/

iiI 0.100 i

i i

i i e i

i i

i i iii 1.00 LOG Hz 100.00 Capacity

. Demand File Record Capacity H:\\GIPiGIP\\ spectra. des Label l Bounding Spectrum Demand 1 H.\\GlP\\PR(,1002Dwpectra des PLANT l Point BeschlBUILDINGtControl Building lELEVATIONj26l DIRECT 10NIHorizontal Demand 2 H.\\ GIP \\PROJ002D\\ spectra. des PLANTIPoint BeachjBUILDINGIControl BuildinglELEVATION126l DIRECTION l Horizontal Does capacity exceed demand?

Y_es O

a

Wisc nsin Electric Power Company - Psint Berch Nucl:ar Pl:nt GIP Rsv 2, Correctsd,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 2 of 3 ID : 2C 166-167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets O-Desenpton : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model. Etc.

  • CAVEATS - BOUNDING SPECTRUM l&C/BS Caveat 1 - Earthquake Experience Equipment Class.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 2 - Computers and Programmable Controllers Evaluated Separately.

Yes I&C/BS Caveat 3 - Stnp Chart Recorders Evaluated.

Yes j

l&C/BS Caveat 4 - Structural Adequate.

Yes I&C/BS Caveat 5 - Adjacent Cabinets or Panels Bolted TWether.

Yes j

l&C/BS Caveat 6 - Drawers or Equipment on F: ides Restrained.

Yes I&C/BS Caveat 7 - Doors Secured.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 8 - Sufficient Slack and Flexibility of Attached Lines.

Yes l&C/BS Caveat 9 - Adequate Anchorage.

No*

I&C/BS Caveat 10 - Potential Chatter of Essential Relays Evaluated.

Yes I&C/BS Caveat 11 - No Other Concems.

Yes l

is the intent of all the caveats met for Bounding Spectrum?

HQ l

ANCHORAGE Yes

1. The sizes and locations of anchors have been determined.
2. Appropriate equipment characteristics have been determined (mass, CG, natural freq.,

Yes damping, center of rotation).

3. The type of anchorage is covered by the GlP.

Yes

4. The adequacy of the anchorage installation has been evaluated (weld quality and length, Yes nuts and washers, expansion anchor tightness, etc.) ~.

S. Factors affecting anchorage capacity or margin of safety have been considered: embedmont Yes length, anchor spacing, free-edge distance, concrete strength / condition, and concrete cracking.

6. For bolted anchorages, any gaps under the base are less than 1/4.

Yes

'7. Factors affecting essential relays have been considered: gaps under the base, capacity Yes reduction for expansion anchors.

8. The base has adequate stiffness and the effect of prying action on anchors has been Yes considered.
9. The strength of the equipment base and the load path to the CG is adequate.

Yes

10. The adequacy of embedded steel, grout pads or large concrete pads have been evaluated.

No*

11. The anchorage capacity exceeds the demand.

No*

Are anchorage requirements met?

NQ e

O

Wl;cin;in Electric Power Company - Paint D ach Nucle:r Pirnt GIP Rev 2, Corrtet;d,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 3 of 3 ID : 2C-166-167 ( Rev. 0 )

l Class : 20. Instrumentation and Control Panels and Cabinets Q

Desenption : SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B RELAY CABINETS Building : CB l Floor El. : 26.0000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 3 Manufacturer, Model, Etc.

INTERACTION EFFECTS

1. Soft targets are free from impact by nearby equipment or structures.

Yes

2. If the equipment contains sensitive relays, it is free from allimpact by nearby equipment or Yes structures.
3. Attached lines have adequate flexibility.

Yes

4. Overhead equipment or distnbution systems are not likely to collapse.

No*

5. No other adverse concems were found.

Yes is equipment free of interaction effects?

No IS EQUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADEQUATE 7 En CpMMENTS The SRTs are S. R. St Amour and W. Djordjevic - 10/25/93.

Capacity vs Demand:

/"%

The seismic demand exceeds the capacity at a low frequency, but it is acceptable because the demand is

(

enveloped at and above the estimated frequency.

Anchorage:

~'

The cabinet is welded to an edge channel by an 1/8" fillets,2" long at one conner and 1.5" at the other 3. The channels run along the perimeter of a grout pad and anchored to the concrete floor by expansion anchors. These expansion anchor are located intermittently along the channel. The bolt shank was measured at 2.25" and the channel height at 1.75".

ru _ _ _ u. _ _ _ _ _ i.. u.. _ _ 2.____e_i___ m _

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Interactions:

The overhead light has one open S-hook which needs to be clamped down p $

.[

Other.

The following items are sub-components of 2C-166-167 :

2C-166 SAFEGUARDS TRAtN B CHANNELS 1 AND 3 RELAY RACK i

2C-167 SAFEGUARDS TRAIN B CHANNELS 2 AND 4 RELAY RACK Date:

Evaluated by:

'p W4f9(

/t A h' 2)u %

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_ASa a.a-.

4

\\

RWST 4

i a

a 7

f 4

f i

i 1

J f

i a

1 1

I Wisctn in Electric P w:r Ccmpany - Pcint D cch Nu:l;cr PI'nt GIP Rav 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER CEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 1 of 2 ID : 1T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers fQ Desenption : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS

(_/

Building : U1F l Floor El. : 6.50 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 7

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Tanks and Heat Exchangers
a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

Shell Buckling X

Anchor Bolts and Embedment X

Anchorage Connections X

Flexibility of Attached Piping Other b.

Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outfier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).

According to GIP, the tank is unable to resist both the base overturnmg moment and shear (see SEWS). The tank analysis did not indicate a particular failure mechanism, but a combination of the shell buckling, anchor bolt capacity and tank chair capacity.

2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION fontional)
a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier, b.

Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of fundamental frequency).

3. SEISMIC OPERABILITY EVALUATION:

The RWST has been analyzed by Stevenson & Associates using finite element analysis. The high confidence low probability of failure (HCLPF) seismic capacity is.127g (ref. " Point Beach Refueling Water Storage Tank Seismic Capacity," Final Report, S&A Project 91C2696, June 30,1995, by Stevenson & Associates).

1 Wl c:nzin Electric P w r C:mpany - Pcint BIach Nucl:ir Plant GIP RIv 2, Correct:;d 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 2 of 2 ID : 1T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers Description : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS

s Building
U1F l Floor El. : 6.50 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 7
4. CERTIFICATION:

The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:

Approved by:

Date:

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Wisc nsin Electric P wer C:mp:ny - P: int B:ach Nucl:ar Plant GIP R:;v 2, Corrected,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 1 of 8 ID : 1T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers

,,i !

Desenption : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS Building : U1F l Floor El. : 6.50 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 7 Manufacturer, Model. Etc.

BASIS : Vertical TANK analysis

1. The buckling capacity of the shell of a large, flat-bottom. vertical tank is equal to or greater No than the demand.
2. The capacity of the anchor bolts and their embedments is equal to or greater than the No demand.
3. The capacity of connections between the anchor bolts and the tank shell is equal to or No greater than the demand.
4. Attached piping has adequate flexibility to accommodate the motion of a large, flat-bottom, Yes vertical tank.
5. A ring-type foundation is not used to support a large, flat-bottom. vertical tank.

Yes IS EQUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADEQUATE?

No t

COMMENTS l

~

The SRTs are M. A. Woznicki and W Djordjevic.

(D

,V REF: Graver Tank & MFG. Dwg. L-24015 and Bechtel Dwg. C-142 & C-149 Anchorage:

The Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) stands 72.5 feet high and is 27.0 feet in diameter. The tank is anchored into the concrete floor by 27 - 1.25" cast-in-place bolts, equally spaced in a 27.5 foot diameter bolt circle.

The anchor bolts go through concrete pad (18" high & 29' diameter) which is doweled into the concrete floor by #6 dowel at 12" on center all around the perimeter, in order to run the attached tank analysis the following data deviations were made:

1.) The maximum fluid height was assumed to be at about 0.5 feet below the overflow nozzle height. The overflow nozzle is at 68' above the bottom of the tank, hence H/R = 68 /13.5 = 5.037 is not within GIP's applicable range of parameters (1.0 to 5.0 - GIP table 7-1). The height of 68 - 0.5 = 67.5' is at the upper parameter limit, i.e. H/R = 67.5 /13.5 = 5.0.

2.) The tank's chair vertical stiffener plates are 0.5" thick, which does not meet one of the GIP requirements (i.e.

>0.5"), but since the thickness is equal to 0.5" this requirement was judged acceptable.

The attached tank analysis declared this tank an outlier because the tank failed to resist both the base overtuming moment and shear.

Date:

Evaluated by:

7 b

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Wisc:nsin Electric Paw;r Comp:ny - Paint B:ach Nuct:ar Plant GlP RLv 2, Corrected,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No 1

Sheet 2 of 8 (N

10 : 1T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers

!Q, Desenption : REFUEUNG WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS Building : U1F

\\ Floor El. : 6.5000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 7 Manufacturer, Model. Etc.

Attachment:

TANK Analysis Results f

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l Wisc n:In Electric P w;r C:mpiny - Pcint Bxch Nu:le r Plant GIF' 9tv 2, Corrncted,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 3 of 8 ID : 1T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers (qj Desenption : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS Building : U1F l Floor El. : 6.5000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 7 Manufacturer, Model, Etc.

TANK Analysis Results Step 1 -Input Data a) Assumptions

1. Tank is a flat bottom cylindrical vertical tank.

Yes

2. Tank is ground or floor mounted (not supported on skirts and structural legs).

Yes

3. Tank is not supported on a ring-type foundation.

Yes

4. Tank shell materialis carbon steel (ASTM A36 or A283 Grade C), stainless steel (ASTM Yes A240 Type 304), aluminum, or better.
5. Tank's fluid content is water or similar.

Yes

6. Anchor bolts are attached using a bolt chair similar to that shown in GIP Figure 7-6 (page7-Yes 43).

7, Anchor bolts are cast in place or J-bolts made of regular-strength or high-strength carbon Yes steel (ASTM A36, A307, or better material A325).

8. There are at least 8 anchor bolts evenly spaced around the circumference.

Yes

9. Attached piping has adequate flexibiltiy.

Yes b) Materials Tank Material A240 - Type 304 I

\\

Tank Yield Strength 30.0 ksi Tank Elastic Modulus 28000.0 ksi Anchor Bolt Type 1-1/4 in Cast-in-place Bolts Bolt Elastic Modulus 29000.0 ksi Weight Density of Fluid 62.38 lbs/ft^3 i

Bolt Chair Material A283 Gr. C Chair Yield Strength 30.0 ksi Chair Allowab!e Buckhng Stress 18.0 ksi Allowable Weld Stress 30.6 ksi l Tank bottom rests on ground & soil shear wave velocity < 3500 ft/sec.

l No l

c) Dimensions Tank Radius, R 13.5 ft Tank Height. H' 70.0 ft Maximum Fluid Level, H 67.5 ft Freeboard, ht 2.5 ft Number of Sections 3

Tank Piof'le Section Number Thickness (in)

To Height (ft) 1

.32 7.45 2

.28 15.49 G[D 3

.25 70

i i

Wi:ctnsin Electric P:w r Ctmpany. Print Beach Nucl:ar Plant GIP Rrv 2, Corrected,2/14/92 1

SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 4 of 8 A

ID : 1T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers V

Desenption : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS 7

Building : U1F l Floor El. : 6.5000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 7 Manufacturer, Model Etc.

Shell Wall Thickness at Base, ts 0.32 in Average Thickness 0.2609 in Effective Thickness of the Tank Shell, tef 0.2554 in Number of Bolts 27 Bolt Effective Length, hb 44.0 in Chair Height, h 12.0 in Top Plate Width, a 8.0 in Top Plate Thickness, c 0.75 in Anchor Bolt Eccentricity, e 2.69 in j

Hole Edge to Plate Edge Distance, f 1.188 in i

Stiffener Spacing, g 6.0 in Stiffener Thickness, j 0.5 in Stiffener Width, k 4.69 in Base Plate Thickness, tb 0.25 in Chair to Tank Weld Size 0.25 in 5

d) Anchor Bolts

)

i Type = Cast-in-Place Bolt Diameter = 1-1/4 in i

Manufacturer =

Product Name =

f i

(

Pullout Shear Nominal Capacity 41.72 kips 20.86 kips l Concrete Compression Strength, fc' = 3000.0 psi l

j Reduction Parameters Capacity Reduction Factor Label Check Condition Pullout Shear

1. Type of Anchorage Yes 1.0 1.0
2. Installation Adequacy Yes Installation is adequate 1.0 1.0
3. Embedment Length Yes Embedment Length = 44.0 1.0 1.0 l

in

4. Gap at Threaded Anchors Yes Gap size = 0.0 in 1.0 1.0
5. Spacing between Anchorages Yes 1.0 1.0
6. Edge Distance Yes Edge Distance = 12.0 in 1.0 1.0
7. Concrete Strength and Condition Yes 0.93 0.93
8. Concrete Crack Location and Size Yes Crack Size = 0.0 in 1.0 1.0
9. Essential Relays in Cabinets Yes Essential relays are not 1.0 1.0 present
10. Base Stiffness and Prying Action Yes 1.0 1.0
11. Equipment Base Strength and Yes Base streogth and load path 1.0 1.0 Structural Load Path are O.K.
12. Embedment Steel and Pads Yes Installation is O.K.

1.0 1.0 Does the tank satisfy all the as-sumptions and is within the applicable range of parameters?

Yfts

Wl;c nsin Electric Pcwor Company - Point Beach Nucl:ar Pl:nt GIP R&v 2, Corrected,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 5 of 8 Q

ID : 1T 13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers V

Desenption : REFUELING WAl ER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS Building : U1F l Floor El. : 6.5000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 7 Manufacturer Model. Etc.

Step 2 - Calculate the ratios and values H/R 5.0 ts/R 0.00198 tef/R 0.00158 Ab 1.2272 in^2 t'

O.03371 in c'

O.0287 W

2410.861 kips Step 3 - The fluid-structure modal frequency Coefficient. F'f 0.38 Hz Fluid-structure modal Frequency, Ff 2.71 Hz Step 4 - The spectral acceleration for the fluid structure modal frequency

%s l Spectral Acceleration. Saf l

0.652 G /4.0% damping l

Step 5 - The Base Shear Load

. Coefficient, Q' O.7679 g^-1 Base Shear, O 1207.847 kips Step 6 -The Base Overturning Moment Coefficient, M' 0.465 g^-1 Base Overturning Moment, M 49349.65 kip-ft Step 7 - The Allowable Bolt Stress Bolt Tension Capacity, Pu 38.625 kips A

Allowable Bolt Stress, Fb 31.475 ksi

\\h

i Wisc;n:In Electric Power Company Pcint UC=h Nucle:r Plint GIP Rtv 2, Corrected,2/14/92 i

SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 6 of 8

/~'N ID : 1T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers V

Desenption : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS Building : U1F l Floor El. : 6.5000 l Room. Row / Col: AREA 7 Manufacturer, Model, Etc.

  • Step 8 -The maximum bending stress of the top plate l

l Maximum Bending Stress of the Top Plate (ksi) l 114.156 l

The top plate is considered to fail in a ductile manner, Reduced Allowable Bolt Stress, Fr (ksi) = 8.271 Step 9 - The maximum bending stress of tank shell l Maximum Bending Stress of Tank Shell(ksi) l 31.251 l

The tank shell is considered to fail in a ductile manner t

Reduced Allowable Bolt Stress, Fr = 30.215 ksi Step 10 -Verify stiffener strength The Stiffeners have adequate strength in shear, buckling and compression.

Step 11 - Chair-to-tank shell weld load l Weld Load l

1.323 kips l

The weld is adequate.

Step 12 - Fluid pressure for elephant-foot buckling Pressure Coefficient Pe' 6.48 Fluid Pressure for Elephant-Foot Buckling 0.0379 ksi Step 13 - Elephant-foot buckling stress capacity factor -

O l Elephant-Foot Buckling Stress Capacity Factor l

11.019 ksi l

Wisctn;in Electric P*. wor C:mp:ny - Print Be:ch Nucle:r Plint GIP Riv 2, Corrected,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 7 of 8 ID : 1T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers O

Description : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS i

Building : U1F l Floor El. : 6.5000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 7 i

Manufacturer, Model, Etc.

Step 14 - Fluid pressure for diamond-shape buckling

{

i Pressure Coefficient, Pd' 5.11 i

Fluid Pressure for Diamond-Shape Buckling (ksi) 0.0299 Step 15 - Diamond shape buckling stress capacity factor increase Factor for Intemal Pressure 0.1486 Diamond-shape Buckling Stress Capacity Factor 23.115 ksi Step 18 - Allowable buckling stress l

l Allowable Buckling Stress l

7.934 ksi l

Step 17 - Overtuming moment capacity (a) Base Overtuming moment coefficient for ductile failure:

Allowable Bolt Stress, Fb (ksi) = 8.271 Base Overtuming Moment Coefficient for Ductile Failure = 0.08506 (c) Base Overtuming moment capacity:

Base Overtuming Moment Capacity, Mcap = 3610.78 kip-ft Step 18 - Compare the overtuming moment capacity with the overtuming moment I

" The tank is an outlier because of the failure to resist the base overtuming moment.

Step 19 - Base shear capacity l Base Shear Capacity, Ocap l

1144.31 kips l

Step 20 - Compare the base shear capacity with the shear load

" The tank is an outlier because of failure to resist the base shear.

l l

l l

Wisc n:in Electric P:wer C mp:ny Print Uccch Nucl:cr PI:nt GIP RIv 2, Corrected,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 8 of 8 A

ID : 1T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers

(,)

Desenption : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS Building : U1F l Floor El. : 6.5000 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 7 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. -

Step 21 -The slosh height Slosh Frequency 0.333 Hz Spectral Acceleration for the Slosh Mode, Sas 0.021 G /0.5% damping Slosh Height 0.243 ft Step 22 - Compare the available freeboard with the slosh height Tank freeboard is OK.

Stop 23 - Flexibility of attached piping check t

There is adequate flexibility in the attached piping.

O Summary IS EQUlPMENT SEISMICALLY ADEQUATE 7 MQ The tank is an outlier because of

- failure to resist the base overtuming moment

- failure to resist the base shear e

W1.:ctn:In Electric Power Compiny - Print B:ach Nuctorr Plant GIP Rtv 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 1 of 2 lD : 2T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers O

Desenption : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS h

Building : U2F l Floor El. : 6.50 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 11

1. OUTLIER ISSUE DEFINITION - Tanks and Heat Exchanners
a. Identify all the screening guidelines which are not met. (Check more than one if several guidelines could not be satisfied.)

Shell Buckling X

Anchor Bolts and Embedment X

Anchorage Connections X

Flexibility of Attached Piping Other b.

Describe all the reasons for the outlier (i.e., if all the listed outlier issues were resolved, then the signatories would consider this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy).

According to GIP, the tank is unable to resist both the base overtunung moment and shear (see SEWS). The tank analysis did not indicate a particular failure mechanism, but a combination of the shell buckling, anchor bolt capacity and tank chair capacity.

2. PROPOSED METHOD OF OUTLIER RESOLUTION (Optional) l J
a. Defined proposed method (s) for resolving outlier.

i b.

Provide information needed to implement proposed method (s) for resolving outlier (e.g., estimate of l

fundamental frequency).

3. SEISMIC OPERABILITY EVALUATION:

The RWST has been analyzed by Stevenson & Associates using finite element analysis. The high confidence low probability of failure (HCLPF) seismic capacity is.127g (ref: " Point Beach Refueling Water Storage Tank Seismic Capacity," Final Report, S&A Project 91C2696 June 30,1995, by Stevenson & Associates).

Wisctnsin Electric Pow:r Company - Print BeaIh Nu leir Pl nt GIP Rsv 2, Corrected 2/14/92 OUTLIER SEISMIC VERIFICATION SHEET (OSVS)

Sheet 2 of 2 ID : 2T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21. Tanks and Heat Exchangers O

Desenption : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS Building : U2F l Floor El. : 6.50 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 11

4. CERTIFICATION:

The information on this OSVS is, to the best of our knowledge and belief, correct and accurate, and resolution of the outlier issues listed on the previous page will satisfy the requirements for this item of equipment to be verified for seismic adequacy:

Approved by:

Date:

b W

i b

$6 i

s

/

o E

1 4g I

e

Wisxn:in Electric Power Comp:ny Print Ecach Nucirr Pl:nt GIP Rav 2, Corr,cted,2/14/92 SCREENING EVALUATION WORK SHEET (SEWS)

Status: No Sheet 1 of 1 f-]

ID : 2T-13 (Rev. 0) l Class : 21 - Tanks and Heat Exchangers Description : REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK W/6 IMMERSION HTRS

~ Building : U2F l Floor El. : 6.50 l Room, Row / Col: AREA 11 Manufacturer, Model. Etc.

BASIS : Vertical TANK analysis

1. The buckling capacity of the shell of a large, flat-bettom, vertical tank is equal to or greater No than the demand.
2. The capacity of the anchor bolts and their embedments is equal to or greater than the No demand.
3. The capacity of connections between the anchor bolts and the tank shell is equal to or No greater than the demand.
4. Attached piping has adequate flexibility to accommodate the motion of a large, flat-bottom, Yes vertical tank.
5. A ring-type foundation is not used to support a large, flat-bottom, vertical tank.

Yes IS EQUIPMENT SEISMICALLY ADEQUATE?

No t

COMMENTS The SRTs are M. A. Woznicki and W. Djordjevic.

O V

REF: Graver Tank & MFG. Dwg. L-24102-2 and Bechtel Dwg. C 142, C-144 & C-149 Anchorage:

The Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) stands 72.5 feet high and is 27.0 feet in diameter. The tank is anchored into the concrete floor by 27 - 1.25" cast-in-place bolts, equally spaced in a 27.5 foot diameter bolt circle.

The anchor bolts go through concrete pad (18" high & 29' diameter) which is doweled into the concrete floor by #6 dowel at 12" on center all around the perimeter.

For the tank analysis and addition notes see iT-13. The tank analysis declared this tank an outlier because the tank failed to resist both the base overtuming moment and shear.

i Evaluated by:

Date:

W d l l } %, d b M,// FAG v

.

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