ML20115B144

Forwards Initial Decision Issued by Aslb,For Info for Commission

ML20115B144
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	10/04/1966
From:	Mccool W US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML093631134	List: ML18010B195 ML20087F806 ML20087F808 ML20087F815 ML20114E363 ML20114E376 ML20114E393 ML20114E412 ML20114E468 ML20114E472 ML20114E487 ML20114E503 ML20114E514 ML20114E518 ML20114E524 ML20114E628 ML20114E678 ML20114E702 ML20114E729 ML20114E765 ML20114E777 ML20114E794 ML20114E836 ML20114E844 ML20114E871 ML20114E876 ML20114E883 ML20114E887 ML20114E896 ML20114E916 ML20114E941 ML20114E963 ML20114E971 ML20114E988 ML20114E999 ML20114F029 ML20114F032 ML20114F049 ML20114F076 ML20114F121 ML20114F142 ML20114F153 ML20114F189 ML20114F202 ML20114F209 ML20114F221 ML20114F260 ML20114F273 ML20114F279 ML20114F282 ... further results
References
AEC-R-135-3, NUDOCS 9210150296
Download: ML20115B144 (6)

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i,TOMIC ENER0Y COMMISSION

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effectivenessj th'e initial decision'becomes the final decision 1

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dr the Commission on November 18, 1966 unless there is.a petition for review filed on er before October 24, 1966 nr

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W.~B. McCool Secretary 9210150296 920520 PDR ORG NRCHIST PDR t'

DISTRIIUTION COPY NO.

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26-31 Secretary 1,54-62 Compliance Commissioners 2-6,63 Congr. Relations 32-33 General Manager 7-8 Inspection i

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9 Materials Licensing 35-36 Dir. of Regulation 10-10 Naval'Eeactors 37-38 Deputy Dir, of Regulation 13 Operational Safety 39-40 Asst. Gen. Mgr.

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1. The attached initial decisian issued by the Atomic l

Safety ard Licensing Board is circulated for the information of the Commission.

2. The initial decision becomes effective on October 14, 1966 in the absence et any order by the Commission suspending 4

effectiveness; the initial deci.lon becomec the final decision, '. '"

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UNITED fTATIE OF AMERICA kiCMIC ENERGY COMMISSION Di THE MA?fER OF CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. )

DOCKET NO. 50-2h7 (Indian Point Statien Unit No. 2)

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Appearances Arvin E. Up~an, Esq.

Eugene B. Thomas, Jr., Esq.

Lex K. larson, Esq.

Appearing on behalf of the Applicant Consolidnted Edison Ccmpany of New York, Inc.

Trray B. Conner, Jr., Esq.

Ronald M. Weiskopf, Esq.

Appearing on behalf of the Regulatory Staff of the Atomic Energy Cnmission Joseph F. Scinto, Esq.

Appeating en behalf of the New York State Office of Atemic and Space D2velopment Limited Appearances Honorable Richard L. Ottinger Congressman from New York Frederick J. Martin, Jr.

Candidate for Congress frem New York James Stead

.2xecutive Assistant to "e tchester County Executives Villiam J. Burke Mayor, Village of Buchanan John R. Dunning Chairman,,-Counsel on Science & Technolcgy for City of New York Elizabeth R. Ecgan Pro Se Walter S. Boardman l

Pro Se Smith W. Brookhart, Esq.

Counsol, National Parks Association Mary Hays Weik Secretary of Committee to lhd Radiological Hazards i

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DiITIAL DECISION Consolidated Edison Ca=pany of New York, Inc. (Con-Ed), has filed an application and amendments thereto for licenses in-accordance with Section 104b of the Atcnnic Energy Act, as amended, seekins, among other things, a construction pemit to build a pressurized water reactor des 15ned to operate at 2,758 MWt which is propoced to be located at Con-Ed's Indian Point site on the Hudson River in the Town of Buchanan, Westchester County, New York.

The application, as amended, proposes that,the facility vill be constructed for Con-Ed in accordance with a contract executed with-Westinghouse Electric Corporation and with the assistance of desi5nated architect-et.gineers und a. construction contractor.- The contract'provides that Westinghouse vill complete'the construction i

of the proposed facility and operate it for one hundred hours before l^

j delivery is considered complete to Con-Ed. The application contains i

a description of the site and the proposed facility, the financial qualifications of Con-Ed, as well as the technical qualifications of Con-Ed considered in comb 2 nation with those of Westinghouse, to 1

design and to constract the proposed facility.

Consistent with th7 requirements of Section-29 of the Atomic

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Energy Act, as amended, and the procedures of the Cc= mission, the application and its five amendments have been reviewed by both 1

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I the Regulatory Staff of the Ca::m2ssien (Staff) and the Advisory i

Ccr::mittee on. Reactor Safeguards (ACIE).

l The Atcnic Energy Ca::nission, in accordance with the require-ments of the Act icsued a notice providirg for a hearing 1efore an j

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Town-of Buchanan, New York.N 4

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The State of Ncv York, through its Office of Atcmic and Space Develop-i ment,.' intervened and participated in the. proceeding.

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there vere several limited appeannees, some of whom uppeared in -

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behalf of the project and.ctners who appeared in.oppositicn to the i

project. A petition to' intervene in these proceedings was filed.by l

The Conservation Center of New York on 'Geptembar 15,19f6, the V

f cecond day of the evidentiary hearing. The petition was served upon l

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g General. public notice vus 61ven of the proceeding, which

- included publication in the Federal Register on July 30, 1966 s

(31 Fed. Reg. 10331). Prior to the' convening 7f the hearing, public prehearing conferences were held in Buchanan on; August-17, 1966, and on September 13, 1966, to consider pro-cedural r.atters regarding the presentation of the evidence, schedules for vitnesses and other items contemplated by the -

Rules of Practice of the Ccc ission. At the aforesaid pre-I hearing conference th'e date for the hearing vas' vrscheduled -

i for September -14, 1966, and due notice of this postponement vue issued.

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the parties and the Board during the second day of the hearings, andwasdeniedbytheBoard.2I 1

2] The fortal petitton. to intervene alleged, amon6 other items, the folloving:

"The Conservation Center, Inc., a non-profit Delaware Corporation... was-organized in an effort to help protect the health, velfare and cafety of the-public in the 1tudson River Valley Sain as well as in other areas of Eastern United States, where blight and pollution are present dangers.

"The outcome of the present proceeding, and any increase in levels of radioactivity.by the operation of the type of plant proposed manifestly affects the interests of -

the petitioner. The reasons supporting the petitioner's position in the proceeding are set forth in the pages hereinafter attached."

In the attached ten pages were quotations frcn several docu-ments, particularly the Safety Evaluation by the Regulatory Staff of the 'Ccesission which expressed its belief that the construction and operation of the proposed facility vould be without undue hazard to the health and safety of the public.

Included in the petition, alco, were ceveral questions which have been substantially answered by the evidence presented.-

The Board considered the petition to inter.ene at a recess in the hearings, as-well as the arguments and presentations -

nade after the recess, and denied the petition to intervene 1

for-failure to comply with the lhics of practice of the.Cce-mission. The contentions of the. participants had largely centered upon the n quirement that a petition to intervene must set forth "... - the-interest of the petitioner in the

-proceeding, how that interest may be affected by Co= mission act.on, and the contentions of the petitioner."

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3 Con-Ed's 250 acre site ic on the east cide of the Hudson River in the Town of Buchanan, Westchester County, New York.

It is about 24 miles north-of New York City and about 2 5 miles i

i from the center of Peekskill. This second unit vill be built adjacent to Con-Ed's ex. sting nuclear generating rtation, known i

as Unit No.1.

There are approximately 53,000 people who live within 5 miles of the site; within a 10 mile radius-there are people.N.In 1980 it is estimated that the popula-about 155,000

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tion vithin this 10 mil'd radius vill total aboutd325,000.3A

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a consequence of its proximity to large_ppyulation centers'.

yific_ engineered safeguards, which are considered later in' this decision, have been desi ned to avoid undue exposure of the 5

public to radiation in the event of an accident.

The area surrounding InM.an Point is generally residential.

f Bedrock at the site vill provide the foundation for the facility and it capacity for loads is calculated to be up to-50 tonc per squam foot, which exceede any load that this. plant-vill super-1mpoce upon tL-edrock. All ground water flov is toward the river The site is an area.

and the' site is not to be'cubject to flooding.

i reported to be of relatively inactive ceic=1c~ forces, and such as they are, more closely resemble the " creaking stair" releases from previous glacial veight, r:.ther than tectonic or cour.tain-r I

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\\ a building forces such as those believed to be active on the vest coast of the United States. The peak tidal flow of the Hudson past Indian Point is 80 million gallons per minute and thus there vill be adequate mixing and dilution of any liquid discharges fra:n the facility. EW luations made of the meteoroi gy at the site support the belief that stmospneric diffucion and distribution for the gaces released from the facility can be expected.

Con-Ed is a large privately owned utility vnich supplice electric service to 2,900,000 cuMo::ers in the city of New York and in meet of Westchester County.

It also supplies natural gas to about 1,300,000 customere and har facilicies for providing 3,810,000 pounde of tteam per hour vnich it sella to about 2,500 customers.

Con-Ed's electric requirements are cup-d plied by 12 generating stations which have a net generating capacity of approximately 7,477 megavatte. The maxiram load is 2

expected to increase to 7,750 megavutta in 1971.

Con-Ed hat exchanFe power arrangements with certain other utilities in New York Stste.

For ceveral years Con-Ed has bien actively engaged with several other companies in the nuclear de.'elo; cont field.

It also ovns and operates a pressurized veter reactor at Indian Point, which nuclear facility has operated successfully for-more than four years.

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i Con-Ed has assets in excess of three billion dollars.

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1 plans to finance the cost of consthetion-of this proposed nuclear-plant in the ortlinary ' course of business through the internal generation of funds and the issuance of stocks-and bonds.

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The proposed pressurized water reactor facility is of the

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same general type as a number of others which are now in operation or under construction, including Connecticut Yankee at Haddam,-

j Southern California Edison'at San Onofre and the Rochester Gas and Electric facility at Broorxood..

The reactor vill be fue'ied with i

uranium dioxide sintered pellets, sealed in Zirealoy tubes. The i

actual core vill be approximately 12 feet in diameter'and 12 feet long.

It vill be confined in a pressurized vessel designed to with-stand a pressure of approximately 2,500 psis.

Cooling vater vill

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be circulated through the core and four steam generatorc by four 90,007 gpm primary coolant pumps.

i The containment, within which the reactor vessel, steam generators, primary coolant pumps, and other primary system equip-

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ment vill be located, Will be a reinforced concrete stracture similar in concept to the containment vessel being built-for the L

Connecticut Yankee-facility.

The containment in designed lto vithstand the pressures -and temperatures that would occur in the unlikely event of a failure of the largest primary coolant line

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and to retain radioactive fission products.which might be released

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) as a consequence of this and lesser accidents.

The Indian Point containment system is designed with the added objective of pm-venting outleakage under accident conditions.

To achieve thic coal, the containment system design includes a penetrution l

pressuri:.ation system and an isolation s alve seal water system.

The penetration pressuritation system vill provide a zone main-tained at a pressure of at least 50 psig at the potential leak-ar,e paths at the various containment penetrations.

In addition, velded joints of the containment liner vill also be covend with a channel which is pressurized to at least 50 psig. The value of 50 psig has been celected as being 64euter than the maximum pres-sure calculated to occur in the containment during the course of a major loss-of-coolant accident.

The isohtion valve seal suter -

system vill be des 1 ned to provide under accident conditions -

6 either a water seal at isolation valves or a-vater leg in fluid lines which penetmte the containment barrier..The water pressure at-the valves or in the fluid line vould be maintained at a pressure of at least 50 psig.

A safety injection system vill be: provided to cool' the more with torated vater in case of a major loss-of-coolant accident.

6[L In addition,-two other emergency cooling systems (containment' spray and. air recirculation system) with' n the conta nment vessel i

vill deprecsurize the containment by coolin6 the-co tainment

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9 stmo:phere and vill-remcVe ccme radicactive ficcien produ;tt which.

night te released frem the co-at a cencequence of an accident.

Iither cf these centainmOnt cooling cystems acting independently it deriEned to maintain internal containment pressure within-2eceptable limitt eith no reliance cn the cafety injection system.-

The systems vill function in accordance with different principles una are to be provided with redundant components- (pumps, valve;,

heat exchangers, -etc. ) within each system for maximum reliability.

~te service water cystem which vill transfeer the heat-from the containment cooling cystems to the river vill also be provided with duplicate equipment so _that no single failure would preclude continued operation of these important engineered safeEuards.

Phile the desi6n of Indian Pcint Unit No. 2 plant in similar i

in mest respects to o+.her pressurized Tater reactor facilities pre--

vicusly approved.ty the Commission, ' there are severel differences.

The length cf the-core in the Brockwood-and= Indian Foint Unit No. 2 reacters vill be 12 feet as compared to 10 feet in both Connecticut Yenhee and San Oncfre reactors.

fhe Brockvood and Indian Point Unit Jo. 2 fuel rede vill be clad with_cirecnium, whereas both San Onofre and Connecticut Yankee vill employ stainless steel cladding in the -

first core.

The Indian T31nt Unit No. 2 core vill operate at seme-what higher linear heat generation rate (the' maximum specific power in_ kilowatts per foot of a. fuel rod is f designed to be 18 5) and

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% I higher central fuel temperature than Brookwood, San Onofre or C nnecticut Yankee.

Experience at there higher design values

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has been gained from fuel testing programs and opem tiens in the Westinghouse Saxton reactor. Some of the post-accident reactor core and containment coolin6 cystem components vill be installed inside the centainment r,tructure to minimize potential leakage I

cources, and a complete backup system vill also be installed in the primary auxiliary building.

The design capacity of the y nt-accident core ecoling system has been improved by addi'.ional

,pu= ping capacity and pipin6 Moct of thece items are within the ranSe of established technology and engineering practice. The othere vill be the subject of a development program proposed by Cen-Ed.

The development of the final design of the containment and the accident mitigating componente vill be carefull; followed 4

i by the AEC Staff as recorrended by the ACES.

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i Althou6h both the Staff and ACRS have concluded that-there 1

l is reasonable assurance that the proposed facility can be con-3 structed and operated without undue risk to the health and cafety ofthepublic,{.CEShasenumeratedseveralitemowhichtheyvish to review before the issuance of an unqualified approval for a

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Specifically, theirviev3/is, in part, at follevs:

f I77te Indian Point 2 plant iti provided with two safety injec-

, tion syste=s for flooding the core vith borated water in the event of a pipe rupture ir, the primary system.

The emergency-ccre cooling systems are of particular importance, and the

,, ACRS belitves that an increase in the flow capacity of thece systems is necded;; improvements of cther characteris-tics such as pump discharge pressure may be appropriate.

The forces imposed on variots structural members within the pressure vessel during blevdown in a lo9s-of-coolant acci-dent should be reviewed. to assure adequate design conservatism.

The Committee believes that these matters can be resclved during construction of these facilities. However, it believes that the AEC Regulatory Staff and the Committee should review the final design cf the emergency core cooJ1

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prior to irrev,ocable commitments relative is aure vessel, I

snstruction of these itemc.1/.

I "In order to reduce still further the low-probability-of primary system 2pture, the applicant should take the adiitional mea-sures noted belov.' The Ccmmittee vould like to review the recul' of ctudies made by the applicant in this connection, and consecuent proposals, as soon as these are available. "/

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Design and fabricatien techniques for the entire primary cystem should be reviewed thorou6hly to -

assure adequate conservatism throughout and to make full use of practical, existing inspection techniques which can provide still Breater-assurance cf hi hest 6

quality.

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As Attachtent "A", the ecmplete ACES letter is inch?de; 1/

Emphasis added.

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Great attention should be placed in design on in-service inspection possibilities and the destation of incipient trouble in the entire primary system during reactor operation. Methods of leak detec-4 tion should be employed which provide a maximum of protection against serious accidents, n**

"The app'4 cant 'Tas made.r+2a ss of reactivity excursions re-sulting truc the improbable event that structural failure leads to expulsion of a control rod from the core. Such transients should be limited by design and operation so that l

they cannot result in gross primary-system rupture or disruption of the core, which cou.k. impair the effectiveness of emergency core cooling.

The reactivity transient problem is complicated by the er.istence of sizeable positive reactivity effects associated with voiding the borated coolant water, particularly early in core life.

In addition. the course of the transients is sensitive to various parameters, some of which remain to ba fixed daring.the final design. Westinghouse representatives reported that the magnitude of such reactivity transients could be reduced.by installation of solid burnable poisons -in the core te permit reduction of the soluble boron content of the moderator, thereby reducing the positive modera-tor coefficient.

The Committee agrees with the applicant's plans to be prepared to install the burnable poison if neces-l sarv.

The Cc=mittee vishes to review the question of reactivitr transients as soon as the core design is set "t/

These requests by ACES that further data, particularly in reference to emergency core cooling systems ant ertinent struc-c r/ ture members within the pressure vessel, be made available for its reviev "... prior to irrevocable cctmitments relative to construc-

,.. tion of these items. ~', reflect a enneern not heretefore expressed I e

n ACRS repcrts. Recor?,s of unrelated proceedings in the public l} '/O r

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files of the Co= mission shov, hcvever, that as a matter of practice, i

epplicants for licenses to construct and operate nuclear facilities do keep the ACRS,- as well as the Staff, informed respecting progress in design and technology for a facility even after the issuance of i

l a construction permit.

It is reasonable to conclude that the same informational-procedures vill remain in effect.

A review and a hearing 'at the construction permit stage of a l

nuclear facility project is a more limited one than is available i

vhen the consideration is related to a request for an operating authority.

At the construction permit hearing, the principal l

architectural and er.gineering criteria are presented.. In addi-tion, Con Edison here, as have other applicants in most instances involving ecnstruction permits, has presented considerable design l

detail related to those criteria.

Con Edison has also identified those technical features and components requiring further design-I work.

The review by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is limited to a censideration of those criteria and technical design features ' which have bee 1 presented and which in' the Board's -

opinion are adequate to prov.fe reasonable assurance that the l

proposed facility can be cons.ructed and operated-vithout undue risk to.the health and-safety of the public.- The Rules of the-Commission pensit the Board, ':oon making that finding, to authorize in its initial decision the issuance of a provisional construction 1

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permit.

The Rules of the Commission also contemplate that in the interim before an operating license is sought, the indicated architectural and engineering details vill be developed and presented for Cc= mission review, which could include hearing 8 if deemed advisable.

It is apparent that the ACRS has concluded that the eddi-tienal architectural and engineering details can be developed in a way that vill provide reasonable assurance if this facility is later authorized to be operated, that it can be done without undue risk to the health ar.d safety of the pt.lic.

At the present status of development of the architectural and engineering features, however, the ACRS reco=mendation to the Commission is that the ACRS desires to reviev final design details for the specified facility ecmponents.

This vill, of 9

course, provide the best basis for a substantial determination respecting the safety of the project.

The Commission's program cf safety reviews indicates its desire to have availab3e to it

.n additional objective and independent technical reviews, first by the ACES, and secondly, ty the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards, and thus it is cencluded that there appears no doubt Ts

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that the Ccemission vill accede to this ACRS request.

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permit stage by an Atomic Sarety and Licensing soard, however,

ve' conclude in our reviev and determination respecting the architectural and engineering criteria and features which have been presented that there is reasonable assurance that the proposed facility can be constructed and operated vi-thout undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

I At the conclusion of the hearing, Consolidated Edison filed with the Board, in accordance with-Section 2 764(a) of the Commission s Rules of Practice, a motion _for expedited effective-ness of the initial decision.

There vas no objection to the motion by the Staff or the State of New York.

Section 2.76L(a) of the Commission's Rules of Practice pro-vides as follows:

"... An initial decision directing the issuance or amendment of a constr'tetion permit or construction authorization may, upon written motion, be-made effective ten (10, days after issuance' when the presiding -officer finds that > (1) no sig-nificant question of fact, law, or discretion-has been presented;_ (2) that the recora clearly warrants such action and shevs_that denfal of the motion vill result in substan-tial economic-_njury or be' detrimental to the public inte re s t. "

It =ust be clear frcm the extensive record of t e evidence and the consideration thereof as reflected Hin this initial decision that significant and substantial questions of fact-have been presented.5! The record also shows that Con-Ed_has'an increasing f/

The Staff prcposal respecting the motion is related to the language of Jection.2 761 of the Rules and is rejected on that ground.

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demand for electricity and means must be found to fulfill that demand.

Con-Ed has presented evidence respecting the capacity of its existing generating plants and its endeavors to provide additional capacity, including the protracted Storm King Mountain pumped vater storage project. A failure to supply the demand would affect the public interest that buyers have in their concern that electricity be dehvered when they make a call for it.-

Con-Ed is obligated in the public service to make delivery as the demand arines and an it may vary from time to time.

The Board, having found that reasonab?e assurance has been established that, based upon the present record the prooosed facility can be con-structed and operated within the limi ts. of the principal archi--

tectural and engineering criteria vithout undue risk to the health -and safety of the public, consideration can then be given to the possibility of. substantial economic injury if the effec-tive date of-this initial decision is not advanced for the-short-period of time permitted by the Rules of Practice of the Commis-sien. Con-Ed has-asserted that as the fall and vinter veather approacnes, each day is important in the construction schedule r

in order to achieve as much cement work as possible

.'cre freezing veather delays _the work._ These aspects of construction are reflected in the capability of Con-Ed to supply the-demands made upon it for electricity. The Board concludes that ' substantial s

c

- 17 economic injury will occur if this initial decision is not made effective in accordance with the Rules, and thus the motior,is granted and the order herein vill so provide.

Upon a consideration of all of the evidence, the contentions and the proposed findings and conclusions submitted by-the par +1es, which have been substantially adopted as herein shown, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board finda and concludes as follows:

(1) Consolidated Edison Company of New York,-Inc.,

has supplied cufficient information to varrant the issuance of a provisional construction permit.

The absence of many Cetails and features related to the general architectural and en6 neering criteria, which must necessarily avait a 1

research and development program, precludes the issuance of

-an-unqualified construction permit at this-time; (2) Consolidated Edison Company has described the pro-posed design, including but not-. limited to the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the desi6n, a.nd has identified the major features or ecmponents on which further technical info:r.ation is required and which is to be supplied; (3) "he omitted technical information vill be supplied; (h) Consolidated Edison has proposed, and there vill be conducted, a research and development program reasonably.

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% designed to resolve the safety questions with respect to those features or components which require research and development; ana (5) On the basis of the foregoing, there is reasonable assurance that (1) such safety questions vill be satisfac-torily resolved at or before the latest date stated in the application for completion of construction of the proposed.

facility and (ii) taking into consideration the site criteria contained in Part 100, the proposed facility can be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and scfety of the public;-

Censolidated Edison is technically qualified to design and construct the proposed facility; Consolidated Edison is-financially qualified to design and-construct the proposed facility; The issuance of a permit for_the.censtruction of the facility will not be inimical to the common defense and security cr to the health and safety of the public.

WHERITORE, in accordance with Section 10hb of the Atcmic Energy Act, as amended, and the Rules and Regulations cf the Com-mission, IT IS ORDERED that, subject to review by the Commission upon its ovn-motion er upon the filing of exceptions in accordance with the Rules of Practice, 10 CFR Part 2, Consolidated Edison is-

% authorized to construct the facility in accordance with the appli-cation and with the evidence and representations entered in the record tt the hearing; and the Director of the Division of Reactor Licensing is directed to issue a provisional construction pemit i

pursuant to Section 10kb of the Act substantially in the fem of Attachment "B"

hereto.

IT IS IURTHER OEDERED THAT, in accordance with Section 2.

s4, 4

this Initial Decision shall become effective on October lL,1966, and, in the absence of any further order from the Ccc: mission, shall constitute the final decision of the Commission on November 18, 1966, subject to the filing of exceptions and to any crder by the 4

Com=ission upon such petition or upon its evn motion.

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICE:GIRG E0ARD dd_ O.

David B. Hall Q

j W

,_CLW Jchn

_Geyer C

mf Samuel W. Jensah, Chaimarf Attachments:

Attachment "A" Attachment "B" Issued:

October 3,1%6 Germantown, Maryland S

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4 4TTAC51E:i? "A" AD"ISOEY C O'.!THI Of FEACTOP SJEG"!J.IS

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U'iITED STATES i.TO:4IC E: EFG7 C::CIISSION

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Usshin6 ten, D. C.

2:5L 5 1

c.Js, au 900 i

4 i

Ecnorable Glenn T. Seaborg Chairman l

U. S. Atemic Energy Ccamission

[

Washin6 ten, D. C.

i

Subject:

REPORT CH INDIAli POI'iT !UCIIAE GE:iEEA~'ING 'JUIT ::0. 2 i

i Eear Dr. Seaborg:

i j

At its ceventy-fifth meetin6, Jaly 1;-16, 1966, and itc special neeting en August h-5,1966, the Advisory Cc=nittee en Beacter Safeguard: :cm-pleted itc review of the application of Consolidated Edison Ccepany cf !!ev York, Inc. for authori:stion to ecnstruct Indian Point !!uelear Generating Unit No. 2, This project had provicusly been censidered' i

at the seventy-second and seventy-third meetings ~cf the Conmittee, and at Subeccmittee meetings en March 30, May 3, and June 23, 1966.

Luring its review, the Cc==ittee had the tenefit of discussions with retresen-g tatives cf the Consolidated Edison Ccmpany and their centracters and censultante and vith representatives of the AEC Fegulatorj Staff and l

their censultants.

The Cc==ittee also' had the benefit of the documents l-listed.

l The Indian Pcint 2 plant is to be a pressuriced sater reacter system -

utilizing a core fueled with clightly enriched uranium dioxide pelletc contained in Zircaloy fuel reds; it is to be centrolled by a ec=bitaticn cf rod cluster-type control rods and boron dissolved in the primary ccolant system.

The plant is Lrated at 2758 MW(th the gross electrical cutput ir estimated to be 916 MW(e ).

Although the turbine has an ad-ditional calculated grces capacity cf about 109, the applicant hae stated that there are. no plans for pcVer ctretch in this plant, The Indian Point 2 facility is the largest reactor that has been ecn-sidered for licensing to date. Furtherncre, it vill be located ir. a 4

i regicn cf relatively high pcpulatien density.

For these reascas,.

3 particular attenticn has been given to improving and supplementing the protective features previcusly provided in ether-plants of this type.

The propcsed design has a reinforced concrete centainment with an in-ternal steel liner which is provided with facilities for pressuri:stien cf. veld areas to reduce the possibility of leakage in these areas.

The containment design also includes an internal recirculatien d

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containment spray system and an air' recirculation tystem consisting of five air handling units to provide long-term cooling of the con-tainment without having-to pump radioactive liquids _outside the containment in the event of an accident.

Even thou6h the applicant anticipates negligible leakage from the containment, two indepen6 7t means of iodine. removal within the containment have been provided.

3' These are an air filtration' system using activated charcoal filters,

'g and a containment epray system which uses sodium thiosulfate in the epray water as a reagent to aid removal of elemental iodine.

4 The reactor vestel and various other components of the system are surrounded by concrete shielding which provides protection to the containment against missiles that might_be generated if structurel 4

failure of such components were to occur during operation at pressure.

7his includes missile protaction against the hi6hly unlikely failure of the reactor vessel by longitudinal splitting or by various modes -

of circumferential cracking.

The Committee favors such protection i

for lar6e reactors in regions of relatively hi h population density.

S t

- The Indian Point 2 plant is provided with two safety injection systems 3

i for flooding the core with borated water in the event of. a -pipe lapture in the primary system.

The emergency core cooling systems are of particular importanct, and the ACES believes that an. increase j

in the flow capacity of these systems is needed; tmprovements of p

other characteristics such as pump discharge pressure may be ap-propriate.

The forces imposed en various structural members within-the pressure vessel during blevdown in a loss-of-coolant accident should be revieved to assure adequate design conservatism.. The

'~

Cc=mittee believes that these matters can be resolved during-con-l struction of these facilities.

However, it believes that the AEC Regalatory Staff and the Committee should review the final design

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of the emergency core cooling.s/ stems and the pertinent structural members.vithin the pressure vessel, prior to irrevocable commitments i

relative to construction of these ite=s.

The applicant stated that, even if a significant fraction of the core vere to melt during a loss-of-coolant accident, the melted-portion vould not penetrate the bottcm of the reactor pressure vessel owing 1

to contact of the vessel with vater in the sump beneath it, b

The spplicant also proposes to install a backup to the emergency core cooling systems, in the form of a water-cooled refractory lined ctainless steel tank beneath the reactor pressure vessel.

The Com-mittee vould like to be advised of des 1gn details and their theo-retical and expert = ental bases when the design is completed.

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_Y In crder to reduce still further the low probability of primary system rupture, the applicant should take the additional measures noted belev.

The Cct:itt< e vould like to review the results of studies made by the applicant in this connection, and consequent proposals, as scen as these are available.

1.

Design and fabrication techniques for the entire primary system should be reviewed thoroughly to assure adequate conservatism throughout and to take full use of practical, eristing inspecticn techniques which can provide still Ereater assurance of highest quality.

2.

Great attention should be placed in design on in-service inspecticn possib1_1 ties and the detection of incipient trouble in the entire primary system during reactor operation.

Methods of leak detection should be employed which provide a maximum cf protection against sericus incidents.

Attention should also be 61ven to quality control aspects, as well as stress analysis evaluation, cf the containment and its liner.

The Cc=mittee recc=cends that these itams be resolved between the 4

AEC Regu3atory Staff and the applicant as adequate information is developed.

lhe applicant has made studies of reactivity excursiens resulting frcm the improbable event that structural failure leads to expulsion of a control red frem tne core.

Such transients should be limited by design and cperation so that they cannot result in gross primary-system rupture or disruption of the core, which eculd impair the effectiveness of emergency core cooling.

The reactivity transient probles is ec= plicated by the existence cf siteable positive re-activity ef fects associated vi+' volding the berated coolant water, particularly early in core lift.

In-addition, the course of the transients is sensitive to varicus parameters, sc=e of which retain

.c le fixed during the final design. Westinghouse representatives reported that the magnitude of such reactivity transients could be reduced by installation cf solid burnable poisens in the core to permit reductica of the solucle boren centent cf the moderator, there-by reducing tne positive moderator coefficient.

The Cet:1ttee agrees with the applicant's plans to be prepared to install the burnable poisen if necessary.

The Oc=mittee wishes to review the question of reactivity transients as soon as the core design is set.

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~Y The Adviscry Cctaittee on Reactor Safeguards believes that the. ~

various items centioned can be resolved during construction and that the prepoced reacter can be constructed at the Indian Point cite with reasonable assurance that it can be cperated sdthout undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ David Okre *.

Cuvid Okrent Chairman Ref - :es*

1.

Consclidated Edison Company cf New Yerk, Inc., Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Preliminary Safety Analysis i

Report, Volume 1, and Volume 2, Parts A & B, received December 7,1965 2.

First Supplement to Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, dated March 31, 1966.

Seccnd Supplement to Preliminary Safety Analysis Peport.

l received June 2, 1966.

Errata Sheets for Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and First Supplement.thereto, received June 13, 1966.-

Third Supplement 'to Preliminary Sai'ety Analysis Peport, re-ceived June 22, 1966.

6.

Fourth Suppicient to Preliminary Safety = Analysis Eeport, re-ceived July 26,15f6.

7 Fif th Supplement to freliminary Safety Analysis Eerort, re-ceived July 28, 1966.

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I e

s ATTACFSENT "O" CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK. INC.

DOCKET NO. 50-2L7 PROVISIONAL CONSTEUCTION PEFFIT Construction Permit No.

1.

Pursuant to Section 10Lb of the Atomic Energy Act of 195L, as amended (the Act), and Tj tle 10, CLapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, and pursuant to the order of the A Lomic Sefety and Licensing Board, the Atomic Energy Lommission (the Co=nission) hereby iscues a provisional construction permit to Consolidated Edison Company cf New York, Inc. (Consolidated Edison) for a utilization i'acility (being a part of an electric generating plant designated q,s Indian Point Station Unit No. 2) described in the application and mmendments thereto filed in this matter by Consolidated Edison and as also described in the evidence received at the public hearing upon that application.

The utili;ation facility is a pressurized 5

vater reactor having a thermal capacity of and designed to operate at 2758 megevatts.

The plant of which the facility is a part vill be located on the Hudsen River in the Village of Buchanan, 'Jestchester County, New York.

2.

This permit shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in Sections 50 5L and 50 55 of said regulations; is subject to all applicable proviciens of the Act, and rules, regulations and orders of the Ccemission nov or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the conditions specified cr incorporated below:

A.

The earliest date fcr completion of the facility is January 1, 1969 and the latest date for completion cf the facility is June 1, 1969 B.

The facility shall be constructed and operated at the site as 6escribed in the application as amended in the Village of Buchanan, Westchester County, New York.

C.

This construction pennit authorizes Consolidated Edison to construct the facility described in the application and the hearing record in accordance with the principal architectural and engineering critetia set forth therein.

2 3

This permit is provisional te the extent that a license authcri ing cperation cf the facility vill not-be issued by the Ccumissien un.1ers:

( A) Consolidated Edicen cutmitt to the Commiccion, by emendment to the application, the ccmplete final hacards summary report, portient of which may be submitted and evaluated frcm time to time; (3) the Ccmmission finds that the fir.s1 design provides reasonable escurance that the health and safety of the public vill net be endar.gered b.y the operation cf the facility in ecccrdance with procedures approved by it in connecticn 1

sith the icsuance of said licence; and (C) Consclidated Edicen submitt prcer of financial protection and the execution cf an indemnity agreement as reouired by Section 170 of the Act.

L.

Purcuant to Section 50.60 cf the regulationc in Title 10, Cnapter 1, CFR. Part 50, the Cc= mission has allocated to Consolidated Ediscn for use in the cperation of the reactor 23,222 kilogrems of uranfum 235 contained in uranium in the isctopic ratios specified in the application.

Estimated senedales of special nuclear material trancfers to Consoli-dated Edison snd returns to the Commission are ontained in rippendin A which is ' attached hereto.

Transfers by the Cceniccicn to Centolidated Edison in accordance with tne column entitled "/IC to Con Ed" in Appendir. /. will be conditicned upcn Ccnsolidated -Edicon's return to the Ccamicsion of material substantially in -acecrdance. ith the column entitled " Con Ed to AEC" in Appendix l.

FCE TdE. COMIC TLERGY COMMISSION Eirector Livisien cf Reactor Licensing

Attachment:

)

Appendix A Date of Iceuance:

i y

i Appendix A ALLOCATION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS To CONSOLIDATED EDISON CobiPANY INDIAN POINT #2 (Ko U-235) i AEC to Year Cumulative FY Con Ed 1/

Cold 1/

Irrad.S/

ypt Net.

1968 2,378 2 /

-o-

-o-2,378 2,378

~s (238 2,140 1969

-o-238 3/

-o-1,904) 4,044 1970 1,904

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-o-1971 952 190 295 467 4,511 l

1972 952 95 206 651 5,162 1973 952 95 197 660 5,822 1974 952 95 252 605 6,427 3

1975 952 95 504 353 6,780 1976 952 95 252 605 7,385 1977 952 95 252 605 7,990 1978 952 95 252 605 8,595 1979 952 95 252 6c5 9,200 1980 952 95 252 005 9,805 1981 952 95 252 605 10,410 1982 952 95 252 605 11,015 1983 952 95 252 605 11,620 1984 952 95 252 605 12,225 1985 952 95 252 605 12,830 1986 E52 95 252 605 13,435 1987 952 95 252 605 14,040 1988 952 95 252 605 14,645 1989 952 95 252 605 15,250 1990 952 95 252 603 15,855 1991 952 95 252 605

'16,460 1992 952 95 252 605 17,065 199p 952 95 252 605 17,670 1994 952 95 252 605 18,275 1995 952 95 252

(*

18,880 1996 952 95 252 605 19,485 1997 952 95 252 605 20,090 1998 952 95 252 605 20,695 1999 952 95 252 605 21,300 2000 952 95 252 605 21,905 (continued) l g#' 2.92% unless otherwise indicated.776 kg at 2 38; 875 ks at 2.68.

/ 727 kg at 2.235:

i 3/ 73 kg at 2.235; 77 kg at 2 30; 88 kg at 2.68.

0. 2% unless otherwise indicated.

Ej/ o.72%

o.75%

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i A11ocacic7 of Specic1 Nuclear Materials to Conso]1 dated Edison Conpeny, Indian Point 62 (KG U-235)

PG 2

AEC to Cor. Ed to AEC Year Cumulative Py Con Ed Cold Irrad.

Net Not 2001 952 95 252 605 22,510 2002 952 95 252 605 23,115 2003 952 95 252 605 2p,720 2004 952 95 252 605 24,325 2005

-o-95 252 (347 23,978 2006 -o-252 (252 23,726 2007 252 (252 23,474 2008 -o-252 (252) 23,222 TOTAL 36,650 3,658 9,770 03;222 f

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