ML20099C598
ML20099C598 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Three Mile Island ![]() |
Issue date: | 03/07/1985 |
From: | Aamodt M AAMODTS |
To: | |
References | |
CON-#185-953 SP, NUDOCS 8503110368 | |
Download: ML20099C598 (21) | |
Text
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p UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .
NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0tEISSION _
"YidF O '5 R$:15 In the Matter of (j,, ,.
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nag METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY et al. Docket 50-289 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 l f
ERRATA TO AAMODT FILING OF MARCH 5, 1985 i Exhibit A is being replaced as the copy supplied was not ledgible.
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The service sheet should be corrected to delete "and a letter, dated March 5, 1985 to the Commissioners" and change "were" following this deletion to "was".
The delivery to Licensee was by hand-delivery on March 7, 1985 and on March.8, 1985 to those serviced.by .
U.S. Mail.
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Marjorie M. Aamodt ,
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g M: This is a meeting being conducted at the Department of Environ-2 mental heecurces Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in Norrisburg, Pennsylvania.
3 h time is m 12:H p.m., % 3. M. N meeting is being conducted in 4 the effice of Mr. Thomas M. Gerusky. Mr. Gerus h is present for this meeting and is the Director of the Bureau of Radiation Protection. Also 5 ,
, present is Margaret A. Reilly. Ms. Reilly is the Chief. Division of Environmental Radiation. Also present is Mr. William P. Dorns1Ye. Mr.
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, Dornstfe is a Muclear Engineer with the Department of Environmental Resources.
Present from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is Mr. Dale E. Donaldsen.
Mr. Donaldson is a Radiation Specialist assigned to Region I. Also present is Mr. Thomas M. Essig. Mr. Essig is the chief. Environmental and special Project Section, Region III. % name is Owen C. Shackleton. I as an -
investigator assigned to Region V. Please begin your conference.
14 00MALD50N: What our intent is or purpose or charter for the investigation is to primarily look at the licensee's actions and the adequacy of those actions. And the time frame specified for our particular portion of the investigation is March 28 through sidnight on March 30. So what we are hoping to accesplish, at least, by having some discussion with you, to 19 discuss, prior to the incident, the state and nature of coordination that 20 existed between yourself and Metropolitan Edison, and then trace through 21 some of the striy notification sequences, the type of information that was 22 .
relayed back and forth; and then discuss certain of the licensees actions 23 in light of information that you may have provided or certain actions that 24 you may have accomplished in support of their response. I guess probably 25 1
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the best thing we can de is start with a discussion, a general discussion g of the scope and nature of the coordination between the Stata of Pennsylvania, Sereau of Radielegical Mealth, and Metropolitan Edison.
3 4
- It's Screau of Radiation Protection. Maggie, why don' t you. . .
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REIRY: You mean with respect to...
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00NALD$0N: With respect to emergency planning, ahead cf time.
10 R[BM: Okay. Reilly. With respec't to the emergency plan we have a document called Pa. PIPAG (Plan for Implementatior of Protective Action Guides) which originated in 1973, which was for some years the base document regarding emergency planning for reactors annexed to that or site specific annexes 14 for the various operating reactors. In 1977, in light of changes in Federal guidance, particularly the EPA dose projection PHE type guidance, we rewrote 18 the plan. Specifically, sort of targeted at the Susquehanna Station, which 17 was then in its aid phases of developing 'its emergency plan. We've been 181 attempting to get around to the other facilities which are in operation and 19 gradually update them as to the revised plan. Insofar as.Three Mile was 20 concerned, the changes regarding the notification and the PAGs and informa-21 tion protocol, Three Mile had adopted them.
22 23 00NALD50N: I wonder if you could discuss the nature of any meetings or 24 routine meetings or discussions that would take placa in the prior planning 25 area?
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g M: Let's see, prehably the last fairly large meeting we had with then 2
was, I think, last April, le get updated with Iseplex and the site map.
uns a e a consistent ama w among an of the parti-3 4 cipating agencies. And that would have been April of '78, roughly. It was around this time of year.
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7 M: As part of their training and coordination progree, do they
, periodically invite you to the sita to attend either their emergency direct 3r training er drills or asything of that nature?
le M: idhenever they're having a drill they invita us down, in addition te whatever it is we do out here, we haven't had anyone...
13 GERIEEY: Yes, sill was down.
14 15 R[lLLY: ifere you down there the last time they had a drill?
17 M: Yes I was. Also at that last meeting, Maggie, the last meeting 18, we had down there, all the locals, the civil defense directors and the 19 local fire chiefs and policemen were there and they were going through 20 essentially what everybo % in the organization does. I thought it was a 21, very good meeting.
22 23 M: They also gave Dornsife and I some briefings as to their meteoro-24 logical techniques in establishing which family of curves they went to use 25 for the various weather conditions.
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3 M: As of March 2gth, were there any outstanding items or out-l 7 standing information that the facility had agreed to provide to you that had not yet been provided?
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00NALD50N: Then all the issues were fairly well resolved.
7 8 i REILLY: Yeah. In general, we've gotten pretty good cooperation from them.
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00NALD50N: Bill, do you remember whether - was Kevin Malloy or anybo$
11 I from State Council Civil Defense at that big meeting?
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00RNSIFE: Yeah, there were quite a few. But Kevin wasn't there, I don't 14 think. Some people from the State Council were there. Lamison was there.
I don't know all the names.
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REILLY: I don't know if Craig was there or not. There was a fair flock of us... going through TMI airport there.
19 20 00RNSIFE: Lancaster County was represented with the Civil Defense Director.
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i REILLY: Yeah. Connors was there.
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.! 8 M: A lot of local fire chiefs and policemen were there. .
- 2 l REIRY: Some one was there free the State Police too, I believe.
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) 4 M: Yeah, two people free State Police.
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DONALDSON: Tom, do you have arty questions regarding the proplanning area?
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i {Fg: No, I don't have arty questions regarding the proplanning area. I I i would like to, at the appropriate time, would like to get into the initial ' 10 1 sample analyses performed by the State by the Commonwealth. 11 12 GERU5KY: We use state, that's all right. ! 13 l 14 fulj,[g: OK. 15 M: It's easier to say early in the morning. 18 00NALD50N: Why don't we move on into the morning of the 28th, and I 19 believe, Bill, you were the one who received the initial call fres State 20 Council, free local Civil Defense. Why don't you just pick it up and < 21 t'escribe what took place that morning. ) 22 ! 23 1 00RN5fFE: About 5 after 7:00, I received a call free Clarence Deller, who 24 was the Civil Defense Outy Officer. I was the designated Bureau Outy 25 I i l g -
. 6 1 Officer at the time. They have a list of our noess and phone numbers.
2 It's updated monthly. It rotates. I get a call about 7:06 saying that 3 e has MaM a site mm. M Wk k W MMI m 4 Unit 2." !asediately after that I called Mn9gie Reilly and wanted to aske 5
, rees. ido didn't. She didn't tall as we had atty - I guess we did have one 7
to the control rees.
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, M: I just rattled off the switchboard ....
j N M: So, I called back through the switchboard and I guess Maggie went ahead and called Tom to tell him to get somebo# to get in to take over the office. 13 i 14 M: The first person I called was Melloy. 18 l M: Okay, ide11 I called back to the plant immediately after hanging up with Maggie, which was about a minute later, and I got the switchboard. 18 The switchboard operator had difficulty connecting as with the control 19 - roca. She could get the control room, but she couldn't get us together. 20 So finally after a couple of minutes I told her, "why don't you have then 21 call se back at my home." So ! gave her the number and about a minute 22 later someone from the control room called me back. I forget I don't know 23 whether he even told me his name. I guess it was the shift supervisor, 24 whoever was on duty at the time. Things sounded very confused ac the ' 25 e a m
7 g plant. You could hear a 1st of noise in the background. I started asking 2 questions about what had happened. They gave se a little bit of blurt, but 3 I d1Wt wits agthing h. Na is just fna amen. I believe he told 4 as that the plant was...it was a transient, the plant was shut down, the 5
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6 systems had werked. There was a slight pressure in the containment. At 7 the time they didn't relate ag thing concerning the relief valve sticking.
, That prkles--they didn't say anthing about anthing being carried over te , the auxiliary butiding at that time. But they did tell as that there was no releases offsite. They had teams out and they couldn't find anthing offsite. So I guess I asked a few questions additionally, what I thought was appropriate. I don't really recall but I satisfied myself that the conditions were stable.
13 14 M: Excuseme,justforasecond,8111. You indicated that they had told you at that time, this was shortly after 7:00 in the morning, that they had not found anything offsite. 12 00RNSIFE: Right. They definitely had teams out, they could not find anything offsite. 20 21 {J5)$1G: Okay, sorry. Go ahead. 22 23 00RN5!FE: Then I heard in the background, an announcement- " evacuate the 24 fuel handling and auxiliary building." 25
8 , 1 M: It really makes you feel good. (laughter) l 2
- All along I'd waiting for s W to tell as it was a 3
4 drill. idhen I heard that I figured "ch-oh this is the biggy." Then, the 5 sh swine emntly put en a Mth Wsics W, W he--again
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- 6 7 announcement he said to me, "I have tb go, I really have to go now." Very
, confused and very upset. "I really have to go now; I'll call you back" and he hung up.
10 00NAL,0$0N: This was about what ties? 12 M: This was about... 14 M: A quarter after seven. 14 M: idell, in that time frame, quarter after--twenty after, about twenty after, I'd say. He hung up. So I figured, at that point I knew people were coming into the office. I figured there was no reason to try 19 and call his back so I just took off and headed for the office. Oh no, I'm . 20 sorry, I called into the office after the plant hung up on me and I told 21 one of the secretaries who was there--I told her, the first person who 22 comes in to get them to call back to the plant immediately. Andjust 23 briefly told her that there was a probles there, but not to alars her 24 needlessly, because at that point it didn't seen...the situation seemed to 25
be under control, at least free what they were telling me. Except, of
- course, you had an uneasy feeling about the ameencement to evacuate the fuel hand 11ag and auxiliary building... l 3
Donaldsen: I believe, are there not, some standard formats in which initial notifications are te be provided to you? l 004N$1Ff: Yes, there are. In the emergency plan there is a check-off ) list, kind of. 10 . 00NALD$0N: That's in the State's PIPAG, or in the Stata..
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- It's in the annex to the...
14 QQElllM: It's in the procedures part. l 16 M: The annex to the Three Mile Island emergency plan? 18 1 M: Yeah. 20 00NALD50N: Then that information was or was not provided in that format? 21 22 00RM5fFE: The way I recall the format, it was not absolutely--someone 23 reading down the whole list--no. It was somewhat disjointed. 24 25 L -
10 3 M: In leeking at that formet, is there critical information on y that forest that any have been able to have been provided that wasn't 3 E" 4 5 00letsIFE: No, I don't believe se. The format is pretty general. It talks 8 7 would have made much difference. I got essentially the information I would've gotten through the checklist by what they told se and with the questions I asked. _ 10 M: The fomet in the plan, it's a famley of femats actually, that are based en design basis accidents ano on anticipated transients. For instance, a LOCA or a loss of AC, or a loss of load, or a fuel rod ejection, things like that, things that have a recognized beginning, and they're essentially developed out of SAA infometton. l 18 00NALD50N: Bill, the time you received that call did they give you a 17 generic classification of the type of event that they thought that they 14 sight have had? 19 00AN5!ff: I believe they told me it was a transient, and that comp 11-21 cations had occurred in addition to the normal transient. 22 ' 23 DONALDSON: They did not sention anything such as a steam generator tube 24 rupture? 25
11 3 00RElft: At that time--no. 2 3 M: ife eventually kasw that fairly early. 4 - 5
- dell, we an get to that later.
6 7 M: Okay. t#y don't we proceed from that point and pick ie,
, whoever has something to effer free that point.
9 REILLY: Okay. At that point I get into the office about 7:30, thereabouts. Gerusky was alrea $ here and on the phone with the plant. And it was around that point that they rolled over from a site to a general. Okay. l 13 Meanwhile the rest of our people were coming in. Fairly early in this thing I contacted the Department of Agriculture because we always perceive that there is a good chance of having a dairy problem with a reacter accident. ide were disappointed with this one. ido didn't really...it continues to blow my mind. Let's see... we got the map out--all that good stuff. 18 M: No, wait a minutes. Let's stop. I was the first one in the office after the call from Margaret. And the secretary gave se the infor-20 mat' ion that till had called and that I was supposed to call the Island 21 right away which is our normal procedure anyway. The first person into the 22 office calls the Island, calls the reactor control roce. 23 24 25
12 y M: There is a neber, I believe you have a number that's a direct 2 line dial inte it. 3 faLRuig: I called 944-7259. I don't know why. I've get it written down. 4 I have no idea why I dialed that neber unless that was the ne ber till 5, I'" ' ' * ** """ "I "' "* 6 7 00RMSIFE: I didn't have the plan at home with me. In hindsight, I guess we should have. That was our plan originally, to de that, but we never got around to it, yet. 11 GERUSKY: You're supposed to have the plan at home with you. 13 00RMSIFE: Yeah, well, no one ever gave it to me. I think there was probably only about a five minuta lapse in caemunications with the control room, if , even that long. 16 17 GERUSKY: Well, I believe I was in the office about 7:25 and nede the call 18 l back to the control roce. They told se that it was a site emergency, that ! 19 there was a steam generator primary to secondary leak and it was isolated; that there was a general...at'that point they went from site to general 21 emergency. 22 23 00NALD50N: Tom, do you ren aber who you were talking with? 24 25 l
i I-13 y $2lgg: It was a health physics type, and it any have been... 2 3 MUM: Dubiel, or Landry? . 4 GERUSKY: I think it was Outiel but I didn't write the name down. Maggie 5 6 were on the extension weren't yout 7 8 M: Yeah, I remember being out there. 10 GERUSKY: And went and got the map out. They then said they were going from a site to a general emergency, that they had failed fuel. The does monitor was reading 800 R per hour in the reactor building and they had onsite teams out checking. They told me the wind was out of 30 degrees in 14 h south-westernly direction. The high pressure injection initiated; some 15 - loss of core coolant; failed fuel; a high radiation area. And in the 16 seanties someone was working on a prediction of dose offsite, based upon 17 the 800 R per hour reading on the does sonttor. They predicted 10 R/hr 18 noble gas, was sure at Goldsboro, based upon the does monitor and a leak 19 rate of .2 of a percent per day in the containment. 20 21 DONALDSON: That 10 R, was that a time dependent or was that a course of 22 accident projection. 23 24 25
o i 14 glWlg: That was an accident...that was a 10 R/hr. We then contacted civil Defense. l 3 l M: P9th (Pa. Energency Management, A0ency) l s-l
, jggg: And I think you contacted the State Council of Civil Defense, to 7 inform them at our directiort-well, I was feeding the infonestion to Margaret-to infore them, that this is where the wind was b) ewing and that to be t
prepared to awacuate on the west side of the river. In the meanties ! I
- 10 requested them to try to get their teams somehow to Goldsboro, and they 11 said that the State Police helicopter was there and that they would get ont, of their teams up in the air and over Goldsboro. We stayed on the phone with them. They found no radiation levels onsite or in Goldsboro that 13 would indicata any kind of a leak. So therefore, we then notified th 14 Civil Defense to hold tight. This was all before 8:00. From that point 15 i
i 15 on, we maintained an q wi line to the Unit 2 control room, and a variety of people were on the phone including--Sill was on mainly I believe. You weis 17 on the phone with thee, and here are your notes Bill. 18 19 000t3IFI: The next notes we have is, about 8:30, somebo@ came down. I 20 i think it was Mittendorf, who is the Deputy Secretary of Environmental I 21 Protection, Toe's boss, came down and said that they wanted somebody to go 22 over to the Lt. Governor's office and brief his and to take part in the 23 press conference. So I could volunteer since I probably knew more about 24 the plant status than anybody at that point. So right before I left I 25
1 L 15 g called back to the plant and said I need s Tal good briefing en what happened and what the status is, because I have to go over and brief the 2
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And he told me that the plant was shut, that there was a turbine trip, and 4 ' there was a violation of toch specs also. I guess he meant by that, I 5 8"*" *** * "" ** * " " **# "* 6 just said there was a violation of toch specs. He said that the defense 7 posts dose rates were less than 1 millires per heur; there was a primary to secondary leak; the B steam generatcr was isolated; there was failed fuel; they may have temporarily lost reactor coolant circulation; the does ;j oonitor reading was 500 R/hr; there was 1 lb. pressure in the reactor i butiding, one pound above atmospheric; that the boron concentration in the primary was 100 PPM, and they suspected there was a negative feedback from the secondary to the primary. They got some secondary side water back into the primary when the pressure was reduced in the primary. High pressure i injection had initiated and they were using high pressure injection to keep 161 the core covered. And they may have had a bubble in the primary; they 17 depressurized. Then I went over to brief the Lt. Governor. 18 19.
, 00NALD50N: At this time did they discuss any releases or any possibility 20 for releases, at any time in the future?
l 22 I guess after that we were in 00RMSIFE: I just asked for plant status. 23 constant connunication. I'm sure that was ..... Miller just briefed me on - 24
. the plant status--what had happened, what initiated the transient and what .
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I . - . l i i 18 l the status was now. Ide know there were ne releases occurring at that ties, nothing esasured offsite. ! 3 i DOMER$0M: I believe at about 10:00 or 10:30 is when they received same l first effsite resulta indicating that there any be some levels of iodine. . 5 8 l M: That's about right. They had taken some airborne iodine samples i 8 i on the west shore and also sons, I reensber one value south of the obser- ) vation building. The estimates that they had from the field estinating 10 techniques suggested iodine 131 concentrations to the order of 10'8 aC per i cc. And they wanted to verify this because this was getting into a rather interesting inhalatten pathway hazard, although not an acute problem. They 13 I wanted us to verify their estimate using our counting equipment. in that i 14 their backgrounds were steadily going to pot. Arrangements for this were i 15 made between syself and Dick Dubiel. *And Met Ed was going to chopper the l 18 cartridge to the heliport at Holy Spirit Hospital and we would send a i 17 runner over to get it. I think I must of spent the greater part of 3/4 of 18 an hour trying to get through to whoever at the hospital was in authority 19 to tell them, "there is a helicopter coming with the sample--not to worry." 20 So finally we straightened that out and we ran the sample, and the con-centration we observed in that was to the order of 10-10 , 3,,,, 22
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! DONALDSON: What was the minimum detectable amount on the counting system? 24
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I 17 3 M: W'11 break the tape at this time end Maggio can come back on p it and respond to that questian en the other side. The time is new 12:39 p.m. , 3 . t SHACKLETOM: This is a centinuetten of the conference taking place at the 3 Department of Environmental Resources. The time is new 12:43 p.m., May 3, 1979. 7 8 M: I think when the tape ran out, I had asked you if you could recall the 2 , minimum detectable activity, for the... 11 M: I don't think it was reported, this would not have been a routine sample from the stan@oint that...! have no knowledge of what the volume 13 8 was on it. Our usual lea, say for 3 x 10 cc s g le, d ich is b ut h t 14 we collect on a weekly 1 cfm sample, our 6 on that is about 4 x 10"I4 . 15 That would be a routine sample, but I don't know what it would have been 18 for this one. 17 18 00NALD50N: I wonder if you could discuss a little more, the rationale or 19 the thought process that went back and forth regarding that high sample, 20 and whether or not you decided to initiate any actions or recommend any 21 further studies on the part of the licensee. 22 23 1 REILLY: Okay. Well, they were continuing to take air samples and looking < 24 for airborne iodines. Based on that number--the conflict between their 25
la g field estiasta and our lab estimate, I very quickly came to the conclusion = 2 that it's harder to do a decent job of estimating airborne iodines in the 3 environment than I thought. I don't recall that I told them to keep sampilng. 4 That is something that I assumed that they would do because that's part of their routine. I also decided at that time--we have a sampler down at the 8 bservation building and I decided we were going to let that keep running 7 until whatever it was that any be coming was over so at least we wov1d have
, one historical sample. Our field guy was all hot-to-trot to go out and 9
change the TLDs, and I kind of wish I would have told his to go out and change them that day, but I thought I'd let them in place to. Soeswhere in there I called AG, Department of Agricultural, to alert them to the fact that something funtty had gone on or would go on, and that we would get back to them about sampling rational, depending on how the situation developed. Somewhere in there too, around the time I was trying to tell Holy Hilton that a helicopter was coming, we got a call from... I don't know--did wo 15 16 call Mineholt or did he call us? I don't remember but... 17 GERUSKY: He called us. 18 19 RE!LLY: The RAP (Radiological Assitance Plan) gang at Brookhaven called gn .. and said " Hey, do you went us?" I said, "I'm not sure yet, we'll call you 21 back." Of course, I was thinking, well you know it would really be ducky..thei r ET was like four hours anyway. I thought, well, by that time things may 23 well be over. Then later on we decided, well you know, we will drag thee down. They got here around supportime, I guess. 25 i l , gass ..
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g ggggg: Maggie, de you remember that the result, cartridge result was available, made available to Mt Ed at the site? 2 3 M: I don't remember, it would have been late morning. 4 5 M: Before noon seestime. 'at asty rate. 7 M: Yeah, I believe se. I couldn't swear to it. 9 00NAl0$0N: Do you know if... 11 . M: Sometimes I think the only way I's gonna remember any detail on l this is to time regress as under itypnosis. You'd get all the parentheticals, l 13 too. l 14 15 ((jlg: Maggi,e are you pretty sure it was late in the morning hours, as opposed to middle afternoon or that...? 17 1 81 RQLLY: It could have been early afternoon. 19 20 GERUSKY: No, it was late morning, because I was here when the decision was 21 made. You were here. I think you were here when we got the infonnetion 22 over the--well, we got it while I was here anyway, and after that I went to 23 the Governor's Office in the morning so.. 24 25
- 30 M: I een tell m enestly when it wee.
Me All right. M: I wee on'sy way to the press conference, and you called me right before I left end told as that they had found 104 of iodine in Goldehore. M: OK. ; M: That waJ about eleven. I M: And se it wee en its way out. 13 M: Yeah, in fact everyhe $ get and at as ever there, because I just get it on the _way over--beiere I went up there and I didn't tall artyhe$ about it. Ide kasw there were small releases. I told the Lt. Governor and everybo% that there was nothing detectable offsite. And I told the press that they'd found a little bit of ledine... 1s l M: Ife heard you en the radie. ! l M: Could hear Bill shouting on the radio eventually. tt l 23 00MLD10N: De you recall whether or not, when the result of your counting 24 of that sample had returned and you passed it on to someone at the site, 25 j i _ _ _}}