ML20096H055

Reply Opposing Suffolk County & State of Ny Proposed Findings of Fact.Findings Represent Unbalanced & Inaccurate Treatment of Facts

ML20096H055
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	09/07/1984
From:	Rolfe R HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
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ML20096H057	List: ML20096H055 ML20096H076
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OL-4, NUDOCS 8409110245
Download: ML20096H055 (85)

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. LILCO, S:pt:mber 7, 1984 4

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'l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'84 SEP 10 Pl2:04 il Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board l

! In the Matter of )

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! LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-4 j ) (Low Power)

-.l (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station )

<i Unit 1) )

LILCO'S REPLY TO SUFFOLK COUNTY AND

STATE OF NEW YORK PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1

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Hunton & Williams Post Office Box 1535 l

! Richmond, Virginia 23212 l DATED: September 7, 1984 l

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!<-l 840911024505000322 PDR ADOCK PDR

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, LILCO, Septcmbar 7, 1984 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic' Safety and Licensing Board h;fCD In the Matter of 4

) SEP 10

) P12:04

.LONG' ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL .4

) (Low Power): .

w i-(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) d' [;b ^

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S REPLY TO SUFFOLK COUNTY AND l' STATE OF NEW YORK PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT These reply findings address the majority of the findings proposed by Suffolk County and New York State (Joint Proposed Findings) in more detail than outlined in LILCO's Reply Brief.1/ LILCO does not propose that the Board adopt these reply findings. Rather, they demonstrate that the findings proposed by.the Intervenors should be rejected by the Board.2/ A surprising number of the findings are just plain wrong. For example, Joint Proposed Finding 182 claims only one EMD diesel generator synchronized during a July 2 test; the 1/ This reply follows the format of the Joint Proposed Findings for convenience.

2/ LILCO does not contest the facts asserted in the Staff's Proposed Findings, though LILCO does not agree with several of the conclusions drawn by the Staff from those facts. Those areas of disagreement are evident from LILCO's Brief and Proposed Findings. Accordingly, to avoid repetition, LILCO does not address the Staff's Proposed Findings.

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record unmistakably.. establishes that three machines synchronized. 2(LILCO Reply Finding 46; see, e.g., LILCO Reply

- Findings 32, 47, 135). Other findings are wholly unsupported by;the. evidentiary record. Joint Proposed Findings- 416, 417, 424 and 425, for example, are taken.1' rom the arguments of t.

L counsel or comments of Judge Miller and not sworn testimony.

(See, e.g., LILCO Reply Finding 118). Still others.

misrepresent or omit pertinent testimony. (See, e.g.,-LILCO-Reply Findings 27, 34, 44, 91, 99, 106). Indeed, some findings t

l "are contrary to the testimony of the County's own witnesses.

J (See,;e.g., LILCO Reply Findings 11, 15). The Joint Proposed L

ll Findings largely reflect the County's and State's profiled L

testimony, ignoring much of the cross-examination of its

. witnesses or direct testimony of other parties' witnesses.

-(E.g., LILCO Reply Findings 15, 19, 26, 36, 37, 53). In short,

,they represent an unbalanced'and inaccurate treatment of the record that merits little consideration by the Board.

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m I.- RELATIVE SAFETY OF LOW POWER OPERATION WITH ALTERNATE CONFIGURATION AND WITH QUALIFIED POWER SOURCES i'

A. Vulnerabilities to a Seismic Event

1. . LJoint Proposed Finding 2 discusses Dr. Christian

. Meyer's-qualifications. While Dr. Meyer is well qualified in

. certain aspects-of seismic analysis, his experience does not-

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p involve hands-on analysis of the type of equipment which was the subject of his.-testimony.- Dr.-Meyer has specialized in the area of analytic'ai techniques and computer code development

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L relating to. seismic analysis. -(Tr. 2681,.Meyer). For example,

. Dr. Meyer's principal responsibility as a member of the computer department =and as a consultant at Stone & Webster was.

in computer l code' development for seismic applications. Also,-a L large part of his.vork as a structural engineer at Stone &

' Webster involved the development of mathematical models for seismic analyses. (Tr. 2677-78, Meyer). His' consulting work has 91so. focused on the development of mathematical models and b

- computer. programs used in seismic analyses. (Tr.~2678-80, L

l Meyer). Meyer has not actually performed any analysis of the

types-of equipment discussed in his testimony. He has not

- performed anLanalysis of the' operability of electrical equipment;during or after a seismic event. (Tr. 2681, Meyer).

He has not--performed any seismic analysis on a gas turbine, F

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electrical control equipment or electrical transmission systems. (Tr. 2682, Meyer). He has never had any principal responsibility for performing seismic analyses of cable trays or_ cable tray supports. (Tr. 2683, Meyer).

Further, his experience does not include hands-on performance of seismic analyses for nuclear power plants. For example, he has never performed walkdowns of cable trays or cable trays supports in conjunction with a seismic analysis, never performed a walkdown of a piping system as part of a seismic analysis, and was not familiar with the term " conduit" as it is used in nuclear power plants. (Tr. 2683-84, Meyer).

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2. Joint Proposed Finding 3 demonstrates that Dr.

Roesset is well qualified in his area of expertise. Dr.

Roesset, however, has not visited the Shoreham site. (Tr 2684-85, Roesset). Thus, he could not sponsor testimony that was based upon Dr. Meyer's opinions and visual inspections.

(Tr. 2741, Roesset; see Tr. 2782, 2792).

3. Joint Proposed Finding 4 discusses the

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qualifications of Gregory C. Minor. The finding is incomplete because it fails to mention that Minor's experience with General ~ Electric was limited to instrumentation and control systems. (Tr. 2424, Minor). He has no experience in gas turbines or diesel generators. (Tr. 2424-28, Minor).

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Significantly, Minor has never been responsible for operating any type of power generation equipment, except for a summer job j in which he participated in testing hydroplants. (Tr. 2427-28, Minor). He is not experienced in performing seismic analysis of structures (Tr. 2688-89, Minor); his seismic qualification experience is limited to dynamic testing of individual components. (Tr. 2600-93, Minor).

4. Joint Proposed Finding 6 concludes, without citation to the record, that a structural engineer's lack of experience with a particular structure is immaterial to that engineer's ability to perform a structural analysis or predict the response of such a structure. This finding ignores the fact that.much of the County's seismic testimony is based primarily upon judgment and not on calculations. (E.g, Tr.

l 2709, 2787, 2788, 2789, Meyer). Thus, experience, or lack thereof, with a particular type of installation is significant.

5. - Joint Proposed Finding 11, dealing with William Museler's qualifications, fails to note that he has had direct responsibility for the review of seismic and structural analyses in his previous positions as Assistant Project Manager and as Manager of Construction and Engineering. (Tr. 535-37, Museler). Moreover, Museler's testimony with respect to seismic matters was based upon consultantion with geotechnical

-engineers at Stone & Webster. (Tr. 533, Museler). This type of consultation was one of the ways in which Museler normally.

performed his duties with respect to seismic analyses. (Tr.

538, Museler).

6. Joint Proposed Findings 13, 17, 30, 37, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53, 54,'55, 57, and 78 conclude that certain components of the 138 KV and 69 KV system might fail during a seismic event and cause a loss of offsite power. Yet NRC studies of actual seismic events have shown that it is unlikely that offsite power would be lost during an earthquake. (Tr. 1888,

1894-95,' Knox; see also Tr. 430-33, Schiffmacher). In 1

_ addition, these findings fail to acknowledge LILCO's ability to repair damage in a short period of time. (See LILCO Proposed Finding.139; Joint Proposed Finding 54).

7. Joint Proposed Finding 14 claims LILCO's testimony with respect to the need to consider seismic events did not address the "as safe as h standard. To the contrary, by demonstrating that no safety standards or limits would be exceeded for an essentially unlimited period of time, LILCO's i

testimony does demonstrate that its proposal for low power testing is as safe as low power testing with qualified diesels.

LILCO's_ witnesses testified about facts, not conclusions more appropriately reac,hed by the Board.

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8. Joint Proposed Findings 16,:38-42, 62, and 79

-suggest that a seismic event will cause failures in fuel supplies for the 20 MW-gas-turbine and the EMD diesels. LILCO, l '

however, will-have-two 9,000 gallon tanker trucks available on siteLto ' supply. fuel in the event of a failure of either fuel oil supply system. LILCO Proposed Findings 75, 81.

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9. Joint Proposed Finding 20 and other findings L ~

.(e.g.,L49,-57) indicate that relative motion between structures

and-transmission. systems may cause problems with insulators.

i But Dr. Meyer:did not have any prior experience with design requirements for insulators'on transmission systems. Although

.he claimed that it is common engineering judgment that insulators are-made of ceramic material which is known to be brittle, he-did not have any specific information concerning.

the properties of insulators used in'the transmission system Jand switchyards for-Shoreham. (Tr. 2735, Meyer). Schiffmacher I

testified'that.under actual earthquake conditions transmission lines have experienced little or no damage. (Tr. 444, Schiffmacher).

~ 10. Joint Proposed Findings 33, 35, 36, 45, 46, 65, These

-and 78 conclude that specific components will fail.

. conclusions are based in whole or in part upon Dr. Meyer's judgments and not upon comprehensive calculations of the actual L

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4 performance'of the equipment during an earthquake. Meyer does

' 'not have'the experience necessary to make such-judgments. (See L 4

.LILCO Reply Finding 1).

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11. Joint Proposed Finding 34 concludes'that the cables /from the EMD switchgear could fail. This contradicts I- testimony-of a Suffolk County witness who testified that the

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s 3 cables appeared to have sufficient flexibility to withstand a h .

. seismic event.- '(Tr. 2782, Meyer).

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412.- Joint Proposed Finding 44, which concludes that L the; air starting unit for the 20 MW gas turbine might be inoperable!during.an SSE,.is not supported by any calculations.

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> (Tr.~.2705, Meyer). Normally, this type of equipment would be

-subject to detailed computer analysis or testing cn a shake Ltable in order 1to determine the seismic capabilities. (Tr.

C' 2705-06', ' Meyer) .- But Dr.,Meyer's conclusions are only based Jupon, engineering' judgment and a visual inspection of this installation. (Tr. 2788,;Meyer). As already noted, Dr. Meyer

,is not experienced in visual inspections associated with Eseismic analyses. (See LILCO' Reply Finding 1). Moreover, Dr.

p _ lMayer.did not know the function of the link between the air

-tank and'the compressor motor that he described in his testimony and therefore did'not know the impact of a break in that line on the ability of the gas turbine to start. (Tr.

2707-08,-Meyer).

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Joint Proposed. Finding 49 concludes that an earthquake of intensity 0.14 g would be sufficient to topple over the 13 KV/69 KV. transformer in the 69 KV switchyard,if this force were applied statically. Dr. Meyer also testified, however, that forces duri'ng an earthquake'would not be applied statically and that he did not perform any calculations to p

1 determine the effect of actual earthquake conditions. (Tr.

2716, Meyer).. In addition, the finding suggests that rocking and overturning of transformers have been observed in many earthquakes. This testimony was based in part upon experience in.the Sylmar converter station in California. (Tr. 2716,

- Meyer). But it is not appropriate to draw any conclusions about Shoreham based upon the experiences in California.

First, Dr.'Meyer testified that ground accelerations in the

earthquake in_ question were in excess of 0.2 g, the safe shutdown earthquake for Shoreham. (Tr. 2717, Meyer). Second, ,

in determining whether a transformer or piece of equipment would rock or overturn, information concerning the geometry.of the transformer, including the location of the center of

. gravity,'must be known. (Tr. 2717, Meyer). Indeed, the witness testified that based on his visual observation, he had originally believed that the Shoreham transformers were much more compact than the Sylmar converter station transformers and

! therefore were less likely to rock or tip over during an I

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earthquake. It was only after he performed some calculations that he. concluded there might be a possibility that the

. Shoreham transformers might rock. These calculations, however, were. static. calculations and did not duplicate actual earthquake conditions. -(Tr. 2719-20, Meyer).

14. Joint Proposed Findings 50 and 56 deal with the potential.of the RSST and the NSST to rock or overturn during an earthquake. Dr. Meyer, however, did not know the icoation of the: center of gravity for these components and indicated l

that he had only limited experience with specific transformers

l. from which to make any judgments. (Tr. 2728, Meyer). .In fact, with' respect to the NSST, Dr. Meyer agreed that if one assumes the center of gravity is approximately one-half the overall height of the transformer, rocking would not be a problem.

(See Tr.-2722-28, Meyer). He indicated that the assumption for the center of gravity might be a reasonable initial assumption 1(Tr. 2723, Meyer), but emphasized that he could not reach any final' conclusion without knowing the exact location of the center of gravity, which he did not know. (Tr. 2728-29, f Meyer).

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15. Joint Proposed Findings 58-60 criticize LILCO witness Meligi's conclusions about the EMD diesels because he did not know when the Navy shock tests were performed, when the

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[' =EMDs subject.to'the-tests were manufactured or when the

'Shoreham EMDs were" manufactured. But Meligi testified explicitly that the machines tested by the Navy were of the

.same type'as installed at Shoreham. (Tr. 956-57, Meligi).

Moreoverp as reflected in Joint Proposed Finding 61, Suffolk

-County witness Meyer' agreed that the EMDs were capable of operating after an SSE.

l ,16. ' Joint Proposed Finding 64 concerning bolting of the EMD switchgear cubicle? ignores cross-examination that demonstrated that the' drawing upon which Meyer relied is not a Shoreham-specific drawing and'that it applies to a concrete pad

. base rather than the type of base installed at Shoreham. (Tr.

'2736-37, Meyer).

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17. Joint Proposed Finding _66 concerning the seismic

~ qualification.of the EMD diesela ignores Meligi's and M yer's

. testimony'that the EMD diesel generators will withstand an SSE.

-(LILCO Proposed. Findings 144-48; Joint Proposed Finding 61),

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18. Joint Prcposed Finding 80 reflects Suffolk

County witnesses' unreasoned conclusion that as a result of

. seismic vulnerabilities, the "as safe as" standard is not met.

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-The witnesses-failed to consider the amount of time that would be available in a seismic event to restore AC power in reaching

, their conclusions. (See Tr. 2696-98, Meyer, Roesset). Thus, l- - - - - -

their testimony did not even consider whether the alternate AC power sources would even be needed immediately after a seismic event. (See LILCO Proposed Findings 137-141).

B. Reliability of EMD Diesels and Gas Turbine Compared to Qualified Diesel Generttors

19. Joint Proposed Findings 81-97 devoce eight pages to the qualifications of its witnesses on the EMD diesels and the 20 MW gas turbine and but two pages to the qualifications of both LILCO's witnesses and the Staff's witnesses. Wh'ile these proposed Suffolk County findings correctly reflect the County's prefiled testimony and the direct testimony of the witnesses on voir dire, the findings fail to fairly reflect the entire record because they do not acknowledge any l

! cross-examination of the witnesses nor do they accurately l

depict the qualifications of all the experts who offered testimony on the 20 MW gas turbine and the EMDs.

20. Joint Proposed Findings 82-88 ignore significant I

testimony on cross-examination concerning the professional qualifications of Smith and Eley. Neither Smith nor Eley has any prior experience with TDI or EMD diesel generators nor knowledge of industry experience with EMD diesels. (Tr. 2418-2423 Smith, Eley).

21. Joint Proposed Finding 90 catalogues Minor's experience but fails to state that he has never operated or designed diesal generators sets or gas turbines and has no experience in the design of electrical transmission systems from the power generation source to the buses powering the plant. (Tr. 2424, Minor). Minor's only experience with power generation equipment was as a college student in a summer job.

(Tr. 2427-28, Minor) .

22. Joint Proposed Finding 92 implies that muen of Minor's experience while with MHB has been in the performance of technical reviews of nuclear power plant systems for both safety and control purposes. In fact, Minor testified that since he and others founded MHB Technical Associates eight years ago, the firm has spent 50-80% of its time in testifying i and preparing to testify. (Tr. 2426-27, Minor).

23. Joint Proposed Findings 94 c7, which describe Bridenbaugh's professional qualificationo, omit significant l facts. Bridenbaugh has had no experience with the design of electrical transmission systems, has not operated or installed I a gas turbine. has not operated or installed a diesel engine, and has not procured a diesel engine for nuclear service. (Tr.

2175-77, 2428-31, Bridenbaugh). Bridenbaugh's only experience with a gas turbine occurred in 1963-1966 when he coordinated

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h r using the. exhaust from an'already installed gas turbine to run

- the forced draft fan for'a boiler. -

Bridenbaugh has had no experience with Pratt & Whitney gas turbines which is the type of gas turbine': installed at Shoreham.- (Tr. 2428-31,

. Bridenbaugh).

'24. Joint Proposed Findings 96-97 erroneously imply

! . that Bridenbaugh has had direct'~experie'sce with start-up itestingofdieselenginesandha turbines. In facti, as a

. start-up' engineer ~Bridenbaugh'did not have any hands-on-experience withMies'el~ generators; he only supervised maintenance; installation and pre-operational.. testing as c an engineer from thel level of.the control room and not at a

. foreman's level.. (Tr. 2179-80,. Bridenbaugh). - -

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l ' Bridenb'augh had no dire _ct resgorisibilityx for engineering associated with diesel-engines. iTr. 2180, Briden$augh).

s 2'5 . Joint Proposed Findings98-101'addr'egs the professionel. qualifications of LILCO's witnesses. While factually: correct,~they failto reflect fairly the full-record

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on-the profe'ssional qualifications of Messrs. Iannuszi,. Lewis ,

' ' and Gunther ardd5, totally omit ~ any reference to Mr. William s -o -

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Schif' f'macher, J.ano' tifer .of . LI'LCO's witnesses who~ offered

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,testimon-fion. thes 2O MW gas turbine and the EMD diesel *-- .

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background and experience of LILCO's witnesses gives the misleading impression that the experience of the witnesses is limited. 'As the record demonstrates, LILCO's witnesses have substantial experience with EMD diesels.

Iannuzzi's professional qualifications include his current employment with Morrison and Knudsen as Manager of Engineering where he is responsible for the direct supervision of: project engineers who design and build diesel and turbine generator systems for utility, military and emergency applications. These. include diesel generator systems and

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nuclear plants. Prior to his employment with PSD, Iannuzzi was the Supervisor of Systems Engineering at Colt Industries where he'supervied engineers responsible for the engineering of diesel engines and diesel generator units for use in a variety of government,. nuclear and commercial installations. (Tr.

1042, 1161-63, Iannuzzi).

Lewis' experience is not limited to servicing the Shoreham EMD diesels while they were owned by New England Power Company and now by'LILCO; as Technical Services Manager of PSD, Lewis is responsible for all of PSD's service activities. PSD performs field service work in many nuclear plants and in

! non-nuclear plants around the world on a daily basis. In the I

I years 1982-83, while Lewis has been Technical Services Manager,

PSD has serviced-diesel generator at eighteen domestic nuclear plants. The service done under Lewis' supervision runs from complete inspections, installations and overhauls to emergency repairs. Prior to becoming Technical-Services Manager of PSD, Lewis'was a test technician for PSD and, in that capacity, tested approximately 66 diesel generator units for nuclear

service along with several non-nu. lear application. (Tr.

1043-44, 1164-65, 1168, 1188, Lewis).

Suffolk County nas totally omitted the qualifications of William G. Schiffmacher, LILCO's Manager of Electrical

/ Engineering. who is responsible for all electrical engineering projects at LILCO. (Tr. 480-81, Schiffmacher). Mr.

Schiffmacher_was responsible for purchasing the EMDs and ,

oversaw the' effort to research the reliability _of those machines prior _to purchase. (Tr. 326-27, 462-63, Schiffmacher).

26. Joint Proposed Finding 102 omits substantial

-experience of NRC Staff members John L. Knox and Edward B.

Tomlinson with:both onsite and offsite_ electric power systems.

As Senior Electrical Engineer, Knox performs technical reviews and-evaluations of onsite and offsite electric' power systems in'cluding instrumentation and control. Prior to the NRC, Mr.

Knox worked _for Potomac Electric. Power Company where his duties

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' included relocation and restoration of underground power and transmission' cables. (Tr. 1856-57, 2337-38, Knox).

-Edward B. Tomlinson's 24 years of diversified-c Lexperience in the operation, maintenance and/or application-of diesel; engines for use as main propulsion engines as prime novers'forfahipiservice and stationary generators,. (Tr. 1857,

- Tomlinson), is ignored by Suffolk County's findings. As a mechanical engineer in the Power Systems Branch of the NRC, Mr.

JTomlins'on's. responsibilities include review and evaluation of' diesel engines and their-: auxiliary systems associated with 7-

's onsite. power systems.- 'He is also'a member of the NRC's TDI Task. Group:forfGeneric Review of TDI diesel engines. Prior to the:NRC,-Mr. Tomlinson.was. employed in the' Marine Engineering h Division'ofLN'adional Ocean. Spray, NOAA, where his-primary responsibility wasimaintenance planning and equipment selection-for shipboard systems, including diesel powered propulsion and

electric generating equipment. In his four and one-half with

-NOAA;.Tomlinson'~had direct dealing with approximately eight

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Lsea-going.. vessels that used EMD diesels of'the same model as are used'at Shoreham. (Tr. 1857, 1896', 2339-41, Tomlinson).

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1. EMD Diesels

27. Joint Proposed Findings 104-130 discuss the vulnerability of the EMD diesels to a single failure.

Throughout these findings, Suffolk County ignores the cross-examination' testimony of its witnesses that if the EMDs shut down because of a failure, a double failure would have to be postulated because'the 20 MW turbine would have failed in order for LILCO to be relying on the EMD diesels. (Tr. 2480-84, 2500-01, Smith, Eley).

28. Joint Proposed Finding 104 attributes the stat'ement "A failure in any of these systems.has the potential

to disable the entire 4-unit system and there are a number of such failure possibilities" to Suffolk County's witnesses. No such statement or concept was expressed by Suffolk County's witnesses at the page cited.

29. Joint Proposed Findings 106-109 note that the single electrical output cable of the EMDs is subject to a single failure and, therefore, makes the EMDs-less' reliable than~a qualified set of onsite diesel generators. These

. findings ignore the availability of an alternate routing of output cable that would be available to mitigate all events other than a LOCA. -(Tr. 813-15, Gunther, Schiffmacher; Tr.

818-20,.832-37, 842, 863-65, Schiffmacher; Tr. 832, 862-63,

I Gunther;:Tr.-1890,. Knox, Tomlinson; see also LILCO Proposed Finding 156).

30. In Joint Proposed Findings 114-115, Suffolk

-County states that the failure of the stepping switch could preventLall four.EMDs from starting and that there is no evidence in the record that a failure in the stepping switch could be overridden through manual operation. These findings misrepresent'the evidence on the record. Eley stated:that the EMD machines could be started manually and that he was not familiar enough with the manual start system to know whether or not the stepping switch could be overridden by manual opera + ion. (Tr. 2468-69, Eley). In addition, Joint Proposed Finding'114 states'that the failure of the battery array and/or the battery ' charger . could . render the EMD starting system

' inoperable. The' County's finding does not reflect Eley's lack of. knowledge: as to whether there had been any failures of the batteries or the' battery charger on these EMDs or on any EMDs in use at either a-commercial or. nuclear application. (Tr.

12469.Eley). ' Finally, neither Smith nor Eley could testify as to.whether the starter control mechanism on the EMDs had ever failed to function properly. (Tr. 2469-70, Eley, Smith).

E 31. . Joint Proposed Finding 116 correctly quotes prefiled' testimony that the failure of one automatic starter u.

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L ' component could prevent'the EBO sets from starting, but ignores

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st'tements by Suffolk County's witnesses that it is possible to b

manually. start each of.the EMD engines. (Tr. 2468, Eley).

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32. - Joint Proposed Findings 117 and 126 state that

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.the single fuel-supply.line that carries-fuel to EMD 402 is

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above-ground and susceptible-to missile impact. The Suffolk ,

L County' witnesses testified, however, that LILCO does plan.to

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bury ~the.-fuel line and that if the fuel line were buried, it would l remove ~tte concern about any. missile impact. (Tr.

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2477-78, Smith; see also, Tr. 2587, at n. 4, Eley, et al.).

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33. The statement in Joint Proposed' Finding.130 that l^

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-event could disable all four breakers mischaracterizes the l <

H , concept of single. failure. .The finding ignores evidence ~that LILCots proposed power-system forLlow power licensing is an

, integrated system and that.the ' single' failure of'the EMD

breakers;would not affect the 20<MW gas'_ turbine's availability to.provid5 power. (See-Tr..-2482-84, Smith).

>> 34. Joint : Proposed Findings '131-152 on fire

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detection andimitigation'for-the EMDs. ignore the fact that the

EMDs-are physically.so far separated from the 20 MW gas turbine that a fire in the EMDs would not incapacitate the 20 MW gas turbine.

(Tr. 2493;-Eley).

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'In Proposed Finding 135, che County misrepresents Smith's testimony?on emergency DC powered lighting outside b'uildings. Contrary to the County's finding, Smith testified

'that he.was.not aware whether lighting outside the buildings

. would exist in.a blackout situation. (Tr. 2476-77, Smith). -

'Moreover,-the Staff's'SSER No. 6 specifically requires that LLILCOcinstall emergency lighting at the NSST to' illuminate the.

-disconnects in a blackout condition and further states that the Staff has-evaluated the lighting conditions-for the EMD diesel

generators.and found them acceptable. (Staff Ex. LP-2, SSER 6,

atJ13-2).

'35. ;The' statement in. Joint Proposed Finding-136 e 'that smoke from a fire would be drawn inside the engine and would not be. visible is-inconsistent-with the record. Smith's testimony at'the pages cited by Suffolk County is that.there is-

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some' air: flowing through-the vents on either side of the engine and that, even if:the fire was very close-to-the turbocharger, at some point in time the smoke would be vented. (Tr. 2488-89, 1 Smith).

36. In Joint Proposed Finding 140, Suffolk County againihas; chosen to ignore' cross-examination in favor of its prefiled testimony. The proposed finding states that there is a risk that wat'er.used by fire fighters could be drawn into the m- s

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running EMDs through their air intakes. It fails to reflect Smith's testimony-that the air ~ intake for these-units is iU-shapedLand pointed down to the ground and that-it would be unlikely that streams of water could be taken up into the. air intakes. Smith' believed that spray could be sucked into the air ~ intakes, but not a stream of water. (Tr. 2489, Smith).

13 7 . Joint ~ Proposed Findings 143, 146, 147, 149, 150 and 152 deal with the alleged susceptibility of-the EMD diesels to fires and explosions. The findings ignore the testimony of

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Suffolk County witnesses-that they did not know whether there had been a major fire on anfoperating EMD at either a commercialEor nuclear plant. (Tr.'2486,. Smith, Eley).

.Significantly,LLILCO's witnesses Iannuzzi and Lewis, who have thad substantial experience with EMD diesels, stated.that fires with stati.onary:EMD diesels are'very. rare occurrences. (Tr.

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1183, Iannuzzi, Lewis). In addition, the record shows that:the operating l history,of the EMDs at Shoreham did;not show any-fire caused'by the. battery charger. (Tr._2490-91, Smith).

~3 8 . cJoint Proposed Findings 149, 150 and 152 erroneously conclude that the EMD batteries are.not ventilated-

' ? inia manner'which prevents the accumulation of explosive gases.

.(Tr.:2491). ' Smith acknowledgedithat while the diesel generators were running that there would be air circulation.

l.

I-L (Tr. 2492, Smith). Additionally, the threat of any fire is not II a single failure.which would prevent the supply of AC power b

l- -when needed.

(See LILCO Reply Finding 83).

f:

39. Joint Proposed Finding 160 states that the FSAR

' lists 38 individual,~ specific alarms for the TDIs. It is somawhat misleading in that only ten of the 38 alarms are indicated in the control room (Tr. 2497, 2603-04), and some of the alarms on-the TDIs are not diagnostic but indicate that the machines have alreadyfshut down. (Tr. 2499, Smith).

l. 40. Joint Proposed' Finding 171 details the steps b

, which must be taken to bring power from.the EMD diesels to Bus 11,_but incorrectly indicates that_the opening of disconnect switches on.the' low side of the NSST must be performed every time the EMDs are used. In fact, the disconnect switches must

~

be opened-only in the event that a fault exists at the NSST.

t (Tr. 1830, 1837, Clifford).

i

41. Joint Proposed Finding 174 states there is no emergency lighting in_the vicinity of the NSST and flatly ignores'the requirement in-SSER. No. 6 that lighting be placed

-inithe area of the NSST. (Tr. 2504-05, Smith; Staff Exhibit LP-2,'SSER 6, ff. Tr. 721 at 13-2).

u

-42. Joint Proposed Finding 176 incorrectly implies that the four.EMDs'will be connected to a low load and, therefore, that the automatic load adjusting system will not work properly causing the machines to go into reverse current and shut down. -The EMDs have an automatic load adjusting system. -If the system has difficulty balancing load at low power, one:of the EMDs would trip off the line and the other EMDs would pick up the load. (Tr. 2506-07, Smith).

43. Joint Proposed Finding 177 misstates the

' testimony at the page cited. When asked if other EMDs would pick up the load from an EMD that had tripped off due to reverse current, Smith replied that the other EMDs should pick up the load. (Tr.-2506-07). The uncertainty alleged by this

. finding is not suported by the testimony.

44. Joint Proposed Finding 179His "no evidence" that the loss of all AC power procedure has been-modified to instruct the operators to restore power by means of the alternate configuration proposed by LILCO. While portions of Gunther's prefiled testimony discussing Revision 6 was stricken

(see,.Tr. 802), he testified on cross-examination that Revision

( '6 did include' specific instructions to the operator on use of C

R :the alternate configuration proposed by LILCO. (Tr. 793-94,

].

Gunther).

- 45 '.. Joint Proposed Findings 180-181 imply that Shoreham~ control room-operators have not received training on the new procedures and that the only testing of the new

'proceduresLhas been.the July 2, 1984, demonstration. This

. inaccurate finding'is contradicted by Joint Proposed Finding

'200 which reflects Gunther's testimony diat training and walk-through's-of:the procedures for surveillance testing of the EMD

- Idiesels~and'the.20 megawatt gas turbine have taken place.

-Training has also been conducted for all six operating crews and management license holders on.the procedures for operating lthe'EMDs and the 20 megawatt gas turbine in an emergency. (Tr.

-809, 855-57; 788-90, Gunther). .Moreover, Suffolk County's own witness testified that the procedures had been drilled. (Tr.

-2504,1 Smith).

46. Joint Proposed Finding 182 is wrong in stating that'only one/EMD synchronized and carried load in the July 2

-test. All four of the diesels started on the loss of power and three of the four synchronized to their common bus. Engine

$403d which did.not synchronize in its allowed time and return

.to an idle condition, remained in a standby mode and the three v 'available engines were lightly loaded. (Tr. 858, Gunther).

/

47. Joint Proposed Finding 183 is wrong in two respects. First, it states that more than one field operator l- 'was used during the July 2~ demonstration to perform the functions 1 required for restoring power with the EMD diesels.

Only'one field operator was used. (Tr. 1837, Clifford).

Secon'd, the Staff witnesses did address the time necessary to l:

perform-the' actions set forth in the LILCO procedures.

Clifford noted_in his_ testimony that the operators at the July 12' demonstration completed the necessary-actions to restore AC

- power to tite emergency buses with the 20 megawatt gas turbine in approximately 4 minutes and that AC power was restored to he emergency buses using the temporary EMD diesel generators in

-approximately 9-minutes. (Tr. 1852, Clifford). Finally, the

-statement that Clifford's conclusions do not relate to any particular pieces of equipment is taken out of context. The actual-testimony stated: ,

Q. The. fact that you nention the TDI diesel generators, I take it that doesn't impact in any way on your conclusions that LILCO can successfully implement or use a supplemental power source within the period of time indicated in your testimony,-and I believe it is approximately 4 and 9 minutes?

A: My conclusion is based on the operator's ability to perform a specified set of actions and a necessary set of actions and did not relate to any particular piece of equipment being relied upon but merely being available.

a.

4 (Tr.'184n; Clifford).

~

48. Joint Proposed Finding 188 states that there is no evidence.that all the proceduralichanges required by the Staff SER have been made to LILCO's procedures. Clifford stated that there has-been some modification to at least one of the procedures that appears to address some of the items raised-

- in the SSER and that as license conditions, the Staff would review-implementation of'the conditions on the procedures.

-(Tr.,1838-39, Clifford).

49. ' Joint-Proposed Finding 189 is incomplete.

Although'LILCO does.not currently'have a~ standing-order or

- procedure which would require lthe operators to maintain the

, reactor:below 5% power during Phase IV, Gunther stated that if

-LILCO were given_a low power license, LILCO would provide such r.

procedures cnc -standing - orders. (Tr. 180-81, Gunther). ,

50. . Joint Proposed Finding 190 incorrectly states i

.that LILCO's proposed EMD surveillance test procedure does not b

L . provide for regular testing of the automatic starting, synchronizing, and' load sharing mechanisms in the EMDs. The

Staff.is requiring LILCO.to test the EMDs in all facets of their operation. including their' ability to start automatically,

to pick ~up load, and to carry, full load ~for an hour. (Staff Ex. LP-2, SSER 6, ff. Tr. 721aat 8-4; Tr. 2495, Smith). Thus,

___.__-_____--_2- - - -

the conclusion that the surveillance testing of the EMDs would be inadequate is incorrect. Moreover, the opinions cited in the finding are without foundation. One witness expressly admitted that he had never had any involvement with the preoperational~or surveillance testing for diesel generators at a nuclear plant, and further, that he had no idea how often a

'DDI diesel generator would have to test their ability to start automatically and pick up load. (Tr. 2495-96, Smith). Nothing in the record suggests that any other County witness had such knowledge.

.51. Joint Proposed Finding 197 has no supporting citation to the record and it is contradicted by Joint Proposed Findings 198 and 199 which note that the Staff's SSER has identified seven changes to LILCO's proposed testing of the EMDs. (See Staff Ex. LP-2, SSER 6, ff. Tr. 721, at 8-3 through 8-5). For the' Staff to have identified changes to the proposed testing program, it had.to have reviewed the surveillance testing procedures.

52. Joint Proposed Finding 209 juxtaposes two

. portions of testimony and draws an unjustified inference that parts produced by EMD are not reliable. As Iannuzzi's

~ testimony indicates, the service records for the Shoreham EMD

-diesels show a number of instances of cracked cylinder heads;

4 1

however, Suffolk County. neglects to. reference the remainder of.

~

Iannuzzi's testimony ~in.which he explained that the early.

Edesign of.the cylinder-hieads was' prone to cracking and that EMDs'later improved designs have corrected the problem. The

. maintenance records of the Shoreham EMDs demonstrate that there-

~

' have been no instances of-cracking with the new heads.

(Tr.

L1174-75,-Iannuzzi).

53. Joint Proposed' Findings 211 to 213, which address the maintenance'and repair history for turbochargers on the'Shoreham EMD diesels, rely solely!on cross-examination

' testimony-elicited by-Suffolk County and ignore clarifying.

testimony on' redirect examination.

54. By placing Joint Proposed Finding 211 directly

~after one which summarizes the testimony of witnesses Iannuzzi.

and. Lewis.that-they werefaware of no instances in-which units had shut.down for repairs during-operation at NAPCO, the Lfinding. misleadingly implies that the failure of.the turbocharger on EMD 4 causedithe unit to shut down. Lewis.

stated ~-that the maintenance records.did~not indicate that the turbocharger;had caused the diesel generator to shut down.

(Tr. 1118, Lewis). Further,-Lewis stated that since he has

. personally supervised the servicing of the Shoreham EMD units, both at New England Power and now at Shoreham, there have been

~

H 'no failures of the turbo chargers. (Tr. 1118, Lewis). Lewis stated that smoking turbochargers would not necessarily cause a unit 1to shut down. (Tr. 1157, Lewis).

55. Joint Proposed Finding 213 has been taken out of context. While Iannuzzi did testify.that a diesel could not' carry full load without an operable turbocharger, both Iannuzzi and Lewis stated that the engine.would be capable of running

.without.a turbocharger. Lewis further testified that even if the engine shut down subsequent to a~ failure of the

turbocharger,.the engine could.be restarted depending on the

(-

v -

! moderof failure. (Tr. 1062, 1124, Lewis).

5 6.- . Joint-Proposed Finding 214, discussing the failure- of a generator and dust bin blower on February 20, 1974, fails to consider clarifying redirect examination testimony on the incident in question. The log books and

. maintenance records do not indicate whether the units actually shut down as a' result of the failure of the components. The engine would have to be shut down-to remove the parts for l changeout and repair. (Tr. 1067-68, 1124-25, Lewis; SC Ex. LP--

L 6;'LILCO Proposed Finding 96).

^

5'7. Joint Proposed Finding 218 contains bits of testimony assembled'in a way that unfairly. characterizes the record.- Although Lewis did say that a turbocharger failure I

r - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . - _

1 g

-might'not'have been brought to his attention, he further

-testified that it is.likely-he would ultimately-hear about.any failure from the -field service personnel. (Tr. 1118-19, Lewis).

58. Joint Proposed Findings 219-228 fail to reflect p , basic concepts-about the maintenance-of the Shoreham EMDs which

~

First,

~

are necessary to put the specific findings in context.

to the extent that parts were replaced. prior to schedule, it is the normal practice for electric utilities to perform recommended maintenance on peaking units in advance when the normal recommended maintenance period would fall during a peak

-period. (Tr. 2512,~ Smith). Second, the record demonstrates that there are.several maintenance instructions for the EMDs

.and that a controversy exists as to which maintenance' schedule is applicable to the Shoreham EMDs. (Tr. 2517, Smith, Eley;

.see.also:LILCO LP-14 at 5). Third, Suffolk County presented no-testimony with respect to existing defects in the Shoreham EMD L-diesels. In contrast, LILCO witness Lewis testified that there was.no evidence that the diesels had shut down-for major

-repairs because of an operating condition. Significantly, Lewis _has had personal knowledge since 1981 of the. repair and maintenance history of the Shoreham EMD diesels as Technical Services Manager of Morrison and Knudson. Even in the light most favorable to Suffolk County, the testimony at best shows

~ that there were some maintenance problems prior to 1981 which may -have caused particular units to shut down. (Tr. 1118, 1173-75, Lewis).

59. Joint Proposed Finding 229,. dealing with the

- manufacturer's recommended replacement schedules, omits Iannuzzi's and Lewis' testimony which states that all recommended maintenance has been performed and that conditions which were discovered.during routine maintenance and were t

[~ remedied as necessary. (Tr. 1073, Iannuzzi, Lewis).

60. Joint Proposed Finding 232 attempts to show that LILCO did not utilize UTEX or new parts based upon a comment in maintenance records that a "used unit" was installed. Both

. LILCO's and the County's. witnesses agree-that "UTEX" is a term employed by the Electro Motive Division of General Motors to-cover parts which have been remanufactured to "as new"

. standards. (Tr. 2610, Eley, et al;'Tr. 1125-26, Lewis). Thus, UTEX parts are, in-effect, used parts which have been remanufactured. As a consequence, it is likely that the notation "used unit" next to " replaced power ASSY" at both 12,922 hours0.0107 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.50821e-4 months <br /> and 13,074 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> in Suffolk County Ex. LP-47 indicates that it was, in fact, a UTEX component.

l.

l l

(.

i m -

61. Joint Proposed Finding 233 uses the statements

.of Lewis outno f_ context, leaving the-impression that there was a'significant quality control problem with EMD UTEX parts. The contrary is true. Lewis testified that the problems were infrequent-and insignificant and that they were not of the type that'would cause the unit to fail. (Tr. 1126-27, Lewis).

62. Joint Proposed Findings 235-237 ignores-significant testimony about the viscous dampers on three of the four Shoreham diesels. Importantly, based on PSD's inspection of the:Shoreham units, there is no evidence of any problem with the three original viscous dampers. Lewis and Iannuzzi also testified that even a failure of the viscous damper would not lead to an immediate catastrophic failure of any unit; it~could

~ run approximately.150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> after such a failure before the L

unit would' develop problems cau' sing a shutdown. Such time is substantially greater than the one hour per month one would expect on an emergency diesel generator.at nuclear plant at full power. (Tr. 1174, Iannuzzi, Lewis; Tr. 1088-91, Lewis).

4 Moreover, the EMD recommended replacement schedule gives a very conservative time estimate for replacing the viscous dampers.

_-( T r '. 1 0 9 2 ,. L e w i s ) .

l l

l

63. Joint Proposed Finding 242 reports the hearsay commentary of Art Kornichuk, the EMD Regional Sales Manager,

.about-the EMDs fast-start tests. Intervenors ignore Iannuzzi's testimony that, in his professional opinion, the fast-start

-tests are evidence of the starting reliability of the Shoreham EIG) diesels in that the tests demonstrate the ability- of the engines to come up to speed after starting that number of times. (See Tr. 1099-100, Iannuzzi).

.64. Similarly, Joint Proposed. Finding 243 recites Ethe? portions of General Motor's report entitled " Starting.

Reliability of EMDs Model 999 Diesel Electric Generator Sets,"

but. fails to include Iannuzzi's opinion that starting features were added to engines used in nuclear service to enhance starting reliability rather than to attain high reliability.

(Tr. 1106, Iannuzzi).

65'. Contrary to Joint Proposed Finding 245, Iannuzzi did not testify.that he had no knowledge as to what EMD meant by a " successful start" in the report of 1976 which catalogued a success rate of 99.23% on electric start units. Rather, Iannuzzi stated that based on his experience of how successful starts are reported, the term " successful start" was intended tx) reflect a case where the engine came up to at least an idle condition. (Tr. 1108, Iannuzzi).

6'6 . Joint Proposed Finding 248 implies that Lewis lacked knowledge of the reliability of EMDs with electric start motors. Although-Lewis could not provide specific numbers, he testified that the electric start units are reliable based on his professional-opinion, his communications with the industry and-his knowledge of.the reliability of units sold and serviced by PSD. - ( Tr .- 1094-95, 1177, Lewis).

67. Joint Proposed Finding 251 implies that the Staff's' testimony concerning the reliability of the EMD diesels is based solely on LILCO's data of 275 successful starts out of 279 attempts and.that the staff accepted LILCO's data blindly without attempting to verify its validity in any way. The

~

' finding ignores the Staff's testimony that the starting reliability _ data for Shoreham EMDs was consistent with the Staff's knowledge of the general reliability of EM) diesels.

(Tr.-1891, Tomlinson).

2. 20 MW Gas Turbine

68. Joint Proposed Finding 254 claims that there is no evidence that.the surveillance testing program for the gas turbine is effective. This finding misleadingly cites the testimony of William Gunther at Tr. 854. Gunther did not testify ~that the surveillance program was-inadequate. To the

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ J

4

, contrary, LILCO's Manager of Electrical Engineering, William

Schiffmacher, Ltestified --that .the. periodic testing performed on the.20=MW gas turbine will prove its~ reliability. (Tr. 498,

Schiffmacher). Similarly, LILCO witness Museler testified that surveillance. testing of the 20 MW gas turbine gives added assurance-of-the availability of reliable AC power during

. Phases'III and.IV-offlow: power testing. (Tr. 577, Museler).

c 69. Joint-Proposed Findings 255-57 incorrectly

- allege'that the surveillance program for the 20 MW gas. turbine

--will only be tested at five to ten percent of capacity.

LILCO's original commitment for surveillance testing included (bi-weekly-testing at 13 MW, over sixty percent of capacity.

~ (Tr. 577,-Museler). In addition, to ensure further that the 20 1MW gas turbine has sufficient capacity, the NRC Staff has

?

required a one time test of the machine loaded to 20 MW prior

-to conducting. Phases III and IV. (Staff Ex. LP-2, SSER 6, ff.

Tr. 721, .at 8-2).

70. Joint Proposed Findings 258 and 259 allege that surveillance testing procedures have not been reviewed by the NRC:to ensure that the claimed deficiencies have been

' corrected.~ 'But the record-reflects that the NRC will ensure that'any license conditions imposed by the SER have been-implemented.- (Tr. 1889, Knox). -Technical specifications will

-be included as part of'an operating license. (Tr. 1891, Knox).

L. .- .

]

"71. Joint Proposed Finding 260 is incomplete because it'failsLto acknowledge that indicating lights are an appropria'te and' accepted means of indicating that power is available. (Tr..1836, Clifford).

72. Joint Proposed Findings 263 and 264 discuss starting the 20 MW-gas turbine. Finding 264 is inconsistent with Finding 263 in that it asserts that the gas turbine can only be started from the local control panel if it fails to start-automatically. As Finding 263 indicates, however, the system operator in Hicksville can start the machine. The Lcontrol room operator has three means of communication with the system operator, the plant telephone system, a dedicated phone

'line and a VHF radio link. (Gunther, ff. Tr. 1214, at 15;-Tr.

507, Schiffmacher). These communications links would be available-despite any loss of AC power. (Gunther, ff. Tr.

'1214, at 15).

73. Joint Proposed Finding 267 incorrectly claims that it would take more than ten minutes for an operator to reach the 20 MW gas turbine. An operator can get to it from the control room in approximately seven minutes. It would_take less-time if the operator was already out in the field. (Tr.

2928, Gunther).

m G

J l

(-

74. . Joint Proposed Finding-'268 claims the gas L- turbine-is'not protected from missiles falling from aircraft.

1This finding'is immaterial-for two reasons. First, aircraft crashes 7and aircraft missiles do not need to be considered for.

(~ Shoreham because of the extremely low probability of occurrence. -(FSAR'69 2.2.2.5, 2.2.3.1.7, Appendix 2K, l

-3.5.263). :Second,-even if a missile disabled the gas turbine, l

E itLis. located approximately 300 feet from the EMD diesels, a sufficient distance to' ensure that both-power supplies are not

-affected b'y:the same? event. (See Staff Ex. 2, SSER 6, ff.'Tr.

- 1721,!atL8-5 to18-6..)_ .

L

75. ' Joint Proposed _ Finding'269 erroneously considers

.the 20 MW gas' turbine in isolation; nothing in the record

~

indicates'that a failure _of the 20 MW gas turbine would affect

'the EBE) diesels. _Moreover,Lthe specific concerns raised about thh fuelisupply line areiunfounded because LILCO'will have two e

9000 gallon. tank trucks on site in the event the_ fuel supply to the EMDs.is disrupted. (LILCO Proposed Findings 75,_81).

'7 6 . Joint-Proposed Finding 270 fails to note that the' Staff's reliance on reliability; data for the 20 MW gas

, turbine provided by LILCO is consistent with Staff practice.

(Tr. 1891,1-Knox)

y .

G .

4

~ '

L

~

177. Joint Proposed Finding 271 claims that the Staff 1had'no basis for concluding'that refurbishing the gas turbine

enhanced its reliability. First, common sense _ dictates the

~

-conclusion that the overhaul of mechanical equipment improves

, its; performance._ Second, the Staff's-conclusion is consistent

with the testimony of Iannuzzi and Lewis in the context of the EMD diesels that maintenance and overhaul schedules are a factor toiconsiderLin assessing the reliabiity of a machine.

(See Tr. 1170, Iannuzzi, Lewis). Third, Staff witness

Tomlinson had ample qualifications and' experience _to give l- - . .

testimony concerning the'effect of refurbishment on

reliability. '(E.g., Tr.

1856-57, 2337-41, Tomlinson).

78. Joint Proposed-Finding 272 incorrectly asserts

-that there is inadequate assurance that the 20 MW gas turbine-

~

willIoperate reliably. The finding is based upon the testimony

-'of County ~ witnesses Bridenbaugh and Minor, both of whom lack the requisite expertise to testify concerning gas turbine reliability. (LILCO Reply Finding 21-24). In contrast, s E m William'Schiffmacher, LILCO's Manager of Electrical L- 1 Engineering,-testified that there was evidence that the machine would-operate reliably. (Tr. 497, Schiffmacher). Schiffmacher

-has-considerable experience with electric transmission and generation equipment, including gas turbines. (Tr. 481-86, Schiffmacher). Moreover, the gas turbine has been tested as

-y 4

n =- ,

i F

k-

! part of the installation process-(Tr. 857, 859-60, Gunther),

and will be subject to a full load test and periodic i

. surveillance tests. (LILCO Proposed Finding 134; Staff Proposed Finding 44)

79. Joint. Proposed Findings 273 and 274 summarize the'conciveions of Bridenbaugh and Minor with respect to the 20 MW gas turbine. These'conclusory statements merit little weight because of the witnesses' lack of pertinent qualifications. (LILCO Reply Finding 21-24). In addition, the l-fin' dings are deficient because they rely on matters raised in

. prior erroneous or immaterial findings.

l-

3. Complexity of the I: Proposed Alternate AC Power System

80. Joint Proposed Findings 275-79 allege that LILCO's alternate AC power arrangement is more complex than the original AC power system because more devices (circuit breakers, switches, transformers) are involved in delivering power to emergency equipment. These findings, however, fail to consider the large amount of time available to restore AC power

'(See, e.g.,-LILCO Proposed Findings 33, 34, 38, 39; Staff Findings 18, 19, 22). Thus, the plant operator has ample time to perform the necessary actions. Importantly, the ability of

=_

~.

LILCO's enhanced AC power system to' supply power to the plant's emergency equipment has been demonstrated. (See, e.g., LILCO Proposed Findings 71, 76, 118, 127, 129; Staff Proposed Findings 37, 47). Moreover,_the suggestion that the enhanced AC power system is deficient because it relies on manual action is unfounded. County witness Minor testified that in the United States it is an unwritten rule requires actions to be taken in less than 10 minutes should be automated. (Tr. 2534, Minor). For low power testing, more than five times that period is available to act under even the most conservative assumptions. (LILCO Finding 39; Staff Finding 19). Thus, manual action is appropriate under these circumstances.

Finally, these findings fail to consider the added complexity of the TDI diesels due to the automatic controls and alarms associated with these machines.

4. Other Aspects of Alternate AC Power Configuration

81. Joint Proposed Finding 280 is incomplete. While Iannuzzi and Lewis did testify that the EMD diesel generators do net strictly comply with all technical requirements for

~

qualified diesels (Tr. 1170, Iannuzzi, Lewis), they provided significant additional testimony which is ignored by the proposed finding. The engines and generators on the four EMDs o

A ,y*

% 1. . 3 m

p j 3

~ '

w .g 7gh -s

.g .s

_ :, +

bag 'y 8-' ,

-at Shoreham are the same'as tlose 3 in nuclear service at several o -

g nue)., ear plants'. (Tr. ,1171, . Le'wis; : Tr. #1172, 1180, Iannuzzi, ~

,4 -

le'uis) ./ While the Shoreham EMDs have auxiliary eq' uipment which

" differs'from equipment in nuclear-service with respect to some requirements such as envi'r$nmental and seismic qualification,

..,., n, m ._n. ' y,%

the ? systems and the dQit.r paraineters for ther$ remain the same.

. . .o

.There.have.been no. major or catastrophic failures of the type m

J of auxiliary equipment in,use atihoreham o6 which LILCO's

' witnesses were aware. (Tr.y 118'l-82', Iannuzzi, Lewis). The

% .s . .

extensive-experience'of LILCo?s witneases concerning the diesel

' generators makes 'it likely tNat' they would- be aware of any

+ . .

failures had they occurred, (Tr.*1182, Iannuzzi, Lewis; see, e e .~.;

- e . g .' ,' ' T r . 1166-68,g1188-89,.1192, - w I annitzzi, Bewis). Finally, y5, unlike-qualified nucle ~aridiesdis necesYary forcfull power .

u .e f;v. . o p e r a t'i o n , the Shoreham'EMDs de not have to " fart start.": This

"? ., . reduces wear.on ~ u the engines 4 and, c, stress on.theey auxiliary s.g [ [ package. (Tr. 1182-83,, Ia'nnuzzi, Lewis). .(See LILCO Proposed m .

^,

tsFindings- 84,.-85,.86;-87). * $p-

.+ g], r, - -

Pio .

82. Joint Proposed Finding 281 uses selected

-r.. .

a .,

portions of the record to imply'.t$ere is no similarity between py the-EMD diesel generators'aE Shoreham and those used to supply I

y

,a o ,

Ji. '

M emergency-onsite AC power at [$her. nuclear plants. LILCO Reply 4 ,

NfFinding 81" addresses genera _lly the record on similarity.

~

(See L;k .. N -

halso '1LILC05P. . . ~ ,roposed Findings '.89 'l 92, - 102 ) .

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83. Joint Proposed Findings 282 and 284 selectively cite the record to state that County witnesses considered the EMDs and 20 MW gas turbine as a combined system in reaching their opinions on single failure vulnerability. The basis for concluding the combined system is vulnerable to single failure appears to be the fact that the EMDs are not relied upon unless the 20 MW gas turbine has failed. Therefore, a " single failure" of the EMDs defeats the system. The County's witnesses acknowledged, however, that problems in the EMD diesels would not affect the ability of the 20 MW gas turbine to supply AC power to the plant (e.g., Tr. 2462-63, 2465-66, 2471, Eley; 2478, Smith: 2463-65, Minor). They further stated that in applying the single failure criterion, if a failure of the 20 MW gas turbine is postulated, an additional postulated failure of the EMD disels would be a double failure (e.g., Tr.

2,479-84, Smith; 2500-01, Smith, Eley). (See LILCO Proposed Findings 106, 107). Finally, County witness Eley agreed that if power were needed to supply emergency loads at low power testing up to 5% rated power, the combined power of the 20 MW gas turbine and the EMD diesels is not needed. (Tr. 2457, Eley). It follows that either source can be lost without violating the single failure criterion. Consequently, the County witnesses were applying a double failure criterion by considering single failures of the EMDs and the 20 MW gas i

i

i. ~44-a turbine individually as opposed to considering them as a

system. .They compared each. source individually to the onsite-source described:in the FSAR.

(See, e.g., Tr. 2452, Eley; Tr.

2578, 2581-91,- Eley et al.;-2617, Minor, Bridenbaugh).

84. Joint Proposed Findings 283 and 285' state the

_ :TDIl generators could supply power to the systems independently, through separate buses-as-opposed to being paralleled, while rthe' gas. turbine-and the EMDs cannot be-used to supply power at tthefsame1timecbecause the procedures require isolating the' gas

. turbine.before the EMDs are used, and there is no method to l parallel these' supplies. These findings are based solely on testimonyf of the: County's witnesses and ' ignore pertinent portions of the record.

.First, County. witness Eley, on whose testimony the

-findingsLare mainly. based, indicated ,that he was not

particularly knowledgeable concerning plant electrical distribution and paralleling of-power sources. (Tr. 2449-60,

, Eley). Second, the procedures mentioned.as requiring. isolation

~

EofLther2O MW ga's turbine before use of the EMDs are testing

~

sprocedures. -(Tr. 2449,.Eley). Most importantly, the findings

'are' factually, wrong about the distribution system. Although

the capacity of the sources and requirement of the loads obviate need for simultaneous use of the EMDs and 20 MW gas t

im

turbine, it can be done. The EMDs feed 4 KV bus No. 11 while

.the.20 MW gas turbine feeds 4 KV bus No. 12. These separate

_ buses can be powered simultaneously without paralleling the sources. Similarly, any of the emergency buses No. 101, 102

~

and 103 can be fed from either 4 KV. bus. Thus, var'ious combinations of-emergency buses, and emergency loads, can be fed simultaneously from the sources without their being paralleled. The plant operators are familiar with the plant electric system. (Schiffmacher, Attachment 9, ff. Tr. 336; Tr.

g 491, 499-98, Schiffmacher; Gunther, ff. Tr. 1214, at 18-19; Tr.

.862-63, Gunther).

85. Joint Proposed Finding 286 mischaracterizes the testimony of NRC witness Knox in stating that the EMD diesels and the gas turbine are-subject to single failures.and single events that'could cause the loss of both sources of power. In fact, the witnes testimony did not address the machines

-themselves, but rather their cables to the emergency load.

Only one failure, a failure of the block wall in the non-emergency switchgear room, and one event, a fire in that switchgear. room, were identified. (Tr. 1885-86, Knox).

Neither of these occurrences present a safety concern. As to a random-failure of the block wall, the witness testified the cables are separated by about 40 feet. (Tr. 1886, Knox).

Thus, a failure of one section of the wall would not affect y

, =- .. . . .

both cables. Further, as the County witnesses testified, their concern for the block wall was not a random failure but a failure due to a seismic event. But the EMD cables do not pass through the wall'section of concern for a seismic event. (See Tr. 2774-75, Minor; Tr. 2732-33, Meyer; Tr. 2795-97, Meyer, Roesset, Minor). Moreover, almost unlimited time is available to_ restore power after seismic event. (LILCO Proposed Findings 136-141; Staff. Proposed Finding 46). With respect to protection against fire in the normal switchgear room, the NRC l-Staff has conditioned low power operation on LILCO either meeting Appendix R fire protection requirements in the i .non-emergency switchgear room or providing a procedure to l

bypass.the room within 30 days. (Tr. 2354-55, Kno):) . LILCO has agreed to provide such a bypass. (Tr. 813-15, ' Gunther, -

Schiffmacher, - Tr. 818-20, 832-37, 842, 863-65, Schiffmacher; Tr. 832, 862-63, Gunther; Tr. 1889-90, Knox).

86. Joint Proposed Findings 287 and 288 cite the testimony of NRC witness Knox that the gas turbine uses a portion of the 69 KV system to discredit his conclusion that the 20 MW gas turbine'is independent of the normal offsite power: system. But, Mr. Knox testified that notwithstanding the use of the 69 KV lines, the 20 MW gas turbine meets the same standard 1of independence from the normal offsite system as is required.for qualified onsite power sources. (Tr. 1868-70, 2344, Knox).

r

87. Joint Proposed Finding 289 accurately reflects the testimony of' Minor as to why the County witnesses chose not

.to. consider offsite gas turbines when analyzing the

-availability of AC power to the Shoreham site. Minor's assumption that there will be no means of transmitting power Jfrom~ remote sources to Shoreham is not credible, however, in light of the' number, separation.and independence of offsite transmission. lines to the Shoreham site. (Tr. 371-74, 445-46, 517-19, Schiffmacher; Tr. 2353-54, Knox; LILCO Proposed Findings 54, 55, 56).

88. Joint Proposed Findings 290 through 295 address several1 aspects of the alternate power supplies and related' license-conditions which the Staff will impose. Joint Proposed Finding 296 concludes.that as presently configured low power

-operation:as proposed by LILCO is not acceptable to the~ Staff.

Joint Proposed Finding 298 concludes, without citation to the record, that there is no evidence that the modifications required by the Staff have been implemented.by LILCO. .These findings are collectively misleading. -As to each area

. addressed: by .these findings, the Staff has identified a license condition ~and its' associated basis. -(Tr. 2354-55, Knox; Staff

'~Ex.1LP-2, SSER 6,1ff. Tr. 721, at 8-5, 8-6, 8-8). With implementation of these conditions, LILCO's proposal for the

.conductLof. low power testing is acceptable. The NRC will

q P

-48 =

review implementation of the' license condition. (Staff Ex.

LP-2, SSER'6, ff. Tr. 721,'at 8-5, 8-6, 8-8; Tr. 1889, Knox).

'89. Joint Proposed Finding 292 fails to mention that the Staff did~ define a license condition requiring a quality assurance program for the alternate AC power sources. The Staff considers-the. item resolved by the license condition.

(StaffLEx. LP-2, SSER 6, ff. Tr. 721, at 8-6). Contrary-to the implication.of the finding, the Staff did not state that there

,was any particular lack of quality assurance in the past.

90. Joint Proposed Finding 294 states that the circuits associated with the gas turbine and EMD diesels are j not protected in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 1

The record cited does not state.this.

Part 50 Appendix R.

Rather, the Staff SSER No. 6 is limited to a license condition to meet the requirements of Appendix R in the non-emergency switchgear room or to develop a procedure by which the room can be bypassed from one source within 30 days. (Staff Ex. LP-2,

.SSER 6, ff. Tr. 721, at 8-8). LILCO has committed to a bypass (e.g. Tr. 813-15, Gunther, Schiffmacher) which the Staff finds toLbe more than responsive to its concern. (Tr. 1890, Knox).

91. ' Joint Proposed Finding 297 mischaracterizes the testimony of Staff witness Knox. While he stated that additional technical specification requirements were possible, i

3 _.

M d C

s . - 49 _ .

the.'also testified that he.did not expect to see any additional ones:beyond those-mentioned-in SSER No. 6 or_the Staff s ' testimony. _- (Tr. 1879, Knox).

192. Joint Proposed Findings 299 through 304 address

~

"LILCO's; proposal to provide alternate' routing of power from the 1EMD ? diesels to the emergency switchgear: room, bypassing the

~

s normal switchgear room. In_ summary, these findings state that

^

- itNe proposal is_only conceptual, has not been implemented, involves; future Iinstallations and train'ing, and has not been 1reviewedfin' detail by the NRC Staff. -These findings are

_ )significantly1 incomplete. They do not note that LILCO has

-considered the two options for the alternate routing in some

, detail.- The feasibility of the, options;has been verified. The connectionsLneedediare-_not extraordinary or_ unique, but rather carelinithe realm of everyday engineering, and material availabilityLfor the modification is known. (Tr. 832-33,

- 834236, LSchiffmacher). ' Additional work to implement the bypass-icanLbe accomplished-in approximately;four weeks

. If the

~

requested exemptionLisigranted,.LILCO will install portions before commencing Phase?III testing, with remaining elements

being installed when.needed. L(Tr. 864-65, Schiffmacher).

[

- - - _ _ _- a

I

93. Joint Proposed Findings 305 and 309 state that LILCO and Staff testimony concerning the consequences of the

. events considered in Chapter 15 of the FSAR,-if they occurred during low power testing, does not address the standard enunciated-by the Commission in CLI-84-8. Thus, the Intervenors argue that the testimony compares low power versus full power as opposed to low power versus low power, with and without a fully qualified AC power system. This is not true.

Both ~ the LILCO and Staff witnesses eval tated the events at low power =and concluded that with the enhanced offsite power the deterministic thermal and radiological success criteria are met assuming no. qualified diesels. These are the same criteria

.that would be. met at low power with a qualified power source.

Indeed,-the Staff states that.for most transients and accidents -

at 5% rated power no fuel failures occur whether or not the TDI diesels'are available. .For those few instances, such as a fuel handling accident, in which fuel failure can occur, the activity available for release to the environment is negligibly small whether or not the TDI diesels are available. (Staff Ex.

LP-2, SSER 6, ff. Tr. 721, at 15-1). That csmparisons are also made to FSAR full power evaluations which are available and bounding (see, e.g.,-Tr. 1755, Hodges) does not alter the factual showings made for 5% operation without qualified diesels.

L -

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~94. Joint Proposed Finding 307 mischaracterizes the record by stating that Mr. Hodges testified that there is less margin of-safetyLwith the alternate configuration than there would be with qualified TDI diesels. Mr. Hodges clearly testified that less margin in terms of a difference in temperature between the regulatory limit and the maximum that would be achieved during-a transient would not mean there is less margin of safety. As Mr. Hodges stated, "It's kind of like driving on a four-lane bridge, being in the outside lane near,the edge as opposed to the inside lane. Is there less margin of safety?" (Tr. 1749-51, Hodges).

,s

( 95. Joint Proposed Finding 310 describes a potential

, _LOCA. scenario which prompted LILCO to commit to station an equipment operator in the Reactor Building. The operator's function is to manually close two 3/4 inch valves to assure containment. isolation in the event of a LOCA during Phase III

.or Phase IV testing. This finding correctly states this commitment will be a license condition or technical specification (Tr. 1765-66, Hodges), but does not acknowledge that, with this commitment, the Staff finds that containment integrity is assured. (Staff Ex. LP-2, SSER 6, ff. Tr. 721, at-15-6). Further, the finding fails to point out that only this particular scenario could-threaten containment isolation and that it is an unlikely event. (Staff Ex. LP-2,- SSER 6, ff. Tr.

'721, at 15-6).

2

96. Joint' Proposed Findings 311 and 312 provide an incomplete-and, therefore, inaccurate statement of the availability of, and necessity for, operation of the Standby

Gas Treatment System (SGTS). These findings conclude that (1)

)

'the SGTS would not be available-to reduce the quantity of radioactive iodine released to the environment if there were a fuel' handling accident and a loss of offsite power, and (2) that a fuel handling accident is not precluded. The record is clear,- however, that the Staff's conclusion on acceptability of loss of the SGTS is not predicated on finding that fuel handling-is unlikely and thus precludes an accident. Rather,

-the. combination of low fission product inventory in the fuel due to low power operation, and the small fraction of that

' inventory that will' leave the. fuel and enter the fuel-cladding

_ gap,' compensates for the loss of the SGTS. The activity lavailable for release is negligibly small. (Tr. 1797-98, Quay; Staff Ex. LP-2, SSER 6, ff. Tr.'721, at 15-1, 15-6). Further, it is only partially correct to say the SGTS mitigative effects would not be available; Quay testified isolation capability is

'available although it is not typically relied upon in a Staff analysis. (Tr. 1769, Quay).

97. Joint Proposed Finding 313 deceptively mis-characterizes the record. It cites the testimony of NRC

witness Tomlinson in concluding that there is no evidence that

+

[- additional sources of AC power, such as a generator from ths

-: Army Corps of Engineers, would be available to Shoreham if needed,.or-that'such. sources would be feasible or compatible.

1 Contrary _to this finding, Mr.'Tomlinson clearly stated that he iknew mobile' generators would be available from the Army Corps of Engineers'non-tacticaligenerator program. The basis for his

-testimony was an interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act.and conversations between himself, and others, and the Corps of

' Engineers and FEMA. (Tr. 1867, Tomlinson).

I II. EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES A '. LILCO's Asserted Training'Benef1ts

98. ' Joint Proposed Findings 314-328 micleadingly

' imply that there is no additional benefit from performing low power testing early:because each phase of low power testing will.be performed.whether or not the exemption is granted.

These findings ignore the evidence described in LILCO Proposed Findings'186-190. Specifically, additional testing-and training'during Phase II will allow operating crews to take the

-reactor critical.for several hundred manhours of additional training in the use of appropriate instrumentation and

. equipment.to determine when criticality is achi'eved during the withdrawal of control rods. (Tr. 764-66, 773, 829, 849,

n~ m .,

L e

Gunther; LILCO Proposed Finding 188). Additionally, at the conclusion of Phase IV additional' reactor heatups will be

~

performed to give all operating crews additional training.

(Tr. 775-77,-851-52, Gunther; LILCO Proposed Finding 189).

.Overall, LILCO will have flexibility to perform additional

' testing and training during low power testing as a result of 1the earlier schedule. (Tr. 830, Gunther; LILCO Proposed r

- Finding.190).

l l .99. Joint Proposed Finding 317 argues that there is no' evidence that Phase'I of LILCO' proposed low power testing i program would result in any additional or augmented training

.beyond that which would be received by operators if low power testing were to take place without an exemption. This ignores

'the uncontradicted testimony by. Gunther that all phases of the proposed low power testing will allow additional flexibility to perform additional testing and training. (Tr. 830, Gunther; LILCO Proposed Finding 190).

100. Joint Proposed Findings 319 and 321 misleadingly implies that only 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of additional training will take place during Phase II. William Gunther testified that 72 sequential hours will be added to the length of Phase II testing.- In fact, hundreds of manhours of additional training will be achieved. (Tr. 829, Gunther; LILCO Proposed Finding-188).

1 k.. .

. ~ -'

l'

t .c  ; ,;-

- 4 4

b _ . B. . LILCO's Asserted-Good Faith Efforts'to Comply with GDC 17 l4 101. -Joint Proposed Findings 340 and 341 deal ~with L.

'LILCO's effort 1to determine ~the adequacy of the TDI diesel generator crankshafts prior to the failure of the crankshaft in

-Diesel Generator 102~.. The findings fail to mention that,-

~

although quality, assurance programs review various aspects of a r

manuf acturer's operation, torsional fatigue calculations are

'not the type ~of detail-that such a program would'normally review.--Moreover,-prior to the failure of the crankshaft, j :there was no basis for questioning the adequacy of the crankshaft. (Tr. 1472, McCaffrey).

n

102. Joint Proposed Findings 343-347 deal with an NRC Notice.of'. Violation concerning diesel generator testing.

~

These' findings are incomplete because they fail to acknowledge that, in'large measure, the' violation stemmed from differing b ,

Linterpretations of the requirements of a regulatory guide

-covering diesel generator testing. (LILCO Ex. LP-9, at 5.) No guidance existed on how.to interpret'a requirement that diesels

'must be.testedLat a " load equivalent to the two hour rating of the diesels" (Id. at 5-6).

~

LILCO interpreted this to mean that Lthe integrated-load profile during the two hours of tha. test should be equivalent to running.the diesel for two hours at the

-two-hour rating. The load profile for the test in question

]

represented in excess of 99% of the integrated two-hour ioad.

'(Id. at 6). Thus, LILCO believed the test was satisfactory.

Although the NRC ultimately. disagreed with LILCO's interpretation, the fact remains that the load test was performed with substantial load on the diesel. (Id. at 5-6).

Moreover, the suggestion in Joint Proposed Finding 347 that the crankshaft failure might have been found earlier had the test been properly run has no basis. Indeed, when the NRC raised initial concerns about the load test, it was repeated successfully using the NRC's acceptance criteria. (LILCO Ex.

LP-9 at 7; see also LILCO Ex. LP-lO at 7). This violation was the first and only time the NRC has imposed a fine on LILCO.

(Tr. 1534, McCaffrey).

103. Joint Proposed Findings 348-354 deal with problems found with the TDI diesel generators at Shoreham and LILCO's response to those problems. They attempt to give the

impression that LILCO's Diesel Generator Operability Review Program was, in hindsight, defective because it did not involve disassembly of the engine. The findings fail to reflect that LILCO studied the problems that had been found, assembled a group of LILCO and Stone & Webster experts, and devised the elements'of a program that these experts felt would be adequate. (Tr. 1496-97, McCaffrey). This program was reviewed by the NRC Staff. (Tr. 1708, McCaffrey).

L

r .

s 104. ' Joint Proposed Findings 356-365 reflect

~

questions-asked of Brian McCaffrey concerning defects in TDI

-diesels generators at other facilities. These findings, which ,

generally recite that McCaffrey did not know whether LILCO had knowledge of specific defects, are irrelevant to the present inquiry. The significant point is that LILCO made reasonable efforts to discover problems with TDI diesel generators. As

.the record reflects,-LILCO discussed TDI problems with other

! Lowners, joined the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), installed a computerized Note Pad system to communicate with'other utilities, and participated in the NPRDS system.

These systems are designed to provide utilities with information about industry problems. (Tr. 1500, 1510-11, McCaffrey). For example, the the INFO system screens licensee event reports and generates significant event reports designed to notify utilities of important developments at other plants.

(Tr. 1511-12, 1521-22, McCaffrey). In fact, LILCO was tied into all known systems to provide information about problems in the industry. (Tr. 1524, McCaffrey).

105. Joint Proposed Finding 357 seems-to suggest ,

some-delay in LILCO's actions by stating that LILCO did not join the TDI Owners Group until January 1984. The finding fails to note that LILCO was instrumental in forming this Group and that LILCO employees played key roles in it. The Owners

~

Group program was modeled on LILCO's own DRQR program. (Tr.

1711, McCaffrey).

106. Joint Proposed Finding 366 is incomplete; it reflects only part of McCaffrey's answer. He also stated that the cracks in the blocks of TDI diesels 101 and 102 will not grow and will not affect the' availability or operability of the TDI diesels. (Tr. 1496, 1497, McCaffrey).

I C. LILCO's Asserted Undue Burden from NRC Licensing Proceedings 107. Joint Proposed Finding 377 erroneously claims that Mr. McCaffrey's testimony contained no other facts, beyond those discussed in Joint Proposed Findings 373-376, to support his assertions that LILCO was held to a higher standard than ether applicants. McCaffrey testified that NRC project management and Staff-personnel have indicated that LILCO is indeed held'to a higher standard. They attributed this to the Shoreham litigation. (Tr. 1652-53, McCaffrey; see Tr. 1666-68, McCaffrey).

108. Joint Proposed Findings 378-380 deal with Mr.

McCaffrey',s testimony that the Staff Safety Evaluation ~ Report t .( SER) could have been issued in late 1978 or early 1979. They fail to mention that in early 1979 the Staff had prepared a

/y draft SER which was about to be released. (Tr. 1653, McCaffrey).

109. Joint Proposed Finding 404-recites conclusions from the.Marbur'ger Commission Report. The finding fails to indicate that~the Report's conclusions must be read in light of

[ ,

the more detailed views of-the Commission's members expressed elsewhere in the Report. (Tr. 1607, 1610, 1614, McCaffrey).

n 110. Joint Proposed Finding 406 suggests that Mr.

McCaffrey's testimony concerning the effect of the extended t

hear'ngEprocess i on-Shoreham's fuel load is incorrect because the: plant.was not ready to load until April 1984. This finding

' ignores McCaffrey's testimony that the hearing process slowed the'NRC Staff's. review and diverted significant LILCO

' resources. .(Tr. 1716-17, 1722-23, McCaffrey).

111~. Joint Proposed Finding 410 attacks Mr.

McCaffrey's qualifications to give testimony concerning public perception concerning Shoreham. Although he is not a social scientist or' statistical analyst, his testimony reflects that he has been involved in public presentations on behalf of.LILCO relating to Shoreham. (Tr. 1633-34, McCaffrey).

112. Joint Proposed Finding 411 erroneously states that Mr. McCaffrey was unable to say how the adverse public W-

4

- perception. created by the extended Shoreham licensing hearings

~

related to LILCO's exemption. request. He testified that it related to the exigent circumstances surrounding the request.

. (Tr. 1635, 1729-30, McCaffrey; Joint Proposed Finding 409).

III. PUBLIC INTEREST

,A. LILCO's Asserted Foreign Oil Bene _ fit 2

113. Joint Proposed' Findings 412-28 argue that there is no public benefit from reducing LILCO's dependence on

, foreign oil three months sooner because of uncertainties as to whether there will be any disruption in oil supplies or any increase in price of oil. While uncertainties exist, LILCO's

^

customers will benefit by insulating themselves from those uncertainties by reducing LILCO's dependence.on an uncertain p and unpredictable supply of oil. Thus, while they may be no l

L ' oil shortage or price increase, there is at least an equal probability that.there will be. (Tr. 1275, Szabo). Thus, the national policy of the United States is-to reduce dependence on foreign oil. (Tr. 1270, Szabo; LILCO Proposed Finding 204).

114. -Joint Proposed Finding 413 misleadingly implies that Cornelius Szabo's prior experience was limited to consulting for six public service commissions in the area of i-- - - - - -

.j

, ~ .

fuel ~ prices,. fuel supply and oil availability. In fact, Szabo's experience was much broader. It included, for example, eight years in the petroleum industry with Mobil, Exxon and Shell in both marketing and planning related functions, employment.as a management consultant whose clients included utilities in 13 states, federal energy agencies and investment

. bankers involved in the financing of coal and petroleum projects and involvement in a special management audit for the Board Chairman of Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO).

Additionally, Szabo was Manager of LILCO's Fuels and Chemical Division from January 1982 through October 1983. (Tr. 1328-29, Szabo).

115. -Joint Proposed Finding 413 also misleadingly implies that Szabo admitted that he was not qualified to opine about the likelihood of a cutoff of foreign oil supplies as a result of Iraq-Iran war. Szabo merely admitted that he was not a military expert. Szabo emphasized that he had a great deal of information about the Middle East beyond that which a lay person would have and was aware of many sociological and economic factors which could disrupt the oil supply from the

(~ Middle East. (Tr. 1219-21, 1224-25, 1275-76, Szabo).

r- i h.

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t..

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.116. The words "if ever" on lines 4 and 5 at the top oof page 15711n Joint Proposed Finding 415 should be deleted.

Whether'LILCO attains ~ commercial operation is not relevant to this proceeding. When Shoreham may reach commercial operation is relevant.

117. Joint Proposed Finding 415 erroneously argues

that earlier low power testing is not relevant to whether the L requested exemption should be granted. If this exemption allows early low power testing which in_ turn leads to early commerical operation, there will be a benefit from the reduction of dependence on' foreign oil at an earlier date. If I.

this exemption-does not' lead to earlier low power operation,

-there'will be no detriment. Thus, the evidence concerning dependence on foreign oil is relevant and demonstrates a potential public benefit.

118. Joint Proposed Findings 416,.417, 424 and'425 are not based on evidence. All are taken from the argument of counsel'or comments by_ Judge Miller. Neither counsel nor the judges are witnesses. 'Their comments cannot constitute .

findings.

119. Joint Proposed Finding 418 misleadingly argues that Szabo was unable to state whether a disruption in the availability of foreign oil would be likely to occur now, P

within-the next three-months, or within the next ten years. In l fact,7 Szabo testified that there is a potential for a serious

. disruption in the oil markets at any time. (Tr. 1273, Szabo).

'He' expressly noted such a potential in the next 90 days. (Tr.

1275,-Szabo).

120. Joint Proposed Finding 419 erroneously states

' hat t Szabo's principal basis for-concern about future

disruption in oil supplies is the ongoing war between Iraq and Iran. Szabo did not so testify. He specifically noted that his concern'over potential disruptions was "not limited to an ongoing' major war." (Tr. 1240, Szabo). Additionally, his l-testimony is repleat with other reasons for concern, such as the. decreasing leverage of tse United States in controlling oil

. prices,1the reduced oil reserves in the United States, the

-commercial trend toward upgrading distilling facilities so as not to produce residual oil and the like. (See LILCO Proposed Findings 194-96, 201). Joint Proposed Finding 419 also misleadingly fails to assert that the present glut of oil arises because of the intentional efforts of Saudi Arabia.

(Tr.1 1271, Szabo). Much of the uncertainty which Szabo described arose from the fact that Saudi Arabia virtually controls the world's oil markets and has a substantial potential for political instability. (Tr. 1275-77, Szabo).

4 s

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c 121. -Joint Proposed Finding 421 fails to reflect Szabo's-testimony that the strategic petroleum reserve in the

? United States might not operate properly. Szabo only testified that there may.be sufficient oil when the reserve is

'" operating" and "if they can get it out." (Tr. 1278, Szabo).

- 12 2 . - Joint Proposed-Finding 423 incorrectly implies that a disruption in oil markets would.have to occur 1during a narrow period beginning two months before. commencement of commercial operation of Shoreham and-persist for three months

.thereafter. Szabo only testified that any such disruption would have to be in effect during commercial operation for Shoreham and that in order for such a_ disruption to take effect, it would have to exist at least two months before commercial operation. (Tr. 1302-03, Szabo).

123. Joint Proposed Finding 426 misleadingly argues that Middle Eastern events'have no effect on LILCO's oil supplies because only one percent of-LILCO's oil is derived from the Middle East. In fact, Szabo testified that:

(a) A disruption in the Middle East would affect oil worldwide'in terms of price and availability. Oil is fungible and any shortage in the Persian Gulf which currently produces 20%-of the world's oil and three-quarters of its spare capacity would cause an increase in price. (Tr.

1277, Szabo).

l

,7 (b) If there were a major disruption in foreign oil markets, LILCO would find it

, difficult, if not imposssible, to buy residual oil derived from domestic crude.

(Tr. 1339, Szabo).

(c) Even the availability and price of the domestically derived residual. oil burned by LILCO is affected by events related to foreign oil to a very great, if not. total, . extent. (Tr. 1269-70, 1333-40, Szabo).

(See LILCO Proposed Findings 194, 200-01).

124. Joint Proposed Finding 427 fails to reflect Szabo's testimony that any attempt by LILCO to increase the amount of its petroleum reserves would entail a substantial additional cost to LILCO. (Tr. 1319, Szabo). Further, Proposed Finding 427 wrongly states.that LILCO could purchase

--futures contracts on oil. Szabo testified that "no one trades in futures on residual oil." (Tr. 1320, Szabo). Additionally, there would be substantial additional costs if LILCO tried to trade ~ crude' oil futures against residual oil. (Tr. 1320, Szabo).

B. . Economic Impact-of the-Exemption 125. Joint Pr.oposed Finding 429 erroneously' states

-that Richard Kessel testified as to whether there will be any economic-benefit to the public as a result of the requested E

-exemption. Kessel did not purport to perform any economic

" analysis. ~ Additionally, Kessel was.unqaalified to render any such opinion, even to the extent that his testimony might have touched on this area. Kessel has degrees in political science

, (Tr. 2881, Kessel), not economics. He hac never worked for a utility (Tr. 2881, Kessel)', has no engineering background (Tr.

2882, Kessel) and has never held a management position with any private business (Tr. 2882, Kessel). For the reasons discussed in the next-section, his testimony is irrelevant and unsupported.

126. Joint Proposed Finding 429 also erroneously states that Madan and Dirmeier testified about whether there would'be'any' economic benefit. Madan and Dirmeier performed no independent analysis, but purported solely to " test the assumptions or . . .. conclusions" reached by LILCO's witness Nozzolillo. (Tr. 1967, Madan, Dirmeier). In fact, Madan and Dirmeier did not address Nozzolillo's analysis, but addressed an' earlier computer run-upon which LILCO's evidence was not based. (See LILCO Reply Findings 131, 132, 134, 135).

t 127. Joint Proposed Findings 430 and 431 incompletely' reflect.the background of Madan and Dirmeier.

Madan's limited experience in working for a utility, Public Service Illectric & Gas of New Jersey, did not include any

responsibility for maintaining or supervising the maintenance of power generation equipment or any responsibility for deciding when electric generation equipment would be brought on line or taken out of service. (Tr. 1922, Madan). Dirmeier had never worked for a utility and had no exoerience in operating electric generation equipment. Neither Madan nor Dirmeier had any background in any technical area related to the safety of operation of a nuclear power plant. (Tr. 1926, Madan, Dirmeier).

128. Joint Proposed Finding 433 states that Richard Kessel has worked "in the public interest" for approximately ten years. While that proposed finding accurately reflects Kessel's conclusory testimony, the record does not reflect that Kessel has, in fact, worked in the public interest. During that ten-year period, Kessel did not hold any public office.

It has only been since January 1984 that he has been Director of the New York State Consumer Protection Board. (Tr. 2918, Kessel). Kessel does not represent the "public interest" and has no special power to assess it either in his private i capacity or in his capacity as Director of the New York State V

Consumer Protection Board.

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1. - 129., Jo' int Proposed Findings 434, 441 and 442

,.- .?

M incorrectly ' char'acterize Nozzolillo's testimony concerning the TV

j ,,,rag-

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.s /

<- , of economic benefits to LILCO's customers. Proposed 1

, , M s, w ,

c J,f= %.e.,L jf Finding 434 states that the alleged economic benefit to LILCO's N ' T. customers bill be eithe'r $8 million or $45 million, depending s-on the tim,ing of the receipt of certain tax benefits.

+

In fact,

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3 0 !N62tolillo t6stified that there could be a range of benefits M r*

M.

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from-48-$45 million' . (Tr' 1359-61, 1407, Nozzolillo).

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i - Proposed;* Findings 441 and 442 imply that Nozzolillo determined

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f ,this'. range by adding the $8 million benefit for the three-month chahge ti an sdditional $37 million # '

bensfit which could be

% r., f t : ., j e~

< ' attaine/.J enly if,, Shoreh4m

,e can he synchronized in 1984. In

- e s , ,,,

, ,. ., i

+

- fut/Noz:plillo did no,c a/ rive at,the range of benefits in E

,- y( Q y; He cohiputed'thrg& different incoms streams.

thar manner. He

,, i i s

': p , did 'not 'merely identHy- the $37 million difference and a st. ,

p..

/1 att41bute it to taxes. (Tr.j1361, Nozzolillo).

, ,, 'y i f* 130. Joint Proposed Fihding 436 misleadingly

)

~

character.izes ..

Nozzolillo'sC/.es(imony

,, -s~ ,

that his models "are not ,

the real world tod v." That stat'ement - -

dealt solely with the

.. ;c o A fact that the riad # sesemos convkntional ratemaking and further -

( . s .,

. , ~ . - -

~

+/ O- assumes that LILc0 huledsorrow .short-term debt of $378

~

y .

.. o

,e

/ I milliisn. ,

(Tr. 1376-7/, Nozzoli L,lo) . , Nozzolillo acknowledged w,

,yt** that LILCO had fidanci+.1,diffic 21 ties which made such borrowing - -

'.(

1 ,

uncert/a% changing e.hess/assumpt',i/ ins would affect the amount

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of tho' benefit. If, for example, Nozzolillo assumed a rate moderation plan, the $8 million benefit would become a $45 million benefit.

131. Footnote 3 to Joint Proposed Finding 437 completely mischaracterizes the record concerning the computer runs upon which Nozzolillo's testimony was based. The record

' reflects as follows:

(a) Though the earlier irrelevant computer runs and those upon which Nozzolillo based his testimony reflected results in the same order of magnitude, the earlier runs used different interest rates i

and different input. (Tr. 1372, Nozzolillo).

j (b) There were substantial differences l

in the runs, for example, in the

" retrofits" account showing post-commercial operation capital expenditures. (Tr.

2009-13, Nozzolillo).

(c) The differences in the computer runs should have had a substantial effect on Madan and Dirmeier's conclusions had they not overlooked the differences. (See LILCC Reply Findings 132, 134, 135).

L _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - -

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. iff 93 ,

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4 p 70_

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, ;r s s a

y! N[  ;(,d["MadanLandDirmeiertestifiedon-c-f .' direct examinatiotf that they had received

^

ys and r iewed the computer runs upon which a -

. \ t. y v- -Nozzolillo based his testimony, that those

, 2e r ne L

new. computer reno contained numerous l

- 16-subsidiary changes and assumptions and

n

-slight chainges in. numbers throughout, but that Madan and Dirmeier's conclusions did t

not change. (Tr. 1912-13, Madan,

'Dirmeier). Cross-examination revealed that c *E : Madak and.Dirmeier hadssimply missed some of"the changes and had mado mistakes in y *

?

., }

' % - their analysis. (See LILCO Rbply Findings c

~; . 7;,

134,:135). .

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,,7q -132. , Joint Proposed 3 Findings 444, 445 and 447

- ,e .-m

? : d'i scuss the incres#s iri -ra,tes in thh 'f'irst three months and in 3 -

1, -

s the 'first year as'y aTresulttof eirlier commercihl operation for

, , ~g,m n_ -

., These' proposed. findings unfairly isolate the first

' .Sho reham.

s year of operation. Earlier commercial operatioti would result

~

in a' lower book cost over'.'the life of the Shoreham f acility p ~ 'w o,e

'khicha would. result in Qn oveYall. lower amount of rates for the yearb'Nl985-2000 (Tr. 13 G6; 1409, Nozzolillo) and the years

l. _m .

. .o

. o200'o3. . .2015. .(Tr. 2055-56,".Dirmeier, Madan).

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133'. Joint Proposed Finding 455 erroneously states that "it does not appear possible" for Shoreham to be synchronized in 1984. Nozzolillo testified that a 1984 synchronization was achievable. (Tr. 1373, Nozzolillo). Madan and Dirmeier acknowledged that there were many uncertainties in the. schedule making it unpredictable. (Tr. 1984, 1985, 1991, Madan, Dirmeier). Thus, a 1984 synchronization is possible, though. uncertain.

134. Joint Proposed Findings 449, 456 and 457-67, reflecting Madan's and Dirmeier's erroneous conclusions completely ignore the cross-examination of Madan and Dirmeier.

Those findings should reflect as follows:

(a) There is no " mismatch" in LILCo's analysis. The perception of a mismatch resulted from a mistake in Madan's and Dirmeier's analysis. (Tr. 1992-2027, Madan, Dirmeier).

(b) The perceived mismatch did not exist in the computer runs upon which Nozzolillo based his testimony. Instead, it appeared in earlier computer runs upon which Nozzolillo did not base his testimony. (E.g., Tr. 2022, Dirmeier).

Since Madan and Dirmeier performed no independent analysis and had no independent knowledge of the facts underlying Nozzolillo's computer runs, their testimony concerning computer runs which were not the basis of his testimony is irrelevant and ought not to be considered.

(c) The basis for the perceived mismatch was Madan's and Dirmeier's view that a decrease of $59 million in the cash cost of Shoreham if full power operation is moved up by three months should be equalled by a $59 million increase in post-commercial operation expenses when'Shoreham is operated three months earlier. (Tr.

1992-93, Dirmeier).

(d) Before commercial operation, all expenditures, including expenses and capital items, are capitalized. (Tr. 1998, 2002, Dirmeier).

(e) After commercial operation, expenses and capital investment are treated differently. Expenses may be recovered immediately in the rate base, while capital

expenditures are capitalized. (Tr. 1998, Dirmeier).

(f) The perceived $28 million mismatch results from a comparison of pre-commercial

. cperation capitalization (including capital expenditures and expenses) solely with post-commercial operation expenses. (Tr.

2006-13, Dirmeier). Madan and Dirmeier failed to take into account an increase of

$11 million.in the capital retrofits account, representing capital expenditures, after July.1985 commercial operation. (Tr.

-2007, Dirmeier).

(g) Madan and Dirmeier had no independent facts upon which to' base their opinions. Yet,.they did not agree that the remainder of the difference between pre-and post-commercial operation expenditures could be' attributable to an actual.

~ difference in pre- and post-commercial L

operation expenditures. (Tr. 2041-53,

.Dirmeier, Madan). Madan's testimony in this regard was-simply-incredible. He expressed the opinion that there would be

],

s

._ i -- '

m..u- _u-..

- no change in the level of pre- and post-commercial operation expenses. (Tr.

2046-47, Madan). He did not believe, for example, that consultant fees would be

-reduced after commercial operation or that the_ longer LILCO kept consultants at the plant, the more~ expensive their bills would be. (Tr. 2047-48, Madan). He further

~

believed that the cost of licensing proceedings would not change regardless of their length. (Tr. 2052-53, Madan). Such -

an inherently incredible opinion does not contradict LILCO's business records, upon which Nozzolillo based his testimony,.that there were differences in pre- and post-commercial operation expenses.

135. The conclusions expressed in Joint Proposed Findings 462-67 are erroneous. Economic analysis of the effect of earlier commercial operation on rates for the-years 2000-2015 would add a benefit of approximately $6,200,000 to the $8 to'$45 million present worth benefit already proved by LILCO for the following reasons:

i

U ~75-i

_(a) LILCO's analysis contains no i- implicit assumption that early. low power

-operation results in greater lifetime energy production from Shoreham as implied in Joint Proposed Finding 462. Similarly, there can be no-assumption that beginning commercial operation three months earlier will cause the plant to be_ retired three months earlier as suggested in Joint Proposed Finding 463. Neither Madan nor L Dirmeier-had any experience in t

decisionmaking as to when plants would be taken out of service or put into service.

-(Tr. 1922, Madan, Dirmeier). They could not know, for example, whether-a utility's practice would be to remove plants from ,

L~ service during offpeak' times. It does not

_necessarily follow, therefore, that Shoreham will be taken out of operation l

three months earlier as a result of

~

beginning-commercial operation three months sooner-and Madan and-Dirmeier were incompetent to express any such opinion.

D Y.

(b) _ Proposed Findings 463, 464, 465 erroneously assumed that Shoreham will be displaced by oil-fired plants of the same efficiency as those now in service in order to calculate the alleged fuel offset at the-conclusion of Shoreham's useful life. (Tr.

2058-61, Madan). In fact, it is now unlawful to construct baseload oil-fired

_ generation plants. (Tr. 1270, 1299-1300, Szabo; Tr. 2062, Madan). Because of the depleting nature of oil ~, it is very unlikely that the next plant replacing Shoreham would be an oil-fired plant. Most probably some other technology, such_as coal,- solar, nuclear or other_will replace Shoreham. (Tr. 1270, 1299-1300, Szabo).

Thus, there may be no fuel offset at all.

(c) ThoughLthey purported to comment upon Nozzolillo's analysis and performed none of their own, Madan and Dirmeier did not compute their alleged fuel offset using the same assumptions as Nozzolillo used in his model. In their calculations, Madan and Dirmeier deceptively increased the cost

7 uof oil'at a4 rate of 13% per year. (Tr.

2065-66, Madan). Nozzolillo's analysis

, :used a 6% inflation rate. (Tr. 2066-67,

' Madan). Madan and Dirmeier. conceded that if one were to use a 6 1/2% escalation rate,.the proper formula for' calculating

fuel offset would be

$50,000,000 x (1.065)30

. (1.13)31 x .96

.(Tr. 2069-70, Dirmeier). That calculation

-results in only a $7.8 million offset.

(d) Madan and Dirmeier calculate-that lower revenue requirements for the years

- 2000 to 2015, before factoring in the alleged fuel offset, would be worth.$14 million in present worth benefits to-LILCO's ratepayers. (Tr. 2055-56, Madan).

(e) Accordingly, even if there were a fuel' offset, using the assumptions in Nozzolillo's analysis, the benefit of $14 million would be offset by'only $7.8 million, for a net benefit of $6,200,000, for-the years-2000 through 2015. This

-would increase the overall benefit l?'

postulated by Nozzolillo to $14.2 to $51.2 million.

C. :Other'Results of-the Grant of the Exemption 136. . Joint Proposed Findings 468 and 469 state that

~ Richard-Kessel testified about the public interest. Only Kessel's self-serving statements mentioned the public interest.

l- In fact,.the record shows that Kessel has no engineering

-background, has never been in a management position in private business, has no experience with-nuclear fuel, has never worked ifor a utility,lhas no formal economics education and has been avidly anti-LILCO for much of his career. (Tr. 2881-83,

-Kessel). At best, Kessel can be characterized as a consumer advocate and has spent his career dealing with pricing of consumer coods and dating of perishable foods, intervening in

~

-rate = cases, organizing commuter strikes on. railroads,

' performing surveys of the prices of Halloween candy, Thanksgiving: turkeys, Valentine hearts and Mother's Day roses

~

Land' worrying about "butterless buttered popcorn," "alcoholess apple champagne," and " leaded leadfree gasoline." (Tr.

2918-19, Kessel).

i 137. Joint Proposed Finding 470 should be revised to reflect that despite New-York's recognition of the necessity

-for reducing its dependence on foreign oil and its numerous

-measures to attempt to reduce its consumption, New York State burns more oil to produce-electricity than any other state.

(Tr. 1307-08, Stipulation). Moreover, the latest version of the New York State Energy Master Plan emphasizes that New York's: consumption of petroleum products must be reduced and calls for the utilization of Shoreham plant to provide electricity for New York State. (Tr. 2886-87, Kessel).

138. Joint Proposed Finding 471 is irrelevant. It is based on Kessel's irrelevant testimony that Shoreham should not be contaminated before "the uncertainties surrounding its future operation have been resolved." (Tr. 2912, Kessel).

(a) This Licensing Board has ruled on at least two occasions that consideration of such uncertainties is irrelevant. (Tr.

2145-48, Board; June 27 Order Regarding Discovery Rulings).

(b)' The Commission has ruled on at least two occasions that consideration as to whether Shoreham will be licensed ultimately is not relevant to the

r 1

-80 .

determination regarding a low power license. Long Island LiThting Co. -

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

CLI-84-9, 19 NRC (June 6, 1984); Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-17, 17 NRC 1032 (1983).

(c) The only variable here is when Shorehamlwill conduct' low power operation.

Once qualified diesel generators r e licensed, LILCO will have the right to conduct low-power testing regardless of the resolution of any emergency planning matters necessary for a full power license.

.Thus, the so-called " uncertainties" are not unique.to the grant of this exemption and, therefore, are not relevant to this proceeding.

(d). Kessel has no expertise and no facts upon which to base this opinion. As reflected in Joint Proposed Finding 471, Kessel's opinion is predicated upon an unsupported assertion that if Shoreham were to be operated at low power and a_

'. 6_

4 P

subsequently. abandoned, costs would increase unncessarily,.for example, the

, value of nuclear fuel would be-

,substantially. reduced.- .Kessel has'no E _

expertise.upon which-to base such an opinion'and there are no facts in-the 5' record upon which he could base such an

_ opinion.

139. Joint: Proposed Finding 472 dealing with an

.m -

" alleged decline in quality of LILCO's' service is irrelevant and 4 unsupp'orted.

b

,(a) The-Board previously ruled that ,

Jany decline in_the-quality of service was le~

notfrelevant.. . (Tr. 2146, Board).

-(b) 'There are/no facts in'the record e

indicating ~that there has in fact been a decline:in the quality offservice by LILCO

.L 1

toiits-customers.

140. Joint-Proposed." Finding 473 is at;most a bald Tassertionithat_" austerity measures have been and will be impleme'nted.by LILCO" haveLaffect'ed its non-nuclear operations.

=Kesseltdid not_ establish any personal. knowledge of such 3h 2 fausterity measures or-their effect on LILCO's service- .

)

t ,

1

w. -

_ , _ . . _ . _ . . . . ~ , . . _ . . _ _ . . _ . . . . _ , _ _ . . - . . - - _ _ .

, y. . . . . - . . _ . _ .._ . - _ _ . . . _ _ __ _-.. . _

ta

'~

82-Joint 1 Proposed' Finding.473 also is contingent

- '141.

4 upontKessel's op'nion i that LILCO's' proposed accelerated low

poweritesting will' require the expenditure of additional funds.

-ThereLare no factsein the. record to support-this_ opinion and JKessel?has.no expertise on which.to found such an opinion. In fact,.LKesselLhas never' worked for a utility, has never worked at a-nuclear' facility'and has no experience with nuclear: fuel.

.(Tr.:2881-83,. Kessel).

~

~

- 142. _Moreover, the uncontradicted testimony of Anthony Nozzolillo established that LILCO's financial hardships imight be' alleviated byLgranting the requested exemption,

refusal to grant the exemption might exacerbate LILCO's ,

financial problems and adversely affect the level'of service.

, , 143. Joint Proposed Findings /474'through.493_ argue

~

.that it-is.not in the public. interest to allow a financially weakened utility to operate a nuclear facility. Memorandum and Order Denying _Suffolk County and the State of New York Petition for Exception from_ Regulations Precluding Financial Qualificetions. Contentions and Motion for Certification to the

< (Commission, Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear

~

Power Station,EUnit 1), LBP-84-30.(Aug. 13, 1984); see also

'fo$derRegardingDiscovery; Rulings, June 27, 1984.

Financial The

~

. qualifications are-irrelevant in a licensing proceeding.

6 e

9 -

['+

_.,d.,,.

, . . . , . . - , , -..- -, ,.,..m ,,.m,w _%.,,_w,,w._,.- ,,rre- s,w--gw-=-

' facts in these Joint Proposed Findings, to the extent correct, are relevant only to the financial hardships now being suffered by LILCO which comprise one of the " equities" outlined by the

' Commission.

144. Joint Proposed Findings 483(a) and 488 dealing with the Public Service Commission "prudency proceeding" are also irrelevant and no findings should be made in connection

! with this subject. Those proceedings have not been concluded.

Any findings based on them would necessarily be speculative.

Respectfully submitted,

.21 -

REbr1E 'M? 11o'lW '

Anthony F. Earley Jr.

Jessine A. Monag n HUNTON & WILLIAMS P. O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: September 7, 1984 l

1 l

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _