ML20106F491
| ML20106F491 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1984 |
| From: | Brown H, Zahnleuter R KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, NEW YORK, STATE OF, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#484-764 OL-3, NUDOCS 8410300266 | |
| Download: ML20106F491 (425) | |
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l, 4fW6 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '8g' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION pg pg N2:56 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board f;7
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In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Proceeding)
Unit 1) )
)
SUFFOLK COUNTY AND STATE OF NEW YORK PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING Volume I - Fabian G. Palomino, Esq. KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq. CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS Executive Chamber, Room 229 1900 M Street, N.W., Suite 800 Capitol Building Washington, D.C. 20036
. Albany, New-York 12224 Attorneys for the Governor Attorneys for Suffolk County of-The State of New York October 26, 1984
y- . L
'SUFFOLK COUNTY AND STATE OF NEW YORK PROPOSED' FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION............................................................ 1 A. Background..................................................... 1 B. The Nature and Quality o f t he Evid enc e o f R e co rd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 C. _LILCO's Proposed " Basic Principles of Emergency Planning"............................. 13 D. LILCO's Characcerization of "the Governmental Intervenors' Strategy" in this Case.............. .................................. 27 - CONTENTIONS................... ........................................ 30 I. HUMAN BEHAVIOR (CONTENTIONS 23.A.-B, C, 25)....................... 30 A. Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon (Contentions 23.A, B, C)..................................... 30
- 1. Introduction ........................................... 30
- 2. The Nature of the Shadow Phenomenon In Radiological Emergencies............................. 31
- 3. The TMI Experience and Surveys Conducted on Long Island................................ 34 (a) The TMI svacuation Shadow.......................... 34
-(b) Surveys on-Long Island............................. 35 (c)_ Use of Survey Data to Predict Human Behavior............................. 42 (d) Alleged Bias in the County's Survey............................................. 46
1
- 4. -LILCO's EBS Messages Will Not Substantially Reduce Voluntary Evacuation.............................................. 49 (a) Comparative Impact of
.Information and Non-Information Factor at TMI...................................... 51 (b) ._ Effectiveness of LILCO's-EBS Messages....................................... 55
- 5. Some Effects of Shadow Phenomenon on Protective Actions......,............................. 63
- 6. Conclusions on Contentions 23.A, B, and C.......................................... 66 B. Role Conflict (Contention 25)................................ 68
- 1. Historical Resolution of Role Conflict................................................. 70
- 2. LILCO Workers (Contention 25.A)......................... 78
-3. BNL Personnel (Contention 25.B)......................... 83
- 4. ' School Bus Drivers (Contention 25.C).................... 84
- 5. Teachers and School Employees (Contention 25.D)....................................... 89
- 6. Health Care Personnel (Contention 25.E).......................... ............ 93
.7. Non-LILCO Volunteers (Contention 25.F)..........................o............. 97
- 8. Conclus ion on Contention 25. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 II. CONFLICT OF-INTEREST AND CREDIBILITY' (Contentions 11 and 15)........................................... 99 A. Cor.fli~ct of Interest (Contention 11)......................... 99 B. Credibility (Contention 15).............. ................... 117
- 1. LILCO is Not a Credible Source
.of Information.......................................... 119
- 2. Significance of LILCO's Lack of Credibility............................................ 123 (a) Non-LILCO Personnel (Contention 15.A).................................. 132 (b) Sheltering (Contention 15.B)....................... 134 (c) Schools (Contention 15.C).......................... 135 (d) Traffic Guides and Security Personnel (Contention 15.D)........................ 136 (e)- EBS Messages (Contention 15.E)..................... 138 (f)- Rumor Control (Concention 15.F)................... 138 (g) Pre-Emergency Information (Contention 15.G)............................ .... 140
- 3. Conclusion on Contention 15............................ 141 III. EPZ BOUNDARY (CONTENTION 22.D).................................... 142 IV. LERO WORKERS (CONTENTIONS 24.L, 26, 27, 28-32, 33, 34).................................................... 148 A. Notification (Contention 26)................................. 148
'1. The Adequacy of LILCO's Customer Service Office as the Primary Notification Point for LERO (Contention 26.A)................................ ..... 150
- 2. Notification of Emergency Response Personnel by Pager (Contention 26.C)...................................... 159
- 3. Notification of Emergency Response Personnel by Telephone
.(Contention 26.D)....................................... 165
- 4. . Notification of Non-LILCO Organizations and Personnel (Cantention 26.E)...................................... 168 B. Mobilization (Contention 27)........,........................ 170
- 1. Introduction............................................ 170
- 111 -
v.
- 2. Extended Travel Times From Homes and Places of Work (Contention 27.A)....................................... 174
- 3. The Effects of Traffic.
Conditions on Mobilization ' (Contentions 27.B. E and F-)............................. 178
- 4. Delays at Staging Areas (Contention 27.C)....................................... 181
- 5. Delays Due to Picking Up
- Equipment Away from Staging Areas L (Contention 27.D)....................................... 184
- 6. Conclusion on Contention 27............................. 187 C. Communications (Contentions 24.L, 28-32, 33 and 34)............................................ 188
- 1. Communications with Federal Agencies (Contention 28)................................ 189 i 2. Communications Personnel and l Repair Technicians (Contention 29)...................... 190 l
i: 3. LILCO's Emergency Radio System (Contentions 30 and 31)................................. 194 f(a) LILCO's Radio Channels ! Are Overloaded..................................... 199 (i) Control of LILCO's Radio Channels............................. 201 (ii) The Nature of Traffic Control Functions.......................... 202 (iii) Monitoring Functions....................... 205 (iv) Prob 1' ems With Radio Use.....................'206 (b) LILCO's Proposed Radio System Lacks Backup Channels............................. 207 (c) LILCO's Reliance on Mobile Radios.................. 208 (d) Limited Broadcast Range............................ 209 i
- iv -
fi L-f: c I L (e) Problems with Dedicated Telephone Lines................................... 211 h y 4. Lack of. Direct Communications (Contention 32)............ ........................... 212
- 5. Communications Between Field Monitoring Teams and the EOC (Contention 33)........................................ 213
- 6. Communications with Hospitals and Ambulance Personnel (Contentions 24.L and 34).............................. 216 1
V. TRAINING (CONTENTIONS 24.S , 39-41, 44, 98-100) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 A. Arrangements for Training Non-LILCO Personnel (Contention.98)................................... 222 B. Training and Experience (Contentions 40, [ 44. E , 44. F ,- 9 ' and 10 0 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 24
- 1. The Need Fo r Expe rience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 24 -
! 2. LILCO's Training Program Does Not ! Compensate for the LILCO Emergency Workers' Lack of Experience............................. 229 (a) LILCO's Selection Process Does Not Identify Candidates Who Are Likely to be Able to Overcome Their Lack of Experience.......................... 230 (b) LILCO's Formal Training Program Does Not Compensate For the Lack of Experience Among LERO Hembers...................... 232 (1) LILCO's Classroom Program................... 233 (ii) LILCO's Drill / Exercise Program..................................... 241 (iii) Communications Training (Contentions 41 and 44.D)................... 253 (iv) Drill / Exercise Results....................... 256
-v-
-(c) LILCO's Training Program Does Not Provide Necessary Post-Training Experience...... ................................. 257 (d) Conclusion........................................ 259 C. Att rition (Cont ention 39 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 0 VI. NOTIFIbATIONANDINFORMATIONTOTHEPUBLIC (CONTEMTIONS 16.E, 18, 20, 21.C, 24.T, 55-59).................... 264
- A. Notification (Contentions 24.T. 55-59)...................... 264
- 1. Activating the LILCO Siren System (Contention 55)........................................ 265
- 2. - Backup to the Siren System
.(Contention 56)........................................ 272
- 3. Notification to Special Facilities and Persons Without FM Radios (Cont ent ion 5 7 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 81
- 4. Notification of and Communication with Special Facilities and the Handicapped'at Home (Contention 58).................... 282
- 5. Notification to the Public by the Coast Guard (Contentions 24.T, 59)..................... 284
- 6. Conclusion............................................. 292 B. . WALK-AM (Contention 20)..................................... 292 C. Zones and' Routes-(Contention 18)............................ 295 D. Hispanics (Contention 21.C)................................. 298
+
E. Brochure (Contention-16.E).................................. 300 VII.' SHELTERING-(CONTENTION 61)....................................... 310 VIII. MAKING PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTENTIONS- 60, 63, 64 AND 49).................................. 317 A. Selective Sheltering and Selective Evacuation (Contentions 60 and 63)......................... 317
- 1. Protection of the Radiosensitive....................... 317
- vi -
- 2. Protection of Hospital Patients........................ 323
.B. Wind Shifts (Contention 64)................................. 328
-C. Nomogram (Contention 49).................................... 332
'IX. EVACUATION (CONTENTIONS 23.D, 24.F.2, 123.H, 24.'I, 65,'66, 67, 97)...................................... 335 A. Time Estimates (Contentions 65, 23.D, 23.H).......... ...... 335
-1. Introduction........................................... 335
- 2. The KLD Computer Model (DYNEV)......................... 337
- 3. Mobilization (Contention 65.A)......................... 341
- 4. Pre-Evacuation Trips (Contention 65.B)................. 346 i
- 5. _ Route Deviation (Contention 65.C.4).................... 349
- 6. Confusion As A Result Of LILCO's Traffic Control Tactics (Contention 65.C.1)...................................., 359
- 7. Aggressive Behavior (Contention 65.C.2)................ 360
- 8. Traffic Direction In Conflict With Normal Traffic Signals (Contention 65.C.3).................................... 364
- 9. The Validity of LILCO's Estimated
" Uncontrolled" Evacuation Time Estimates.......................................... 366
- 10. The Effects of Accidents, Running Out of Fuel And Other Similar Blockages (Contention 65.D)...................................... 370
- 11. Emergency Vehicles (Contention 65.E)................... 379
- 12. The Effect of Stress (Contention 65.F)... ............. 380
- 13. Estimates for Special Populations (Contention 65.G)...................................... 383
- 14. Rout'e Spotters (Contention 65.H)....................... 383
- vii -
w
- 15. The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon (Contention 23.D)...................................... 385
- 16. Perimeter Control (Contention 23.H).................... 393
- 17. Conclusions on Contentions 65, 23. D , H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 i
B. Road Obstacles and Cars Without Fuel'
'(Contention 66)............................................. 395
- 1. -Number of Tow Trucks (Contention 66.A)................. 396
- 2. Time Needed To Remove Obstacles
.(Contention 66.B)........................'............. . 398
- 3. Evacuation of Persons Whose Cars 3 Become Disabled (Contention 66.C)...................... 400
- 4. Snow Removal (Contention 66.D)......................... 401
- 5. Fuel Disbursement (Contention 66.F).................... 404 i
- 6. Conclusion on Contention 66............................ 406
'C. Weather (Contention 97.B)........... ....................... 407 D. Buses for the Public (Contentions 24. F . 2, 24. I , 6 7 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
- 1. Contention 67....................................... .. 412 (a) Number of Buses Needed (Contention 67.A)................................. 412 (b) Evacuation Time Estimates (Centention 67.C)................................. 412 (c) Location and Configuration of Trans fer Points . (Contention 6 7.D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
.. 2. Agreements for the Use of Transfer Points (Cont ention 24. I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
- 3. Contention 24.F.2...................................... 419 X. RELOCATION CENTERS (CONTENTIONS 24.0, 24,P,-74, 75, 77).......................'................... 421
- vill - l l
A. Centers for the Public
-(Contentions 24.0, 24~.P. 74, 75)............................ 421
- 1. Identification of Centers.............................. 422
- 2. Location of Centers.................................... 426
-3. Letters of Agreement.................................... 427 1
- 4. Capacities and Facilities in Centers................... 430 B. Thyroid Monitoring (Contention 77).......................... 432 XI. THE HANDICAPPED, HOSPITALS, AND NURSING HOMES (CONTENTIONS 24.G, J, K, N, 58, 72, 73.A, B)..................... 436 A. Ambulances (Contentions 24.G, 24.K)......................... 436
- 1. Agreements for Vehicles (Contention 24.G)...................................... 436
- 2. ' Agreements for Staffing (Contention 24.K).......................................,439
. B. Hospitals and Nursing Homes (Contentions 24.J, 24.N, 72)................................ 441 1~. Agreements with Special Facilities (Contention 24.J)...................................... 441
'2. Evacuation Times (Contention 72.A)..................... 444
- 3. Relocation Centers (Contentions 72.C and 24.N)........ ..................................... 448
- 4. Standards for Evacuation (Contention 72.D)............. 451
- 5. Ad Hoc Evacuation (Contention 72.E).................... 451 C. Registration of Handicapped Persons (Contention 73.A)........................................... 453 D. Notification and Evacuation of Handicapped Persons at Home (Contentions 58, 73.B)...................... 459
- 1. Notification (Contentions 73.B.1, B.3, and B.5). ...... 459 .
- 2. Evacuation (Contention 73.B.4)......................... 462
- ix -
l.
p XII. SCH00.2 (CONTENTIONS 24.E, 24.F,
-24.M, 24.N, 61.C, 68-71)......................................... 463 A. Lack of Agreements with Schools (Contention 24.E)........................................... 466 1 1. The Schools and School Districts Have Not Agreed to Implement LILCO's Plan............... ... 468
- 2. LILCO's Efforts to Obtain School Cooperation.............................. ...... 470
- 3. LILCO's Speculations As to What School Districts Would Do If There Were A Shoreham Accident Are No Substitute for A P1an.................................. 476 B. Agreements to Provide School Buses (Contentions 24.F.1 and 24.F.3)............................. 478 C. -Lack of Agreements with School Bus Companies (Contention 24.M)................................. 483 D.. Lack of Agreements For Relocation Centers For School Children (Contention 24.N)........................................... 485 o E. Sheltering (Contention 61. C .1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 6 F. Early_ Dismissal of School Children (Contentions 68 and 69)...................................... 492
- 1. Adequacy of Existing School Early Dismissal P1ans.................................. 493
- 2. Time to Accomplish Early Dismissa1..................... 494 .
3.- Homes Without *dults . When Children Arrivu Home................................... 499
- 4. Dealing with An Escalating 2mergency................s... 501 G. Evacuation of School Children (Contentions 70 and 71)..................................... 503 XIII. INGESTION PATHWAY (CONTENTIONS 24.R, 81, 8 5 , 8 8 , 9 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 7 A. 50-Mile EPZ (Contention 81)................................. 507
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s B. Recovery and Reentry (Contentions 85, 88)................... 512 C. New York State Plan (Contention 92)......................... 516 D. Connecticut (Contention 24.B)............................... 521 XIV. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (CONTENTIONS 93, 96)....................... 527 XV. : STRIKE _BY LILCO EMPLOYEES........................................ 528 A. Introduction............................................... . 528 B. The Ris ks o f Cold Shutdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530 , C. Comparison to-Lov Power Risks............................... 534 D. The Language of the License Condition....................... 537
'E. Conclusions on Strike Issue................................. 538
, CONCLUSION.................................................... ....... 539 l l- List of Witnesses (filed separately) . l- List of Exhibits (filed separately) Sequence of Testimony (filed separately) 4 L l' s xi -
INTRODUCTION A. Background
- 1. This Partial Initial Decision addresses whether the offsite ra-diological emergency response plan (" Plan") prepared and submitted by the Long Island Lighting Company ("LILC0") satisfies the NRC's emergency pre-paredness regulations in 10 CFR 5 50.47 and Part 50, Appendix E. In par-ticular, it rules on the ev.tentions of Suffolk County, the State of New York, the Town of Southampton, the Shoreham Opponents Coalition, and the North Shore Coalition. (The County, State, Town, and Coalitions are herein referred to as "Intervenors.") The Intervenors urge this Board to find that the Plan is deficient on numerous grounds and, accordingly, to rule that the Plan fails to satisfy NRC regulation's.
- 2. This proceeding is one of first impression: it is the first time in which the NRC has been requested to rule on the adequacy of a utility's own offsite emergency plan. In light of this, we believe it is helpful to review the circumstances under which this matter has come before us.
- 3. In March 1982, the government of Suffolk County determined that the ra*diological emergency planning effort it had been pursuing was unsatisfactory to protect the public in the event of a nuclear accident at Shoreham.1/ Thus, Suffolk County scrapped the work that had been done and 1/ The background data concerning the County planning effort are largely derived from factual portions of the County's Motion to Terminate the Shoreham Operating License Proceeding, dated February 23, 1983, and attachments thereto.
commissioned a new and upgraded planning process. Accordingly, at a cost in excess of $500,000, the County commenced an 8-month planning effort by a team of nationally recognized emergency planning experts. This effort fo-cused on the~ actual local conditions which exist on Long Island: for exam-ple, the elongated geography of Long Island: the limited east-west road network; and the pattern of quickly changing meteorological conditions. The effort also directed special attention to the lessons learned from the Three Mile Island ("TMI") accident, including human behavioral information concerning such matters as " role conflict" and the " evacuation shadow phe-nomenon," which are discussed hereinbelow.
- 4. The draft emergency plan prepared by the County's planning team was transmitted to the Suffolk County Legislature in December 1982. The ,
I following month, January 1983, the Legislature held 8 days of public hear-ings cnt the draft plan. Hundreds of individuals and organizations ! testified on numerous issues related to the plan. LILCO, accompanied by its. consultants , testified twice. Following the Legislature's hearings, the Legislature travelled to the TMI area where it met with local officials and others to gain insights into the lessons learned from the accident there. ,
- 5. Following these meetings and deliberations, the County Legislature determined on February 17, 1983, that the actual conditions on Long Island rendered effective emergency preparedness unworkable. Accordingly, the Legislature determined not to adopt or implement an emergency plan for
- - . =-- -- . _ _ . . . - _ _ . . - _ _ .- _. ,-_.-,-
s
-Shoreham. Is did this in pursuit of its governmental police power "to pro-tect the health, safety and welfare" of the County's residents (County Leg.
Res. No. 111-1983), and to assure that it did not mislead its residents into believing they were being protected when in reality they were not.
- 6. Given that the County had resolved not to adopt or implement an offsite emergency plan for Shoreham, LILCO, on May 26, 1983, submitted its l-I 'own Plan. Therein, LILCO established an emergency response team (the Local Ii Emergency Response Organization, or "LER0"), which consists largely of LILCO employees. The Plan sets forth how LERO, primarily in conjunction with certain non-governcental organizations, would respond to a nuclear accident at Shoreham. In instances where local or state governmental func-l tions are normally required, the Plan provides for actions chiefly by.LERO
(- or other non governmental organizations. In no way does the Plan rely on Suffolk County or New York State government personnel or resources to re-I l - spond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham. This Plan, as revised on several occasions by LILCO, is what is now before us for decision. t
- 7. On January 17, 1984, following a 6-month study by a special com-mission appointed by the Governor of New York to examine safety and econcm-ic issues related to Shoreham, Governor Mario Cuomo, representing the State of New York, entered this proceeding in full support of the position taken I
by Suffolk County, Southampton, and the Coalitions. Tr. 2238, et_ seq. Thus, the Governor has joined the other Intervenors in urging this Board to reject the Plar. as deficient under NRC regulations. E l t .
l
- 8. This proceeding presents the NRC with unprecedented facts and issues: LILCO is seeking this Board's approval of an offsite emergency plan while the County government, with jurisdiction over the entire 10-mile emergency planning zone ("EPZ"), has found adequate emergency preparedness to be unachievable and the State government has supported the County's de-termination. The Board has reviewed the Plan pursuant to the Commission's Order of May 11, 1983 (CLI-83-13, 17 NRC 741 (1983)), and has applied the same regulatory standards which would be applied to an offsite emergency plan prepared by a State or local government.2/
2/ 'Unlike a State or local government plan, however, the Plan before us raises significant legal issues of New York law regarding LILCO's legal authority to implement its Plan. Intervenors have argued that LILCO has no such authority and FEMA has recognized that this is a significant issue which must be resolved before a license could be issued, even assuming arguendo that the Plan is otherwise satisfacto-ry. LILCO, of course, takes a different view,, believing it has legal authority to implement the Plan under New York law or, if not, that application of the preemption doctrine would permit it to do so. The question of LILCO's legal authority has been raised in Contentions 1-10. In addition, the legal authority issues are pending for deci-sion in New York State Court in Cuomo, et al. v. Long Island Lighting Company, Consolidated Index No. 84-4615. The County and the Town of Southampton are also plaintiffs in that action. For reasons urged by the State and County in filings before us, we have decided to await the ruling of that court and urge the parties to take every step pos-sible to expedite that court's decision. In the legal authority context, we also note that LILCO has the burden of showing that it can and will implement the Plan. It is not enouah for LILCO to allege (Plan, at 1.4-1) that nothing in State law pre-vents such implementation. Rather, before any license could be autho-rized or issued, LILCO must demonstrate its affirmative legal capabil-ity under New York law to implement the Plan. E'
- 19. Both governmental and " utility" plans must-satisfy the ultimate requirement of-Section 50.47 of the Commission's regulations: namely, in -
the event of a radiological emergency, there must be " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken" to protect the public health'and safety. For the reasons set forth hereinbelow and in our findings'on each of the contentions, and after a review of all of the evi-i dance before us, we find that the Plan does not satisfy that regulatory
- j. standard.3/
f 10. In reaching this conclusion, the Board was cognizant of the stan-I - dard of Section 50.47(a), the 16 planning standards of Section 50.47(b), the requirements of Part 50, Appendix E, the' guidance of NUREG 0654, and
- the allowance for certain compensating measures in Section 50.47(c)(1).
j , Our findings on the contentions document numerous specific deficiencies in the Plan. We wish to point out, however, that these deficiencies collec-l tively have great relevance to the ultimate' question before the Board: l Does the Plan provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective mea-sures can and will be taken?
- 11. We stress this point because the procedure we have followed to l
conduct orderly hearings has required evidence to tie taken on numerous l issues (more than 55 contentions were litigated, many with multiple parts), 3_/ All the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties have been considered. Those not incorporated directly or
- inferentially.in this decision are rejected ~as unsupported in fact or l law or'as unnecessary to the rendering of this decision.
L l U
i some more significant than others, and many of them appearing during the
~
taking of evidence to be remote from the ultimate standard of Section 50.47(a)(1). Now that we have all of the evidence before us, it is the Board's responsibility not.only to rule on the individual contentions and their subparts, but to-assess the-effects that the separate deficiencies have on the central regulatory issue of whether there is reasonable assur-ance that. adequate protective measures can and will be taken. As is dis-
- ' cussed below, our finding-is that there is no such reasonable assurance.
'B. The Nature and Quality of the Evidence of Record l
- 12. The hearings in this proceeding have been long and hotly contest-ed. On al'most each contention, the Intervenors, LILCO, and the Staff or FEMA have presented direct testimony (often by panels of experts), intro-duced exhibits, and conducted cross-examination. More than 85 experts have testified, and more than 15,000 pages of. transcript have been compiled, not including thousands of pages of prefiled testimony. At the outset, there-fore, it is helpful to examine as a whole the body of evidence before us and to draw some general conclusions that are pertinent to the findings presented hereinbelow. .
- 13. On many contentions, strong cases are presented by both Interve-nors and LILCO. Each side has marshalled a large body of facts and expert opinion in supp,sc of its position. In additicn, each side has through cross-examination amplified matters to its own advantage. As a rasult, in
those instances we are presented with comprehensive evidentiary cases which do not lend themselves to blacs and white decisions. They present grey areas in which we have been required to make judgments which favor one side's position to the exclusion of the other's. The principal factors on which we have relied in making such judgments are the following.
- 14. First, we have examined the technical quality of the evidence presented by each side. We have thus studied the merits of the testimony and exhibits and have determined where there is a stronger technical basis for one side's position than the other's. As a whole, we have found that both Intervenors and LILCO have presented evidence of high technical quali-ty.
- 15. Second, we have looked to the qualificat' ions of the experts
- presented and to the foundation which they offered in support of their opinions. Again, we have found that both sides have gencrally presented expert witnesses who are recognized in their fields. However, it is on this point that we must make an observation concerning the nature of the witnesses presented by Intervenors.
- 16. Unlike LILCO's expert witnesses, most of whom were drawn from the consulting community or from LILCO's inhouse utility staff, the Intervenors presented not only such expert consultants, but also a substantial number of expert witnesses whose professional responsibilities embrace the very matters.on which they testified. For example, on contentions related to traffic control, Suffolk County presented police officers whose duties have included actual . traffic control and/or supervision of traffic control dur-ing various ordinary and extraordinary conditions. See Section IX.A.,
infra. Similarly, the State presented traffic control experts who are em-ployed by the New York State Department of Transportation ("NYSDOT") and who have dealt with traffic control problems during actual emergency condi-tions. Id. The point'is that these and other experts (such as public school administrators, governmental health officials, highway maintenance engineers, and school bus inspectors) presented by the County _and State are persons'with actual hands-on experience concerning conditions in Suffolk County. They most favorably compliment the evidence presented by the In-tervenors' outside consultants. .Their expertise and opinions on the con-tentions before us are entitled to the added weight that comes from the practical experiences on which they have formed their expert opinions. Ac-cordingly, in weighing the testimony before us, we have taken into consid- , eration1the value which is derived through years of professional responsi-bility an'd hands-on experience. .
- 17. .This is intended in no way to diminish the merit or significance Jof testimony presented by other experts of the Intervenors and LILCO.
.; .Their testimony was also given full consideration by the Board and it con-stituted an integral part of the' bases on which we formed our judgments.
We.are simply stating the obvious and inevitable: the testimony of local, l County and State officials on matters within the scope of their hands-on experience and professional responsibil.ities is a factor that cannot be overlooked.
.g.
r e . . - ..- _ , . _ _ _ , .m_._.,__.--.-_.~,,..,__m-,- ,_-_..-._.,m,..m . _ . _ _ . . - - _ , . . . - - , -
- 18. Third, we have weighed the evidence with a view toward the pre-ponderance of the evidence standard which controls the legal sufficiency of our findings of fact. We have accordingly looked to the totality of evi-dence presented on each contention and have sought to issue findings that have the requisite factual support. We have borne in mind that by law, Section 2.732 of the Regulations, LILCO must shoulder the burden of proof.
This means that once a prima facie case is established, it is LILCO which must establish a preponderance of the evidence on each of the issues before us. See Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B, and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 360 (1978); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1093 (1983). Where LILCO has not done so, we have not been able to find the requisite. reasonable assurance. i 19. Fourth, we have separated argument, speculation, and conjacture from facts in assessing whether there is the required " reasonable assur-ance" that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. Thus, in repeated instances we have found that the Plan is not supported by facts, but by speculation. For example, as discussed in Section XII, the Plan fails to provide a factual basis on which to conclude that there will be timely early dismissal of school children or evacuation of school children from the EPZ, if those protective actions were recommended. LILCO has pro-vided no plans for such school children that have been endorsed by schools, but instead speculates that an ad hoc response would suffice. Similarly, as discussed in Section X, the Plan does not provide required relocation centers, despite the pendency of this issue since June 1983. LILCO's an-swer is that these centers will be identified in the future. Again, that is speculation; it is argument where fact is required for us to find rea-sonable assurance. And, LILCO asks this Board to find that LILCO has planned adequately for protective actions in the ingestion pathway in Con-necticut (see discussion in Section XIII.D). However, the plan (s) Con-necticut might purportedly use in this effort were never even proffered to the Board. Surely, we cannot find adequate preparedness when we have not even seen the Connecticut plan (s). See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-580, 11 NRC 227 (1980).4/ Additional examples of factual voids in the Plan and the record are dis-cussed in sections dealing with the individual contentions. What bears em-phasis, however, is that where plans are required, the absence of such plans means the requirement is not met. In such instances, the Plan is de-ficient. 4/ The Appeal Board addressed a similar situation in the Zimmer proceed-ing. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. (Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760 (1983). The Licensing Board had found inadequacies in school plans, including, inter alia, some pertaining to communication with schools and bus drivers. On appeal, the utility urged reversal, arguing that there were other means of communication. The Appeal Board refused, stating that "there is no evidence of record that these alternative communication means will actually be included in the (schools'] plans." Id. at 772. LILCO's conjecture and specu-lation are rejected by us for the same reason: we cannot rely on testimony and data unless it is convincingly demonstrated that the information will be incorporated as part of the emergency response.
- 20. Finally, FEMA and, in fewer cases, the NRC Staff presented testi-mony: FEMA in the form of that agency's " findings and determinations,"
which consisted primarily of a FEMA Regional Assistance Committee ("RAC") review of Revision 3 of the Plan, along with testimony to accompany that RAC review; and the NRC Staff largely on the basis of limited review of discrete portions of the Plan. The principal federal government review of the Plan was performed by FEMA. Both FEMA and the NRC Staff generally sup-port the adequacy of the Plan. !ndeed, the Staff's witness went so far as to say that the Plan is the "best" he had ever seen. Tr. 15,226 (Sears). We, of course, give due weight to the testimony of the FEMA and NRC Staf f experts who reviewed the Plan.5/ But, we are bound to maintain a balanced perspective and to recognize that-both FEMA and the Staff have basica11y' performed only a " paper review" of the Plan, which was not particularly helpful to the Board.6/ 5/ Given the highly contested nature of this proceeding on virtually every contention, there is no presumptive effect to be accorded to the FEMA testimony. See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nu-clear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-59, 14 NRC 1211, 1462-65 (1981), aff'd, ALAB-697, 16 NRC 1265 (1982). Further, we find that NRC witness Sears' testimony is due little weight in light of his colleague's testimony that the NRC does not have expertise in offsite emergency planning. Tr. 15,155-56 (Schwartz) . 6/ We apparently are not the first Board which has found the FEMA review process not to have been particularly helpful. See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-68, 16 NRC 741, 747 (1982), rev'd on grounds that Board can decido case even without detailed FEMA review, ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760 (1983); Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-32, 17 NRC 1164, 1166-68 (1983) and LDP-83-60, 18 SRC 672, 678 (1983); Consumers Pcwor Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-83-44, 18 NRC 201, 204 (1984).
- 21. In testimony, the FEMA and NRC witnesses admitted on repeated oc-casions that they had not taken steps to verify the content of what LILCO had written into its Plan. E.g., Tr. 4722 (Sears); 12,438, 12,240-41, 12,454, 12,776, 12,807-08 (Kowleski); 12,521 (McIntire); 12,803 (Baldwin).
Nor had they sought to determine if the measures proposed by LILCO were in fact likely to work. Tr. 12,605-07 (Kowieski); 12,775 (McIntire). Indeed, despite FEMA's mandate to work cooperatively with State and local govern-ments, FEMA never contacted officials of the State or County to gain in-sight into the technical determinations made by governmental officials who have relevant knowledge of logistic and operational requirements during a Shoreham emergency. See, e.g., Tr. 12,525 (Kowieski, McIntire); 12,741 (McIntire).7/ This point bears emphasis, because FEMA and the Staff have approved certain features of the Plan over the factual representations of County and State professionals who have testified that such measures simply would not work. For example, the communications experts who testified for the County were Suffolk County Pclice Department ("SCPD") personnel whose professional responsibilities are emergency communications and who have ex-tensive actual experience with communications logistics on Long Island. Neither FEMA nor the Staff even sought to meet with these communications 7/ There was reference to 1 or 2 meetings in 1982 between FEMA, Suffolk County, LILCO, the NRC and New York regarding the general subject of emergency planning, and 1 meeting in January 1984 to hear the County's general views. There is no evidence, however, that FEMA ever has sought the technical views of County and/or State experts (such as the County police traffic and communications experts). See Tr. 12,289, 13,022-23 (Kowieski). -
experts during the FEMA and Staff review process. Nevertheless, FEMA and the Staff decided that LILCO's communications plan generally was adequate. C. LILCO's Proposed " Basic Principles of Emergency Planning"
- 22. LILCO has proposed that we find "certain principles of emergency planning that arise out of the NRC regulations and case law." LILCO's Pro-posed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Offsite Emergency Plan-ning, October 5, 1984, at 5 ("LILCO Brief"). Ordinarily, we would not address such proposed " basic principles," given that it is our decision on the contentions before us that is the central. focus of the proceeding.
Nevertheless, here it is necessary that we address LILCO's proposed basic principles for two reasons. First, the proponderance of LILCO's proposed
" principles" reveals a slant toward LILCO's self-interest that is not jus-tified by the language and consistent application of the NRC's regulations.
Second, LILCO's unobjective view of the regulations pervados LILCO's Brief, so much so that LILCO often fails to recognize the significance that must be attached to testimony presented by County and State professionals who have testified on matters within the area of their hands-on experience and ; expertise. Indeed, reading LILCO's Brief pruvides an inappecpriately glib view of the evidence -- a view which suggests that the 15,000 pages of transcript before us and the " basic principles" of law are to be road with enthusiasm for LILCO's interests. The fact is that the evidence before us is not black and white, and the applicable " principles" of law are not in-trinsically in LILCO's favor. The following addresses the more significant of LILCO's proposed " basic principles."
- 23. LILCO has proposed we find that there is evidence in the record more detailed than required by NRC regulations and that this fact "does not necessarily mean it is material to the issue this Board must decide."
LILCO Brief, at 5, citing Louisiana power & Light Co., ALAB-732, supra, 17 NRC at 1107. There are several answers to this " basic principle." First, it is indeed a novel proposition for LILCO to suggest that the relevance and materiality of evidence is now to be judged after the close of the record, rather than upon admission of contentions or introduction of the evidence into the record. Clearly LILCO is off base. Whatever LILCO now considers irrelevant is evidence which LILCO invited by submitting detailed OPIPs and training paraphornalia, for examplo, or evidence to which LILCO should have objected at the right time. As for any evidence which was l'
- admitted over its objection, LILCO's recourse is by way of appeal.3/
I
- 24. Second, with respect to the content of tho evidence before us, there is no " basic principle" as to what lovel of evidentiary detail is ap-propriate or, indeed, excessivo. This Board, like every other, must rest its findings on probative evidence, be that general or detailed, on any given issue. Indeed, in the record before us, it is of ten the detail which puts flash on the conclusions of the exports. On a variety of issues, our
!/ This Boei i to having felt at times trustrated over the poco of this procae 'e extended examination conducted on some issues.
However, w. 'tod to considor the avidence which is beforo us
,nt, considor that the vast majority of the ovi-and, with sc. ..a. i dance was necessary to permit us to address the difficult issuos which have boon presented. !
14 - I
findings are based on the foundation of expert opinion. Details and exam-pies have repeatedly given us the capability to make choices among the con-flicting expert conclusions and to test or corroborate the soundness of such opiniins.9/
- 25. LILCO also has stated that we are "not required to find that the present state of emergency preparedness is fully adequatoi" only that thero ,
exist no " insurmountable barriers" to the successful completion of plan-ning. LILCO Brief, at 6. LILCO's statement stops short of accurately characterizing the Board's responsibility, and glosses over the seriousness of our task. We adhere to the NRC decisions which emphasize that emergency planning findings are "prodictivo" in nature.10/ Given thtt, we find the r l 9/ The Waterford decision does not stand for the proposition that a Board i should not be concerned about details concerning the adequacy of emer-sorted pr, gency ,eparedness, which appears basic principle." to be Rather, the the implication Board of LILCO's is to considor as-whatever data are necessary in order to make findings on the Section 50.47(b)(1) planning standards. 17 NRC at 1107. Thus, while the Watarford Appeal Board cautioned not to get bogged down in details which are not important to the reasonabla assurance findings, it is just as clear that when a Board noods to got into details in order to make the reasonable assurance findings, it is nxpected to do so. The Board in the Limerick proceeding so hold. Philadolphia Elac. Co. (Limerick Generating Station Unita 1 and 2), LBP-84-31, ___ NRC ___, ellp op, at til (Aug. 29, 1984). Saa also, consumers Pownr Co. (Big , Rock Point Plant), LDP-82 60, 16 NRC 540 (1982) and Duka powne Co. ' (Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2), LBP 84 37, ___ NRC ___, slip ont, at 9 22 (Sept. 18, 1984) (Boards addressed dntailed changes , needed in emergency information pamphlet). 10/ Saa fouts tana Power & Light Co. , ALAD-732, supra,17 NRC at 1104 We note, however, that thn recant D.C. Circuit opinion regarding the nood to provido an opportunity for a hoaring on tho adoqi.acy of amorgency planning axercians enrtainly placos a limit on thn degran to which (Footnoto cont'd next page) 15 -
evidence here demonstrates that there are clearly barriers to effective emergency prepardness. Indeed, it is because of such barriers that this proceeding was instituted. Our duty, therefore, is not a simple one of declaring that there are no such " insurmountable barriers," but one of de-termining whether the barriers which do exist can and will be overcome. It
~is only if we can find a preponderance of the evidence in the record to support the removal of such barriers that we could make a predictive find-ing~of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken.11/
I
- 26. LILCO has stated that the Intervenors have suggested that the standard of. adequacy of an emergency plan is that it providd a " guarantee" or " perfect assurance" of safety. LILCO Brief, at 6-7. This.is not an k
l (Footnote cont'd from previous page) issues of potential materiality can be deferred under the predictive finding rubric. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. United States . Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Fur-ther, the Appeal Board has emphasized that pr'dictive e findings cannot
.be used to substitute for a real demonstration that the reasonable as-
, surance finding:s can be made. Thus, it stated that any plan, nc, mat- [ ter how skeletal, would not necessarily suffice. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., ALAB-727, supra, 17 NRC at 770. 11/ For example, the evidence shows that therearepresentlynbplansen-dorsed by schools for. dealing with the dismissal of school children at the time of a radiological emergency; and there is little evidence of any plan being developed or any preplanning being. conducted by schoolti for such a contingency. See Section XII, infra. Pa such an instance, the Plan is inadequate, because we plainly cannot predict adequate ' preparedness when the entities charged with dismissal of school chil-dren'are not preparing at all. There is thus no' evidence in support of LILCO's view, let alone the required preponderahce of evidence. The same' applies to other voids in the Plan,'as are discussed below. 1 a ir 16 -
accurate characterization of the Intervenors' position, but a strawman cre-ated by LILCO. The applicable standard clearly is that there be reasonable assurance that adequate protective actions can and will be taken, and In-tervenors' contentions and the County and State evidence have been directed at this' standard. The Intervenors have sought no " guarantee," but they de-manded, as was their right, that the NRC's regulations be interpreted in accordance with their intended purpose -- the protection of the public. We stress that the elements of the reasonable assurance standard must be taken
. at face value and in the light of the Commission's stated objectives when promulgating Section 50.47. Thus, it is not sufficient for LILCO merely to put.words on paper stating that certain protective actions would be recom-
- mended or taken; we must go beyond the words and find, with reasonable as-surance, that the actions in fact can and will be taken and that, if taken, they will be adequate.
- 27. LILCO also has proposed we find.that "NRC regulations impose no-minimum evacuation time" and that the requirement is only that LILCO's time estimates be " reliable" and " attention be paid to'the efficiency of evacua-tion." LILCO Brief, at 7-8. LILCO's assertions gloss over the essence of NRC requirements and the evidentiary case presented by the County and State. It is true that the regulations impose no quantitative maximum evacuation time and that time ' estimates must be reliable. They also must
; be realistic. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-2,19 NRC 36, 263 (1984).
Given this, the County and State:have presented evidence that, considering the constraints of h
l l 1 geography and other actual conditions in Suffolk County, LILCO's time esti-mates-are unrealistic and evacuation is not an adequate protective measure. This is so particularly because traffic would become so ensnarled that it would be immobilized and people would thus be exposed to the very radiation they were attempting to flee. This evidence, coupled with the thorough and detailed analyses of LILCO's evacuation time estimates by the County's and State's experts, precludes us from finding that LILCO's time estimates are reliable.
- 28. Indeed, to the distinct contrary, the evidence before us demon-strates that LILCO's tir.e estimates are heavily laden with uncertainties; are understated and employ overly optimistic assumptions; are indifferent to virtually certain practical obstacles which hinder, if not block, timely evacuation; are insensitive to meaningful and adverse human behavioral im-pacts; and, significantly, are predicated upon a result-oriented methodolo-gy and approach which minimizes the obstacles to evacuation but fosters LILCO's licensing objectives.
- 29. Further, LILCO has' stated, "There has never been a case where an emergency plan was rejected because the evacuation times were too high, and there are power plants that have evacuation times comparable to or greater.
~
than those.for Shoreham." LILCO Brief, at 8. Though unstated, we presume that LILCO is implying that Shoreham should not be the case in which to set a new precedent. LILCO's statement, however, has no bearing on the factual issues before us. ~That there has been no rejection to date of an emergency l .:
plan on grounds of unacceptedly high evacuation times is immaterial. Each case must be judged on its own merits. Here, we are constrained to consid-er only the evidence before us.
- 30. Moreover, LILCO's claim that other plants have evacuation times as great or greater than Shoreham's is invalid for several reasons. First, it assumes the correctness and reliability of LILCO's own time estimates.
Second, it seeks to make a comparison with other plants; the issue here, however, is only Shoreham. Third, it fails to take cognizance of the ap-plicable law. The following addresses each of these points.
- 31. First, as we discuss in Section IX.A, infra, the evidence does not support a finding that LILCO's time estimates are correct and reliable.
Indeed, the record discloses a broad range of data and competing testimony on evacuation times. The overriding conclusion which emerges is that LILCO's time estimates are too short because they are result-oriented and also fail to account for the factors identified by the County and State. In short, given the evidence before us, there is no basis on which we could find a preponderance of the evidence in support of LILCO's time estimates. Indeed, it is our finding that the time estimates of the County and State 'are more reliable than LILCO's.
- 32. Second, our findings cannot be made based on comparisons of LILCO's time estimates with those presented in any other proceeding. We have no facts upon which to base such a comparison -- no detailed evidence was presented here concerning the geography, road networks, capacities, etc. for any other plants. The County and State have not framed a conten-tion based on such a comparison; such a comparative assessment has not been the theory of the evidence in this proceeding; and we have not taken evi-dence on such a comparison. The evidence before us concerns only Shoreham, and it is on this that we base our findings.
- 33. . Third, the evidence presented by the County and State has pro-vided evacuation time estimates that clearly rule out evacuation as an ade-quate protective measure at Shoreham. As discussed infra, evacuation would provide no dose savings for persons whose health and safety were at risk.
LILCO's citation of Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163, 1184 (1982), for the proposition that "there is no requirement that evacuation be possible under all circumstances" is misplaced. San Onofre gives meaning to the require-ment of Section 50.47 that " adequate protective measures can and will be taken." The key is that there~be protection for the public. In a situa-tion where evacuation is not adequate, an alternative' protect'ive measure must be adequate.
~
At Shoreham, there is only 1 alternative protective mea-sure available: ~ sheltering. As discussed infra, however, sheltering is not adequate because sheltering will not provide significant dose savings from the anticipated radioactive plume. . 34. LILCO has next proposed we find that "the vagaries of human be - havior and the possibility of such things as panic, disobedience, and con-
. fusion do not make the LILCO Plan. inadequate." LILCO Brief, at 10. We cannot find as LILCO proposes for 2 reasons. First, LILCO mischaracterizes the issue before us. Second, the behavior of the persons who must respond to give effect to protective actions is a critical factor in determining whether those actions "can and will" be taken. The question before us, therefore, is to determine how this behavior will be influenced.
- 35. Contrary to LILCO's characterizations, the County and State do not contend that the " vagaries" of human behavior are here at issue. It is not their position that happenstance would cripple implementation of the Plan. Rather, the County and State rely on an extensive array of Long Island-specific and Shoreham-specific facts, studies, analyses, surveys, and expert opinion to support their position. In fact, this evidence ap-pears to be the most voluminous and comprehensive presentation of site-specific behavioral data ever presented by any party in an NRC licensing proceeding.
- 36. Moreover, the expert witnesses presented by the County and State included government officials whose daily professional responsibilities and careers in law enforcement and other governmental activities involve deal-ing with and observing people's behavior during stressful conditions.
Thus, we are not being asked by the County and State to speculate about
. human behavior, but to accept analyses, testimony, and other probative evi-dence which is the workproduct of well-situated professionals who have ex-tensive hands-on, practical experience and expertise. We therefore find -- ~ contrary to LILCO's assertion that "[a]rguably these sorts of contentions v -
l l 1 i ought not to be heard at all" (LILCO Brief, at 9) -- that (1) the County's l and State's presentation of likely human behavior during implementation of protective measures in a Shoreham emergency is germane to our findings on
.whether LILCO's proposed protective measures can and will be taken, and (2) the Intervenors' evidence demonstrates that we cannot conclude that such measures will be taken.
37~. In so finding, we dismiss LILCO's suggestion that the issues raised by the County and State concerning human behavior are " generic" and thus presumably not appropriate for decision here. Id. While the topic of these issues could be and, indeed, has been raised in proceedings involving other nuclear plants,12/ the County and State have not rested their case on generic data or generallzed evidence. They have instead presented site-specific surveys, analyses, . studies, and testimony of County and State officials and other qualified experts. This body of evidence has been de-rived largely from information specific to Long Island and Shoreham. At all points during this proceeding, LILCO has had the opportunity to con-front this evidence and to present its own case, which has itself been vo-luminous, in response to the issues raised by Intervenors. On examining the record, however, we find that LILCO's case'does not overcome the evi-dence presented by iue Intervenors. Indeed, in no way could it be found that LILCO has sustained, or even' approached, its evidentiary burden of 12/ E.g.,-Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Units 2 and 3), LBP-83-68, 18 NRC 811, 955, et seq. (1983); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-59, 14 NRC 1211, 1569 (1981).
b f [I proof.1_3/
- 38. ~ We come now to a controversial aspect of this proceeding:
LILCO's contention that the State and County would resp ~ond to a ra-diological emergency despite the actions of the State and County in opposing the licensing of Shoreham. LILCO c' aims that we should accept that there is " substantial = evidence . . . that in a real emergency these r governments would respond and try to protect the public." LILCO Brief, at
- 10. However, the " substantial evidence" LILCO cites is but a sentence taken out of context from a press release in which Governor Cuomo announced
- the State's opposition to Shoreham.M/ Therefore, if we were to find as
- LILCO requests, this Board would be saying that a 1-sentence excerpt from a i '
press release, not a State plan, is adequate under NRC regulations to docu-ment state emergency preparedness for Shoreham. Clearly, we cannot do that, p I 39. Indeed, the Board is unable to find that the State and County
- governments would respond as LILCO claims. First, the State and County-have not said they will. Those governments speak for themselves, and this 13/. We note that the Zimmer Appeal Board, when confronted with potential role conflict of bus drivers, termed the issuc a " serious question" and thus hardly viewed it as a generic issue which the Board might ig-nore. -See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., ALAB-727, supra, 17 NRC at 772.
M/ The full text of the press release is part of the record, attached to the Oppasition of Suffolk County and New York to LILC0 Motion for Sum-mary Disposition of Contentions 1-10 (Legal Authority), dated September 24, 1984. L'_
Board cannot put words into the mouths of State and local government offi-
' cials who have themselves chosen not to speak these words. Second, it goes without further elaboration that LILCO does not speak for the State and County. Third, LILCO's claim that Governor Cuomo's press release satisfies the NRC's requirement that there be a " state plan" is inherently unsound.
A press release is not a plan, let alone the compendium of site-specific,
. systematic response measures contemplated by NRC regulations. Fourth, a press release clearly does not set aside the laws of Suffolk County, which in Resolutions 456-1982 and 111-1983 specifically resolve that County re-sources and personnel would not be used to respond for reasons articulated in those Resolutions.
- 40. In light of the foregoing, it would not be productive to address LILCO's assertion that the issue here is not whether the State and County
- would respond, but how they would respond. See LILCO Brief, at 11. To reach LILCO's question would merely beg the genuine issue. It would re-quire us to give unrealistic and disproportionate authority to a press re-lease, to glorify that press release as a legitimate substitute for a State plan for Shoreham which deliberately does not exist, and to ignore the laws of Suffolk County, Clearly, we cannot do that.15/
15 / Further, LILCO's effort to insert so-called State or County response into this proceeding at this late date violates the law of the case. In June 1983, LILCO asked us to assess the adequacy of alternate ver-sions of the Plan, assuming the County and State would participate.
.We declined, stating that "(u]ntil such time as LILCO can establish that one or more of the governmental entities designated in its emer-(Footnote cont'd next page) 24 - .I
r -
-41. Next, we~ address the legal standard which LILCO must satisfy in
. order to receive NRC approval of its Plan. LILCO urges that we apply a lower _ standard of public safety to its' Plan than would be applied to a gov-ernment's. plan. Thus, LILCO proposes we find that the Plan "is not re-quired to give as much assurance as the ordinary governmental plan." LILCO Brief, at 12. LILCO cites Section 50.47(c) as support for its proposal on grounds that its Plan is but an " interim compensating action." Id. We disagree with LILCO's proposed legal standard and with LILCO's character-ization of its Plan.
- 42. -First, the legal standard which applies to offsite plans is set forth-inSection50.47(a)(1): there must.be " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken." This is the NRC's
- only standard for emergency plans. There is no lower standard for " utility plans," as' opposed to governmental plans.16/ Similarly, the NRC (Footnote cont'd'from previous page) gency plan consent to participate in such a venture," the Intervenors did not need.to address those alternate schemes. ASLB Order Limiting Scope of Submissions, June 10, 1983, at 3. Nothing has changed; the State and County clearly have not consented to participate with LILCO.
.Thus, we' agree with Intervenors that LILCO's argument must be disre-garded. -16/- . Where interim compensatory measures are to be implemented, they still must satisfy the threshold of being adequate, even if the level of protection ~ offered by one plan may be less than that provided by an-other. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Units 1 and 2),
CLI-83-16, 17 NRC 1006, 1010 (1983); see Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), Special Prehearing Conf. ' Order, slip op. at 5 (April 20, 1984) (Section 50.47(a)(1) overarches all of the other emergency planning regulations and guidance).
-Authorization Act, pursuant to which we are considering the Plan, provides that the NRC may issue an operating license supported by a utility's own offsite' plan only if'we can find the existence of such " reasonable assur-ance." To subscribe to LILCO's proposal would be_to say that the level of protection to which the public is entitled varies depending upon who is
-doing the planning. There is no basis for such a standard.
t
- 43. Second, the Plan is not an " interim coupensating measure" under Section 50.47(c). Though LILCO labels its Plan a " Transition" Plan, the
, fact is that the Plan is before us in support of LILCO's application for a t j full-term operating license, and the measures it proposes to implement are t not " interim" in the sense explained in Indian Point.
~
- See Commonwealth Edison Co., CLI'83-16, supra, 17 NRC at 1010.
Rather, this is the Plan i which_LILCO proposes to use in the-event of a radiological emergency for the forseeable future,.and this_ Plan must provide the reasonable assurance required by Section 50.47(a). By labeling its Plan " transitional" or "in-terim," LILCO cannot reduce the level of protection which must be afforded to the public.
- 44. Finally, as noted above, LILCO's use of the label " Transition Plan" is itself a misnomer. There is no evidence that LILCO's Plan would be in effect temporarily or during the pendency of the preparation of a
. governmental plan. Compare Consolidated Edison Co., CLI-83-16, supra, 17 NRC-1006 (measures to compensate for lack of Rockland County plan, which
-included State role, were interim since Commission found that progress was 1
' being made toward preparation of a Rockland County plan). Indeed, the evi-dance shows that LILCO's Plan-is an end unto itself. It must be judged on its own merits against the NRC's emergency preparedness standards.
'D. LILCO's Characterization of "the Governmental Intervenors' Strategy" in th_is Case
- 45. LILCO has proposed we find that "no evidence has been presented to show that Long Island is ' uniquely' unsuited for emergency planning" and
- that "there is evidence that Long Island is an especially favorable loca-
. tion for an emergency plan in some respects . . . ." LILCO Brief, at 12-13. LILCO's assertions are-immaterial to the task at hand. The ques-tion before us-is not the general one whether Long Island is uniquely
- suited or' unsuited for emergency-planning, but whether the Plan'is ade-quate.' Where'the Plan fails to meet NRC regulations, we have.found it to
~
be inadequate.
- 46. Nevertheless, we cannot-help but address the casual characteriza-tions with which LILCO passes off the obstacles that LILCO itself has con-
; fronted in. preparing its Plan. We take notice of'the complexity of this
- proceeding, of the voluminous record and, indeed, of the repeated revisions and changes LILCO has made in its Plan over the past year. No one, and es -
C 'pecially not LILCO, should at this tima be downplaying the difficulties of radiological emergency preparedness on Long Island. The geography of Long Island and other local conditions there have had an airing unlike that in anyLother proceeding. As is evidenced by our findings of deficiencies in I the Plan, there are barriers to adequate radiological emergency prepared-ness on Long Island that must be taken seriously.
- 47. Moreover, LILCO has mischaracterized the import of Intervenors' position concerning the significance of a major release of radiation. The County and State have presented a comprehensive and sophisticated body of evidence based on studies, analyses, surveys, and expert testimony of gov-ernmental officials and well qualified consultants. The evidence demon-strates the responses to be expected of the population in Suffolk County if there were a radiological emergency. LILCO claims that "the uniqueness of radiological accidents has been rejected by other boards." Id., at 13.
Even if that were the case, it would be immaterial here. This proceeding has its own evidentiary record, its own parties, its own contentions, and its own set of arguments. LILCO would have us_ sweep away an essential fac-tual issue because it claims "other boards" have " rejected" it. In short, no board has rejected the factual issues on the record before us. See also discussion, Section I.A.2, infra.
- 48. LILCO has also proposed we find that "the County's position is a challenge to the NRC regulations, since it challenges the basic premise of the regulations that planning for radiological emergencies is feasible and useful." Id. We can make no such finding. The " basic premise" of the .
NRC's regulations is that the public must be protected. LILCO's proposed finding is another example of a result-oriented slant which pervades LILCO's Brief. The regulations do not -- indeed, they could not -- declare by regulatory fiat that adequate emergency preparedness is " feasible" ev-erywhere. The regulations, rather, require that emergency preparedness be adequate. Whether it is adequate is a question of fact in each case.
- 49. LILCO claims that "the County, and even more the State, chose not to present as witnesses people in their employ who might have shed light on the issues." LILCO Brief, at 14. Based on this claim, LILCO asks us to draw inferences " contrary to the State's and County's positions." Id. We cannot grant LILCO's request. First, contrary to LI~CO's assertion, the County and State in fact presented a large number of witnesses in their em-ploy (15 County employees, 7 State employees, plus many other witnesses),
as documented hereafter in these findings.12/ We cannot find that Interve-nors withheld any important experts or testimony or that any adverse infer-ences should be drawn. Second, LILCO deposed many County and State employees. LILCO could have subpoenaed them as witnesses at trial if it thought that was material to its case, just.as LILCO subpoenacd officials of 2 State institutions after those officials stated that they never gave LILCO permission to designate their facilities as relocation centers under the Plan. It is unseemly for LILCO, now apparently wishing that it had offered additional evidence, to attempt to blame the Intervenors. Third, it is ill-suited for LILCO to criticize the composition of the County's and 12/ Considering that Governor Cuomo entered his appearance in January 1984, and considering that we conditioned his participation on the premise that he take the proceedings as he found them, we are impressed that the State was able to present 7 State officials as wit-nesses, some of whom testified on more than one occasion. i I i S' tate's case. The County and State were entitled to address the conten-tions at issue in the manner and with witnesses they considered most effec-tive, just as was LILCO. LILCO cannot now seek to build its case on infer- ' ences; it must rely on the evidence alone.
- 50. Finally, LILCO writes in its Brief of "the County's commitment to prevent the operaticn of Shoreham, no matter what the facts." LILCO Brief, at 14. We wish to address that comment, as well as other comments of LILCO of similar kind that are inapproprite and immaterial. The parties to this proceeding have done thorough jobs in presenting their positions. LILCO's position clearly is to license Shoreham. We do not criticize LILCO for this, and we accept :he company's strategy and tactics as long as the rules are followed. SimiLirly, Suffolk County, the State, and the other Interve-nors have their own positions in opposition to the licensing of Shoreham.
We accept their presuntations on the same terms as we-do LIICO's. We have approached our job on the basis of the evidence of record. CONTENTIONS I. HUMAN BEHAVIOR (CONTENTIONS 23.A, B, C, 25) A. Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon (Contentions 23.A, B, C)
- 1. I'ntroduction
- 51. The major issues in Contention 23 are whether a Shoreham emergen-cy will result in an evacuation shadow and, whether in light of such a phe-nomenon, the Plan can and will be implemented so as to provide adequate protection.to the public. Subparts A and B-allege that the evacuation l
shadow renders sheltering under the Plan an inadequate protective action; Subpart C alleges that the Plan's proposed division of the EPZ into 19 subzones will not work.
- 52. For reasons discussed below, the Board finds for Intervenors on Contentions 23.A, B, and C. The evidence is convincing that in a Shoreham emergency, thousands of families will evacuate voluntarily, even if they are not advised to do so. This affects substantially the adequacy of LILCO's proposed protactive actions. First, if sheltering is recommended, this protective action will not be capable of implementation; rather, hun-dreds of thousands of persons will evacuate and thus be exposed to the ra-dioactive plume that the sheltering recommendation sought to avoid. Sec-ond, LILCO's proposed evacuation in certain circumstances of only particular subzones of the EPZ will not work; rather, the shadow phenomenon will result in all areas of the EPZ and beyond being crowded with traffic, thus affecting evacuation times. See findings on Contention 23.D, in Sec-tion IX.A, infra, for further effects of the evacuation shadow phenomenon on LILCO's evacuation time estimates.
- 2. The Nature of the Shadow Phenomenon In Radiological Emergencies
- 53. The term " evacuation shadow phenomenon" refers to the propensity for people to leave an area threatened or perceived to be threatened by a hazard, although they are not ordered or advised to do so. For instance, in a radiological emergency, some or all of the residents in the EPZ may be
advised to evacuate; however, other people, inside or outside the EPZ who
'are'not advised to evacuate, may also perceive themselves to be in danger and thus " voluntarily" take protective action (s) such as evacuation.
Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 2-3, 5. The evacuation shadow phe- , nomenon is not panic or hysteria; it is rational, reasoned behavior during an emergency consistent with individuals' perceptions of the risks in-volved. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 9-10, 12-19.
- 54. Although studies of human response to non-radiological disasters have found a tendency for some people to overreact in crisis situations (id. , at 18), the County's witnesses emphasized that where the disaster agent.is radiation, the voluntary evacuation response is likely to be much greater. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 5-6, 8. This is the case largely because of the way in which the public perceives the disaster agent. Id., at 23-24.18/ Because radiation is imperceptible to the sens-es, one cannot determine its presence, and fear of radiation is increased by'the uncertainty associated with the consequences of exposure.19/
18 LILCO asserts that other licensing boards have rejected the
~"u/ niqueness of radiological emergencies." LILCO Brief, at 13, citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 ,
and 2), LBP-82-70, 16 NRC 756, 823, 825 and Metropolitan Edison Co., LBP-81-59, supra, 14 NRC at 1563. LILCO misses the point, however, which was made very clearly in the TMI decision. The question is not
..whether a radiological emergency is unique, but rather whether it is gerceived to be unique. 14 NRC at 1563. Those other cases did not address this point, with the TMI-Board stating that the perception issue had not been presented, but that it could not be lightly dis-missed. Id.
19/ Personalization, the process of determining whether one may be affect-ed by a hazard, can lead to both underresponse and overresponse in (Footnote cont'd next page) Studies have shown that people perceive nuclear power to be far more frightening than almost any other disaster agent; only terrorism and war are more dreaded. Tr. 1740-50, 1990-91 (Sorensen); SC Ex. 2. Indeed, LILCO's own study conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly and White ("YSW") con-cluded that many people on Lcng Island are very fearful of nuclear power plants. Tr. 1946-50 (Richardson); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, Att. 13 at 23.
- 55. LILCO's witnesses acknowledged the distinct characteristics and the public's perception of radiation as a disaster agen'. However, they argued that behavior in other emergencies (e.g., floods, hurricanes, earth-quakes) can be used to predict how people will behave during a radiological emergency because the factors that determine behavior in any emergency aro l
the same. In other emergencies inappropriate responses have been minimized by good emergency information. They testified that overresponse to a ra-diological emergency which could result from the unique nature of radiation would similarly be minimized by good emergency information. Cordaro et al.,'ff. Tr. 1470, at 112-14; Tr. 1506 (Mileti). The County's witnesses disagreed. Natural disasters are events which most people understand and (Footnote cont'd from previous page) emergencies. The ability or inability to detect a disaster agent with one's own senses can affect personalization. Tr. 1598-99 (Dynes); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 24-25. Studies have also shown that a large proportion of the public relates the fear of nuclear power to the use of nuclear weapons. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at ; 23-25 and Fig. 6; Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 26-27.
have grown up with; radiological emergencies, however, are very different because virtually nobody has ever experienced one. Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 26-27. The Board agrees with the County's witnesses: because natural di-sasters are so different from radiological emergencies, it cannot be as-sumed that people will react in the s ame way to these events or that ef-forts which limit overreaction in natural disasters will necessarily be successful in a radiological emergency. The actual behavior at TMI and the survey data developed on Long Island document the differences between natu-ral disasters and nuclear emergencies and the high potential for voluntary evacuation in nuclear accidents. Id.
- 3. The TMI Experience and Surveys Conducted On Long Island (a) The TMI Evacuation Shadow
- 56. Professors Zeigler and Johnson conducted a survey of TMI area residents one month after the 1979 TMI accident. They found a high degree of overreaction to the accident. Specifically, during the emergency, state officials advised all pregnant women and preschool age children within a 5-mile radius of the plant to evacuate. If only those people had done so, about 2500 people would have evacuated; instead, 144,000,.or 39% of the population in that area, actually left. Nine percent of the population in 3 communities beyond 15 miles of the plant also evacuated. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 7-10 and Figs. 1, 2; Tr. 1531-33 (Sorensen);
2851-53 (J. Johnson). The survey also found that the TMI evacuees tended to travel much further from the hazard than had been observed in previous
7-studies-of evacuation behavior; the median distance traveled by evacuees was 85 miles. Zeigler and. Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 9-10 and Figs. 1, 2; Tr. 2852-53 (J. Johnson).
- 57. The Zeigler/ Johnson TMI studies were corroborated by at-least 2 other studies conducted after TMI,2_0/ and 2 noted experts in disaster re-search, Lindell and Perry, have recently acknowledged the existence of the evacuation sha'dow phenomenon at TMI and the necessity of taking the phenom-enon into account in planning for a radiological emergency. Ziegler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 9-10; Tr. 2887-88 (Zeigler); 2852-53 (J.
-Johnson). FEMA's witness also testified that experience has shown that-
~
overresponse will occur in most cases. McIntire, ff. Tr. 2086, at 3. The implication of these survey findings is that to be capable of imple-
~
mentation, a radiological emergency response plan must anticipate and be able to cope with the movement of much larger numbers of people than might otherwise be recommended or expected. (b) Surveys on Long Island
- 58. Suffolk County undertook analyses to determine whether the TMI
-evacuation experience might occur on Long Island. The County conducted a 2_0/ K. Barnes, J. Brosius, S. Cutter, and J.K. Mitchell, Responses of Impacted Population to the Three Mile Island and Nuclear Reactor Accident. Discussion Paper No. 13. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University, October 1979. C.B. Flynn, Three Mile Island Telephone Survey. Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NUREG/CR-1093). Tempe, AZ: Mountain West Research, October 1979.
survey of 2600 households on Long Island 21/ to determine what people rear Shoreham intended to do, and whether the shadow phenomenon was likely to occur in the event of an accident at Shoreham. The survey results indicate that in a Shoreham accident, many people would flee even though they had not been instructed to evacuate. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at , 10-11; Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 4; Tr. 2816-17 (Cole).
- 59. The County survey presented 3 scenarios of increasing severity to
-each person interviewed. Each scenario contained the type of information that might be conveyed if there actually were an accident at Shoreham. The first scenario stated:
Assuming that the Shoreham nuclear plant is licensed and begins to operate, we are interested in knowing what you would do if there was an accident at the plant. Suppose that you and your family were at home, and there was an accident at Shoreham. All people who live within five miles of the plant were advised to y stay indoors. Do you think that you and the other mem-bers of your family would:
- 1. go about your normal business, or
- 2. stay inside your home, or
- 3. leave your home and go someplace else.
21/ Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 12-13; Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 6; Tr. 2799-2801, 2817 (Cole). This was a very large sample with a small sampling error of plus or minus 3 points. Cole, ff. Tr. 2792,
.at 9; Tr.'2838-39 (Cole). The methods used for developing, pretesting, sampling, and administering the survey are described in the County's testimony. See Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 7-10 and Att. 2; Zeigler and Jahrson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 13-15; Tr. 2805-06 (Cole).
[The.secondandthirdscenarioshadthesameintroductory"supposeyouwere at home" language and the same possible responses, but stated respectively: All pregnant women and pre-school children living with-in five miles of the plant were advised to evacuate and everyone living between six and ten miles from the
- plant were advised to remain indoors. (Scenario 2).22/
Everyone living within ten miles of the plant was advised to evacuate. (Scenario 3). Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 15-16.
- 60. For Scenario 1, in which people within 5 miles were advised to stay indoors, the County survey showed that 217,000 families, or 25% of the total population of Long Island (including both Suffolk and Nassau
' Counties) stated they would evacuate.23/ Under Scenario 2, in which only 22/; .This scenario is similar to the official advisory issued at TMI. If Dr. Cole did the' County survey again, he would include information about what people other than preschoolers or pregnant women within 5 miles were advised to do and what people outside the 10-mile zone should do. However, he stated that the failure to include this infor-mation in the survey did not bias'the results toward a larger evacua-tion response because Dr. Cole provided that additional information in a survey he conducted for Newsday, which asked an almost identical
. question. Even more people said they would evacuate in response to the Newsday survey. Tr. 2813-22 (Cole).
23/. All numbers in these findings are approximate. The methods used in tabulating the survey results were described in Dr. Cole's testimony. Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 10-11. Among the 10,000 families living within 5 miles of Shoreham, 40% said that they would leave their homes to go someplace else. Forty percent (8000 families) of those living within 6-10 miles would evacuate. Twenty-two percent (13,000 families) in eastern Suffolk County (outside the EPZ) would evacuate; 34% (110,000 families) would evacuate from western Suffolk County (outside the EPZ). Eighteen percent (80,000 families) from Nassau County would
~ evacuate. Id., at 12 and Att. 2, at 4-5.
pregnant women and preschool children within 5 miles of the plant were advisedJto evacuate, an estimated 290,000 households (34% of the Long Is-land population) would evacuate.24/ For Scenario 3, in which persons with-in~10 miles of the plant were advised to evacuate, 432,000 families (50% of the Long Island population) would evacuate.25/ The proportion of respon-dents who would evacuate diminished significantly only beyond 25 miles from the plant, but included people who live as far as 50 miles from the plant. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 17-18 and Figs. 3, 4.
- 61. Thus,_the survey results indicate that in a Shoreham accident,
, there would be a significant voluntary evacuation outside the area for which a pr.otective action was recommended, and that if sheltering were rec-j ommended, many people would evacuate. Id., at 18-19; Cole, ff. Tr. 2792,
'at 3,'12. The precise amount of voluntary evacuation would vary oepending upon the perceived severity of the event. Nevertheless, in all cases a significant amount of voluntary evacuation is likely. Id., at 14. More-over, within 10 miles of the respective plants, the intended Shoreham 24/ For this scenario, 57% of those living within 5 miles (5700 families),
~ 52% of those living within 6-10 miles (11,000 families), 30% of those
-living in Eastern Suffolk (18,000 families), 44% of those living in Western Suffolk (142,000 families), and 25% of the people living in Nassau County (113,000 families), stated they would evacuate. Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 13 and Att. 2, at 5-6.
25/ Under these conditions, 78% of those living within 5 miles (7800 fami-lies), 78% of those living within 6-10 miles (16,000 families), 46% of those living in Eastern Suffolk (27,000 families), 63% of those living in Western Suffolk (205,000 families), and 39% of the people living in Nassau County (175,000 families) said that they would evacuate. Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 14 and Att. 2, at 6.
~. _ _ _ . _ .
~;. !
, . evacuation behavior as indicated in the survey is strikingly similar to the factual TMI evacuation pattern; beyond 10 miles, the survey suggests an even
. larger Shoreham. evacuation shadow than at TMI. Zeigler and Johnson, ff.
Tr. 2789, at 19; Cordaro et'al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 83-88.26/
- 62. The County's survey results have been corroborated by other studies conducted for Newsday by Dr. Cole and for LILCO by YSW and Bill Johnson Associates. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 21-23; Cole, ff.
Tr. 2792, at 15-25. Two Newsday surveys published in February and October 1983 showed an even higher proportion of the Long Island population intend-ing to evacuate than did the County's survey. Id., at 15-18. -The YSW and Bill Joh ton Associates surveys, although producing results lower than the County's' survey, also showed a substantial evacuation shadow. Id., at 23.'27/ 26/ Several factors may account.for this anticipated higher evacuation rate: . (1) a long-term basic distrust of LILC0; (2) the fear of being trapped on Long Island if extensive evacuation were ordered; (3) the longstanding controversy over the Shoreham plant; and (4) perceptions and recollections about the TMI accident. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. 1Tr. 2789, at 19-21. 27/ The Bill Johnson Associates survey was intended to show that giving people additional information such as LILCO would provide in the event i of a radiological emergency at Shoreham would change survey responses and result in fewer people saying that they would evacuate. The sur-vey was developed to replicate the County's survey, but the survey instrument took 3 different forms. One was virtually identical to the County's; the other 2 contained additional information either in the initial scenario question or in a " follow-up" question.~ Cordaro et !- al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 99-102; Tr. 1890-97 (W. Johnson). While the
" follow-up" format used in 1 form of the Johnson survey is flawed (see l= infra), and thus produced somewhat lower results than the County's
! , survey, all 3 forms of the Johnson survey showed a significant evacua- [ tion shadow occurring in the event 'of an accident at Shoreham. Id., at 20-23. a
~ 1 i
. 1
- 63. The sample design utilized in the May 1983 YSW survey was essen-tially the same as that employed in the 1982 County survey. Id., at 23 and Att.-7, at 87-97. Using 3 scenarios similar to those in the County's sur-vey, YSW found that for the first scenario, about 143,000 (17%) of the fam-illes on Long Island would evacuate (none would be responding in accordance with instructions); for the second scenario, 235,890 families (28%) would evacuate (fewer than 2000 families would be following instructions); and for the third scenario, 362,000 families (43%) would evacuate (only 31,000 families would be following instructions). A subsequent " follow-up" ques-i tion 28/ reduced these figures to 100,000 (12%), 177,000 (21%), and 245,000
(- , (29%), respectively. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 22-23; Cole, , ff. Tr. 2792, at 24-25 and Att. 7, at 41-43. The YSW survey results also ( show that many Long Island residents are fearful about nuclear power plants. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 111,
- 64. Dr. Cole testified that survey flaws and invalid tabulation pro-cedures made the YSW results too low. For example, the YSW " follow-up" question format appeared to confuse respondents since it increased inappro-priate responses among many segments. Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 52-62. Dr.
Mileti agreed that the follow-up format could have biased the YSW survey and thus-lowered the number of people who stated they would evacuate. Tr. 28/ 'After each scenario was posed to a respondent, he was asked a follow-up question as to what he would do if the message included a statement that those not advised to take protective actions could go about their normal business. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 110; Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 48. 1881-85 (Mileti).29/ The-YSW survey instrument also biased the results by putting normative pressure on respendents to say that they would not evacu-ate. Further, the low completion rate for the YSW survey raises questions whether the sample used is representative of the population.30/ Finally, the method used to tabulate the data from the initial evacuation questions and the follow-up questions was misleading and led to slightly lower 29/ Testimony also suggested that there may have been some attempt to ma-nipulate the YSW survey to produce results minimizing the magnitude of the evacuation shadow. First, although YSW asserted that it was com-pletely independent of LILCO, Mr. Richardson, who had primary respon-l sibility for the YSW survey, knew it was to be used by LILCO to l counteract the County's survey. Tr. 1903, 1935 (Richardson). Second, although the YSW report states that it was reviewed by "outside" re-viewers for bias, the report failed to disclose that such reviewers
, were LILCO consultants and LILCO's legal counsel. Cordaro et al., ff.
Tr. 1470, Att. 13, at 9; Tr. 1942-43 (Richardson). Third, the Bill ' Johnson and Associates survey, conducted prior to the YSW survey, used 3 survey instrument forms; the one using the follow-up question format obtained the lowest number of evacuation responses. Tr. 1928-29 (W. Johnson). After the Johnson survey was conducted, the follow-up ques-tion format was incorporated into the YSW survey as a result of dis-cussions between YSW, LILCO counsel and Mr. Johnson (Tr. 1928-29 (W. Johnson); 1930-35 (W. Johnson, Richardson)), suggesting a decision to use the format that would achieve the lowest evacuation results. Fi-nally, although Dr. Mileti believed at the time he reviewed the Johnson survey (prior to the YSW survey) that the follow-up format might produce biased results, Mr. Johnson, who was the conduit for contacts between YSW and LILCO, failed -tx> transmit Dr. Mileti's opin-ion to YSW. Tr. 1928-29 (W. Jchnson, M11eti); 1943-44 (Richardson). 30/ YSW survey' interviews were completed with only 46% of the eligible re-spondents (Tr. 1910-14 (Richardson)); the County's completion rate was 63%. The low YSW completion rate casts doubt on whether the results from the sample can be generalized to the population. Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 39. Although Mr.' Richardson believed the refusal rate for the YSW survey was acceptable (Tr. 1922-24, 2063 (Richardson)), anoth-er LILCO witness, Dr. Sorensen, stated that a survey with a response rate as low as the YSW survey should be used with extreme caution. Tr. 1924 (Sorensen). FE I results. Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 49-51; see Tr. 1936-40 (Richardson) (if Mr. Richardson could tabulate the results again, he would do it differ-ently). f-
- 65. The Board finds that these criticisms by Dr. Cole were substan-l tially uncontroverted, and that they do cast doubt on the validity of the YSW results as compared to the County's. The Board finds, however, that i even accepting YSW's numbers, the survey confirms that thousands of fami-I lies will attempt to evacuate in a Shoreham accident even though not advised to do so. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 23; Cole, ff. Tr.
l 2792, at 25, 37-41; Tr. 2842 (Cole). l (c) Use of Survey Data to Predict Human Behavior
- 66. LILCO's witnesses testified that surveys should not be used to determine the scope of any evacuation shadow that might occur at Shoreham t
( because the volume of overresponse would be the direct consequence of what l- went on at the time of the accident, including the quality of the informa-tion disseminated then. Thus, LILCO's witnesses asserted that the County's attempt to use a survey to predict emergency behavior is inappropriate. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 66-68, 74-76; Tr. 2059-61 (Mileti). They asserted that while surveys measure attitudes at tha time that the survey
-is taken, most investigators have concluded that there is a weak relation-ship between attitudes and future behavior. Although they cited a number of studies in support of their assertion,31/ they acknowledged that recent 31/ The LILCo witnesses cited, among others, a study by R.T. LaPierre; Dr.
Dynes conceded, however, that the LaPierre study cannot be cited to (Footpato cont'd next page) , -M- . ,
work by social scientists disagrees with this conclusion (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 69-74), and Dr. Dynes stated that the correlation between attitudes and behavior can in fact be high. Tr. 1815 (Dynes). Dr. Sorensen's study of the TMI evacuation, which we discuss further below, also demonstrates that pre-emergency attitudes were very much related to how people behaved during the TMI emergency. Tr. 1822-24 (Sorensen); SC Ex. 3. We find that the weight of the evidence supports the existence of a correlation between attitudes and behavior. i 67. LILCO's witnesses also testified that in their opinion, the Coun-ty survey is "perhaps the worst information available" about how people will actually behave in a real Shoreham emergency, because it did not and could not take into account all factors that would exist during an emergen-cy, including emergency information. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at l 74-76; Tr. 1165-66 (Mileti) (polls can predict, however, how people will vote or whether they will buy a product). The LILCO witnesses recognized the similarities in the evacuation patterns displayed in the Shoreham sur-vey and the TMI evacuation behavior. However, they did not believe those similarities mean that the County survey is a valid predictor of future (Footnote cont'd from previous page) prove that survey responses are poor indicators of human behavior, and he was unable to name any other studies showing that attitude and be-havior do not co-vary. Tr. 1811-14, 1816 (Dynes). Drs. Dynes and Mileti later stated that the only purpose of citing the LaPierre study was to show that social scientists have studied the relationship be-tween attitudes and behavior. Tr. 2048-49 (Dynes, Mileti).
~,
6
' )l behavior in a Shoreham accident. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr._1470, at 82-86. ; Finally, they testified that the polling profession has n'ol always accu-
! rately predicted human behavior (citing part.icular inaccurate' election polls), and asserted that while polls can be used to predict behavior if people do not change their minds bet'een.the time of a survey and an actual , event, in their opinion people are certain telchange their minds about how I 't to behave in a radiological emergency betweEn the timeiof the survey and the emergency. Id., at 76-80, 106-08. They cited ncffaats,or research in i t
~ support of this-assertion. '
, s '4 a w s.
s
- 68. Dr. Cole testified, on the other hand, that surveys'can estimate- [
accurately human response to future events, and that they are, in fact, ' - used for that purpose. Cole, fi._T2..# 2792, at 25. l Indeed, LILCO vit ,ndss
~ Johnson conceded that polls can be reasonably accurate predictors of voting behavior and Mr. Richardson acknowledged that YSW has conducted surveys tb % , 3~
L s determine how people would react in the future. Tr. 1824-30 (Richardson);' 1
)
1106-07-(W. Johnson). Dr. Cole also explained that the County's survey was
- not aimed at pre,dicting precisely what particular individuals will actually do;-rather, it'sparho'sewastoassessgeneralattitudestowardara-
, x
,%
- 1 diological emergency and the general'k'idds of behavior that emergency plan- 3 w ners must" confront. Survey research is.the best available method to ansder
, ) g \
q' , . these questions, particularly in light of the limited number of nuclear
....* T n w 1 ,
accidents available to study.32/ be. Cole disputed the LILCO witnesses' I . , 32/ Dr. Cole noted that t e accuracy of ,the County's survey data is con-firmed by comparing it with:what actually happened at TMI and by the *
\
(?ootnoto.gcont'd next page) ' ' 1 1 4 % e N 1
'~ - 44 h
) ,
aa '
i
. . 1 charge that behavioral intentions were likely to change between the time of the survey and an actual accident. He cited surveys showing that attitudes about nuclear power and. behavioral intentions remain very stable over time.
- Cole,1ff.-Tr. 2792, at 18-19.33/
- 69. The Board finds that while surveys may not predict the exact be-
- havior' of particular individuals, they are useful tools for predicting the
. general magnitude of-voluntary evacuation that could occur in a ra-
- diological accident at'Shoreham. Several different surveys of Long Island residents, conducted on behalf of Suffolk County, LILCO and Newsday, have shown. roughly similar results, demonstrating that a Shoreham accident could
- cause-hundreds of thousands of families to attempt to evacuate, even though
- not advise'd to do so. .Furthermore, the results of the surveys are consis-
. tent with the behavior exhibited at TMI. These data cannot be ignored in assessing ~th'e adequacy and implementability of the Plan.
(Footnote cont'd from previous page) other surveys' conducted on Long Island, all of which strongly suggest that if there were a serious accident at Shoreham, there would be sub-
-stantial voluntary evacuation. -Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 27-31; Tr.
2825-26, 2828.(Cole).
. ~ - .
- 33/' Professor Johnson concurred, noting that the more important an issue is to one's self and one's family, the more likely~one is to follow
.through on an expressed behavioral intention regarding that issue.
The surveys' conducted'on Long Island show that:the Shoreham issue is perceived to be highly important and of great concern to the people of
.Long Island. Tr. 1421-23 (J. Johnson).
u.
.. . . - . . . .. ~_ _
l (d). Alleged Bias in the County's Survey a
- 70. LILCO's witnesses testified that the County's survey was biased because,; allegedly: the survey instrument iden'tified the interviewer as calling on behalf of Suffolk County; it included a question about whether Shoreham should be licensed; it used value-laden terms; the response categories for-the 3 scenarios were not mutually exclusive or exhaustive; the scenarios did not include a recommendation of no evacuation for persons m
' living outside the area for which protective actions were recommended; and
^the sample was not an appropriate random' sample . Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.
'1470, at 88-98. Dr. Cole testified, however,:that most of LILCO's criti-cisms were either-irrelevant or of~1ittle significance because they dealt with questions whichi-are notLcrucial in in'terpreting the results of the survey. Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 32-37. For reasons set forth below, we agree with Dr. Cole.
- 71. First, even assuming,,arguendo, that bias existed .we find it had no substantive influence on the main conclusions of the County's survey.
This'is demonstrated by the fact that all the surveys' conducted, the Coun-
. ty's or LILCO's or Newsday's, found- only. minor differences in the size of l
the evacuation shadow phenomenon. Id., at 32-33. Moreover, we find that
, LILCO has made no. credible showing that any alleged deficiencies in the County's survey are significant.
- 72. 'It is unlikely that the identification of the interviewers as calling for Suffolk County had any substantial effect on responses given to
=-
r-the May 1982. survey. In May 1982, Suffolk County had not taken any posi-tion.on whether Shoreham should operate or whether emergency preparedness is-feasible on Long Island. Indeed, at that time the Countf was attempting to develop an evacuation plan to be utilized if Shoreham was licensed. Id., at.35-36. LILCO's witness Mileti stated that he had no way of knowing whether the statement at the beginning of the survey instrument had any ef-feet at all. Tr. 1875 (Mileti); see Tr. 1874-76 (W. Johnson) (LILCO wit-ness critical of County survey did_not even know if County had taken a po-
'sition on Shoreham at time of survey).34/
- 73. Dr. Cole testified that LILCO's assertion that if a respondent
~said that Shoreham should not be licensed he would then give a response to the. scenarios in order to support this position, was implausible. The more plausible explanation for the survey finding that those who oppose Shoreham's opening are more likely to say they will evacuate than those who favor Shoreham's opening'is that both responses are influenced by the same 34/ Throughout this discussion, we attach little weight to William Johnson's testimony. Mr. Johnson's academic training on social sci-ence survey.research' consisted of a 2-month summer program while an undergraduate at college, and 1 graduate level course that " touched"
'on survey research. None of the polls conducted by Mr. Johnson has undergone a formal peer review process to determine the-soundness of the methodology or the validity of the conclusions. Tr. 1487-95 (W.
Johnson). Neither Mr.. Johnson nor his firm is a member of the Nation-al Council of Public Opinion Polls, the American Association of Public Opinion. Researchers or any professional organization regulating the conduct of the polling industry. Indeed, while Mr. Johnson criticized a survey conducted by the County for failing to meet the customary standards of the industry, he admitted that he only knows what those
- professional standards are by talking to other people in the industry.
Tr. 1898-99 (W. Johnson). b
I J l I i variable: fear of radiation. Thus, people with a greater fear of radia-tion are more likely.to oppose the opening of the plant and are also more likely to say they would evacuate if there were an accident at the plant.
~ Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 36-37.
- 74. Dr. Cole agreed that in general it is desirable to have question categories which are both mutually exclusive and exhaustive. However, due to the complexity of the variable studied, it is sometimes difficult and
. undesirable to create such categories. The categories used in the County -survey covered the great bulk of possible responses, were well understood by the respondent's (Tr. 2809, 2812 (Cole)), and the primary distinction of interest to the County (the difference between people who would evacuate and those who would not) was clearly made in the possible response categories. Thus, the absence of response-categories that were mutually exclusive and exhaustive did not significantly alter the results. In fact, YSW used the same response categories in.its survey (Tr. 2836 (Cole); Cole, i ff. Tr. 2792, at 33-35) and LILCO's own witness stated that the absence of response categories that were mutually exclusive or exhaustive did not have a large effect on the County's results. Tr. 1880 (Richardson).
- 75. Dr. Cole also disputed the LILCO charge that the County survey used value-laden terms, noting that the words he used were clear and appro-priate. Thus, their use could not have had an effect on the results of the survey. Tr. 2834 (Cole).
i i l
- 76. The Board thus rejects LILCO's assertion that any bias in the County's survey invalidates its results.
- 4. LILCO's EBS Messages Will Not Substantially Reduce Voluntary Evacuation
- 77. A final' issue on the evacuation shadow is whether there are any
-actions which can be implemented which would sharply reduce the potential for voluntary evacuation. As discussed below, the parties differed sharply i on this issue.35/
i ( l' '78. LILCO's witnesses treat the evacuation shadow phenomenon as lit-e t1e more than.a problem of inadequate information. They would virtually l- ignore the TMI evacuation experience and the survey data from Long Island
~
L - l residents. They testified that people generally respond in a manner con-sistent with their perceptions of the risk at the time of an emergency. f. Tr. 1535-37 (Sorensen). Thus, people overrespond largely because they l overperceive the risks, do not believe the information they receive, im-properly personalize the risk, and/or make the wrong decision about what to do in. response to the emergency. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 41-42. According to LILCO's witnesses, emergency information provided at the time of an emergency *is tha key factor which determines behavior in an 35/ LILCO argues that nothing need be done to address overreaction. See LILCO Brief, at 20, citing Louisiana Power and Light (Waterford Steam
-Electric Station, Unit 3), LBP-82-100, 16 NRC 1550, 1562 (1982). That is.not the point; rather, the point is whether, given overreaction, LILCO can implement adequate protective measures. If it cannot, then it does not satisfy 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1).
l l l emergency.36/ They asserted that a good emergency information program will cause people to perceive correctly the nature of the risks, to believe the information that they receive, to p.rsonalize the risk appropriately, and to make appropriate decisions about what to do in response to an accident, thus reducing the possibility of overresponse. Id., at 41-42, 50; Tr. 2081 (Mileti). Drs. Mileti and Sorensen believe that LILCO's Emergency Broadcast System-("EBS") messages meet the criteria for good information, and thus that the volume of overreaction that occurred at TMI could not happen at Shoreham. Id., at 63-66; Tr. 1484-85 (Sorensen).3Z/
- 79. The County witnesses rejected the suggestion that LILCO will be able to reduce voluntary evacuation significantly through its EBS messages.
While . clear, precise, consistent, timely and accurate warning messages from LILCO may have some marginal effect in reducing the shadow phenomenon, they are unlikely to override the public's fear of radiation, their mistrust of 36/ LILC0 testified that the public's process of deciding what protective actions to take involves the following steps after the dissemination of emergency information: (1) hearing, (2) understanding, (3) believ-ing, (4) personalizing, (5) deciding, and (6) responding. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 21. LILCO asserted that its EBS messages are designed to address each step and thereby maximize the likelihood of appropriate responses to protective action recommendations. Id., at 21-36. We discuss in the text only those areas related to the issues in substantial controversy among the parties. 32/ FEMA's witness, Mr. McIntire, testified that if LILCO's public educa-tion is effectively implemented, it can be assumed that the public will follow the instruction- 'ssued during an emergency. McIntire, ff. Tr. 2086, at 3. However, he had not reviewed or analyzed LILCO's emergency messages. Tr. 3610 (McIntire). Therefore, we can give no weight to FEMA's testimony on this subject. I l t l LILCO, and other factors which will lead to substantial voluntary evacua-tion. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 35. Even Dr. Mileti, who
' stated that LILCO's messages-are the best he has ever seen, nevertheless
- predicted that in the event of a Shoreham emergency, one could expect a
- shadow phenomenon of as much as 20-25% outside the 10-mile EPZ. Tr. 2012, 2061, 2069, 2080 (Mileti).38/ Further, pre-emergency fears of radiation may affect a person's response by shaping the way he understands informa-tion and how he perceives the risk during an emergency. Tr. 1671, 2052 (Sorensen); see generally, SC Ex. 3; Tr. 1668 (Dynes). The TMI study;by Zeigler and Johnson found that fear of impending harm, not conflicting information, was the overriding factor in triggering evacuation. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 35.
(a) Comparative Impact of Information and Non-Information Factor at TMI
- 80. The LILCO witnesses testified that the voluntary evacuation at TMI-is largely explainable by the conflicting, confusing and frightening 38/ LILCO's witnesses also conceded that emergency behavior is greatly in-fluenced by factors beyond LILCO's control. Decisions regarding what protective action (s) to take in crisis situations are related not only to the' type, content, and frequency of warnings, but also to factors such as pre-emergency fear of the impending crisis and perception of the likelihood that it will materialize; the nature of the disaster -
agent; distance and direction from the source; level of trust in emer-gency response officials; prior disaster experience; socioeconomic status; stage-in-life cycle characteristics; and the level of family , cohesiveness. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 36-41;.Ziegler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2739, at 35-36; Tr. 1508 (Dynes); 1535-36, 1539 (Sorensen); 1665-66 (Mileti). e .pMt. %.- ,-m --e--r,
information which was disseminated at that time 39/ and which did not meet the criteria set forth by the LILCO witnesses for good emergency informa-tion.40/ They thus asserted that one cannot predict responses in other emergencies on the basis of what happened at TMI. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 53-58.41/ However, the Board places little weight on this testi-mony because it is contradicteu by studies conducted by LILCO's as well as the County's witnesses. Thus, in an article on emergency warning systems for nuclear plants, LILCO's witness, Dr. Sorenson, stated that generalizing from the TMI experience to other nuclear emergencies is warranted. One such generalization is that segments of the population in such an emergency 39/ LILCO cited for support the study of the TMI evacuation by Cynthia B. Flynn in which 83% of the respondents cited confusing information as one reason for leaving. 40/ According to LILCO's witnesses, emergency information which is credi-ble, consistent, accurate, clear, conveyed with certainty, sufficient, clear in guidance, repeated with frequency, specific about the hazard location, and uses a range of communications channels is more likely to elicit an appropriate emergency response than are messages which do not meet these criteria. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 26-36. 41/ The LILCO witnesses also stated that regulations promulgated after TMI were intended to alleviate the type of confusion that occurred at TMI, and cited an incident at the Ginna nuclear plant on January 25, 1982 as an example of a successful public information program. They testified that if pre-accident fear of radiation is a main cause of evacuation in a nuclear plant accident, people would have evacuated after having heard that a release of radiation had occurred; that did not occur at Ginna. Cordaro, et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 62-63. How-ever, no protective action recommendations were issued during the Ginna incident (Tr. 1738 (Sorensen)) and the utility at Ginna was not in command or control of the offsite response or communications to the public. Therefore, the events at Ginna do not support the conclusion that emergency information provided by LILCO would substantially re-duce voluntary evacuation in a Shoreham emergency or where protective actions were recommended. will'want to avoid contact with nuclear incidents regardless of the techni-cal basis of the threats presented and, therefore, when informed of the danger, people may evacuate or take protective actions whether officially advised to do so or not. Tr. 1739-40 (Sorensen).
- 81. Dr. Sorensen conducted a path analysis 42/ using the Flynn survey data.to determine whether general attitudes toward nuclear power, such as fear,' caused people to-evacuate from TMI or if other factors were more sig-nificant'causes of that behavior. Cordaro et al, ff. Tr. 1470, at 60; Tr.
- 1475-79, 1839-40 (Sorensen); SC Ex. 3, at 2, 9. His analysis supports the proposition that situational risk perceptions and informational factors played an important role in TMI-evacuation decisions. The analysis also showed that pre-accident fear was not a direct cause of evacuation, but that it had a significant indirect effect on other factors, including per-ception of the risk and informational factors, which in turn had a direct impact on evacuation behavior. 'Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 60-61;
~ ' Cole and Tyree, ff. Tr. 3907, at 9-20; Tr. 2050 (Sorensen). Nevertheless, the LILCO witnesses concluded that fear of radiation was not a primary cause for evacuation behavior at TMI. Mileti and Sorenson, ff. Tr. 3940, at 22-23.
42/ A path analysis is a method to determine causation or factors associ-ated with causation. Dr. Sorensen testified that path analysis is a valid tool in the social sciences. Tr. 1431 (Sorensen). m l
- 82. The County witnesses disagreed with the conclusions drawn by LILCO's witnesses from the Sorensen TMI analysis. Drs. Cole and Tyree testified that LILCO's witnesses had misrepresented the Sorensen findings by concluding that: (1) because pre-accident fear of radiation had an in-
. direct impact on evacuation behavior, it was not a significant cause of
. evacuation at TMI; and (2) information factors were the primary determinant of overresponse at TMI. Cole and Tyree, ff. Tr. 3907, at 2-6. Through a statistical analysis of Sorensen's data, Drs. Cole and Tyree demonstrated how indirect effects on behavior are no less important than direct effects
-in determining human behavior 43/ (Id., at 9-14; Tr. 3917, 3919-20 (Tyree, Cole)), an'd that pre-accident fear of radiation had a stronger effect on i
evacuation behavior-than did information factors. Cole and Tyree, ff. Tr. p 3907,.at 13-14, 17; Tr. 3915-17 (Cole, Tyree). They also demonstrated that I-l- concern about the TMI plant (which was a measure, in part, of fear of radi-ation) and distance from the plant, also had a greater impact on TMI evacu-I ation behavior than the information factors. Cole and Tyree, ff. Tr. 3907, l at 13-14.44/ 43/ The County's cross-examination of LILCO's witnesses demonstrated that when the information variables studied by Sorensen were broken down into direct and indirect effects on evacuation behavior, the indirect effects were more significant. Tr. 3945-51 (Sorensen, Mileti). 44/ LILCO's criticisms of Drs. Cole's and Tyree's analysis were largely ,: baseless. See, generally, Mileti and Sorensen, ff. Tr. 3940. For in-stance, the criticism that Dr. Tyree entered the variables into the equation in a different order than did Dr. Sorensen was shown to have no effect on Dr. Tyree's results. Tr. 3970-77 (Mileti). Likewise, the LILCO testimony that conclusions about the relative strengths of (Footnote cont'd next page) l i
1 l l l 4
- 83. While the County's witnesses agreed that one's perception of the risk determines behavior at the time of an accident, they stated that this fact was meaningless without determining what influences one's perception of risk. Tr. 3915 (Cole) . Dr. Sorensen's own data showed that pre-accident fear of radiation had greater direct and indirect effects on perception of risk than did information factors (Cole and Tyree, ff. Tr.
3907, at 9-20; Tr. 1855-58, 3966 (Sorensen); 2982 (Zeigler); SC Ex. 3, at 14), and that, while information factors were important, broader social cognitive factors persistently may influence response. SC Ex. 3, at 23. (b) Effectiveness of LILCO's EBS Messages
- 84. For a number of reasons, we agree with the County that even with LILCO's EBS messages, substantial voluntary evacuation must be predicted.
Some percons may not hear LILCO's messages because they do not listen to media sources or because of selective perception (hearing only what they want or expect to hear), which has occurred in past emergencies. Tr. 1570-79 (Mileti); 1684-85 (Sorensen); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 22. In addition, each person may understand a message to mean a different (Footnote cont'd from previous page) the variables should not be drawn from Dr. Sorensen's testimony di-rectly contradicts LILCO's direct testimony on the matter. Tr. 3967 (Mileti); compare Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 60 with Mileti and Sorensen, ff. Tr. 3940, at 15. Finally, the LILCO witnesses admitted that they misinterpreted some of the relevant data in Dr. Sorensen's analysis. Tr. 3940-44, 3989 (Sorensen, Mileti).
=--
.i thing, depending on that person's perception of the risk. Id., at
'22-23.45/
- 85. [Even if messages are heard and understood, some may not believe the messages. Tr. 1684-85 (Sorensen). Believability is influenced by the source, the content, and consistency of the information, and the situation in which it is disseminated. -Cordaro et. al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 24; Tr.
1509,1512 (Dynes, Mileti); 1856-57 (Sorensen). Dr. Sorensen has written
-that believability is the dominant factor influencing people's response to a warning. Tr. 1590, 1595-96, 2016-17 (Sorensen).
_86. There was no dispute.that the perceived credibility of the source
~
of emergency information is important in determining human behavior. Tr. 1509 (Dynes, Mileti); 1586-87 (Sorensen).46/ Indeed the low credibility I 45/. The LILCO witnesses testified that inconsistency in the tone or infor-mation in a message creates confusion and uncertainty among recipi-ents,.and'that accuracy is important because if people learn or sus-pect that they are not receiving the whole truth, they are likely to ignore: instructions about how to respond. Thus, a message should not say that something bad is happening but that there is no cause for-concern. Mr. Weismantle testified that LILCO's EBS me.ssages are con-sistent and contain a complete range of accurate information. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 27-29; Tr. 1692-93 (Sorensen). However, as discussed in the text, the effectiveness of information disseminated by LILCO could be diminished by other sources. Furthermore, at least i sample LILCO message (regarding a general emergency) appeared to be inconsistent. See Tr. 1653-55 (Weismantle); 1977 (Mileti). 46/ _ LILCO's witnesses testified that official sources are generally more believable than non-officia1' sources (Tr. 1588 (Sorensen)), and that the absence of local government participation-in the response could adversely affect the public's response in an emergency because it would be more difficult to disseminate good information. Tr. 1781-85, (Footnote cont'd next page) of the sources of information at TMI was an important reason why people evacuated. Tr. 1509-11 (Sorensen). Survey data reveal that LILCO's credi-bility is very low among the Long Island population.47/ See findings on Contention 15. Thus, even if LILCO's messages are assumed to be perfect, they may be ineffective. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 36-37.
- 87. Furthermore, LILCO will not be the only source of information in a Shoreham emergency because, particularly in light of LILCO's low credi-bility, people likely will seek alternate sources of information which are likely to include the news media. Id., at 37-38. Yet the media performed dismally at TMI and contributed to the conflicting information which is cited as a cause of the voluntary evacuation. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr.
~ 2789, at 37-38; see Tr. 1624-27 (Sorensen, Mileti) (media at TMI reported facts inaccurately).48/ Dr. Sorensen agreed that despite LILCO's (Footnote cont'd from previous page) 1508, 1513-15 (Dynes, Mileti). The perceived existence of emergency management authority and technical expertise are 2 factors affecting whether emergency information is perceived to be official. Dr. Sorensen stated that an organization perceived to lack authority might be considered credible if it was also perceived to have technical expertise, bpt he could not say what degree of technical expertise is required to override such lack of authority. Tr. 1589, 2013-16, 2071-72 (Sorensen). For reasons set forth in our findings on Conten-tion 15, we find that the public will not generally perceive LILCO to have technical expertise.
. 47/ The YSW survey found that only 23% of the public considers LILCO a be-llevable source of information on nuclear power issues. Tr. 1605-08 (Richardson). The County's survey found that 56% of the public would not trust a LILCO official at all to tell the truth about an accident at Shoreham. Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, Att. 2, at 18, 48/ The Kemeny Commission found thct at TMI the media lacked an under-standing of nuclear power and sensationalized the event, and recom-(Footnote cont'd next page) dissemination of emergency warnings, people may continue to hear a variety of messages and understand them differently due to selective perceptions and biases. Tr. 1585-86 (Sorensen). Indeed, the LILCO witnesses stated that emergency planners should assume that the public will be immersed in an "information soup" composed mostly of misinformation. Cordaro et al.,
ff. Tr. 1470, at 41-42, 50; Tr. 2080 (Mileti).49/
- 88. LILCO's witnesses asserted that to alleviate the possibility that any 1 source could be perceived as non-credible, warning messages should contain an endorsement by a " mix" of scientists, organizations and offi-cials. LILC0's sample EBS messages state that the recommended protective actions are based on consultation with scientists, public agencies, the utility and representat'ives of government should they choose to participate (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 26-27; Tr. 1569 (Sorensen)); the (Footnote cont'd from previous page) mended that the media become more knowledgeable on nuclear power issues. The LILCO witnesses were unaware of any studies evaluating whether the media had followed up on the Kemeny Commission's recommen-dations. Tr. 1726-29 (Dynes, Mileti, Sorensen). LILCO's Plan pro-poses annual briefings for the news media but LILCO has no agreements with the media to attend LILCO's briefings or.to make sure that people attending the briefings are those who would cover an actual accident.
Tr. 1729-32 (Weismantle). 49/ Dr. Sorensen stated during cross-examination that it was unlikely that a well-designed warning system could be undermined by another source like the media. However, in an article about nucicar plant warning systems, he wrote that a well-designed warning system "can be under-mined unintentionally by the media during an emergency. Conflicting information, sensationalism and misinterpretation by improper journal-istic behavior are significant problems." Tr. 1624-27 (Sorensen).
-SA-
_ y
- f 3 messages, however, do not state that any of those entities or persons con-cur in LILCO's protective action recommendations. LILCO also has no agree-ment with the NRC or State and local officials to engage in the consulta-tion described in the EBS messages, and the Plan includes no procedures for such consultation prior to the issuance of recommendations by LILCO. Tr.
1608-13, 1617-21, 2021-23 (Weismantle); see OPIP 3.8.1.50/ Furthermore, Dr..Sorensen acknowledged that the value of the announced " consultation" could be diminished if people hear or focus on the fact that the message is being delivered on behalf of the LERO Director. Tr. 1622-23 (Sorenson).51/ 50/ Mr. Weismantle believed that Brookhaven National Laboratory ("BNL") scientists would consult with LILCO on protective actions, but was not sure that such services were provided for in LILCO's agreement with I the U.S. Department of Energy (" DOE"). Tr. 1608-13, 1617-21, 2021-23 (Weismantle).. 51/ The Plan contemplates that LILCO's Emergency News Center (" ENC") will be.the single focal point for all information disseminated to the pub-lic concerning an accident. LILCO expects that governmental officials L will be represented at the center and will coordinate their statements with the utility. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 51-52; Tr. 2024-25 (Weismantle). There are, however, no agreements with state or local officials to participate in activities at LILCO's ENC (Tr. 1715-16 (Weismantle)), and Mr. Weismantle acknowledged that LILCO/LERO will not be the sole source of information disseminated to the public about a Shoreham emergency. The media, for. instance, has not agreed to re-port only information disseminated by LILCO, nor can LILCO control . what the media says about an emergency. Tr. 1716, 1718 (Weismantle); 1970-71 (Cordaro .M11eti). The absence of governmental agreement to coordinate the release of information could mean that inconsistent information could reach the public despite the existence of a LILCO news center. Tr. 1973-74 (Mileti). It is also possible that the of-ficials with whom LILCO attempts such coordination may not agree with the information being disseminated by LILC0; no agencies have agreed to endorse LILCO's statements and officials disagreeing with LILCO cannot be expected to remain silent. Where significant differences of opinion could not be resolved, they would have to be aired to the pub-lic. Tr. 1719-22, 2036-37 (Weismantle). I LILCO's intention to use scientists and engineers as part of the " mix" of information will also be ineffective in raising LILCO's credibility. See findings on Contention 15, Section II, infra.
- 89. The LILCO witnesses stated that an emergency message should con-vey a high level of certainty about the events taking place, even if the situation is ambiguous, because a certain warning is more likely to elicit an appropriate response. Cordaro et al., ff. 1470, at 30; Tr. 1975-76 (Mileti). Mr. Weismantle stated that LILCO's sample messages leave no room for confusion, contain specific and definite information, and .ill be de-livered by radio announcers in a manner that conveys certainty. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 30-31. However, all people will be confronted by un-certainty in a radiological emergency. This makes protective action deci-sions more difficult and time consuming, resulting in delays or other prob-lems in the warning process. Dr. Sorensen stated in his warning systems article that it will be difficeit to issue warnings that reflect appropri-ate levels of risk (which determine response) because of the inherent com-plexities of nuclear technology and because of public experience with acci-j dents. Tr. 1629, 1634 (Sorensen).
- 90. LILCO's witnesses also testified that a message must contain suf-ficient information so that the public will feel fully informed because a perception that one has insufficient information creates confusion, uncer-tainty and anxiety. Mr. Weismantle testified that all information neces-sary for the public to make an informed decision about what actions to take is includ'ed in LILCO's EBS messages (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 30-32),52/ bdd'5 cme of LILCO's messages clearly seem deficient. For exam-pie, Dr. Mileti stated that the best way to keep people, such as those on the East End, out of an unsafe area is to give them sufficient information to make the right decisions. However, none of LILCO's EBS messages address the East End population specifically. Tr. 1779-81 (Mileti).53/
- 91. The location of the hazard must be clearly specified in an emor-gency message because it is important that people know whether they are the intended recipient of the message. If people are confused about whether l they are in an area at risk, they may not respond appropriately. Mr.
Weismantle stated that the messages for Shoreham c1carly outline the area affected, both by zone designation and by b,oundaries, and state that people outside the designated boundaries are not affected. Cordaro et al., ff. l Tr. 1470, at 24-25, 32-35; Tr. 1651-52 (Mileti). 52/ Dr. Dynes testified that some people will need more information than others in order to respond appropriately and therefore, an emergency information system should deliver alternative and multiplo messages to the public. Tr. 1646-50 (Dynes). But, under the Plan, only 1 message wculd be read continually until changed circumstances required a new message to be road. Tr. 1650 (Weismantle). 53/ Similarly, LILCO's Message E advises the public to sock chsiter but does not explain why sheltering is preferrad over evacuation. Although Dr. Mileti testified that such information was implied by the message's statement that school children had been sheltered, which, he said, would lead people to conclude that sheltering is an appropriate ' protective action (Tr. 1753-58 (Mileti)), we find no basis for Dr. M110ti's assertion. No language in the btochure explains why shel-taring is preferred ovdr evacuation. We find that Message E is an ex-ample of a message that does not provide sufficient information.
- 92. Infermation about which of the 19 subzones of the EPZ one lives in will be made available through LILCO's EBS messages and by pre-emergency information. Tr. 1652-53 (Weismantle). Dr. Mileti testified, however, that the effectiveness of pre-emergency public information, such as LILCO's public education brochure, in helping to assure an appropriate response is questionable. It would also be a mistake to assume that people who have read the brochure will remember-its details. Tr. 1708-09 (Mileti). In-deed, at least 1 study has shown that a pre-emergency education program
. ; teaching people about radiation served to make the participants more con- ! l cerned and confused about nuclear power. Tr. 1711-15 (Mileti); see also Tr. 1644-46 (Sorensen). Furthermore, the public is unlikely to read or re-membur LILCO's brochure in light of LILCO's lack of credibility as a source l of information. See findings on Contention 15, Section II.B, infra.
- 93. Mr. Weismantle testified that if someone did not have LILCO's public information brochure or other such information available at the time of an emergency, the EBS messages could be relied upon to offer clear information describing which subzones were required to take protective ac- '
tions. Tr. 1653 (Weismantle). However, we find the description of Zone G, for example, to be unclear and confusing. Tr. 1653-55 (Weismantle).54/ 54/ Mr. Weismantle admitted that the description of the EPZ is somewhat fuzzy and ambiguous. Tr. 1658-59 (Weismantle). After examination, LILCO changed the description of the 10 mile EPZ in an attempt to be more specific. Tr. 2029-32 (Weismantle). See also our findings on Contention 22.D. i r
- 94. The Board has considered all the evidence relating to EBS mes-sages. While such messages, if clear, concise, etc., will help somewhat in reducing inappropriate behavior, the evidence does not support a finding that LILCO's emergency information system will reduce substantially the predicted voluntary evacuation. Thus, for purposes of this decision, we conclude that substantial voluntary evacuation must be assumed to occur.
- 95. Even if LILCO's emergency information system were perfect, which it is not, the evacuation shadow phenomenon would not necessarily be sub-stantially reduced due to LILCO's lack of credibility as a source of infor-mation, the impossibility of controlling all information disseminated to the public, the public's fear of radiation as a disaster agent, and the p many factors affecting risk perception which are beyond LILCO's control.
- 5. Some Effects of Shadow Phenomenon on Protective Actions (See Findings on Contentions 23.D and H for Further Effects)
- 96. The County's witnesses testified that sheltering advisories made under the LILCO Plan will precipitato evacuation by substantial numbers of people.55/ Since an automobile offers essentially no shielding from 55/ These conclusions are confirmed by.the TMI experience where in re-sponse to a sheltering advisory for everyone within 10 miles of the plant (except for pregnant women and children within 5 miles who were advised to evacuate) over half the peopic within 10 miles evacuated.
The County's survey results for the first and second scenarios, where despite a sheltering advisory a substantial proportion of the respon-dents indicated that they would evacuate, further support the finding that in light of the shadow phenomenon, sheltering would not be an effective protective action in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 26-27. i
-radiation, people.who evacuate rather than follow a sheltering advisory will be endangered if there has already been a release of radiation and will not receive the shielding benefit which the LILCO personnel who made the sheltering recommendation would assume to be available. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 25-26.
'97. Although the LILCO witnesses stated that good emergency informa-L.
' tion would substantially reduce the chances of people evacuating rather-than sheltering (Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr.1470, at 115-17), we find that
! substantial-voluntary evacuation still must be predicted. We do not rule L l on the precise size of such evacuation, but find that a substantia 1' number , t l of. people are likely to attempt to evacuate even if a sheltering recommen- ; i
- i. dation is made. .
- 98. Similarly, the Shoreham surveys suggest that many people are ,
'likely to attempt to evacuate after having heard of an accident, but prior to the issuance of a protective action recommendation that is intended to l be applicable to them. If-they were on the road when a sheltering advisory [
l < r l is. issued, they would be more vulnerable to the effects of radiation in L ; i their' automobiles than they would have been in their homes. Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 27-28.56/ t t 56/ LILCO asserts that'the first thing people will do after hearing of an accident will be to seek more information, not to evacuate. Cordaro, et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 119-20. This is beside the point. Dr. M11 41 acknowledged that once people get information, they might then evacuate. Tr. 1758-59, 2019-20, 1766 (Mileti). 1 1 I
- 99. The Plan divides the 10-mile EPZ into 19 smaller subzones. The Plan contemplates evacuation recommendations for only some of the zones, depending _on the direction of the plume and the nature of the release. The County's witnesses' testified that LILCO's subdivision of the EPZ does not take into account the evacuation shadow phenomenon, which demonstrates that-if there is a recommendation to evacuate some EPZ subzones, large numbers of the residents of other subzones will evacuate also. Even if their subzone was'not advised to evacuate, those residents are unlikely to be-lieve that they are not in danger when they know that their neighbors across the street or only blocks away have been told to evacuate. Id., at 29-32. It is also likely that the daily activity locations (home, workplace(s), school (s), stores, day care center (s), etc.) of a substantial proportion of the' households encompass more than one of the 19 subzones.
Therefore, any effort to evacuate only selected subzones will increase pub-lic anxiety and confusion, especially among those families who are not to-gether when the initial warning is issued, and this will heighten popula-tion overreaction. Id., at 29-30. 100. LILCO's witnesses testified that good emergency information would counteract the effect on risk perception of seeing one's neighbors take action, and that social and physical barriers (such as highways, etc.) would prevent a " spreading effect" as people saw their neighbors leave. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 122-24; Tr. 1769-71 (Dynes); 1771-75 (Sorensen). We have already ruled, however, that LILCO's emergency infor-mation will have only a limited effect on evacuation behavior. In i addition, Dr. Sorensen conceded that physical and social barriers would not eliminate all the interaction that could lead to the spread of evacuation behavior. Tr. 1766-69, 1775-76 (Sorensen). 101. Mr. Lieberman stated that LILCO's evacuation time estimates for an evacuation of only portions of the EPZ in fact took into account the evacuation shadow phenomenon by assuming that 20-25* of the population of the subzones in the EPZ would attempt to evacuate. While no estimates have been conducted assuming a larger percentage of voluntary evacuation, Mr. Lieberman expected that any such analysis would show an increase in evacua-tion times. Cordaro et al. (Shadow Phenomenon), ff. Tr. 2337, at 11-12.
- 6. Conclusions on Contentions 23.A, B, and C 102, 10 CFR $ 50.47(b)(10) requires the development of a range of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway such as evacuation and sheltering. The Board must find reasonable assurance that adequate protec-tive measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergen-cy. See 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1).
103. We find that LILCO has not met its burden on the issues presented in Subparts A, B and C of Contention 23. The evidence demon-strates that in the event of a Shoreham emergency, there would be a sub-stantial voluntary evacuation, causing perhaps hundreds of thousands of families to evacuate, even though not advised to do so. Due to such volun-tary evacuation, sheltering as proposed in the Plan would not constitute an II t I adequate protective action because many persons would not shelter but in-stead would attempt to evacuate and thus be exposed to harmful radiation. The Plan's~ proposed staged evacuation could not be implemented because per-sons from all EPZ zones, as well as areas beyond the EPZ, will attempt to evacuate. Accordingly, LILCO has failed to comply with 10 CFR
$$ 50.47(a)(1) and 50.'47(b)(10).
104. Finally, we address LILCO's argument that "LILCO has done all it can" and thus the Board should rule for LILCO on Contentions 23.A, B and C because otherwise this Board would be requiring LILCO, in effect, to guar-antee the safety of County residents in an emergency. See LILCO Brief, at
- 26. The regulations require us to find, as a conditien to licensing, that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and ,
will be taken in the event of an emergency. 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1). NRC de-cisions indicate that in assessing the adequacy of protective measures, li-censing boards should focus on whether a protective measure will result in dose savings.57/ If so, the measure may be deemed adequate. A guarantee of complete safety is not required. 105. However, even under the foregoing standard, we cannot find for LILCO on these contentions. First, under LILCO's Plan, the protective mea-sure of sheltering will not be implemented; instead, persons will evacuate. 57/ See, g.g., Cincinnati Gas _& Elec. Co., ALAB-727, supra, 17 NRC at 770 (basic goal of emergency planning is achievement of maximum dose sav-ings). t
Second, under LILCO's Plan, because people will attempt to evacuate in the face of a sheltering advisory, that proposed protective measure will not result in dose savings; instead, people will be exposed to increased doses from the passing plume. Under these circumstances, we cannot make the rea-sonable assurance finding required by 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1), and according-ly, we find for Intervenors on Contentions 23.A, B and C. B. Role Conflict (Contention 25) 106. Contention 25 alleges that the Plan cannot be implemented be-l cause a substantial number of the persons relied upon to perform functions necessary to implement the Plan will attend to the safety of their families prior to, or'in lieu of, performing Plan functions. Such role conflict, the nature and likelihood of its resolution, the individuals likely to re-solve role conflict in favor of family obligations in a Shoreham emergency, and the effect of such resolution upon LILCO's ability to implement the Plan were addressed by the parties. 107. The term " role conflict" refers to the situation in which an individual is confronted with contradictory demands on his/her sense of
. loyalty. Erikson and Johnson, ff. Tr. 1*55, at 4-5. The witnesses agreed ,
that during a Shoreham emergency, workers will experience role conflict be-cause their sense of duty as a member of a family and as a member of an emergency team will suggest different courses of action. Id.; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 2, 16-17. The matter at issue between the parties was how the conflict would be resolved by the individuals relied upon in the Plan. The County's witnesses asserted that many individuals would resolve the conflict by either delayed performance of emergency roles or ncn-performance of those roles, because individuals would attend to their fami-ly obligations before they turned to their Plan jobs. Erikson and Johnson, ff. Tr. 1455, at 6, 17-18. LILCO's witnesses essentially ignored the pos-sibility of a delayed response, discussed what they termed role " abandon-ment," and asserted that abandonment would not occur because the people relied upon by LILCO would have a clear idea of their emergency roles and would be properly trained for those roles. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 2. 108. We find that LILCO has failed to demonstrate that its planning efforts will prevent the resolution of role conflict in favor of family ob-ligations by a substantial number of the individuals relied upon in the Plan, and that such resolution will make implementation of the Plan untime-ly or impossible. The detailed bases for our decision are set forth below. Generally, we base this decision on two facts: (1) in past emergencies, including THI, resolution of role conflict in favor of family obligations has resulted in delay or non performance of emergency jobs, even when emer-gency roles have been identified and training provided; and (2) many per-sons relied upon in the Plan will not be identified or trained as emergency workers of the type who are more likely to resolve role conflict in favor of performing emergency jobs.58/ 58/ LILCO asserts that NRC caso law is consistent with a finding that role conflict will be no problem at Shoreham. LILCO Drief, at 27. This (Footnoto cont'd next page) 1
- 1. Historical Resolution of Role Conflict )
. I 109. The County's witnesses testified that virtually all the avail- '
able evidence -- studies of natural and technological disasters, research conducted after TMI, and surveys of persons relied upon in the Plan -- sug-gests that in a Shoreham accident, a significant proportion of the workers relied upon by LILCO will experience role conflict and many will resolve this conflict in favor of first ensuring the saft:ty of their families. Erikson and Johnson, ff. Tr. 1455, at 13.59/ We agree. Setting asido the studies relating to TMI which we discuss separately below, virtually all research supports the proposition that in emergencias, people take actions to assure the safety of their families before they perform emorgency work l that does not relate directly to their familias' safety 60/ - (Footnote cont'd from previous page) Board cannot rely on such a generalized conclusion but rather must deal solely with the facts and evidence of record. Furcher, wo note that the Zimmer Appeal Board termed the rolo conflict issue con- I fronting it as a " serious question." See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., ALAB-727, supra, 17 NRC at 772. 59/ Families tend to evacuate or tako protective actions as a unit; thus, large numbers of those who experience rola conflict will resolve the tension by reuniting with their families, even at the cost of delaying or not performing their omorgency responsibilities. This outcomo is recognized by most social scientists who have reviewed the literature pertaining to human behavior in crises. Erikson and Johnson, (f. Tr. 1455, at 15-16. 60/ Sne, n1 3., the studios cited by LILCO's witnessos at Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 44-45, 54-59, and Tt. 979-95 (Mileti, Dynos) and by the County's witnesses at Erikson and Johnson, ff. Tr. 1455, at 13-18. 70 -
110. LILCO's witnesses characterized most of the cited evidence as irrelevant; they did so by focusing on role " abandonment," asserting that the studies did not involve individuals with emergency jobs formally as-signed to them and for which they were trained, and then concluding that if one does not have an assigned role in a formal plan, by definition, he can-not be said to have " abandoned" the role, even if during an emorgency he attends to his family rather than participating in the emergency re.ponse. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 43.61/ We find LILCO's reasoning cir-cular and unpersuasivo, particularly in light of the evidence that even trained emergency workers in identified emergency responso organizations have delayed reporting or did not perform their known omorgency roles in favor of first ensuring the safety of their families. l 111. Specifically, the LILCO witnesses conceded that a 1958 study of i Texas tornados found that people with assigned emergency roles, including key efficials such as the director of civil defense, postponed or abandoned those roles to care for their families. Tr. 984 (Miloti). Similarly, a study of another emergency by Form and Nosow found that half the dt/ FEMA's witness McIntire testifind that he was not aware of conflicts of such magnitude that response eparations were negatively in.pactad. His opinion is based primarily on the Disastor Research Center ("DRC") studins we discuss below and his personal experience with the post-impact phann of emergencias involving FEMA and Stato-employed emergency workers. San McIntire, ff. Tr. 2086 at 3 Tr. 2091-92, 2101-04, 2120-23 (McIntiro). He also testifind that even in cmargencias with which he was familiar, thora could havo been rolo conflict problems of which he was not made awaro. Tr. 2094 95 (McIntiro). L _
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~
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l
+ -
i s . s \, ~ l e , g% e s g 4 g
.'in'd ividuals belotiging ES disEster-oriented orga' n izations did not pe)orm their ass,igned esergency roles. Tr. 984-85 (Mileti). Similar findings i N regarding' role conflict resolution in favor of family obligations by per- ])
sons with assigned emergency roles or emergency training were made in s yd - A stud)es conceriing the responce to Hurricane Carla (Tr. 985-86 (Mileti)), 1
. . s the Euf falo Creek flood (Cordaro e't al. , f f. Tr. 831, at 45-46; Tr.,980-81 ii s (Mileti); 1399-1.'Od (Er'ikson)),M/ and Hurricane Audrey (Tr. 2990-95 6 A (Mileti)), and in works by Fritz Killian (Tr. 1331-34 (Erikson); LlLCO Ex.'
% \ s
, ~~
54;M / Tr. 1412 (Erikson); 9E)-63 (Mileti)), Hill and Hanson, and Thompson i 3 3 and Hawkes (Eriksom and Johnson,'ff.* Tr; \1455, at 15-16). m e
rcise command and control functions. Go the other hand, LILCO A ~ [ has ta' en some steps designed to minimize the potential f9r conflicts. The
- l. Q, % , . is 3-a , -
s r que.~ tic.n presented, therefore, is whether those' steps are suffidient to L. [% S . l's g proJide reasonable easurance th st conflicts Eill not adversel'y
- affect ei-t -
s . 2 ther, the implementation of the LILCO Plan. or ths ' adequacy of protection af- n- . . s , forded by the Plan. We concinae that LILCO has rot demonstrated that it t has taken steps thet meet the regulatory standard ( Thus, we 'r ule for In- -y . . ,3 ~ tervenors on Contention 11. - y w )y $154,. AttItaoutset,wenotethatIntervenorshavenotallegedthat M(} , + LILCO employees in command an,d control positions wouldlconsciously make ^ 4 ;t , 4 g wrong or improper decisions./;t iorder to serve LI,LCO.'s perceived. interests, y y ~; Y ~., as opposed to the public's interest. Rather, the concern is that due pri-e t- . k s y ga
- marily to their many years - of s employment by LILCO and tr.e management posi-
+ , *\ s , ,1 y . -,D, o . ;,-, tions they),h, Id,90/ 0 the kommthd and contr$1 persondil 'miy interpret data 74 gN ' - 3 4 y /* 2 9/, Fcte$ ample, Messrs.Weismantle Seale, an Es ler have been with LILCOfor(respectively,18,37and32 years. Each will hold an im-portant cdmmand and control position in LERO. Purce11 et al., ff. Tr. 10,727,'at'8: Yr. 10.213-14 (Kessler). 'Their salaries and benefits y are.dependcc on job performance. Tr. 10,214 (Kessler), 10,218-19 (Weismantloh.~ See also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196.,at 5 (LERO di-g I (Footnote cont'd next page) f- 3 4 V 5 , 4 8 s ,~ f & J g 4 [ f /'. 100.'/(# > .s o s . o . g ,y [ ,/45 ' .t,' ' .(** s , 4 7.x 17 S>- 4 - -, .. r u s s I , m differently in an emergency situation, leading to inappropriate or untimely . protective action decisions. -Tr. 10,920-21, 10,928 (Cole); 10,907, 10,921, 10,929, 10,947-48, 10,751-52 (Saegert); 10,918-19, 10,928 (Lipsky); 10,931 (Purcell). 155. Conflicts of interest can occur in a variety of situations. Thus, public officials have, at times, sacrificed the public interest for their own interests (Tr. 10,729-33 (01 son)) and have even underplayed a risk because of concern for suffering a voter backlash. Tr. 10,229-30 (Mileti); see Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196, at 7-9 (examples of conflict of interest situations). Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that the . potential for conflicts of interest problems is even greater for private employees (such as LERO command and control officials) than it is for pub- -lic officials.91/ .(Footnote cont'd from previous page) rectors all are at LILCO vice president level); Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727 at.7-9; Tr. 10,911 (Olson) (LERO managers'are management level employees); 10,343, 10,354 (Weismentle) (LER0' persons not re-quired to divest LILCO stock holdings or create blind trusts). '91/ LILCO argued that public officials are just as susceptible to con-flicts as private officials. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196, at 20-21. LILCO also suggested that it might be perceived to be in ~LERO/LILCO's interest to err on the side of taking protective actions too early. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196, at 23. However, this merely serves to highlight the multiple pressures brought to bear on LILCO personnel. Further, we agree that public officials have indeed ~been susceptible to conflicts'and could do the wrong thing in a Shoreham emergency; however, for reasons described below, we find that LERO personnel will be even more susceptible. - 101 - 156. Standards of acceptable conduct for public sector officials have evolved for the purpose of avoiding conflicts of interest or even the ap-pearance of such conflicts. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 15-16.92/ JHowever, no comparable standards exist for persons in the private sector. The primary objectives, purposes and goals of a private company (such as LILCO) are to reward investors by making profits. In the course of pursuing these objectives, conflict of interest issues rarely arise, be . cause the firm's interests are narrowly defined and internally consistent, and its goals are oriented toward earning a profit. When conflicts arise in the private sector, they usually involve employees pursuing their indi-vidual interests' which are at odds with the profit goals of the company, rather than with any "public interest" goals. Id., at 16-17; see Tr. 10,917-18 (Olson). 157. A utility's conflict of interest in a radiological emergency was amply demonstrated in the 111I emergency where a number of statements by utility spokespersons in the-early stages of the emergency indicated that there was little objectivity in the utility's approach to informing the public about the seriousness of the accident. For example, the utility 92/ There are several processes which safeguard against conflicts of in-terest for public officials. First, in a democratic society, the basic mechanism of accountability is the electorate. Next, the way that institutional arrangements are devised to place one set of gov-ernment institutions against another (the Judiciary against the Execu-tive, etc.)'is.another check on conflicts. Finally, laws have been enacted that impose means for minimizing conflicts of intercat (e.g., -legislation dealing with public disclosure, public audits, placing holdings in blind trusts, etc.). Tr. 10,745-47 (01 son). - 102 - s spokesperson during public briefings displayed anger at suggestions that . coping with the accident might be beyond the capability of the utility, .although this subsequently was shown to be the case. This individual's e subjective approach to the emergency, combined with his lack of indepen-dence from the utility, led to a loss of the utility's credibility. r Purcelliet al., ff.'Tr. 10,727, at 10.93/ Furthermore, the Kemeny Commis- , _ sion found that the utility was slow to confirm pessimistic reports'about the accident. SC Ex. 93; Tr. 15,168-69 (Schwartz) . 1 158. The need for independence in protecting the public health and safety in the context of nuclear power plants was also demonstrated by the testimonyof. Staff l.witnessSchwartzwhostatedthattheNRC(andtheAEC before it) was established for the purpose of creating an independent agen-cy, not subject to other interests, to regulate nuclear power and to pro-tect the.public health and safety in nuclear. matters. Tr. 15,157-58 (Schwartz). Thus, it was recognized that public safety matters could not- ~ be left to'the utilities alons. 93/ ,Even after the TMI' accident, the utility continued to behave in a way that suggested the utility was more concerned with its image and orga-- nizational maintenance than with objectively presenting information about the severity of the -accident. The GPU chairman in May 1979, two months ~after the accident, stated: "As we look forward, we think the plant will be out of service for approximately three years.'" This prediction indicated not only-that he had little idea of the seri-ousness of the accident but also that he was so preoccupied with the idea that TMI could not fail. totally that he did not even consider the . . possibility that TMI-2 was lost. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 11. n - 103 - 159. The County's witnesses explained that LILC0 employees in command and control positions are likely to experience conflicts of interest in the event of a radiological emergency, unless adequate measures are taken to lessen the potential. The roles LILCO employees are expected to perform -- managing LILCO for. profit making purposes and acting to ensure the public. safety, health and welfare -- are potentially conflicting. The latter role places them in a position of public trust and conflicts with the former role, which is a position of preserving and furthering the private inter-ests of LILCO as a for profit entity. In such potentially conflicting roles, objectivity may be sacrificed and the appearance of objectivity- is eroded. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 18.94/ 160. The weight of the evidence leads us to find that independence from the source or cause of an emergency -- or objectivity -- is essential to effective command and control of emergency response. An important ele-ment in the exercise of effective command and control is the ability to weigh and evaluate the appropriateness of possible options before making management decisions. Without objectivity, it is quite possible that in .the face of emergency management pressures, optimal approach (es) will be discarded or ignored because of pre-existing biases or simple lack of 94/. LILCO argues that it would not in fact be in LILCO's interest for com-mand and control personnel to act inappropriately. See, e.g., Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196, at 27. That may be true but LILCO misperceives the concern: we question whether the institutional framework has been created to ensure that employees understand LILCO's true' interest in responding appropriately. - 104 - w-- - y e 1 l 1 ~ \ l 1 desire to cons'ider all reasonable perspectives. Id., at 9-10; see id., at ~11-12 (President's Commission on the accident at TMI was concerned about utility " mind set"). .Yet, LILCO command and control personnel lack neces-- sary independence and objectivity for a number of reasons. First,' they are not independent, as the term " independent" com- ~ 161. LE 'monly is used. To be independent is to be not dependent. This means that the individual is not subject to control by others and not directly affili - .ated with larger controlling units. The 3 LILCO employees designated to be the LERO Director are clearly subject to control by others; they are all .vice presidents of LILCO and they report to the president and indirectly to the board of directors. Indeed, Mr. Acker, who is -the primary LERO Direc- -tor,.was assigned to tuat position by the president of LILCO and has been --described as " representing [LILCO's] top corporate management." The 4 ELILC0 ' employees designated-to be managers of LERO are all managers of de-partments in LILCO. Clearly, therefore, the command and control personnel under the Plan,are in a dependent corporate status to superior officers of the company. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 12-13; see also Cordaro et al.,uff. Tr.'10,196, at 5. 162. Second, the LILCO. employees in command and control positions ^ 'also lack objectivity to perform the role assigned to them as LERO offi-lcials. Objectivity requires that facts and conditions are received and ' dealt.with without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or inter-pretations. .Yet facts and conditions surrounding a radiological emergency - 105 - ,~ . . - . . - - - . - . , - , - , - - . . - - .- .---. -n-at Shoreham necessarily would impact the future existence, well being, profit, and public perception of LILCO and LILCO's management. In particu-lar, the LILCO employees in command and control will have full knowledge of the costs, to the utility and to society, that would be involved in or-dering an emergency response, and would be mindful of the loss in public confidence, resulting from the heightened public awareness that people liv-ing near the facility are at risk, that would follow such an order. LILCO management level employees cannot help but interpret and judge those facts and conditions, at least in part, according to their positions in the com-pany. Their relationship with LILCO unavoidably compromises their ability to act objectively in the command and control functions assigned to them in the Plan. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 13, 19; see Tr. 10,926 (Cole) (LILCO would be more hesitant than other utilities to take protective ac-tions).95/ 95/ The fact that the individuals in command and control are long-time employees of LILCO produces an additional conflict. Their long stand-ing and, presumably, ingrained loyalty to LILCO and to fellow employees in the management hierarchy, will likely result in a desire to please LILCO management during an emergency. This could be mani-fested by their taking the advice of other LILCO executives (such as Shoreham onsite personnel or individuals with no Shoreham or LERO af-filiation), or making statements during the emergency that present management in the most favorable light. However, the requirement im-posed by their positions in LERO -- loyalty only to the public inter-est - presents the opposite demand. If t'ruly answering only to the public, a person in a command and control position would make indepen-dent decisions after evaluating input from the utility and perhaps other sources, and would be objective and forthcoming in portraying the emergency and its dangers without consideration of the public re-action vis-a-vis LILCO or the competence of its management. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 20-21. 106 - r: 163. . Third,.this-lack of objectivity is compounded by the length of t'ime each has been-in LILCO's employ. Members of an organization increase their commitment and attachment to an organization over time. Thus, the lengthy affiliation of these individuals with LILCO reduces their objectiv- .ity even further, and also compromises public and non-LILCO emergency per-sonnel perceptions of their independence and objectivity. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727 at 14. 164. The evidence above establishes that the LILCO command and con- ' trol employees owe their allegiance to two_ inconsistent mandates. On the one hand, as high level employees of LILCO, they report to LILCO's presi-dent and board of directors and their mandate is to enhance the utility's profits and reputation; and, as long time management employees or officers of the company, their personal prestige, reputation, and economic well-being is inextricably tied to the financial success and organizational stability of LILCO. On the other hand, as the primary decisionmakers in LERO, these same individuals owe their loyalty to the public; in that role .their mandate is to ignore any consideration of LILCO's interests and to protect the public health, safety and welfare. There are inherent, irrec-oncilable conflicts between'these two incompatible roles. Id., at 20. 165. 'All parties agreed that emergency planning should be structured
- 1 to' remove inappropriate influences from decisionmakers' judgments. See
.Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196, at 10-11; Tr. 10,290 (Mileti); 10,964 (Lipsky); 15,216-17 (Sears). If such measures are not taken, then command - 107 - n . i 'and control performance could be affected in several respects. The firstL is.the speed and timeliness with which' emergency announcements are made. There may be legitimate questions about the status of the plant at the out-set offan accident. 'The persons in command and control must weigh the need for beginning 'aniemergency response against the consequences of unnecessarily frightening or worrying the public. A LILCO management employee would be more likely than a person not affiliated with LILCO to ~delayLthe announcement that an emergency had occurred because of his per- ~ ception of the adverse personal and corporate consequences of a premature or unnecessary announcement. Purcell et al., ff.'Tr. 10,727, at 23-24. The. employee need not be consciously aware of these conflicts for them to ~ cause a delayed perception of negative events, or to produce a tendency to misinterpret data is conformity with perceived expectations and desires. ~ LThis could result in a delay in.the decision to announce to the public that an emergency had occurred at Shoreham. Id., at'24.96/ 96/f The~ nature, scope'and content of the notification may also be affected by. conflicts experienced by the LILCO personnel. The extent to which the severity or seriousness of a particular radiological emergency is conveyed to support personnel or to the public generally, as well as the manner in which the emergency is characterized or described, par-ticularly when some uncertainty exists, may be influenced by the fact ^ that individuals responsible for. deciding on the content of public .information are.LILCO employees. Purcell et al.,'ff. Tr. 10,727, at
- 24. We recognize that 'the existence of predefined emergency classifi-
. cation levels addresses this problem to some degree; however, under the Plan, . persons in command and control have a great ' deal of discre-tion.in determining how to respond, or what actions to recommend, in any particular class of emcrgency. See Cordaro et al., ff. 10,196, at 12-13;.Tr. 10,379 (Cordaro); 10,292-93, 10-263-64 (Weismantle). - 108 - 166. Second, the decision to recommend protective actions may be ad-versely affected by the conflicts experienced by LILCO personnel. It is one thing to alert the public to the occurrence of an accident; it is more significant, however, to tell the public that the accident has resulted in a release of radioactive materials, and that the public must take actions Lto avoid harm. The risk of delay in making such an announcement must be weighed against the risk in unnecessarily or prematurely frightening mem-bers of the public or causing them to begin to evacuate or take other ac-tions in an effort to protect themselves. The conflicts experienced by the LILCO personnel may result in their weighing those risks differently than would an independent authority. Id., at 25-26. .167. Third, conflicts may affect decisicns as to what protective ac- - tions should be recommended. LILCO personnel may believe that the dis-ruption, confusion and anxiety generated by an evacuation recommendation is likely to be greater than that generated by a sheltering recommendation. Moreover, once an evacuation is recommended, complex procedures regarding traffic control, busing people without access to cars, etc. , must be put 'into effect. Sheltering is an easier action to implement, at least in the short term. Therefore, as a result of conflicts, LILCO employees may be L. more-liksly than non-LILCO authorities to recommend sheltering as a protec-tive action, even if svacuation were the more appropriate protective ac-tion. Id., at 26-27. - 109 - l l l l l l 168. Finally, the LERO Director may feel pressure to rely on advice of other LILCO management employees during an emergency to demonstrate loy-alty to LILCO management -- regardless of the competence, objectivity, or nature of such persons. Indeed, one of the individuals which LILCO desig-nated to be a LERO Director told Mr. Sears of the NRC Staff that he would first check with LILCO management before taking action under the Plan. Tr. 15,249-50 (Sears) . Thus, the Director could make inappropriate decisions not necessarily in an effort to minimize public relations damage or poten-tial harm to his own reputation or position, but rather based on advice from non-objective LILCO employees. Moreover, if officials with command authority feel pressures to consult with others, they are likely to spend time locating and consulting others when the situation may require speedy, authoritative judgment. Thus, the conflict may lead to delay and compro-mise the effectiveness of emergency response. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 27-28. 169. The foregoing findings do not mean that LILCO management employees will in fact perform improperly during a Shoreham emergency. Rather, these findings document that absent effective measures to the con-trary, there is a real potential for LILCO personnel in command and control to respond in an inappropriate fashion. Based on the evidence presented by Intervenors concerning the actual TMI experience, the existence of con-flicts in other situations, and the fact that LILCO personnel will be more prone to conflicts than public officials, it was incumbent on LILCO to dem-onstrate that it has taken adequate measures to prevent such conflicts from occurring and from adversely affecting implementation of the LILCO Plan. - 110 - r 170. LILCO has taken some steps to attempt to reduce the potential for conflicts. It has retained Dr. M11eti as a consultant and has followed ' his recommendations. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196, at 13-20.97/ Steps proposed to be taken or being taken include: (1) structuring LERO to fos-ter independence from onsite plant staff (id., at.28);98/ (2) emphasizing in the training program the need to protect the public (id., at 29, Atts. 8, 9);-(3) having a formalized decisionmaking process with detailed proce-dures, thus limiting discretion (see e1 g , id., at 13-15);99/ (4) having the LERO Director advised by a Radiation Health Coordinator who is an inde-pendent contractor (id., at 14-17); (5) having the Department of. Energy-Radiological Assistance Plan (" DOE-RAP") team involved in making protective act' ion recommendations (id., at 32); (6) having drills and exer-cises (Tr. 15,228-29 (Sears)): and (7) knowledge that there will almost certainly be a post-event audit. Cordaro et al., ff..Tr. 10,196, at 19-20, 32-33; Tr. 10,271-72 (Mileti); 10,309-10 (Cordaro). 97/ Dr. Mileti recommended 4 measures to minimize conflicts: formalized decision and transmittal instructions; advance formalized substance, process and spacing of public information; participants' knowledge that they are to carry out the tasks in a specified manner; and knowl-edge that there would be a post-event audit.. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196, at 11-12. The County's witnesses questioned the merits of Dr. Mileti's approach. Tr. 10,903-09 (Purcell). ' 98/ For example, LERO command and control employees at the E0C are of equal or superior rank to onsite response personnel. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196, at 28. 99/ LILCO has in mind that the initial classification of the emergency will be based on nondiscretionary Emergency Action Levels ("EALs"), s which do prescribe actions for many events. See LILCO Brief, at 45. However, discretion still exists. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196, at 12-13; Tr. 10,379 (Cordaro); 10,292-93, 10,263-64 (Weismantle). - 111 - 171. This Board does not doubt that LILCO will carry out each of the items mentioned above, although in certain respects we have doubts as to how effective these " checks" will be.100/ But when these actions are looked at, they really amount to very little. Indeed, we doubt that many of these steps represent anything beyond what is ordinarily done for offsite planning, despite the fact that the potential for conflicts is sub-
- stantially greater in this case than where governmental personnel are not
'in command and control positions. For instance, we are sure that training for all plants emphasizes the need to protect the public safety. Simi-larly, we are confident that all plants utilize EAL classifications, since EALs are spelled out in NUREG-0654. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,196 at 13-14. Having the DOE-RAP team involved and an outside Radiation Health Coordinator may represent some check, but these persons are not part of the top level LERO command and control structure, and actions can be taken without their input an'd contrary to their recommendations. Tr. 10,295-96, 10,307-09 (Weismantle); 10,788 (01 son). See OPIP 3.6.1,(LERO Director has sole authority for making protective action recommendations). Thus, it is t 100/ For instance, this Board doubts whether a drill or exercise, under-taken necessarily in the, context of no actual accident, could really reveal anything material about whether emergency personnel would pause inappropriately to analyze an accident due to conflict of interest. See Tr. 15,228-29 (Sears). And while a post-accident audit may find whether a response was properly carried out, it would not eliminate l the conflict which may impact that. response during an accident. Tr. L 10,926-28 (Lipsky); see Tr. 10,928 (Cole) (post-accident accountabili-ty will not be an effective check because LERO personnel will think they are performing properly; post-accident accountability helps only when persons are consciously doing the wrong thing). - 112 - still management level LILCO employees who will be making the actual deci-sions on protective' actions. ~ Finally, these " steps" fall to address the ~ ' concern that LERO personnel will unconsciously, albeit in good faith', take actionswhichsimplyfarecontrarytothepublicinterest. The checks as-serted' by LILCO include no independent means of assuring that the public's . interest, as opposed to that of LILCO, has been properly and adequately taken into account by those responsible for the alternate command and con-trol decisions. 7 L172. We~are also. unpersuaded by the suggestion that the NRC regula- ' tory structure will-minimize the potential for conflicts. See, n , Tr. 10,381 (Cordaro); 15,168-71, 15,174-76, 15,230 (Schwartz); Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 10,196,.at 30-31. To.be sure, since the TMI accident a central focus of'the NRC's efforts has been to upgrade emergency planning to m id another debacle such as occurred at TMI. Indeed, 10 CFR S 50.47 was pro-Laulgate'd'in~1arge part as a result of that accident and the lack of effec- ~ .tive response to it. The existence of those regulations should help to re-duce many of the problems exhibited at TMI, since prior to TMI no formalized emergency planning regulatory structure existed at all. But the ~ existence of emergency planning regulations is not a comple,te answer to the conflict issue-presented here, particularly since those regulations are premised 'primarily on governmental personnel exercising command and control authority. Sg e.g., NUREG 0654 Section I, at 1, 20. The LILCO Plan, of , course,c is inconsistent with that premise, since LILCO itself seeks to , . guide and control the emergency response.101/ Thus, the emergency planning 101/ Indeed, the-fact.that LILCO's proposal is unique and contrary to the i situation upon which the regulations are premised is what gives rise =to the conflict issue presented in Contention 11 in the first place. - 113 - [ l h regulations do not expressly deal with the conflict issue presented by the LILCO proposal. -Furthermore, the issue here is not whether LILCO will ful-l fill its obligation under the NRC regulations to report safety problems promptly to the NRC. See, e.g., Tr. 15,258 (Sears); 15,247-48 (Schwartz); Schwartz, ff. Tr.' 15,143, at 2-3; Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 10,196, at 27-28. .We are confident that it can and will do so. However, the mere reporting of an event to the NRC does not change the responsibilities of those LILCO employees in command and control under the LILCO Plan. Even though the NRC may be aware that an accident has occurred and may be monitoring its prog-ress and LILCO's response, in the early minutes and hours of an accident, g LILCO employees in command and control will be the only ones responsible ' for and with the.information necessary to make all required commandd 'eci-sions, including protective recommendatlons to the public. See Tr. 15,235 (Schwartz).102/ 173. There was also discussion at trial of the NRC's authority to in-tervene during an accident and actually order the utility to take certain offsite actions. First, we note that the NRC's authority to order'offsite 102/ NRC Region I personnel would likely be dispatched from King of Prussia and others would be available from headquarters to monitor the LILCO response. Schwartz, f f. Tr. 15,143, at 3. We do not doubt that NRC personnel would attempt to ensure appropriate response, and perhaps once they were fully integrated into the response, their presence would in fact serve to lessen the potential for conflicts. However, this does not change our view that in the early hours of a fast moving emergency, both as a practical matter and, according to the provisions of the LILCO Plan, the response would be determined by the LILCO per- ~ sonnel. It' simply would not be feasible for the NRC to play an effec-tive role.early in the event. 114 - m l suthorities to make particular protective action recommendations was uncer-t'ain,'although Mr. Schwartz eventually concluded.that the'NRC could do so in this case. fr. 15,233-35, 15,240-46 (Schwartz). As a practical matter, however, tFis offsrs us 1ittle assurance of prompt or effective action. ~ While NRC personnel in King of Prussia or elsewhere may be available by phone, they will be in no position to oversee or second guess the actual course of events because they would be receiving their information from the [ utility. .Tr. 15,235 (Schwartz). Furthermore, .although there is an NRC resident. inspector at Shoreham, he is onsite only 8 hours a day and thus I
- would not always be available during the initial stages of an accident.
i~ Id. In addition, there is no reason.to believe that the resident inspector at Shoreham has any particular knowledge or expertise relating to offsite planning or preparedness for' an emergency on Long Island. Thus, any at-. tempt by him to take over LILCO's offsite response would be based on little or no knowledge of LILCO's offsite plan. See Tr. 15,162-65 (Sears). In short, we cannot find that the NRC.can provide any effective restraint on the adverse effect a conflict of interest experienced by command and con-trol personnel could have on the emergency response. Indeed, if the NRC .tried to do so, confusion could result. Finally, we cannot base our ruling on this contention on speculation that NRC officials might be able to act as a check on the actions of persons in control of an emergency response. It 'is our duty to determine the adequacy of. LILCO's Plan, as written and presented to us by LILCO. We cannot read out of that Plan the portion which says LILCO employees are in command and control of the emergency, nor can we read into it an assumption about possible NRC actions. - 115 - 174. Finally, LILCO argues that it has done the best it can do under the- circumstances and that.any defect this Board might find relating to conflict of interest could be eliminated if the County or State joined in implementation of the Plan. See LILCO Brief, at 53-56. Further, LILCO suggests that if the Board were to rule for Intervenors, it would be to ; t read the " utility plen" option out of the regulations. LILCO Brief, at 53. This is wrong. While a utility is entitled to an opportunity to attempt to show that there can be adequate preparedness under a utility plan, Long 1 ' Island Llahting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-13, 17 ft NRC 741 (1983), a utility is not guaranteed that the NRC will find, as a , factual matter, in favor of the utility on that question. We rule in favor of Intervenors on Contention 11, based on the evadence which is before us concerning the LILCO Plan. We intimate no view whether another utility or even LILCO under a different organizational framework could overcome the problems which we have found prevent us from making the necessary finding under 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1).103/ 103/ We note, however, that LILCO's suggestion that it "has done everything it can under the circumstances" (LILCO Brief, at 56) is wrong on its face. It was not up to Intervenors or this Board to tell LILCO how it could improve the Plan. But some steps are obvious in terms of l increasing the independence and objectivity of command and control personnel. For instance, under a proper protocol ensuring indepan-dence, the command and control functions could be contracted to out-j side consultants with actual emergency planning experience, a parallel
- to contract security personnel often retained in licensees' efforts to L satisfy Section 73.55. Or such contracted personnel could be hired as command and control advisors to the LERO Directors, thus ensuring that there'would be timely checks on LERO personnel. LILCO, of course, has not adopted any such proposals. '
116 - + ~- - +--- < - - ' - B. Credibility (Contention 15) l -175. Contention 15 concerns the effect of LILCO's asserted low credi- - l bility on LILCO's ability to implement the Plan. The major issues are ' whether LILCO in fact lacks credibility and whether LILCO's recommendations would be obeyed by the public and non-LILCO response personnel.104/ 176. Credibility means the extent to which someone or something is considered capable of being believed. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at [
- 31. The County argues that the public's perception of LILCO's credibility L is likely to 1. ave a significant impact on the public's response to a
'Shoreham accident and, in particular, on whether to follow LILCO's protec-tive action recommendations'.. Cole, ff. Tr. 10,727, at 4-5.' For the res-
- , sons set forth below, we agree.
? e 177.- The County's witnesses testified thct, for the Plan to be work-l able,' people must believe that the organization and individuals imple-menting the Plan are competent and trustworthy sources of information. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 33-34; Tr. 10,806-07 (Cole); 10,802 (Lipsky). Mr. McIntire agreed. McIntire, ff. Tr. 2086, at 4. Likewise,- 104/ The Board heard testimony from 5 Suffolk County and 7 LILCO witnesses. All witnesses were found to be qualified although LILCO witnesses Cordaro, Weismantle, Robinson and Clawson have no particular expertise on this issue and base their testimony largely on their employment ; with LILCO. Tr. 10,409-10 (Robinson); 10,491 (Clawson); 10,415-16 (Weismantle); 10,417 (Cordaro). As made clear in our findings, we re-ject LILCO's assertion (LILCO Brief, at 64) that its witnesses were more credible than the County's. - 117 - LILCO witnesses Mileti and Sorensen testified that emergency public infor-mation or warnings must seem credible and reliable to people receiving them. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 27-28; M11eti, ff. Tr. 10,396, at 41; Tr. 10,408 (Sorensen); see also Tr. 10,802-08 (Saegert); 10.802 (Lipsky); LILCO Ex. 55, at 6. Otherwise, people are likely to ignore in-structions about how to respond, and will follow their own perceptions in-stead. Cole, ff. Tr. 10,727, at 6; Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 32-33.105/ Furthermore, credibility is a major qualification for an indi-vidual to be able to exercise command and control over personnel in unrelated organizations (as command and control personnel must do under the Plan). Id., at 31-34; Tr. 10,846-50 (Saegert). The TMI experience indi-cates that the low credibility of information sources during the emergency probably contributed to evacuation from the TMI area. Tr. 10,589-90 (Sorensen). 178. We find, therefore, that a public perception that LILCO is com-petent to manage a Shoreham emergency and that it is credible as a source of information is essential to successful implementation of the Plan. Nev-ertheless, the evidence leads us to conclude that the public does not per-ceive LILCO to be credible. 105/ See also Cole, ff. Tr. 10,727, at 13 (LILCO survey stated that LILCO's credibility was essential to accomplishing successful communications with the public). 118 -
- 1. LILCO Is Not a Credible Source of Information ~
179. Surveys conducted by Suffolk County and LILCO show that Long Is-land residents have a high level of concern about the dangers of nuclear power and are mistrustful and suspicious of LILCO. Cole, ff. Tr. 10,727, at 5.106/ For instance, a May 1982 Social Data Analysts ("SDA") survey asked respondents how much they would trust a LILCO official to tell the truth about a possible Shoreham accident. Only 4% said that they would have a great deal of trust in the LILCO official, 36% said that they would trust a LILCO official "somewhat," and 58% said that they would not trust a LILCO official at all. Id., at 7.107/ 180. SDA also conducted two Shoreham surveys for Newsday which in-cluded questions on LILCO's credibility. In February 1983, Nassau and Suffolk County residents were asked how much they would trust various peo-ple, including Charles Pierce, then LILCO's Board Chairman, to tell the truth about Shoreham. LILCO's Board Chairman had the lowest credibility. Forty-four percent said that they would not trust him at all and 7% said 106/ LILCO argues that this Board should not rely on survey data. See LILCO Brief, at 63. For reasons discussed in our findings on Conten-tion 23, we do find such data to be useful. Further, we note that the Board in the Catawba proceeding recently fully accepted public opinion findings conducted on behalf of Duke Power concerning the public's concerns about radiation effects and the possibility of a radiological accident. See Duke Power Co., supra, L3P-84-37, slip op. at 26. 122/ More recently, Bill Johnson and Associates, Inc, conducted three sur-veys for LILCO which were similar to the 1982 SDA survey. The Johnson survey results are virtually identical to those from the May 1982 SDA survey. Cole, ff. Tr. 10,727, at 11-12. - 119 - that they would trust him a great deal. The respondents' distrust of LILCO's Chairman on Shoreham matters was almost twice as great as it was of any.other person included in the questionnaire. Id., at 8. When a sub-sample of the original Newsday respondents was reinterviewed in September / October 1983, LILCO's credibility had decreased: 52?. stated they would not trust Mr. Pierce at all. Id.108/ 181. LILCO has also sponsored research which documents LILCO's low credibility. First, a 1979 study performed for LILCO concluded that Long Island residents had "a profound distrust of nuclear energy," and that "most LILCO customers no longer believe LILCO is inherently trustworthy" or "a benign rational authority." Cole, ff. Tr. 10,'727, at 10-11; SC Ex. 55, at S; Tr. 10,490-92 (Robinson). LILCO witness Barnett, who worked on the 1979 study, has obtained no subsequent data that would lead him to question those findings. Tr. 9696-97 (Barnett). Second, in 1981, Dr. Cole re-searchea women's attitudes toward LILCO, and found, inter alia, that LILCO was not trusted, nor did the respondents believe they would trust anyone . who spoke on LILCO's behalf in a LILCO-sponsored message. Tr. 10,823-27 108/ The Newsday survey results are lower than the 1982 SDA survey because the question asked was different. The Newsday surveys asked a general question about telling the truth about Shoreham. The 1982 survey asked about telling the truth about an accident at Shoreham. The fact that the 1982 survey showed higher proportions distrusting LILCO is evidence that LILCO's credibility will decline in the event of an accident. Cole, ff. Tr. 10,727, a_t 9. Furthermore, the 1982 survey was conducted before the problems irrvorving the Shoreham diesel gener-ators were reported. It is reasonable to assume that, if the 1982 survey were repeated today, an even larger proportion would not trust LILCO to tell the truth about a Shoreham accident. Id., at 9-10. 120 -
- c. . . . . .
. _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _. _ . _ - - - - - - - - -J (Celo). Third, the 1983 YSW survey (discussed in our findings on Conten-tion 23) found LILCO to be the least credible source of information about nuclear power: 23% rated information given out by LILCO as being very be-llevable and 37% rated such information as very unbelievable. Cole, ff. Tr. 10,727 at 13.109/ 182. Public entities have also found that LILC0 lacks credibility. The New York State Fact Finding Panel on the Shoreham Nuclear Power Facility ("Marburger Commission") found that LILC0 "still lacks credibility l as an operator of a nuclear power plant." Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 35 and Att. 5.110/ Similarly, several Boards of Education and other 109/ LILCO pointed to the YSW data in an attempt to prove that the County Executive's credibility is as low as LILCO's. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 12, 16-18. Hcwever, LILCO's witnesses conceded that only selected data from the YSW survey had been included in their testi-many. If all the YSW survey data were included, it would show that LILCO's conclusion was not valid. Tr. 10,481 (Sorensen); 10,486-87 (Cordaro). 110/ LILCO's credibility has undoubtedly been reduced even further in re-cent months because of the substancial publicity about LILCO's manage-ment incompetence with respect to Shoreham. The issues covered exten-sively by the press include (1) the findings of the Marburger Commission; (2) the persistent failures of the Shoreham diesel genera-tors; (3) the increasing delay and costs involved in completing Shoreham and statements that the delay and the cost are attributable to LILCO management errors; (4) recommendations by the New York Public Service Commission staff that approximately $1.5 billion of Shoreham's costs should be borne by LILCO, rather than its ratepayers, because of LILCO mismanagement; and (5) allegations by government entities about the competence or prudence of LILCO's management with respect to Shoreham. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 35-36, 40-42 and Atts. 7-10; Tr. 10,736-37 (Lipsky). Mrs. Clawson conceded that the negative publicity about Shoreham has had an adverse impact on LILCO's credi-bility. Tr. 10,473-74 (Clawson). Drs. Mileti and Barnett were unfa-(Footnote cont'd next'page) - 121 - f:- e school organizations have expressed the view that LILCO is not credible ~cr objective, and that they are unwilling to rely upon LILCO officials for .information or advice during a Shoreham emergency.111/ Others have passed -resolutions which state that the Plan is not realistic or workable, or does { not provide adequate protection. M., at 38 and Att. 6. Indeed, represen- .tatives of three school districts located near Shoreham confirmed that their districts would not believe or base their decisionmaking on informa- -tion disseminated by LILCO. Muto and Smith (Crediblity), ff. Tr. 11,001, at.2; Petrilak (Credibility), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 2-3; Jeffers and Rossi (Credibility), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 2; Tr. 11,042-44, 11,049-50 (Muto); 11,045 (Smith); 11,058, 11,065 (Petrilak); 11,063, 11,,67-68 (Jeffers). This sentiment appears to be widespread. Jeffers and Rossi (Cred,1bility), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 3; Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 37-38 and Att. 6.11_2/ (Footnote cont'd from previous page) miliar with the scope for Mileti of the negative publicity LILCO has received. Tr. 10,545-47 (M11eti); 9722 (Barnett). Their ignorance of this factor related to LILCO's credibility diminishes the weight we can give to their views on this' issue. M / ' Resolutions have been adopted by the Mount Sinal Parents Teachers Or-ganization, the MCCSD, the Miller Place Union Free School District Board of Education, the Mt. Sinai Teachers' Association, the Middle Island Central . School District Board of Education, St. Andrew's School Board, and the Board and Membership of the Sound Beach Pre-School Co-Op. Purcell et al.,'ff. Tr. 10,727, at 36-37 and Att. 6. 112/ Additional support for the view that LILCO lacks credibility comes from studies which indicate public suspicion of the nuclear power in-dustry. For example, a study by LILCO witness Barnett for DOE con-(Footnote cont'd next page) 122 - J w 183. The foregoing evidence in our view establishes conc.lusively that LILCO is not viewed as a credible source of information. We now' turn to the impact.of that finding on the adequacy of the Plan.
- 2. Significance of LILCO's Lack of Csedibility 184. -We find that LILCO's lack of credibility will have an adverse
-effect on implemention of the Plan. Perceptions of LILCO's incompetence and lack of credibility will lead the public and non-LILCO organizations to doubt the competence and credibility of LILCO employees assigned to imple-ment the Plan. These doubts will be exacerbated by doubts about the objec-tivity of LILCO personnel.in command and control (s_eee findings on Conten- ~ tion 11),.and' suspicions that LERO personnel have not been adequately trained. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 43-44, 47. As an emergency develops, LILCO is likely to be viewed as even less credible since an acci-dent will be interpreted as evidence of LILCO's incompetence. Yet, the . Plan assumes that LILCO will be believed and obeyed by the public and non-LILCO organizations. Id., at 44-45. This is not realistic. (Footnote cont'd from previous page) cluded, among other things, that the nuclear industry "has serious credibility problems concerning its competence and honesty." Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 38-39; Cordaro'et al...ff. Tr. 10.396, at 19-20. Studies by Dr. Barnett also indicate that there is significant skepticism about nuclear emergency planning. Id. at 21-22; s_ee e also Tr. 9697, 9727 (Barnett). These data and other studies also reveal that even utilities with' operating nuclear plants are not seen as credible information sources. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 39. - 123 - 185. LILCO downplayed the significance of the evidence showing that 4 LILCO has low credibility. First, LILCO urged that, since LILCO is not unique among utilities in having low credibility, one cannot make a case that people around Shoreham are especially unlikely to follon emergency in-structions. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 18-23. However, the cru-cial question here is not whether LILCO has lower credibility than other utilities, although there is evidence that it does. See Tr. 9715 (Barnett). Rathor, this case is distinguished from others because no other utility has proposed an offsite plan that is to be directed, controlled and implemented by utility employees. That fact makes LILCO's credibility a crucial issue. Cole, ff. Tr. 10,727, at 14.113/ 186. LILCO also argued that, while low credibility cannot help emer-gency response, it is possible to elicit belief in emergency information (thereby eliciting a " good" response to the emergency) even when credibili-ty is low. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 43-45; Tr. 10,545 (Mileti).114/ LILCO believes this can be accomplished by designing an . 113/ LILCO suggests that, if this Board finds that its lack of credibility renders the Plan impossible to implement, then no plan anywhere can be implemented because no one has great credibility on nuclear issues. LILCO Brief, at 59. The Board rejects the suggestion. We are dealing only with the facts of this case, facts which demonstrate a serious question regarding whether LILCO is capable of leading an effective emergency response. 114/ We find little validity in the distinction Dr. M11eti attempted to draw between credibility.and believability. Tr. 10,564-68 (Mileti). Indeed, his position is undercut by his testimony that in past emergencies credibility and belief co-varied. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. (Footnote cont'd next page) 124 - e I emergency public information system that meets sta'ndards set forth by Dr. Mileti. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 49-55; Tr. 10,543-44, 10,556 (Mileti); but see Contention 23 findings regarding these standards and our view that they do not substantially reduce inappropriate responses. 187. Of the various factors which add up to " good information," LILCO held out 2 as being of foremost importance: the existence of a " mix of sources" and confirmation (i.e., frequent repetition of a clear, accurate and consistent warning over multiple channels). Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 55-56. With respect to the first factor, LILCO asserted that people evaluate some persons within an organization as having little credi-bility while others in the same organization are perceived as having high credibility. LILCO suggested that a nuclear scientist or engineer working for a utility would be a more credible information source than an officer of that utility, or even a local or state government official. Id., at 32-33. On this basis, LILCO's EBS messages are written to state that con-sultations with nuclear scientists ,and engineers, as well as with officials from public agencies, have taken place prior to issuance of protective ac-tion recommendations. Id., at 39. (Footnote cont'd from previous page) 10,396, at 45; Tr. 10,631-32 (Mileti). Furthermore, Dr. Mileti was unable to provide any meaningful examples of actual emergencies where belief 6 s elicited in the presence of low credibility (see Tr. 10,557-64, 10,578-88 (Mileti)) and the TMI data he and Dr. Sorensen presented to support this point was demonstrated on cross-examination to provide no such support. Tr. 10,436-58 (Sorensen); see Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 28-36. 125 - I 188. Despite LILCO's proposed use of a " mix" of sources , we concur with the County's witnesses that LILCO's announcement would not be be-lieved, no matter what authorities were referenced in the message. Cole, ff. Tr. 104727, at 15-16. First, LILCO's EBS messages identify the "Direc-tor of Local Response" as the source of information. OPIP 3.8.2, at 13-26. Assuming the public knows, based on LILCO's public information program, ,that the " Director of Local Response" is a LILCO employee, the EBS message will not be believed or obeyed because the source of the recommendation re-mains a LILCO official. Thus, the actual information source is one having low credibility. Id., at 17-18; Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 70-72. Dr. Sorenson agreed that the value of the " mix of sources" would diminish if people perceived the source of information to be the LERO Director. Tr. 1622-23 (Sorenson). 189. Second, the scientists referer.ct.d in LILCO's EBS messages come from sources associated with LILCO, including scientists from LERO and LILCO's onsite organization. Others are DOE-RAP team members from the Brookhaven Area Office (" Bit 0") who are involved in LILCO's ef fsite plan. The public, not knowing the particular reputation of these individuals, would have to base its judgment on the scientists' and engineers' organiza-tional affiliation. Tr. 10,501 (Weisa ntle) . That affiliation, of course, is primarily with LILCO.M/ Thus, we find that the public will perceive 115/ LILCO also committed to increase its " mix" of sources by having two BNL radiation health effects experts at the ENC as independant review-(footnote cont'd next page) - 126 - E f these individuals to be affiliated wholly or in part with LILCO, an entity which clearly lacks credibility and thus these individuals will have no more credibility than LILCO. See Tr. 10,823-24 (Cole) (respendents in a LILCO-sponsored study would not trust engineer speaking on LILCO's be-half).116/ Therefore, LILCO's reference in its EBS messages to consulta-tions with other sources, such as scientists and engineers, will not make LILCO's messages more believable.117/ (Footnote cont'd from previous page) ers of the information disseminated by LILCO. Cordaro et al. (Erra-ta), ff. Tr. 10,396, at 1-2. A similar procedure was used during the Ginna incident. Cordaro et al., (f. Tr. 10,396, at 37. We cannot ,, find that these two experts will substantially change the public's re-sponse because, as noted in the text, having a " mix" of sources is not i - a panacea for LILCO's low credibility. Furthermore, Dr. Sorensen stated the 2 experts used at Ginna were effective because they had no organizational affiliation with the utility there. Tr. 10,523 (Sorensen). Here, however, BNL personne; have a role in LILCO's offsite plan. Tr. 10,523-24 (Robinson); 10,466-70 (Robinson, 'Cordaro). Mrs. Robinson did not know whether'the public perceived BNL to be aligned with LILCo. Therefore, we cannot find that LILCO's "in- ,, dependent" experts will in fa6t be' perceived to be independent. Fur-ther, we give no great weight to the Ginna experience since no evi- 'dence was presented of the utility's credibility and whether the allegedly independent experts were a factor in the response to that emergency. Indeed, for all Dr. Sorensen knew, that utility's credi-bility could have been high to begin with. Tr. 10,521-22 (Sorensen). . .i , 116/ Utility-affiliated scientists and enginners lacking independent aca-demic affiliation have a level of credibility no different than that of utility management. Tr. 9766-69, 9771 (Barnett). Furthermore, the h believability of nuclear scientists has been declining recently. Tr. 9730-31 (Barnett); SC Ex. 56, at 2. Finally, Dr. Mileti conceded that people may find the whole array of sources lacking in credibility. Tr. 10,606 (Hilati), 11I/ Similarly, LILCO's reliance on EBS messages to shape the public's emergency response is misplaced because there will be many other (Footnote cont'd next page) - 127 - .m. % u i .g
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/ i V. .v / . t a c ; , t q, 7,.N, 1 4 x , 1 / ' , ' 'y. ; ,i' . i *f# ? s a 190. With respect to making public authorities part of the " mix" of ) (s ,\ f / 4 i i information sources, LILCO asserted that the NRC and DOE will paticipate ,
- a. ; s in .the emergency response and'In the infdrmation dissemination process, .\.
.i '? j q < 5b, i '. < l tnersby allegedly enhancirig LILCO s credibility and its information. ,\ # 4 \ 4 a Cordark, et al....ff. Tr. 10,396 fat I s58-3R 4 M;c. Weismantle conceded,Il dd-w s ,s *s ec4 + g _ / n ever, that neither NRC'no,r DOE representatives would be on the scene in the
- i r - + 4 crucial early stages of the emergency. Tr. 10,518-19 (Weismnele) .118/
)' * }
- i f ^g
,191. With despect to the second factor (confirmation of the message), t. > ~. ,? - .,, s, t1 the LILCO witnesses asserted ,tihat when a warning is received frcg a source s~ , < h 1F . Judged to have lowM cAdibil1ty. peopIe tend not to take immediatylction. ., w sh ~ h & ' /ps \ '"2
- g. + (Rather, they are morevNkrif to go albut their bud.-r,uess or seek additional y , .
- _ information to confirm vaat they, he.vc heard. Thus, in a Shoreham emergency 4.; g s ,
t , u ,f 1 , .j s,( LILCO expects people who perceive LILCO as having low credibility;20t to %lj +
- t. f
- i . . t. ?- Y, e , (Footrotacont'dfrompreviouspagh), 1 - ,. ; i ( p%- ,. sources of 'information about the accident ava)1able to the public, - e . some of which )re bound to -contradict LILCO's information. ' Cole, ff. , + y 'DJ . 10,727,~ at 17-18. Indeed, Mrs. Clawson acknowledged that LILCO f(* 4 has no control over the media and that scientists of status equal to LILCO's could disagree with LILCO's information. ITr. 10,615-20, 10,703 (Clawson). She was also certain that some people would believe information that conflicted with LILCO's. Tr. 10,622 (Clawson). Dr. , Soren% h concurred that such conflititing statements by scientists about the accident would detract from LILCO's credibility. -Tr. 10,521 (Sorerfen) . s f , . ., .s 't r 118/ LkLCO also stated that it' intends to integrate 44unty and St4teper - 3 - sonnel, fcto the response process if they decidd/to participate. 49 Cordarifet al., ff. Tr._10,396, at 116. Howeva#, there are no plans - or procedures 1ffr3 performing this integration process. Tr. !/),681 82
- gg '
(Weismant1 9 ) . ' See our ff // dings on Conte'ntion 92. ', Ye3 7 .yA 1 3 \,
- 4 t i ,
8 <;$ J). -s /, g IO I '4s128 - y, , 4 ,1 / * \ i l'( & 4 s' a ,j- { b <* .2 a AI .% y 4 ~ 'm ' c,-
- w. f ( .,
act but instead to listen for confirmatory information. In other words, according to LILCO, inaction is more likely than action. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, et 46-47; Tr. 10,572-74 (Mileti). We note, however, that this testimony directly contradicts Dr. Barnett, who testified that a heightened fear of radiation would increase pressures to act, which could mean doing things other than seeking confirmatory information, such as 4 evacuating. Tr. 9754-55 (Barnett).119/ 192. LILCO offered additional reasons why its low credibility alleg-edly would not hamper emergency response. First, Dr. Barnett testified that participants in anthropological 1y-based interviews indicated that they would follow instructions during an emergency. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 45-46. However, the evidence demonstrated that the opposite was true. Dr. Barnett's interviews indicate there is a widespread feeling that people will not pay attention to a radiological emergency response plan be-cause they doubt that one could work. SC Ex. 57, at 2, 4-6; see Tr. 9741-47 (Barnett). Furthermore, none of his interviews asked whether peo-ple would obey the instructions of a utility; only governmental or quasi governmental organizations were discussed. Tr. 9750-52 (Barnett); SC Ex. 57, at 5. Thus, Dr. Barnett's interviews do not support LILCO's posi-tion. 119/ We do not accept Dr. Mileti's statement that if a message is not be-lieved by the public, it will be believed if repeated over and over again. Tr. 10,607 (Mileti). Dr. Mileti later backed away from this assertion, conceding that frequency will not necessarily lead to be-lief. Tr. 10,614, 10,704-05 (Mileti). 129 - l I 193. Second, LILCO suggested that people will obey LILCO in a Shoreham accident because people generally obey LILCO during gas leaks or when live power lines are down. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396 at 59-60. We concur with the County's witnesses, however, who demonstrated that it is irrelevant that people allegedly listen to LILCO with respect to such non-nuclear matters. Tr. 10,938 (Cole).120/ 194. Third, LILCO assert'ed that credibility changes over time, and thus, the survey results may change as LILCO becomes more or less popular or.if the controversy over Shoreham deminishes. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 17;.Tr. 10,547-58 (Mileti). We reject this as purely specula-tive; no evidence was presented from which we could infer that LILCO's credibility has risen in the past, or that it will rise in the future.121/ 120/ It is not surprising that people obey LILCO during gas leaks and when lines are down because LILCO probably has some credibility in the con-text of its experience in non-nuclear matters. Tr. 10,635-40 (Weismantle). However, an entity can have credibility in some areas and not in others (Tr. 10,634 (Mileti), and responding to a ra-diological emergency is not a routine event for LILCO. Tr. 10,640 (Weismantle). We find that even assuming that people would obey LILCO in " normal" events, it does not follow that LILCO would be believed in a radiological emergency. Tr. 10,938 (Cole). LILCO's other examples of people following instructions of purportedly non-credible persons or entities are irrelevant and wholly lacking in empirical support. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 58-59, 64-66; Tr. 10,641-47 (Mileti). We also find that LILCO's examples of private sector assis-tance in evacuations (for instance, from highrise structures) are ir-relevant to the credibility issue presented here. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 61-62; Tr. 10,650-57 (Mileti). Finally, the pur-ported analogy to planning for an earthquake in California, where again no credibility issues were presented, is totally inapposite to an emergency at Shoreham where LILCO's lack of credibility has been established. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 62-63. 121/ Likewise, LILCO speculated that its credibility would rise as people become more aware of the quality of its planning effort. Cordaro et (Footnote cont'd next page) - 130 - L 195. Finally, LILCO testified that adverse health consequences would not necessarily result from LILCO's lack of credibility. LILCO reasoned, for example, that if people actually sheltered when asked to evacuate, it would reduce traffic on the roads, thereby helping evacuees. Likewise, if LILCO recommended no protective. action at all, but some people decided to take protective action anyway, no harm would result. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 66-67. We reject LILCO's reasoning. Harm clearly could re-sult if the public failed to take appropriate actions; for example, if LILCO recommended sheltering because a quick release was expected but peo-ple evacuated instead, they would have no protection from a passing plume (see our findings on Contention 61, Section VII, infra) and no dose savings. would be achieved. See id., at 67-68. (Footnote cont'd from previous page) al., ff.-Tr. 10,396,'at 40. However, LILCO has been sending out information about Shoreham and emergency planning on a regular basis -since January 1983 with no evidence that its credibility has in-creased. Tr. 10,536-40 (Clawson). LILCO saggested that receipt of approximately 2000 return-mail postcards is evidence that people will turn to LILCO for information. We note, however, there are approxi-mately 42,000 households in the EPZ who received the postcard, that not all of the 2000 raturned cards asked about emergency planning (30-80%), and that some of those were from the same households. Tr. 10,664-68 (Clawscn). This small response (well under 5% of the EPZ households) is not convincing evidence of LILCO's credibility nor does it support the suggestion that people will turn to LILCO for informa- ~ tion concerning a Shoreham emergency. . See Tr. 10,669-70 (Clawson). Furthermore, contrary to LILCO's assertion (Tr. 10,474 (Clawson)), it is unlikely that LILCO's credibility would rise even ,if it received an operating license. See Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 39. - 131 - L 196. Subparts A through G of Contention 15 set forth particular Plan functions that will allegedly be affected adversely by LILCO's lack of credibility. For the reasons stated below, we find that each of these con- - cerns is valid. (a) Non-LILCO Personnel (Contention 15.A) i 197. Contention 15.A alleges that the lack of credibility of LILCO command and control personnel is likely to result in noncompliance with, or at least questioning of, directives from LILCO employees, by non-LILCO per-sonnel relied upon_to implement the Plan. Thus, it is alleged that indi-viduals affiliated with schools, ambulance companies, etc., may question or disbelieve LILCO directives for the same reasons as the public. 19'8. LILCO challenged this contention, observing that LILCO has had meetings with'the ARC, DOE, the Coast Guard and ambulance companies, re-sulting in-letters of agreement or letters of understanding with those entities. LILCO asserts that it is unreasonable to believe that these or-ganizat, ions would agree to participate in LILCO's proposed emergency re-sponse and receive training, but refuse to respond or respond inappropri- , ately. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 69-82.122/ 122/ LILCO also stated that, even if non-LILCO organizations did not par-ticipate, an evacuation could still be accomplished because neither the ARC nor DOE has any function-in evacuating traffic or people. Mr. -Weismantle conceded that if ambulance drivers do not obey LILCO's in-structions, people will not be evacuated from nursing homes or other special-facilities as-quickly as LILCO assumes. Tr. 10,688 (Weismantle). - 132 - t__' 199. The evidence on this issue weighs against LILCO. As the Coun-ty's witnesses' testified, non-LILCO support personnel may not obey LILCO because effective command and control requires that those being commanded view the source of their orders as legitimate. Social scientists generally agree that those who exercise authority possess legitimacy by virtue of ei-ther holding public office, or because of their skill, knowledge and compe-tence. The LILCO command and control employees meet neither of these stan-dardc. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 50-51; Tr. 10,859-60 (Saegert). See also Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 51-52 (LILCO lacks the appear-ance of a legitimate authority). 200. LILCO's lack of credibility or legitimacy will also lead non-LILCO organization members not to obey command and control directives be-cause the.LILCO employees acting as contact, points for non-LILCO organiza-tions generally have no established relationships with the organizations they are assigned to " coordinate," nor do they appear-to have prior experi-ence pertinent to the concerns of such organizations and individuals.123/. Without established relationships of trust and confidence, there can be no 123 "5e/alth ForFacilities instance,Coordinator, 3 LILCO employees who is toare bedesignated in contact to fill hospitals with the position of and nursing homes and coordinate evacuation of health care facilities. However, it does not appear from the LERO job titles that any of the individuals assigned as Health Facilities Coordinator normally has
- anything to do with hospitals, nursing homes, or the needs of their administrators. Nor do they have_ experience in health care concerns.
Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 53-56. Comparable deficiencies exist for LILCO personnel expected to fill the positions of Public Schools Coordinator and Public Services Liaison. Id., at 56-57. - 133 - r -) assurance that schools, health care facilities and other non-LILCO organi-zations relied upon by LILCO will follow LILCO's command and control directives. Id., at 52-59. 201. Furthermore, LILCO's proposal to cssign the role of Radiation Health Coordinator to a LILCO contractor does not eliminate LILCO's credi-bility problem because the designated individual would be directly depen-dent upon LILCO for the contract, and would have an interest in appealing to and meeting LILCO' interests in perceived conflict with the public's in-terest. Thus, the contractor would also lack legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the public. Id., at 60. (b) Sheltering (Contention 15.B) 202. . Contention 15.B asserts that the public will not obey a LILCO sheltering recommendation. Based on our finding that LILCO lacks credibil-ity, we find that-people will not believe that their homes provide adequate protection from radiation despite a LILCO recommendation that they shelter at home. This conclusion is supported by the survey data discussed in our findings on Contention 23, which reveal that evacuation would be the pre-ferred public response in an emergency, even uhen it is not recommended for a specific population. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 61-62. 203. The LILCO witnesses acknowledged the County and YSW survey data , indicating that a significant number of people would evacuate rather than follow a LILCO recommendation to shelter, but had two responses: (1) that - 134 - L even assuming some people would evacuate rather than shelter, it would be , irresponsible for LILCO to recommend any other protective action; and (2) that simply because some people might not follow LILCO's recommendation does not mean LILCO does not comply with NRC regulations. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 88-90. Neither response addresses the issue raised in Contention 15.B. That issue is not whether LILCO's recommendations would be responsible or appropriate; we address that in our discussion of Conten-tiens 11 (Section II.A) and 61 (Section VII). Rather, the issue here is whether:the protective actions recommended by LILCO can and will be imple-mented. If the answer is no, then contrary to LILCO's assertion, LILC0 does not comply with the regulations which require that we make such a finding. We find that due to LILCO's lack of credibility there is no as-surance that sheltering would be implemented in a Shoreham emergency. See also findings.on Contention 23.A (see Section I.A). (c) Schools (Contention 15.C) '204. Contention 15.C asserts that appropriate protective actions for schools may not be carried out because school authorities do not find LILCO to be credible. The LILCO witnesses testified that LILCO has had numerous contacts with schools regarding' emergency preparedness and has sent pack-ages of material to all EPZ school district supervisors. Tone alert radios have also been provided to many districts and the EBS messages will provide specific guidance for schools. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 92-93. This testimony, however, evades the issue.124/ 124/ This testimony also is refuted in many respects in our findings on the school contentions. See Section XII. - 135 - 205. As already noted, many school districts have adopted resolutions in which they determine that'LILCO is not a credible source of information and resolve that they would not rely on LILCO's information in making their decisions during a Shoreham emergency. .Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at '36-38, and'Att. 6. School district representatives confirmed this position in testimony. Muto and Smith (Credibility), ff. Tr. 11,001; Jeffers and Rossi (Credibility), ff. Tr.11,001; Petrilak (Credibility), ff. Tr. 11,001. But see Doremus, ff. Tr. 9491, at 4. k'hile LILCO was confident -that school officials would act on the best information available_and that, after consulting with state and local officials, LILCO's recommendations -would be implemented (Cordaro et-al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 95-96), LILCO's testimony was purely speculative and thus was not effective in refuting the testimony of the school authorities. Therefore, we find that the Plan offers no assurance that school children would be protected in a Shoreham emergency. '(d)? Traffic Guides and Security Personnel '(Contention 15.D) 206. . Contention 15.D alleges that due to LILCO's' lack of credibility, the public wiril not obey LILCO's traffic guides or comply with LILCO's traffic control scheme, and that the public will not obey LILCO personnel performing security functions at various emergency response facilities. Dr. Mileti testified that traffic guides and security personnel will not be viewed with hostility because LILCO's emergency information,_which the LILCO traffic guides will merely be confirming, will eliminate suspicion. Co'daro r et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 98-100. l- - 136 - 207. We find, however, that the public will not obey LILCO employees designated to act as traffic guides and security personnel because percep-tions about LILC0 will be transferred to those LILCO employees. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 65. LILCO's traffic guides and security guards .will have no appearance of legitimate authority. Tr. 10,862-63 (Lipsky). Furthermore, the public's distrust of, and refusal to obey, LILCO employees will be increased and reinforced by the inability of these LILCO employees to-provide helpful or meaningful information about the status or danger in-volved in the emergency. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 65. Finally, ' LILCO employees assigned to emergency response work are not subject to fun-damental background characteristics of public safety organizations that normally contribute to.public confidence.125/ The absence of these funda' mental characteristics will influence public perceptions of LILCO's public safety personnel, and will contribute to distrust of LILCO personnel who are assigned to perform public safety functions. Id., at 66-67. For these reasons and the additional reasons set forth in our findings on Contention 65.C '(Section IX. A), we decide Contention 15.D in favor of the Intervenors. 125/ The fundamental background characteristics lacking in LILCO personnel are: recruitment in a competitive, merit-oriented system based on criteria appropriate to the roles recruits will-play in public life; job training to help emergency response personnel learn the limits of theory when confronted with real situations, and techniques to handle responsibilities, routines to help process work expeditiously, and emotional survival skills that allow them to resolve the psychological contradictions.in their jobs; and the potential for regular feedback and self-correction that is intrinsic to governmental bureaucracies, that helps to maintain workers' accountability, and that provides opportunities for citizens to register opinions and complaints, there-by insuring that public service workers remain' accountable to citi-zens' interests. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 66-70. - 137 - 1: (e) EBS Messages (Contention 15.E) 208. Contention 15.E alleges that the public will not comply with the actions recommended in LILCO's EBS messages because they will be issued by LILCO. For reasons discussed above and in our findings on Contention 23 (Section I.A), we find _that many members of the public will not obey LILCO's EBS messages. (f) Rumor Control (Contention 15.F) 209. The Plan includes a rumor control procedure according to which the public is expected to contact the LILCO offices for information con-cerning the emergency response. LILCO personnel will be provided with up-dated press releases. Plan', at 3.8-5; see also OPIP 3.8'.1. Contention 15.F alleges that LILCO's lack of credibility will' render.the rumor control - ' function' ineffective. 210. The LILCO panel did not address whether people would in fact call LILCO's rumor control point, despite LILCO's lack of credibility. They did state, however, that those people who called LILCO's rumor control point would most likely believe the information or they would not have . called in the first place. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 108.126/ 126/ LILCO asserted that rumor control points at other plants are commonly staffed by utility personnel. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 109. LILCO's witnesses were not aware, however, whether these persons at other plants are under the supervision and control of state or local governments. See Tr. 10,678-80 (Clawson). There are no agreements with any state or local governments to participate in the Shoreham rumor control function. Tr. 10,675-76 (Clawson). - 138 - 1 '211. The evidence persuades us that LILCO's rumor control effort will be ineffective. First, the perception of LILCO as not credible, objective, or. trustworthy in discussing the extent, danger, or effect of a Shoreham accident will cause the public.and the media to seek sources of information other than LILCO. Thus, the basic premise upon which LILCO's rumor control proposal rests, i.e. that people.will call LILCO for information, is erro- .neous. .Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 74. Indeed, Mrs. Clawson stated E that'she did not know whether people would call LILCO's rumor control point if they did not believe LILCO to be credible, and that it was just as like-ly that they would call some other information source. Tr. 10,672-75 (Clawson).127/ Because people would not believe the information prrvided by LILCO, they would seek other* sources of information, leading to an in-creased. proliferation of rumors. Purcell et al.,_ff. Tr. 10,727, at 78. -212. Second, even if people called the rumor control point, we find that the information provided by LILC0 is unlikely to be believed due to LILCO's. lack of credibility and the cumbersome nature of the Plan's public information procedures. Id., at 75-77. 127/ During the TMI; accident, reporters turned to sources other than Metro-politan Edison because they viewed the utility as evasive and not to .be trusted. Many journalists interviewed after TMI expressed the opinion _that utility personnel generally cannot be trusted to report , on utility-related problems. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 74. See findings on Contention 23 (Section I.A) for further finding on the media's coverage of TMI. - 139 - ~ C___ r l l (g) Pre-Emergency Information (Contention 15.G) 213. Contention 15.G asserts that LILCO's lack of credibility will render its pre-emergency public information program (such as the brochure) ineffective. Dr. Mileti stated that he saw no reason to suspect that LILCO's alleged lack of credibility would detract from the primary function of a brochure, which is to expose the public to the fact that an emergency plan exists, that an emergency information system would be available, and that they may be asked to do things during an emergency. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 10,396, at 119. However, he recalled no studies that would support that conclusion. Tr. 10,686-87 (Mileti). Dr. Mileti's statement also ap-pears somewhat inconsistent with his previous testimony that the effective-ness of pre-emergency information, such as LILCO's brochure, is question-able. Tr. 1708-09 (Mileti). 214. We find for Intervenors on this issue. The public will not only be unlikely to believe public education information provided by LILCO be-cause of LILCO's lack of credibility, but the public is also likely to dis-card or disregard such caterials. Research on emergency preparedness has shown that the public tends to be unaware of information presented in bro-chures. When the source is viewed as not credible or likely to provide unreliable information (as LILCO would be), the public would be even more unlikely to read such material. Purcell et al., ff. Tr. 10,727, at 78-79; Tr. 10,814-15 (Saegert). Thus, there is no assurance that LILCO's public information program will be effective. - 140 -
- 3. Conclusion on Contention 15 215. The credibility issue touches many of the emergency planning regulatory requirements. First, 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1) requires that there be reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken-in a radiological emergency. Likewise, 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) re-quires the development of a range of protective actions for the EPZ, and a plan must also provide for the dissemination of appropriate information to the public both before and during an emergency. 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(5) and 50.47(b)(7).
216. LILCO has failed to meet the Commission's standards. LILCO's lack of credibility pervades almost every aspect of its Plan, leaving almost no part untouched. Without credibility, LILCO's information to the . public'will not be believed and, if not believed, will be ineffective. Thus, the requirements of 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(5) and 50.47(b)(7) are not met. Furthermore, if LILCO's information is not believed, many people will not follow LILCO's protective action recommendations, or will take inappro-priate protective actions. Since LILCO's proposed protective actions thus will be largely incffective, LILCO also fails to satisfy 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10). _ Finally, the evidence indicates that LILCO is not per-ceived by the public to be credible, competent or trustworthy. Thus, we have no basis for finding that protective actions recommended to the public by LILCO would be implemented in a Shoreham accident. Therefore, we cannot find reasonable assurance that protective actions can and will be implemented in a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1). 1 i - 141 - l III. EPZ BOUNDARY (CONTENTION 22.D) 217. Contention 22 D alleges that the Shoreham EPZ boundary fails to ^ meet the criteria of 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654, and violates good emergency planning principles. As a result, the public and emergency workers may not understand or acknowledge the location or validity of the EPZ boundary which,.in turn, would lead to confusion and impaired emergency response. Specifically, Contention 22.D alleges inappropriate EPZ design in the areas of Port Jefferson, Terryville, and Riverhead.128/ For the reasons set forth below, we find in favor of the Intervenors. 218. The diransions and design of an EPZ are governed by the planning principles embodied in 10 CFR 5 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654. In general, an EPZ should be about 10 miles in radius. However, the " exact size and con-figuration of the EPZs . . . shall be determined in relation to local emer-gency response needs and capabilities as they'are affected by such condi-tions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes and jurisdictional boundaries." 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(2); see also NUREG 0654, at
- 17. The case law makes clear that rigid rules do not apply for drawing EPZ boundaries. For instance, an entire jurisdictional area does not 128/ The area of Riverhead pertinent to Contention 22.D is not the entire township, but rather the unincorporated' area 1-2 miles east of the EPZ containing Riverhead's business district and some densely populated areas. See Contention 22.D. It is clear that an extention of an EPZ
'l-2 miles beyond the nominal 10-mile limit constitutes no challenge to the regulations. See Southern Calif. Edison Co., LBP-82-39, supra, 15 NRC at'1181. - 142 - L necessarily have to be encompassed if any part of it is included. See . Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-59, 14 NRC 1211, 1556-57 (1981). What is required, however, is that from a practical point of view, the boundaries for an EPZ make good common sense. 219. An appropriately designed EPZ is crucial to emergency prepared-ness. .Since an EPZ boundary marks significant differences in operational readiness on either side of the boundary, it is important that it appear to have a rational basis. Otherwise, distinctions between protective actions recommended for those outside or inside the EPZ will become blurred, lead-ing to confused and incorrect responses by the public. In particular, an EPZ should not divide coherent population centers and should exhibit physi-cal or jurisdictional' distinctions on opposite sides of the boundary line. Herr, ff. Tr. 8666, at 4-5; Tr.'8538 (Herr); see Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8536, at 6; Tr. 8543-44 (Daverio). Several fundamental principles have evolved to assist in identifying EPZ boundaries. According to these prin-ciples, a planner should: (1) use wide separators such as bodies of water or park lands; (2) avoid the use of narrow streets; (3) avoid dividing functional systems such as interrelated traffic systems or school sys-tems;129/ (4) avoid running the boundary through high density areas; (5) 129/ An EPZ should not be designed so that schools are left directly out-side of its area, since to do so would create the confusing situation 2,: "of no protective actions being proposed for such schools while the contiguous population immediately inside the EPZ is told to take pro-(Footnote cont'd next page) - 143 - n draw the boundary in a way that will minimize the opportunity for unwarranted entry into the EPZ; and (6) make the EPZ Loundary easily recog- 'nizable. Herr, ff. Tr. 8666, at 5-11. 220. FEMA's witnesses acknowledged that the Shoreham EPZ divides Port Jefferson, Riverhead and Terryville. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at Yet, both they and LILCO's witnesses testified that the Shoreham EPZ ~ 11. adheres to NRC guidelines because it is about 10 miles in radius and fol-lows well known roads and highways, and further because there are no easily recognizable jurisdictional boundaries where the boundary could otherwise be drawn. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8536, at 10, 13-16, 22-23; Tr. 8572-74, -8634;(Daverio); 8657-58 (Lieberman).130/ We cannot accept this conclusion. (Footnote cont'd from previous page) tective. action. See South Carolina Electric and Gas-Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station), LBP-82-57,16 NRC 477, 486-87 (1982). Suffolk County's witnesses from school districts in and around the EPZ, however, were'especially critical of LILCO's EPZ which has been gerrymandered to exclude certain schools for no apparent purpose. Tr. 3161-65, 3128-29 (Rossi, Jeffers). The result of such gerrymandering is confusion and inappropriate responses. Herr, ff. Tr. 8666, at 10; Tr. 8721-25 (Herr). As noted below, we find the exclusion of these schools, many of which abut the EPZ (see infra) to be contrary to com-mon sense and good planning principles. See Summer, supra. 130/ LILCO's panel suggested that the County had acquiesced in the configu-ration of the Shoreham EPZ because work done by some County. planners in 1980 led to the design of a similarly configured EPZ. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr._8536, at 9-10 and Att. 5. We reject this argument. The 'EPZ proposed by LILCO and at issue here was never adopted by the Coun-ty and was in fact rejected by the County as inadequate. Tr. 8736-38 (Herr); 8564-69 (Daverio). - 144 - L_ 221. With respect to Riverhead, the LILCO witnesses testified that expansion to the east would encompass some additional densely populated areas and create an elongated appendage projecting to the east out to a distance of almost 13 miles from the plant. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8536, at 19-22. LILCO argues that such expansion of the EPZ would violate the requirement that the boundary be about 10 miles and might cause confusion. Id., at 21. We reject this testimony for several reasons. 222. It is apparent that the current design of the EPZ ignores the wide separators (such as cemetaries and ponds) which exist only a short distance east of the current boundary (Herr, ff. Tr. 8666, at 6; see Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8536, at 21-22 and Atts. 14-16), and which could have been utilized without, as LILCO suggests, creating an elongated appen - dage.131/ If these wide separators were used, the present EPZ boundary would be expanded by the 1-2 miles set forth in the contention, not the almost 3 miles suggested by LILCO. See Tr. 8714-15 (Herr); Contention 22.D. Instead, however, LILCO chose to zigzag the EPZ boundary through Riverhead in a way that is difficult to visualize, verbalize, or 131/ In an attempt to rebut Contention 22.D, LILCO's testimony included a graphic depiction of the Riverhead census tract which represented the LILCO witnesses' interpretation of hcw the County would have the EPZ extended eastward beyond its present boundaries. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8536, at 20 and Atts. 4, 14-16. This inappropriate attempt to set up a straw man is rejected. There was no evidence that the County was suggesting the EPZ configuration attributed to it by LILCO. Further-more, Contention 22.D neither asserts that the EPZ should follow cen-sus tract boundaries, nor does it assert that any reconfiguration should result in an elongated appendage projecting to the east. See Tr. 8562-64 (Daverio). - 145 - rationalize. Herr, ff. Tr. 8666, at 11-12. The EPZ boundary in Riverhead also violates fundamental planning principles by running directly down the center of the business district along narrow streets, which have similar developmant on both the east and west sides. Id., at 7; Tr. 8682, 8716-18 (Herr). Furthermore, the EPZ arbitrarily excludes 3 Riverhead schools that I abut the EPZ. Herr, ff. Tr. 8666, at 10; see Tr. 8637-42 (h'eismantle) . This is contrary to the guidance in Summer, supra, 16 NRC at 486-87, which ordered inclusion within the EPZ of 3 schools just over 10 miles from the plant. Finally, the boundary is drawn in such a way that it divides the traffic network around the downtown Riverhead area. This is likely to re-sult in a chaotic traffic situation and will also make interdiction of traffic into the EPZ far more difficult. Herr, ff. Tr. 8666, at 8-9, 13-15. For these reasons, we find that the EPZ boundary in Riverhead does not adhere to appropriate planning principles and is therefore inadequate. 223. The LILCO witnesses defended the western EPZ boundary in Port Jefferson because it centers on a wide body of water (Port Jefferson Har-bor) and continues south along a recognizable road (Main Street) which eventually becomes Route 25A (also well-recognized). Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8536, at 22-23; Tr. 8634 (Daverio). Nevertheless, as Professor Herr testified, Main Street is narrow and runs down the center of s single, co-herent population center. There is little distinction in land use on ei-ther side of Main Street and its use as a boundary is unlikely to be per-ceived as rational by the population. Herr, ff. Tr. 8666, at 8; Tr. 8727-28 (Herr). The EPZ, as drawn, also leaves 1 of the Port Jefferson 146 - m 1 . schools only 1,000 feet outside of the EPZ. Herr, ff. Tr. 8666, at 10. ' Finally,'the boundary presents formidable traffic interdiction problems be-cause of all'the side streets which intersect with Main Strect. Id., at - , 14. ' For these reasons,'we concur with Professor Herr that the EPZ as it ~ is currently drawn _through Port Jefferson is inadequate. -224. Finally, with' respect to Terryville, LILCO's witnesses testified that.Terryville is not a governmental jurisdiction but rather a locality with no official boundaries. Thus, in their view, there is no rationale for including it in the EPZ. They furthermore testified that if all the area known as Terryville were included, the EPZ would needlessly " bubble out." Cordaro et al. , 'ff. Tr. 8536, at 14-18.' We find that Terryville is a distinct population center which_ people recognize (Tr. 8729-30 (Herr); SC Ex. 37; see Tr. 8599-8603 (Lieberman)), which the boundary divides in vio-lation of fundamental planning principles. The EPZ boundary in Terryville also'ruas along narrow streets. Herr, ff. Tr. 8666, at 5, 8. Finally, the boundary in Terryville abuts, but for no apparent reason excludes from the ; EPZ, an elementary school and a high schodl. Tr. 8722-24 (Herr); 8635-37 ~ (Daverio); see Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8536 and Att. 11. Again, we find the-boundary as it runs through Terryville is inadequate. We further find that LILCO's concern that the EPZ would " bubble out" if extended to cover alllof Terryville is without merit. The additional territory could easily be incorporated into the EPZ without creating an undue protrusion. Tr. 8742 (Herr). , - 147 - ,.-n-,..-meeww- mw--um N 225. In conclusion, we find that the planning principles explained by Professor Herr are consistent with the guidance of 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654 which require consideration of far more factors than simply fol-lowing roads :in a rough 10 mile radius as LILCO appears to have done. While Professor Herr did not attempt to redraw the Shoreham EPZ, it is clear to the Board that a more rational EPZ boundary which complies with NRC guidance could and should be drawn. For this reason, we find that LILCO's EPZ does not meet the standards set forth in 10 CFR 5 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654. IV. LERO WORKERS (CONTENTIONS 24.L, 26, 27, 28-32, 33, 34) A. Notification (Contention 26) 226. Contention 26 alleges that the Plan fails to satisfy regulatory requirements because LILCO's proposed corcunications system and procedures for notifying offsite emergency personnel of a Shoreham emergency do not provide adequate assurance that emergency personnel will be promptly notified so that they can be mobilized and the protective actions imple-mented. 227. The Board finds that the County witnesses were well qualified by .their experience and training to provide the opinions set forth in their testimony. Further, they have drafted plans for dealing with the communi-cations, logistics, personnel and transportation aspects of emergency - 148 - I situations, and have implemented such plans. Tr. 4580 (Snow).132/ By contrast, the.LILCO witnesses never designed a communications system, nor ,i' were any of them communications engineers, specialists or technicians. Tr. 4022-23 (Cordaro); 4045-46 (Renz); 4094-95 (Hobbs, Daverio). Moreover, no -one with responsibility for actually installing or maintaining LILCO's com-munications equipment testified for LILCO. Tr. 4039-41 (Renz); 4082-83 (Schiffmacher, Renz). Witnesses for FEMA and the NRC Staff only had gener-al familiarity with the issues raised by Contention 26.133/ 228. LILCO sought to impeach the County testimony on the basis that the witnesses, in connection with an earlier draft emergency plan prepared bytheCounty'PlanningiDepartment, allegedly had approved communications 132/ Deputy Inspector Regensburg was formerly the Commanding Officer of 260 police and civilian personnel who comprise the SCPD's Communications and Records Bureau. Deputy Inspector Snow is the Commanding Officer of the SCPD's Communications and Records Bureau. Police Officer Stile has been the Communications Coordinator for the SCPD since 1975 and is presently assigned to the SCPD's Communications Technical Services Unit. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 2-3. Officer Stile holds a supervisory position and has been responsible for designing, engi-neering and implementing the.SCPD's radio communications system and holds a first-class FCC license. Tr. 4634-35 (Stile). 133/ .The familiarity of the FEMA witnesses was based primarily on their having reviewed such issues in other of fsite plans. Tr. 12,459-60 (McIntire, Baldwin,,Keller). . They never evaluated, or attempted to verify, performance standards or other technical aspects of LILCO's communications system. Tr. 12,521-22 (McIntire). The Staff witness reviewed the Plan and conducted some interviews, none of which, how-ever, specifically related to the communications issues raised by Con-tention 26. Tr. 4739-40, 4745, 4753-54 (Scars). Mr. Sears did noth-ing to determine the reliability of the commercial paging company used by LILCO, nor was he familiar with the pagers used by LILCO. Tr. 4720, 4722 (Sears). - 149 - L. links and equipment that LILCO now proposes to use. See LILCO Brief, at 77-78. The Board disagrees. Officer Snow was never involved in matters regarding the draft County plan. The involvement of Officers Regensburg and Stile was limited and did not involve approving the communications por-tion of the' draft plan. Tr. 4483 (Regensburg); 4546-47 (Stile).134/ Fur-thermore,.having viewed the demeanor of these gentlemen at trial, we are satisfied with their objectivity and integrity and believe that their testimony-in this proceeding represents their best professional judgment on the issues.
- 1. -The Adequacy of LILCO's Customer Service Office as the Primary Notification Point for LERO (Contention 26.A) 229. The chie'f issue presented in this subcontention concerns whether the initial 15-minute notification requirement-of 10 CFR-Part-50, Appendix E, is met by notification of LILCO's Customer Service Office ("CS0") or whether key LERO officials must also be notified to satisfy the regula-tions. We find that more than the CSO must be notified and that LILCO has not demonstrated assurance that this can be done within 15 minutes.
134/ Officer Regensburg testified that his only involvement in the draft County plan was _ with respect to the communications capabilities of the SCPD and whether th'e~ proposed use of the SCPD's communications facili-ties and equipment would affect the SCPD's own communications capabil-ities. Tr. 4676-77 (Regensburg). Neither Officer Stile nor Officer - Regensburg was ever asked to render an opinion regarding the feasibil-ity of-the plan's overall communications scheme, and, in fact, neither ever saw a complete draft of any County plan. Tr. 4667-70 (Stile, 'Regensburg). - 150 - 1 1 I' 230. The Plan designates the CSO in Hicksville as the primary notifi-cation point for LERO. As such, the Hicksville CSO is responsible for receiving notification from Shoreham that an emergency has occurred, veri-fying the authenticity of the notification, and taking the necessary steps l to notify key emergency personnel. Plan, at 3.3-1 to 3.3-4. The CSO must exercise these functions until LILCO's Emergency Operations Center ("E0C") has been activated. Id., at 3.3-1; Tr. 4295 (Renz). 231. The CSO may be notified of an emergency in 1 of 3 ways, with a total of 2-4 minutes likely required, depending on the means used. Tr. 4108, 4111-12 (Renz).135/ 4 232. After receiving notification of an emergency and verifying the authenticity and content of the notification message, the CSO must then no-tify supervisory and key emergency response personnel. The number of emer-gency personnel to be contacted increases with the severity of the emergen- , cy. Plan, at 3.3-1 to 3.3-4 and Figs. 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4. See also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 15-16 and Att. 1. In an Unusual Event, the CSO must notify 7 key emergency response coordinators, including the LERO Director and Manager. See Plan, at 3.3-2 and Fig. 3.3.2. For an 135/ The primary means is the RECS telephone system,. a series of dedicated telephones located at various sites, including the Shoreham control room and the CSO. Plan, at 3.4-1. Notification may also be given by commercial telephone. If that means is used, the CSO operator must go through a lengthier verification procedure. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442,~at 9. If the RECS system and commercial telephone lines fail, the ESO radio frequency may be utilized. Tr. 4111 (Renz). - 151 - Alert.or higher emergency classification, 142 personnel must be notified, including the initial 7 who would also be notified in an Unusual Event. Jgi., at'3.3-2 to 3.3-4 and Figs. 3.3.3, 3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.2 and Atts. ^ 3.136/ The Plan calls for the 142 supervisory and key emergency' response t personnel to be contacted by pagers. Plan, at 3.3-2 to 3.3-4 and Fig. 3.3.6; OPIP 3.3.2; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 37-38.137/ 233. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, requires that notification of an emergency be made within 15 minutes from the time the emergency is de-clared.138/ FEMA testified, and LILCO asserts in its Brief, that this requirement would be satisfied if the ~ Hicksville CSO was itself notified 136/ See also'Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 37-38; Tr. 4148, 4150 ' (Renz). The Plan contemplates that 87 of these' 142 persons will, in turn, attempt to contact approximately 823 additional LERO personnel. ' Cordaro et - a1. , ff. Tr. 4014, ,at 37-38. The CSO must also notify non-LILCO organizations, including BNL and, in certain situations, h'ALK radio station, which is responsible for broadcasting EBS messages and activating the network station monitors of relay stations and tone alert radios. OPIP 3.8.2; Plan, Fig. 3.3.5. See also Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 14-15. 137/ The. pagers sound a distinct tone and show a digital display which . serves as a verification that a Shoreham incident has occurred. De-pending on the code number, the individual paged is either brought.to a standby status or is directed to report to his duty station. Plan, at 3.4-5; Tr. ~ 4114-15 (Renz); Regensburg et al. , f f. Tr. 4442, at 11. 138/ .LILCO claims'that the issue of initial notification from Shoreham to LERO is not within the' scope of Contention 26. LILCO Brief, at 79. This assertion is rejected. Contention 26 specifically raises LILCO's capability for notifying offsite response personnel within 15 minutes, -as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 6 IV.D.3. Moreover, this issue was the subject of extensive cross-examination by the County and LILCO. Thus, there is no basis for LILCO now to assert that this is a " Phase I" issue. - 152 - t ~ within 15 minutes. Tr. 13,043 (Kowieski); 13,048 (Keller); LILCO Brief,'at
- 79. The' County stated that, at a minimum, the 7 key personnel required to be r.otified of any emergency at Shoreham would have to be notified within the specified 15-minute period, and that a more reasonable interpretation of the requirement is_that, if the emergency is classified Alert or higher, all 142 supervisory and key LERO personnel must be notified. Tr. 4662-63 (Snow). We conclude that the object of the 15-minute notification require-ment is1to transmit the emergency information.to key emergency response
-personnel. .Thus,.we reject the interpretation of FEMA and LILCO. Notifi-cation of the CSO itself.within 15 minutes accomplishes nothing, since it is merely the vehic1'e for achieving actual notification of key LERO person-nel. .However, we also do not fully accept the County's p6sition that for Alert and higher EALs, 142 persons must be contacted. Rather, for all EALs, = LERO has identified 7 key persons who must be notified. We rule that to meet the' Appendix E requirement, LILCO must be able to contact these 7 ~ people within 15 minutes. We find below that LILCO cannot accomplish this.139/ 234'.' I The County testified that within 15 minutes, the CSO could not realistically receive notification of an emergency, verify the authenticity and' content of the'information contained in the notification message, and then notify the 7 key LERO personnel equipped with pagers. Regensburg et l .139/ See.Cincinati Gas & Elec. Co., ALAB-727, supra, 17 NRC at 771-72 (Ap-peal Board discussion of-time for notification of school officials and school bus drivers). ~ - 153 - c V a J al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 12-13; Tr. 4662-64 (Snow). The process of receiving and verifying notification, as noted, is itself estimated to take up to 4 minutes. In.the remaining allotted time, there are too many steps to be completed by CSO operators to meet the 15-minute requirement, even if malfunctions or -other problems do not develop. These steps include: (1) obtaining lists of personnel to be notified; (2) activating the test pagers and entering the appropriate emergency codes, a process'which LILCO's wit-nesses estimated could take as long as 1 minute (Tr. 4122-23 (Renz)); (3) . verifying that the test pagers alarm and display the emergency codes en- - tered;-(4) reactivating the notification pagers after a 3-minute waiting period; and (5) reverifying that the test pagers alarm and display the -emergency codes. OPIP 3.3.2, at 2. See also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 11-13; Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 11-12. 235. As noted, the CSO must always notify-(by pager) a minimum of 7 persons. .LILCO estimated that if these persons respond by telephoning the CSO without any delay between calls, approximately 6-1/2 minutes would be required just to provide them with necessary information concerning the emergency. Tr. 4135 (Renz). If any of them fails to respond within 15 minutes of paging, the CSO must attempt to reach them by commercial tele-phone. See, e.g., OPIP 3.3.2, at 3. See also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 15; Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 12. If they cannot be . reached, CSO will telephone their alternates. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 15.140/ LILCO estimated that approximately 14 minutes would be 140/ -Since there are 2 alternates for each of these emergency positions (except for the LERO Manager, for which there are 3 alternates), up to 22 persons may have to be telephoned. Tr. 4125-27 (Renz). - 154 - L-L- T t
- n '
so s required to telephone the 7 persons. This estimate assumes that all 7 per-sons can be contacted successfully. They estimated that another 4 minutes would be required if additional calls to alternate personnel were neces-( sary. Tr. 4127-28 (Daverio). 236. Based on the foregoing, as well as the deficiencies in pagers described in our findings on Contention 26.C below, we find there is no reasonable assurance that the 7 key response personnel can be contacted within 15 minutes,
- j. 1 237. Contention 26.A also concerns the broader. issue whether the CSO can reliably serve as the primary point of notification of emergency workers. Concerns center on the work assigned the CSO versus the available
' staff. The number of CSO operators varies from shif t to shif t, but at - times there will be only,2 CSO workers on duty. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 10; Sears, ff. Tr. 4709, at 5. Moreover, regardless of the shift, onlh-2 workers per shift will be trained LERO workers. Tr. 4098-99 (Renz); 4100-01 (Daverio). nr' "O , >238. As noted earlier, if there'is an Alert or higher EAL classifica- , tion, the CSO will attempt to notify approximately 142 emergency response L Npersonnel by pagers. The County testified that problems with LILCO's paging system must be expected to occur, since the LILCO paging system is .unreliebin and, in some espects, unworkable. See findings on Contention 26.C. In that event, the CSO would attempt to contact the 142 people by commercial telephone.141/ In the County's opinion, the Hicksville CSO has 141/ Due to the multiple shifts LILCO contemplates, should there be a fail-ure of the LILCO paging system, CSO personnel could have to telephone (Footnote cont'd next page) - 155 - ^ m.. n 1 gv3 ' 3 - ,q q <fr - ^ v.,f ,n , , q+ i y 2 gp .\ p 1
- f. g r
~ ]'3 I f \ , j 3 ] . 1 5 A /f 4 ~h. . ,/ 4 7 .! * .#. j ( ,
- \ -< s 'a, ,
insufficient
- staffing to perf6cm a task of that magnitude in an acceptable .
time frame. Regensburg et al. , ff, Tr. 4442, at 15-16. x _'I s . ..- r 'l < 239. The. Con ty's position is based, in part, on the restits of a . ! % & l< d s1 SCPD test condteted in Januarp 1983. The test involved attenots to contact A fapproximately 150 off-datinSCPJ officers using a caw.dichtel{ephone scheme- + ' q t ., t 9 , , , \ like LILCO plans to use J to notify its emergency personnel. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 17; see Plan, at 3.3-2. Thetestdisclosedkhatit 1 s L took 43 minutes to attempt to contact 150 officers and that of the 150 con-V . ) g ., j tacts attempted, 34% were on.4ucce'ssful. Reg-[nsbdrg et al. , ff. Tr. (5 ( 3 j 4442, ^ at 18. The County believed Ehat LILCO's attempt) to cont.act ;jspersonnel , A wouldtakelongerandbelesssuccessful.h/
- g q
.p,.p t , . e5. g .' .3 . \* s (Footnote cont'd from previous page) f 9 ', ') , / 4 as many*as 426 emerg,ency personnel. Tr. 4321/(Renz); see Tr. 4150-52, ,.9", ~, ;} , 4321,.4414 (Daverio)g s. * * + 4 142/ Under the Plan, as few as 2 CSO operators may initially have to at-tempt to contact 142 emergency personnel, whereas the SCPD test in-l 1,. ~ .volved 15 officers attempting to contact 135 officers. The SCPD. test, moreover, only required the telephoning officery to ask how long it ,p wo.uld take'them to report to duty, whereds the CSO operators would ' % -have to spend significantly more time with each emergency worker con-d tacted. It is estimated than each-s'ucce'ssful call would require *a miniinum -cf '3-5 minutes. Regensb'urget,ql rf.'l'r. 4442, at 20-23; I' Tr. 4606-08 (Snow)! For-thete reasonge' , /_ .hn draw no comfort from q gtLe facti that I.he SCID alto uses a cker M elephe.,nc ? system as a means' for calling oupperyonnel. S3 - ' (Regensburg); LILCO '4 9: Brief, at 83. y 3 ~ It is also anticipated that LIICO would experier$*:e, aliowernotifica- . . tion success rate in contacting the 142' eme +gancy personnef than the ip " 66%. rate adieved 'by the .SCfD. Wile sprD dfficers, cq sbe expected to respond to a " test,".LILCO's perennelvould not necessarfly ., r - be as ' , s ., , (Footnote cont'd ,; ext page) / 'I > ., V d y' g4 f ; /s 3 156 - "y ,. f '., 4 4
- Af $
240. In addition to notifying emergency respense personnel, the CSO also has_other' responsibilities: manually verifying emergency worker pager notifications; compiling staffing lists; and telephoning emergency response personnel who do not acknowledge receipt of pager notification. As dis-cussed below, these responsibilities magnify the staffing deficiency. 241. Emergency response personnel who are contacted through the -paging system are to call an Automated Verification System ("AVS") located at the Hicksville CSO. Plan, at 3.3-2; OPIP 3.3.2, at 12. This system permits LILCO to know how many persons in a given job position have re- ~ ceived notification. Telephone calls into the system must, however, be made from touch-tone telephones; otherwise, a CSO operator must personally speak to the worker and manually verify pager notification. Ici . , at 12-13; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 21. LILCO intends to provide touch-tone t'elephones for the residences of all emergency personnel issued pagers. -Tr. 4193 (Daverio).143/ (Footnote cont'd from previous page) likely,to respond-if notified of a Shoreham euergency. In addition, ,the SCPD test was conducted on a weekday, shortly after the lunch hour. The chances for contacting individuals at such a time were almost'certainly better than at other times, when notification of an . emergency might have to be given to LILCO's personnel. Regensburg et al.,-ff. Tr. 4442, at 22. Because the 142 LERO personnel are relied upon, in turn, to contact approximately 823 other emergency response personnel using a cascading telephone scheme, a significant number of LILCO's personnel would likely never be contacted. As a result, there would be insufficient personnel to implement LILCO's Plan. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 23. 143/ Approximately 40% of telephones in Suffolk County are rotary models. Therefore, a significant number of LILCO's personnel who attempt to (Footnote cont'd next page) - 157 - 242. Under the Plan, CSO personnel must also manually compile a list .of individuals who respond to the pager notification through that office. OPIP 3.3.2, at 13. These duties, and the time required to perform them, would be significantly expanded should the AVS fail. In such'a failure, .all call'-ins by emergency personnel contacted through the paging system would be routed to operators in the Hicksville CSO, who would then be re-sponsible for manually verifying pager notifications and for compiling staffing lists. Id. Thus, for an Alert, Site Area or General Emergency, the CSO could have to verify notifications and compile staffing lists for approximately 142 emergency personnel. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 24-25; see also Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 4014, at 14, 16. 243. The CS0 'is also responsible for telephoning personnel who do not, within 30 minuter, acknowledge receipt of pager notification. If a significant number of personnel did not call in, manual call-outs by CSO would require a significant amount of time. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 26-27. (Footnote cont'd from previous page) call the system may not have access to a touch-tone phone and would, E therefore, be. connected to a CSO operator, who would then have to man-ually verify pager notification. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 24-25. In addition, even if the emergency worker uses a touch-tone -telephone, if he were to fail to enter his LERO identification number within 7_ seconds, or if the AVS did not repeat correctly the number entered by the caller, the system would connect the caller to either the Hicksville or the Hewlett CSO so that an operator could manually verify pager notification and enter the worker's identification num-ber. OPIP 3.3.2, at 13; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 21-22; Tr. 4176-77 (Schiffmacher, Renz); 4202-03 (Schiffmacher). 158 - b 244. In light of the foregoing additional responsibilities, and since sometimes only 2 operators would be on duty at the Hicksville CSO, the Board finds that that office could not under all conditions effectively L function as the primary notification point for LERO.144/
- 2. Notification of_ Emergency Response Personnel by Pager (Contention 26.C) 245. Suffolk County asserted that LILCO's paging system provides no reasonable assurance that key emergency personnel will be notified or a Shoreham emergency.145/ The County did not disagree with the concept of 144/ We are aware that witnesses for LILCO, the NRC Staff and FEMA conclud-ed that staffing at the Hicksville CSO is sufficient to perform re-quired functions. See, e.g., Tr. 12,441-42 (Keller); 12,481-82 (Kowieski, Keller). We have concluded, however, that these' witnesses failed to take into account the additional responsibilities that may be required of the CSO if, for example, the paging system or AVS malfunctions. Indeed, LILCO's witnesses were uncertain that 2 workers could carry out CSO notification functions if there were paging system or AVS failures. Tr. 4217-19 (Renz). This conclusion is not altered by the Plan's provisions for backup assistance from LILCO's Hewlett and Brentwood CS0s. See OPIP 3.3.2, at 16-17;.Regensburg et al., ff.
Tr. 4442, at 28-29. There could be as few'as 2 persons available at each of these offices. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 10, 25. Moreover, these persons will not have received LERO training to the same degree as would the Hicksville CSO personnel. Tr. 4191-92 (Renz, Daverio). The Plan does not even specifically require personnel at the Hewlett and Brentwood CS0s to be advised of a Shoreham emergency. Tr. 4188-90 (Renz, Daverio, Schiffmacher). Accordingly, LILCO's back-up procedures fail to alleviate concerns regarding the adequacy of staffing ut the Hicksville CSO. 145/ The Board finds the Staff testimony with respect to LILCO's paging system to have been conclusory and of little assistance to the Board. For example,-simply because LILCO uses pagers, Mr. Sears testified that LILCO's notification scheme'is " superior" to the notification schemes at other nuclear plants. Tr. 4776-77 (Sears) He was unfa-(Footnome cont'd next page) - 159 - r. using pagers to notify emergency personnel, but did question LILCO's system from'a technical and logistical point of view.146/ 246'. Notwithstanding LILCO's assertion that its paging system is of ~" proven reliability ' (LILCO Brief, at 83), the Board cannot find that the system is reliable. We have several concerns. First, although LILCO has .provided NEC pagers to its emergency response personnel (Tr. 4409-10 (Hobbs)),*this particular pager may be of questionable quality. Tr. 4642-43-(Snow). In fact, LILCO's testing of its pagers has resulted in some having to be replaced due to malfunctions. Tr. 4774 (Sears). LILCO's witnesses were unaware that the commercial paging company used by LILCO is (Footnote cont'd from previous page) miliar, however, with the pagers used by LILCO. Id., at 4720-22. Moreover,.although FEMA testified that the-LILCO paging system is ade- .quate (Tr. 12,453-54 (Baldwin, Kowieski)), the FEMA witnesses did not know-that LILCO uses a commercial paging company and they never had g seen LILCO's paging hardware. Further, they did not know the paging range or the capabilities of. LILCO's system. Tr. 12,441, 12,454 (Kowieski); 12,499 (Baldwin). According to FEMA, the mere fact that LILCO will use pagers and that the Plan provides some backup to LILCO's reliance on a paging system are sufficient to satisfy FEMA, for. purposes of a plan review, that the criteria of NUREG 0654 are met. Tr. 12,457 (McIntire). 146/ The Board rejects LILCO's assertion that the County's witnesses previ-ously acknowledged that a paging system would be adequate for noti-fying emergency personnel. See LILCO Brief, at 83. This was not the County's testimony or even within the bounds of any reasonable inter-pretation of the testimony given by the County. Rather, the County testified that there are limitations to any paging system. Tr. 4591 (Regensburg); see Tr. 4775 (Sears). For this reason, the Sr" unlike LILCO, does not use its paging system for emergency purpose r. 4657-58 (Snow). - 160 - w A . discontinuing use of NEC pagers. Tr. 4436 (Hobbs);.4642-43 (Snow). Nor were they aware that the paging company's signal might not broadcast. east ;of Deer Park, Long Island (Tr. 4436-(Hobbs)), or that.even when'such broad-zcasts'are possible, communications are unreliable dus to the lack of . strength and clarity of the paging signal, with 15-minute delays typical due-to overcrowding of the paging system. Tr. 4437 (Hobbs); 4593 (Stile, 3; Snow); 4641-42, 4694 (Snow). . 1247. .Second, as persons call into paging systems of the type used by 1LILCO, their page requests are stacked behind prior page requests, based I' on information provided by LILCO's commercial paging company, delays of
- 4 3-10 minutes before-the paging signal is actually broadcast can be expect-ed,.even if the paging company accords LILCO priority service. Regensburg
.et'al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 43; SC Ex. 13, at 1; Tr. 4641-42 (Snow) . 248. - Third,jLILCO instructs its emergency workers dur'ing training. . ~ that if they are paged an'd alerted to, remain on standby status, they should , 4
- Just "go.about their business," presumably because they would be paged 2 againzif any special action were required. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr.
5-4442, at.43. This' instruction renders LILCO's not :ation scheme-unreliable as-a means to ensure prompt emergency response, since an emer-4 , gency at the plant could quickly escalate, thereby requiring workers on standby status to notify other emergency persor.nel to report for duty.147/ - 147/ The instruction also indicates that LILCO may not understand the capa-bilities of paging signals or the area of coverage provided by the (Footnote cont'd next page) 161 - ((- r= . l l l l t 1 . Given the problems with LILCO's paging system, LILCO should not rely on a second'page after a standby alert is given. 249. .' Apart from technical problems with the pagers themselves, logistical problems are raised as well; for example, personnel may be out-side of the paging area when an emergency occurs. The LILCO system covers the least territory of any system offered by the paging company used by LILCO. Tr. 4315 (Renz); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, Att. 5. It excludes a large part of southern Connecticut. Id.; Tr. 4315-16, 4321 (Renz). Although the Plan asserts that holders of pagers "will-not leave the LILCO . service territory or New York City while on call" (OPIP 3.3.2, at 14), the LILCO witnesses acknowledged that LILCO has no procedures to monitor wheth- , er personnel adhere to this requirement. Tr. 4316-17 (Renz, Daverio). The Plan also assumes that personnel assigned "on call duty" will " arrange for ' coverage by one of their emergency position alternates for those time peri-ods [during] which they cannot be on call (i.e., illness, travel out of the on-call territory, etc.)." OPIP 3.3.2, at 14 .LILCO, however, has no pro-cedure by which it would be informed of alternates standing in for primary emergency workers. Tr. 4393-94 (Renz, Cordaro). The County pointed out, . moreover, that even if the emergency worker has not left the paging area, (Footnote cont'd from previous page) paging company used by LILCO. Many brick or steel buildings and buildings with lead windows may prevent a paging signal from penetrating the building's structure. Dead spots in the broadcast area-can also be caused by terrain, weather conditions and other fac-tors. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 44. - 162 - s - it cannot be assumed that a person paged anywhere in the paging area, including New' York City, would be able to report quickly to his duty sta-tion if that should be required. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 46. L The Board agrees with the County in this regard. 250. LILCO also fails to provide any means for verifying whether the paged ~ message meant to be sent has been received. The Plan merely assumes that emergency personnel will respond according to the code displayed on their pagers,.whether or not verification of the code and its meaning can be made. See CPTP 3.3.2, at 14. Since verification under the Plan is only verification that emargency personnel have received some paged message (Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 4014, at 36), the response to the message may not be the response intended. Due to pager malfunction or. improper encoding by CSO operators, emergency personnel may actually be notified to go to stand-by status, although it is intended that they report for duty. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 46-47.148/ 148/ LILCO's AVS, moreover, fails to confirm the content of paged messages. The AVS tracks only the number of emergency personnel who call in to the system, enters their identification numbers, and provides informa-tion as to their job description. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 16-18 and Att. 4. Thus,' many workers will not really believe there is an emergency requiring them to report for duty. As a result, CSO op-erators would be flooded with phone calls from workers who have been paged, thereby preventing them from talking to the persons who need to obtain prompt, full information regarding the situation -- the top management of LERO. Moreover, the CSO operators would be prevented from contacting other organizations such as BNL (see OPIP 3.3.2, Att.
- 4) that have to be notified by commercial telephone. The problem be-comes especially acute if the emergency comes during the midnight shift when the CSO is staffed by only 2 operators. Regensburg et al.,
(Footnote cont'd next page) - 163 - T P 1 I 251. These concerns about the technical and logistical problems in-volved with LILCO's paging system are significant because LILCO is required . . to have the capability of promptly notifying and mobilizing (see Contention t 27 findings) emergency personnel relied upon in the Plan. Unless it is as-sumed that there will be no problems with notification of the emergency to the CSO, and wich notification of key emergency personnel by pager, and wit' notification of other emergency response personnel by paged personnel using commercial telephones, it is unrealistic to assume that LERO can be notified and mobilized in a short time. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, - at 51-52. However, it is unrealistic to assume, as the Plan does, that there will be no problems encountered in tt various notification scenar-ios. It is only realistic to believe that there will be delays in (Footnote cont'd from previous page) ' f f. Tr. 4442, at 49-50. In addition, many key emergency personnel equipped with pagers are re-quired to telephone other emergency workers to notify them to report for duty. See, e.g., OPIP 3.3.2, at 7 and Att. 5. It must be antici-pated that in some cases pagers will malfunction or the paged individ-uals, for various reasons, will not respond. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 51. If.these individuals.who have responsibility for im-plementing LILCO's cascading telephone scheme fail to respond to their paged message (see Tr. 4609 (Regensburg)) or if their pagers do not function for.some reason, an entire segment of workers will never be notified. LILCO could, in this fashion, lose 10 or more emergency workers for every worker who does not respond or whose pager does not . -work. Regensburg et al. , ff. Tr. 4442, at 50-51; Tr. 4618 (Snow) . Even assuming ~a 90% success rate in contacting paged emergency person-nel' assigned responsibility for telephoning other emergency workers, between 90-100 other emergency workers would not be contacted. Tr. 4346 (Renz). . - 164 - rw mobilizing LILCO's emergency personnel and in implementing command and con-trol decisions regarding protective actions for the public. Like the Coun- _ty'(see, e g , Tr. 4618-19,'4649 (Snow)), we find that the Plan is a "best case" planning' effort, whereas LILCO should have planned for the " worst -case" or at least a realistic case in order to provide adequate assurance regarding the Plan's implementability. This does not mean that emergency plans must consider all possible eventualities. However, planning efforts should take into consideration all of the reasonable possibilities that are likely to arise. The Plan has failed to do this and,'as a result, while ~ there is a possibility that communications aspects of the Plan will work, there_is no reasonable assurance that they will. See Tr. 4639, 4649 (Snow).
- 3. Notification of Emergency Response Personnel by Telephone (Contention 26.D) 252.' .Under the Plan, paged individuals, using commercial telephones-i and a cascading telephone scheme, would be responsible for carrying out LILCO's notification / mobilization effort. Sm Plan,-at 3.3-2 to 3.3-4; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 38. Contention 26.D alleges that given LILCO's reliance on commercial telephones to notify emergency response per- t sonnel, there is no reasonable assurance of proper notifica-tion / mobilization, even if it is assumed that the paging system itself
-works.149/ We agree with this contention. 149/ NRC witness Sears was unaware of any attempt by LILCO to test its cascading telephone system. Tr. 4762-63.(Sears). Moreover, FEMA's (Footnote cont'd next page) - 165 - b ~ 253. In the first place, accessibility to telephones could be a prob-lem'because some paged' individuals will not have ready access to a tele-if phone when they are ngtified' of the emergency. Even assuming they do, how-ever, .it still may take substantial time for them to locate the names and . telephone numbers'of the persons they are to contact. As noted, of the 142 persons LILCO. intends to notify by pager, approximately 87 will in turn be expected.to telephone 823 other emergency workers. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 38.-39; Tr. 4331 (Renz). However, these other emergency workers - are not on call 24 hours per day (as are those personnel given pagers). Tr. 4334 (Renz). If they are not at home .or work, they tray not be reachable. 254. Moreover, even if these other emergency workers can be con-tacted, the County's witnesses estimate that each telephone call could take 3-5' minutes. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 58. Further, since tele-phoned personnel are not instructed to verify receipt of notification but instead are instructed to report to duty stations where their reporting ~ constitutes verification (Sears, ff. Tr. 4709, at 7), LILCO may not know . (Footnote cont'd from previous page) witnesses did not perform any. analysis of the time that would be re-quired to-notify emergency workers using LILCO's cascading' telephone system. Tr. 12,472 (McIntire). Thus, they were unable to state whether LILCO's-notification scheme would in fact result in emergency l personnel being notified of a Shoreham emergency and reporting for duty. Tr. 12,505 (Baldwin, Kowleski) . As a result, FEMA had no rea-son to disagree with Contention 26.D. ~ - 166 - 1 l 1 for a substantial time following initial notification whether backup emer-gency personnel would have to be contacted and requested to report for duty.150/ Reporting to duty stations could be difficult or impossible for many workers, since many.LILCO employees often have no transportation dur-ing the day while they are in the field. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 56. 255. A related concern is that the Plan addresses only the notifica-tion / mobilization of emergency personnel initially responding to a Shoreham emergency. Because a prolonged emergency could require a second shift of emergency personnel, the Plan's failure to address notifica-tion / mobilization of "second shif t" emergency personnel is a further defi-ciency. Id., at 54-55. 256. Based on the' foregoing considerations, the Board finds that the Plan does not take into account many practical problems that would be en-ccuntered by any communications network that relies upon paged individuals to notify others by way of commercial telephones. 150/ Although Mr. Sears testified that the reporting of personnel to their duty stations would constitute adequate verification of notification, he acknowledged that the use of personnel reporting as a means of no-tification would result in LILCO's not knowing for some time whether alternate personnel would have to be contacted. Tr. 4778 (Sears). - 167 -
- 4. Notification of Non-LILCO Organizations and Personnel (Contention 26.E) 257. The County criticized the Plan's failure to include procedures for notifying many of the support organizations relied upon by LILCO, including hospitals, reception and relocation conters, bus companies, and ambulance companies. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 59.151/ The Board agrees that LILCO's failure to have procedures for notifying these -
crganizations could lead to problems in coordinating the response of these organizations and their personnel to a Shoreham emergency. '58. The Plan assigns to designated individuals responsibility for contacting emergency support organizations. Tnis does not, however, assure that prompt notification will be made. Indeed, because commercial tele-phones will be used (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 41), it must be ques-tioned whether notification will be possible (e.g., because the persons to be contacted will not be near telephones or will be using their tele-phones). Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 60-61. 259. Moreover, while LILCO intends to notify BHO, the New York Tele-phone Company ("NYT"), the U.S. Coast Guard, and the FAA at the Alert stage (Plan, Fig. 3.3.3; Cordaro et al. , f f. Tr. 4014, at 43), other non-LILCO support organizations will only be notified if a Site Area or General Emer-gency has been declared. Plan, Fig. 3.3.4; Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 151/ FEMA had no reason either to agree or disagree with Contention 26.E. Tr. 12,510-11 (McIntire). - 168 - 4442, at 64-65. As a result, there is no assurance that there will be timely notification and response by the support organizations and personnel relied upon by LILCO.152/ i 260. The Board believes that there should be specific procedures regarding notification of all support organizations relied upon by LILCO. These procedures, at a minimum, should designate the individual responsible for notifying each organization and should contain the content of notifica-tion messages and other necessary information, such as the name(s) of spe-cific individual (s) to be contacted. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 60-62. 15_2/ Moreover, the procedure for notifying BHO, the Coast Guard, the FAA and the NYT lacks necessary detail and scope. The procedure does not designate alternates to the emergency response positions assigned're-sponsibility for notifying the support organizations, nor are there checks built into the procedure to assure that notification is actual-ly made or at least attempted. In addition, notification of these or-ganizations is again by way of commercial telephones. Thus, there can be no assurance.that the necessary personnel will be contacted. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 62-63. While the Plan provides a backup means of communication to BHO, the Coast Guard, and the FAA (OPIP 3.3.2, Att. 4; Baldwin et al. , f f. Tr. 12,174, at 27), the back-up is via the Federal Telephone System ("FTS") which is nothing more than the federal tie-line telephone system and therefore subject to the same problems common to commercial telephones. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 4442, at 63. - 169 - b i B. Mobilization (Contention 27)
- 1. Introduction 261. Contention 27 asserts that LILCO and non-LILCO emergency re-sponse personnel, will not be promptly available to perform their emergency functions because of ex* nded mobilization times. It is alleged that under the Plan, mobilization could take several hours, thus adversely affecting the timely implementation of protective actions.
262. " Mobilization," as used in this contention, describes the activ-ities which emergency personnel must undertake between the ti,a the person-nel are notified and the time such personnel report with necessary equip-ment to the locations where emergency functions are to be performed. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 6; Tr. 12,760 (Kowieski). Timely mobili-zation of emergency workers is essential for an effective emergency re-sponse. Tr. 12,761 (Kowieski); see also Tr. 12,762 (McIntire). Further-more, command and control personnel should have a realistic understanding of mobilization times in order to know whether emergency workers will be in place to put a chosen protective action into effect. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 11; Tr. 7,058-60 (Weismantle). .Nevertheless, mobilization times for most LILCO workers are not addressed in the Plan. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 11. 263. The LILCO witnesses testified that the Plan is based on a se-quenced mobilization of emergency workers according to emergency action 170 - r- ~
- it ~4 l
!N' - i - [. .. levels. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7043, at 9-12. At the lowest classifica-l' tion (Unusual Event), 7 high ranking members of LERO are placed on standby.
- At the Alert level, the EOC is activated and key personnel are mobilized.
Should the' situation escalate to a Site Area or General Emergency, all LERO L personnel are mobilized. At that time, bus drivers, traffic guides, road crews and other field personnel are notified, travel to their respective staging areas, are processed through the staging areas as they arrive, and then are dispatched to their posts. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7043, at 9-12. t- } '264. According to LILCO, the Plan also contains features designed to minimize LILCO workers' mobilization times, including: (1) establishment of 3 staging areas around the periphery of EPZ; (2) geographical distri-bution of responsibilities among staging areas; (3) activation of the EOC < and staging areas at the Alert Stage; (4) assignment of LERO workers gener-ally to the closest staging area; (5) development of call-out lists struc-tured so that the closest workers are called first; (6) increased efficien-cy in processing workers through staging areas; and (7) matching special vehicles to the 3' staging areas to reduce travel times. Id., at 8-9; Tr. 7080-81 (Lieberman); 7073-76 (Weismantle). r 265. The LILCO witnesses state that in most cases the pace of an accident sequencg would permit ample time for mobilization of LERO person-nel so that the Plan could be implemented exactly as. designed. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7043, at 24-26. However, we find that rapid mobilization is most crucial in severe accidents requiring evacuation, which are likely - 171 - 1 l to' progress rapidly (Tr. 7394-95, 7488-90 (Herr)); it is these types of accidents which appear to pose the greatest life-threatening risk. LILCO acknowledged that in a rapidly progressing accident, it could not effec-tively mobilize its personnel to implement the Plan as designed.- Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7043, at 24-26. Accordingly, we conclude that LILC0 cannot mobilize its personnel in a timely manner.153/ 266. It is apparent to the Board after hearing LILCO's witnesses tes-tify that they are relying on an accident to proceed at a moderate pace which will permit them to notify, gather, equip and dispatch LILCO's workers in a timely manner. Yet, as NUREG 0654 recognizes, many accidents may proceed at a rapid pace which will require a rapid response which we find LILCO will not be able to meet, whether its mobilization is staged or not. 267. The experience of the SCPD witnesses and drills conducted by the SCPD154/ demonstrated that an unscheduled mobilization of a large number of 153/ Mr. Weismantle did not appear concerned about LILCO's inability to get personnel into the field before an evacuation is declared during a fast moving accident, noting that Mr. Lieberman's time estimates for-an " uncontrolled" evacuation show a 1-1/2 increase over times based on an effective control scheme. Tr. 7175-81 (Weismantle). See our find-ings on Contention 65.C. however, where we find that LILCO's " uncontrolled" evacuation times are too low. . 154/ A drill conducted by the SCPD in Janusry 1983 found that it would take 2 hours to muster the Sixth Precinct (before dispatching officers to field locations) with only a 667,succe s rate. A full mobilization of .the entire SCPD would take approximately 6 hours. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381 at 12-15; Tr. 7431-38 (Monteith). It would take LILCO (Footnote cont'd next page) - 172 - individuals is always difficult, time-consuming, and, most often, only par-tially successful. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 12-15; Tr. 7472-75 (Turano, Roberts); 7477 (Monteith). Thus, significant time must be built into the Plan for mobilization activities. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 10-11. LILCO, however, has had no experience in mobilizing personnel and equipment to perform the scores of non-utility-related functions (such t as traffic direction and control, operating evacuation buses, crowd con-trol, providing security, etc.) which the Plan contemplates. Id., at 8-9; see Tr. 7409-11 (McGuire, Monteith); 7417-19 (Monteith, McGuire, Roberts, Michel). 268. The County's witnesses testified that although the Plan depends upon timely implementation of various tasks, LILCO's personnel will not be able to mobilize rapidly enough to implement those tasks. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 8-9. This renders many crucial assumptions in the Plan invalid, thus~ casting doubt on LILCO's ability to protect the public.155/ (Footnote cont'd from previous page) , longer to mobilize because many LILCO personnel live and work much further to the west of the EPZ. Monteith et al. , f f. Tr. 7381 at 13-15. Professor Herr estimated that a full LERO mobilization would take about 8 hours. Tr. 7499-7502 (Herr). 155/ For example, LILCO's evacuation time estimates specifically assume that all traffic guides and other personnel necessary to control and assist traffic during an evacuation will be " mobilized and in place at '[the] outset of [the] evacuation process or soon thereafter." Plan, App. A, at V-2; Tr. 7063-64 (Weismantle). If such personnel ara not in place, the time estimates in Appendix A could be expected to in-crease substantially. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 9-10. Fur-(Footnote cont'd next page) 173 - o c .r-. ( For the reasons set forth below, we concur with the County's witnesses and rule for Intervenors on Contention 27.
- 2. Extended Travel Times From Homes and Places of Work (Contention 27. A) I 269. One of the factors affecting timely implementation of a response plan isJhow far the workers live or work from their reporting locations.
.Tr. 12,780-81 (McIntire). Contention 27.A asserts that LILCO personnel live and/or work substantial distances from the EOC, staging areas and other emergency locations, and that consequently their arrival at these lo-cations will be delayed, thereby delaying timely implementation of the Plan. For reasons which follow, we agree with Intervenors and find that LILCO has failed to comply,with NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.2, F.1.e and H.4. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., LBP-82-48, supra, 15 NRC at 1571 (long travel time for workers residing for outside EPZ is serious but correctable -defect). .(Footnote cont'd from previous page) thermore, if they arrive at their posts after the evacuation has com-menced, they will never gain control of the situation. Tr. 7400-02, 7494-95-(Monteith); 7426 (Herr). Likewise, the evacuation times for those people dependent upon LILCO buses for evacuation are based on the assumption that LILCO bus drivers'can be notified and mobilized so that buses arrive at LILCO's transfer points within 2 hours from the commencement of an evacuation. Plan, App. A, at IV-74b; see also, -App. A, at V-8a. -The evacuation times for those in special facilities also depend upon the assumption that buses and ambulances will reach the " edge of the EPZ" in 2 hours. Plan, App. A, at IV-176; Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 9-12; Tr. 7493 (Herr). For the reasons set forth below, those assumptions are not valid. Therefore, LILCO's evacuation time estimates forfthe populations served by these modes of transportation are inaccurate. See also our findings on Contentions 67, 72, and 73. - 174 - 270. Both LILCO and Suffolk County agreed that, on average, it would take LIICO workers approximately an hour to reach the staging areas from either their homes or places of work (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7043, at 22-23; SC Ex. 23), with times for many workers extending to 2 hours or I more. SC Ex. 23. This is because most LERO personnel work and live far to the west of the EPZ and therefore would be required to travel'subtantial- ' distances'to their emergency reporting locations. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at_16-18 and Atts. 2-4. 156/ LILCO has not_ established a maximum distance beyond which it would not assign a person to a staging area. Tr. 7084-85 (Weismantle). Mr. Kowieski was not aware of any other plant where'offsite response personnel live an hour, on average, from their ini- ~ tial reporting sites. Tr. 12,780-81 (Kowieski). 156/ A majority of LILCO workers assigned to respond to a Shoreham emergen-cy work in Nassau County (1035 in Nassau County, 508 in Suffolk County and 3 in Queens). Monteith et al.,-ff. Tr. 7381, at 16 and Atts. 2 and 3. Likewise, approximately 44% of the workers expected to fill LERO jobs live in Nassau County, Queens or beyond. Many more live in western Suffolk. Thus, if required to mobilizo from home, these per-sonnel would need to travel.long distances to arrive at their initial emergency response locations. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 18-19. The distance problem is especially apparent for LILCO's traffic guides, many of whom work in Nassau County. For instance, it would take approximately 1 hour 20 minutes for the 48 traffic guides working in Hewlett to drive to.the 2 closest (in time) staging areas, Port Jefferson or Patchogue. The 40 guides who work in Garden City would require over an hour to travel to the Port Jefferson and Patchogue staging areas and 1 hour 20 minutes to travel to the Riverhead staging area. Similarly, long travel times would be necessary for those traf-fic guides who work in Hicksville, Roslyn, Bellmore, Mineola and Bridgehampton. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 20 and Att. 6. 175 - i l 271. The LILCO witnesses testified that LILCO attempted to reduce the effect of the distance factor by structuring the call-out lists to permit those living closest to the plant to be called first. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7043, at 14-15. Nevertheless, a review of LILCO's call-out lists shows that even the closest individuals may require an hour or more to reach their reporting locations from home. SC Exs. 26, 27; see Tr. 7220-24 (Weismantle). 272. Furthermore, the fact that LILCO's call-out lists are structured according to where people live may not assure minimal travel time during working hours because, in some instances, people live closest to 1 staging area, but work closest to another. Tr. 7461-62 (Michel). LILCO,has con-ducted no analyses to determine how many workers fit this category. Tr. 7083-85 (Weismantle). 273. Travel time to reporting locations could also be delayed by other practical considerations which LILCO has ignored. For instance, LILCO's meter readers, who constitute the bulk of LILCO's traffic guides, perform their jobs in the community -- walking from house to house. .Gener-ally, they do not have an automobile immediately available to them. There-fore, they would have to be located, picked up and returned to their work locations before they could proceed to the staging areas. Tr. 7460-61 (Michel). 274. Extended travel times could also affect the timely arrival of non-LILCO personnel. For example, the Plan provides that ambulance drivers - 176 - are to report to 1 of the LILCO staging areas to receive dosimetry equip-ment before they report to a special facility or home to pick up an evacuee. OPIP 3.6.5, at 4, 10. In many instances, the distances between their garages and the staging areas will require them to travel an hour or more (after having traveled from their homes to the ambulance company to pick up the ambulance), just to reach the closest staging area. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 20-21. Indeed, LILCO's own data indicate that it will take hours for the full complement of ambulettes and ambulances to re-spond to staging areas, particularly during off peak hours.157/ SC Ex. 25, at 2; Tr. 7198-7203 (Weismantle). 157/ .For instance, data compiled by LILCO showed that during off peak hours, only 15 (24%) ambulances would arrive in the first hour follow-ing notification. Another 39 (62%) would arrive between 1-3 hours following notification. The remaining ambulances would need 3-5 hours to arrive. LILCO's figures for ambulettes show similar delays. SC Ex. 25, at 2. LILCO does not intend to confirm these estimates through drills. Tr. 7207-09 (Weismantle). Furthermore, the LILC0 data are based on the time required to reach the nearest staging area. Yet, ambulances and ambulettes will not necessarily be required to re-port to the nearest staging area. Tr. 7209-11 (Weismantle). In addition, Mr. Weismantle did not know how long it would take the ARC to mobilize its volunteers for the staffing of relocation cen-ters, nor has the ARC provided estimates of how long it would take to set up those facilities. Tr. 7187-89, 7196-97 (Weismantle). Thus, there is no basis on which the Board could find timely mobilization of these workers. - 177 - L_
- P l i
- 3. The Effects of Traffic Conditions on Mobilization
. (Contentions 27.B, E and F) 275. Contentions 27.B and E allege that congested traffic resulting from public mobilization and evacuation travel will delay the arrival of personnel ~ traveling to staging areas or other emergency facilities and will further delay their ar' rival at their' field posts. Cortention 27.F observes that congestion will be exacerbated by the fact that most emergency re-sponse personnel (e.g., traffic guides, bus drivers, and ambulance drivers) are not notified to report to field locations until the Site or General Emergency Level (Plan, Figs. 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4) -- the same time that many members of the public will be-mobilizing in preparation for evacua-l tion. We agree with these concerns and consider them additional bases for
- finding noncompliance with NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.2, F.1.e and H.4.
276. LILCO testified that LILCO workers would not be delayed in trav-eling to their initial reporting locations because, according to LILCO es-timates, only 30*. of the total populat. ion of workers who live within the EPZ and who are moving toward home will occupy the roadways at the same time as LERO workers are responding to staging areas. Thus, the extent of such intermingling between LILCO workers and the public would be limited. Tr. 7,320-23 (Lieberman). 158/ 158/ We note, however, that the accuracy of Mr. Lieberman's estimates regarding the scope and effect of pre-evacuation trips is in serious doubt. Contrary to Mr. Lieberman's testimony, Professors Herr and Pigozzi testified that pre-evacuation trips are likely to be exten-i sive. See findings on Contentions 65.A and 65.B Section IX.A. infra. r h r - 178 - m 277. Furthermore, LILCO stated that evacuation traffic will not delay the mobilization of,LILCO's personnel because they will be notified to re-port to their duty station or staging area at a Site Area Emergency or ear-lier, whereas'an' evacuation would normally not begin until a General Emer-gencythas been declared and an order to evacuate has been given. Thus, in LILCO's estimation, the 2 traffic flows would be separated in time. In ad-dition, the initial reporting location for these LERO workers will in almost all cases be the EOC or one of the 3 staging areas, all located out-side the EPZ. .Thus, the possibility of conflicts between these workers and evacuees'is low. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7043, at 15. Finally, LILCO urged that emergency workers will not be delayed by traffic congestion on their trips from staging areas to their emergency posts because they will be moving counter to the flow of normal evacuation traffic. Id., at 21. 278. In contra,st to LILCO's testimony,' however, Mr. McIntire testified that LILCO's workers traveling from the west could be slowed by traffic generated by EPZ residents returning to the EPZ to rejoin their, families. Tr. 12,794 (McIntire); see 12,787-88 (McIntire). Likewise, the County witnesses testified that all mobilizing personnel are likely to en-counter heavy traffic congestion on their'way to their reporting locations and on their way to their field posts. The extent of the congestion will depend on when the personnel are on the roads and the directions in which they must travel. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 21, 159/ 159/ LILCO's own data show that some traffic guides would take up to 40 minutes to reach their posts after being dispatched. SC Ex. 23; Tr. 7291-93 (Weismantle). t - 179 - l l l .279. 'As the-County's witnesses explained, traffic congestion would be caused by the numerous pre-evacuation trips expected to occur both inside . and outside the- EPZ following the declaration of an emergency, as well as by people commencing actual evacuation trips. Thus, the location of the staging-areas outside the EPZ does not eliminate conflicts between traffic flows' generated by the public and by emergency workers. Furthermore, Mr. Weismantle also conceded that some emergency workers may be required to trave 1'through the EPZ to reach their reporting locations. Tr. 7250-52 (Weismantle). Traffic congestion will likely increase as the severity of the nuclear accident increases. Some trips will occur at the Alert stage, when the public is first made aware of the emergency; however, it is likely that most such trips would begin around the Site Area Emergency stage as the situation becomes more serious. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at
- 23. 110/- This is significant because the majority of LILCO and non-LILCO emergency. personnel are not mobilized until the Site Area or Gen-eral Emergency stage. OPIP 2.1.1 at 77, 79; id., 3.3.3 at 4-6. Thus, the traffic generated by the public and by emergency workers will not be 'sepa-rated in time, but rather will contlict.lfi/ The resulting congestion will raise the LILCO workers' travel times to their initial reporting locations i
1f0/ Indeed, LILCO's consultant, KLD, assumes that such trips will begin at the Site Area Emergency stage -- that is, before any evacuation recom-mendation is made. Cordaro et a1. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, Att. 10, at 3-4, 16. 111/ Mr. Weismantle conceded that EPZ residents traveling from work loca-tions outside the EPZ to their homes inside the EPZ, would be using the'same roads as the LILCO personnel. Tr. 7249-50 (Weismantle). 180 - I : l l l l and to their field posts. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 23-24, 30-31; Tr. 7449-50 (Roberts, Monteith); 7413-15 (Herr, Turano). The County's wit-nesses also explained that emergency personnel will not necessarily be traveling counter-flow to the emergency workers when reporting to their staging areas or their field posts because the public's pre-evacuation trips will be going in all directions. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 30-31. 280. Furthermore, if a Shoreham emergency occurred during rush hour, significant delays in mobilization travel by LILCO's emergency workers could be expected. For instance, the majority of the LILCO emergency workers would have to travel east to reach their reporting locations; how-ever, all major highways and most other routes heading east are heavily congested during the evening rush hour (from 3:30 p.m. to 7 p.m.) and traf-fic is frequently stopped altogether. If any emergency mobilization were required during those hours, emergency workers would be significantly de-layed in reaching their reporting locations. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 21-22; Tr. 7441-43, 7485-86, 7498-99 (Michel).
- 4. Delays at Staging Areas (Contention 27.Cl 281. _ Contention 27.C states that after emergency workers report to a staging area, they must perform several additional tasks before they are able to perform their actual emergency roles. The County's witnesses testified that the activities will have an effect on mobilization times.
For instance, the briefings to be given to traffic guides, road crews, - 181 - route spotters and bus drivers will all take time.162/ Distributing equipment and clothing, having it inventoried and checked for operability, and loading it into appropriate vehicles will also be time consuming. Monteith et al. ff. Tr. 7381, at 26-27.163/ 282. LILCO's witnesses testified that to facilitate deployment of .LERO field personnel, activities at the staging area have been refined. For instance, key staging area personnel will report to each staging area at the Alert stage to prepare the facilities and equipment for possible use should the emergency escalate.164/ LILCO estimated that it would require 162/ In LILCO drills, job-specific briefings averaged around 15 minutes apiece for groups *of about 30 workers. SC Ex. 23 at 13, 18; SC Ex. 24; Tr. 7252-54 (Varley). 163/ All field personnel must also obtain dosimeters from the limited num-ber of Dosimetry Record Keepers at each staging area. See OPIPs 3.6.3, 3.6.4. With only 3 Record Keepers at each staging area and hundreds of field workers at each staging area during an emergency, the process of filling out forms, record filing,' distribution of equipment, and receiving instructions on the proper use of the equip-ment will obviously be time consuming. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 27. In drills conducted by LILCO on average it took 30 minutes to an hour for workers to receive dosimetry. SC Ex. 23, at 13, 18; see Tr. 7296-97 (Varley). The time required to complete dosimetry distri-bution ranged up to 2 hours and 20 minutes. SC Ex. 24. Field person-nel must also check and install in their automobiles certain equipment such as radios or public address systems. Again, with potentially hundreds of field personnel at each staging area, this process will delay deployment of personnel to their field locations. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381 at 27-28. 164/ Other steps taken at the staging areas have been streamlined. For in-stance, (1) distribution of dosimetry to field personnel has been simplified; (2) information packets provided to the field (including traffic guides and bus drivers) have been prepackaged to reduce briefing time; (3) equipment storage trailers have been positioned at (Footnote cont'd next page) - 182 - 3 ? e f' i je 1-1/2 to 2 hours to activate the staging areas and another 2 hours for "a sufficient" number of LERO workers to be processed through a staging area and be ready for dispatching into the EPZ. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7043, at 24-25. 283. As the County's witnesses observed, however, this estimate is overly optimistic. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 29-30. First, LILCO's 2 hour estimate appears to include the time required by workers to travel-to the staging areas. Given the extended travel times required by most LILCO personnel, this estimate la clearly inaccurate. Indeed, LILCO's own drill scenario estimated that it will take 2 hours or more just to con-duct the tasks that must be performed at the staging areas (i.e. - not including any travel time to staging areas or from staging areas' to equip-ment or work locations). Id., at 29-30 and Att. 7. Our review of the evi-dence thus leads us to conclude that the tasks to be performed at the staging areas will take several hours to complete and thus will have a sig- , nificant impact on the time required to field emergency workers. k 1 (Footnote cont'd from previous page) i staging areas to permit rapid distribution of field equipment to LERO personnel;<and (4) the installation and use of portable radios by traffic guides have been practiced and refined. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7043, at 16-17; Tr. 7087-89 (Weismantle). - 183 - , a J# 6 1 1 \ ~ 4 s # 4 i .. i L , n 8 /+, e _ ,. 3 5. -DelaysDuetoPickingUpEquipmentAwag ltf 9' a, *- from Ft. aging Areas (Contantion 27.D) f, , . y L : . f r ; i <' j<>r > j 2N,. Contention, 27.D, alleges that bus drivers must drive to garages ip '\ p } % to p,1ckv up buses, and road crews must drive to various LILC0 ' facilities
- to
%j y. , pick up IJLCO fuel and tow trucks before reporting to,their assigned field. #- l e- posts.'gThe problem with t'ais procedure is that in c most.lcases, the hus r 3p ,) - s. truck storage locations are located far from thq staging areas. We find
- i that the substantial distances beiween staging arpas and veN.cle storage 2 x locations will significantly increase bIbd V mobilization t'imes, again 9
contributing to its noncompliance) with NUREG e654 Sections II.E.2, F.I.e, q - and H.4. See also NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.k ind Appendix 4, at 4-2 to >ls 4-3. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 31. , r, '.a
- 285. The LILCO witnesses testified that the effect of distance be-
/ : + tween the bus companies and,.the staging areas has been reduced by , structuring call-out lists so that the closest bus companies would provide the first buses. Thus, the schedule for evacuation of the transit-dependent population allegedly would not be adverse d affected. o 4 g!- Cordaro et al.,,ff. Tr. 7043, at 19-20; Tr. 7$71 t72 (Weismantle); LILCO Ex. ., . 1
- 27. 1_65/ Nevertheless, Mr. Weismantle conceded that bus drivers would re-quire the most time to be mobilized b<scause of their required travel to bus
~ 1_65/ 44e note, however, that LILCO's call-out list is based only on the time to travel from the staging areas to,the bus companies and not on trav-el from the bus companies to the transfer points. LILCO Ex. 27; see Tr. 7281-82 (Weismantle) . 9 , ) ,. e , l , - 184 - 4 .,6 3 a E companies to retrieve buses before reporting to their respective transfer points in the EPZ (not including the. time required for them to travel to the staging areas and be processed). Tr. 7305-06 (Weismantle). -286. The County's witnesses shed further light on the issue, however, noting that some of the companies from which LILCO expects to obtain buses are located over an hour away from the nearest staging area (under non-emergency traffic conditions). The average travel time between the staging areas and the bus companies is 37 minutes (again, under j non-emergency traffic conditions). ' . , on average, it would take well over 1 hour and 15 minutes for LILCO bus drivers to travel to the bus ccm-panies and then drive to the transfer points inside the EPZ where their bus routes. start. In the case of the more distant bus companies, round trip travel times would be well over two hours. Monteith et al. , ff. Tr. 7381, at 31-32 and Att.,6; see also SC Ex. 30. 166/ 287. 'A critical further problem with mobilization time for LILCO's ~ bus drivers arises from the fact that most of LILCO's buses are committed to school districts when school is in session. Thus, if an emergency oc-curs while the buses are in use by local school districts, the buses will not be made available to LILCO until the schools no longer need them. This could mean delays of several hours in deploying buses. Monteith et al., 166/ These times weald be further increased by the time necessary to obtain each bus, and check its gas and >perability as required in OPIP 3.6.4. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, t 32. 185 - ff.- Tr. 7381, at 32-33; see our findings in Sections IX and XII, infra. Additional delays may result if an emergency occurs during non-business hours when bus company officials are not readily available to turn over the buses to LILCO. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 33. LILCO has received no commitments from bus companies to have a representative available within any specific amount of time. Tr. 7287 (Weismantle). 288. With respect to tow trucks and fuel trucks, although the Plan calls for drivers first to report to staging areas, then to drive to vehi-cle storage areas, obtain.the tow trucks, and return to the EPZ, LILCO inten'ds to modifying this procedure so that an emergency worker would pick up a vehicle prior to reporting to the staging area. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7043, at 20; Tr. 7287-90 (Weismantle). This modification is not pres-ently in the Plan, however. Nevertheless, we no'.e that the extreme dis- . tances required to bring LILCO's fuel trucks to the.EPZ (since the majority are located in Nassau County) would still hamper LILCO's ability to field those trucks in a timely manner.167/ The problem of timely mobilization will be further compounded by the need to fill the tank trucks with gaso-line. See Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 7381, at 36. 167/ With respect to tow trucks, the distance problem has been diminished by LILCO's decision to use line trucks stationed at or near the staging areas. See Tr. 7288 (Weismantle); but see our findings on Contention 66 regarding the inadequacy of these vehicles. - 186 -
- 6. ' Conclusion on Contention 27 l 1289. 10 CFR 55 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(3) require that this Board find reasonable assurance that adequate protective actions can and will be .
taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Subsections (b)(8) and (b)(10) require that there be adequate facilities available to support the emergency response and that there be developed a range of protective ac-tions to ensure the public's safety. NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.2, II.F.1.e. and II.H.4 also require.means for the effective and timely mobilization of -emergency personnel. Yet, we find that even under ideal conditions, and even assuming prompt and adequate notification of LILCO personnel, the mo-bilization of the emergency workers and special equipment relied upon by LILCO for implementation of its Plan would be very time-consuming, taking many hours to complete. In many cases, this extended mobilization period would.mean that protective actions would not be implemented in a timely or . -effective manner. 290. LILCO's failure to mobilize its emergency personnel in a timely manner renders many of the Plan's assumptions invalid. This is particular-ly so with' respect to the mobilization of bus drivers, traffic guides and ' ~ -ambulances. We must c'onclude that LILSD's inability to mobilize its per- 'sonnel in a timely fashion impairs LILCO's ability to implement its Plan. Thus, LILCO has failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR $$ 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(8), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.E.2, II.F.1.e and II.H.4. - 187 - Ie , a C. Communications (Contentions 24.L, 28-32, 33, 34) i 291. Contentions 24.L and 28-34 contest the adequacy of LILCO's pro- ] l posals for communications among emergency response personnel. The conten- I i -tions raise concerns regarding communications between LILCO and federal re- j . sponse' agencies (Contention 28); assert that the Plan neither specifies the number of personnel that will be assigned responsibility for manning commu- l t nications equipment nor provides for trained communications equipment re-pair technicians (Contention 29); contest the adequacy of LILCO's proposed radio communications system for emergency response personnel (Contentions 30 and 31); allege that the lack of direct communications between emergency response personnel in the field (including DOE-RAP field monitoring teams) and the EOC will result in delaying the implementation of emergency actions -(Contentions'32 and 33); and question the adequacy of communications among . LILCO's emergency personnel and hospitals, ambulance personnel and dispatch -locations (Contention 34), in part because there are no agreements with .such dispatch locations to ensure theit availability to LILCO during an emergency (Contention 24.L). 292. The Board finds ~that all witnesses were generally familiar with, t and qualified to testify about, the issues raised by Contentions 24.L and 28-34.168/ 168/ In addition to the testimony heard by the Board, the County made an offer of proof pursuant to 10. CFR S 2.743 regarding the issues raised by Contentions 28-32 and 34. See Tr. 6134 et seq. This offer of (Footnote cont'd next page) - 188 - ms i
- _ 1. Communications With Federal-Amencies (Contention 28) l-293. Under the Plan, commercial telephones are the primary means for J
ll communicating with FEMA, the Coast Guard, and the FAA. See Plan, Figs. t L 3.3.5, 3.4.1; OPIP-3.3.2, Att. 4;.Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.'5823, at 7-8. With the possible exception of the Coast Guard,169/ there are no radio or dedicated telephone links to these federal agencies. Tr. 12,533-34 (Keller). In addition, the only backup means of communicating to these . federal agencies is the FTS, a system of leased commercial lines. Tr. 5835 1' .i . . (Footnote cont'd from previous pago) -proof, made in the absence of the' Board (see Tr. 6134), was in re-sponse to our termination of the County's cross-examination of LILCO's witnesses. Tr. 6115-16. In its offer of proof, the County alleged, among other things,_that if it.had been allowed to continue its exami-1 nation, it would.have established;that: (1) LILCO's: simplex radio frequencies limit the range of mobile radios and provide no assurance ~ of adequate or effective communications with and among emergency per-sonnel;- (2) traffic guides need to communicate directly wich each other to ensure coordinated information concerning traffic conditions; (3) the configuration of LILCO's proposed radio system does not ensure- .either a coordinated or a timely exchange of information among emer-gency personnel; and.(4) LILCO's: proposed radio system would be inade - 'quate to handle the amount.of radio traffic anticipated during a .Shoreham emergency due to, inter alia, overload of LILCO's radio chan-nels,' range limitations, and the ~ 1ack of backup radio channels. The Board finds that it erred _in terminating the County's cross- . examination-but believes, in light of its findings below in Interve-nors' favor,'such error was harmless. e '169/ Although LILCO apparently intends to install marine-band radios for i . .use.in communicating with the Coast Guard (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, hat 4, 8; Tr. 5855-56 (Renz); SC Ex. 16),.it continues to rely on commercial telephones as the primary means of communications with the ' Coast Guard. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 3-4; Tr. 5862 (Renz). - - 189 - $1 _ , 2. ._ __._. _ _ - . _ _ ._- - ~ _ - , . . , - . . a, I (Renz). LILCO asserts that radio or dedicated telephone links to federal agencies are not required since NUREG 0654 calls for communications "as needed" with' federal response organizations but does not require any spe-cific type of communication. See NUREG 0654, Section'II.F.1.c; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 4, 7. I 294. Problems must be expected with LILCO's reliance on the FTS as a backup communications system since, under the Plan, the FTS can only be ac-cessed from the Shoreham control room. Tr. 5850 (Renz); see OPIP 3.3.2, Att. 4. At the same time, however, the Plan assigns primary responsibility for. notifying FEMA, the Coast Guard, and the FAA to LILCO perso::nel who, during an emergency, will not be located in the control room. See Plan, Fig. 3.4.1; see also OPIP 3.3.2, at 7, 11-12, and Att. 4; Tr. 5852 (Renz). The Board thus finds that the Plan fails to provide adequate and reliable means'of communications with the federal emergency response organizations referred to in Contention 28.170/
- 2. Communications Personnel and Repair Technicians (Contention 29) 295. The' communications equipment that LILCO proposes to use (see Plan, at.3.4-1 to 3.4-6 and Fig. 3.4.1) includes radio transmitters and 170/ - While FEMA testified that commercial telephones and the FTS satisfied NUREG 0654 standards (Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 31; Tr.
12,534-36 (Kowieski)), Argonne National Laboratory reviewed the Plan on behalf of FEMA and apparently determined that radio links with fed- .eral agencies were necessary. See Tr. 12,537 (Kowieski). - - 190 - other radio equipment, dedicated and commercial telephones, .ind the LILCO paging system.171/ LILCO's Plan is deficient because it fails to specify the number of emergency personnel that will be responsible for manning this equipment.122/ Without sufficient qualified personnel, there can be no as-surance that reliable communications among emergency personnel will be pos-1 sible. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 6. While the Plan does not specify the personnel assigned to man communications equipment, other information provided by LILCO suggests in particular a lack of adequate communications staffing at the EOC. Id., at 7 123/ 171/ Among other places, such equipment is located at the EOC, the 3 LILCO staging areas in Riverhead, Port Jefferson, and Patchogue, the 11 LILCO transfer points, ambulance dispatch stations, the Hicksville CSO, and the Shorsham control room. See, e.g., Plan, Figs. 3.3.5, 3.4.1. 172/ FEMA determined that the Plan assigned 8 persons responsibility for manning radio and telephone communications equipment at the E0C. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 32; Tr. 12,539 (Keller). FEMA was unable to state whether this will be sufficient but indicated that the matter would be evaluated during an exercise. Tr. 12,540 (Keller). LILCO, on the other hand, testified that the Plan expressly designates 12 persons as " communicators" and that 2 additional persons have also been made " communicators" and given responsibility for manning commu-nications equipment at the EOC. Tr. 5870 (Renz). LILCO decided to sdd these 2 communicators after training drills indicated there was a need for additional personnel. Tr. 5871 (Renz). Yet even after these 2 communicators were added, 1 of the radio base stations at the EOC was observed during a drill to be vacant for some 40 minutes. Tr. 5887-88, 5887-90, 5892 (Renz). LILC0 has not acted on a recommenda-tion to ensure that there are sufficient communicators / dispatchers at the EOC. Tr. 5883-84 (Hobbs); SC Ex. 17, at 1; Tr. 5889-90 (Renz). 173/ There are 5 radio base stations at the EOC, 3 of which cover channels used by traffic guides, transfer points and staging areas and will be manned by LILCO's 3 Traffic Control Communicators. One of LILCO's 2 Transportation Support Communicators will man the radio base station (Footnoto cont'd next page) - 191 - I 1 i 296. The Plan similarly does not indicate the number of emergency personnel assigned responsibility for manning communications equipment at other communication posts, including staging areas, transfer points and am-bulance dispatch stations.174/ Moreover, specific responsibilities for 'those persons responsible for manning this equipment are nowhere stated. Without clear lines of responsibility among communications personnel, there is no assurance that LILCO's communications system can be properly operated if a Shoreham emergency occurs. Id., at 7-8; Tr. 6264-65 (Snow)., Further-more, problems encountered during training drills directly contradict the LILCO testimony (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 11; Tr. 5880-81 (Renz)) that there are adequate personnel ~ assigned to fill communications roles at . staging areas-ind othef communications posts. See, e.g., SC Ex. 17, at 1. 297. ' Apart from manning, other communications problems may be antici-pated. Radio systems regularly break down and need constant maintenance and repair. Tr. 6300-01 (Snow). The Plan, however, fails to provide for trained repair technicians capable of keeping _ communications equipment (Footnote cont'd from previous page) used to communicate with road crews and route spotters, leaving the other available as a backup to the other base stations at the EOC. LILCO's Ambulance Coordinator will man the radio base station used to . communicate with t e private ambulance dispatch locations relied upon by LILCO. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at'7; Tr. 5885-86, 5894-95 .(Renz). -174/ LILCO testified that in addition to the 14 communicators at the EOC, approximately 195 other persons would also " routinely" use communica-tions equipment. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 10 and Att. 1. - 192 - i l 1 operational. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 8; Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 32. The Plan states that there will be personnel to perform maintenance activities at the EOC. However, they are not trained and qual-ified communications repair technicians. See OPIP 2.1.1, Att. 2. If com-munications equipment develops problems, the Plan has no provisions for . identifying or resolving them. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 8-9.175/ 175/ LILCO's witnesses conceded that the Plan does not provide for communi-cations equipment repair technicians. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 11; Tr. 5895-96 (Renz). Although they asserted that the regula-tions and guidelines do not require the Plan to make provisions for such personnel, they acknowledged that it is required that adequate communications equipment be provided and mainta'ined. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 11; Tr. 5896, 6112 (Renz). LILCO's witnesses testified that repairs would be made either by LILCO communications technicians (Tr. 5901-02 (Renz)) or by NYT personnel. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 12. Hevever, the communications technicians are not on. call 24 hours a day, have not been told not to evacuate in the event of a Shoreham emergency, and, even if contacted, only 2 would be requested to report -- both to the EOC. Tr. 5903-06, 6154 (Renz). Moreover, LILCO has not attempted to determine how quickly these technicians coula be called out (Tr. 6111 (Renz)) and ' does not know where they reside. Tr. 6153 (Renz). With respect to telephone service repair, LILCO relied upon a letter of agreement with NYT, which provides for priority service only at the E0C. Plan, App. B, at App-B-28; Tr. 5909 (Renz). Further, the repair of telephone equipment is not covered by the agreement. Tr. 5911 (Renz); Tr.- 6271-72 (Snow). Nor does the agreement require a repair technician to be sent to the EOC. It only states that a NYT represen-tative would be sent, with no mention of how quickly that would occur. ~ Tr. 5911-12 (Renz) . The Board finds that neither LILCO's communications technicians nor LILCO's NYT agreement provides reasonable assurance that communica-tions equipment would be kept operational during a Shoreham emergency. 4 - 193 - m -- t L , { 298.~ The Board finds that this lack of qualified repair technicians l- = is a deficiency in the Plan. Without trained repair-technicians on duty at locations where communications posts are established, there is no assurance thatfthe-communications proposed under the Plan can be achieved. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 9; Tr. 6200 01 1 (Snow).176/ -3. LILCO's' Emergency Radio System (Contentions 30, 31) 299. LILCO's Emergency Radio System will utilize 5 radio channels -- 2 UHF channels, a high band VHF channel, and 2 low band VHF channels. Cordaro.et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 22; Tr. 6108 (Renz).177/ .These ~ ~176/ In the County's view, the-reliability of.any communications link lies ' in its redundancy. .Tr.'6257, 6263 (Snow). Unless there are adequate redundancies to a communications system, repair. technicians should be 1 assigned to wherever' radio equipment'is located. Tr.- 6201, 6203, 6205-06-(Snow, Stile). For example, even with all.the redundancies . built into the SCPD's communications system:(Tr. 6203 (Snow)), the SCPD routinely has as many as 10 repair technicians at its communica-Etions center and in the. field. Tr. 6203, 6205 (Stile). Similarly, a further communications problem concerns LILCO's failure to make ade-quate provision for backup equipment and spares. Nothing in the record suggests-that there are backup transmitters for LILCO's radio channels, procedures in case radios become inoperable, spare radio an - tennas at the staging areas-(where' mobile radios are to be installed), or backup generators at all staging areas and other communications ; posts. Thus, we conclude that LILCO's system does not have sufficient equipment and does not take problems that can be anticipated into con-sideration. .See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 30; Tr. 6255-56 ~ (Snow). 177/ ' FEMA's witnesses were unaware that LILCO modified its system to add a new frequency. Its~ testimony-regarding LILCO's proposed radio system was therefore of Iittle assistance to the Board. See Baldwin et al., ff.'Tr. 12,174, at-33-34; Tr. 12,540-41 (Keller); 12,543-44 (Kowieski)." - 194 - l I I frequencies are intended to provide either the primary or backup means of communication between the EOC and field emergency response personnel. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 9-10. One channel is assigned to each of LILCO's 3 staging areas to provide communications within each such geo-graphic area. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 22 and Att. 4.178/ Since each traffic guide location and transfer point will have a mobile radio, there will be approximately 160 users assigned to the 3 staging area radio channels. See Plan, at 3.4-3 and Fig. 2.1.1; see also OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4; Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 11.179/ These 3 channels provide the only means of communication between the LILCO staging areas and emergency personnel in the field. In addition, LILC0 intends to use these channels as backups to the dedicated telephone lines which provide the primary means of communication between the EOC and the staging areas. gee Plan, at 3.4-3, 3.4-4; Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 12. 300. LILCO's remaining 2 radio channels will be used by the Transpor-tation Support Coordinator and the Ambulance Coordinator at the EOC to com-municate with road crews, evacuation route spotters, and ambulance dispatch stations. See Plan, at 3.4-3; Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 12; 178/ These communications will be between traffic control communicators at the EOC, bus dispatchers, lead traffic guides, traffic guides, and transfer point coordinators. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 10-11; see Tr. 6036-37 (Renz). 179/ Under the Plan, 147 traffic posts would be manned in an evacuation of the entire EPZ. See Plan, App. A, Fig. 8. In addition, there are 11 transfer points under the Plan. Plan, App. A, at IV-74c; Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 11-12. - 195 - _Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 18, 23. Unlike the 3 channels assigned to LILCO's staging areas, these channels are designed to direct response ac-tivities'throughout the EPZ from the EOC. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 23; Tr. 6032-33 (Renz). 301. LILCO asserts, and Intervenors agree, that the major difference between the parties with respect to Contentions 30-31 involves the propri-ety of LILCO's decision to construct its radio system as an administrative, rather than an operational, system. See LILCO Brief, at 99-102. LILCO contends that its system is better adapted to implement a preset evacuation plan. Id., at 100. In LILCO's view, virtually all decisions (with respect to traffic flow, for example) will be made by LILCO before any evacuation takes place; thus, traffic guides would only have to implement LILCO's preset plan, and.this would require no extensive communications between traffic guides. Iji., at 100-01. Accordingly, the Plan does not contem-plate that there will be direct communications among field personnel; in-stead,'all communications will go either from the EOC or from staging areas directly to field personnel. Tr. 5927, 6029-30 (Renz); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 15, 22-23 189/. In LILCO's view, this approach permits a 180/ While direct communications among field personnel within a given staging area may be technically possible, such direct communications are not possible among field personnel assigned to different staging areas, nor among such personnel and those who communicate directly with the EOC (road crews, route spotters, etc.). Tr. 5933 (Hobbs). Each staging area will be equipped with a radio and will serve as the control point for those traffic guides and transfer point coordinators within the geographic jurisdiction of the staging area. The EOC will (Footnote cont'd next page) 196 - -coordinated flow of communications from field personnel through staging areas to the EOC. 302. It is the Board's conclusion, however, that while a coordinated flow of communications is desirable, the Plan's failure to permit the vari-t ous emergency workers in the field to communicate with one another is a crucial deficiency in LILCO's radio system which renders LILCO's entire emergency response scheme unworkable. Contrary to LILCO's assertion (see LILCO Brief, at 101), even a preset evacuation plan must include the capa-bility for communications among emergency personnel.181/ This is because (Footnote cont'd from previous page) be equipped with the radio channels assigned to the staging areas and will serve as the command and control point. Hence, information from field locations within each staging area's jurisdiction would be com-municated to the staging area and,'if necessary, by the staging area to the EOC. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 22. 181/ LILCO claimed that traffic guides need not communicate directly with each other to ensure effective communications since they will have direct radio communications with their staging areas which, in turn, can' communicate with the EOC, where traffic conditions can be analyzed on a large scale, with directions provided back to the staging areas and, from there,-to the traffic guides. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 20. In support of this testimony, LILCO's witnesses pointed out that other nuclear sites do not have direct communications among field personnel. Tr. 5930-32 (Hobbs), But this experience has no relevance here because these other sites rely on state and local governments (and governmental agencies / entities) to provide emergency response, and these entities do have the capacity for , direct communications among personnel in the field. See Tr. 5932 (Hobbs). The Board notes, moreover, that none of LILCO's witnesses has ever directed traffic (Tr. 5944 (Renz, Hobbs, Daverio, Cordaro)), and, therefore, none is qualified to render testimony regarding the neces-sity of direct communications in handling traffic problems of the kind (Footnote cont'd next page) - 197 - no plan can accurately and reliably predict all contingencies and traffic contro1' activities are not predictable in advance. -For example, if there is a major traffic accident, communications between a road crew or route spotter and a traffic guide would not be possible. These workers could ; only radio the EOC, where the appropriate coordinators could then talk among themselves. This would result in tying up an entire radio network just to deal with one problem. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 31-32. It is particularly essential for effective traffic control that LILCO's traffic guides be able to communicate information to other traffic guides in order to coordinate traffic control strategy. Such direct commu-nications between field personnel is essential if there is to be potential for effective control. Because traffic guides dispatched from i staging. area cannot communicate with the guides from either of the other 2 staging (Footnote cont'd from previous page) that could develop during a Shoreham emergency. The County's witness-es, on the_other hand, were trained and experienced in traffic direc-tion (Tr. 6281 (Snow)) and wel1~ qualified to render the testimony presented. The Board therefore concurs with the County and finds that LILCO's proposed system will not work. The system is an administrative radio network, but LILCO is attempting to use the system for operational j, ' purposes. Tr. 6211-12 (Snow). The difference lies in the use made of a system. For example, performing roll calls of personnel is an ad-ministrative matter; the coordination of emergency personnel and tac- , tical decisionmaking activities are examples of operational matters. Tactical decisionmaking activities, such as the alleviation of traffic problems, require lateral communications between and among field per-sonnel. Tr. 6213 (Snow). LILCO's system, therefore, precludes the very kind of _ lateral communications necessary to direct or control traffic or to alleviate traffic problems. Tr. 6215-16, 6307-09 (Snow). - 198 - e I l areas (Tr. 5943 (Renz)), the Board finds LILCO's proposed radio system to be unworkable. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 31.182/ LILCO con-cedes that its Plan precludes any strategic decisionmaking by field person-nel. LILCO Brief, at 101. This may be. However, this does not mean, as LILCO asserts (id.), that there will not be a need for communications among field personnel. As next discussed, the Board also finds that LILCO's pro-posed radio communications system is not workable because of the number of - users per channel, the lack of backup channels, limited broadcast range, and LILCO's use of mobile radios. (a) LILCO's Radio Channels Are Overloaded 303.' When told to report, LILCO's traffic guides and transfer point coordinators will go to.1 of the 3 staging areas before reporting to their . assigned posts. The staging area coordinators, bus dispatchers, and lead traffic guides will report to and remain at the staging areas. See OPIP 3.3.3, Att. 2; see also OPIP 3.6.3. Thus, the users of each of LILCO's 3 radio channels assigned to the. staging areas will be located at a staging area, at 1 of several transfer points, or at 1 of approximately 50 traffic posts. Regensburg et al., ff.'Tr. 6184, at 13-14. 182/ To alleviate traffic problems, direct communications (i.e., lateral communications) among LILCO's traffic guides would be necessary. Tr. 6281, 6288-89, 6309 (Snow). The areas surrounding some traffic posts within the EPZ are manned by guides from different staging areas. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, Att. 4. To handle traffic problems at -such locations, direct communications between and among traffic guides, irrespective of their designated staging area, would be essen-tial. However, under the Plan, this would not be possible. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 16; Tr. 6284-88 (Snow). - 199 - 304. While the staging areas.will be able to communicate directly with the EOC via dedicated telephone lines backed up by radio (see Plan, at 3.4-4; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 26), traffic guides will communi- l 1 -cate with lead traffic guides, not with the EOC. Three such lead traffic guides will be assigned to each staging area. Along with the staging area coordinators, these lead traffic guides will be able to communicate direct-ly with the E0C. Regensburg et al. , ff. Tr. 6184, at 14. 305. Under the Plan, there is no provision for controlling the use of channels by staging areas, transfer point coordinators, or traffic guides. Regardless of who controls the channels, however, there will be serious problems of overloading. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 15; Tr. .6208-09 (Snow). Specifically, if the entire EPZ is evacuated, 193 traffic ~ guides will man 147 traffic control posts (see Plan, App. A, Fig. 8), each of which will be provided with a mobile radio. Accordingly, the lead traf-fic guides at each of the 3 staging areas will have approximately 50 traf-fic control posts reporting to them. In addition, the individual traffic guides within each staging area may also have to communicate with one an-other. Thus, each channel will have more than 50 users just with respect to traffic control functions. But, each channel will also be used by transfer point coordinators and staging area personnel. LILCO's channels simply cannot accommodate that much traffic. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 15-16. For the reasons next discussed, the Board finds that the number of users assigned to LILCO's radio channals make the system unworkable for reasons related to control of the channels, the nature of - 200 - the function performed, monitoring capabilities, and practical problems in-volved in radio usage. See id., at 16-17. (1) Control of LILCO's Radio Channels 306. A radio system can give users freedom to communicate over the radio at willlor can preclude use except as given by someone controlling the channel. The Plan does not state which approach LILCO will adopt but, given the limitations of LILCO's radio system, either approach will be unworkable as a practical matter. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 17; Tr. 6208-09 (Snow). If only the lead traffic guides are permitted to ini-tiate radio conversations, it will be impossible to maintain traffic con-trol or coordination. For example, if a lead traffic guide simply contacts one traffic guide after another for status reports, he cannot know if traf-fic' conditions changed after he has spoken with a particular guide until he has contacted the other 50 guides. Obviously, such a procedure is totally unsatisfactory. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 17-18. However,'giv-ing 50 traffic guides freedom to initiate communications at will on only 1 channel-is equally unworkable since use of the channel by any 1 person pre-cludes simultaneous use by anyone else.' Id., at 18; Tr. 5943 (Renz). i-307. To adequately report traffic conditions, 15 minutes or more of conversation from each traffic guide every hour must be allowed. Tr. 6218-19 (Snow).183/ Under LILCO's system, even if every traffic guide had 183/ This estimate was obviously not based on the limited capabilities of LILCO's system, but on the duties that must be performed by these emergency workers. Tr. 6219-20 (Snow). - 201 - to speak for only slightly more than one minute each hour, there still would not be enough time in an hour for every guide to use the channel once. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 18. The severe limitations of this system are obvious and compel the Board to find that LILCO has over-loaded the radio channels assigned to the staging areas with too many asers. If communications are freely initiated by the traffic guides, the channels will quickly overload. If only the lead traffic guides initiate communications, the traffic guides cannot report on traffic conditions at their respective posts until asked to do so. Either way, the result will be that nobody knows what is happening and traffic control and coordination will become impossible. See id., at 18-19; Tr. 6209-10 (Snow). (ii) The Nature of Traffic Control Functions 308. The number of users assigned to a radio channel depends upon the nature of the communication and the work to be performed by the channel's users. Tr. 6217 (hnow).184/ In the case of traffic control, there should be no more than 5 or 6 users per channel, the channel should not be used for other functions, and traffic control supervisors and coordinators should have their own separate channel. Tr. 6245 (Snow); Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 19.185/ The reason is that coordination of traffic . 184/ The SCPD's radio system normally assigns 30-50 officers to a channel. Tr. 6217-18 (Snow). To control the channel's use, officers may not use the channel until given permission by an SCPD dispatcher. Tr. 6216-17 (Snow). 185/ Assigning no more than 3-5 traffic guides to a channel would not mean that LILCO would need 30 or more frequencies just for its traffic (Footnote cont'd next page) - 202 - I flow requires frequent communications, with each traffic controller being constantly apprised of what is happening at other locations. Id., at 19-20; Tr. 6221-22, 6307 (Snow). 309. The County's witnesses testified that in heavy traffic, even an experienced police officer may have to use his radio 15 minutes or more per hour. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 20. For that reason, the SCPD would never contemplate assigning 50 officers (or any figure remotely ap-proaching that number) to a single channel. In fact, because traffic con-trol demands so much air time, the police dispatcher will not permit offi-cers handling a particular traffic situation to use the same channel that others are.using but instead will'put them on their own dedicated channel. This gives them the necessary air time to communicate effectively with each other without disrupting other radio traffic or being disrupted them-sel'ves .186/ (Footnote cont'd from previous page) guides. A limited number of low powered, simplex frequencies would allow a number of users in different locations to use the same fre-quency, without interfering with one another, due to the limited broadcast range of the frequencies. See Tr. 6245-50 (Snow). LILCO, however, would probably have to increase the number of supervisory personnel for traffic guides. Tr. 6250-53 (Snow). 186/ Actually, officers talk to one another more than to their dispatchers; for example, to tell an officer down the street to direct traffic elsewhere if traffic conditions warrant. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at'20. A case in point is the last Shoreham demonstration, when the SCPD dedicated a single channel for just 4 officers controlling traffic on 2 streets adjacent to the site. Congested traffic condi-tions necessitated this approach. Id., at 21; Tr. 6244 (Snow). - 203 - l 310. As noted, LILCO's system does not contemplate direct communica-1. tions.between traffic guides. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 19-20; Tr. 5927 (Renz). Moreover, it assigns users with functions unrelated to traf-fic control to the channsis used by the traffic guides. This further undercuts the effectiveness of communications over those channels and adds even more users to already overloaded channels. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 21. 311. Overloading of the single channel to be used by LILCO's road crews and route spotters can also be anticipated. Since each road crew and route spotter will have a mobile radio, there will be approximately 22 , users of this channel. Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 5823, at 25. This can be a problem since the nature of the emergency functions to be performed by road crews'and route spotters demand heavy radio use. The Transportation Sup- -port Coordinator at the EOC will have to provide instructions and requests for assistance to.the road crews and route spotters; road crews and route spotters will also have to communicate with each other (e.g., to coordinate the removal of obstacles from roadways) and report periodically to the EOC. See, e.g., OPIP 3.6.3, Atts. 2, 3. As a result, the channel could become overloaded and communications would then break down. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 21-22. 312. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that traffic control functions generate heavy radio traffic requiring the number of users on a channel to be severely limited; that LILCO cannot expect effective - 204 - i r: . communication with the number of traffic guides assigned to its radio chan . nels; and that, for the same reasons, there is no assurance that LILCO's road crews and route spotters will be able to communicate effectively. (iii) Monitoring Functions 313. An experienced radio dispatcher can monitor 2 radio channels at a time. It becomes unworkable with 3 channels since the dispatcher cannot hear everything being said and therefore cannot exercise control over the channels. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 23. Under the Plan, the - Evacuation Coordinator has to be aware of communications taking place on 4 of LILCO's 5 channels (which may be used by as many as 250 emergency workers). Id., at 23-24. Although the 3 channels to be used by the LILCO - staging areas will be separately monitored by the Traffic Control Communi-cators at the EOC (Tr. 5887 (Renz)), the Evacuation Coordinator has to co-4 ordinate the information monitored. In addition, he must coordinate the information monitored by the Transportation Support Coordinator with re-4 spect to LILCO's road crews and route spotters. The Board finds that this monitoring function cannot be effectively performed. 314. Further, each communicator at the EOC will be monitoring infor-mation reported by the users of each channel. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 23-24. Given the number of users per channel, and taking into consideration the nature of communications that must be expected, the Board finds that the communicators at the EOC will be unable to monitor effec-tively communications from personnel in the field. See Tr. 6242-43 (Snow). - 205 - (iv) Problems With Radio Use 315. lThere are problems related to radio use which also must be an-ticipated. One problem certain to occur-is that individuals will " key up"187/ their microphones at the same time, making it virtually impossible to discern any communications over that channel. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 2'4; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 28; Tr. 6064 (Hobbs). Given LILCO's overloading of radio channels,- it is almost certain that there will be times when 2 or more persons key their microphones at the same time. See Tr. 6166 (Hobbs). The results in a Shoreham emergency would be severe, since communications for all users of the channel would then be knocked out. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 25-27.18g/ - 316. - A second problem relates to lack of radio discipline. People ~ who are not accustomed to working with a radio on a daily basis, like. LILCO's emergency personnel, tend to talk too much, trying to report 187/. " Keying up" is depressing the microphone button in order to transmit. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 24-25. When an individual de- . presses his microphone button while another is transmitting, the transmitted messages interfere with each other and communications be-come garbled. Tr. 6189-90 (Stipulation of Counsel). 188/ . Training will not prevent _these problems. ~ Trained, experienced pol. ice officers sometimes key up at the same time on the same channel, dis-rupting communications. The tendency is to pick up the microphone and talk. Keying up can also happen by accident. If the microphone lands on its key, and the key remains depressed, communications are shut down on that channel. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 25-26. Notwithstanding LILCO's assertion to the contrary (see LILCO Brief, at 104; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 28), this problem may not be , correctable. See Tr. 6297-99 (Snow). - 206 - , everything regarding a particular situation. This problem will be exacer-bated under the Plan because it provides too few channels for too many l users. Id., at 27-28. (b)- LILCO's Proposed Radio System Lacks Backup Channels 317. LILCO acknowledges that it has no backup channels to the 5 chan-nels which comprise its radio system. See LILCO Brief, at 106. This poses a serious problem because there is no way for emergency personnel to main-tain communications if a channel becomes inoperable.189/ LILCO's radios are all single channel radios. If problems develop on a channel, communi-cations become impossible for all personnel assigned to that channel. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 29; Tr. 12,557 (McIntire). There are many ways that a channel can be rendered unusable: weather can knock out a channel; a radio microphone can be keyed open; a radio can lock onto the transmit mode; the transmitter can lose power; and, with a single repeater system, if the repeater- fails, communications will become impossible. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 29; Tr. 6049-50, 6059 (Hobbs). -318. -Because of the serious consequences that would ensue from loss of communications in a single-channel radio system, the Board concludes that the Plan's failure to provide backup channels makes LILCO's proposed 189/ FEMA stated that NUREG 0654 does not specifically require backup com-munication capabilities between the EOC and field personnel. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 35. However, FEMA's testimony is of limit-ed utility because FEMA's witnesses did not know that LILCO's radios are single-channel radios. Tr. 12,552 (McIntire). - 207 - j n ra'dio system unworkable. See Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 30.190/ (c) LILCO's Reliance on Mobile Radios 319. The Plan calls for response personnel to be provided with mobile radios. See Plan, at 3.4-3; Tr. 5835-36 (Renz). The problem with mobile radios is that communications are only possible if field personnel are in their vehicles.191/ Thus, emergency response personnel who have to perform duties'outside their vehicles, such as traffic guides, will be without a readily available means of communication. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 32. Moreover, if a traffic guide is posted at an intersection directing traffic, he might not even hear his radio (Tr. 5944 (Renz)) and, even if he did, he would have to leave his post to get to the radio. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 32; Tr. 6291-92 (Snow). 190/ LILCO asserts that it has safeguards and redundancies in radio links to field personnel. See Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 5823, at 24-25. How-ever, transfer point coordinators and traffic guides would not have any alternative means of communication should their radios fail, other than dispatching a member' of the transfer point support staff or an-other traffic guide (should the traffic post have more than one traf-fic guide) to the nearest available telephone or, if necessary, to one of LILCO's staging areas or another traffic guide location. Tr. 5837-39 (Renz). This could require a traffic post to be abandoned. Tr. 5839 (Renz). 191/ ~LILCO conceded that field personnel will have to be in their vehicles to transmit, but presented no proposal for resolving this problem. Tr. 5943-44 (Renz). They asserted, however, that field personnel will be able to hear messages if within several feet of their vehicles. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 16; Tr. 5966 (Renz). - 208 -
- e. . . . - - , , -, --
r? 320. In. addition, mobile radios operate on battery power, and the ve-hicles must be run to keep up the battery charge. In most cases, LILCO's personnel will use their own personal automobiles. There is no assurance that these automobiles will have enough fuel to keep them running while l workers perform such functions as directing traffic. Regensburg et al., ff..Tr. 6184, at 33.192/ ~(d). Limited Broadcast Range ~ 321. LILCO's 3 VHF channels are single frequency, or simplex, sys- ^ tems; the 2 UHF channels utilize dual frequencies. With a simplex system, it is not possible to use a repeater. This limits the broadcast range of the single frequency VHF channels. Thus, if emergency personnel assigned -to a VHF channel have to talk over a mobile radio from the Riverhead area to the EOC in Brentwood, there likely will be problems. See Regensburg ct al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 33-34. 322. Broadcast range can also be affected by terrain. Ordinarily, persons attempting radio communications between vehicles experience few problems when the vehicles are within 3-5 miles of ecch other. However, terrain can limit broadcast range, and the Shoreham area is heavily ter-rained. Thus, if 2 road crews needed to communicate with each other, and 1 192/ FEMA testified that the Plan fails to specify either operating time or recharge requirements for LILCO's radios. Tr. 12,548 (Kowieski). Further,-FEMA had never seen any of the radio equipment used by LILCO. Id. FEMA would therefore evaluate these matters during an exercise. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 34; Tr. - 12,549 (McIntire) . I - 209 - crew was ' located some distance east of the Shoreham plant and the other some distance west of the plant, because of the terrain in the area, commu-nications may not be possible. Id., at 33-34. 323. Range also depends on the radio's effective power, which is in- -fluenced by wattage and the terrain over which the signal is broadcast. Id., at 34; Tr. 6026 (Renz); 6296-97 (Snow). The mobile radios used by LILCO range from 25-50 watts and will not be powerful enough to cover the ent' ire EPZ, absent a repeater system. Range could therefore be a problem, 1 especially since LILCO will be using each vehicle's-cigarette lighter sock-et to power the mobile radio. With such sockets, which are only temporary connections, radios typically do not receive the full power wattage they require. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 34-35.193/ 193/ LILCO claims'that reliance on simplex frequencies will not impede transmission of needed information. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at
- 18. The Board finds-LILCO's testimony to be of questionable validity.
The range of a simplex frequency is dependent upon such factors as ty-pography and the power, number and location of _ the frequency's trans-mitter(s). See Tr. 5993, 6026 (Renz). Thus, the user of a simplex frequency may be able to hear transmissions from the frequency's base station, but unable to hear transmissions initiated by another user of the frequency via mobile radio. Tr. 6026.(Renz). As a result, per-sons could initiate communications believing the frequency to be clear, but actually " step on," or interfere with, communications al-ready in progress. Tr. 6211 (Snow). LILCO did not represent that any of its simplex frequencies can be transmitted throughout Long Island. Tr. 5992-93 (Renz). The Board also notes that the Shoreham area is. heavily terrained, and the hills and high ground in the area often disrupt radio communications. Tr. 6293-95, 6313 (Stile). This might explain why, during training drills, LILCO has experienced problems in the use of simplex frequencies. Tr. 5998, 6013-14 (Renz); SC Ex. 19, at 1-15. These problems, contrary to LILCO's assertion (LILCO Brief, at 104), have continued during LILCO's later' training drills / exercises. See, e.g., Tr. 11,772, 11,775 (Renz); see also Sec-tion V, infra. - 210 - I? . j 1 (e) Problems With Dedicated Telephone Lines 2 324. The Plan describes a number of dedicated telephone lines that LILCO expe, cts tua be available in an emergency. See Plan, at 3.4-3 and 3.4-4. Dedicated lines may be more reliable than regular commercial lines since they are outside the commercial network and therefore not subject to telephone switching office overload. See Tr. 6264 (Snow). However, dedi-cated lines:also fail. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 36-37.194/ ~325. Dedicated lines do not provide re'dundancy to commercial lines because they have common failure modes. Tr. 6198, 6257-58 (Snow). The SCPD has about 50 dedicated lines. On the average, about 2 lines per week are inoperable due to line failures or other problems. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 38. In the County's view, the use of dedicated lines without backup or redundancy to particular communications links is impru- 1 dent. 'Tr.L62'58 (Snow). 326. According to_the Plan (at 3.4-5),~LILCO has requested priority service maintenance from NYT. That, however, does not lessen concerns regarding LILCO's reliance on commercial and dedicated telephone lines. First, .the Plan indicates only that NYT will provide priority service main-tenance'at the EOC. .NeePlan,at3.4-5, App.B,atAPP-B-28;Regensburget 194/ In many respects, dedicated telephone lines are as susceptible to failure as are commercial lines. Thus, telephone line stubs, amplifi-ers, and fuses could all cause a dedicated line to go down. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 37-38. - 211 - ~ 3h f ,, N 6 ( 4-\ /i
- 4. . ,
4 k\ r c 1 ., s , t
- g '
r l >) . < ' * , al., ff. Tr'. 6184, at 38-39. Second, it is unrealistic for LILCO to assume .o that its letter agreement with NYT will
- guarantee prompt restoration of
/ . ' service in a Shoreham emergency. Downed circuits typically require 6 hours e j' h or more to repa r. With the heavy telephone use that must be expec'ted dur-1 ,r ' ~^ g in a Shoreham, emergency, restoration of service could take far longer, , i $.. i. even asstning that telephone crews can reach the problem area (which itself .s , 3 : is questionable with the highway co$gestion expected). .Id., at 39-40.195/ Qt .y , .. Finally, even if NYT does its >best - to give priority service, problems will i, w d occur. The crew has to respond, determine the cause of the problem l and if a y the central , switching office is t?e problem, get into that office. jBoth . ends of the telephone line often have to be checked, a process tha:.zcan * ,v f' 1 ,3 take considerable 1 time. In short, the concept of priority service in the .. 1 context of a Shcreham emergency appears illusory. M. ,1 at 40-41. 4
- 4. Lack of Direct Communications (Contention 32) j i yr Q 327. The Plan only provides for direct communications between the EOC and staging areas (primarily via dedicated telephone) and between the EOC
;p m " and road crews, route spotters and ambulance dispatch stations (via' radio). < / y y- ~1 ~ 4' See Plan, at 3.4-3, 3.4-4;.Tr. 6079 (Rent)'. Direct communications between the EOC and traffic guides and transfer point coordinators, although possi-y + ~ s , ble,(is'notcontedplatedbythePlan'.' ; a Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at ' g 4 .s -1R /, Based upon past experience with the NYT emergency service, the SCPD is designing its own mobile communicatieps center that can be used during the ; time from the commencement of an emergency until' NYT can respond. Tr. 6302-03'(Snow). 4' i 'j l (, t s , 212'- ;f . .yo ^Y _____a n b 41-42. ' The Board finds that this lack of direct communication between LILCO's traffic guides and transfer point coordinators and the EOC may re-sult in delays in providing information to emergency personnel in the field, and consequent delays in implementation of emergency actions. Tr. 5938 (Hobbs).196/ Moreover, delays in implementing emergency actions could also occur if LILCO's. response ccordinators at the EOC decide to initiate actions requiring some response by emergency personnel, such as traffic guides and/or transfer point coordinators, in the field. See Regensburg et al.,'ff.:Tr. 6184, at 42-43. '5. Communications Between Field Monitoring Teams and the EOC (Contention 33) 328. The Plan originally contemplated that th,e coordination of field monitoring teams would be performed at the EOC. A radio frequency and space at the EOC was provided to support this operation. See Plan, at 3.5-2. Thereafter, DOE decided to conduct field monitoring operations by dispatching DOE-RAP monitoring teams from BHO (7-8 miles from Shoreham) using DOE-RAP radio equipment. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,948, at 5; Tr. 196/ For example, if a problem arises requiring a traffic guide to request instructions ast to how to proceed, the traffic guide would first have to brief his lead traffic guide on the problem. The lead traffic guide might then have to brief the staging area coordinator before contacting the EOC to brief appropriate response coordinators on the problem. If the problem is significant, personnel at the EOC may have to confer before responding to the staging area coordinator or the lead traffic guide. Finally,' whatever instructions are given to the staging area coordinator ar the lead traffic guide would then have to be relayed to the traffic guide. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at '42; see Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5823, at 30-31; Tr. 6067 (Renz). 4 - 213 - 13,949, 13,959,'13,975-76 (Renz). As a result, LILCO testified that field survey information will be transmitted, via DOE-RAP radio equipment, to BHO where it will be assimilated and used in support of the dose assessment function. This information will then be transmitted to the EOC, along with information provided by LILCO's onsite organization. Protective action recommendations will then be decided upon at the EOC. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,948, at 9; Tr. 13,972-73 (Daverio). 329. While there are direct communications between the EOC and BHO (by means of a dedicated telephone line and commercial telephone) and be-tween BHO and the DOE-RAP monitoring teams (by means of 3-channel portable radios),197/ there can be no direct communications between the EOC and the DOE-KAP monitoring teams in the field. Tr. 6040 (Cordaro); 13,966-67, . 13,983 (Renz). Further, the DOE-RAP radios do not operate on any of the same channels utilized by LILCO. Tr. 13,961-62 (Renz). Therefore, unless DOE's personnel-report to the EOC, EOC personnel will be compelled to com-municate with DOE personnel at BHO to obtain information reported to BHO by the DOE-RAP monitoring teams. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,948, at 6.198/ 197/- The Board notes that this use of multi-channel portable radios by DOE-RAP personnel will permit such personnel to communicate via radio without being in vehicles and will also afford them backup communica-tions channels. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,948, at 5-6; Tr. 13,950 (Renz). Neither is available to LILCO personnel. 198/' While FEMA's witnesses correctly noted that the primary means of com-munications with field monitoring teams will be by radio to BHO, fol-lowed by contact by BHO to the E0C via dedicated telephone-(Tr. 14,302-03 (Keller)), they also believed (incorrectly) that the RAP (Footnote cont'd next page) - 214 - o + 330. The RAC review, in its discussion of NUREG 0654, Section II.H.11, noted that " Communications equipment . . . should include radio links between the field teams and the EOC." RAC Report, ff. Tr. 12,174 at 26; Tr. 12,537-38 (Keller); 13,968 (Renz). Such radio links are not pro-vided for by the Plan. Tr. 12,538, 14,313-14 (Keller). LILCO testified, however, that NUREG 0654 does not require a direct radio link between the EOC and field monitoring teams. In LILCO's view, communications between the EOC and the DOE-RAP monitoring teams using BHO as a relay point satisfies regulatory requirements. Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 13,948, at 6-8. FEMA apparently agrees. Tr. 14,316-18 (Keller).199/ -(Footnote cont'd from previous page) team captain will report to the EOC with a portable radio which, as-suming sufficient range, would permit direct radio communications be-tween the EOC and the field monitoring teams. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 37; Tr. 12,538, 14,303-04 (Keller). FEMA did not know whether a portable radio at the EOC will be able to communicate di-rectly with field monitoring teams, but committed to evaluate this matter, as well as whether LILCO's provisions for communications with DOE-RAP field teams are adequate to ensure offsite accident dose as-sessment functions, during an exercise. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 37; Tr. 12,538-39, 14,302, 14,310 (Keller). 199/ Mr. Keller testified that since DOE-RAP personnel responsible for in-terpreting' field data will be at BHO, not the EOC, there is no need for radio links between the field teams and the EOC. Tr. 14,316-17 (Keller). The RAC's comment, according to Mr. Keller, was made be-cause the RAC believed that DOE-RAP personnel would be performing dose assessment functions at the EOC; therefore, direct radio links to the EOC from field personnel gathering data was thought appropriate. Id. Notwithstanding Mr.'Keller's testimony, however, the LILC0/ DOE propos-al to have RAP personnel perform dose assessment functions at BHO, rather than the EOC, will have to be reviewed by the-full RAC to de-termine its adequacy. Tr. 14,321 (Keller). Among other factors, it (Footnote cont'd next page) - 215 - 331. Notwithstanding LILCO's and FEMA's testimony, the Board finds that the lack of direct communications between DOE-RAP field teams and the EOC is significant because of the importance of the information to be pro-vided by the DOE-RAP personnel. Data provided by them constitute an essen-tial element in the determination of protective action recommendations. That determination is made by personnel located at the EOC. We find that the lack of direct communications between DOE-RAP field teams and the EOC introduces an unnecessary potential for delay and error into the process of making protective action decisions and otherwise implementing the Plan.
- 6. Communications with Hospitals and Ambulance Personnel (Contentions 24.L, 34) 332. Under the Plan, the EOC will not have direct radio communica-tions with hospitals or ambulances because LILCO's system uses different channels which are not compatible with those used in day-to-day operations by-hospitals and ambulances. See Plan, at 3.4-3. The Board finds that this proposal provides no assurance that there will be adequate communica-tions between the EOC and hospitals, ambulance dispatch locations and ambu-lance personnel.
(Footnote cont'd from previous page) may be necessary to look at the communications / radio equipment used by the field teams, BHO's procedures for performing field monitoring functions, and the range of DOE's radios and the frequencies utilized by the field teams -- none of which has been reviewed or evaluated by FEMA. Tr. 14,322-23, 14,327-28 (Keller). - 216 - 333. To communicate directly with hospitals, LILCO relies only upon commercial telephone lines. See Plan, Fig. 3.4.1. The many problems that must be expected with commercial telephone lines in the event of a Shoreham emergency _(see findings regarding Contention 26) lead the Board to conclude that LILCO may be without any means of communication with the hospitals in and around the EPZ. '334. In the case of ambulances, communications from the EOC must go
- ~
through the dispatch stations of the private ambulance companies LILCO will - use. Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at 19-21.200/ This may lead to some delays in dispatching the ambulance crews. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 44.201/ Moreover, should. ambulance dispatchers experience ' 200/ LILCO has letters of agreement with 11 ambulance companies to provide ambulances /ambulettes in an emergency. Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at 8, 34 and Atts. 13-21.C. However, LILCO's agreements are with the ambulance companies, not with the operators of the. dispatch locations. Id., at 22. Moreover, LILCO has had no discussions or meetings with dispatch location operators; in some cases, the dispatch locations are manned only with telephone answering services. Tr. 6535-36, 6539-40, 6555-56 (Robinson). FEMA was not aware of LILCO's letters of agreement with ambulance com-panies,~ since the Plan reviewed by FEMA included only letters of in- . tent with some ambulance companies. .Such letters of intent did not
- j. commit the companies to provide dispatching services on LILCO's behalf and were not considered adequate to satisfy NUREG 0654. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 15, 18; Tr. 12,256 (Kowieski). Nor was FEMA familiar with the communications capabilities or equipment used by the ambulance dispatch stations relied upon by LILCO (Tr. 12,541, 12,264
-(McIntire)) or with the locations of the dispatch stations. Tr. 12,262-63 (Kowieski). _ 201/ For example, LILCO did not know the range of the radios used by any of the ambulance dispatch stations performing evacuation functions inside (Footnote cont'd next page) - 217 - m m problems with the radio channels used to communicate with these ambulance drivers,.no> communications would be possible. Tr. 6035 (Renz). Further-more, only 2 of_the private ambulance companies relied upon by LILCO are licensed to operate on the Emergency Medical Services (" EMS") frequency used by. hospitals to communicate with fire / rescue vehicles, including ambu- ' lances. Tr. 6099_(Renz). Therefore, LILCO has no means to coordinate am-bulance vehicles and personnel with hospitals, and'the private ambulances that LILCO will"use will not be.able to communicate directly by radio with ~ the hospitals. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 6184, at 45. 335. A further problem concerns the fact that once the ambulances are dispatched by the private dispatchers, they will report to 1 o.f the .3 des-ignated staging' areas. Thereafter, they will be dispatched by LILCO per-sonnel at the staging areas, and' receive instructions from LILCO, not from -the private dispatchers. Tr. 6105 (Daverio); 6550-51 (Cordaro). Yet be-cause there is no way for-LILCO to communicate directly with the ambulances - when they are on the, road, an ambulance driver needing to communicate witn ' his designated staging area will have to drive back to the staging area. Tr. 6553-54-(Cordaro). (Footnote cont'd from previous page) i 1 .the EPZ (Tr. 6550:(Robinson); 6634 (Cordaro)) and some of the compa-nies operate in Nassau County and in Long Island City. See findings on Contention 24.G. -Thus, ambulances could be outside a dispatcher's broadcast range and unable to hear the dispatcher's instructions. Tr. 6550 (Robinson); 6554 (Cordaro). - 218 - b
- r 1 336. LILCO asserts that it is neither vocessary nor desirable for the EOC to be able to communicate directly with hospitals or ambulances. Tr. -
6102-03-(Renz). While FEMA testified that it is " accepted" practice to rely on existing radio links'that have been established beween hospitals, ambulance dispatchers and ambulance vehicles (Tr. 12,564 (Kowieski)), FEMA's testimony was -limited to its review of the Plan's provisions. FEMA did not. testify that existing radio links, if any, between hospitals, ambu- -lance dispatchers and ambulance vehicles relied upon by LILCO have actually been found to be adequate. Tr. 12,567-68 (Keller).202/ V. TRAINING (CONTENTIONS 24.S, 39-41, 44, 98-100) '337. Contentions 24.S, 39-41, 44, and 98-LOO contest the adequacy of LILCO's' training program. The contentions raise concerns regarding LILCO's provisions for training non-LILCO personnel (Contentions 24.S and 98), as-sert that LILCO's training program, including classroom sessions, drills and exercises, cannot compensate for the lack of experience among LILCO's _ personnel (Contentions 40, 44.E, 44.F, 99 and 100) or provide proper in-struction for-them in the use~of emergency equipment (Contentions 41 and 44.D), and question the adequacy of LILCO's proposal for dealing wit,h at-trition (Contention 39). 202/ For example, FEMA did not know which, if any, ambulance companies have the capability to communicate with hospitals via radio. Tr. 12,566 (Kowieski). Nor had FEMA visited, or met with officials from, any of the ambulance companies or hospitals that LILCO intends to rely upon. Tr. 12,570 (Kowieski). - 219 - 3 ~ 338A .The Board finds'that the witnesses were generally familiar with, 'and_ qualified to testify'about, the issues rai:ed by Contentions 24.S, 41, f 441 and 98-100.203/ We note, however, that the' County's witnesses were well qualified to-render-the opinions set forth in their testimony. P i " Officer Cosgrove hhs had"a long association with the Suffolk County Police ' Academy, having been~a lecturer at the Academy since 1972 and Commanding 4 4 Officer from.0ctober 1981.until January 1984. As Commanding Officer, he - !had' responsibility.for the Academy's operations and directed 33 full-timo trainers-in areas such as traffic direction and control, community rela-itions and crowd control and radio usage. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 2-4. Officer Fakler has been 'a member of the SCPD for 21 years and-has-worked-for the last 16 years as a supervisor and training manager, ,
- 203/ ~ FEMA'had not completed'its review of LILCO's training materials when its testimony was filed. Tr. 14,355-56 (Keller, Baldwin). Further,
[ some. materials were reviewed by. persons without expertise in the sub-ject areas covered by the training ' materials (Tr. 14,365-66 (Keller), Land there'was no evidence that.the FEMA reviewers had background or training related-to training methods or techniques. As a result, FEMA's review consisted primarily of looking at the training program to determine wh'e ther: the materials read well, were understandable and were consistent with provisions.of the' Plan. - Tr . 14,368 (Baldwin); 14,369 (Kowieski). However, not all training materials were made available to FEMA for its review. Tr. 14,358-59 (Baldwin). FEMA . concedes that, with the exception of the training issues, its testi-mony was based solely on a review of the LILCO Plan, with no verifica-tion of the Plan's statements or provisions. However, even'with the training issues,fFEMA's verification' effort was minimal. Tr. 14,381-82.(Keller). In view of FEMA's minimal effort and ability to assess LILCO's training program, we find that we can give little E weightjto.its opinions. Likewise, LILCO's unbridled citation of FEMA testimony (LILCO Brief,-at 111, et seq.) without considering the limi-tations <xt FEMA's review makes us skeptical of the degree to which -LILCO has attempted to submit balanced proposed findings of fact.
- - 220 -
4 tr_ i s ' holding the position of Administrator of Recruitment Training and Media Services at the Academy. He has supervised the instruction of entry level . personnel,-including training'in how to' deal with stress. In addition:to . supervising'the training of recruits, he has had responsibility for manag-ing the production, distribution and evaluation of instructional television ~ l programs for recruit'and continual. training programs. Id., at 4-5. Pro-
- fessor Lipsky is a professor of Political Science at MIT, where he has taught'since 1969. He has conducted research and written extensively on matters involving interaction with the public. In addition, his research
_and writings have focused on stress and quick decisionmaking. Id., at 5-6. 339: 'At.the outset, we'must comment upon LILCO's pr,oposed training findings. LILCO attempts to create a strawman, asserting that the " training issue" is whether th'e Board is to' accept LILCO's view that people . vill act in a'" civilized manner" in an emergency or the County's alleged view that they will act with:" riotous or aberrant behavior." LILCO Brief, at L 111'. -We. find that LILCO's argument is based on an improper and inaccu- -rate characterization of the evidence. LILCO's characterization of the ~ County's position is markedly different from the responsible positions ac-tually taken by'the County's witnesses at trial and the findings urged by the Cot:nty _ in its Brief, and its inclusion in LILCO's Brief violates our-Order of July 27, 1984. As we indicate in our Introduction, this is a se-rious proceeding that must be decided on the evidence of record. LILCO's . unseemly rhetoric and innuendo does a disservice to the diligent ef forts of the parties tx) litigate these serious issues. - 221 - r A. Arrangements for Training Non-LILCO Personnel (Contention 9$1 340. NUREG 0654, Section II.O.4 requires radiological emergency re-sponse training for "those who may be called upon to assist in an emergen-cy." If there is an emergency at Shoreham, LILC0 intends to rely on the personnel of schools, hospitals, nursing and adult homes and other special facilities to implement protective actions for those in their care. Plan, App. A, at II-19 to 21, IV-169 to 178. LILCO also expects DOE personnel to perform radiological accident and dose assessment functions (id., at 2.2-3; Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 86) and ARC personnel to operate relocation centers (Plan, at 2.2-1;-Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 85-86). See Cosgrove and Fakler, ff. Tr. 8407, at.3. But, despit'e the expectation that th'ese organizations and individuals will assist LILCO in implementing its offsite response, LILC0 has no agreements, and in fact has not even made arrangements, to train them. Cosgrove and Fakler, ff. Tr. 8407, at 3. LILCO's drills and exercises have not included personnel from these organi-zations and LILCO does not intend to include them in the future even though LILCO has conceded that people who make decisions in an emergency, such as school principals, need some training on matters relevant to the Plan. Babb et al. , ff. Tr. 11,140, at 79, 83; Tr. 11,417 (Davorio).204/ 204/ Training has not been provided to any school personnel or the person-nel of hospitals, nursing / adult homes, or other special facilities. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at-80. Notwithstanding LILCO's assertion that thare is no reason to believe that such organizations would not accept training (see LILCO Brief, at 115, 117), the record does not support such a finding. See, e.g., Tr. 13,108 (Cosgrove) and findings (Footnote cont'd next page) - 222 - 341. The Board finds that this does not comply with the clear mandate of NUREG 0654, Section II.O.4. These non-LILCO personnel are expected to perform critical tasks that are not within the scope of their normal activ-ities. More importantly, they are expected by LILCO to perform these tasks in a manner consistent with the complex administrative and procedural structure set forth in the LILCO Plan. Unless they receive appropriate pe-riodic training on their roles as set forth in the Plan, there can be no reasonable assurance that they will fulfill the roles assigned them by LILCO in a competent manner consistent with implementation of the Plan as a whole. See Cosgrove and Fakler, ff. Tr. 8407, at 3; Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 12; Tr. 8420 (Cosgrove). Indeed, some non-LILCO personnel may not even realize that they have emergency roles.205/ (Footnote cont'd from previous page) on the schools contentions in Section XII. Indeed, the record is clear that the schools have not engaged in any training of personnel for a Shoreham emergency; preplanning has not even begun. Thus, the Board must find noncompliance with 10 CFR S 50,47(b)(15). See Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Units 2 and 3), LBP-83-16, 18 NRC 811, 952-53 (1983); Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-77, 16 NRC 1096, 1098-1100 (1982). Moreover, although the Plan states that annual training will be provided to those groups LILCO conaiders " essential" support organizations (Plan, at 5.1-6), and not-withstanding the fact that LILCO considers the DOE and ARC to fall in this category, training will not be provided for their personnel. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 85-86; see Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 11. 205/ We reject LILCO's argument that because some of these non-LILCO per-sonnel are not part of " support" organizations, LILCO (and implicitly this Board) does not need to be concerned about their training or lack thereof. See, e.g., LILCO Brief, at 113, 117. This argument must be (Footnote cont'd next page) - 223 - B. Training and Experience (Contentions 40, 44.E, 44.F, 99 and 100)
- 1. The Need For Experience 342. Most of the emergency response jobs assigned to LILCO personnel cannot be adequately performed without extensive experience. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 17. Despite that fact, very few LILCO personnel have experience relevant to the emergency responsibilities they are assigned under the Plan. Tr. 14,469 (Keller). With few exceptions, their day-to-day jobs are unrelated to their assigned emergency functions.
See Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 40; Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 23-24. 206/ For that reason, most LILCO employees assigned to LERO do not have the experience essential to enable them to perform their LERO functions. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 23-24. More-over, they have been selected in a manner not designed to identify individ-uals with relevant experience, aptitudes or skills.207/ These deficiencies (Footnote cont'd from previous page) rejected. Whether a governmental entity is a " support" organization or not, the fact remains that schools and similar entitles have roles to play in an emergency. Just because LILCO asserts that they can make do without training (e.g., id., at 114) does not make it so. There is no factual support in the record for LILCO's speculation. Further, the TMI Board has already made clear that we are not to rely on such ad hoc response; it is no substitute for preparedness. See Metropolitan Edison Co., LBP-81-59, supra, 14 NRC at 1640-41. I 206/ For example, among the LILCO personnel designated as traf fic guides ' are meter readers and customer order representatives. And among LERO security personnel are systems analysts, information processing forms supervisors, insurance analysts and an auditor. See OPIP 2.1.1. 207/ LILCO concedea that 50* or more of LER9s jobs are staffed by LILCO employees whose job skills do not match their LERO jobs. Tr. 11,489-90 (Daverio). - 224 - l l l lead the Board to conclude that most LILCO emergency workers will not be able to discharge effectively their emergency responsibilities ur. der the Plan. 343. LILCO has claimed, and allegedly FEMA agrees, that its employees will be able to perform'their assigned emergency duties because those du-ties are not complex and do not require regular practice to ensure profi-ciency. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 39-40, 43-44; Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 104. But LILCO's witnesses, for the most part, have them-selves never performed the jobs (such as directing traffic or driving a bus) they characterize as being "not complex," nor have they performed emergency work during an emergency. See, e.g., Tr. 11,485 (Mileti). For this reason, we find LILCO's assertion that Professor Lipsky's testimony should be'given "[1]ittle weight" because of his " limited prior experience" (see LILCO Brief, at 111) to be an indictment of LILCO's own testimony. In any event, the Board agrees with the County and FEMA that the emergency jobs required by the Plan are not routine or single-function in nature. To the contrary, many LERO jobs are complex and all are potentially difficult in the context of a real radiological emergency. Tr. 13,119-20, 13,177-78 (Lipsky); 14,475 (McIntire). 344. This does not mean, as LILCO asserts (LILCO Brief, at 111, 138), that the County believes the public will be " hysterical" or " exhibit riot-ous or aberrant behavior in a radiological emergency." However, as LILCO recognized (LILCO Brief, at 111), the County does believe that LERO workers - 225 - bc^ should be trained to deal with anxious evacuees and emergency conditions. The Board agrees with the County and rejects the testimony of Dr. Mileti on this issue; notwithstanding LILCO's urging (see LILCO Brief, at 111, 138), it is the County's testim'ony, not Dr. Mileti's, that is "piirsuasive" on matters regarding the behavior of the public during emergency situations, especially since the SCPD witnesses, and not Dr. Mileti, have had the real-life experience in dealing with the public and reaction to emergency situations. Moreover, we concur in the County's opinion that LILCO's training program fails to provide such training. Indeed, based upon the many negative comments and problems noted by observers of LILCO's drills / exercises, it must be concluded either that LERO jobs are too complex and difficult for LILCO's personnel, or that LILCO's training has been inade-quate, or both. Tr. 13,325-28 (Fakler, Cosgrove, Lipsky). 345. Some LILCO employees are members of LILCO's emergency restora-tion organization. LILCO asserts that the performance of its employees in this organization demonstrates their ability to perform emergency jobs not related to their normal jobs. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 39-40, 45; Tr. 11,489 (Daverio).208/ The Board finds this unpersuasive. First, such workers are unlikely to have gained enough relevant emergency experience 208/ LILCO asserts that emergency response work in hazardous situations is not new to the LILCO personnel in LERO. Va note, however, that the LILCO employees in the restoration organization who have to perform hazardous work are trained for such work and often have to perform the work for which they have been trained (such as handling high voltage lines) on a daily basis. Tr. 11,592-93 (Daverio, Cordaro). - 226 - i through their work with that o:rganization to enable them to perform their LERO jobs. Cosgrove at al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 24. LILCO's res- -.toration organization consists primarily of workers who travel along elec- 'trical-lines to locate damage (survey teams) and who repair low-voltage power lines that have been damaged by storms (two-man crew teams). Babb et al.. ff. Tr. 11,140, at 45. These jobs are irrelevant to the sort of work that LERO meubers would have to perform during a radiological emergency. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 25. Furthermore, most of the restoration organization members who were selected for LERO positions are in sections of the restoration organization that have not been mobilized to respond to an emergency since January 1978. Thus, even if membership in the restoration group were somehow relevant to the emergency response posi-tions under the Plan, that membership would not. provide any significant ex-perience because personnel are called out for emergency duty so infre-quently. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 26.209/ 346. Mastering tasks with any degree of complexity requires per-forming those tasks regularly. Whatever the classroom instruction or prac-tice in drills or exercises,'a worker is not finally trained unless he has applied that instruction and practice in a field setting. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff.-Tr. 13,083, at 19. This is particularly true with emergency 209/ LILCO testified that during the last 7 years, the restoration organi-zation has been mobilized only 3 times in response to major storms. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 45. During the last 5 years, mobili-zation has been required only once or twice. Tr. 11,597 (Daverio). - 227 - ~- - - . , response jobs that so often have to be performed under stress yet require decisions to be made calmly and efficiently.210/ Frequently, what has been learned in a controlled environment such as a classroom is simply forgotten or becomes difficult to apply in a pressurized situation. Indeed, some in-experienced individuals may even attempt to avoid dangerous situations (es-pecially when encountered for the first time) by flight. To overcome this, there must be real experience in a live setting so that skills are not only learned but applied routinely to the point of becoming habitual. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 19-20. 211/ 210/ For example, to control crowds like those that nay exist at important traffic intersections, relocation centers and transfer points, LER0's personnel must be able to deal calmly with people in tense situations. They must understand the psych'ological factors that govern crowds. They must be able to exert physical control over distraught individ-uals (whose actions threaten harm to others) by using techniques that minimize the risk of injury. Similarly, to direct traffic, they must be able to execute proper hand signals and position themselves cor-rectly, while in the middle of active traffic. They must also be able to deal with accidents and stalled cars without losing control of the traffic flow. Cosgrave et al. (Dirc~ct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 22. 211/ For example, to perform his job properly a LERO traffic guide will have to be able to direct traffic out of habit while dealing with dis-tractions such as drivers who stop to ask questions or seek direc-tions. If such a driver were to stop in the intersection next to the traffic guide and impede traffic, the traffic guide could not simply ignore the driver. But if the traffic guide cannot direct traffic out of habit, he will have to stop directing traf fic to answer the driv-er's questions, thereby causing traffic tie-ups. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 19-20. - 228 -
- 2. LILCO's Training Program Does Not Compensate for
.the LILCO Emergency Workers' Lack of Experience 347. LILCO concedes that emergency workers must know their jobs but contends that this can be accomplished by training. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 38-44. It is true that a formal training program, if it is good, can compensate to some extent for a lack of initial experience. But such a program must contain at least three elements. First, it must be able to identify those persons who are capable of being trained for the jobs involved. Second, it must provide competent training in classes and practice sessions such as drills. And, third, it must provide post-training experience in real world situations so that skills academ-ically learned can be developed in practice. ,Cosgrove et al..(Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 27; Tr. 13,117 (Cosgrove). For the reasons set forth below, we find that LILCO's training program does not adequately satisfy these el-ements and, as a result, falls to overcome the lack of prior emergency ex-perience among LILCO personnel. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 27.212/ 212/ Witnesses for LILCO have testified that LILCO's training program is of high quality and comprehensiveness. See Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 22-25. But this testimony was offered by witnesses whose primary experience has been with onsite training programs or who had no prior experience in training emergency personnel. See Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 6-10; Tr. 11,214, 11,217 (Varley); 11,217 (Berger); 11,238 (Mileti). Therefore, we give it little weight. - 229 - (a) LILCO's Selection Process Does Not Identify Candidates Who Are Likely to be Able to Overcome Their Lack of Experience 348. The County testified that to have a realistic chance of success, any training program must begin with a pool of trainees who have the tal-ents and motivation necessary to learn the subjects being taught. LILCO, therefore, should have exercised care in selecting LILCO personnel for LERO. -It did not do this. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 28; Tr. 13,274-75 (Cosgrove). For example, LILCO did not use any pre-testing techniques in selecting LERO personnel (Tr. 11,162 (Berger)),213/ and its purported attempt to match LILCO and LERO job posi-tions that share common skills has been unsuccessful. Most often, LILCO personnel are assigned emergency response jobs in LERO that are unrelated to their LILCO job functions. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 29. 349. Particular aptitudes are needed for most of the emergency posi-tions described in the Plan. For example, a certain temperament and cer-tain physical abilities are required to perform adequately the security functions required by the Plan. See Tr. 13,165-66 (Lipsky). Cecurity per-sonnel may have to maintain order, and to do that they must be forceful, 213/ Pre-testing enables the trainer to determine the skill level of poten-tial trainees so that a training program can be structured in a way which teaches skills that are lacking -- not skills which trainees might already possess. Tr. 11,161-62 (Berger); 13,278-80 (Cosgrove, 'Fakler). - 230 - l l confident and physically able to impress and confront people. However, it is quite likely that many of LILCO's security personnel do not have the skills and abilities necessary to perform their jobs. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 30-31. 350. Similarly, some traffic guides have been selected because they have LILCO jobs that require them to work outside offices and to go out into the communities. But there is more to directing traffic than famil-iarity with roads. Physical coordination and command presence are both necessary. LILCO's selection process, however, makes no effort to look for these characteristics. Id., at 31. 351. In addition, LILCO's skill-matching process ign6res the fact that many emergency response positions require the exercise of good judg-ment under pressure.214/ LILCO has made little, if any, real attem,t to identify potential LERO members who have the temperment to make the right decisions in emergency conditions. Id., at 33. 352. We find that LILCO's inadequate selection process has resulted .in at least three adverse consequences. First, many emergency positions '214/ This.is true, for example, of traffic guides, security personnel, route spotters, road' crews, ambulance coordinators, bus coordinators and staging area coordinators. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 31. Traffic guides may have to respond to questions from angry drivers or may have to react quickly to driving behavior that snarls an intersection. Ambulance coordinators may have to allocate judiciously a limited number of vehicles to achieve a safe evacuation of homebound individuals and health care facilities. Id., at 31-32. l - 231 - have been filled by LILCO employees with no previous experience relevant to their emergency responsibilities. Without such experience, they will be able to perform their LERO jobs properly only if they receive adequate - training and subsequent on-the-job experience. Second, the LILCO selection process has no mechanism for excluding individuals who are unable to learn - their emergency jobs. As a result, the training program cannot compensate for -the lack of relevant emergency experience among emergency personnel. And third, the selection process does not identify specific individuals who may be ill-suited for emergency work. These deficiencies are particularly serious for a training program, like LILCO's, that has no post-training testing or evaluation. Id., at 33-34. , (b) LILCO's Formal Training Program Does Not Compensate For the Lack of Experience Among LERO Members 353. If well designed and properly implemented, a formal training program can compensate for a lack of previous experience. But for the rea-sons we detail below, we conclude that LILCO's program does not compensate, and that many LERO workers will not learn their assigned emergency jobs to a satisfactory level of competence. 354. LILCO's program consists of classroom sessions and drills / exercises. All LERO personnel are supposed to attend classes cov-oring general topics, such as notification of emergency workers and the health consequences of radiation. Job-specific classes arn to be attended by LERO personnel as necessary. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 14-15; see - 232 - L Plan, Fig. 5.1.1. LILCO has organized its classroom instruction into sub-ject area " modules," each of which consists of a workbook or a videotape, or both. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 35. After the classroom program is completed, LILCO holds training drills / exercises.215/ Emergency personnel within LILCO (but not from non-LILCO organizations like the Coast Guard) are required to attend drills conducted for their particu-lar emergency response positions. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 15. Training exercises are held after the drills have been evaluated by LILCO. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 35-36. These exercises at-tempt to integrate different LERO personnel and groups into a " common re-sponse." Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 15-16. (i) LILCO's Classroom Program 355. The proper performance of many LERO jobs depends on the develop-ment of skills. The County testified, however, that the LILCO classroom program does not adequately teach skills to LILCO's emergency response workers. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 36. At classroom sessions, the training instructor distributes workbooks, shows a videotape, lets the trainees read the workbooks and answer the review questions, and attempts to answer any questions asked by the trainees. Babb et al., ff. 215/ Drills are supervised instruction periods aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills for particular LERO positions. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 21; Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 110. Exer-cises, on the other hand, are conducted to test the ability of the LERO organization to function as an integrated unit. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 21. - 233 - Tr. 11,140, at 16. But most skills cannot be developed by watching vid-eotapes or reading workbooks. Telling someone what to do does not teach him how to do it. Skills can only be developed through instruction, hands-on practice and experience. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083,.at 36-37.-216/ 356. The County also identified flaws in LILCO's classroom program related to the instructors and the materials themselves. As alleged by Contention 99.C and apparently conceded by LILCO (see Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 87, 89), most of LILCO's classroom instructors are not experi-enced in or knowledgeable about most of the LERO jobs they attempt to . teach.217/- Very few have had any prior experience in areas such as 216/ Although LILCO asserts that hands-on demonstrations of equipment that might be used by trainees are frequently provided by classroom in-structors (Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 17), such demonstrations are limited primarily to personnel dosimetry and radiological moni-toring equipment. Id., at 94-95; Tr. 13,324 (Cosgrovn). Most trainees do not receive practical demonstrations for equipment neces-sary to the performance of their LERO jobs, such as communications equipment. Moreover, the County's witnesses testified that it is not enough for the instructor to show the trainees some equipment and let them take turns handling it; if a particular job is dependent on the use of equipment, the workers must practice the use of that equipment over and over again. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 51; see Tr. 11,261-62 (Berger); 13,324 (Cosgrove). We agree. 217/ LILCO suggests that this lack of experience and knowledge about the subject areas of its training program among classroom instructors presents no problem since the videotapes and workbooks provide the substantive information trainees must learn. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 87. LILCO therefore contends that videotape and workbook instruction somehow eliminates the need for qualified instructors. Id., at 89. We cannot agree. LILCO itself acknowledges that instruc-tors must be able to answer questions concerning the subject matter presented and to assist in the completion of written workbook materi-I al. Id., at 87; Tr. 11,357-58 (Berger). This obviously requires ex- , perience in and knowledge about the subjects taught. - 234 - w__ security, traffic control, crowd control, command and control, or communi-cations. :Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 37.218/ Because LILCO's instructors lack knowledge and experience in the jobs they attempt to teach, they may be incapable of teaching others how to perform their as-( signed jobs properly. Moreover, it_is important to effective training that an instructor be viewed as an authority who can credibly teach his subject area. Tr. 13,180-81 (Fakler). A student is unlikely to pay close atten-tion to an instructor if the student believes the instructor does not know the job he is attempting to teach. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 38-39.219/ 357. We' find that LILCO has done little to offset this lack of job-specific knowledge and experience among its instructors. Id., at 38.220/ 218/ It is uncontroverted that the Plan does not address the qualifications of LILCO's classroom instructors. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 109. This, combined with the fact that FEMA did not review any quali-fications of LILCO's instructors (Tr. 14,533 (Keller)) resulted in FEMA's being- unable to agree or disagree with the issues raised in Contention 99.C. Tr. 14,528 (Keller). 219/ To teach a job effectively, an instructor must be able to draw from his own experience to provide examples of actions relevant to the job. Students' perception of an instructor's credibility is strengthened if he speaks from experience. Also, an instructor is obviously better able to respond to trainees' questions if he can cite examples from his own experience to clarify a point. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 38-39, 220/ LILCO apparently recognized and attempted to correct this defect by employing 2 former police officers to teach courses on traffic direc-tion. See Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 96-97; Tr. 11,992-94 (Daverio, Babb). However, these instructors taught no other classes, and therefore only a limited number of LILCO's emergency workers were (Footnote cont'd next page) - 235 - e , Prior to conducting class sessions, each instructor was required to attend a preparation session. However, this session only consisted of a review of applicable lesson plans and the same training materials given to the trainees, which does little to overcome lack of job-specific knowledge and experience. It may permit the instructors to become familiar with the ma-terial they are expected to teach, but, since they are not trained or expe-rienced in the emergency jobs they teach, they really know little, if any- ' thing, more than the trainees. Id., at 40; see Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 88; Tr. 11,204-05, 11,900-02 (Varley). Moreover, classroom training sessions have not been formally monitored by LILCO, nor have any formal evaluations been prepared. Tr. 11,205-07 (Varley, Daverio); 11,904 (Varley). Even when classes were monitored, there was no attempt made to determine whether instructors conducted their classes in the manner intended by LILCO. Tr. 11,905-06 (Daverio, Varley) . 358.. The County demonstrated that LILCO instructors are not provided any objective, observable teaching goals. Cosgroveaet al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 38-39. It is a fundamental of good instruction that the in-structor must know and seek to achieve his teaching objectives -- that is, what the students should. learn by the end of the lesson. Unless the (Footnote cont'd from previous page) exposed to their instruction. Moreover, traffic control is not some-thing that can be effectively taught in a classroom. To learn to do it right, trainees need real experience on the streets. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 37. - 236 - Instructor knows specifically what skills he is to develop in his students, .the. lesson will be directionless. And without clearly stated goals that C include indications of the proficiency levels the trainees are expected to attain, the instructor will not know how much time or emphasis to devote to any particular point. See SC Ex. 59.221/ 359. Contention 99.G asserts that LILCO's training workbooks and vid-eotapes do not contain enough information to teach emergency workers how to , perform their LERO jobs. The County's witnesses testified that many of the workbooks and tapes display indifference to the kinds of problems likely to be encountered by the workers in the field. Instead, they concentrate on orienting personnel to matters of organizational hierarchy and technical details associated with various tasks. This may be appropriate for some simple jobs, but it is an ineffective way of teaching complex jobs such as those involved in traffic coi rol and coordinating the evacuation of spe- , cial facilities. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 40-41. n - 221/ For instance, LILCO's instructors are not provided lesson plans which ) contain the substantive information needed to teach classroom ses-I 'sions. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 88. In LILCO's view, this is justified by the fact that videotapes and workbooks, and not the classroom instructors, are the primary instructional tools in the classroom training sessions. Id., at 89; Tr. 11,902-03 (Varley). However, LILCO's training materials were not in all cases prepared by individuals with expertise in the subject areas taught. See, e.g., Tr. 11,928-29 (Varley). In the County's view, training without mean-ingful lesson plans is similar to building a home without a blueprint. Tr.'13,345-46 (Cosgrove). f - 237 - l c= s , 0 E 360. In addition, some.of LILCO's' training materials undermine what Linstructional value they do contain by presenting inaccurate or contradic-tory information. For example, videotapes show LERO workers using hand-held or portable radios, even though LILCO,has no intent to use such radios. Tr. 11,350 (Varley). Moreover,'the videotapes present much irrel-evant information on job functions and emergency questions, thereby * ' increasing the likelihood that pertinent information will be missed. Tr. 13,292-93 (Fakler). They are also unrealistic (id.), not geared to a par-ticular audience (Tr. 13,295 (Fakler)), and utilize a lecture-type format .that leads to inattention among many trainees (Tr. 13,296-97 (Fakler)). i I 361. The County also identified as a significant problem with LILCO's training program- the absence of evaluation of trainees' performance. LILCO concedes that it is important to determine whether trainees are learning ' the training material. Tr. 11,277 (Barger). But there is no testing in- - cluded in LILCO's classroom training program. See Tr. 13,364 (Fakler). Instead, a trainee's progress in the classroom sessions is measured by the trainee himself. Tr. 13,276-77 (Cosgrove, Fakler).222/ Thus, it is I t 222/. The training workbooks contain self-review exercises (Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 16), but these exercises are not used as a testing technique.' See Tr. 14,396-97 (Keller). Instead, the trainees are al-lowed to work through the exercises in open book fashion, the instruc-tors review the trainees' answers during the classroom sessions, and the exercises are never graded. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 16-17; Tr. 11,301, 11,306, 11,315-16 (Varley); 14,396-97 (Keller). At best, the exercises allow trainees to determine whether or not they can remember and' understand whatever information has been presented during the classroom session. Tr. 11,301-02 (Varley). However, they provide no way for LILCO to measure whether trainees have actually learned anything. Tr. 13,290 (Fakler). - 238 - i - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ impossible for a trainee to fail out of the LILCO training program. Trainees who fail to learn anything about their jobs will therefore remain in LERO and will be relied upon by LILCO to protect the public in the event of a Shoreham emergency. See Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 36-37. We find this to be a significant deficiency in LILCO's training program. 362. The County's witnesses also stated that there are no incentives for LILCO personnel to learn or retain the emergency training provided them. In fact, LILCO's training materials downplay the importance of the training or the need to retain the materials that are taught. For example, LILCO's videotapes frequently state that nuc1 car occidents would not pro-duce serious consequences and emphasize the unlikeliness of such accidents. Tr. 13,185-86 (Fakler, Cosgrove); Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 46-48. The results are predictable. Attendance at training sessions has suffered and trainees have a hard time recalling the substance of the training they have received. Id., at 49; SC Ex. 60, at 2; Tr. 11,428-29 (Daverio).223/ 363. LILCO concedes that its classroom training does not teach trainees how to perform their LERO jobs. See LILCO Brief, at 137-38; Tr. 223/ According to LILCO, during April 1984, attendance averaged about 65%, compared to about 90% levels during the classroom training held in 1983. Tr. 11,428-29 (Davorio). In addition, some trainees have failed to attend drills and exercises. Tr. 11,686 (Daverio). LILCO acknowledged that poor attendance by trainees can be indicative of a lack of desire by trainees to learn. Tr. 11,260 (Berger). - 239 - i # .x U , , .e 11,227 (Varley); 11,942-43 (Daverio).224/ According to LILCO, this is by' design since classroom sessions are only mealt to provide trainees basic information about LERO and how their jobs fit within LERO . Tr. 11,269 (Varley). Thus, LILCO does not expect trainees to be able to perform their ' jobs,untiltheentiretrainingprogram(includingdrillsandexercises)has been completed. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 92-93, 99-101; Tr. 11,224, , j 11,227 (Varley); 11,225'-07 (Berger).215/ . 364. The Board concludes that the foregoing reflects a basic misun- $ derstanding of the instru:ticn&I needs of LERO workers. In the past, some of LILCO's instructors apparently have been involved in training police and bus drivers in connection with other nuclear plants. In those situations, ~~ 224/ Thus, LILCC; acknowledged that its videotapes do not adequately prepare trainees to perform their jobs. Tr. 11,299 (Berger). For example, g the job-specific module given to traffic guides and road crews does not impart necessary information about how to direct traffic or how to , remove obstructions from the middle of crowded roadways. Although traffic guides are given a total of 5 classroom sessions, 3 of the 5 sessions include general information provided to all LERO trainees and , do not address traffic direction. Tr. 11,990 (Daverio). The other 2 provide only a general overview of a traffic guide's functions; they ig do n'ot instruct them how to direct traffic. Tr. 11,992 (Daverio). 225/ LILCO cites the training provided to monitoring and decontamination personnel as an example of how its training program works. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 93-94; Tr. 11,950 (Daverio). But, during training drills in which;these personnel have participated, numerous ! problems have occurred that suggest that they have not, in fact,. learned their LERO jobs. SC Ex. 64, at 14; Tr. 11,960 (Daverio). For example, although all drills / exercises conducted for these personnel have involved LTLCO's Emergency Worker Decontamination Facilit; ("EWDF") (Tr. 11,985-86 (Daverio)), there have been insufficient per-sonnel assigned to the EWDF to adequately monitor and decontaminate vehicles and personnel. Moreover, menitoring procedures have been very lax in general. SC Ex. 63, at.15; Tr. 11,969 (Daverio). ./ - r - 240 - .) c - 1 unlike Shoreham, the police and bus drivers already knew how to perform their jobs, and only needed to be trained in how to fit into the overall _ plan for the specific plan involved. See Tr. 11,386-88 (Mileti); 11,390-91 ,ji- -(Bstger).226/ LILCO's situation is different. Its offsite emergency . workers do not already know how to perform their response jobs. Unlike emergency workers at_other facilities, they must' be taught not only how , their roles fit into the Plan, but also how to perform their jobs. Tr. <13,301-02 (Cosgrove). LILCO's training program, however, only attempts to teach the workers how they fit into the overall Plan. (ii) LILCO's Drill / Exercise Program 365. Based on the weight of the evidence, we find that LILCO's drill / exercise program does not compensate for the lack of experience among LILCO's personnel or for defic'iencies in LILCO's classroom training. 'Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 54-55.227/ It-is neither well J 226/ LILCO has acknowledged that utility workers at other nuclear sites'are not expected to perform offsite emergency tasks, such as lirecting traffic. Tr. 11,275-77 (Berger, Daverio, Renz). -Thus, the type of training needed for'offsite workers at other plants simply cannot be analogized to the training needs of LILCO employees who are expected to assume governmental functions. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. , 13,083, at 43. 227/_ The County's witnesses explained that simulated experience _is helpful, but it is. generally not sufficient to prepare emergency response workers for their jobs. That is why police and fire agencies require field training. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 55. For -example, when a police recruit in Suffolk County, after 18 weeks of intense training, graduates from the Police Academy, he spends the _ , _ next 3. months working exclusively with experienced field training of-(Footnote cont'd next page) - 241 - designed nor adequately implemented. Nor does it provide the resources or devote the time necessary to provide trainees with the flexibility, re-sourcefulness or responsiveness that would be required during a ra-diological emergency. Tr. I'3,139-40 (Lipsky, Cosgrove). Most importantly, LILCO's program does not give trainees an adequate opportunity to apply the knowledge they may have learned during classroom training. Consequently, it is not very helpful in providing meaningful emergency experience for LILCO's personnel. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr.13,083, at 56. 366. For example, LIL'CO's drills and exercises have not been struc-i.ared or conducted in a way which simulates realistic, emergency condi-tions. Therefore, even when LILCO personnel are given an opportunity to practice their LERO jobs, their learning will not be reinforced. As an ex-ample, we note that none of LILCO's drills / exercises to date have been spontaneous or unannounced. Tr. 11,499-500 (Varley). Thus, mobilization of LERO under simulated emergency conditions has not been tested. Tr. 11,283-84 (Daverio). Moreover, during drills / exercises, communications circuits at the EOC and some radio communications have not been operation-al. Tr. 11,501 (Ronz). These and other problems 1. ave led LILCO's observ-ers to conclude that LILCO's drills / exercises are not realistic. See Tr. (Footnote cont'd from previous _page) .ficers. During this time, the training officer can correct errors made by the new cadet and advisa him about.how to improve his perfor-mance. This arrangement is typical of police departments and reflects the fact that an emergency worker cannot learn to perform his job well without real experience. d., at 55; Tr. 13,094 (Cosgrove). - 242 - r '11,523-24,11,528 (Varley); 13,145 (Fakler, Cosgrove).228/ 367. A further example of the lack of realism in LILCO's drills / exercises concerns LILCO's traffic guides. Although directing traf-fic is a skilled job that can be learned only through practice and experi-ence, LILCO's traffic guides do not direct traffic under realistic condi-tions. See Cosgrove et al. (Direct), f f. Tr.13,083, at 57. Their training includes classroom instruction on methods of directing traffic and drills during which they direct traffic under simulated conditions through different instructional configurations. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 96-97, 104-05. But they never actually direct traffic. Tr. 11,503 (Varley). Instead, training drills are held in a LILCO parking lot under controlled conditions. Tr. 11,987, 12,020 (Babb). These conditions have not simulated realistic conditions, which we consider a serious defect in the training. See Tr. 13,347-49 (Fakler); 13,377-78 (Cosgrove). For exam-ple, traffic flow during the simulated training drills was too light. Tr. 13,375 (Fakler). In addition, there was no role playing of any kind -- for example, to simulate traffic guide-motorist confrontations. Tr. 13,376-77 (Cosgrove). -Moreover, of the 10 hours of training provided, each traffic guide is given less than 1-1/2 hours to actually practice the skill of 228/ According'to FEMA, drills / exercises can lead to valid conclusions regarding the adequacy of a training program. To do so, however, they must simulate realistic conditions. Tr. 14,454 (Kowieski). FEMA thus acknowledged that to fully train LERO personnel, LILCO would have to employ realistic and credible drill / exercise scenarios. Tr. 14,474-75 (McIntire). - 243 - i 7 directing traffic. Tr. 11,998 (Bchb).229/ Based on the County's testimony from police officers with years of experience, we believe that this is sim-ply not sufficient time to provide the necessary training. Tr. 13,347-48 (Fakler).230/ 368. LILCO's bus drivers face similar problems. According to LILCO, the majority of them were selected because they were familiar with driving large vehicles. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 40. However, their normal jobs involve transporting equipment, not people. Tr. 12,058-59 (Daverio). Familiarity with driving a large vehicle is only one aspect of driving an evacuation bus. The driver must also be able to deal with passengers who will likely be anxious about their personal safety. LILCO's bus drivers are given no opportunity to practice under realistic emergency conditions. Instead, during LILCO's drills they simply drive over one or two routes.231/ Similarly, LILCO's road crews do not actually move stalled 229/ Even school-crossing guards in Suffolk County receive more training than this; further, they have the benefit of day-to-day practice on the job. Tr. 11,998, 12,000-01 (Babb); 13,116 (Cosgrove). 230/ LILCO concedes that in directing traffic, it is especially important to practice fundamental skills on a regular basis. For example, Dr. Babb ' testified that, while a police officer, he saw other police offi-cers directing traffic inadequately. In his opinion, this was not be- -cause they did not know the fundamental skills of directing traffic, but because such skills had not been practiced on a consistent basis. Tr. 12,003-05, 12,077 (Babb). 231/ During these drills, none of LILCO's bus drivers actually drive their routes and pick up passengers. Tr. 11,501-02 (Varley); 11,945-46 (Daverio). Nor, contrary to FEMA's understanding (Tr. 14,549 (Baldwin)), do they even drive buses. Tr. 11,233 (Daverio). LILCO (Footnote cont'd next page) - 244 - I hi l vehicles or other road blockages in heavy traffic, and route spotters do not locate trouble spots in traffic congestion. Cosgrove.et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 57-58; Tr. 11,503 (Varley). Indeed, route alert drivers may not even drive the route they would he assigned during an actual emer-gency. Tr. 11,579-80 (Daverio). These examples highlight the Board's con-cern that LILCO personnel will never have adequately practiced, let alone . performed, their actual emergency jobs before they are called on to respond 'to a real emergency.232/ 369. Even if trainees were given the opportunity to practice their skills during LILCO's training drills, that opportunity would be of little value because LILCO's training instructors do not accompany LILCO emergency workers, such as' traffic guides, during drills. See Tr. 11,230-31 (Daverio). Observers and controllers of LILCO's drills are located at (Footnote cont'd from previous page) should_ require bus drivers to drive buses so that it can be determined whether drivers can handle and turn the buses and are familiar with their routes. They should also be required to simulate picking up passengers. This could be done'through role play techniques. See Tr. 13,202-04 (Fakler). Without the foregoing, the Board finds LILCO's bus driver training program to be inadequate. 232/ LILCO acknowledges that the regulations and guidelines require there .to be training drills / exercises during which trainees perform their emergency jobs. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 105-06. However, LILCO claims it is not required to hold drills / exercises that impact the public. We find that even if NRC regulations and guidelines do not require an offsite training program to interface with the public, the explanation lies in the fact that state and local agencies normal-ly relied _upon to provide emergency response do not require training in interfacing with the public since they do so on a regular basis. See Tr. 13,138 (Cosgrove). This is not the situation here. - 245 - facilities such as the EOC and staging areas, but generally not in the field where traffic guides.and other workers are allegedly being "dr111ed."233/ When a trainee is learning a job, practice without observa-tion is valueless. Without an instructor, there is no one to correct mis-takes or suggest improvements. In fact, the trainee will not know he made a mistake. When the trainee later has to perform under real circumstances, he will not know how to perform properly. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at'58-59; see Tr. 14,544-45 (Keller). i j 370. The drills / exercises, moreover, contain.no performance standards or objective criteria to be used in evaluating the performance of the-trainees. Tr. 13,355-56 (Fakler).234/ This makes it impossible for a 233/ LILCO asserts that the County's witnesses " incorrectly assume that ob-servers are positioned only at the EOC and the staging areas," and then argues that trainees are accompanied "to field positions" or "re-l mote locations." LILCO Brief, at 140 (emphasis added). This is a misstatement of the record. First, the County did not state that ob-servers were only at the EOC and staging areas; those were examples of the types of areas where observers would be. Moreover, LILCO's asser-tion that observers go to field positions or remote locations, and its discussion of "in-the-field" training, does not change the fact that during drills, LERO workers are not, by.and large, observed performing their: Jobs in the field. Mr. Daverio admitted as much. See Tr. 11,230-31 (Daverio). , 234/ LILCO concedes that its drills and exercises contain no performance-standards. LILCO Brief, at 143; Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 108; Tr. 12,037 (Daverio); cf. Tr. 11,399-402 (Berger). LILCO reasons that -drills / exercises are not the termination of its training program and, therefore, esserts that such standards are not necessary. In LILCO's , view, the performance standard by which its training program should be judged will come at the time of a FEMA graded exercise. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 107-08; Tr. 11,224 (Varley). The Board rejects the notion that performance standards have no place outside a FEMA exer-(Footnote cont'd next page) - 246 - trainee to fail out of the program no matter how bad his/her performance, and, in' fact, no trainee has failed LILCO's training program. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 110. Workbook exercises have not been reviewed and graded;'nor, contrary to LILCO's assertion (Tr. 11,228 (Varley)), have individual trainees been specifically observed and evaluated during drills / exercises. See Tr. 13,254-56, 13,276 (Cosgrove); 13,367-68 (Fakler, Cosgrove). We find that this lack of meaningful evaluation of trainees' performance is a serious deficiency in LILCO's training program. Moreover, it raises substantial questions as to the weight we can place on LILCO's testimony.concerning the adequacy of its training program since there ap-parently exist no performance criteria upon which such testimony could be based.235/ . (Footnote cont'd.from previous page) cise. LILCO acknowledges that'it is required by the regulations to critique'its drills and exercises. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 111. To critique or evaluate a training drill / exercise, performance standards are obviously necessary. Indeed, LILCO acknowledged that performance of trainees must be gauged by evaluating the level of pro-ficiency demonstrated against standards established beforehand to en-sure acceptability. Tr. 11,399-400 (Berger); 11,845 (Daverio). Con-trary to LILCO's assertion (LILCO Brief, at 143-44), neither drill / exercise scenarios nor critique / evaluation forms used by LILCO include fully objective criteria by which to evaluate the performance of trainees. See Tr. 11,846 (Daverio); 13,355-56 (Fakler). 235/ Related to this is the Contention 44.F allegation that LILCO will not be able to critique adequately its own Plan, including drills / exercises conducted under the Plan, due to its lack of exper-tise and objectivity. LILCO acknowledges that it has no agreements with any state or local authorities to attend drills or exercises to assess- LER0's capabilities. Tr. 11,383-84 (Cordaro). Moreover, there is no basis in this record to support LILCO's assertion (LILCO Brief, (Footnote cont'd next page) - 247 - 4 m- . _ - l l D L 371. Contention 44.E alleges that training drills should be designed to allow " free play for decisionmaking."236/ Indeed, free play for deci-sionmaking is required by NUREG 0654, Section II.N.3. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140,'at 69'; see LILCO Brief, at 130. LILCO acknowledges'the value of th'is-fres play and asserts that its drills and exercises provide for it. Babb' et' a1. , ff. Tr. 11,140, at 70-72; Tr. 11,791-93 (Daverio) .237/ LILCO (Footnote cont'd.from previous page) at 132), that state and. local government officials would agree to ob-serve ' training drills / exercises for Shoreham. -Assuming no state or local participation,-which we must for purposes of this proceeding, -even at a FEMA graded exercise lead controllers and observers would be either LILCO or Impe11 personnel-(Tr. 11,837-38 (Daverio)), and LILCO would make the decisions lregarding their qualifications (Tr. 11,842
- .(Cordaro)). This caused the RAC to iden*ify a number of concerns regarding LILCO's-legal-authority to implement-training aspects of the Plan._RAC Report, ff. Tr, 12,174,latf51 and Att. 2, at 5; Tr.
-14,559-60 (Kowieski). Although we find that if the deficiencies in LILCO's drill program were corrected, LILCO personnel likely could perform drill critiques, we cannot make the same finding with respect to full-scale exercises. Thus, the Plan does not comply with NUREG '0654,iSection II.N.4. ^ ' 1 16/ During free play,; trainees should be free to reach whatever decisions they feel are appropriate, and to carry out whatever actions are re-quired in response to their decisions, without interference or coaching. For: example, the County's witnesses testified that in po- ; , lice training, extensive-use is made of role playing and simulated situations to develop in trainees the ability to make quick decisions. In these role play exercises,. recruits are confronted by experienced . training officers realistically playing the roles of civilians to present the recruit with unexpected difficulties. The recruit is graded on'his ability to handle the surprise situation appropriately. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff..Tr. 13,083, at 63-64. p .237/' FEMA agreed with LILCO that the Plan adequately addresses. free play,- but acknowledged that this conclusion was based on the Plan's state-ment that drills / exercises will allow for " participant discretion and .decisionmaking." Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 106. FEMA had made no determination as to whether LILCO has built free play into its . drill / exercise scenarios. Id., at 106-07; Tr. 14,492-93 (Kowieski). I - 248 - i concedes, however, that, to be of value, free play must allow trainees to develop response decisions and carry out actions just as they would during an actual emergency. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 71-72. LILCO's training program fails to do this. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 63-64. For example, road crews and traffic guides.in heavy evacuation traffic, and monitoring, decontamination and security personnel at crowded relocation centers, will all have to deal with-evacuees in pressure-filled situations and make quick decisions upon which public safe-ty will depend. However, LILCO's training program fails to provide field personnel meaningful experience in dealing with situations like these. Id., at 64.238/ Indeed, LILCO has acknowledged that free play is not built into drills or exercises for bus drivers, traffic guides, route spotters or road crews. Tr. 11,798-801 (Daverio). We find that participants at all levels of LERO should be provided the opportunity to exercise free play. See Tr. 14,507 (McIntire). 223/ The Board is aware that LILCO relies on "subsituations" within the framework of drill / exercise scenarios, not as a substitute for free play for decisionmaking, but in an attempt to simulate the kinds of problems and distractions which might arise during an actual emergen-cy. See Tr. 11,569-70 (Varley). These "subsituations," in LILCO's view, require trainees to develop on-the-spot responses to unexpected situations. LILCO, however, was unable to provide even an approximate percentage of the drill / exercise scenarios that contain such subsituations. Tr. 11,679 (Varley). Moreover, the subsituations given to LILCO's trainees are really nothing more than. trivial _ inter-ruptions. Tr. 13,306-07 (Lipsky). Therefore, the Board finds the subsituations used by LILCO to be an inadequate substitute for provid-ing an opportunity to practice solving problems or dealing with sur-prises during drills. See Tr. 13,308 (Cosgrove). l - 249 - 372. A-related' shortcoming is that LILCO's drills do not provide trainees experience in dealing with fatigue, simulated pressure or stress.239/ Because LILCO considers many LERO jobs to be one-shift jobs ' (e.g., traffic guides, bus drivers) and has not staffed these jobs suffi-ciently to permit shift relief (Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 28, 46), fatigue may impair job performance among a significant number of LERO per-sonnel. See Tr. 13,333-37 (Cosgrove). This is particularly true in light of our findings in Sections IX, XI, and XII relating to the length of time an evacuation could take. Moreover, as the County's witnesses noted, under LILCO's training program, the first time trainees may be called upon te _ perform their jobs under stress is in response to a real emergency. At that time, because they will not be accustomed to pressure, their perfor-mance will likely be substantially impaired. We find it unrealistic to ex-pect that emergency workers will perform adequately in a real emergency if-they are not required to deal-beforehand with the anxiety likely to be present in an emergency. ~ See Cosgrove et al.,(Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 64-65.240/ 239/ 'Although one of LILCO's witnesses has testified that there is no way to subject an individual to stress during training drills (Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 64-65; Tr. 11,666 (Varley)), Impell, in its proposal to LILCO, offered to provide training in confronta-tional skills and stress' control (Tr. 11,668-69 (Varley)). This pro-posal, however, was rejected by LILCO. Tr. 11,671-72 (Berger). 240/. LILCO, and apparently FEMA, assert that the stress that would be asso-ciated with a radiological emergency will not impair job performance among LILCO's employees in LERO. 'Babb et-al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 46-53, 56-57; Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 104. However, FEMA's (Footnote cont'd next page) - 250 - 4 l 373. LILCO's drills also fail to provide emergency workers with an opportunity to become familiar with the specific surroundings in which they will have to work. Ordinarily, people with jobs similar to LILCO's bus drivers, route spotters, road crews, and traffic guides are familiar, through their day-to-day jobs, with the areas where they may have to work in an emergency. Familiarity with the area, including local roadways, is important to_many of the emergency responsibilities assigned to LILCO's personnel. Id., at 65.241/ LILCO's drills, however, do not provide (Footnote cont'd from previous page) testimony merely referenced unspecified " experiences" during . unspecified "other emergencies" as support. Id., at 104. Moreover, LIIf0 conceded that stress would exist, and that it would be higher in some LERO workers than in others. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 53. The County offered testimony by experienced police officers that, based on their experience in working under and dealing with emergency conditions, stress will likely impair job performance. See, e.g., Tr. 13,336-37 (Cosgrove). The Board finds such testimony probative and rejects LILCO's suggestions that the testimony offered by Dr. Mileti should be given more weight. See LILCO Brief, at 124-25. Indeed, Dr. Mileti's testimony, contrary to LILCO's assertion (LILCO Brief, at 125), was based on somewhat 3 estionable studies. Seep.g.,Tr. -11,616-24, 11,633, 11,637-42 (Mileti). Moreover, LILCO s own witness-es disagreed on this issue. For example, Dr. Babb testified that, as a police officer, he had seen stress adversely affect job performance and acknowledged that stress would probably exist among some LERO per-sonnel. Tr. 11,627-28, 11,650, 11,655-56 (Babb). Indeed, even Dr. Mileti acknowledged that utility workers at TMI did not respond ade-quately to the emergency at that site. Tr. 11,633-34 (Mileti). The Board therefore finds it significant that LILCO has not employed any test to determine how its employees will respond to stress during an emergency. Tr. 11,611-13 (Mileti). In addition, the Board is dis-turbed by LILCO's decision not to simulate stress during drills and exercises (Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 53), especially since LILCO concedes that stress will exist and that training can be used to pro-vide experience in how to deal with it. 241/ LILCO has acknowledged the importance of familiarity with the local area to emergency response personnel. However, most of LILCO's meter t (Footnote cont'd next page) - 251 - I n LILCO's employees this opportunity. Traffic guides do not go to all the traffic' control points to which they might be assigned. Bus drivers, route spotters, and road crews do not drive the routes they might have to drive during an emergency. Decontamination and monitoring workers and security personnel are not taken to the relocation centers where they will work dur-ing an emergency. Id., at 66. Traffic guides, however, should not be ex-pected to direct traffic at intersections which they have never seen be-fore. See Tr. 13,208-09 (Fakler). Bus drivers should not be expected to find their ways along possibly poorly marked routes they have not seen be-fore. Also, it is unrealistic to expect security, monitoring or decontamination personnel to arrive at relocation centers and set up and ' operate facilities for. handling evacuees without any prior familiarity with the facilities. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 67. The Board finds that this deficiency of LILCO's drill / exercise program will re-sult in many LILCO personnel being cuprepared for their emergency response roles. J (Footnote cont'd from previous page) readers, who are assigned jobs as traffic guides, live and e rk in-areas outside the EPZ. In fact, only 73 of the LILCO employees who are members of LERO live in the EPZ. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at
- 15. Further, none of the LILCO workers in LERO are assigned to work locations'in the EPZ as part of their regular duties. Cosgrove et al.
(Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 65-66. - 252 - ,, a--. - , , , ,,,, , , , , , - - - . . - - . . ~ F . m (iii) Communications Training (Contentions 41 and 44.D) 374.' The Plan provides noLassurance that emergency personnel will be adequately prepared and trained to use communications equipment in an emer-gency.242/ Most LILCO emergency workers are not only inexperienced at re-sponding to emergencies but also in using communications equipment in emergencies. Many have no experience with radios in their regular jobs.243/ Even if they do, radio experience in nonemergency situations is not very relevant because the volume of radio traffic is so much lower. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 72-74, 77-78. 375. Based on their personal experiences in training police recruits, - the County's Oitnesses. testified that use of communications equipment in emergency conditions is not something that most people can do naturally. It is a skill that can only be learned through training and experience.244/ 242/ The Plan relies on telephones and radios for. communications. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 57-58. The County's concerns relate to the .use of ridios by staging area personnel, traffic guides, road crews, route spotters, transfer point coordinators, and communica-tors / coordinators,at the EOC. See id., at 58, 243/ Most notably, only a few of LILCO's traffic guides use radios on a frequent basis in their regular jobs. Tr. 11,726 (Renz). 244/ Emergency workers do not use their communications aquipment under the best of conditions. Radio operators typically are under stress, and there are often conflicting demands for their attention. Anxiety on their part often leads them to talk too fast to be understood. There is often confusion among the personnel attempting to use the various radio frequencies, and heavy radio traffic taxes the system of the re-sponse organization. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, e.t 72-73. i , - 253 - ..m They identified as the primary defect in LILCO's communications training program that it contains almost no real life experience or hands-on prac-tice. Id., at 72-74. Instead, the bulk of LILCO's communications training P consists of two classroom lecture and videotape sessions. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 59, 61 and Atts. 15, 16, 20 and 30.245/ A trainee cannot learn to use a radio properly from a workbook or videotape. He must have extensive practice. LILCO's proposed communications drills, however, .re apparently intended to test the equipment, not the ability of emergency personnel to operate it. See OPIP 3.4.1; Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 62; Tr. 14,481 (Keller).246/ The County testified that there is not suffi-cient opportunity for trainces to practice during LILCO's drills. See Tr. 13,405-07 (Cosgrove). ! 245/ LILCO concedes that its training does not include instruction in the range of coverage of each radio channel. Babb et al, ff. Tr. 11,140, at 65. Nor are trainees required to use radio codes (Tr. 11,750 (Renz)) or given any specific training regarding what they should do when their radios malfunction. Tr. 11,753 (Renz); 11,733-34 (Varley). Further, training in the proper use of radio channels and proper radio discipline, although apparently offered (see Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 65-66), is inadequate. Tr. 11,578 (Varley); 11,772-73 (henz); SC Ex. 63, at 15. 246/ FEMA testified that the Plan on paper provides the capability for ade-quate communications training. Tr. 14,476 (Keller). However, that testimony was based on the premise that during the quarterly communi-cations drills, LILCO will staff field locations (e.g., with traffic guides at their posts) to test radio transmissions between the E SC and field locations. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 105. Nothib. 'n the record supports this assumption. See Tr. 14,479-80, 14,483 (Keller). - 254 - 376. ELILCO asserts that the operation of radios is simple (Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 60) and claims that trainees are able to practice the use of radios during drills / exercises. Id., at 61. While some drills / exercises may provide trainees with limited opportunities to operate radios, these opportunities are insufficient to develop necessary communi-cations skills. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 74; Tr. 13,343-44. (Fakler). Moreover, during these drills / exercises, there has been a consistent pattern of problems in radio use. Tr. 13,215 (Fak1'er); see also Tr. 11,576 (Varley).247/ There are also no radio drills / exercises, with individualized supervision, that simulate fast paced emergency conditions. In fact, trainees, including traffic guides, are-generally given the opportunity to make only a few radio transmissions dur-ing their drills. Tr. 11,730-31, 11,741-42 (Renz). Based on the testimony of the County's witnesses, who have had extensive experience in conducting communications trainidg, we find LILCO's program inadequate because it fails to provide sufficient opportunity for repeated use of radios. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 76-77. 247/ For example, during training drills / exercises, trainees have engaged in horseplay over their radios. Tr. 11,578 (Varley). Communications have also been lax at times, Tr. 11,772-73 (Renz); SU Ex. 63, at 15. Messages have been broadcast at the same time, leading to problems with reception. Tr. 11,574 (Varley). Moreover, there have been other problems during training drills / exercises, including technical equip-ment problems (e.g., poor radio reception). Tr. 11,772, 11,775 (Renz). Thus, it is questionable for LILCO to claim that trainees have performed adequately during the communications-related drills / exercises conducted to date. Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 65; Tr. 11,763-64 (Renz). This particularly is the case since, as noted supra, LILCO has no means for fairly judging performance of the per-sons in the training program. - 255 - 1 l l (iv) Drill / Exercise Results 377. The County's supplemental training testimony provides an analy-sis of LILCO's training program that is useful to the Board. See Cosgrove and Fakler (Supp.), ff. Tr. 13,083. That analysis, based upon the County's review of all drill / exercise critique and evaluation forms retained by LILCO, raises concerns about the adequacy of LILCO's training program. See -id., at 2. In particular, problems were observed with respect to the fol-lowing: (1) the lack of and adequacy of briefings for trainees both prior to and during drills / exercises; (2) radio users' being unfamiliar with proper radio language, radio protocol and general communications tech-niques; (3) radio equipment not being provided to trainees or, when pro-vided, the equipment not being appropriate for the training session; (4) insufficient training to enable trainees at LILCO's EWDF to perform ade-quately their monitoring and decontamination functions;, (S) inadequate training of personnel regarding .the necessity of checking dosimetry equip-ment; and (6) 'inadoquate briefings and insufficient staffing of observers / controllers for training drills / exercises. Id., at 3-19. The Board finds that, taken as a whole, the problems discussed in the County's supplemental training testimony indicate significant problems with LILCO's training pro-gram that consistently reoccurred throughout the drills / exercises. See Tr. 13,431 (Lipsky). 378. _What is most disturbing to the Board is that LII.C0 has failed to recognize and deal with the problems which have been identified during - 256 - drills. See Cosgrove and Fakler (Supp.), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 19-20; Tr. 13,270, 13,412, 13,438 (Cosgrove). This is a serious deficiency which can-not be minimized, as LILCO attempts to do, by challenging the County's methodology in reviewing the critique / evaluation forms. See LILCO Brief, at 146-47; Tr. 13,467, 13,476-77, 13,494-96 (Lichtenfels). Contrary to LILCO's assertion'(Tr. 13,467 (Lichtenfels)), the County's methodology was not one of developing hypotheses and then selectively looking through the . forms'to confirm those hypotheses. Tr. 13,547 (Cosgrove). Rather, the forms were reviewed, patterns of problems were found and, through further review, it was determined that those patterns continued throughout the drills / exercises. Tr. 13,240-41 (Fakler). Although the County did not perform a statistical or quantitative analysis of the forms and relied on the narrative comments rather than the numerical ratings provided by LILCO's observers / controllers (Tr. 13,226-27 (Cosgrove)), the Board agrees with the County that a statistical / quantitative analysis would not have been appropriate or desirable for a number of reasons, including the fact that there was confusion / ambiguity displayed by those who completed the forms. Tr. 13,231 (Cosgrove). This confusion and ambiguity led to unreliable data in the rating portions of the form. Tr. 13,499-500 (Lichtenfels). Thus, it was appropriate for the County to rely on the nar-rative comments, which provided less ambiguous and more reliable data from which to draw conclusions about LILCO's training program. 379. Even LILCO's witnesses acknowledged that, in the final analysis, the proof of the effectiveness of LILCO's training program lies in the - 257 - I p -ability of LERO personnel to perform their jobs. Job performance, however, as evaluated and r.ritiqued during LILCO's drill / exercise program, has been poor. See, e.g., Cosgrove and Fakler (Supp.), ff. Tr. 13,083. I 380. LILCO contends that the final test of LILCO's ability to respond to a Shoreham emergency will be the FEMA-graded exercise. See, e.g., Tr. -11,220-21 (Berger); 11,224 (Varley). However, there has been no FEMA exer-cise and, indeed, at this time there is no indication that one is scheduled 4 .or even under discussion. Tr. 14,511 (McIntire). The Board therefore finds that LILCO cannot rely on a FEMA graded exercise to support its as-sertion that adequate training can or will be provided to emergency re-sponse personnel. (c) LILCO's Training Program Does Not Provide Necessary Post-Training Experience 381. LILCO's program completely lacks the third element of an effec-l tive training program: post-training experience. Although the amount of post-training experience needed depends upon the trainee and the skill he is expected to perform (Tr. 13,117 (Cosgrove)), it is essential for adults to centinuously apply what they have learned because they quickly forget knowledge'and skills not used frequently. Even if some LILCO workers may learn needed information or skills during classroom training and drills, because they are given no opportunity to apply'what they have learned, they will inevitably forget-it. As a result, the workers will never properly ~ , learn their emergency jobs. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 68-69. l-f - 258 - L r (d) Conclusion 382. 'The Board finds that training for difficult jobs requires exten-s!ve' experience which must be brought to the job or acquired through a com-bination of classroom and drill sessions, field training, and post-training experience. LILCO's emergency response personnel hr/e almost no prior ex-perience relevant to their emergency functions since their regular jobs are unrelated to their emergency roles. LILCO's r:aining program does not ade-quately compensate for this situation. Classroom sessions are lectures, taught by non-experts, with few practical demonstrations and insufficient opportunity to practice learned skills. The LILCO drills / exercises do'not include simulated interaction with the public, subject trainees to stress, ~ require trainees to solve unexpected problems under realistic conditions, . or permit trainees to practice their emergency jobs. See Cosgreve et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 69-70. .383. Moreover, the lack of performance criteria makes it difficult to evaluate meaningfully the offectiveness of the training program. We con-clude that because LILCO's training program does not' include effective field training or post-training experience, LILCO's employees wil,1 have little opportunity to. apply what they have learned. As a result, there is no assurance that they will have a clear understanding of their emergency roles or that they will be able to perform those roles effectively in a Shoreham emergency. Id., at 70-71.248/ 248/ FEMA testified that LILCO's training program is designed to provide adequate training to LILCO personnel. However, FEMA also acknowledged (Footnote cont'd next page) - 259 - C. ' Attrition (Contention 39) 384. .Every organization experiences attrition among its employees in the normal course of its operations. Attrition is a fact of life for LILCO, the Coast Guard, ambulance companies, and the other organizations relied upon for emergency response duties under the Plan. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 81.249/ Attrition is, of coursu, a problem for any organization that depends on trained and experienced members. Whenever an experienced worker leaves, that person takes with him all his training and experience. The replacement rarely has an equal level of ex-perience and familiarity with the procedures of the organization. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 82. Attrition, however, is an espe- . cially acute problem for emergency response organizations because their workers need high levels of training and experience to perform their tasks. An untrained, inexperienced person simply cannot " replace" a veteran emer-gency worker who has left the organization. Therefore, if an emergency (Footnote cont'd from previous page) that it.was unable-to evaluate the ability of LILCO personnel to per- , form their LERO jobs. Baldwin et al . , ff. Tr. 14,151, at 104. Thus, FEMA's testimony was of little, if any, assistance to the Board. 249/ Including layoffs from the austerity program, approximately 10% of LER0's personnel (166 individuals) left LERO between !! arch 6 and May 23, 1984. SC Ex. 61; Tr. 11,435 (Daverio). This represents a large attrition problem which is already a reality for LILCO. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 81. LILCO acknowledged that there have been 51 resignations from LERO and that such resignations can occur without LILCO's knowledge. Tr. 11,421, 11,427-28, 11,683 ~(Daverio). L !. - 260 - -u.. response organization is to be continuously ready to respond to emergencies, it must have in place an effective training program that en-sures that adequately trained and prepared replacements are available at all times to staff all positions within the organization. Id., at 82-83. 385. LILCO's current proposals for dealing with attrition will not assure that LEKO is continuously staffed with trained personnel. LILCO proposes to offer classes on a quarterly basis that will repeat the basic LERO training materials. Tr. 11,453, 11,458-59 (Varley); Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 32-33. More specialized " job specific" training will be offered semi-annually. Plan, at 5.1-7, 5.1-8; Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 32-33. Drills and exercises will only be repeated annually. Tr. 11,715-16 (Daverio) . The Board finds that LILCO's semi-annual job-specific training sessions and annual drills are too infrequent to provide assurance that trained LILCO employees will be available to fill positions in LERO as the need arises, particularly since drills provide the only opportunity ~ under LILCO's program for personnel to practice their emergency jobs. See 13,368-69 (Fakler); Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 85.250/ 250/ Moreover, providing new and repeat trainees the same classroom in-struction as LILCO proposes can lead to inattention and boredom among repeat trainees. Tr. 11,465 (Berger); 13,284 (Cosgrove). In addi-tion, the effectiveness of merely repeating training material year after year must be questioned since trainces will either remember the training previously given to them (thereby leading to boredom or inat-tention) or they will not, which then indicates problems with the ini-tial training sessions. Tr. 13,283-84 (Cosgrove). - 261 - 386. LILCO relies on the concept of overstaffing to offset attrition within LERO. See LILCO Brief, at 120-21; Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 102. We find, however, that overstaffing does not fully address the consequences of attrition. Factors such as vacations, illness and failures by LERO workers to report for duty require overstaffing to levels at least as high as those committed to by LILCO.251/ 387. We find that LILCO should repeat job-specific as well as general classroom training quarterly, and that drills should also be held quarter-ly. Not only will this more adequately address the problem of attrition among LILCO/LERO personnel, but the holding of drills with such frequency will also increase the overall effectivenss of LILCO's training program, since'LERO workers would have additional opportunities to perform or prac-tice their assigned emergency roles. 388. Attrition among non-LILCO personnel will also be a problem. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 85-86. However, LILCO has made only token plans to counteract attrition among non-LILCO personnel. As noted above, there is no assurance that some groups will receive any training at all, including training designed to offset the effects of at-trition. The training that LILCO apparently intends to provide to person-nel from the Coast Guard, ambulance companies and Island Helicopter will do 251/ Moreover, if.LILCO adopts the suggestions of its LERO workers concern-ing the need for more decontamination and monitoring personnel, bus drivers, route alert drivers, and traffic guides (see, Tr. 11,711-14 (Daverio)), the amount of overstaffing would effectively be reduced. - 262 - . I I little to. overcome the consequences of attrition. See id., at 87-90.252/ 389. LILCO and FEMA testified that support organizations which sign letters of agreement with LILCO accept the responsibility of informing LILCO of training needs. Tr. 11,473-74 (Daverio); Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 103; Tr. 14,445-46 (Keller). The Board finds, however, that LILCO cannot depend on prompt notification of staffing problems from non-LILCO support organizations. These organizations have no obligation to maintain adequate staffing for LERO or to notify LILCO of understaffing. Neither the Coast Guard letter to LILCO nor LILCO's contracts with ambu-lance companies, Impell or Island Helicopter contain any obligation to no-tify LILCO of personnel changes. Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at 34-36 and Atts. 13-21.C, 31, 34 and 35. Without appropriate agreements,
- there is no assurance that LILCO will have up-to-date information about the staffing of non-LILCO support organizations. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff.
Tr.~13,083, at 88-89. Moreover, even if LILCO did receive timely staffing information, the Plan would still fail to ensure that adequate non-LILCO personnel will be available for emergency service at Shoreham since the Plan will not provide attrition-related training until after attrition has resulted in inadequate staffing. Thus, the Board finds that the Plan fails 252/ For example, while the Plan purports to provide for annual training of the personnel of the Coast Guard (see Plan, at 5.1-6 and Fig. 5.1.1), its letter agreement mentions only retraining concerning dosimetry and personal safety. Similarly, the agreements that LILCO has obtained from ambulance companies do not mention retraining. Cosgrove et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 13,083, at 87. - 263 - p to deal with the problem of attrition among the non-LILCO workers relied upon for Plan implementation. VI. NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION TO PUBLIC ' (CONTENTIONS 16.E, 18, 20, 21.C, 24.T 55-59) A. Notification (Contentions 24.T, 55-59) 390. Contentions 24.T and 55-59 contest LILCO's proposals for noti-fying the public of a Shoreham emergency. The contentions question whether LILCO has' established means to notify the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within 15 minutes, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section-IV.D.3.2_53/ 5 See also_NUREG 0654, Section II.E.6 and Appendix 3.254/ 253/ Under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, there are two 15-minute periods: the first requires-LILCO to have the capability to notify offsite au-thorities (in this case, LERO) within 15 minutes from the time an emergency is declared; the second requires LILCO to have the capabili-ty to complete notification of an emergency to the public within 15 minutes. See 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. The second 15-minute period is at issue here. See Tr. 4307-08 (Renz). 254/ Contentions 24.T and 55-59 assert that: LILCO will not be able to contact key command and control personnel in a timely manner, thereby delaying the activation of the siren system (Contention 55); LILCO does not provide adequate backup to the siren. system (Contention 56); the tone alert radios relied upon by LILCO do not provide adequate emergency notification to special facilities and organizations with a large number of personnel, such as schools, hospitals and major em-ployers (Contention 57); LILCO's reliance upon commercial telephones for contacting special facilities and the handicapped at home is an inadequate means to provide timely notification to such facilities and individuals (Contention 58); LILCO has no agreement with the Coast Guard to notify people on beaches or at marinas in and around the EPZ Contention 24.T); and the Coast Guard cannot provide timely notifica-tion _to the public (Contention 59). - 264 - p 391. All witnesses were generally familiar with, and qualified to testify about,.the issues raised by Contentions 24.T and 55-59. Suffolk County witnesses Hoffman and Read were especially well qualified to provide the opinions set forth in their testimony.255/
- 1. Activating the LILCO Siren System (Contention 55) 392. Under the Plan,. notification to the public is made via LILCO's prompt notification system ("PNS"), the principal components of which are outdoor sirens, tone alert radios, and the EBS. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.
4014, at 31; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 5, 8. The Plan requires activating the PNS at the Site Area or General Emergency level. Tr. 5439-40 (Snow, Regensburg). When the EOC is activated, the PNS activation is to be carried out from there. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 32. 393. LILCO relies upon 89 fixed sirens to alert the public to a Shoreham emergency. See Plan, at 3.4-6. For the reasons discussed in our findings regarding Contention 26 (Section IV.A), the decision to activate the siren system may be delayed due to delays in contacting key command and control personnel, including the LERO Director.256/ Moreover, even after 255/ Officers Hoffman and Read are assigned to the SCPD's Marine Bureau. Together, they have 50 years of police experience (more than 35 of which have been spent in the Marine Bureau). They are intimately fa-miliar with Long Island Sound, including those portions within the EP". See Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 5522, Att. 1. 256/ FEMA testified that the Plan adequately provides for prompt notifica-tion and mobilization of key personnel to ensure timely activation of (Footnote cont'd next page) - 265 - the LERO Director and other key personnel are contacted, the Plan requires a number of actions to be taken before the sirens can be activated (see OPIP.3.1.1), causing further delay in siren system activation. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 6. 394. Under the Plan, notification of an emergency is given by the control room to the Hicksville CSO, which then notifies;the LERO Director who is responsible for activating the PNS, including the siren system. See OPIP 3.3.4; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 8. Before the Director can activate the siren system in an Alert or higher classification emergency, he must, at a minimum: (1) contact the CSO and complete the "LERO Event Summary Sheet" (see OPIP 3.1.1, at 2 and Att. 1); (2) report to and acti-vate the EOC;257/ (3) obtain from the Radiation Health Coordinator any pro-tective action recommendations and direct their implementation; (4) contact - (Footnote cont'd from previous page) the siren system. Tr. 12,684-85 (Keller). Moreover, LILCO's witness-es testified that the' sirens will be activated promptly, whether or not key personnel can be reached. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 8. Witnesses for the County, FEMA and even one of LILCO's own witnesses testified, however, that under the Plan, only the LERO Director or one of his designated alternates is authorized to activate the PNS, including the siren system, in situations other than a General Emer-gency requiring immediate protective actions. Tr. 5436 (Snow); 4876, 5179, 5245 (Renz); 12,688-89 (Kowieski). For reasons discussed here-after, we find that a decision to activate sirens may have to be de-layed pending notification of key command and control personnel. 257/ There must be a General Emergency before the Plan authorizes / instructs .the Director to activate sirens without being at the EOC. See OPIPs 3.1.1, at 13, 3.3.4, at 2-3. If the sirens were activated prior to manning the ECO, the LERO organization would not be in place. Tr. 4866 (Renz). - 266 - E - 1 4 -k the Coordinator of Public I'nformation to ensure that a news release and an EBS message for siren system activation are being prepared; (5) ensure that the Coordinator of Public Information has notified WALK radio of the emer-gency and transmitted the EBS message to WALK; and, (6) ensure that WALK is prepared'to broadcast the message. Only when the EBS is activated is the Director authorized to activate the siren system. See OPIPs 3.1.1, at 8; 3.3.4, at 2. See also Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 6-7.258/ 395. The Board finds that realistically the LERO Director cannot be notified of an emergency in time to take the actions required for siren activation within 15 minutes of declaration of the emergency. Indeed, the Director himself may not even be notified of an emergency within 15 minutes. Thus, we conclude that LILCO lacks the capability to notify the public within even 30 minutes of declaration of an emergency. See Regensburg et al. , ff. Tr. 5416, at 7-8; Tr. 5432-35 (Snow). 396. If a General Emergency requiring immediate protective action is declared, the CSO Supervisor can order activation of the sirens if the LERO c Director cannot be contacted "promptly" (within 10 minutes of notification 258/ LILCO asserts that the ?lan'does not require these actions to be taken before activation of the sirens; rather, in LILCO's view, the Plan provides guidance to the Director and some of the steps in the proce-dure in fact do not need to be followed and merely contemplates that such actions will precede activation. See'LILCO Brief, at 149. The Plan's clear language is to the contrary. Indeed, Mr. Renz acknowl-edged that the Plan does require various actions to be taken before the Director can direct siren activation. Tr. 4862, 4870-71 (Renz). Thus, we are compelled to assume for purposes of this litigation that these actions need to be taken. - 267 -
- y. . . _ _
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- n 3,:
/ e lh' of the' emergency). See OPIP 3.3.4, at 2-3. 'See also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4014, at 32; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 9.2 9/ In all other cir- ,r ' cuestances, only the Director,can activate the siren system. See OPIP ) - 3.3.4; Regensburg et al., ff.1Tr. 5416, at 8-9; Tr. 5179-80 (Renz). For this' reason,'the Board rejects LILCO's assertion that its sirens will be - promptly activated even in the absence of the LERO Director. See Cordaro et al. ff..Tr. 4842, at 9.260/ 397. .Because, ontrarIcr$ LILCO's assertion (sg LILCO Brief, at _ _. 149), siren activation must occur simultaneously with broadcast of an EBS }ll r " 'messagelover WALK-radio (see, g , OPIPs 3.1.1, at 8, 3.3.4, at 1; Tr. . 4 ~ 4370-/1,' 4929 (Renz)), additional de ay in siren activation is likely. 'Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416,'at 9. The EBS can only be activated by vi WALK, radio. OPIP 3.8.2, at 1-2. . However, until the local EOC is acti-vat'ed, commercial telephones'are the only way to contact WALK. See Plan, ,x Fig.L3.3.S.) Indeed, even after the EOC is activated, thereby making @C ' 9 s. . , . .# -259/' In this'circhmstance, the CSO Supervisor must-notify the Shoreham Emergency Director (a member of LILCO's onsite eme:gency team) and re-quest'that control room personnel activate the siren system. OPIP 3.3.4, at 3. The control room is not authorized to activate the si-rens on its own accord. Tr. 4,881 (Renz). 260/ LILCO asserts that NRC ' regulations do not mandate that the PNS be ac-tivated prior to a General Emergency and that the Plan's provision au-thorizing the CSO Supervisor to-activate the PNS whenever the Director cannot be reached ^during'a General Emergency within 10 minutes there- -fore complies.with regulatory requirements. ^ -LILCO Brief, at 148 (cit-1?" , ~ ing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70, lo NRC 756, 774, 814-15 (1982)). Given the fact th.t,' under.the Plan, the PNS can be activated even at the Alert level (se'e Tr. 5006 (Renz)),"we find LILCO's reliance on Diablo Canyon to be misplaced. r .h* " - 268 - . : . ). . ;,u <- 4 . g-a< .4 b ' availab'le a dedicated telephone line between the EOC and WALK (see M ., at 3.'4-4), both LILCO's primary (dedicated telephone) and secondary (commer-M(q,?. cial telephone) means of communication with WALK will have common failure hy . modes'.261/ For this reason,' there isino reasonable assurance that the EBS can be promptly. activated. If it is not,-the siren system activation will , be' delayed. Regensburg;et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 9-10. 4 398. M$reover, it is unrealistic to assume tha't an EBS message can be prepared and transmitted to WALK within 15 minutes of declaring an emergen- ;_ cy. _M., at_10. Preparation of such a message requires the Coordinator of Public'Information to have access to various information, including the names _and titles of emergency response officials, the amount of radiation released,' protective ' action r'ecommendations, and descriptions of the emer-gency planning' zones affected. See OPIP 3.8.2, at 5. Only after this information:has been obtained, assimilated and processed can an EBS message- 'be, prepared, and only then can,it be transmitted to WALK. Regensburg et 'a1., ff. Tr. 5416, at 10-11.262/ ~ 23 /~/A dedicated telephone line.provides the user exclusive access. How- ~ ever,' dedicated lines, travel the same routes, are attached to the same _ poles, and are susceptible to the same failure modes as commercial lines. 'Tr. 5442,55101(Snow). The.SCPD, for example, experiences on average 2 dedicated telephone line failures per week. Tr. 5511 ; (Snow)._.-While the County witnesses were testifying, bad weather knocked out 965 telephone lines, with an additional 1,000 persons without_ service due to cable failure. Tr. 5510-11 (Snow). Thus, reliability-of. communications lies not with dedicated lines, but with redundant means of communications.having-different failure modes. Tr. '5445 (Snow). L262/ While the Plan assumes that an EBS' message will generally be prepared .and transmitted ~to WALK by the-Coordinator of Public Information, ei-(Footnote cont'd next page) - 269 - E 399. The necessity for simultaneous activation of the EBS and the siren' system also renders impractical LILCO's proposal that, in the event of a General Emergency, the CSO Supervisor request the Shoreham Emergency I Director to activate the sirens if the LER3 Director cannot be promptly reached. See OPIP 3.3.4, at 3. Although authorized to activate the EBS under those circumstances (see OPIPs 3.3.4, at 3, 3.8.2, at 2; Tr. 5181-82 (Renz)), the CSO Supervisor would not have the necessary information to prepare an EBS message for broadcast to the public. Regensburg et al., ff. i Tr. 5416, at 12.263/ (Footnote cont'd from previous page) ther the LERO Director or LILCO's CSO Supervisor can tiso activate the . EBS. See OPIPs 3.8.2, at 1-2, 3.3.4, at 2-3. Mr. Renz, for example, testified that in instances when the Coordinator of Public Information cannot be contacted, the LERO Director has responsibility for con-tacting WALK and activating the EBS. Tr. 4871-73 (Renz). Under the. Plan, however, irrespective of who contacts VALK, that person must first attempt to contact some other person. For example, before the ' Director is authorized to contact WALK to activate the EBS, he must attempt to contact the Coordinator of Public Information. See OPIP 3.3.4, at 2. The Coordinator of Public Information and the CSO Super- , visor, on the other hand, must first attempt to contact the designated LERO Director. See id., at 2, 3. Should the Director not be able to - be ' contacted, the CSO Supervisor is charged with activating the EBS. Thus, as.'a practical matter, the Coordinator of Public Information is only authorized to activate the EBS when instructed to do so by the LERO. Director. See id.; Regensburg et al.,.ff. Tr. 5416, at 11. 263/ LILCO concedes that the CSO Supervisor is only authorized to prepare messages that would inford the public to " stand by" for an emergency message regarding Shoreham. Sae LILCO Brief, at 149; Tr. 5234 (Renz). ite also Tr.- 5447, 5449 (Snow)._ The Board therefore finds that the public might not be provided with timely substantive information regarding a Shoreham emergency. (Footnote cont'd next page) - 270 - = - - 1 Y 'Ni 400. LILCO testified that it will be able to activate the PNS, ' including sirens, and notify the public of a Shoreham emergency within 15 minutes. See, e.g., Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 12. For the reasons discussed above, however, the Board does not accept this conclusion. .The -j; Board finds that the deficiencies in LILCO's proposed system for notifying emergency personnel, the Plan's requirement that the siren system be acti-vated simultaneously with activation of the EBS, the proposed means of com-munication with WALK, the various preparatory actions required to transmit- , , t an EBS~ message to WALK, and the limited number of LILCO personnel autho-rized to activate the EBS are all factors compelling the conclusion that the PNS,' including the siren system, cannot and will not be activated with- ~ in 15 minutes as required by the regulations.264/ (Footnote' cont'd from previous page) The Board is also concerned that the Director and Coordinator of Pub-lic Information may have inadequate access to information necessary to prepare an EBS message. In the event of a General Emergency requiring immediate protective action, information needed to prepare an EBS mes-sage would be given to the Director and/or the Coordinator of Public Information by the CSO. eTr. 4874, 4943-44 (Renz); see also Tr. 4938 (Weismantle). However, some EBS messages require information that would not be immediately available to the CSO. Tr. 4945 (Renz). In-w) fact, activation of the EOC might be required before such information would be available. Tr. 4875-76 (Renz). 264/ LILCO's witnesses were in conflict regarding the degree of discretion given_the Director-to decide when and whether to activate the PNS. 'Mr. Renz testified that, even with a General Emergency requiring imme- , =diate protective actions, the Director has discretion whether to acti-vate the system. Tr. 5212-13 (Renz). Mr. Weismantle testified that under those circumstances, the Director is required to activate the system. Tr. 5213-14 (Weismantle). Mr. Weismantle, however, was un-(Footnote cont'd next page)
- - 271 -
4
- 2. Backup to the Siren System (Contention 56) 401. LILCO plans to_use route alert drivers to provide backup'to the siren system. .See Plan, at 3.3-4, 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4, ct'4-4A and Att. 1; Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 13; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 13.265/ 'Upon learning of a siren malfunction, LILCO will dispatch these drivers to the area where the malfunction occurred.266/ The drivers will
- broadcast messages over loudspeakers attached to standard passenger vehi-cles (Tr. 5008-09 (Weismantle)), notifying residents of the accident and
' advising them to turn to a local EBS station for further information. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 14. The Board finds this proposal imprac-tical' and unworkable.267/- (Footnote cont'd from previous page)' 'able to state whether the Director has.any discretion regarding activation of tha system .from the time he is notified of an emergency until the time it -is decided to recommend protective action. Tr; .5216-17 (Weismantle). -265/ A study of siren warning systems conducted by PRC Engineering for FEMA revealed that 5-20% generally fail to activate. See Tr. 3241 (Polk). ~266/. LERO has approximately 90 route alert drivers, 60 of whom would report .during an emergency, 20 per staging area. Tr. 4979 (Renz); 5686 -(Weismantle). .LILCO's witnesses did not know~the number of sirens within each staging area. The Port Jefferson and Riverhead areas were believed.to have more than two-thirds of the sirens. Tr. 4962-63 ,(Schiffmacher). 267/ LILCO is also contemplating the use of helicopters to support route -alert drivers and the Coast Guard in providing notification to the - public in areas where sirens fail to sound and on the waters within the EPZ. Tr. 4857, 5148 (Ren ); 5014 (Weismantle).- Such a use of-he-licopters is not set forth'in the Plan (Tr. 4857, 5147 (Rene)), and .therefore the Board finds this testimony was outside the proper scope of litigated issues. i - 272 - i-- - e-w 402. There are two reasons for using route alert drivers as a backup . - to the siren system. First, LILCO's sirens have no backup power source.268/ Second, LILCO's siren decoders only confirm that a given -activation signal has been sent from the encoder and received by the decoders at the siren locations. Tr. 4954 (Schiffmacher). Thus, even if the sirens failed to activate, LILCO would still receive confirmation that the signal to activate was sent and received. Id. LILCO will therefore not know whether some of its sirens failed to activate and has no backup power source to activate them. For that reason, route alert drivers are required as a backup means of notifying the public. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 13-14, 268/ LILCO asserted that backup power is not required. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 12. LILCO also represented that it is committed to restoring power to sirens on a priority basis. Id.; Tr. 4954-55 -(Schiffmacher). However, these procedures have not yet been developed (Tr. 4955-56 (Schiffmacher)), and even when developed, will not - address loss of power to random siren locations, but only loss of power to the circuit. Tr. 4959-61, 4964-65 (Schif fmacher) . See LILCO Brief, at 151. Sirens can malfunction for numerous reasons, including loss of power, component failure, a siren pole being knocked down in a traffic acci-dent (Tr. 4965-66 (Schiffmacher)), vandalism, ice lodging in the siren - housing, poor electrical connections and/or improper grounding, birds nesting in the siren housings leading to motor -failure (Tr. 5501 ~ -(Stile)), and stray radio signals. Tr. 4971-72 (Schiffmacher, Cordaro). LILC0_has conducted one full test of its siren system, during which 2 of the 89 sirens failed to sound. Tr. 4967 (Schiffmacher). LILCO also conducts a silent test of its sirens once each month, but these ' tests do not test the sirens, only the encoders and decoders. Tr. 4966-67, 4977-78 (Schiffmacher). - 273 - ~403. LILCO plans .tx) locate sirens that fail to sound primarily by means of telephone surveys to be conducted by Marketing Evaluations, Inc. (" Marketing Evaluations"). See OPIP 3.3.4, at 3; see also Plan, App. B, at APP-B-53.269/ - Marketing Evaluations' _ representative (s)270/ will telephone 2 residents near each siren and ask if they heard the siren go off. The M'arketing Evaluations' representative (s) will then advise EOC personnel by telephone of all malfunctioning sirens which have been discovered.271/ The - Plan presumes that the survey can be completed in 90 minutes. See Plan, App. B, at APP-B-53. See also Tr. 4983, 4992 (Weismantle); Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 14-15. 269/. Large-scale failure of the siren system could also be determined by a review of electric circuits. Tr. 4993 (Cordaro). Moreover, an outage to a siren circuit could be detected by LILCO's Riverhead Customer Service Department. However, LILCO's sirens can malfunction without a circuit outage (Tr. 4960-61 (Schiffmacher)), in which case the Riverhead Customer Service Department would not know whether sirens .had malfunctioned. Tr. 5233 (Renz) . - For that reason, LILCO is placing primary reliance on Marketing Evaluations' survey. Tr. 4993 (Cordaro). 270/ The letter between LILCO and Marketing Evaluations (see Plan, App. B, at APP-B-53) anticipates'"two additional-interviewers on call." As-suming they are available to Taspond to an emergency, the telephone survey would apparently be cot. ucted by 3 Marketing Evaluations' rep-resentatives. Regensburg et al., ff, Tr. 5416, at 14. + - 271/ LILCO's route alert drivers would be dispatched from their staging areas by lead traffic guide _s to any siren territories where sirens malfunction. Tr. 5032 (Renz). Lead traffic guides would instruct the drivers regarding assigned routes based upon information provided by . Marketing Evaluations to the Coordinator of Public Information and, thereafter, to 3 other supervisory personnel before such information would reach LILCO's lead traffic guides. Tr. 5032-35 (Renz) . 1 6 - 274 - 404. The Board finds this siren verification system to be impractical and unworkable. First, it is unrealistic to assume that siren verification , can be completed in 90 minutes. As noted, 2 residents in each of the 89 siren locations will be telephoned. Even if every call is answered (which is highly unlikely), 178 telephone calls and conversations canrot be made by Marketing Evaluations' representative (s) within 90 minutes.272/ More-over, in light of the problems related to LILCO's paging system which must be expected in an emergency, (see findings regarding Contention 26), the Marketing Evaluations' representative (s) may not receive timely notifica-tion to begin the telephone survey and thus will not be able to contact residents in the siren locations. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 15. The Board concludes from the foregoing that it is likely that sirens will-fail to activate and that LILCO will be unaware that segments of the public have not been alerted. 272/ Marketing Evaluations has estimated that approximately 267 telephone calls would have to be made to contact successfully 178 persons. Tr. 4987 (Weismantle). Marketing Evaluations apparently believes these calls can be made within 93 minutes by 3 persons. Tr. 4987 (Weismantle). The County's witnesses disagreed. They pointed out that during an emergency, problems with commerc'.al telephones would have to be expected. The sounding of LILCO's sirens would likely prompt many persons to use their telephones, causing Marketing Evalua- .tions to encounter busy signals that would delay its telephone survey. Tr. 5461-62 (Snow). Further, substantial time could be required just for Marketing Evaluations to contact its personnel and have them re-port for duty to make the necessary calls. Tr. 5506 (Snow). FEMA's witnesses did not know the number of persons that would be used to conduct the survey (Tr. 12,693-94 (Baldwin)), but acknowledged that more.than 90 minutes could be required for the survey to be completed. Tr. 12,695 (Keller). - 275 - l 405. .Even if Marketing Evaluations experiences no problems and com-pletes its survey in 90 minutes, LILCO still may not be aware that route alert drivers need to be dispatched until 90 minutes or more after the si-rens have failed to activate. Regensburg'et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 16. Moreover, even if LILCO realizes that it has sirens that have failed, its route alert drivers still have to be notified. 'For reasons explained else-where, it must be anticipated that many drivers will not be notified. See findings regarding Contention 26. And even those who are will not be available for actual duty for an extended period after notification.273/ 273/ Substantial delays after notification must be allowed for LILCO's route alert drivers to travel from their homes or offices to the as-signed staging areas. See findings regarding Contention 27. The County's witnesses test'ified (without rebuttal by LILCO (see Tr. 5007 (Renz, Weismantle)), that 66% of these drivers work, and 56% live over 20 miles from the plant. Moreover, even after they arrive at their staging areas (not the plant, as LILCO incorrectly implies was the County's testimony (seg LIILO Brief, at 152)), they have to obtain necessary equipment (such as dosimetry equipment and route maps), re-ceive instructions from their emergency coordinators, and mount and test the public address systems before they can begin to drive their assigned routes. 'Regensburg et*al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 17. See find-ings regarding Contention 27. LILCO asserts that-use of route alert drivers in areas where sirens malfunction is a omrkable proposal, similar to procedures used at other sites. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 13. This assertion is largely premised on the plan to have drivers report to their staging areas at an Alert or higher EAL so that they will be in place and -ready for dispatch if the emergency escalates. Id., at 13-14; Tr. 5006 (Renz). The Board agrees that by having drivers report at the Alert level, LILCO has reduced the possibility of significant delays between the time an emergency is declared and the time the drivers would be dispatched. However, under the Plan, sirens could be acti-vated at the Alert level. Tr. 5006 (Renz). Further, an emergency could begin in a way requiring immediate notification to the public. Id. Thus, there could still be a significant time after notification (Footnote cont'd next page) - 276 - Of course, substantial delays in notification and mobilization of the route alert drivers will cause commensurate delays in the performance of their - notification duties. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 16-17.. t 406. Moreover, considerable time will be required to drive through areas where sirens have failed to activate. There is likely to be traffic congestion along the routes to be driven. Id., at 17. Some persons, upon hearing the broadcast message, will stop the route alert drivers to seek information and obtain instructions. Tr. 5467-68 (Snow). These factors will cause-further delays.274/ But even if these factors were not present, considerable time would still be required for the route alert drivers to make their assigned-rounds. Regensburg et al. , f f. Tr. 5416, at 17-18. 1407. The SCPD studied the time required to drive through the sector of the Sixth Precinct that includes Shoreham (and therefore would have to be evacuated in any situation where the area to be evacuated exceeds 2 miles). That area, approximately 15 miles square and containing approxi-mately 120 miles of roadway (Regensburg et al., 11. Tr. 5416, at 18; Tr. 5550 (Roberts)),--is roughly equivalent to the area covered by 5-of LILCO's -(Footnote cont'd from previous- page) is given to LILCO's route alert drivers before they could be dis-patched to notify the public. Further, even after the drivers are dispatched, it will require substantial time for them to drive to and through their assigned areas. See findings, infra. 274/ LILCO's public information materials would not alleviate this problem. See our findings regarding Contentions 16.E and 18. - 277 - b . s'irens . Nearly 9 hours of actual driving time, traveling at an average speed of 10-15 mph, were required to drive this sector. Regensburg et al., ~ ff. Tr. 5416, at .18 and Att. 1. This SCPD study confirms that it would take'LILCO's route alert drivers substantial time to drive whatever routes are assigned to them following an emergency. In fact, there is reason to believe that LILCO's drivers ~could not achieve the SCPD's pace. Driving through residential areas to alert residents of the emergency would require travel at a. slow speed. The Plan itself-instructs drivers to drive at ap-proximately 5 mph (see OPIP'3.3.4, Att. 1). By contrast, the SCPD officer drove at 10-15 mph. 'In addition, the SCPD officer was thoroughly familiar - with the sector and its street patterns, whereas LILCO's drivers would probably not be familiar with the routes assigned to them. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 3416, at 19,275/ 275/ As previously noted, 66% of LILCO's route alert drivers work, and 56% of 'them live more than 20 miles from Shoreham. In LILCO's view, how-ever, familiarity with routes is unnecessary; route alert drivers need .no' skills other than reading a map, driving a car and having a good , , Lsense of direction. Tr. 5000-01, 5237 (Weismantle); 5164-65 (Hobbs). Notwithstanding this testimony, LILCO's drivers have experienced prob-lems during training drills with LILCO's maps and having to read such maps while driving unfamiliar areas. SC Ex. 15, at 28-34; Tr. 5692-96 .(Weismantle). Complete routes are not driven during training drills. Tr. 5200-01 (Weismantle). .Moreover, drivers are not assigned routes until the . time of an~ emergency; therefore, they could be sent to areas com-pletely unfamiliar to them. Tr. 5163, . 5202 (Weismantle) . In the County's view, this is a serious deficiency. Officer Snow testified that route alert drivers should be trained to know the siren territories and the specific routes to be covered during an emergency. Tr.-5455-(Snow)'. Within the SCPD, new police officers patrol with an experienced officer until they are sufficiently knowledgeable about ; I (Footnote cont'd next page) - 278 - 408. The Plan also assigns route alert drivers responsibility for no-tifying hearing impaired persons of a Shoreham emergency. Tr. 5019 (Weismantle). This could require drivers to travel to the homes of the -hearing impaired and hand them sheltering or evacuation messages. See OPIP 3.3.4, Att. 1. As a result,-the time needed to alert the public in areas where sirens may not have'been activated could be lengthened since a driver might have to locate the home of each hearing impaired person, park his ve-hicle, and provide such person with individual notification, all before continuing to drive the assigned route. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at-19-20. See also findings regarding Contention 73.B.3 in Section XI. 409.- LILCO's witnesses acknowledged that the route alert drivers could not provide notification to the public within regulatory limits. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 14; Tr. 4996 (Renz).276/ They asserted, (Footnote cont'd from previous page) the area. Tr. 5515, 5518 (Snow). Similarly, school bus drivers drive their routes before the beginning of the school year. Tr. 5509 (Snow). Officer Snow also criticized LILCO's route alert driver maps. The i maps do not indicate how to get to the siren territories, do not show private roads,:and may be inaccurate in other respects. Tr. 5506-08 Indeed, LILCO's own drivers have criticized the maps. SC Ex. ~ -(Snow). 15; Tr. 3677 et seg. (Weismantle). Thus, the Board rejects 'LILCO's , assertion that training drills have confirmed that the maps are satis-fhetory. 'See.LILCO Brief, at 151. l- 276/ There is a lack of specificity in the testimony concerning the time required to notify the public via LILCO's route alert drivers. FEMA
- b. . did not know how long it would take to drive an average siren territo-L (Footnote cont'd next page)
L I ~ - 279 - L L however, that since the drivers merely provide' backup notification and are .not part of LILCO's PNS, NRC guidelines are not controlling. Cordaro et al.,.ff. Tr. 4842, at 14-15; Tr. 5015 (Hobbs). Indeed, it was their testi-mony that no backup notification mechanism is required. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 14.277/ The Board does not concur. While a system of route alert drivers is not itsel' required by the regulations, NUREG 0654 requires completion of public notification within 45 minutes if there 'i:s a . failure of the PNS (sirens). The backup system LILCO has elected to use is (Footnote cont'd from previous page) ry. Tr. 12,702-03 (Baldwin). FEMA acknowledged that under NUREG 0654, LILCO's route alerting procedures must have the capability of completing notification within 45 minutes. Tr. 12,695-96 (Kowieski). They testified, however, that an estimate of the time required to im-plement these procedures could not be located in the Plan. They were therefore unable to determine whether LILCO's system provides assur-ance that the population who may not receive initial notification of an emergency would be alerted within 45 minutes. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 48. LILCO's own witnesses were similarly unable to provide any estimate of the time necessary to notify the public using route alert drivers. Tr. 4995-96 (Renz); 5010-11 (Weismantle, Renz).' Nor has LILCO at-tempted, through its training drills or exercises, to obtair estimates of the time required for the drivers to drive siren territory routes. Tr. 4996-97 (Weismantle); 5047-48 (Renz). 277/ LILCO has urged that the regulations do not require that there be backup notification means. See LILCO Brief, at 150-51, citing Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ASLBP-81-453-03 OL (July 2, -1984) and Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-59, 14 NRC 1211, 1542 (1981). This issue is not free from. doubt, however, since the Indian ~ Point and Catawba Boards addressed this issue on the merits. See ~ Consolidated Edison Co., LBP-83-68, supra, 18 NRC at 939; Duke Power Co., supra, LBP-84-37, slip op, at 66-67. Thus, we address the merits . of the backup notification sources as well. - 280 - 1 r a system of = route alert drivers. Accordingly, we find that this system must be capable of completing notification within 45 minutes. See Tr. 12,695-96-(Kowieski) (NUREG 0654 requires route alerting to be completed i within 45 minutes). 410. LILCO's proposal to drive vehicles equipped with loudspeakers through non-activated siren areas is neither practical nor workable because it lacks flexibility and is based on unrealistic assumptions. It is unre-alistic to assume that LILCO will promptly know whether its sirens have been activated; that the route alert drivers will be promptly notified and mobilized; that the routes can be driven and the public notified without significant delcys; or that all persons would hear and understand the mes-sage broadcast over loudspeakers. We therefore conclude that LILCO's back-up proposal fails to meet regulatory standards because it cannot be imple-mented on a timely basis and because entire segments of the population may never.be alerted to an emergency.
- 3. Notification to Special Facilities and Persons Without FM Radios (Contention 57) 411. Under the Plan, special facilities and organizations with large populations (schools, hospitals, nursing homes, handicapped facilities, and major employers) will be equipped with tone alert radios which, upon activation by the EBS signal from WALK radio, will automatically broadcast the emergency message. See Plan, at 3.3-4 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.4.1, Att. 1; Tr. 5363-64 (Robinson). While these tone alert radios will presumably
- 281 - provide direct notification of the emergency, such notification could coin-cide with notification to the general public, thus providing these special facilities and other organizations with no additional time for protective action. Tr. 5365 (Robinson); Regensburg et al. , f f. Tr. 5416, at 22. Moreover, because the tone alert radios depend upon the EBS signal broad-casting from VALK-FM (see Plan, at 3.3-4; Cordaro et al. , f f. Tr. 4842, at 19), if that station is unable to transmit the EBS signal for any reason, the tone alert radios will not activate and the facilities will not receive the message. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 23; Tr. 5189 (Renz).278/ 412. For these reasons, the Board finds that the tone alert radio system proposed by LILCO may not provide adequate notification to special facilities and other organizations within the EPZ.
- 4. Notification of and Communication with Special Facilities and the Handicapped at Home (Contention 58) 413. Under the Plan, the Public Schools, Private Schools, Health Fa-cilities, and Home Coordinators are required to verify by telephone that special facilities and handicapped individuals at home are aware of the need to evacuate and to determine their specific needs for assistance. See OPIP 3.6.5; Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 24; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.
278/ The EBS signal can be broadcast from radio stations other than WALK. See OPIP 3.8.2, at 3; see Plan, App. B. LILCO concedes, however, that r the radios have been crystallized to WALK's FM frequency and would not activate if WALK-FM is unable to transmit for any reason. LILCO Brief, at 155; Tr. 5067-68 (Renz). - 282 - 5337, at 8 and Att. 2. LILCO testified that as many as 15 administrative support personnel, together'with other personnel assigned the jobs of com-municators at the EOC, could assist in making such phone calls. Id., at 10; Tr. 5387-88 (Robinson). However, these personnel have their own responsibilities and may not be available when such phone calls have to be made. Tr. 5388-89 (Robinson, Weismantle). LILCO estimated that each phone i call would take about 2 minutes (Tr. 5390 (Robinson)) and that if all 65 , special facilities had to be telephoned by only the Public Schools, Private Schools, and Health Facilities Coordinators, approximately 45 minutes would be required. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5337, at 10-11; Tr. 5395 (Rob-inson).279/ However, this 45-minute estimate was limited to the time it would take to verify notification of an emergency, and LILCO's estimate ex-- cluded all but a single telephone call to each special facility. Tr. 5395 ! (Robinson). Neither the County's nor LILCO's witnesses were able to esti-7 mate the time it would take to determine the specific needs of particular facilities. Tr. 5395 (Robinson); 5481 (Snow). However, for some facili-ties, LILCO would have to telephone the facility's director who then would contact the facility. Thus, a minimum of 3 telephone calls per facility i could be required: LILCO to the facility's director; the director to the facility itself; and then personnel at the facility back to LILCO (to report specific needs for assistance). Tr. 5380-81 (Robinson). 279/ LILCO conducted a simulated test upon which it based its 45-minute es-timate. Tr. 5390 (Robinson). This test, however, assumed away Con-tention 58's concerns, since, during the test, telephones were always answered within 6 rings and phones were never busy. Tr. 5398-5400 (Robinson). 283 - I 1 1 t-414. . Based on the foregoing,-the Board concludes that the Plan does not provide reasonable assurance of timely notification of, or communica-tion with, special facilities or the handicapped at home. See Regensburg et al. , 'ff. Tr. 5416, at .24-25.280/ See also our findings on Contentions 72.A, 73.B.1 and 73.B.3 (Sections XI.B.2 and XI.D.1).
- 5. . Notification to the Public by the f Coast Guard (Contentions 24.T, 59)
.415. NRC regulations require that a licensee's notification system be i able to provide public notification within 15 minutes. Witnesses for LILCO and FEMA stated that these requirements do.not apply to the Long Island Sound,;since NUREG 0654, Appendix 3, creates an exception for extended i . water areas. Tr.,5071-72.(Renz); 12,719 (Baldwin). According to FEMA, this exception requires that notification be given within 45 minutes. Tr. 12,719 (Baldwin).281/ FEMA'does not know whether the Coast Guard can l o 280/ LILCO contends that NRC regulations do not require LILCO to establish means for verifying that special facilities are aware of the need to evacuate. Cordaro et al.,-ff. Tr. 5337, at 9. However, LILCO acknowledges thatLit is required to provide a way for determining spe-cific needs for assistance by special facilities. Tr. 5373-74 (Rob-inson); Tr. 5401-02 (Weismantle). FEMA has determined that telephones are an acceptable backup means of communications (to sirens and tone alert radios) for LILCO to verify evacuation recommendations and to obtain information from special facilities regarding specific needs for assistance. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 52; Tr. 12,710-11 (Kowieski). However, we find that LILCO and FEMA have failed to take into account the specific concerns raised by Contention 58. 281/ Requirements governing this-exception are outlined by FEMA's Standard Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems (FEMA 43/ September 1983). See SC Ex. 14. . See also Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. (Footnote cont'd next page) - 284 - F? s l provide 45-minute notification to persons on Long Island Sound. Tr. 12,719 -(Baldwin). .If it does not have that capability, however, FEMA would con-sider this a Plan deficiency. Tr. 12,719-20 (Baldwin). As discussed below,' the Coast Guard itself has estimated that notification on Long Is-land Sound will take at least 90 minutes, or twice the permissible maximum. s I (Footnote cont'd from previous page) ! .4842, at 20-21; Tr. 5071-72, 5083 (Renz). _ According to LILCO, FEMA's criteria require a description of the special alerting method and a written agreement with whomever will implement notification that es-sential equipment and personnel can and will be placed under the con- ' trol of the individual responsible for activating the alert system. Tr. 5086, 5097-98 (Renz.). Such. description is to include any assump-tions made or any analyses necessary to verify that the af'ected popu- - lation can be provided an alert signal within 45 minutes. Tr. 5091-92 (Weismantle). The special alerting method must provide notification -to .that portion of the population who may not have received ' initial notification. LILCO has conducted no analyses to ensure that notifi-cation can be given within 45 minutes. Id. Further, the Coast Guard, which LILCO relies upon to implement special alerting methods for Long Island Sound, has not agreed to place its equipment or personnel under LILCO's control. Tr.' 5097-98'(Renz). See also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 21. According to FEMA's witnesses, while NUREG 0654, Appendix 3, recog- .nizes that there may be special circumstances where public notifica-tion cannot.be achieved throughout the EPZ in 15 minutes, there must be 100% coverage within .45 minutes for persons who have not received initial notification. Moreover, the basis for such special notifica-tion arrangements must be documented. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, ' at 54-55. See also Tr. 5092 (Weismantle). The Plan is deficient be-cause it does not provide this required documentation. Tr. 5072, 5086 (Renz). Nor does LILCO's final design report regarding its PNS (the so-called Wyle Report) explicitly document the special requirements exception relied upon by LILCO for the Long Island Sound. Tr. 5075 (Renz). Thus, at this time LILCO has not documented the basis for any special notification arrangement. Tr. 5080 (Renz); 12,720 (Kowieski). l - 285 - 416. The Plan includes a letter agreement with the Coast Guard to pro-vide special alerting for the EPZ within Long Island Sound. Notification would be made by broadcasts over marine radio frequencies and by direct contact with boats. Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 4842, at 21 and Att. 2; Tr. 5084 (Renz); 5095-(Weismantle). The Coast Guard would be advised of the emergency via commercial telephone (primary) or the FTS (backup) at an Alert or higher EAL. Tr. 5118-20 (Renz) . LILCO intends to install a marine-band radio at.the EOC as another means to communicate with the Coast Guard. Tr. 5120 (Renz); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 21. The letter agreement does not commit the Coast Guard to notify the affected public in any specific amount of time. Tr. 5112-13 (Renz). Indeed, Lil"0 never asked the Coast Guard whether notification can be achieved within 45 minutes. Tr. 5114 (Renz).282/ - 417. . Upon notification of an emergency, the Coast Guard plans to re-spond by dispatching i boat from New Haven and 1 boat from Eaton's Neck, Long Island. Roberts et al. , ff. Tr. 5522, at 2; Tr. 5104 (Renz). The boat from Eaton's Neck, which is 17 miles to the west of Port Jefferson, would be responsible for patrolling the west quadrant of the EPZ. The New Haven boat would be responsible for patrolling the EPZ's east quadrant. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 5522,-at 2-3; Tr. 5106 (Renz).283/ New Haven is 282/ FEMA's witnesses had no knowledge or information regarding the Coast Guard's resources for providing notification to persons on the Long Island Sound. Tr. 12,721 (Kowieski). 283/ According to LILCO, these 2 boats would have responsibility both for patrolling the perimeter of the EPZ and for patrolling, or sweeping, the EPZ. Tr. 5145-46 (Renz). - 286 - ~ l r , .l4 across the Long Island Sound, approximately 10-11 miles from the edge of 1 the EPZ. Tr. 5195 (Cordaro). The Coast Guard estimates that it will take approximately 45 minutes from notification for the New Haven boat just to reach the eastiend of LILCO's EPZ. While time estimates for the Eaton's Neck boat were not provided, it is unlikely that it could reach the west quadrant of the EPZ any sooner, since both boats are about the same dis-tance from the EPZ. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 5522, at 2-3. These facts were not controverted by LILCO. 418. In light of these facts, it is clear that the Coast Guard cannot notify the.public on the waters within the EPZ within 45 minutes as re-quired by NUREG 0654, Appendix 3. In fact, it will take the Coast Guard .approximately 45 minutes _from the time of notification just to, reach the outer perimtor of the EPZ. Upon reaching the EPZ, additional time neces-sarily will be required to sweep the EPZ and notify boats to leave. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 5522, at 3; Tr. 5544 (Roberts). LILCO has not at-tempted to determine, nor could LILCO's witnesses estimate, how long this . process would take. Tr. 5096 (Weismantle); 5239 (Renz).284/ The Coast Guard has indicated that 90 minutes would be required to sweep the east quadrant of the EPZ. Tr. 5544 (Roberts). The County believes this esti-mate is overly optimistic and testified that at least 3-3/4 hours and as 284/ -Moreover, LILCO did not know whether the Coast Guard will conduct . full-scale testing of its equipment at least annually (as required by FEMA 43) to determine-whether notification functions under the Plan can be performed. Tr. 5098-5100 (Renz). - 287 - long as 8 hours could be required just to patrol one-half of the EPZ. Tr. 5545-46, 5557 (Read).285/ ;419. The Coast Guard will attempt to notify boaters by broadcasting warnings over marine radio frequencies. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 21; Tr. 6582-83 (Cordaro). While these broadcasts will provide notifica-tion to some boaters (Tr. 5526-27 (Read)), it cannot be assumed that all persons on the waters within the EPZ will receive notification. The Coast Guard will not broadcast over the entire marine band, but only over channel 16 -- the emergency frequency. Tr. 5101 (Renz) . Moreover, many of the pleasure craft, particularly the smaller boats, found in EPZ waters on a typical summer day, do not have radios.286/ And even those boats with ra-dios would have to have the radio on and tuned to channel 16. Tr. 5102-04 (Hobbs); 5548 (Read).287/ Furthermore, the broadcasts would not reach all 285/. The County's estimate assumed 1 boat.doing a mile search pattern. That boat would have to cover an area of approximately 80 miles to cover half of the EPZ in the Sound. Assuming a speed of 10 knots, ap-proximately 8 hours would be required to sweep this area. At cruising speed (approximate 1y'22 knots), without stopping, approximately 3-3/4 hours would be required to sweep the area. Tr. 5545-46 (22 d). 286/ The County's witnesses have had extensive experience policing the Long Island Sound. Officer Read worked on the waters within the EPZ for 15 years. During that time, part of his duties included stopping boats to check for Coast Guard-required safety equipment. Approximately 1,000 boats per year were stopped; most small boats did not have ra - dios. Tr. 5527 (Read). See also Tr. 5527 (Hoffman). 287/ The County's witnesses testified that even boats equipped with marine radios generally have the radios turned off. Tr. 5546-47 (Read). They acknowledged that commercial boats usually have their radios on, but not tuned to channel 16. Tr. 5547 (Read). - 288 - -c-parts of the Sound since there are " dead spots" as large as one-half square mile in area (Tr. 5543 (Read)) where radio transmissions cannot be heard. These dead spots vary with weather conditions and are not- always in the same locations. Tr. 5554 (Read, Hoffman). Therefore, to assure notifica-tion, Coast Guard boats would have to pull alongside boats or use loud-speakers to inform boaters of the emergency.2!!/ Based on estimates pro-vided by the Coast Guard, it would take at least 90 minutes from the time of notification, assuming an uninterrupted trip and good weather, for the New Haven vessel to patrol the east quadrant of the EPZ. The need to pull alongside or use loudspeakers to warn vessels unable to hear radio broad-cast warnings is likely to increase that estimate. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 5522, at 4. 420. The County presented calculations which demonstate that, during daytime hours on a typical summer weekend, 350 boats can be expected in certain areas of the EPZ out to about 2 miles from shore. With an average of 4 per boat, there would be approximately 1,400 persons in the EPZ por-tion of the Sound. Id., at 5 and Att. 2; Tr. 5541-42 (Read).219/ rhere 2pg/ LILCO's witnesses were not aware of how the Coast Guard would make d'irect contact with boaters in the EPZ or how much time would be re-quired to make such contact. Tr. 5111 (Renz). They testified, how-ever, that larger boats generally have radios and the smaller boats generally stay close enough to shore to hear LILCO's sirens. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 22. This testimony was not based on any sur-veys by LILCO (Tr. 5137 (Cordaro)), and was disputed by the County. 289/ These calculations were performed by Officer Read whose duties over the years have included counting boats in the Sound. Tr. 5528-29 (Footnote cent'd next page) - 289 - u 7 are approximately 150 square miles in the Long Island Sound portion of the E,PZ . Tr. 5133-34 (Renz).290/ 421. LILCO's letter agreement with the Coast Guard is limited. The Coast Guard has agreed to attempt to notify boaters within the EPZ of a Shoreham emergency. However, the agreement does not commit the Coast Guard to attempt notification of people on the beaches and marinas within the EPZ. Roberts'et al., ff. Tr. 5522, at 5; Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 22.291/ In fact, the Coast Guard has informed the County's witnesses (Footnote cont'a from previous page) (Read). Officer Read also prepared a map appended to his testimony which depicts the boat population in an approximately rectangular area 20 miles along the shore and two miles out into the Sound. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 5522, at Att. 2; Tr. 5541 (Read). The County's witnesses stated that their estimate of 350 boats and 1,400 boaters would at least double for that area of the Sound within an arc 10 miles in ra-dius from the Shoreham site. Tr. 5551-52 (Read); 5552 (Hoffman). '290/ LILCO's witnesses asserted that LILCO's sirens, without Coast Guard support, would provide an effective means of notification to boaters and swimmers out to about 2 miles into the Sound. Cordaro et al'., ff. Tr. 4842, at 23; Tr. 4975-76 (Schif fmacher, Cordaro); 5137-38 (Renz). However, 'not all sirens deployed along the Sound are LILCO's large si-rens and this 2-mile estimate was based on tne sirens' design basis coverage, without taking into account terrain, weather or other fac-tors. Tr. 5139 (Renz). LILCO's witnesses acknowledged that weather conditions, such as a strong wind, can affect the broadcast rar.ge of the sirens. Tr. 4974-76~(Schiffmacher, Cordaro). They also acknowl-edged that they have not attempted to determine the distance at which sirens can be heard by boaters on the Sound. Tr. 5140-41 (Renz). Nor have they ever measured the ambiant background noise level on the Sound. Tr. 5141 (Renz) . Engine noise, for example, can prevent si-rens (or Coast Guard broadcasts) from being heard by boaters. Tr. 5552-53 (Read, Hoffman); 5553-54 (Hoffman). For this reason, the SCPD's boats are equipped with central radios and multiple speakers. Private boats would generally not have such equipment. Tr. 5553 (Read). 291/ FEMA's witnesses testified that FEMA will need clarification from LILCO or the Coast Guard regarding notification of persons on beaches (Footnote cont'd next page) - 290 - r; ;that it _will not patrol beach areas or marinas (such as Port Jefferson or Mount Sinai Harbor) to notify people in those locations. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 5522, at 5.292/ 422'. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that, given the substan-tial distance of the Coast Guard boats from the EPZ and the lack of marine radios on many boats (with the resulting need to pull alongside boaters to inform them of an emergency), the proposed notification would take well over 90 minutes -- far more time than the 15 minutes required by NUREG 0654 or the 45-minute exception to NUREG 0654's requirements under FEMA 43.293/ Accordingly, there is no assurance that persons likely to be on tha waters within the EPZ would receive timely notification of a Shoreham emergency. Nor is assurance provided by LILCO's last-minute proposal that the Board (Footnote cont'd from previous page) and marinas during a Shoreham emergency. -Tr. 12,282 (Keller); 12,284 (Kowieski). Assuming the Coast Guard is unable to provide notifica-tion to such persons, and assuming no compensating measures by LILCO, FEMA would consider this a deficiency of the Plan. Tr. 12,281 (Keller). FEMA has not met with Coast Guard personnel regarding Shoreham. Tr. 12,282 (Kowieski). 292/ The Coast Guard does not patrol within 2 miles of Long Island's north shore due to its unfamiliarity with coastal waters and conditions. Tr. 5544 (Hoffman, Read). 293/ LILCO's witnesses testified that LILCO's special alert notification method for alerting the public on the Long Island Sound is essentially idnntical to the State of Connecticut's provisions for the Haddam Neck and Millstone sites. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 4842, at 22 and Atts. 3,
- 4. However, no part of the Haddam Neck EPZ is in the Long Island Sound, and the Millstone plant is'enly about 7 miles from New Haven, from where the Coast Guard would respond. Tr. 5141-43 (Renz).
- 291 - l l l l ifind the Plan's provisions for notifying the public on the Long Island Sound adequate, provided that helicopters are used to supplement notifica-tion by the Coast Guard. LILCO Brief, at 160. LILCO has acknowledged that notification by helicopters-is not provided by the Plan and that use of he-licopters would have to take into account certain limitations, including flight restrictions during bad weather. Tr. 4857, 5147-49, 5152-53 (Renz, Weismantle). Helicopter notification would also be inadequate based upon LILCO's testimony that, except during business hours, as long as 4 hours could be required to man and dispatch helicopters. Tr. 5640-43 (Weismantle).
- 6. Conclusion 423. 'For the reasons detailed above, we find in favor of Intervenors on Contentions 55-59 and 24.T because LILCO has failed to demonstrate com-pliance with 10 CFR Part 50, App. E S IV-D.3.
B. WALK-AM (Contention 20) 424. Contention 20 alleges that because WALK-AM radio station does not broadcast at night, persons without FM radios will be unable to receive adequate information if a Shoreham emergency occurs at night. We agree with Contention 20. 425. NRC regulations require a PNS with "the capability to essential-ly complete the initial notification of the public within the plume expo-sure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes." 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 6 - 292 - IV.D.3. LILCO's PNS relies upon WALK radio station to broadcast emergency messages, providing the public with notification of a Shoreham accident and instructions on recommended protective actions. Clawson et al., ff. Tr. 5254, at 4. 426. WALK is an AM/FM station, which does not broadcast on the AM band between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. Id., at 5. Therefore, persons with-out FM radios may be unable to receive information about a Shoreham emer-gency. Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 23. According to LILCO, although WALK-AM ordinarily broadcasts only during the day, the station has the capacity to broadcast on its AM frequency at night. -Clawson et al., ff. Tr. 5254, at 5-6.294/ AM broadcasts at night, however, require WALK personnel to contact station management for approval. Id., at 6; Tr. 5289-90 (Clawson).295/ Thus, even if WALK-AM did operate at night, it could not do so immediately upon notification from LILCO. Tr. 5518 (Snow).296/ The Board finds this to be a matter of some concern. 294/ It is not clear whether WALK would violate FCC regulations if it broadcast on its AM frequency at night. Under 47 CFR $ 73.1250(f), a station can only broadcastson AM during off hours if regular, unlimited-time service does not exist or offers inadequate coverage. Tr. 5305-06 (Clawson). Thus, WALK-AM could only broadcast at night if no other AM station in the area did so; however, there is another AM station that regularly broadcasts at night to an area which probably overlaps the territory covered by WALK-AM. Tr. 5306-07 (Clawson). 295/ LILCO witness Clawson did not know whether station officials are on call 24 hours per day. Tr. 5291 (Clawson). 296/ Under the Plan, LILCO would notify WALK of an emergency by means of a dedicated telephone line (Tr. 5280 (Clawson)) which would be subject (Footnote cont'd next page) 293 - l 427. Va also have concerns with respect to the broadcast range of WALK's signal. WALK probably does not have the capability of reaching all of Suffolk and Nassau Counties; it may not reach Connecticut. Tr. 5295, 5297 (Clawson). Indeed, there is some doubt whether WALK can reach the en-tire EPZ: - the record only suggests that WALK-FM, but not WALK-AM, might have this capability. Tr. 5297-99 (Clawson); 12,188 (Kowieski).297/ i ^ 428. _ LILCO believes that the adequacy of its PNS is bolstered by the ~ fact that 11 additional radio stations-have agreed to broadcast EBS mes-sages about a Shoreham emergency. LILCO Brief, at 162; Tr. 5324-25 (Clawson); Clawson. et al. , ff. Tr. 5254, at 8. These stations have signed letters of agreement with LILCO (see Clawson et al. , ff. Tr. 5254,\\t 8 and Atts. 4-12), but the agreements do not require the stations to roadcast at full capacity and they provide that the stations have full discretion to decide whether to broadcast an emergency message and whether to use their (Footnote cont'd from previous page) to failure as readily as commercial phone lines. Tr. 5442, 5445 (Snow); Regensburg et al., ff. Tr. 5416, at 9-10. If the EOC were not activated, WALK would be notified via commercial phone lines. Id., at 9; Tr. 5280-81 (Clawson). We find that due to failure vulnerabilities of telephone lines (see findings on Contention 26 (Section IV. A, supra)), the Plan fails to provide reasonable assurance that WALK would be contacted in the event of a Shoreham emergency. _297/ We note that, in the past, WALK-FM has been unable to broadcast be-cause of problems with the broadcast transmitter. Tr. 5323 (Clawson). If WALK-FM is unable to broadcast during a Shoreham emergency, tone alert radios in special facilities would not be activated. Tr. 5321 .(Clawson). The. Plan does not provide for a back-up system in case WALK cannot broadcast. Tr. 5322 (Clawson). - 294 - ' daytime facilities at night in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Tr. 5315 (Clawson).298/ 429. Under the Plan, these stations would receive EBS messages from WALK. Clawson et al., ff. Tr. 5254, at 4; Tr. 5334 (Clawson). Thus, if WALK cannot broadcast for any reason, the other stations relied upon by LILCO would not receive EBS messages, unless notified by LILCO. LILCO
- Brief, at 162; Tr.'5321 (Clawson). The Plan, however, makes no provision for n'tifying o any station other than WALK (Tr. 5322 (Clawson)) and we therefore find that such notification would be carried out, if at all, on an _ad hoc basis, possibly delaying notification to the public.
430. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that LILCO's reliance upon WALK and other radio stations fails to provide reasonable assurance that emergency messages and protective action recommendations will be promptly communicated-to the public. C. Zones and Routes (Contention 18) 431. Contention 18 alleges that proposed LILCO posters, telephone - book inserts and EBS messages would be ineffective in providing information on z .te boundaries and evacuation routes. The Board agrees and finds that the Plan fails to provide assurance that persons in the EPZ will be able to determine '(1) if they are in a zone for which evacuation is recommended, or (2) the evacuation routes from that zone. 298/ Some of these stations are not manned 24 hours per day and do not reach the 10-mile EPZ. Tr. 5313, 5334 (Clawson); 5502 (Stile). - 295 - w -, --- - - - - - . - - - , , , , - . . ~ - . - .-- --- -- -. ., ,,-r-- - , , , - - , - , - - - , , - - - - ~ - . . - - - - - . . /J ! -{ -e +. , 1 ,, *? '( i 'l- + '.f- r L,) < ). s 432. LILCO testified that zone boundaries and evacuation routes would -be publicized in a variety of ways, including inserts in the Suffolk County telephone directory and community telephons dfrectories, refrigerator mag-nets and stickers for automobile gloveboxes.299/ LILCO " anticipates" that stransient information packages containing window display posters and flyers ~ a would be distributed to commercial establishments and that there would be posters ac beaches and recreation areas in the EPZ. . These posters and fly-ers would, according to LILCO, show the zone where the poster is located 'and the evacuation routes from that zone. In addition, LILCO intends to $e post trailblazer signs.along major roads'. Clawson et al., ff. Tr. 10,03c, at 9-13; LILCO Brief, at<'.63465. -433. 1LILCO has-not attempted to assess how many_ people would keep or-hL %" display'a map on a refrigerator magnet or on a sticker for automobile 'gloveboxes. Tr. 10',159-60 (Clawson). Nor_ has ~LILCO conducted any kind of me w 'meaningfulreview.regardingtheadequacyoreffectivenessofitsmapsch telephone book inserts fSee Tr. 10,042-46(Clawson). Thus, there is no ~ evidence that any of these LILCO proposals-could or would effectively con-vey_the.information intended.33 / 299/ LILCO includes;its public information brochure, including a map inside .the brochure (Clawson et al. . ff. Tr._10,035, at 9-11), among the means for providing information from which people can identify the zone in which they are located and the evacuation routes from that zone. LILCO Brief, at 163. We' find LILCO's public information bro-chure not pertinent to the allegations in Contention 18 which deal with_the provision of information during an emergency to persons with-out access-to LILCO's brochure. In addition, FEMA questioned the effectiveness of the map in the brochure. Tr. 14,163 (Keller). -300/ LILCO's ' telephone book inserts, refrigerator magnets, glove box stick-ers and posters were not submitted to FEMA for review and the FEMA (Footnote cont'd next page) - 296 - i- t l 434. LILCO conceded that although it plans to distribute information L packets to commercial businesses (relying on the businesses to distribute flyers to transients and display posters contained in the packets), it has no agreements with merchants in the EPZ to display or distribute such mate-rials. Tr. 10,162-63 (Clawson).301/ Moreover, while LILCO testified that , there would be signs and posters at beaches and recreation areas (Clawson et.al., ff. Tr. 10,035, at 13), LILCO did not know whether permits or licenses must be obtained for such signs and posters, and it has made no effort to obtain licenses or permits. Tr. 10,164-65 (Clawson). '435. 'LILCO also testified that evacuees could follow trailblazer signs which LILCO intends to post on evacuation routes. However, the signs have not been obtained or even ordered. Tr. 10,166 (Clawson). FEMA has . been provided no information regarding the locations of such signs and ex-pressed concerns about LILCO's authority to post the signs. Tr. 14,193-94, .14,197:(Kowieski). 436. LILCO asserts that its EBS . messages will inform people if they are in a zone where evacuation is recommended and provide boundary J (Footnote cont'd from previous page) witnesses were therefore unable to comment on their adequacy. Tr. 14,192 (Kowieski). 301/ The proposed transient information packets have not been reviewed by FEMA -(Baldwin et al. , ff. Tr.14,151, at 8b) or by any of LILCO's so- . cial scisace experts. Tr. 10,165 (Clawson). , - 297 - ? ) descriptions by major roads and landmarks of the combined zonal area af-u facted by the recommendation for evacuation. LILCO Brief, at 163. LILCO concedes, however, that the EBS messages do not include a narrative de-scription of evacuation routes. Id. Further, LILCO has conducted no mean-ingful studies or analyses to determine whether a person would understand such zone descriptions when read in an EBS message. Tr. 10,168 (Clawson). Indeed, questions have been raised about the clarity of the descriptions and thus they may be changed. Tr. 10,168-73 (Clawson); see findings on Contention'23 (Section I.A). i '437. For the foregoing reasons, we find that there has been no mean-ingful. assessment by LILCO to determine whether informational materials regarding zone boundaries-and evacuation routes can be understood by the average person or whether the materials would or could be utilized effec-tively. .Thus, we find that the Plan fails to provide' reasonable assurance that persons in the EPZ will be able to determine (1) if they are in a zone where evacuation is recommended, (2) the evacuation routes from that zone. D. Hispanics (Contention 21.C), 438. Contention 21.C alleges that-because LILCO's public information materials'and EBS messages will be exclusively in English, Hispadic resi- , dents of the EPZ who. speak English poorly or not at all will not understand - LILCO's' materials or EBS messages. - 298 - 439. LILCO contends that there is no need to translate emergency information into Spanish because persons who speak little or no English make up less than 5% of all EPZ residents. LILCO Brief, at 165-67. LILCO relies upon FEMA /NRC Guidance Memorandum 20, " Foreign Language Translation of-Public Education Brochures and Safety Messages," which states that emer-gancy information must be translated into a foreign language if a single-language minority group constitutes more than 5% of a county's vot- - ing population. Clawson et al., ff. Tr. 5752, at 7-8; Tr. 5769-70 , (Clawson, Cordaro); 12,979 (Keller). It appears that the Spanish-Speaking 4 population in Suffolk County does not meet this threshold. Tr. 12,979-80 (Kowieski); Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 10. 440. We find, however, that, the Plan does not comply with the Guid-ance Memorandum 20 provisions that are applicable when a single-language minority does not exceed 5% of the population. Tr. 5778-80 (Clawson); 12,982-83 (Kowieski). LILCO has not offered courses of instruction for foreign language speaking community leaders, held public meetings featuring a trained foreign language speaker, trained the leaders of neighborhood or- , ganizations, or placcd advertisements in foreign language newspapers as Guidance Memorandum 20 requires. Tr. 5778-80 (Clawson)~.302/ Further, 302/ LILCO has sent each EPZ household a notice in Spanish asking that readers return an enclosed postcard if Spanish is their only language. t However, since the notice and postcard did not mention emergency plan- 'ning or Shoreham, and gave no indication that a person who returned the postcard would receive information regarding an emergency or any-thing of importance, we find no significance to the fact that only 25 (Footnote cont'd next page) - 299 - L_ T i l LILCO has made no provisions to broadcast emergency messages in Spanish. Tr. 5782 (Clawson). Thus, we find that LILCO has failed to provide rea-sonble assurance that individuals whose only language is Spanish will be provided with protection similar to that required for the general pub-lic.303/ E. Brochure (Contention 16.E) 441. Contention 16.E contests the adequacy of the LILCO brochure's description of the health effects and magnitude of radiation doses that could be experienced during a Shoreham accident. This contention presents several. issues: whether it is necessary for a public information brochure to contain a clear and accurate description about potential health effects and radiation doses; whether the brochure's descriptiod is adequate; and whether any other material available to the public compensates for any .(Footnote cont'd from previous page) postcards were returned. Clawson et al., ff. Tr. 5752, at 9; Tr. 5783-84 (Clawson). -We are aware that a letter will be sent to the Spanish-speaking persons identified by LILCO and an article will ap-pear in LILCO'o newsletter to inform readers that a brochure concern-ing Shoreham will be forthcoming, with the hope that Hispanic readers will find someone who will translate the brochure for them. Clawson et al., ff. Tr. 5752, at 9-10; Tr. 5756-58 (Clawson). However, con-trary to LILCO's assertion (LILCO Brief, at 167), we do not find these to constitute " reasonable efforts" to reach individuals whose only language is Spanish. 303/ FEMA has not attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of LILCO's pro-gram for single-language minorities (Tr. 12,978 (Kowieski)), nor has it determined the actual percentage of voting-age single-language mi- .nority residents. Tr. 12,981 (Baldwin). - 300 - ._ , . _ _ - - ~ , . - _ . _ . - . _ -. - - - , _ _ . - - _ _ . _ _ . . .. _-_ inadequacies.304/ 442. There was no dispute that one primary purpose of the brochure is to inform the public what to listen for and what to do in case of an emer-gency (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,061, at 8), and that another primary pur-pose is to give the reader an accurate perception of the risk should an accident at Shoreham occur. Tr. 14,085-86 (Clawson). However, LILCO's witnesses believed it is sufficient to state in the brochure that radiation may be hazardous and that it may require protective actions. Cordaro et al., ff Tr. 14,061, at 8. Ms. Clawson even stated that a discussion of high levels of radiation that may result from a severe accident would not be relevant. Tr. 14,087-88 (Clawson). 443. The County's witnesses disagreed. They testified that a bro-chure should contain a clear discussion of the amount of radiation which could be released, the possible health effects of that radiation, and the possible health effects of taking or not taking protective action. Only if the public is informed of and understands the true nature of the risk, is it reasonable to expect that people will understand and attempt to take 304/ There was no challenge to any witness' qualifications. The Board notes, however, that Dr. Radford is particularly qualified to testify on health effects. He is an Adjunct Professor of Epidemiology at the University of Pittsburgh and one of his specialties is the health ef-fects of ionizing radiation. He is presently a visiting scientist of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation in Hiroshima, Japan, where he is conducting research on new data regarding the health effects of the atomic explosions in Japan during 1945. Radford and Saegert, ff. Tr. 14,105, at 1-2. - 301 - l l appropriate protective actions as recommended during an emergency. Inaccu-rate and incomplete information renders the brochure ineffective as a meth-1 1 od of informing the public about why planning for a radiological emergency 1 is' necessary. Radford and Saegert, ff. Tr. 14,105, at 3-4, 6-7, 10-11; Tr. 14,111-12 (Saegert). 444. Fortunately, this Board does not need to resolve this issue in a vacuum. The Board in the Big Rock Point proceeding, Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-60, 16 NRC 540, 544-50 (1982), had occasion to consider the adequacy of the pamphlet proposed for the plant. The Board made clear that while'the Board's role was not that of a censor, it was in-f cumbent for the Board to ensure that the pamphlet is accurate, al eit not so elaborate and extensive that: it does not communicate effectively. Id., at 544.305/ We agree with this statement and in light thereof find LILCO's brochure defective. See also Metropolitan Edison Co., LBP-81-59, supra, 14 NRC at 1520-26. 445. The discussion of radiation in LILCO's brochure is generally limited to statements about low level radiation occurring in nature and household goods. Radford and Saegert', ff. Tr. 14,105, at 4 With respect .to radiation released as a result of a reactor accident, the Fcochure
- 305/ The Board stated: "we view ourselves as responsible only for seeing
. there are .ru) serious errors detracting from the credibility of the documtat, and that there are no serious omissions from the distributed material." 16 NRC at 544. See also Duke Power Co., LBP-84-87, supra, slip op. at 19. - 302 - t states-that the 75 operating nuclear plants in the U.S. have never experi-enced an accident thct exposed the public to radiation abeve natural lev-els, and that the average dose to the public within 5 miles of TMI was only - about 1 millirem. Although LILCO's witnesses defended the brochure, testi-fying that it contains general information as to the nature and effects of radiation,306/ there was no serious dispute that the effects and possible i levels of exposure in the event of a serious accident at Shoreham were not discussed or mentioned.307/ Radford and Saegert, ff. Tr. 14,105, at 5; Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 8a; Tr. 14,089-90 (Watts). 446. It is undisputed that the public is generally not well informed about the health consequences of radiation, because radiation is not a-306/ LILCO's witnesses referenced passages in the brochure which explain that the plant cannot explode like a bomb, that radioactive materials may be airborne and could lead to exposure of individuals offsite or -may require protective actions, and that radiation at high levels can be hazardous. Cordaro etaal., ff. Tr. 14,061, at 8-9 and Att. 1 at 2-5, 16; Tr. 14,099-100 (Clawson). 307/ The brochure's' statements.that any release into the air'would be rela-tively small and-that it would move with the wind until diluted, cou-pled with the statement that radiation can be hazardous'at high lev-els, do not inform the public of the true nature of the' risk because they provide no meaningful or quantitative information about the range of consequences for one's physical well being. Tr. 14,114 (Saegert); 14,124-25 (Radford). Moreover,'the brochure's brief discussion of ' federal guidelines for acceptable exposure limits does not mention the relationship of such exposures to those that could occur during a Shoreham accident, or the health consequences of exposures ab*ove the limits set forth in the brochure. Radford and Saegert, ff. Tr. 14,105, at 7. See also Consumers Power Co., supra, 16 NRC at 546 .(Board. notes with apparent approval licensee agreement to change pro-vision of' pamphlet that implied accident could lead to only minimal exposures). - 303 - m I commonly confronted disaster agent. Radford and Saegert, ff. Tr. 14,105, at 10. LILCO's brochure gives the impression that a radiological emergency would result in minimal', if any, risks to health and thus, as stated by FEMA's witnesses, it downplays the risk of radiation exposure. Tr. 14,125 (Radford); 14,188 (Keller). This violates the standard in Big Rock Point. See 16 NRC.at 544, 546. By concentrating on only the low end of the range of consequences and discussing natural radiation, the brochure fails to im-part an accurate perception of risk. Furthermore, by doing so, it may con-flict'with the public's general ~'k'nowle'dge about the possible effects of ra-diation,308/ making it more likely that the public will suspect that something is being concealed from them. As a result, people may not follow ~ LILCO's. advice. Tr. 14,123, 14,125-26, 14,131 (Saegert, Radford); Radford and S'egert, a ff. Tr. 14,105, at 10-11. 447. The County's witnesses testified that research following TMI shows that lack of information about the risk and health ef fects of radia- . tion exposure caused confusion among the public and the media, resulting in people not taking recommended protective actions. Tr. 14,112-13.(Saegert). Given adequate information on health effec *s and accident dose levels, the public would be in a better position to judge the seriousness of an 308/' For-example, due to publicity, the public generally knows that cancer has been observed as a result of radiation exposure, and therefore, would expect LILCO's brochurs to contain information acknowledging that health effect and explaining it. The absence of such information may make the public suspicious of the brochure and the information provided in it. Tr. 14,117, 14,129-30 (Radford); 14,131 (Saegert). - 304 - L: i accident and the appropriateness of the protective actions that LILCO rec-ommends. Tr. 14,117-18 (Saegert). Thus, LILCO's brochure should provide a brief and accurate description of the possible early and delayed health ef-fects that could result from exposures that might be received given the range of possible accidents at Shoreham. Radford and Saegert, ff. Tr. 14,105,'at 8. 448. LILCO asserted that the inclusion of details about health ef-fects and dose levels in a brochure would confuse the public (Tr. 14,090-91 4 (Cordaro)),'but Dr. Radford disagreed.309/ Mr. Keller stated that if presented in a sensitive and well-balanced manner, the public could be pro-vided with health effects information in a simple manner, and that such an effort would be worthwhile. Tr. 14,185-86 (Keller). - 449. NUREG 0654 Section II.G.1.a, offers no specific guidance or criteria to determine whether educational information regarding radiation ' in a public_ education brochure is adequate; nor does it explicitly require the inclusion of information about possible doses and resulting health ef-fects from a radiological accident. However, the FEMA witnesses testified that inclusion of such information would be informative to the reader, a -result which is certainly consistent with Big Rock Point, supra. Baldwin 309/ For instance, Dr. Radford stated that a straightforward way to de-scribe the risks due to radiation is to compare exposed to non-exposed individuals 4.n terms of increased chances of experiencing particular adverse eff. sets such as cancer or genetic damage. The concept of an increased risk of cancer due to increased exposure to radiation is not difficult to understand. Tr. 14,115-16 (Radford). - 305 - et al., ff. Tr. 14,151, at 8a.310/ -450. The Board finds that LILCO's brochure has no meaningful discus-sion of the radiation exposures or health effects that could result from a Shoreham accident. A discussion of the level of radiation one receives from nature or from household articles may be useful background data but is not directly relevant either to planning for or understanding the potential consequences of a Shoreham emergency requiring protective actions. Thus, for reasons similar to those expressed in Big Rock Point, we find the bro-chure defective. .451. ,LILCO's witnesses attempted to compensate for potential brochure defects by reliance on the Spring 1984 issue of LILCO's quarterly newslet-ter " Keeping Current", which allegedly explained the nature and effects'of radiation from both routine operations and accidents at nuclear plants, and acceptable radiation exposure levels. The " Keeping Current" article (or something similar) and the brochure will be sent to the same addresses an-nually. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,061, at 5-7; Tr. 14,096 (Clawson). Although the article contains a more complete description of radia*. ion ef-fects than the brochure, the Board cannot find that it is an effective sub-stitute.for the brochure or that it includes the information we have held must be provided to the public. 310/ Although LILCO's witness Ms. Clawson testified that the inforattion in + LILCO's brochure is typical of that in brochures for other plants thet have been approved through FEMA's 44 CFR Part 350 process (Tr. 14,094-95 (Clawson)), FEMA's witness stated that the fact of a FEMA review does not necessarily mean that the brochure has been reviewed for substance. Tr. 14,181-82 (Kowieski). l - 306 - a . ~ . - , ,- I 452. First,.although the newsletter is sent to 45,000 EPZ re<idents, LILCO's only evidence as to the effectiveness of the newsletter in trans-mitting information was that 2,000 return postcards requesting information about Shoreham (which had been included with the newsletter) had been re-ceived by LILCO from EPZ residents. Tr. 14,068-70 (Clawson). Second, there was no statement accompanying the newsletter saying that one should read it to derive information about emergency planning for Shoreham or about the health effects of radiation, and there is no reference in the brochure to the newsletter as a source of such information. Tr. 14,067-68 (Clawson); 14,080 (Cordaro). 453. Third, the discussion of radiation effects in the newsletter is not complete. The article states that in a severe accident people could be exposed to dangerously high levels of radiation, that " exposure to very large amounts of radiation over a short period of time (several minutes to several hours) can cause serious injury to cell tissues, and even death," and that'" animal studies show that large doses can cause genetic damage which continues'through several generations of offspring." Cordaro et al., .ff. Tr. 14,061, at 6-7 and Att. 2, at 2-3. "Large doses" is defined as in the range of 25,000 to 30,000 millirem.311/ Tr. 14,083-84-(Watts). + 311/ FEMA witness Keller criticized LILCO's technique of defining hazardous ' doses as being in the range of 25,000 to 30,000 millirem, rather than , 25 to 30 rem, as an attempt by LILCO'to reinforce its view of radia-tion hazards. Tr. 14,178-79 (Keller). We agree that the use of smaller units tends to downplay the significance of the hazard. - 307 - '454. Although one of the most common effects of tissue injury from radiation exposure is cancer (Tr. 14,072 (Watts); Radford and Saegert, ff. Tr. 14,105, at 9), the article never mentions cancer. Tr. 14,122 (Radford). There was no evidence that the lay public would understand the term " serious injury to cell tissues" to mean cancer. See T . 14,180 (Keller). Similarly, although the article states that "large doses" of ra-diation (defined as 25,000 to 50,000 millirem) to pregnant women would have an impact on the development of unborn children, doses less than 25,000 millirem could also have significant adverse effects on an unborn child. Tr. 14,081-84 (Watts). Thus, Dr. Radford testified that the article pro-vides only a superficial discussion of radiation which adds practically nothing to the insufficient levef of information in LILCO's brochure. Tr. 14,110-11, 14,12.2 (Radford) . 455. The Board finds that neither the LILCO brochure nor the " Keeping Current" article contain adequate or accurate information. The brochure avoids any meaningful discussion of the adtual consequences from a Shoreham accident, and both the brochure and the article downplay the risks of expo-sure and the likelihood of a Shoreham accident. We do not believe that an extensive or highly scientific dissertation is required, but rather, a -brief, accurate and realistic depiction of the possible dangers; the FEMA and County witnesses convinced us that it can be done withoat causing con-P fusion. We find further that thsre is no evidence that a quarterly LILCO _ newsletter to its electric customers is an adequate or effective medium for important information to the public a'cout emergency planning and the health - 308 - I \0l p.. effects of a Shoreham accident. Therefore, we rule for Intervenors on Con-tention 16;E and find that LILCO has failed to comply with Section 50.47(b)(7), Appendix-E, and NUREG 0654. e i O-di e C i - 309 - e_ x re - v. -p ,, . s .. < , cc - Wn m e rn ~ @1 # w ~. : , A'- c,. > s ~w- 4 , , - y w. c.
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- 1. Introduction ....................................... ... 30
- 2. The Nature of the Shadow Phenomenon In Radiological Emergencies............................. 31
- 3. The TMI Experience and Surveys Conducted on Long Island..................... .......... 34 (a) The TMI Evacuation Shadow.......................... 34 (b) Surveys on Long Is land . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 (c) Use of Survey Data to Predict Human Behavior................. ........... 42 (d) Alleged Bias in the County's Survey............................................. 46
- 4. LILCO's EBS Messages Will Not Substantially Reduce Voluntarf Evacuation.............................................. 49 (a) Comparative Impact of Information and Non-Information Factor at TMI...................................... 51 (b) Effectiveness of LILCO's EBS Messages....................................... 55
- 5. Some Effects of Shadow Phenomenon on Protective Actions................................... 63
- 6. Conclusions on' Contentions 23.A, B, and C.......................................... 66 B. Role Conflict (Contention 25).......................... ..... 68
- 1. Historical Resolution of Role Conflict............................................. .. 70
- 2. LILCO Workers (Contention 25. A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
- 3. BNL Personnel (Contention 25.B)......................... 83
- 4. School Bus Drivers (Contention 25.C).................... 84
- 5. Teachers and School Employees (Contention 25.D)....................................... 89
- 6. Health Care Personnel (Contention 25.E)...................... ............ ... 93
- 7. Non-LILCO Volunteers (Contention 25.F)......................... ............ . 97
- 8. Conclusion on Contention 25........................... . 98 II. CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND CREDIBILITY (Contentions 11 and 15)........................................... 99 A. Conflict of Interest (Contention 11)......................... 99 B. Credibility (Contention 15)................................. 117
- 1. LILCO is Not a Credible Source of Information.......................................... 119
- Li -
- 2. Significance of LILCO's Lack of Credibility...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 i
(a) Non-LILCO Personnel (Cont ent ion 15 . A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2 (b) Sheltering (Contention 15.B)...................... 134 (c) -Schools (Contention .15.C)......................... 135 (d) Traffic Guides and Security Personnel (Contention 15.D)....................... 136 (e) .EBS Messages (Contention 15.E).................... 138 , (f) Rumor Control (Contention 15.F)................... 138 (g) Pre-Emergency Information (Contention 15.G)................................. 140
- 3. Conclusion on Contention 15. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
' III. E7Z BOUNDARY (CONTENTION 22.D).................................... 142 IV. LERO WORKERS (CONTENTIONS 24.L, 26, 27, 28-32, 33, 34).................................................... 148 A. Notification (Contention 26)................................ 148
- 1. The Adequacy of LILCO's Custome.
Service Office as the Primary Notification Point for LERO (Contention 26.A)...................................... 150
- 2. Notification of Emergency Response Personnel by Pager (Cont ent ion 2 6 . C ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9
- 3. Notification of Emergency Response Personnel by Telephone (Contention 26.D)...................................... 165
- 4. Notification of Non-LILCO Organizations and Personnel (Contention 26.E)...................................... 168 B. Mobilization (Contention 27)................................. 170
- 1. Introduction........................................... 170 111 -
4 ew , , , - - - , n , p, m--- -. ,,.r -- , --,r-- - r '-<w--- = = v w- ------v-e *- - --
- 2. Extended Travel Times From Homes and Places of Work (Contention 27.A)...................................... 174
- 3. The Effects of Traffic Conditions on Mobilization (Contentions 27. B E and F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
- 4. Delays at Staging Areas (Contention 27.C)...................................... 181
- 5. Delays Due to Picking Up Equipment Away from Staging Areas (Contention 27.D)...................................... 184
- 6. Conclusion on Contention 27............................ 187 C. Communications (Contentions 24.L, 2 8 - 3 2 , 3 3 and 3 4 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8
- 1. Communications with Federal Agencies (Contention 28)................................ 189
- 2. Communications Personnel and
. Repair Technicians (Contention 29)..................... 190
- 3. LILCO's Emergency Radio System (Cont ent ions 3 0 and 31) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4 (a) LILCO's' Radio Channels Are Overloaded.................................... 199 (i) Control of LILCO's Radio Channe ls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 (ii) The Nature of Traffic Control Functions.......................... 202 (iii) Monit, ring Functions....................... 205 (iv) Problems With Radio Use.................... 206 (b) LILCO's Proposed Radio System Lacks B ackup Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 (c) LILCO's Reliance on Mobile Radios................. 208 (d) Limited Broadcast Range........................... 209
- iv - r. ) l (e) Problems with Dedicated Telephone Lines................................... 211
- 4. Lack of Direct Communications ,
(Contention 32)....................................... . 212
- 5. Communications Between Field Monitoring Teams and the EOC (Contention 33)........................................ 213
- 6. Communications with Hospitals and Ambulance Persontel (Contentions 24.L and 34).............................. 216 V. TRAINING (CONTENTIONS 24.S 39-41, 44, 98-100)................... 219 A. Arrangements for Training Non-LILCO Personnel (Contention 98)................................... 222 B. Training and Experience (Contentions 40, 44.E, 44.F, 99 and 100)..................................... 224
- 1. The Ne ed For Expe rienc e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 24
- 2. LILCO's Training Program Does Not Compensate for the LILCO Emergency Workers' Lack of Experience............................ 229 (a) LILCO's Selection Process Does Not Identify Candidates Who Are Likely to be Able to Overcome Their Lack of Experience.......................... 230 (b) LILCO's Formal Training Program Does Not Compensate For the Lack of Experience Among LERO Members..................... 232 LILCO's Classroom Program................... 233 (i)
(ii) LILCO's Drill / Exercise 241 Program..................................... (iii) Communications Training (Contentions 41 and 44.D)................... 253 256 (iv) Drill / Exercise Results...................... -v- (c) LILCO's Training Program Does Not Provide Necessary Post-Training Experience........................................ 257 (d) Conclusion........................................ 259 C. Attrition (Contention 39 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 VI, NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC (CONTENTIONS 16.E, 18, 20, 21.C, 24.T, 55-59).................... 264 A. Notification (Contentions 24.T, 55-59)...................... 264
- 1. Activating the LILCO Siren System (Contention 55)........................................ 265
- 2. Backup to the Siren System (Contention 56)........................................ 272
- 3. Notification to Special Facilities and Persons Without FM Radios (Contention 57)........................................ 281
- 4. Notification of and Communication with Special Facilities and the Handicapped at Home (Contention 58) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
- 5. Notification to the Public by the Coast Guard (Contentions 24.T, 59)..................... 284
- 6. Conclusion.................. .......................... 292 B. WALK-AM-(Contention 20)..................................... 292 C .- Zones and Routes (Contention 18)............................ 295 D. Hispanics (Contention 21.C)................................. 298 E. Brochure (Contention 16.E).................................. 300 VII . SHELTERING (CONTENTION 61) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310 VIII. MAKING PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTENTIONS 60, 63, 64 AND 49).................................. 317 A. Selective Sheltering and Selective Evacuation (Contentions 60 and 63)......................... 317
- 1. Protection of the Radiosensitive....................... 317 l
- vi - i
- 2. Protection of Hospital Patients........................ 323 B. Wind Shif ts (Contention 64) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
-C. Nomogram (Contention 49).................................... 332 IX. EVACUATION (CONTENTIONS 23.D, 24.F.2, 23 . H , 24 . I , 6 5 , 6 6 , 6 7 , 9 7 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 35 A. Time Estimates (Contentions 65, 23.D , 23.H) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
- 1. Introduction........................................... 335
- 2. The KLD Computer Model (DYNEV)......................... 337
- 3. Mobilization (Contention 65.A)......................... 341
- 4. Pre-Evacuation Trips (Contention 65.B)................. 346
- 5. Route Deviation (Contention 65.C.4)........... ........ 349
- 6. Confusion As A Result Of LILCO's Traffic Control Tactics (Contention 65.C.1).................................... 359
- 7. Aggressive Behavior (Contention 65.C.2)................ 360
- 8. Traffic Direction In Conflict With Normal Traffic Signals (Contention 65.C.3).................................... 364
- 9. The Validity of LILCO's Estimated
" Uncontrolled" Evacuation Time E s t im a t e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366 t
- 10. The Effects of Accidents, Running Out of Fuel And Other Eimilar Blockages (Contention 65.D)...................................... 370
- 11. Emergency Vehicles (Contention 65.E)................... 379
- 12. The Ef fect of Stress (Contention 65.F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
- 13. Estimates for Special Populations (Contention 65.G)...................................... 383
- 14. Route Spotters (Contention 65.H).. .................... 383
- vii -
- 15. The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon (Contention 23.D)...................................... 385
- 16. Perimeter Control (Contention 23.H).................... 393
- 17. Conclusions on Contentions 65, 23.D, H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 B. Road Obstacles and Cars Without Fuel (Contention 66)............................................. 395
- 1. Number of Tow Trucks (Contention 66.A)................. 396
- 2. Time Needed To Remove Obstacles (Contention 66.B)...................................... 398
- 3. Evacuation of Persons Whose Cars Become Disabled (Contention 66.C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
- 4. Snow Removal (Contention 66.D)......................... 401
- 5. Fuel Disbursement (Contention 66.F).................... 404
- 6. Conclusion on Contention 66............................ 406 C. Weather (Contention 97.B)................................... 407 D. Buses for the Public (Contentions 24.F.2, 24.I, 67).............................. 411
- 1. Contention 67.......................................... 412 (a) Number of Buses Needed (Contention 67.A)................................. 412 (b) Evacuation Time Estimates (Contention 67.C)................................. 412 (c) Location and Configuration of Trans fer Points (Contention 67.D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
- 2. Agreements for the Use of Transfer Points (Contention 24.I)............................... 418
- 3. Contention 24.F.2...................................... 419 X. RELOCATION CENTERS (CONTENTI.;NS 24.0, 24,P, 74, 75, 77)......................................... . 421
- viii - , . ~ . - ~ - . , , ,y- - i i l A. Centers for the Public (Contentions 24.0, 24.P, 74, 75)............................ 421
- 1. Identification of Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422
- 2. Location of Centers.................................... 426
- 3. Lett e rs o f Agr e ement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 7
- 4. Capacities and Facilities in Centers................... 430 B. Thyroid Monitoring (Contention 77) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432 XI. THE HANDICAPPED, HOSPITALS, AND NURSING HOMES (CONTENTIONS 24.G, J, K, N, 58, 72, 73.A, B)................... . 436 A. Ambulances (Contentions 24. G , 24. K) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 6
- 1. Agreements for Vehicles (Contention 24.G)...................................... 436
- 2. Agreements for Staffing (Contention 24.K)...................................... 439 B. Hospitals and Nursing Homes (Cont entions 24. J, 24. N , 7 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
- 1. Agreements with Special Facilities (Contention 24.J)...................................... 441
- 2. Evacuation Times (Contention 72. A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
- 3. Relocation Centers (Contentions 72.C and 24.N).............................................. 448
- 4. Standards for Evacuation (Contention 72.D)............. 451
- 5. Ad Hoc Evacuation (Contention 72.E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451 C. Registration of Handicapped Persons (Contention 73.A)........................................... 453 D. Notification and Evacuation of Handicapped Persons at Home (Contentions 58, 73.B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
- 1. Notification (Contentions 73.B.1, B.3, and B.5)........ 459
- 2. Evacuation (Contention 73.B.4)......................... 462
- ix - XIk. SCHOOLS (CONTENTIONS 24.E, 24.F, 24.M, 24.N, 61.C, 68-71)......................................... 463 A. Lack of Agreements with Schools 466 (Contention 24.E)...........................................
- 1. The Schools and School Districts Have Not Agreed to Implement LILCO's Plan................... 468
- 2. LILCO's Efforts to Obtain S choo l Coop e rat ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 0
- 3. LILCO's Speculations As to What School Districts Would Do If There Were A Shoreham Accident Are No Substitute for A P1an.................................. 476 B. Agreements to Provide School Buses 478 (Contentions 24.F.1 and 24.F.3).............................
C. Lack of Agreements with School Bus Companies (Contention 24.M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483 D. Lack of Agreements For Relocation Centers For School Children (Contention 24.N).......... ................................ 485 486 E. Sheltering (Contention 61.C.1).............................. F. Early Dismissal of School Children 492 (Contentions 68 and 69).....................................
- 1. Adequacy of Existing School Early Dismis s al Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3
- 2. Time to Accomplish Early Dismissal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494
- 3. Homes Without Adults When Children Arrive Home................................... 499 Dealing with An Escalating Emergency................... 501 4.
G. Evacuation of School Children 503 (Contentions 70 and 71)..................................... XIII. INGESTION PATHWAY (CONTENTIONS 24.R, ....................... 507 81, 85, 88, 92)......................... A. 5 0-Mile EPZ (Contention 81) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507 l 1 -x-i B. Recovery and Reentry (Contentions 85, 88)................... 512 C. New York State Plan (Contention 92)......................... 516 D. Connecticut (Contention 24.3)............................... 521 XIV. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (CONTENTIONS 93, 96)....................... 527 XV2 STRIKE BY LILCO EMPLOYEES........................................ 528 A. Int ro duct ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528 B. The Risks of Cold Shutdown.................................. 530 C. Comparison to Lcw Power Risks............................... 534 D. The Language of the - License Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 537 E. Conclusions on Strike Issue................................. 538 CONCLUSION............................................................ 539 List of' Witnesses (filed separately) List of Exhibits (filed separately) Sequence of Testimony (filed separately) - xi - t T m-_ = -- ?" k VII. SHELTERING (CONTENTION 611 _f_ 1 -=- 456. Contention 61 alleges that a sheltering recommendation would not -] _ or could not be implemented because a substantial number of people who =- 3L might be advised to shelter, as a practical matter, will be unable to do N so. Moreover, even if people were willing and able to follow a sheltering recommendation, there is no assurance that taking such action would provide pg{ h:- sufficient dose savings to reduce doses to levels below those that would . cause adverse health effects. Thus, sheltering is not an adequate protec- ]h5 tive action in a Shoreham emergency, and the Plan, therefore, fails to com- [ } ply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10), and SUREG 0654 Section jg-a II.J.9. _T-457. The testimony on Contention 61 addressed the types of shelter 't available in the Shoreham EPZ and the amount of protection each type of { shelter would provide; the methods to be used by LILCO to determine whether Ee sheltering would be recommended; and, Suf folk County's witnesses discussed j_ the health effects that would result from various radiation doses that - could be received even if a sheltering recommendation were implemented in M the Shoreham EPZ. ly; 458. A shielding factor is the ratio of the dose a person would re- ., h ceive while in a shelter, compared to the dose he would receive if shelter -jR gi were not taken. For example, a shielding factor of 0.2 means that a person ]L in a shelter would receive 20% of the dose he would have received if he had i Z_ not taken shelter; a shelter with a shielding factor of 0.2 results in an ; #7 80% dose reduction. Finlayson et al., ff. Tr. 12,320, at 2-3. 4l E-YE i s? _n -310- Nb t i. t i 4 459. The Plan identifies s!!ieldin factors from a cloud dose 312/ for various structures in the EPZ asil.0 (no shielding at all) for vehicles; 0.9 -for wood houses without basements; 0.6 for wood houses with basements and masonry houses without basements; 0.4 for masonry houses with base-ments; and 0.2 for large office and industrial buildings. Plan, at Table
- 3. 6.5 ., The Plan assumes a 0.5 shielding factor for thyroid dose for all types of buildings. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8760, at 20.313/ The protec-tive action recommendations to be prepared by LILCO using OPIP 3.6.1 assume an average whole body dose shielding factor of 0.7, which is representative of the housing in the County. Cordaro et al., ff., Ti 760, at 21-22.
I 460. The County's witnesses testified that assuming a 30% dose reduc-tion is achieved by sheltering -- that is, the average shielding assumed to be available by LILCO -- 12% of severe accidents at Shoreham involving the release of radioactive materials would result in persons within the 10-mile EPZ receiving a dose in excess of 30 rems; 9% would result in persons with-in 2 miles receiving a 100 rem dose; 1% would result in persons within 9 l ~ 312/ In a radiological emergency, the downwind population may be exposed to radioactive noble gases,-radioactive halogen gases (primarily iodine), and radioactive particulates. The noble gases and particulates cause external whole-body doses; the halogen gases and radioactive particulates cause an internal dose, with the halogens concentrating primarily in the thyroid. ' Cordaro et al. , f f. Tr. 8760, at 18. 313/ This shielding factor assumes a constant air replacement rate of roughly one change per hour. Tr. 8844-46, 8852,-53 (Watts). The actu-al air exchange rate in a given structure depends upon construction materials, type of_ ventilation and ventilation control, as well as weather conditions. Tr. 8847-49 (Watts, Cordaro). -311- miles of the plant receiving a dose in excess of 100 rems.314/ Finlayson et al. , ff.-. Tr. 12,320, at 6. 461. Similarly, a 50% cloud dose reduction -- that is, the average shielding available from masonry houses with and without basements -- would result in doses exceeding 30 rems for persons within 10 miles of the plant -in 8% of severe accidents at Shoreham involving a release of radioactive material; 5% of those accidents would result in doses exceeding 100 rems for persons within 2 miles of the plant; and 1% of those accidents would result in doses exceeding 100 rems for persons within 5 miles of the plant. Iji. at 4; Tr. 12,371-72 (Finlayson).315/ 462. For those people in the EPZ who take shelter in wood frame houses without basements, only a 10% cloud dose reduction will be avail-able. In a severe accident at Shoreham involving a radioactive release, 15% of those accidents will result in a dose of 30 rems to persons located within 10 miles of the plant. Twenty percent will result in a 100 rem dose to persons within two miles of the plant; 1% will result in a 100 rem dose to persons located within 1G miles of the plant. Finlayson et al., ff. Tr. 12,320, at 6.316/ LILCO's witnesses Watts and Miele agreed that a wood 314/ These calculations assume LILCO's average cloud shielding factor of 0.7 and a ground dose shielding factor of 0.2. Finlayson et al., ff. Tr. 12,320, at 6. 315/ This calculation assumes a ground dose shielding factor of 0.1. Tr. 12,374-75 (Finlayson). 316/ These calculations assume a 60% ground dose reduction. Finlayson et al., ff. Tr. 12,320, at 6. -312- +- t' , frame house without a basement does not provide a substantial sheltering benefit. Tr. 8868-69 (Watts, Miele). 463. Finally, since vehicles provide no effective shielding from cloud dose, assuming a severe accident at Shoreham involving a release of radiation, people who are in cars or other vehicles within 10 miles of the plant for.about 2 hours -- such as persons caught in evacuation traffic (see our findings on Contention 65) -- would have a 15-35% chance of receiving a dose in' excess of.30 rems. Finlayson et al., ff. Tr. 12,320, - at 8-9.317/ 464. Dr. Radford, whose medical specialty is the health effects of ionizing radiation and who was the Chairman of the 1980 National Academy of - Science Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR 317/ .In cross-examining the County's witnesses, LILCO's counsel questioned some of the assumptions and methodology used by them in performing their analysis. However-, based on the evidence before us, we find: the analysis was based on reasonable and conservative state-of-the-art source terms,'substantially smaller than those used in WASH 1400 and smaller than those used in BWR studies recently performed for the NRC; lower source terms based upon assumed effects of suppression pool scrubbing have not been accepted by the NRC or the scientific communi-ty; the analysis used state-of-the-art PRA techniques and consequence analysis methodology; the accident scenarios used in the analysis rep-resent the majority of the high probability accidents involving con-tainment failure that could occur in the Shoreham BWR Mark II, and they are essentially the equivalent of-the types of accidents used in WASH 1400; the analysis used reasonable assumptions concerning release duration and inhalation dose; the analysis and the conclusions ex-pressed in the' testimony present conditional, rather than absolute, probabilities, which is appropriate since for emergency planning pur-poses, it is necessary to assume that an accident has actually oc-curred. Tr. 12,357-58, 12,369-79, 12,394-96, 12,406-07, 12,421-23, 12,409-11 (Finlayson, Minor) . -313-E III), testified that a 30 rem dose is considered the threshold of early in-juries. People who receive 30 rem doses will probably not experience any acute effects (death or injury occurring within 60 days after exposure) but their lifetime chances of developing cancer (other than skin cancer) will increase by about 21% over the normal rate. Doses above 30 rems are more likely to cause early acute effects and result in even greater increases in the chances of developing cancer. Finlayson et al., ff. Tr. 12,320, at 2, 4, and Att. 3.318/ 465. LILCO's witnesses. testified that if sheltering were recommended, . people .would be able to reach a place of she' Iter quickly.319/ They also testified that transients could-seek shelter in buildings and that persons in boats in the EPZ could leave the EPZ area. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8760, at 24-26; Tr. 8905-06 (Daverio). This LILCO testimony fails to 318/ Dr. Radford's testimony is based upon and supported by recent research and analysis of data from the Japanese atomic bomb survivors. Although there is'not a final scientific concensus on the rate of can-cer incidence caused by radiation exposure, the estimate he used in reaching his conclusions is not near the upper end of the range of scientific opinion on the subject; however, some knowledgeable indi-
- ^ viduals believe that the estimate should be lower than the one he used. Dr. Radford testified further, however, that the most recent evidence and studies, which were not known or available when the BEIR III report was written, support his belief that cancer incidence and fatalities, resulting from radiation exposure, are substantially higher than was assumed in the BEIR III report. Tr. 12,323-27, 12,335-38, 12,340-42 (Radford).
~319/ They also asserted that in 30 minutes, a person would be able to drive .to a point outside the EPZ from any point within it, assuming he musc drive 10 miles and does so at 20 miles per hour. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8760, at 24. These assumptions are' not . consistent with LILCO's own testimony or our findings on Contention 65 (see Section IX. A). ~ -314- e address the primary issue presented in Contention 61, which is whether the shelter available to persons in the EPZ would provide adequate protection. Accordingly, LILCO's testimony on these matters is of no significance to our findings. LILCO failed to present any evidence concerning the adequacy of the protection from adverse health effects which could be provided by the shelter that is available in the EPZ. Since FEMA presented none ei-ther, the County's testimony on that subject was uncontroverted in this record. 466. The witnesses agreed that sheltering reduces the amount of radi-ation exposure, although the amount of reduction varies depending upon the shielding attributable to the particular shelter. Finlayson et al., ff. Tr. 12,320, at 7; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8760, at 19, 21. However, shel-tering cannot totally eliminate a potential dose from being received by the population (Id. , at 27), and contrary to LILCO's assertion, Intervenors hr.ve never suggested that the regulations or good emergency planning re-quire the total elimination of potential doses. See Tr. 12,415-16 (Finlayson, Minor); LILCO Brief, at 172; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8760, at
- 27. However, as stated in Contention 61, assuming the average shielding factor identified by LILCO. in a severe accident at Shoreham there is no assurance that the dose savings from sheltering would be significant enough to reduce doses to levels below those which pose threats to health.
Finlayson et al., ff. Tr. 12,320, at 7. -315- 467. In light of the requirement in 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1) that we find reasonable assurance that protective measures which are adequate can and will be implemented, we must go beyond the statement of the obvious -- that sheltering will reduce deses beyond those that would be received if shelter were not taken. . We must determine that the protective action of shel-tering, as proposed and as it could be implemented under the Plan, provides a level of protection of the public health that we judge to be adequate. It is clear that in order to judge the adequacy of protection, it is neces-sary to examine what is accomplished by the protective action in question in terms of the health of those affected. We find that the uncontroverted evidence'in this proceeding demonstrates that in the event of a severe accident at Shoreham, the proposed protective action of sheltering would not provide adequate protection because substantial numbers of people could still receive doses that would cause seriously adverse health effects. '468. Finally, our decision on. Contention 61 is not contrary to the decisions cited by LILCO.320/ Those cases stand for the proposition that an accident can result in adverse radiation exposures, that the goal of emergency pisnning is maximum dose savings, and that an emergency plan is not viewed as a guarantee that doses above PAG levels will never be 320/ See LILCO Brief at 171, citing Southern Calif. Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528 (1983); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. (Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit J1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983); Philadelphia Elec. Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-31, 20 NRC (August 14, 1984); Southern Calif. Fdison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Sta-tion, Units 2 & 3), LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163, 1188, 1200 (1982). -316- 1 l experienced. However, a Licensing Board cannot merely accept as adequate a protective action such as sheltering without reaching a general judgment whether it will be adequate for most or many of those persons who might be asked to shelter. In this case, sheltering will be of essentially zero benefit to all persons sheltering in wood frame houses with no basements. We have no choice, in such a situation, but to rule that for those persons, sheltering is not an adequate protective action. Since the Plan suggests sheltering for them, the Plan is plainly defective. We thus find that the Plan does not comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). VIII. MAKING PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOT!ENDATIONS (CONTENTIONS 60, 63, 64 AND 49) A. Selective Sheltering and Selective Evacuation (Contentions 60 and 63)
- 1. Protection of the Radiosensitive 469. Contentions 60 and 63 allege that the protective actions of se-
-lective sheltering and selective evacuation, as proposed in the Plan, would not and could not be implemented in a radiological emergency. Three basic issues are considered: whether LILCO alone could or would ever imp 12 ment these actions; whether LILCO has appropriate standards and guidelines for recommending these actions; and wh(4 her hospitals and special facilities could or would attempt to assist in implementing these actions. For rea-sons set forth below, we rule for Intervenors on these issues and find that LILCO has failed to comply with 10 CFR 55 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.9 and II.J.10. -317- 470. The Plan states that selective sheltering may be ordered at projected doses below the PAGs to minimize radiation exposure to ra-diosensitive groups, particularly pregnant women and children; and that se-lective evacuation may be implemented for projected dose levels of 1 to 5 rems (whole body) or 5 to 25 rems (thyroid) for persons with a low toler-ance to radiation exposure, including pregnant women and children. Plan, at 3.6-5 and 3.6-6; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8760, at 9. 471. LILCO conceded .however, that it will not even attempt to imple-l ment either of these protective actions 321/ unless instructed to do so by the New York State' Commissioner of Health or other State officials. Id., at 9-10, 34; Tr. 8778-79 (Daveric).322/ Since this proceeding is premised on an emergency response that is controlled and implemented by LILCO alone, without participation of State officials, since there is no State plan for a Shoreham emergency-(see findings on Contention 92) and since the State Health Commissioner has never indicated that he would ever instruct LILCO to implement'these actions, we find that Intervenors are correct in Conten-tions 60 and 63 -- LILCO would not implement selective sheltering or 321/ See, however, discussion below of LILCO's proposal to recommend shel-tering for special facility patients when evacuation is recommended for the general public, which constitutes a selective recommendation of sheltering. Tr. 8778, 8780 (Daverio). 322/ LILCO asserted that these actions are in the Plan to be consistent with the New York State Radiological Emergency Plan, and to provide flexibility to adapt to a State recommendation for such protective e.:- tions if the State decided to respond. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8760, at 9-10, 34; LILCO Brief, at 176. ! -318-
- 1. .
selective evacuation and thus these cannot be considered as protective ac-tions under the Plan. 472. The real point of these contentions, however, is not the label . ascribed to a protective action, but rather whether the individuals of con-cern -- here, the radiosensitive portion of the EPZ population -- would be protected under the Plan. LILCO indicated that it would be able to protect this r;pulation because, if sheltering or evacuation were advisable for the radiosensitive, LILCO would recommend sheltering or evacuation for the en-tire. population of the affected area. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 8760, at 11; Tr. 8825 (Daverio). We find no evidence, however, that LILCO could proper-ly or effectively implement this alternative proposal, and the Plan contains no guidelines governing the choice of protective actions for the radiosensitive, as required by NUREG 0654 and 10 CFR s 50.47(b)(10).323/ 473. When asked to identify'the " guidelines" in the Plan for de-termining whether sheltering or evacuation should be recommended to protect the radiosensitive, LILCO's witnesses pointed to the following items in OPIP 3.6.1: the Thyroid Guidance and Whole Body Guidance Charts, a footnote and a comment in the EPA PAG, and statements in the " purpose" section and a " caution" comment. Tr. 8785-38, 8832-34 (Daverio, Cordaro, Watts). For the reasons which follow, none provides any usable guidance or instructions concerning the choice of protective actions for the radiosensitive. 323/ FEMA's direct testicoty on these two contentions consisted of nothing but a quotation of the Plan provisions relating to selective shel-tering and selective evacuation. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 36, 61. We give it no weight. -319- fa 474. The cited charts indicate that for projected doses of less than 5 rems (thyroid) and less than 1 rem (whole body) no action is necessary; ~ they contain no guidance for protective actions for radiosensitive persons for projected' doses below those PAG 1evels, even though that is the range at which sheltering would be implemented according to the Plan. Similarly, the only evacuation information in the charts is the instruction that if the projected shelter dose is equal to or greater than 25 rem (thyroid) or. 5 rem (whole body), and the projected evacuation dose is less than the shelter dose, evacuation should be ordered. It says nothing about the ra-1 diosensitive,'or doses between 5'and 25 rem (thyroid) or 1 and 5 tem (whole ., body), even though those are the dose levels at which evacuation of the ra-diosensitive would be recommended according to the Plan. Tr. 8785 (Daverio); OPIP 3.6.1, Att. 3, at 43. 475. The cited footnote in OPIP 3.6.1, which follows the EPA PAG rec-ommendation that for projected doses of less than 1 rem (whole body) and less than 5 rems (thyroid) no protective actions are taken, states that "[ajt the time of the incident, officials may implement low-impact protec-tive actions in keeping with the principle of maintaining radiation expo-sure as low as reasonably achiavable." OPIP 3.6.1, Att. 3, at 44. We find .no substantive information in that footnote that could be used in de-termining at what dose levels or under what conditions sheltering should be recommended for the radiosensitive. Furthermore, there are no provisions in OPIP 3.6.1 which indicate at what dose levels or under what conditions the stated recommendation of "no action" for projected doses of less than 1 -320- rem (whole_ body) and 3 rems (thyroid) should not be followed. Tr. 8803 (Cordaro). The same is true with respect to the comment following the rec-ommendation to " consider evacuation" and " evacuate unless constraints make it imp 6ssible" for projected doses cf 1 to 5 rems (whole body) and between '5 to 25 rems (thyroid). The comment states "If constraints exist, special consideration should be given for evacuation for children and pregnant women." The footnote and the comment are merely statements that some pro-tective actions "may" be implemented or " considered," not' guidelines as to what or when particular-actions should be recommended. 476. The other items in OPIP 3.6.1 cited by LILCO are equally defi- - cient as guidelines for the choice of protective actions. The statement in the purpose section is merely the following: "It is intended that sound judgment along with a personal assessment of the progress of events will be supplemented with the guidance found in this procedure." OPIP 3.6.1, at 1. The " caution" comment merely directs that the EPA PAG we discuss above should be used "if additional time is available for consideration." OPIP 3.6.1, at 37. 477. LILCO's witnesses also referred to some statements in the Manual - for Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, which they said provide an interpretation of the PAGs and information use-ful for_decisionmaking related to thcm.324/ These statemants, like the -324/ For_ example, they cited statements such as " implementation of the guidance will always require the use of-good judgment and a considera-(Footnote cont'd next page) -321- others cited by LILCO, fail to provide any relevant guidance or standards because they do not address the choice of protective actions at doses below the lower PAG values (the level for sheltering of the radiosensitive) or in the ranges between 1 and 5 rems (whole body) and 5 and 25 rems (thyroid) (the range for evacuation of the radiosensitive). 478. Finally, LILCO testified that weather conditions, evacuation times, plant conditions, release duration and the ALARA principle would be taken into consideration by decisionmakers regarding sheltering and evacua-tion recommet.lations for the radiesensitive. Tr. 8800 (Miele); 8803 (Cordaro); 8895-96 (Watts); OPIP 3.6.1, at 1. However, the Plan does not indicate how these considerations should be taken into account, or what im-pact they should have on protective action recommendations for the ra-diosensitive. We agree with the County's witnesses that these statements of considerations are too vague to be of any practical value. Tr. 9812-14 (Harris, Mayer).325/ (Footnote cont'd from previous page) tion of local constraints. The lowest value should be used if there are no major local constraints, in providing protection at that level, especially to sensitive populations," and "The intent is to allow for flexibility in the implementation of the guidance because local condi-l tions will vary and because special information may be available." Tr. 8807-11 (Miele, Cordaro). 325/ ~The vagueness was illustrated when LILCO witness Watts, who is the Ra-diation Health Coordinator responsible for making protective action decisions and recommendations to the LERO Director, could not answer the question: "If the evacuation dose were less than the shelter dose and the shelter dose were equal to or greater than 5 rems, under what circumstances would you not recommend evacuation?" even though he stated that such a decision could be made under the Plan. Tr. 8893-94 (Watts). -322- r-479. We are sensitive to the fact that guidelines and standards can-not be overly prescriptive or else necessary flexibility will be lost. However, in this instance, LILCO has not even taken a meaningful first step in terms of establishing useful guidelines for action. Thus, we conclude that there are no standards or guidelines in the Plan for determining under what conditions and at what dose levels below the PAGs (for sheltering) or between 1 and 5 rems (whole body) and 5 and 25 rems (thyro!d) (for evacua-Jtion) either of those actions should or would be recommended to protect the radiosensitive. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 10-12. Therefore, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR $ 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.9.
- 2. Protection of Hosoital Patients 480. LILCO proposes to recommend sheltering for patients of the three
' hospitals and Suffolk Infirmary if evacuation is recommended for the gener-al population. Tr. 8778, 8780 (Daverio); Cordaro et al., Tr. 5/10/84 Vol. II, at 18; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9101, at 11; Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at 12-13. We find that LILCO failed to demonstrate that such sheltering could or would be implemented. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 12. 481. -First, the Plan does not include any procedures or provisions setting forth how special facilities could, or would, implement a shel-tering recommendation. The Plan states only that hospitals "will be directed to implement their sheltering plans" and that nursing and adult -323-w__ 4 + homes will be advised "to institute standard sheltering procedures." Plan, App. A, at IV-173 to 174. Thus, LILCO's sheltering proposal for special facility patients rests on the asm:mption that there exist sheltering plans, which have'been adopted by special facilities, which could be imple-ment'ed by them, and which could provide protection to patients in the event of a radiological emergency. The evidence contradicts LILCO's assumption. -Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 12-13. 482. Although LILCO representatives have visited some special facili-ties, toured some buildings, spoken with facility representatives and, in some cases, even drafted portions of proposed sheltering plans intended to apply to particular facilities (e.g., Tr. 9040 (Weismantle); 10,053-61, 10,066-69 (Miele, Robinson, Yedvab)), there is no evidence that any facili-ties have adopted the plans or proposals proffered by LILCO. See Tr. 10,090-93 (Robinson) . Similarly, there is no evidence that persons respon-sible for running such special facilities agree with LILCO that any shel-c- tering proposal could be implemented for their facilities, or could ade-quately protect their patients in the event of a radiological emergency. We discuss this further in our findings on Contentions 24.J and 72. See Section XI.B, infra. 483. ;Moreover,_Drs. Harris and Mayer, the County personnel whose pri-mary responsibility involves the provision of health services within the County and who deal on a day-to-day basis with administrators of special facilities, (see Harris, ff. Tr. 1218, Att. 1; Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. . -324- 9574, Att. 1) testified that various proposals made by LILCO at different times are not workable and could, in fact, be harmful to patients, even as-suming they could be implemented.326/ Specifically, Drs. Harris and Mayer testified about the practicalities involved in attempting to care for pa-tients under the conditions proposed by LILCO. See Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 12-21. 484. For example, the County's witnesses testified that patients would be endangered if LILCO's proposals to shut off outside ventilation and'close. windows were implemented in facilities housing elderly and ill individuals. Id., at 16-18; Tr. 9827, 9869-71, 9900-02 (Mayer); 9867-68, 9871 (Harris).327/ In addition, based upon their experience and 326/ Contrary to the suggestions in LILCO's Brief, at 182-83, we find noth-ing " troubling" about the County's witnesses' testimony relating to LILCO proposals made prior to their preparation of testimony in March .1984 and the different proposals which were not made available to the County until shortly before cross-examination in June. This is anoth-er example of the " moving target" with which Intervenors were faced throughout this proceeding. Moreover, we agree with Drs. Harris and Mayer that the mere transmission of some draf t proposals (LILCO Exs. 38-47) to facilities does not mean that " plans" have been adopted or are in effect. Tr. 9819-21 (Mayer). We also agree that the mere ex-istence of factual assertions in LILCO draft proposals (e.g. , instruc-tions that staff should move equipment) does not mean that such asser-tions, or their implications (e.g., that equipment exists or is movable) are true. Tr. 9844-48 (Mayer). Furthermore, we find the , draft proposals incomplete in many respects. Tr. 10,100-10 (Miele, I Robinson, Yedvab). 327/ Mr. Glaser's contrary assertion on behalf of LILCO (Tr. 9076 (Glaser)) was unpersuasive. He stated that endangerment could be overcome if nursing homes kept patients in basements and cared for them properly. Id., at 9075-76. We do not doubt that with " proper care" (LILCO 3rief, at 183) many things can be done. However, given the likely (Footnote cont'd next page) l -325- .r '- familiarity with staffing requirements in health care facilities, Drs. Harris and Mayer testified chat LILCO's proposals for sheltering patients in special facilities ignore the realities involved in the staffing of health care facilities. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 18-19; Tr. 9850-53 (Harris,' Mayer). The County's witnesses stated that LILCO's pro-posal underestimates the number of personnel and types of equipment neces-sary, and the difficulty which would be involved in an attempt to implement sheltering for special facilities. They also stated that LILCO's proposal ignores human nature and the frailty of the individuals to be cared for. They concluded that there is a very real risk that the proposal to shelter special facility patients would result in increased morbidity and mortali-ty. Tr. 9867-68 (Harris). 485. The County's witnesses also pointed out that the Plan does not contain any information on shielding factors or sheltering capabilities relating to the special facilities in the EPZ. We agree. LILCO's command and control personnel would not have sufficient information with which to make an informed decision as to whether sheltering would provide adequate protection for special facilities patients. Harris and Hayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 19.328/ (Footnote cont'd from previous page) shortage of trained staff personnel . (see findings on Contention 25), we believe no proposals should be made that rely on continuation of high level care, absent a convincing showing of adequate numbers of personnel to provide that care. 328/ Although LILCO personnel have apparently toured some facilities in connection with' drafting proposed sheltering plans to apply to those (Footnote cont'd next page) -326- 486. Finally, there are no guidelines in the Plan governing the choice of sheltering as the protective action for hospital patients; nor is there any evidence that sheltering would be an adequate protective action for such patients. First,'LILCO's witnesses conceded that the determina-tion to recommend sheltering for hospital patients would not be based on a comparison of an evacuation dose and a sheltering dose. Tr. 8870-71 (Miele); 8880-81 (Cordaro). Indeed, as we note in our findings on Conten-tion 72, such a comparison would be impossible because the Plan has no evacuation time estimates or evacuation plans for hospital residents. See Section XI.B. Thus, for hospital patients, LILCO does not intend to apply the standard of recommending the protective action that would result in the lowest dose, even though that is its intent for the general public. See Tr. 8886 ('latts). 487. Second, although Messrs. Cordaro and Watts testified that LILCO would calculate a shelter dose for hospital patients during an accident (Tr. 8875-78 (Watts, Cordaro)), they also stated that only if such calcu-lated doses were " excessive," would evacuation even be considered. Tr. 8877-78, 8880-81, 8883-85 (Cordaro, Watts). The Plan does not set forth dose levels that should be considered " excessive" or that should require (Footnote cont'd from previous page) facilities (see LILCO Brief, at 179-80), there is no evidence that whatever knowledge or data they acquired or generated will be avail-able to the LERO decisionmakers during an emergency. -327- evacuation for hospital patients; Mr. Watts stated that such a determina-tion would be made during an emergency, but could not define or describe what " excessive" would be. Tr. 8883-85 (Watts). We find this ad hoc ap- t proach to protective action decisions to be unacceptable and directly con-trary to the requirements of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.9. Furthermore, although we recognize the need for the exercise of professional judgment by the individuals responsible for making protective action decisions, w3 were dismayed to find that Mr. Watts, the Radiation Health Coordinator responsible for making sach decisions under the Plan, was unable to identify or-describe with any specificity how he would make such decisions in an actual accident. 488. We conclude that LILCO's Plan for either an arbitrary (shel-tering regardless of evacuation dose) or ad hoc (decide what is " excessive" during the accident) protective action decision with respect to hospital patients violates the requirements of 10 CFR 6 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.9. We find further that LILCO has failed to demonstrate that sheltering as'it would be decided upon and recommended under the Plan would be an adequate protective action for hospital patients. B. Wind Shifts (Contention 64) 489. The Plan divides the EPZ intc 19 zones. In the event of an emergency requiring evacuation, LILCO intends to evacuate those zones with-7.. in 2 miles of the plant, but only a downwind portion of those zones outside the 2-mile radius. Contention 64 alleges that, because the wind shifts -328- quickly on Long Island with average wind speeds of approximately 10 mph, a radioactive plume could be quickly directed over an area that was not in-cluded in LILCO's initial evacuation order, before that area could be evac-usted. Thus, the contention alleges that whenever evacuation is recom-mended for any area, LILCO should evacuate at least a radius of 5-7 miles aroand the plant. 490. LILCO intends to make protective action recommendations covering an area in the form of a-keyhole, made up of a 360-degree area circling the plant plus a downwind wedge of at least 67 degrees. Depending on projected -doses, the protective action recommendation will cover: a 2-mile circle around the plant; 2 miles plus a 5-mile downwind sector; or 5 miles plus a 10-mile downwind sector. The 2 or 5-mile circular area is included to ac-count for changes in wind direction. Due to the shape of the zones, a pro-tective action recommended for the zones in the 5-mile circle actually would cover an area out to about 7 miles in all zones except Zone J. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.' 8760, at 40-41. The LILCO witnesses testified that, if weather forecast information were to indicate that the wind direc-tion had changed or would change, the protective action would be recalculated and, if necessary, a new protective action recommendation would be issued. Id., at 41. The average wind speed on Long Island, based on data from Suffolk County Air Force Base, is 8 mph. Id., at 42. 491. An analysis of wind direction variability performed for LILCO studied the wind direction changes that occurred on an hourly basis at the -329- ) Shoreham site. The analysis found that, over a year, a 45-degree shift in wind direction occurs approximately 25* of the time, which means that in one out of every 4 hours the wind at Shoreham is likely to shift, on the average, 45 degrees. Id., at Att. 19; Tr. 8927-29 (Daverio).329/ Based on this evidence, there is a substantial likelihood of a major wind shift after an initial protective action recommendation is made. 492. LILCO's witnesses testified that coastal locations have lower wind variability than inland or valley locations. but they conceded that coastal sites experience sea breezes due to the different thermal charac-teristics of water and land. Unlike land, water remains at a relatively constant temperature; as land temperature changes, it results in air move-ments. The saa breeze phenomenon can occur from both sides in the EPZ due to the presence of Long Island Sound on one side and the Atlantic Ocean on the other. Thus, there is the potential for a complex wind system on Long Island. Tr. 8957-63 (Cordaro). The changes in wind direction 5-6 miles inland due to sea breez.2 from the Sound and the ocean would not be regis-tered by the Shoreham meteorological towers. Tr. 8969-70 (Daverio). More-over, a wind shift 5-6 miles inland from Shoreham due to sea breezes could affect the horizontal direction of a radioactive plume's movement and also 329/ Particular wind shifts could have been more or less than 45 degrees; to be counted as a shift, the direction only had to change from one 45 degree sector to another. Tr. 8926-28 (Daverio); Cordaro et al. , f f. Tr. 8760, at Act. 19. We make the finding we do, however, because over an entire year, the shifts which constituted a change in sector would average out to 45 degrees. -330- . .- , . ,, . . .~ , , . . - - - . - - - - - . - - . - _ - - . . - - could cause the plume co rise above incoming breezes from one direction or l another. uTr. 8985-86-(Daverio). Furthermore, the wind variability study discussed above would not have included the phenomenon of wind shifts 5-6 miles inland caused by the complex interaction of sea breezes which can occur.in the EPZ. Tr. 8986-87 (Daverio). 493. Iri addition, the wind shear effect, a variation in wind direc- . tion at different altitudes, is known to occur in the Shoreham area. It is possible that the wind shear effect as well as sea breezes could create different movements of the plume at different altitudes, and, in effect, create 2 different plumes moving in different directions, for a single accident release. Tr. 8976-79 (Watts). 494. We conclude that, in light of the historical data on wind variability at Shoreham, as well as the sea breeze and wind shear phenomena to which the EPZ is subject,'there is a substantial likelihood chat the . direction of's radioactive plume following a Shoreham accident could change quickly and unexpectedly, and may not be quickly detected or predicted by LILCO's meteorological equipment. As a result, to assure that a protective action recommendation of evacuation would provide adequate protection to the portion of the public which could be at risk, we find that LILCO's in- .tention to evacuate only.67 degree sectors beyond a 2 or 5-mile area is unacceptable and in violation of 10 CFR 55 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10). f i -331- , l C. Nomogram (Contention 49) 495. Contention 49, as revised by the Board, alleges that the nomogram in LILCO's procedure, which relates iodine to total fission prod-ucts for the calculation of thyroid dose, is not realistic. Thus, LILCO's proposed procedure may not provide reliable data for use in making protec-tive action decisions and recommendations to the public in violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(9). The testimony focused on the factors which render the nomogram unrealistic, and which result in substantial error probabilities and uncertainties in values derived through the use of the nomogram and LILCO's procedure. 496. A nomogram is a mathematical tool that uses graphs to calculate a total thyroid dose for an area in which an air sample has been taken. Under the Plan, total thyroid dose is to be projected using a calculation worksheet and the nomogram. Cordaro et al. , f f. Tr. 13,909, at 9. LILCO's witnesses testified that the nomogram and LILCO's associated procedure (OPIP 3.5.2) are realistic tools which can provide reliable data on which to base a protectiv 3 action recommendation. Tr. 13,911A-13 (Watts, Daverio, Cordaro). 497. Although LILCO's witnesses stated that the nomogram is based on a FEMA guide for evaluating thyroid dose (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,909, at 7-8), FEMA's review of the Plan concluded that the nomogram "may not be ~ realistic," particularly in that fission products released during an acci- . dent and collected on samples following the accident are not easily amenable to nomogram assumptions. RAC Report, ff. Tr. 12,174, at 29. -332- 498. Because the radioactive material detected in the field is likely to include both iodine and non-iodine particulates, LILCO's nomogram in-cludes a factor to " correct" the ratio of iodine to non-iodine particulates. The correction in the nomogram assumes a certain mixture of iodine and non-iodine particulates and a predetermined change in the ra-dioactivity of this mixture as a function of time. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,909, at 11. This ratio is an average, however; during an actual acci-dent, the real ratio could be higher or lower than the value assumed in the nomogram, depending on the accident. Tr. 13,920 (Watts). Therefore, to the extent the assumptions concerning release fractions of particulate mat-ter in the nomogram are different from the actual release fractions in the accident being analyzed, the calculated thyroid dose will be inaccurate. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 14,292; Tr. 14,294-96 (Keller). In other words, the nomogram properly should be used only if the accident that occurs has the same fission product ratio as is reflected in the nomogram. Tr. 14,296 (Keller). -We find that this feature of the nomogram means that the results of a calculation using the nomogram will be unrealistic unless the particu-lar " average" BWR accident assumed by LILCO is the one that occurs at Shoreham. l 499. In addition, the testimony demonstrated that the use of LILCO's nomogram gives rise to substantial uncertainty and probability of error. First, the readings obtained from an air sampler which collects airborne material in the field have a 20*. range of error. Tr. 13,917 (Watts). These readings are one of the major input items in using the nomogram. -333- Other input variables are also subject to inaccuracies, the magnitude of which depends upon variations in wind speed, variations in direction of plume travel and estimates of distance from the plant. Tr. 13,918-22 (Watts). 500. Second, there is additional inaccuracy-inherent in use of the nomogram technique itself. LILCO estimated this error to be plus or minus 50%. Tr. 13,926-27 (Watts). Thus, by LILCO's cwn admission, the total-error in the thyroid dose calculated by using the nomogram could be plus or minus 70%, plus any additional uncertainty due to variations in the input parameters other than those from the air sampler.330/ 501. According to OPIP 3.6.1, protective actions are to be based upon projected thyroid doses: if less than 5 rems, there are no planned protec-tive actions; between 5 and 25 rems, sheltering is recommended as a mini-mum; above 25 rems evacuatio. is mandatory. Tr. 13,914-15 (Watts). We find that the use of projected thyroid doses with an error band in excess of 70% will not produce reliable data upon which to base protective action recommendations. 330/ The FEMA witnesses also testified that the use of sampling equipment different from that assumed in the development of the nomogram would result in inaccurate dose projections. Tr. 14,296-97 (Keller). Er-rors in OPIP 3.5.2 were also pointed out in the testimony. See Tr. 13,942-44 (Daverio, Watts). Although these are legitimate concerns, we believe they could be remedied by LILCO and therefore they do not play a substantial role in our ultimate conclusion on this issue. -334-
- w. -
502. 10 CFR $ 50.47(b)(9) requires that there be adequate methods, systems and equipment in place for assessing the offsite consequences of a release. The Board finds that the nomogram is unrealistic and the proba-bility of error in dose projections resulting from the use of the nomogram
- is unacceptably large. LILCO has failed to demonstrate that the use of the nomogram would provide reliable data for use in making protective action decisions, and accordingly, we find that LILCO's nomogram as a technique for calculating thyroid dose does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR $
50.47(b)(9). IX. EVACUATION (CONTENTIONS 23.D, 24.F.2, 23.H, 24.I, 65, 66, 67, 97) A. . Time Estimates (Contentions 65, 23.D, 23.H)
- 1. Introduction 503. Contentions 65, 23.D and 23.H allege that LILCO's time estimates substantially underestimate the time required to evacuate the EPZ and that the use of such unreliable time estimates may lead to inappropriate protec-tive actions that will adversely affect the public health.331/
331/ The witnesses testifying on behalf of Suffolk County were Messrs. Roberts, Monteith, licGuire, Turanc, and Michel (hereinaf ter referred to as the "SCPD witnesses") (Tr. 2253 et seq., 2900 et seg), Messrs. Pigozzi, Herr, and Polk (Tr. 2899 et seg.), Ms. Saegert (Tr. 2253 et seq.), and Messrs. Zeigler and Johnson (Tr. 2786 et seq.). The wit-nesses for New York were Messrs. Hartgen, Albertin, Knighton and Beach, (hereinafter referred to as the "NYSDOT witnesses"). Tr. 3691 et seq. Messrs. Cordaro and Weismantle (Tr.1458 et seq., 2333 et seg., 3809 et seq.), M11eti (Tr. 1458 et seq., 3809 et seg.), Sorensen (Tr. 1458 et seq.) and Lieberman (Tr. 2333 et seg., 3809 et seq.) (Footnote cont'd next page) -335- 504. Evacuation tims estimates must be accurate and realistic to en-able emergency planners to develop meaningful plans and to enable those directing the response to an emergency to choose between evacuation or other protective actions. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 8; Herr, ff; - Tr. 2909, at 3-4; McIntire, ff. Tr. 2086, at 6; Urbanik, ff. Tr. 3430, at 9; Tr. 2957 (Herr). Reliance upon inaccurate estimates can lead to inap-propriate planning or emergency response decisions, causing greater expo-sure to radiation. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 3-4. 505. Reliable time estimates are particularly crucial here. First, .the Shoreham EPZ is densely populated (the projucted summer population in 1985 is 160,000), particularly to the west of the plant (the direction in which evacuating traffic will flow). Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 3-4 and Att. (Footnote cont'd from previous page) testified on behalf of LILCO. Mr. McIntire testified on behalf of FEMA (Tr. 3603 et seq.), and Dr. Urbanik testified on behalf of the NRC Staff (Tr. 3429 et seq.). All witnesses were generally qualified to testify on the issues they addressed. However, Dr. Urbanik's review of LILCO's time estimates and supporting documentation was cursory at best. He spent no more than a couple of days evaluating each revision of Appendix A of the Plan. Furthermore, he took few, if any, notes and wrote no reports other than a short letter with a 1 page checklist attached. Moreover, while Dr. Urbanik drove some of the roads in the EPZ, his survey was perfunctory. He took no actual measurements of roadway geometrics and, except for a few notes, again did little to document his find-ings. Tr. 3432-34, 3508-31 (Urbanik); SC Exs. 10, 11. For that rea-son, we have given his testimony little weight. We also give little weight to Mr. McIntire's testimony because it was generic and not based on any Shoreham-specific data or any meaningful review of the Plan. See Tr. 3617-18. -336- 2; Tr. 3488-89 (Urbanik); Plan, App. A, at III-2. Second, traffic demand exceeds capacity on many designated evacuation routes, and there are few limited access highways leading from the EPZ. Tr. 3452-55 (Urbanik); see Tr. 2364-65 (Lieberman). Third, the configuration of Long Island, with the plant situated on Long Island Sound, makes a 360 degree dispersal of evacu-ation traffic impossible and further strains the limited east-west roadway 't network. Plan, App. A, Fig. 3; Tr. 2328-29 (McGuire). Fourth, under the Plan, traffic will be managed without the aid of state or local government personnel. Tr. 2744 (Lieborman). These facts belle LILCO's assertion that the roadway network is " good" and that the Shoreham EPZ presents circum-stances not inhospitable to emergency planning. Cordaro et si. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 18. 506. The record on these contentions was extensive. Based upon care- .c ful review, the Board concludes that the LILCO time estimates are neither accurate nor realistic. We therefore rule for Intervenors on these conten-s tions.
- 2. The KLD Computer Model (DYNEV).
507. LILCO's time estimates (Plan, App. A, at V-8) were derived by LILCO's consultant, KLD Associates, Inc. ("KLD"), through use of a computer model called DYNEV. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 19. r KLD's model consists of 4 basic functions: trip generation, trip distri-bution, trip assignment, and traffic simulation. Id.; Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 4.332/ The trip generation function determines the number ? 332/ The evacuation network is represented in the model as a network com-prised of links and nodes. A link represents a section of roadway and (Footnote cont'd next page) -337-e . . and location of people who will be evacuating, thereby determining how many trips will be generated which the network must accommodate.333/ The trip distribution function determines.the destination (the point at which the evacues exits the EPZ) for each origin node, although it does not determine what route the traffic will take.334/ The trip essignment function "bal-ances" the aggregate transportation supply and demand and assigns traffic to paths on the roadway network in a manner which " optimizes," in the run-ning of the model (not necessarily in reality), the evacuees' travel times 1 (Footnote cont'd from previous page) is expressed in terms of points or nodes that exist at either end. Nodes represent intersections or other discontinuities in the roadway. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 19; Tr. 2374 (Lieberman). 333/ Trips originate from " origin nodes," representing areas of popula-tions, which are scattered throughout the network. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr._2909, at 5; Plan, App. A, Ex. 1. The data for the number of trips generated were derived by the Suffolk County Planning Department in 1981, yet the data have not been updated since that time, nor has Mr. Lieberman independently verified their accuracy. Tr. 2386-87, 2446- 7 (Lieberman). Moreover, KLD's model accounts only for trips generated by the residential population and the population of 2 major employers in the area, BNL and Grumman, ignoring trips generated from other sources, such as other employers, shopping centers, etc. Tr. 2388-89 (Cordaro). Thus, there is no assurance that LILCO's time estimates accurately reflect the number of trips that will be gener-ated in an evacuation. 334/ The result of this process is a " trip table" which defines the origin -and destination of traffic. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 5-6 and Fig. 2. KLD's trip table was developed by examining a large-scale map-and judging which destinations would be suitable for traffic gen-erated at each origin within the 'EPZ. KLD judged a destination to be suitable if it minimized the distance to be traveled and avoided trav-eling closer to-Shoreham. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 36-37; but see findings below on the inadequacy of this procedure. -338- w to the exit nodes specified in the previous step.335/ And the traffic simulation function simulates the evacuation traffic, moving the traffic along each link of the modelled evacuation network to simulate traffic movement. .Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 2337, at 22-23, 38-39; Pigozzi-(Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 7. The functioning of KLD's model can thus be viewed as the balancing of supply and demand. The trip generation and trip distribution functions specify the evacuation demand (i.e., how many trips will be generated to which points). The trip assignment function attempts to satisfy that demand by placing the traffic along the network structure 'in such a way that all available capacity (supply) is put to optimal use. And, the traffic simulation function permits adjustments to the network structure (in response to demand) to reduce evacuation times as much as possible. Id. 508. KLD's model produced an evacuation time estimate for the full EPZ of 4 hours 35 minutes under normal weather conditions and 6 hours under adverse winter weather conditions. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. 'Tr. 2337, at 41-44 and Atts. 5, 6.336/ The adverse winter weather 335/ Because the traffic. assignment model seeks " optimization" of travel times within the model, any motorist departing from his assigned route cannot reach his destination in less time than if he adhered to his route. Pigozzi (Direct), f f. Tr. 2909, at ' 6; Cordaro et al. (Conten - tion 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 23-24, 37. '336/ KLD initially ran its model to evaluate 21 evacuatica scenarios. The first 20 cases examined evacuation times for various portions of the EPZ at distances of 2, 5 and 10 miles from the plant, as well as evac-uation of the full EPZ. The results of Cases 1-20 are reported at Ap-(Footnote cont'd next page) -339- estimates do not include the time necessary to clear snow from the roads. Urbanik, ff. Tr. 3430, at 15. Mr. Lieberman could not assign a level of confidence to these KLD estimates, but believed that they were within a range of plus or minus 30 minutes of what the actual times would be. Tr. 2749-51-(Lieberman).337/ In Dr. Urbanik's opinion, the KLD estimates are reasonable, consistent with NUREG 0654, and can be used by decisionmakers during an emergency. Urbanik,-ff. Tr. 3430, at 16.338/ '509. The Board cannot accept the KLD estimates as accurate and real-istic. They have been derived from a modeling process that was not based on realistic assumptions or complete input data. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr, 2909, at 8. In particular, KLD's model did not include input data to (Footnote cont'd from previous page) pendix A, at V-8. Case 21 assumed a 3-hour trip generation, rather than the 2-hour period assumed in the first 20 cases. The results of that case are discussed below. Additional computer runs subsequently conducted by KLD, but not reported in the Plan, purport to examine the effect of the shadow phenomenon, the presence of accidents during an evacuation, the absence of traffic guides and evacuation route signs, deviation of evacuees from the recommended paths, and the creation of an additional evacuation route along the LILCO right-of-way extending 1 parallel to Route 25A. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 43-44 and Att. 6. '337/ .Mr. Lieberman testified that a review of time estimates for some other nuclear plants shows that sector evacuation times for Shoreham are comparable to the median evacuation times for those plants. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 46-47 and Att. 7. We find this of little utility since there was no testimony about the other modeling efforts and the assumptionc on which they were based. 338/ Dr. Urbanik's testimony in this regard is of dubious validity since he recognized certain errors in the mathematical equations underlying KLD's model but reported them to no one. Tr. 3537 (Urbanik). -340- I l account for the real world circumstances and behavior that are likely to prevail during a Shoreham evacuation. If it had, the Shoreham time esti-mates would be substantially higher than those described in the Plan. Id.
- 3. Mobilization (Contention 65.A) 510. Contention 65.A alleges that LILCO's time estimates inadequately account for the time it will take the public to mobilize for evacuation.
In this context, " mobilization time" is the time that elapses between the first evacuation notice and the time all members of the public have begun to evacuate. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 6; Tr. 2963-64 (Herr); 3048 (Pigozzi).339/ Accurate estimates of mobilization time must be used be-cause mobilization time is a substantial component of the overall evacua-tion time. If mobilization times are based on unwarranted assumptions which make them too short, they result in an underestimation of evacuation time estimates as a whole. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 11-14. KLD has estimat-ed the mobilization time for a Shoreham evacuation at 2 hours and 20 minutes. Id., at 6-7; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 2337, at 48-49.340/ The Board considers this estimate unrealistically low. 339/- This is distinguished from the mobilization of emergency workers which is the subject of Contention 27. See Section IV.B. 340/ The concept . of mobilization time used in Contention 65. A should not be confused with KLD's more restrictive use of the term, which it i!efines as a 20-minute period between the recommendation to evacuate and the time the first evacuee commences an evacuation trip. See Plan, App. A, at V-3. After the 20-minute initial time period, KLD further as-sumes a 2-hour " trip generation" period which represents the time be-tween the departure of the first automobile and the departure of the last automobile on the evacuation trip. Plan, App. A, at V-4. -341- r s 511. Mobilization can involve a number of discrete functions, such as ~ notification, preparing to leave work, work-to-heme travel, school-to-home travel, land.at-home preparations. -Herr,off. Tr. 2909, at 7 and Fig. 1. Notification ' time (the time required for individuals to become aware of the emergency foll ving initial broadcast of the eme.gency notice) can be lengthy where, .for example, sirens have not even been heard. Id., at 7-8, 15.341/ Preparing to leave work can also be time consuming where there is a need to secure work in progress, obesin permission to leave, resolve role conflicts (see findings on Contention 25,.Section I.B, supra), etc. Id., at 8. 512. . Travel time to unite the family prior to evacuation also can add significantly to mobilization time. Most workers will return home before beginning to evacuate. McIntire, ff. Tr. 2086, at 6; Tr. 3052 (Pigozzi). If they must wait to catch a train or have long commutes, mobilization time can be significantly increased. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 9.342/. The time required to bring' children home-from school-can also increase the mobiliza-tion time. Most children will be bused, and our findings on Contention 69 -(Section XII, infra) document that an early dismissal of schools could take as long as'6-7 hours to complete and will take at least 2-3 hours for most 341/ Research by PRC Voorhees shows that a stren failure rate of 5-20% can be expected. Tr. 3240-42 (Polk). 342/~ A third of EPZ residents normally require more than 30 minutes to re-turn home from work.' Nearly 10% commute by rail transit. F. err, ff. Tr. 2909, at 9; Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337 and Att. '9,-Table 8. -342- children under the best conditions. Thus, evacuation trips for those fami-lies cannot commence for substantially longer than the 2 hours 20 minutes assumed by KLD as the longest mobilizaticn time. Further, some pcrents may attempt to unite the family by picking up their children et school. Traf-fic congestion would increase, thereby increasing evacuation times, if a significant number of parents decided to meet their children at school. Tr. 3614 (McIntire); see findings on Contentien 69 (parents coming to schools to pick up children delays early dismissal). In any event, parents obviously.cannot evacuate until they have been united with their children. This will definitely increase mobilization times. Tr. 3414-15 (Herr); Herr, ff. Tr. 2900, at 9-10.343/ Once the family is united r.t home, prepa-rations for evacuation must be made (gathering necessary clothing, money, .etc.). These tasks will take. time and, for many, will involve a number of trips within the EPZ before the evacuation trip. Id., at 10. 513. Mr. Lieberman testified that KLD's 2 hour 20 minute mobilization time accounts for the activities described above. Cordaro et al. (Conten- ~ tion 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 48-49. Professors Herr and Pigozzi demon-strated, however, that KLD's mobilization time is based on assumptions that lack factual support and that mobilization is likely to take far longer than KLD assumes. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 14; Pigozzi, ff. Tr. 2909, at 15-19; Tr. 2967 (Herr). For example, the initial 20 minute increment of 343/ Indeed, the Plan concedes that an accident while school is in session would extend the " trip generation" time assumed in the Plan. Plan, App. A, at V-1. -343- LILCO's 2 hour-20 minute mobilization time reflects that some individuals will receive notification inmediately upon issuance of the evacuation no-tice and will be at or near home at the time. Cordaro et al. (Contention - 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 48,344/ Professors Herr and Pigozzi demonstrated, however, that assigning 20 minutes for this process is arbitrary and with- .out factual basis. Similarly, there are no empirical data to support the assumption of a 2 hour " trip generation" period. Many factors not re- 'flected.in KLD's 2-hour trip generation period, notably pre-evacuation ac-tivities, will affect trip generation frequencies and will lead to a trip generation period extending for several hours rather than the 2-hour period assumed by KLD. Herr, it. Tr. 2909, at 17; Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, I at 17. Furthermore, there is no justification for KLD's distribution of l. trips over the 2-hour period, which is further assumed to follow the same pattern for almost every source node. I_d., at 15-16. 514. The Board's conclusion is not swayed by KLD's study (KLD TM-139) which purports to justify KLD's 2 hour 20 minute mobilization time esti-mate. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337 and Att. 10.345/ This 344/ Indeed, evidence shows that the 20 minute period was actually derived by KLD based upon a telephone survey of EPZ residents conducted for KLD by the National Center for Telephone Research ("NCTR"), which had no logical nexus to the activity that KLD was attempting to measure. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 18; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 16-18, 345/ KLD TM-139 analyzes the time distributions for pre-evacuation activi-ties including notification, preparing to leave work, work to home travel, preparing to leave home, and school to home travel. The final distribution represents the range of time over which families begin the evacuation trip. Pigozzi (Supp.), ff. Tr. 2909, at 3; Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, 31-53 and Att. 10, at 3-13. -344-i L 1 l study involves assumptions and judgments made without benefit of empirical -data (other'than some limited survey data on work-to-home travel and vaguely collected information,on school-to-home travel). Pigozzi (Supp.), -ff. Tr. 2909, at 3-10.346/ Indeed, Mr. Lieberman was unable to assign any level of confidence to the accuracy of the' distributions in KLD TM-139. Tr._2608-10 (Lieberman). Moreover, KLD TM-139 is misleading in the compar-isons it draws between its own curves and time distribution curves previ-ously developed for Suffolk County by PRC Voorhees.347/ 315. The Board also is not pursuaded by Mr. Lieberman's testimony thatta longer mobilization period would not increase evacuation times. His testimony was based on a KLD sensitivity analysis that used a trip genera-tion period of 3 hours rather than 2 hours. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), f f. Tr. 2337, at 49-50, 53-57. According to Mr. Lieberman, this one hour. increase in trip generation time had no effect on the total time esti-mated to evacuate the EPZ. Mr. Lieberman's observation, however, is not 346/ Mr. Lieberman was unable to state with certainty which persons or or-ganizations LILCO contacted to obtain this information. Nor did he verify the information himself, other than to inquire from the school districts whether they transport all of their children by bus or only some children. Pigozzi (Supp.), ff. Tr. 2909, at 7. Our findings in Section XII demonstrate that LILCO's assumptions concerning the time for children to reach home are far too low. 347/ KLD superimposed its curves with the PRC Voorhees curves in a way that suggests agreement between them. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 51-53 and Att. 10, at 15, 17-18. But, KLD has not accu- , rately represented the Voorhees curves. Any implication that the ~Voorhees work confirms the accuracy of KLD's time distribution curves is therefore incorrect. Pigozzi (Supp.), ff. Tr. 2909, at 9; Tr. 3403-07 (Polk, Herr). e -345- dispositive. ,As KLD modeled it, the roadway network had become " saturated" so that a 1 hour change in the trip generation time did not influence the time required to service the demand. Id., at 53-57, Att. 6, Cases 12, 21. But <here the loading rate on the evacuation network is less than the dis-charge rate of the network itself, lengthened mobilization times may well increase evacuation times. Tr. 3387-88 (Polk). In fact, the Plan recog-nizes that evacuation times may increase if mobilization times exceed 3 hours (Plan, App. A, at V-5), an event which the testimony establishes is not unlikely.348/
- 4. Pre-Evacuation Trips (Contention 65.8) 516. Contention 65.B claims that LILCO's time estimates fail to ac-count for the number of pre-evacuation trips people will make before evacuating. These trips include travel from work to home, home to school (and return), shopping areas to home, and home to stores or banks. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 9-11; Tr. 2975-79 (Herr); Cordaro et al. (Con-tention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 58-59. Indeed, there may be more pre-evacuation trips than evacuation trips. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 9-11; Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 9-10. Yet KLD's model reflects no 348/ The NYSDOT witnesses also criticized the KLD modeling for failing to consider the effect of a surge of evacuation traffic onto the roadway network early in the evacuation. A surge is not an unlikely event since during many times of the day families can be united at home and leave quickly. Tr. 3795 (Hartgen). Such a surge would cause conges-tion to build up early in an evacuation. The resulting decrease in level of service would translate into increased evacuation times.
Hartgen et al., ff. Tr. 3695, at 11; Tr. 3792-93 (Hartgen). -346-L __ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ s' pre-evacuation trips. Tr. 2463-64, 2607 (Lieberman).349/ This means that the' additional traffic volume and congestion resulting from these pre-evacuation trips has not been considered in the LILCO time estimates. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 16-17, 18; Tr. 3054 (Pigozzi); Pigozzi.(Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 11-12. .517. _One result of KLD's failure to account for pre-evacuation trips is that the model underestimates network 1 demand (i.e., the number of auto-mobiles attempting to use the limited' capacity of the evacuation routes). Id., at 12-13, 15-16; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 18; Tr. 2323 (McGuire); 3398 '(Herr). Dr. Urbanik recognized that automobiles on pre-evacuation trips will take up capacity meant for evacuating vehicles. ~ Tr. 3444-45, 3458 '(Urbanik). Moreover, KLD also failed to account for potential conflicts in traffic flow between pre-evacuation-and evacuation traffic. Even LILCO acknowledges (Plan, App. A, at IV-8) that evacuating traffic following LILCO's routes may well come into conflict with pre-evacuation flows. ' Given a large number of pre-evacuation trips, such conflicts could increase - travel times-substantially. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 18; Roberts et al., ff. 349/ Mr. Lieberman acknowledged that -the KLD model can account for pre-evacuation trips in developing time estimates, yet this was not done. Tr. 2464 (Lieberman). Dr. Urbanik stated that the conflict between evacuating traffic and pre-evacuation traffic arguably should have been modeled. Tr. 3445-46 (Urbanik). Even in the 2 instances where Mr. Lieberman did model trips originating from employment conters -- BNL and Grumman -- he failed to model them accurately because overy trip"from those locations leaves the EPZ. This ignores all trips taken by workers who live within the EPZ to units with families. Tr. 3055-57, 3198 (Pigozzi). -347- r Tr. 2260, at :10-11; Tr. 3400-01 (Michel); Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 12-13, 15-16. Professor Pigozzi demonstrated that during at least the first' hour of an evacuation, a substantial portion of pre-evacuation and evacuation traffic will attempt to use the evacuation network at the same time. - This will create more demand on the roadway network than modeled by KLD, as well as a significant potential for conflict in traffic flows. We concur with Professor Pigozzi that this will lead to higher evacuation and mobilization times. Id., at 13-14 and Fig. 3.350/ 518. On a related matter, the Board also finds that KLD failed to ac-count for conflict between evacuating traffic and vehicles making normal trips through the EPZ when an evacuation begins (" background traffic"). 'KLD correctly assumed that the network will not then be empty, but also as-sumed that all background traffic would move with the evacuation flow. Tr. 2612-13 (Lieberman) . This is an unrealistic assumption. Normal traf-fic will be moving in all directions, not merely along LILCO's prescribed 350/ Mr. Lieberman stated that a potential conflict between pre-evacuation trips and evacuation trips could arise when congestion started to occur but that the computer did not reflect congested conditions until approximately 40 minutes after the first evacuees left their homes. He estimates that by that time approximately 87% of work-to-home trips would be completed and that any interaction between work-to-home trav-el and evacuation travel would therefore be limited. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 58-59 and Att. 10. The Board re- -jects this conclusion. Mr. Lieberman acknowledged that his conclusion would be' inaccurate if more non-evacuating vehicles were on the road when congestion occurred than he had assumed. Tr. 2608-11 (Lieberman). This is certainly likely since Mr. Lieberman only con-sidered the interaction of work-to-home travel with evacuation flows, and ignored all other reasons for pre-evacuation trips. -348- evacuation routes, creating further conflicts and delays for evacuating traffic. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 14-15 ; Roberts et al. , ff. Tr. 2260, at 11-12. 519. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that KLD's model did not properly account for pre-evacuation and background traffic that could place additional demands on the evacuation network, and that if such traffic had been considered, LILCO's time estimates would have been much higher.
- 5. Route Deviation (Contention 65.C.4) 520. Contention 65.C.4 asserts that noncompliance with LILCO's pre-scribed routes out of the EPZ will raise evacuation times. Appendix A as-signs households in each EPZ subzone specific evacuation routes and desti-nations which are invariant under all evacuation scenarios and conditions.
Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 19-21; Tr. 2984 (Herr); 2356 (Lieberman). LILCO's purpose in using prescribed routes is to avoid conflicts between traf fic flows and to make optimum use of available network capacity, thus reducing evacuation times and the prospects of radiation exposure. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 74.351/ The accuracy of LILCO's time 351/ LILCO's prescribed routes were partly the result of a misguided appli-cation of the traffic assignment model using an " equilibrium" approach which balances demand (evacuating population) and supply (the evacua-tion network and the capacity of its roads). The problem with this approach in an evacuation context is that it assumes " normal" op-erating conditions, " normal" driver behavior, and a stable network structure. Since stability and " normal" conditions will not exist during a_ radiological emergency, LILCO's use of an equilibrium solu-(Footnote cont'd next page) -349- estimates is premised on strict adherence, without deviation, to the routes prescribed in Appendix A. Id., at 65; Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 19-20; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 19-21; Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 12-13.352/ If people deviate from LILCO's prescribed routes, there will be an increase in conflicts between traffic flows and a resultant increase in evacuation times. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 21-22; Tr. 2995-96 (Pigozzi). The evidence establishes that such deviations will occur, although LILCO's time estimates do not reflect this fact.353/ (Footnote cont'd from previous page) tion has no basis and serves to produce artificially low time esti-mates. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 29-33. Mr. Lieberman acknowledged that use of an equilibrium model is justified only if people followed their prescribed paths. Tr. 2479-80 (Lieberman). We find they will not. 352/ We concur with the County's witnesses that from an operational point of view, LILCO's scheme of assigning rigid routes is inadvisable and creates operational problems which cause, rather than alleviate, de-lays. Instead, LILCO should have devised a mora flexible scheme that is adaptable to emergency conditions. Tr. 2985-91, 3407-08 (Herr). Dr. Urbanik agreed that in certain instances it would be desirable to change routing strategies during an evacuation. Tr. 3561 (Urbanik). 353/ KLD similarly fails to account for realistic route selection behavior. KLD arbitrarily assigned destinations, not according to any data showing how people would attempt to leave the EPZ, but rather on plan-nors' judgments as to which origin / destination assignments would mini-mize evacuation times in the model. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 21; Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 25-29. Pro-fessor Pigozzi offered numerous examples where this approach led to arbitrary destination assignments. He concluded that determining where evacuees will go requires much more analysis than has been at-tempted. Id. -350- c 521. There:are several reasons why basing time estimates on rigid compliance with prescribed routes is unrealistic and unsound.354/ First, _peop l e f1seing the EPZ will have their own perceptions of the best evacua-tion routes. They will avoid commonly traveled routes and take short cuts to avoid congestion when they perceive it to be to their advantage. If they perceive that LILCO's routes are riskier than an alternate route (such as requiring travel toward the plant), substantial numbers will not hesi-tate to take the alternate route. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 20-22; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 20, 23-24; Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 3, 11; Tr. 3365-67 (Roberts); Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2250, at 13-14.355/ Second, evacuees may wish to travel to a oestination outside the EPZ that cannot easily be reached by the prescribed route. Tr. 3059, 3200-03 (Pigozzi); Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 23.356/ Finally, people experiencing high levels of stress, as in a radiological emergency, are likely to ignore prescribed routing information rather than make the effort to understand and evaluate it while under pressure.357/ 354/ It is not necessary for a model to do so. For instance, estimates for the Pilgrim and Seabrook plants used dynamic models that assumed many different routing patterns. Tr. 2292-95 (Herr). 355/ The County offered numerous examples where people would deviate from LILCO's routes because they were perceived not to be the best way out of the EPZ. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 23-24 and Fig. 4; Tr. 3421-27 (Michel); Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 30-34. Indeed, Mr. Lieberman acknowledged that where traffic is routed toward Shoreham, deviations from LILCO's routes can be expected. Tr. 2439-40, 2666, 2717-18 (Lieberman). 356/ KLD did not consider the ultimate destination of evacuees when as-signing routes. Tr. 2457-58 (Lieberman). 357/ Studies show that people under stress have reduced ability to process new information such as prescribed routes. Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 5-6, 10; Tr. 2293-95 (Saegert). -351- : l J 522. Mr. Lieberman testified that in an emergency people will be mo-tivated to leave the EPZ by the most expeditious route and that this goal can be schieved by LILCO's public information program, traffic guides and trailblazer signs. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337,.at 65-66, 74-7b; Tr. 2437-38, 2459-60 (Lieberman). We disagree. First, Mr. Lieberman does not have established qualifications to draw these conclu-i sions; his testimony concerning human behavior in emergency conditions is ! speculation and entitled to little, if any, weight.358/ Second, we reject the suggestion that LILCO's public information program will result in com-pliance with prescribed routes. Although LILCO intends to publish route j information in an emergency brochure, such information is unlikely to be read. Even if evacuees read the brochure, the stress generated by the emergency will reduce their ability to recall the routes. Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 12. Route information given at the time of an emergency will also be of little use due to LILCO's lack of credibility as a source of 1 i information.359/ See findings on Contention 15 (Section II.B, supra). 358/ Mr. Lieberman has never designed a traffic control scheme which l- depends on non government personnel for traffic control. He has never studied how people choose routes or destinations in actual emergencies or how drivers respond to non-government employees directing traffic. Moreover, LILCO's choice of evacuation routes was not based on any in-quiry or survey of which routes people might actually attempt to take in a Shoreham emergency. Tr. 2340-42, 2382, 2436, (Lieberman). 359/ Mr. Lieberman conceded that if a source of information is not consid-ered credible, then the information itself will be disregarded. Tr. 2461 (Lieberman). -352- 7" 523. We also cannot agree that LILCO's traffic guides and the control tactics they are expected to implement will result in a high level of com-pliance with prescribed routes.360/ These guides are not adequately trained to direct traffic or encourage compliance with assigned routes.361/ Traffic direction is a learned skill which requires the ability to concen-trate on a variety of circumstances while performing under often stressful and frustrating circumstances.362/ LILCO's training program is inadequate to instill those skills in its employees. In fact, because LILCO's training program does not include any traffic direction exercises in the field (Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 41-42), the first time the traffic guides will be put to the test is during a radiological emergency under 360/ The Plan calls for traffic guides to d!. rect traffic, " discourage" evacuees from departing from prescribed routes, and implement such traffic control techniques as blocked lanes, concurrent continuous flow treatments, channelization, barricades and signs, and conversion of roadway sections to one-way traffic flow. Plan, App. A, at IV-5 through IV-69a; Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 60-61. 361/ LILCO's traffic guides are LILCO employees. The majority are meter readers; the others are persons with jobs such as customer relations representatives. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 41-42; Tr. 2630 (Weismantle). See also, Section V for findings concerning deficiencies in training of LILCO traffic guides. 362/ People who are not police officers such as construction workers or people whose cars have been in accidents occasionally direct teaffic. In these cases, however, the individuals are only moving traffic for-ward around an obstacle. That is completely different from directing traffic to move in different directions and keeping conflicting traf-fic flows apart as traffic guides are expected to do under the Plan. Tr. 2280-81, 2320-23 (McGuire, Michel); 2285-66 (Monteith). Captain Michel's experience with civilians attempting to direct traf fic is that it results in confusion and arguments with motorists. Tr. 2284-85 (Michel). -353-t- 1 l conditions that would severely test even an experienced police officer. Id., at 27, 39-42. In addition, effective traffic direction requires an intimate knowledge of the local road network. There is no evidence that LILCO's traffic guides will have such familiarity with the local roads or that they will have the means of knowing what is occurring upstream or downstream from their posts. Id., at 27, 42-43; Tr. 3343-45 (Roberts, Monteith, Michel).363/ Moreover, the public will perceive the guides as having no authority and, in fact, will likely identify the guides as LILCO employees to be bismed for forcing them to evacuate. As a result, whatever directions are given will likely be viewed with skepticism and even hostil-ity, leading to traffic delays. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 35-36; Tr. 2270 (Turano). 524. LILCO's time estimates do not include any increments for delays resulting from the mistakes or confusion caused by LILCO's traffic guides. Tr. 2532 (Lieberman). The immediately preceding findings demonstrate that they should. Moreover, the traffic control tactics to be implemented by the traffic guides are flawed and thus would not lead to greater compliance with the Plan's evacuation routes. Tr. 2998-99 (Herr). For example, LILCO intends to employ channelization treatments 364/ to increase capacity at 363/ Even with adequate training and experience, it is not always.possible to prevent motorists from deviating from pre-established routes. Trained police officers may often find it difficult to prevent such deviation. It is therefore unrealistic to assume that LILCO's largely untrained and inexperienced traffic guides will be able to maintain the traffic flow along the evacuation routes outlined in the Plan. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 35-42. 364/ Channelization treatments involve adding a traffic lane by using road-way shoulders, channelizing existing lanes, closing existing lanes, or (Footnote cont'd next page) -354- intersections with significant turn movements and high traffic demand. I~ Plan, App. A, at IV-19 through 21. The SCPD witnesses established, how-ever, that these channelization strategies will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to Laplement. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 17, 19-20 and Att. 3.365/ The Plan also proposes to implement contineous concurrent flow treatments at selected intersections. Specific traffic movements i' through these intersections would be mandated to avoid conflicting traffic flows and to keep traffic movement continuous. The guides would try to en-force this traffic control strategy (Plan, App. A, at IV-9 through 14), but i' the SCPD witnesses offered many examples where it could not be implemented. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 21-23, Act. 4. LILCO further intends to i convert roadway sections to 1-way flow (Plan, App. A, Table VIII, at IV-18) to increase roadway capacity. The SCPD witnesses demonstrated that adher-l ence to this tactic would also create serious proble ns. Roberts et al., l (Footnote cont'd from previous page) l adding lanes as " turn pockets" to separate through movement traffic from turning traffic. LILC0's traffic guides, using sign:, barriers, cones and vehicles, would implement these traffic control techniques. Plan, App. A, at IV-19. 365/ For example, tho' channelization treatment to be implemented between traffic nodes 7 and 30 calls for establishing 2 lanes of traffic westbound while still providing i lane eastbound on Route 25A. Plan, i App. A, Table IX, at IV-20. Route 25A is a 2-lane roadway with a lim-ited paved shoulder eastbound and almost no paved shoulder westbound. LILCO's channelization strategy would therefore require extensive use of barrels and emergency lighting for night time evacuation and could only be implemented with considerable lead time. Even then, traffic 1 would likely back up and become congested due to the narrowness of Route'25A'at this location. . Roberts et al. , ff. Tr. 2260, at 19-20;
- Tr. 3333-41 (Michel); SC Ex. 8.
-355-i a ff. Tr. 2260, at 23-24, Att. 5.366/ LILCO also plans to block the right traffic lanes on limited access highways, upstream from entrance ramps, to facilitate access to the highways by traffic from the entrance ramps. Plan, App. A, at Fig. 8.2. While this tactic may help to control traffic flow, it is likely to cause congestion on the limited access highway to the rear of the blocked lane (s). Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 25. There are also a number of intersections where turn movements are prescribed, but which are not manned by traffic guides. Id., at 25-26; Tr. 2697-2701 (Lieberman). 323. Finally, the Board rejects Mr. Lieberman's assertion that the trailblazer signs which LILCO plans to post throughout the EPZ to guide people along prescribed routes (Plan, App. A, at IV-70; see also, Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 61) will in fact enhance route compliance. As the SCPD witnesses testified, such signs may be defaced, turned around, stolen by souvenier hunters, or destroyed during automobile accidents or by snow plows, and thus not be in place when needed. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 24.367/ 366/ For example, to convert Lower Rocky Point Road and North Country Road to 1-way westbound traffic between Woodhull Landing Road and Shore Road, LILCO would have to control traf fic from 15 side streets that enter onto those roads. But for 8 of these side streets, there will be no traffic guides available to prevent traffic from entering and traveling east. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 23. 367/ Mr. Lieberman conceded that LILCO's trailblazer signs would be subject to vandalism and that vandalism to such signs is a prevalent problem around the country. Tr. 2613-14 (Lieberman). In any event, the (Footnote cont'd next page) -356- l l 526. As a backup position, LILCO argued that evacuees' deviation from prescribed' routes would have little effect on evacuation times. This posi-tion was based on a KLD study (KLD TM-140) which analyzed the effect of noncompliance with recommended routes on evacuation time estimates for both a " planned" and an " uncontrolled" evacuation.3_6_8/ 6 The study evaluated ! noncompliance at a 25% ard 50% level. For each level, it was assumed that t i vehicles not complying with the recommended routes would, in most cases, be j equally distributed between 1 or 2 alternative destinations chosen by KLD. i L Cordaro et al. (Contention 65),Eff. Tr. 2337, at 66-68 and Att. 12. KLD concluded that in the case of a " planned" evacuation, if 25% of the popula- F l tion deviated from recommended routes, estimated evacuation times would not be affected. If the level of noncompliance increased to 50%, there would be a 35-minute increase in evacuation time (from 4 hours and 55 minutes to l ! 5 hours and 30 minutes). In an uncontrolled evacuation, KLD found no in-crease in evacuation time at either a 25% or 50% noncompliance level. Id., l [ at 69-70, Att. 12. (Footnote cont'd from previous page) trailblazer signs have not yet been acquired. Tr. 2617 (Weismantle). Mr. Lieberman testified that if the signs are not installed, a lower level of compliance than he assumed could result. Tr. 2618 (Lieberman). 368/ A " planned" evacuation is one in which all LILCO's traffic control strategies are in effect. An " uncontrolled" evacuation is one in which only normal signals and signs are functioning. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, Att. 11, at 1. -357- 527. Professor Pigozzi testified that KLD TM-140 is flawed and mis-leading. First, the study was limited to 1 or 2 alternative destinstions. In reality, for a great many of the EPZ origin nodes, there are many more viable destinations available. Thus, KLD has not modeled the true range of options open to evacuees and therefore it is not surprising that its re-sults showed that " noncompliance" had little or no effect on evacuation times. Pigozzi (Supp.), ff. Tr. 2909, at 11-12. Moreover, the study is further flawed in its assumption as to when drivers will deviate from pre-scribed routes. KLD assumed that deviation would occur only when drivers were actually confronted with traffic blockage. KLD failed to account, however, for drivers electing noncompliant routes in anticipation of traf-fic conditions based upon their perceptions and knowledge of the traffic network. Id., at 12-14; Tr. 3248-53 (Pigozzi). Because of the foregoing deficiencies, the Board is unpersuaded by the results of KLD TM-140. 528. By ignoring deviation from prescribed routes by evacuees, KLD was able to produce the lower times. But in the process, KLD has modaled an ideal that has no basis in reality or actual human behavior. If the time estimates in Appendix A were to account for deviation (in terms of the number and proportion of vehicles deviating and the degree of spatial devi-ation), they would be substantially higher. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 21-22; Pigozzi (Supp.) ff. Tr. 2909, at 10-11; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 27-28.369/ 369/ The Board inquired why route deviation would not simply balance itself out -- that is, why traffic assigned to travel to point A, which de-(Footnote cont'd next page) -358-
- 6. Confusion As A Result Of LILCO's Traffic Control Tactics (Contention 65.C.1) 529. Contention 65.C.1 is related to Contention 65.C.4. It alleges that LILCO's traffic control scheme will cause confusion when traffic guides attempt to enforce compliance with prescribed routes by " screening" or " discouraging" drivers seeking to deviate from routes.370/ 1he County's witnesses testified that these attempts will result in backups and delays, thus increasing evacuation times. As the SCPD witnesses explained, some personal contact between traffic guides and motorists moving in directions contrary to the prescribed traffic flow will be inevitable. Motorists will stop to ask questions or directions, or to persuade traffic guides to let (Footnote cont'd from previous page) cides to travel to point B would not be balanced by traffic assigned to point B, deciding to travel to point A. Professor Herr explained that route switching is not a random process. Rather, deviation re-sults from perceptions and stimuli existing at the time of the acci-dent. It is likely, therefore, that many drivers are going to make the same route choices without countervailing decisions being made by other drivers. This will result in uneven demand and congestion.
Tr. 3401-02 (Herr). 370/ " Screening" is the process of determining whether evacuees have a good reason to deviate from prescribed routes. LILCO revised the Plan to state that LILCO intends to facilitate traffic flow along prescribed routes and to " discourage" other traffic flow through the use of traf-fic guidec, barriers, cones and signs. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 28-29; Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 46; Tr. 2344 (Lieberman). From an operational point of view, there is no meaningful distinction between the " screening" function and " discouraging" and, therefore, the change in the Plan does not eliminate the concern raised in Contention 65.C.1. Rcberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 37, 46; Herr, ff. 2909, at 28-29. -359- them so in their intended directions. This will result in delays, which have not-been considered in LILCO's time estimates. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 34-35;-Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 46; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 30-31. 530. Moreover, these interactions between traffic guides and motor-ists will necessarily require 2 traffic guides at each traffic post since any time a traffic guide diverts his attention to talk to 1 motorist, others will take advantage of the opportunity to proceed along routes that may be contrary to the routes prescribed by LILCO. Nevertheless, LILCO has assigned only 1 traffic guide to many of its traffic control posts. Id., , at 30-31; Roberts et al., ff. Tr.'2260, at 47-51; Plan, App. A, Fig. 8. These considerations compel us to conclude that LILC3's attecpts to " dis-courage" traffic flows will actually cause delays, that these delays are not considered in LILCO's evacuation time estimates, and that such esti-mates are thus further rendered inaccurate.
- 7. Azaressive Behasfor (Contention 65.C.2) 531. Contention 65.C.2 alleges that the interaction between LILCO's traffic guides and evacuees will lead not only to confusion, as discussed above, but also to aggressive behavior. Since substantial numbers of peo-pie will try to deviate from LILCO's routes, attempts by traffic guides to enforce prescribed turn movements and other traffic control measures, or to
" discourage" deviation from prescribed routes, will lead to conflicts be-tween drivers and traffic guides. Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 13-14; Roberts -360-w.-_________-__-_-_____-_______-_______-_________ - et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 49. These conflicts may range from verbal con-frontation to physical assault. Tr. 2296 (Saegert). They will lead to confusion and interruptions in traffic flow, and will cause evacuation times to be increased. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 31-32; Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 34-35; Tr. 3210-11 (Pigozzi). 532. LILCO took the position that because people become more helpful . not more aggressive, in community emergencies, evacuees would accept con-trol by traffic guides and would not intitiate conflicts. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr.1470, at 129; Tr.1787-89 (Mileci); 1789-92 I (Dynes); see Tr. 3449-51 (Urbanik); Urbanik, f f. Tr. 3430, at 15. 533. Suffolk County's witnesses, on the other hand, testified that i aggression will occur for several reasons. First, many evacuees will see the traffic guides as frustrating their goal of finding the safest route out of the EPZ. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 50; Tr. 2297 (Saegert); Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 13-14. Second, evacueos are unlikely to perceive LILCO's guides as having authority to direct traffic or prevent travel along certain routes. Tr. 2297 (Saegert); Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 14.371/ Third, the an er s of some evacuees toward LILCO may be directed at the traffic guides since their employer will be seen as the cause of the danger. Id., at 14-15; Tr. 2277 (Turano); 2324-25 (Monteith, McGuire); ' 371/ LILCO's traffic guides will not be wearing uniforms or other symbols of authority, although they may wear reflective vests. Tr. 1965-66 (Weismantle). -361-L__.._ I 3751-52 (Knighton).372/ Fourth, incompetence and mistakes by LILCO's inexperienced and inadequately trained traffic guides will give rise to driver frustration which may, in turn, lead to aggression. Finally, the guides will not be experienced in responding to people in a highly agitated state of mind. Their inappropriate responses to motorists' aggression or anger may increase the motorists' anger. Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 13-16. See also, findings on Contention 15.D (Section II.B., supra). It has been the experience of the SCPD witnesses that people under stress disobey or disregard the normal rules of the road and that fear, which will surely be present during a radiological emergency, can increase aggressive behavior. Tr. 2264-70 (Turano, Monteith, Roberts, McGuire, Michel). Likewise, when-ever there are heavy stop-and go traffic conditions, drivers become aggres-sive and more willing to disregard traffic laws. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 49-51; Tr. 2297-98 (McGuire, Michel). 534. The New York witnesses concurred that aggression against traffic guides is likely during the stressful conditions of an emergency. Such be-havior was evident at the 1980 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid where trans-portion problems caused many people to be uncooperative and, in some in-stances, to physically and verbally abuse state officials attempting to remedy the situation. Hartgen et al., ff. Tr. 3695, at 15-16. Dr. Mileti disputed the relevance of the Lake Placid experience because the Olympics 372/ Thus, whereas natural disasters often unite communities against a com-mon threat, a Shoreham accident may involve social conflict and mis-trust. Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 9-10. -362- allegedly did not represent a life-threatening situation. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 3857, at 22-27. However, the situation was indeed life-threatening for those exposed to the cold for extended periods. Tr. 3743-44 (Albertin, Knighton). 535. LILCO's position that there would be no hostility against its traffic guides was further undercut by LILCO's own witness Dr. Dynes, who has written that personnel from organizations that play critical roles in emergencies are often the target of direct hostility. This can happen when the organization is perceived to lack authority or when it is considered an "out group" (i.e. not part of the community) . Tr. 1796-97, 2045-46, 2077-78 (Dynes). We agree with the County's position that many people will - perceive LILCO as lacking legitimate authority to respor.d as it intends under its Plan. Furthermore, there is no evidence that LILCO is considered part of the community in any communal sense. Thus, LILCO, as the perceived cause of the emergency, could very well be considered an "out group" orga-nization which the public will treat with hostility. Based on Dr. Dynes' testimony and the testimony of the State and County witnesses, we find that aggression could well occur against LILCO's traffic guides and that, to the extent it occurs, it will increase evacuation times. -363-hm . . .. t l
- 8. Traffic Direction In Conflict With Normal Traffic Sianals (Contention 65.C.3) e 536. Contention 65.C.3 asserts that while LILCO's traffic guides are directing traffic at intersections, the traffic signals will also be cp- l ersting, often in conflict with the traffic guides' directions. This will lead to confusion, a reduction in traffic speed, and possibly increased
{
- accidents. LILCO's time estimates do not take these factors into account; i
if they had, the time estimates would have been higher. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 34-35; Horr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 32; Roberts et al., ff. 1 I Tr. 2260, at 52. l l 537. The U.S. Department of Transportation Manual On Uniform Traffic i Control Devices supports this conclusion. It cautions that traffic signals
- which are improperly operated will adversely impact traffic, causing delays l and increased accidents. LILCO Ex. 6. Giving hand directions contrary to ;
the traffic signals is a prime case of improper signal operation that is I l bound to create ambiguity, confusion, and hazard, and translato into higher evacuation times than LILCO has predicted. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 33-34; ' t Tr. 3007-08 (Herr). The SCPD witnesses testified that when uniformed po- t l l lice officers direct traffic in conflict with signals, problems almost always occur. Rob at al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 52-53; Tr. 3411 12 i (Michel). LIL' s guides can be expected to experienco even more l . difficulty sinc. .. ya not well-trained and will not be perceived by the public as having the authority to override traffic signals. Roberts et l al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 52-53.373/ 323/ LILCO's traffic guides could not direct traffic in coordination with traffic lights even if they tried because many traffic lights are (Footnoto cont'd next page) -364- 538. Mr. Lieberman testified that even if delays result from directing traffic contrary to traffic signals, he accounted for this possi-bility by reducing roadway capacities by 15% under congested conditions. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 2337, at 63. However, we find that chis reduction was not intended to account for loss t f capacity caused by directing traf-fic contrary to traffic signals, but rather was intended to account for the loss of capacity that occurs normally under congested conditions (for rea-sons explained in our findings on Contention 65.F. infra). Accordingly, any capacity reductions reflected in KLD's time estimates do not account for this factor because the issue was not even raised until after Mr. Lieberman completed his computer runs.114/ i (Footnote cont'd from previous page) traffic actuated, i.e., they are designed to cycle in accordance with the flow of traffic. For this reason, police officers, when required to direct traffic against traffic signals, will either turn off the signals or put the signals on flash. In this way, motorists are not confused by conflicting instructions and the officers can control the situation. LILCO's traffic guides will not alter existing traffic signals. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at $31 Tr. 2280 81 (Michel). 224/ Mr. Lieberman conducted his computer runs during 19826 the input has not changed since that time. It was not until May 1983, however, that LILCO considered the possibility that traf fic guides might be requi.ed to direct traffic contrary to traffic signale. Tr. 2496 (Lieberman): ' 2495 96 (Weismantle); m33 also, Cordaro et al. (Contantion 65), ff. Tr. 2337, Act. 11, at 1. 365- I
- 9. The Validity of LILCO's Estimated
" Uncontrolled" Evacuation Time Estimates 539. In addition to responding to the specific claims made in the four subparts of Contention 65.C. , LILCO argued that the Contention 65.C concerns did not matter because evacuation could be successfully achieved, with only a modest increase in evacuation time, without special control tactics. LILCO based its position on a KLD study (KLD TM-77) which con-cludes that eliminating the special control tactics on the network (i.e., the traffic guides, cones, special traffic management features, etc.) will increase evacuation time estimates by only 1 hour and 35 minutes -- from 4 hours and 55 minutes to 6 hours and 30 minutes). Cordaro et al. (Conten-tion 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 61-62, Att. 11, at 12-24.375/ We reject LILCO's argument for both factual and legal reasons. First, from a factual point of view,-this projected increase substantially underestimates the effect of decontrolling the network because, in simulating " uncontrolled" conditions, KLD not only removed LILCO's special control measures but also made the un-realistic assumption that existing intersection and other traffic controls would apply. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 37. In keeping with our ffadings regarding Contentions 65.C and 65.F, we conclude that under the conditions that will exist during a radiological emergency, many people 375/ KLD TM-77 also concluded that under inc1cment winter weather condi-tions, evacuation times for an uncontrolled evacuation would increase by 1 hour and 55 minutes -- from 6 hours to 7 hours and 55 minutes. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 61-62, Att. 6. None of these " uncontrolled" time estimates are included in the Plan. See Plan, App. A, at V-8. 1 1 ~ -366-T 9 ! I's - - - - - 3- . . , , - , , - , - - - - - - - - _ _ _ - - _ , - _ - - - , --- - - (intentionally or unintentionally) will not obey the rules of the road or feel constrained by " normal" traffic controls. The breakdown of these con-trols will liniit capacity and flow, cause further deviation from prescribed routes, and increase evacuation times. Moreover, KLD TM-77 erroneously as-sumes that, despite the absence of LILCO's special controls, people will follow their prescribed routes from the EPZ. This is even less realistic in an " uncontrolled" scenario than for those scenarios in which LILCO's contrc;s are assumed to be in effect since deviations from prescribed routes are likely to be greater where no controls exist than where they do. B ., at 36. In light of these clear flaws in KLD's study, the Board finds that LILCO's time estimates for an " uncontrolled" evacuation are inaccurate and unreliable. Even if they were included in the Plan, they would not provide reliable guidance to decisionmakers. 540. Second, as a legal matter, LILCO's suggestion that we can rely on an uncontrolled evacuation scenario is contrary to the NRC's regula-tions. See LILCO Brief, at 208. LILCO's uncontrolled estimates essential-ly ask the Board to license Shoreham with no capability to perform any traffic-related functions, despite the unqualified assertions in the Plan that those functions will be implemented. According to LILCO, all that needs to be done if there is a serious accident at Shoreham is to notify the public of the emergency and let the people take care of themselves, which allegedly will take only 95 minutes more thar. if traffic control functions were implemented. -367-l- r-+- I IV \ 1 541. LILCO's argument necessarily also encompasses the further con-i tantion that no capability to provide active assistance to evacuees during an emersorcy is necessary to satisfy Section 50.47. Thus, even if serious traffic problems developed during a Shoreham emergency after evacuation had been recommended, and even if implementation of traffic control measures could reduce evacuees' exposure to health-threatening radiation, LILCO sug-gests that its Plan would be adequate without even the capability to imple-ment any such actions to assist evacuees. 542. The NRC's regulations are not prescriptive about particular traffic control strategies and other actions that may need to be imple-mented to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective actions can and will be implemented. This is because it is impossible to predict pre-cisely how a serious accident might proceed and thus precisely what protec-tive actions (and supportive actions to implement those protective actions) may be necessary when the emergency occurs. But this does not mean that there need be no capability to assist evacuees in the event of an emergen-cy. In our view, for adequate emergency preparedness to exist, there must be a dependable response capability so that protective and supportive ac-tions can and will be implemented as necessary. 543. LILCO asks this Board to approve the Plan even assuming there is: no capability at all for LERO to provide any meaningful traffic control assistance during an emergency; no capability at all to remove roadway ob-stacles (see Section IX.B infra); no capability at all to fuel cars which -368- [ have run out of gas and thus constitute traffic impediments (see Section II.B. infra); and no capability at all to control traffic through the EPZ boundary (see findings on Contention 23.H, infra). To our knowledge, there is no nuclear plant in the United States which has an offsite emergency re-sponse organization that lacks the capability to take actions to assist in evacuating the public if there is an emergency. Yet, that is what LILCO is asking the Board to approve. If this were the legal standard for adequate prepardness under the NRC's regulations, then there would be no need to re-quire an emergency plan at all. 544. We find that LILCO's argument does not represent the appropriate legal standard. Rather, Section 50.47(a)(1) requires reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures "can and will be taken" in a radiological emergency. An emergency may present a multitude of possible accident sce-narios, making rigid proposed protective actions unsatisfactory. Thus, it is essential for adequate preparedness that there be a flexible capability to respond to whatever events may occur, including adverse traffic cendi-tions. This is particularly true when it is remembered that an EPZ evacua-tion after a Shoreham accident may involve movement of upwards of 150,000 persons (and even more when shadow evacuees are included). That is why it is inconceivable that this Board could seriously consider approval of a plan where there is no participating entity that has the capability to im-plement traffic control measures or other actions to assist the evacuating public. -369- 1
- 10. The Effects of Accidents, Running Out of Fuel And Other Similar Blockages (Contention 65.D) 545. Contention 65.D states that LILCO's time estimates fall to con-sider the effects of accidents, breakdowns, running out of gas, lack of shoulders on some evacuation routes, road construction or repair, and vehi-cle abandonment.376/ The County's witnesses testified that such incidents are likely to occur during an evacuation, resulting in decreased road ca-pacity and traffic flow, and increased evacuation times. Accidents and breakdowns occur in the EPZ every day.377/ Under emergency evacuation con-ditions, the number and severity of these incidents is likely to increase dramatically. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 55. An analysis by PRC Voorhees estimated that as many as 400 incidents of accidents and cars run- !
ning out of gas could occur during an EPZ evacuation. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909 at 11-16. It is clear that LILCO could have reflected these factors in its time estimates. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 34-35. LILCO's failure to consider 376/ Appendix A at V-2 states explicitly that LILCO's time estimates do not consider the effects of major vehicle breakdowns on the evacuation routes. 377/ During 1982, the County police responded to approximately 10,000 inci-dents such as accidents and breakdowns just on the Suffolk County por-tion of the LIE, a distance of approximately 43 miles. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 55. Mr. Lieberman converted this into an hourly incident rate of 1.14 and concluded thst, given an evacuation time es-timate of 4 hours and 55 minutes, there would be only 5 or 6 incidents during an EPZ evacuation. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 82. While Mr. Lieberman's mathematics were correct, his methodology was faulty. Accidents are not evenly distributed in time. In fact, accident rates are much higher under congested conditions, such as would occur during an emergency. Tr. 3022-24 (Turano, -Roberts); 3416-17 (Monteith). -370- these likely occurrences renders its time estimates seriously flawed. Id. at 34-36; Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 38-39; Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 55. 546. The SCPD witnesses testified that many accidents and traffic in-cidents will occur at key EPZ intersections during an evacuation, thus causing delays. They identified 14 intersections within the Sixth Precinct (which comprises a large part of the EPZ) that reported the most traffic accidents during the year beginning September 1982.378/ They also sub-mitted a chart . showing the number of accidents occurring between September 1982 and September ~1983 along designated sections of five highways that LILCO relies on as major evacuation routes. No fewer than 816 traffic accidents were reported at the 118 locations identified (it is likely that many more actually occurred). Yet LILCO plans to place traffic guides at only 30 of them. Id., at 58-59 and Atts. 8, 9; Tr. 3018-19 (Turano). Fur-thermore, many roads prescribed as evacuation routes (particularly those in the immediate vicinity of Shoreham) are likely candidates for traffic acci-dents because they are hilly and wir. ding and their capacity to handle heavy traffic flow is severely limited. Robarts et al. , ff. Tr. 2260, at 59. 547. Some accidents are less serious than others, but it does not take a major accident to cause heavy congestion and traffic backup. If a 378/ All these intersections are located within the EPZ and three will not even be manned by traffic guides during an evacuation. Roberts et al. , ff. Tr. 2260, at 57-58. -371- major accident does occur, it can block an entire road in one direction. Roberts et al., ff. Tr.-2260, at 55-56; Tr. 3368-69 (Michel); NY Ex. 1. Frequently vehicles cannot be moved to the shoulder of the road.(assuming one exists) because the shoulder is being used by motorists seeking to get around the accident. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 55-56. Even if the vehicle is quickly moved to the shoulder, delays can result because drivers passing an accident will slow down and " rubberneck." Id.; Tr. 3025-27 1(Herr, Michel). 548. ' Factors other than accidents will also slow traffic during an evacuation. Breakdowns will occur and vehicles will run out-of gas. In - summer, some vehicles will overheat and stall in traffic lanes. In winter, snow or' ice storms will cause congestion and possible abandonment of vehi-cles on the roadways. Roberts et al. , ff. Tr. 2260, at 57.379/ 549. -Dr. Urbanik testified that the impact of accidents would be in-4 significant because~ accidents are " rare" and can be cleared in less than 15 minutes, resulting in only a 5-10 minute increase in evacuation time. 379/.-During a 1979 snowstorm, nearly 3,000 vehicles were abandoned in the traffic' lanes of the LIE when a tractor trailer slid in the snow, blocking the Expressway. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 57. This -caused traffic lanes to becoms impassable until the vehicles could be pushed off the road er towed away. On roads where there are no shoul-ders, towing is the only option. However, under.the congested traffic-conditions that would characterize an EPZ evacuation, it is unlikely that tow trucks would be able to get through quickly. Id., at 62-63. Mr. Lieberman stated that abandonment of automobiles was not consid-ered in his computer runs because he assumed tyat such vehicles could be easily pushed out of-the traffic flow. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337,Lat 87. See our findings on Contention 66. -372- - _ . . _ _ _ . _ . . - . _ ~ . - . - _ . . . _ - _ . - _ _ - . ~ _ _ . . , _ _ . . . ~ , _ . . . - . , , , _ _ . _ . . _ . , , _ . _ , . , , _ _ . _ Urbanik, ff. Tr. 3430, at 13.380/ Mr. Lieberman also surmised that there would be few accidents during an evacuation, basing his opinion on two studies: one analyzing the evacuation of residents of Louisiana and Texas from Hurricane Carla; and the other analyzing a number of evacuations from non-radiological emergencies over a 13 year period. Cordaro et al. (Con-tention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 79-81; Tr. 2631 (Lieberman). By contrast, an analysis by PRC Voorhees indicated that an EPZ evacuation could result in as'many as 141 accidents on the evacuation network. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 10-12 and Att. 4. The PRC calculations are based on research conducted by the Federal Highway Administration which reveals that accident rates are higher where traffic travels on a roadway section at speeds significantly lower than the average speed for that section. During an evacuation, it must be assumed that congested conditions will cause traffic to travel at a low rate of speed. Id., at 11 and Att. 4;-Tr. 3273-74 (Polk). Although Mr. Lieberman disagreed with the PRC conclusions, we conclude that the analysis is sound.381/ Mr. Polk demonstrated that the data show that 380/ We give this testimony little weight in light of Dr. Urbanik's state-ment that evacuation times would increase only 5 or 10 minutes even if an accident took up to 4 hours to clear. Tr. 3583 (Urbanik). This testimony is patently lacking in credibility. 381/ Mr. Lieberman testified that the difference between his estimate of 4 accidents and Voorhees' estimate of 141 accidents arises from Voorhees' misinterpretation of the speed-related data it .used to de-rive its estimates. According to Mr. Lieberman, the data actually dem-onstrate that accidents increase as one deviates from the average speed of traffic at the time of accident -- not that accidents in-crease only as speed deviates from the average speed of traffic over time, as Mr. Polk advocated. Using the same data used by Voorhees and (Footnote cont'd next page) -373- i accidents increase as speed varies from the average flow of traffic on a road over time.382/ In fact, his analysis may underestimate the number of accidents and other incidents likely to occur for several reasons. First, incidents on streets other than the seven major outbound routes were not considered. Second, accidents occurring during work-to-home or other pre-evacuation trips were not considered, although it is clear that acci-dents and breakdowns can occur on these trips. Third, incidents outside the EPZ but impacting it through " spill-back" were not considered. Fourth, travel by voluntary evacuees from outside the EPZ but travelling within it was not considered. Fifth, no sources of vehicle disability other than accidents and running out of fuel were considered. Sixth, with as many as 140 accidents (or more, given the omissions listed above), at least some will occur at intersections, where they may have double impact, delaying travel on two routes. And seventh, the delay caused by incidents may last far longer than the time necessary to remove the obstructing vehicles, due to the " ripple effect" of an accident. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 37-38; Tr. 3012 (Herr); 3224, 3226-27 (Pigozzi). (Footnote cont'd from previous page) applying his own interpretation of those data, Mr. Lieberman calculat-ed that since congested conditions would prevail most of the time dur-ing an evacuation, there would be little deviation from the mean speed of 6.5 mph. Therefore, Mr. Lieberman stated that Mr. Polk's analysis should have predicted only 3 accidents. Cordaro et al. (Supp.), ff. Tr. 2337, at 25-27. 382/ For instance, a flow of evacuation traffic exiting the EPZ on Nesconset Highway at 15 mph is likely to experience a high rate of accidents because the 15 mph flow rate deviates greatly from the mean speed on Nesconset Highway of 35 mph. Tr. 3274-3315 (Polk); LILCO Ex. 9. -374- ~. - 550. PRC Voorhees also estimated that 277 cars would run out of gas during an evacuation. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 13-16, Figs. 2 and 3, Att. 4. Mr. Lieberman attacked this estimate because it is premised on fuel usage rates.from a 1976 report that does not take into account improved fuel ' efficiencies for 1985 cars. Cordaro et al. (Supp.), ff. Tr. 2337, at 29-30. Mr. Polk acknowledged that fuel efficiency has increased since 1976,-but concluded that his 277 car estimate is, if anything, too low be-cause it does not consider any automobile trips generated by the shadow ^ phenomenon. Tr. 3372-74 (Polk). 551. On balance, we conclude that Mr. Polk's estimates of the number of accidents and incidences of cars running out of gas more nearly express the magnitude of the problem than do LILCO's estimates which largely ignore the problem.383/ We base our finding not only on Mr. Polk's testimony, but also on our agreement with Professors Herr and Pigozzi that the number of accidents estimated by KLD (four) inherently lacks credibility given the 383/ Based on its prediction that four accidents would occur during an EPZ evacuation, KLD conducted two computer runs to determine their effect on evacuation times. The four predicted accidents were placed ran-domly on the evacuation network. It was assumed that one accident created a 30 minute blockage while the others created blockages of 15 minutes each. The KLD runs indicated that traffic blockage lowered the average speed of traffic movement over the network by only 3/10s mph and that the effect on total evacuation was negligible. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 84-85, Att. 6, Att. 11, at 24-26. In light of our finding regarding the number of accidents likely to occur during an evacuation, we reject KLD's conclusion as academic. In addition, Professor Pigozzi described other flaws in tha '~ KLD study which render its results meaningless. See Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr._2909, at 41-42. -375- thousands of cars that will be on the road, in exceptionally trying circum-stances, during an EPZ evacuation. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 41-42; Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 40-41, 552. We further find that the accidents and other disabling occur-rences reviewed above could significantly increase evacuation times. For instance, on-a two lane road with two-way traffic, an accident in either lane can totally block the section of road where the accident occurs since opposing traffic streams will confront one another on the remaining lane. Id., at 34-40. Even an accident in one lane on a road with two lanes in one direction will cause overall capacity to be reduced 60 to 80%. An accident blocking both. lanes will stop flow completely, especially if there are no shoulders. Polk ff. Tr. 2909, at 16-17. This could have a severe impact on evacuation time, particularly since the reduction of flow result-ing from the accident cannot be expected to diminish immediately after the accident but rather, depending on the severity of the accident, may contin-ne for some time. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 40. LILCO's time es-timates ignore these effects. 553. Road construction and repair work will also increase traffic congestion and delay traffic flow. At any given time, construction and re-pair work is taking place on SuffolK County. roads, and much is planned for the future. Roberts et al. , ff. Tr. 2260, at 61-62.384/ These projects 384/ In 1984 there are 4 projects scheduled on state roads in the EPZ, while another-5 projects are scheduled for locations outside the EPZ (Footnote cont'd next page) -376- can affect evacuation times by removing one or more lanes from service, thus reducing capacity. They also can prevent use of shoulders as storage areas for disabled vehicles or as turn bays. Hartgen et al., ff. Tr. 3695, at 18. 554. Mr. Lieberman acknowledged that while road construction and re-pair occur with regularity in Suffolk County, they were not considered in KLD's modeling runs. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 87. .He also acknowledged that some roadway repairs can significantly slow traf-fic. Tr. 2637 (Lieberman). Nevertheless, LILCO claimed that since con-struction schedules are not certain and construction projects vary in their effects on traffic flow, there was no need for LILCO to prepare estimates considering the effects of roadway construction and repair.385/ . 555. We find LILCO's position unpersuasive and conclude that modeling the probable effects of construction-work on traffic is feasible and neces-sary if the time estimates are to be realistic. See Hartgen et al., ff. (Footnote cont'd from previous page) which could have an impact on evacuation. Ten other major projects are scheduled for the EPZ in the next 5 years, with more projects to be added as a result of additional funds. Hartgen et al., ff. Tr. 3695, at 17 and Att._D. 385/ LILCO has committed itself for the future to review ongoing construc-tion projects and make revisions in time estimates as necessary. How-ever, there is no provision in the Plan for this procedure. Tr. 3847 (Weismantle); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 3857, at 27-28. Nor does LILCO even have a contract with a consultant to perform such a review. Tr. 3848-49 (Weismantle). -377- l l l Tr. 3695, at 19 and Att. D; Tr. 3028 (Herr). First, construction schedules for EPZ locations are not speculative. New York witness Mr. Beach testified that he was confident the construction projects set forth in At-tachment D to his testimony would take place as scheduled, with slippage of no more than a month or two. Tr. 3746-47 (Beach). Furthermore, even if construction schedules are variable, they can still form the basis for in-formed evacuation time estimates. Indeed, much of the modeling already done is based on assumptions and speculations as to weather conditions, roadway conditions, and the like. Since it is clear that roadway construc-tion restricts capacity, it would be prudent to include estimates for this factor in the Plan. Estimates can then be updated as construction actually progresses. 556. LILCO's time estimates also fail to account for the absence of adequate shoulders along many EPZ roads. Shoulders are important as a " safety valve," to store a disabled vehicle, to serve as an alternate trav-el lane when the normal lane is blocked by a disabled car, construction or other obstruction, and to provide access for emergency vehicles. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 43; Tr. 3029 (Herr). Mr. Lieberman asserted (Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 85-86) that all 2-lane roads on the evac-nation network are sufficiently wide from one shoulder to another to permit at least one direction of moving traffic in the outbound direction and one lane in the inbound direction, even if a disabled vehicle is parked on one shoulder or the other.386/ The SCPD witnesses disagreed, noting that many 386/ Mr. Lieberman changed his position somewhat at trial, conceding that there were EPZ roads where, even if a disabled vehicle were pushed to (Footnote cont'd next page) -378- m ) sections of EPZ roadway have inadequate shoulders or shoulders that are in-terrupted by bridge abutments and light posts. See Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 60, Att. 10 (listing a number of roads with inadequate shoul-ders). We accept the SCPD testimony, since these witnesses clearly have detailed knowledge of the roads in and around the EPZ, and conclude that the effect of this factor on evacuation times has not been considered.387/
- 11. Emergency Vehicles (Contention 65.E) 557. Contention 65.E addresses the concern that LILCO's time esti-mates fail to account for the thousands of trips during an evacuation that will be undertaken by special vehicles such as buses and ambulances. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 44-45; Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 42-43. Ac-cording to the County's witnesses, this is a shortcoming since buses are larger and have poorer acceleration than passenger cars, occupying more road capacity per vehicle (anywhere from 1.6x to 12x). Thus, demand on
- (Footnote cont'd from previous page) the extreme edge of the roadway, there still would be a reduction in capacity. Tr. 2633-37 (Lieberman). 387/ We also note that LILCO Proposed Finding 461 states that the SCPD testimony (Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 68-69) proceeds from the mistaken assumption that shoulders will be utilized as evacuation roadways under the Plan. Not only do pages 68-69 of the SCPD testi-mony have nothing to do with' shoulders, but even at the pertinent pages of the testimony, the SCPD witnesses make no such assumption. In fact, the major concern expressed in that testimony is that, due to the absence of adequate shoulders, disabled cars cannot be pushed com-plately off the roadway and will therefore intrude into the evacuation flow. We believe this concern is valid. -379- -available roadway capacity has not been accurately portrayed. The buses will also be making frequent stops, in some cases on designated evacuation routes, blocking the lane for at least some time. Finally, in many cases buses and ambulances will be moving in directions contrary to the evacuating traffic, creating conflicting flow. Id.; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 45-46. 558. Mr. Lieberman and Dr. Urbanik took the position that the pres-ence of special vehicles would have an insignificant effect on evacuation times since their numbers are small relative to the numbers of private ve-hicles. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 91; Urbanik, ff. Tr. 3430, at 14. But this meets only part of the concern addressed by Con-tention 65.E. The special vehicles on the evacuation network will often be traveling in directions contrary to evacuation flows, thus causing delays and interruptions in those flows that have not been, but should be, re-flected in LILCO's time estimates.
- 12. The Effect of Stress (Contention 65.F) 559. Contention 65.F asserts that LILCO's time estimates do not take into account the presence of stress in drivers that can impede their abili-ty to operate, thus leading to increased evacuation times. Professor
. Saegert testified that during a radiological emergency, the health-threatening conditions that the public may perceive te exist will produce stress and anxiety that will, among other things, affect the behavior and , performance of drivers seeking to evacuate. Stress levels are likely to be -380- _ . . . _ _ _ _ . , _ . _ _ . _ , _ _ _ . - _ - - - . . . _ . . - . - . _ . . - _ . _ . . _ , _ . . _ _ _ _ _ . , . . . . ~ . _ _ _ significantly higher during a radiological emergency than in other types of emergencies because of the public's heightened fear of radiation.388/ Con-ditions on Long Island, where the EPZ covers much of the width of the is-land, where there cannot be a 360 degree dispersal of traffic, and where the roadway capacity is limited, are likely to increase stress and anxiety. Tr. 2328-29 (McGuire). Stress on the part of evacuees is also likely to be aggravated by mistrust of the warning messages and information disseminated by LILCO. Evacuees are likely not to believe LILCO's emergency information because of LILCO's low credibility with the public. Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 8-9; see also findings on Contentions 15 (Section II.B) and 23 (Section I.A). 560. Drs. Mileti and Sorensen testified for LILCO that a radiological emergency will indeed increase stress and anxiety. But in their opinion, this may increase rather than decrease vigilance and therefore result in better driving skills.389/ Dr. Mileti acknowledged, however, that if driv-ing skills and driver awareness decreased under stress, the consequence would be an increase in traffic accidents. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 135. 388/ This has been amply demonstrated by studies conducted by Slovic, Lichtenstein and Fischoff and confirmed by the actual behavior at TMI and surveys taken on Long Island. Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 3, 6-7; Tr. 2287-91 (Saegert); see also findings on Contention 23 (Section I.A). 389/ Dr. Mileti conducted a study of the TMI accident that failed to sug-gest an increased incidence of automobile accidents following the accident. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 1470, at 130-32. Professor Saegert testified, however, that Dr. Mileti's data were very weak. Tr. 2300 (Saegert). -381- 561. We are unable to accept-the opinions of LILCO's witnesses. Good driving on congested roads clearly requires concentration and attention to other drivers' speed, direction, and behavior. Drivers who are stressed and anxious will tend to focus on getting to their destinations and may ig-nore what other people are doing. Hisjudgments may lead to wrong turns and accidents, thus causing delay. As Professors Herr and Saegert toscified, studies of driver stress present clear empirical findings that stress, such as will result from a Shoreham emergency, reduces a driver's information processing capacity, which translates into reduced ability to operate an automobile efficiently. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 47-48; Saegert, ff. Tr. 2259, at 17-18. We conclude that the delaying effects of the stress factor should have been included La LILCO's time estimates.390/ 390/ Mr. Lieberman testified that he attempted to account for' driver "un-certainty" by reducing roadway capacities in his model by 15%. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 63. It is clear, however, that the 15% capacity reduction does not reflect the effects of stress but rather the normal loss of capacity that accompanies con-gested conditions. It is apparent that LILCO has retroactively anr. inappropriately attempted to stretch the purpose of the 15% capacity reduction factor to cover the stressful conditions of evacuation. We agree with Professor Herr that Mr. Lieberman's 15% reduction factor is too heavily taxed since LILCO claims that it reflects reduced capacity from congestion, reduced capacity from driver uncertainty and anxiety, and reduced capacity from the confusion caused by directing traffic
- contrary to traffic signals. Tr. 3003-04 (Herr); see Plan, App. A, at
.III-14 through 15. l I l -382-l L I
- 13. Estimates for Special Populations ;
(Contention 65.G)- 562. Contention 65.G states that the Plan does not contain evacuation time estimates for various special populations which cannot rely on private vehicles. While the Plan has been updated to' include some of the required - estimates' for these' populations,391/ ~ it still contains no estimates for the evacuation of school children or for hospitals. We therefore find that the Plan fails.to satisfy NUREG 0654, Appendix 4 (at 4-2, 4-3) which requires that the school population and hospital population (on'an institution-by- , institution basis) be included in a plan's time estimates for special fa- ~c ilities.
- 14. - Route Spotters (Contention 65.H)
.563. LILCO plans.to assign;6 persons known'as " Evacuation Route Spot-ters" to observe road conditions and report them back to the EOC. Conten-tion 65.H alleges that the congested conditions existing during a Shoreham emergency will make this task impossible or irrelevant. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 49. As Professor Herr testified, route spotters will certain-ly be able to spot congestion since it will be endemic; however, they will be unable to do anything about it. Id. The route spotters' own availity will be limited because their routes require them at various points to travel with the evacuation flow. Tr. 2591-92 (Lieberman). Once caught in 391/ But see the findings on Contentions 67, 72 and 73 regarding the inade-quacy of these estimates. -383-t congestion, they are unlikely to escape it, especially since they will not have the special status of officially marked automobiles, like police cars - or ambulances. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 64; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 49-50. 564. Once congestion is observed, the Plan leaves little room for re-lief other than calling for tow trucks (if they are available). If the Plan were more flexible, an advisory could be broadcast suggesting that drivers avoid a particular route because it is congested.~ However, the Plan is keyed to fixed routes; once a route is assigned, that is the route to be taken by evacuees. Id. at 50; Tr. 2590-91 (Weismantle). That inflexibility renders the number of spotters and their mobility nearly moot t since routes will not change according to traffic conditions. Herr,'ff. Tr. 2909,-at.50; Tr. 3031 (Herr). Thus, there is no reason to believe that LILCO's route spotters will offer any meaningful relief to the congested conditions likely to prevail during a radiological emergency.392/ 392/ LILCO admitted that it would not always be possible for route spotters to avoid congestion and that their role is limited because evacuation routes have been pre-assigned. However, LILCO also intends to utilize helicopters for surveillance of. evacuation routes. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at 95-96. But helicopters cannot oper-ate in inclement weather and are not very useful at night. Tr. 2589-90 (Weismantle). Furthermore, they will be useless if the heli-copter operators are not intimately familiar with the roods in the EPZ. -Tr. 3032-36 (McGuire). LILCO presented no evidence that heli-copter personnel would be familiar with those roads. Thus, even if LILCO utilizes helicopters to perform route spotting functions, their utility will be negligible in light of the limited conditions under which they can operate and the Plan's inflexible response even if con-gestion is detected. -384- p ' - -
- 15. The Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon (Contention 23.D) 565. Contention 23.D concerns the effect of the shadow phenomenon on LILCO's evacuation times. Professors Johnson and Zeigler and Dr. Cole testified that a recommendation to evacuate the EPZ will cause thousands of persons from outside the EPZ to evacuate. This will greatly increase the demand placed on the evacuation network, particularly the LIE and Sunrise Highway. Yet LILCO's time estimates consider only the demand created by persons whose trips originate within the EPZ. Failure to consider the evacuation shadow demand leads to unrealistically low demand level esti-mates for the transportation network and resultant unrealistic time esti-mates. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 44-45; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 50-51;. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 3; Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 32-34 and Fig. 8.
566. The evidence shows that the majority of persons living east of the EPZ will attempt to evacuate by traveling west. This will compel them to use routes (particularly the LIE and Sunrise Highway) passing through or along the edge of the EPZ -- the same routes that evacuees from the EPZ will use. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 3-4 and Fig. 1.393/ The additional thou-sands of cars will increase congestion along these and other routes, caus-ing longer queues (both inside and outside the EPZ) and increased 393/ This is especially true since it is almost impossible to cut off all arterials into the EPZ and because the Plan does not contemplate blocking the LIE at the eastern EPZ boundary. Tr. 3471-72 (Urbanik). 385- l m -- . -- ,u --- , -- . . - . _ -.-w..-.e--,...-- c evacuation times, which will, in turn, cause motorists to be in the area of danger longer, enhancing their risk of radiation exposure. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 4. LILCO's evacuation times, as reported in Appendix A, fail to-consider these effects. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 44-45; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 51-52; Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 32-34. 567. There will also be problems created by voluntary evacuees who live in the densely populated areas west of the EPZ. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 4 and Att. 2; Tr. 3534-35 (Urbanik). Large numbers of these evacuees can cause delays for people attempting to leave the EPZ due to congestion on the evacuation routes directly outside and to the west of the EPZ. Again, LILCO failed to give any consideration to these effects in its time estimates. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 4; Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 44-45; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 51-52. 568. PRC Voorhees developed estimates that take the shadow phenomenon into account, using data derived by Prcfessors Zeigler and Johnson and Dr. Cole. The PRC Voorhees study, using its EVACPLAN model, found that the ef-feet of evacuation from the East End on critical portions of the evacuation network will be substantial. For instance, queues along the LIE will ex-tend from within the EPZ westerly and can be expected to last for almost 17 hours. Congestion along Sunrise Highway at the southern edge of the EPZ will continue for a similar period of time, with queues west of the EPZ not dissipating for over 20 hours. There will also be substantial queues along Routes 25A, 347 and 25, among others. Thus, thousands of cars will be -386- virtually immobile along these routes for many hours. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 6. The analysis concludes that during the summer months, under normal weather conditions and with no breakdowns or other road impediments, evacu-ation of the EPZ will take approximately 17 hours. During the rest of the year, evacuation will take approximately 11 hours under normal weather con-ditions. These estimates, of course, increase if there is adverse weath-er.394/ Id., at 5; SC Exs. 6, 7. 569. In supplemental testimony, Mr. Lieberman disputed Voorhees' analysis. He contended that the EVACPLAN model utilizes a more limited body of information and is less flexible than DYNEV. Cordaro et al. (Supp.), ff. Tr. 2337, at 6-12. Based on Mr. Polk's defense of the model, however, we find that Voorhees' modeling effort was complete and comprehen-sive. Tr. 3254-70 (Polk); LILCO Exs. 7, 8. We note in particular that PRC planners based their modeling effort on actual field surveys where capacity restraints on the evacuation network were analyzed and measurements of ac-tual flows and capacities were obtained. Tr. 2922-23 (Polk). Moreover, PRC modeled a more realistic evacuation by accounting for the shadow phe-nomenon anii traffic traveling on the Sunrise Highway (which for all intents and purpos2a is within the EPZ). Id., at 3377-78. Finally, we note that 394/ The KLD and PRC estimates were derived using different traffic models. While the methodology used in both models is roughly comparable, KLD's trip assignments are more heavily predicated on route optimization. The PRC model assumes that optimization will not be achievable during an emergency. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 5. Nevertheless, the PRC esti-mates are, if anything, probably low because they do not include the effects of accidents and other such impediments. Id., at 6. 1 -387-I the Catawba Board recently approved time estimates for that facility which were based on the PRC EVACPLAN model. See Duke Power Co., LBP-84-37, supra, slip. o2. at 96, et seq. PRC's analyses for Duke Power included . time estimates for the shadow phenomenon. Id., at 98-99. 570. Mr. Lieberman charged that the longer evacuation times derived by the PRC analysis were largely the result of including traffic ori-ginating from the East End and traveling westward on Sunrise Highway. Cordaro et al. (Supp.), ff. Tr. 2337, at 14-22. According to Mr. Lieberman, even though Sunrise Highway forms the southern EPZ boundary, it is not actually in the EPZ. Tr. 2366-67 (Lieberman). He claimed that if one considers only the traffic originating from within the EPZ, the PRC data show that traffic clears the EPZ within 7 hours and 30 minutes, thus confirming LILCO's contention that voluntary evacuation does not materially affect evacuation times for EPZ residents. Cordaro et al. (Supp.), ff. Tr. 2337, at 14-22. 571. The Board does not accept Mr. Lieberman's premise. It was ap-propriate for PRC to consider in its estimates traffic from East Enders on Sunrise Highway. Omission of this traffic from time estimates is un-justified since Sunrise Highway forms the southern EPZ boundary for 8 miles and will be a major route for thousands of persons who evacuate from both forks of the East End, as well as for many people who evacuate from the EPZ. Indeed, this Board would be remiss if it arbitrarily closed its eyes to a major evacuation artery just because it allegedly lies mere yards from -388- e M i LILCO's arbitrary EPZ line. Under 10'CFR 5 50.47(c)(2), Sunrise Highway -constitutes an access route that should be considered part of the EPZ. Further, PRC's analysis indicates that there will be severe congestion along Sunrise Highway, with queues extending from west of the EPZ boundar*/ to beyond the eastern EPZ boundary. Since people on Sunrise Highway could be affected by any nuclear accident severe enough to warrant an EPZ evacua-tion, their presence on~the edge of the EPZ must be taken into account in deriving time estimates to give decisionmakers realistic information on the population at risk and the time required to remove them from the area of danger. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 7-9. 5'72 '. .KLD ; iso derived time estimates which purport to account for the shadow phenomenon. Cordaro et al.,- ff. Tr. 2337 and Act. 11. The results of the KLD study (KLD TM-77), however, have not been incorporated in the Plan. Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 6-7.395/ -KLD TM-77 analyzed the shadow phe-nomenon under 5. scenarios, all of which assume evacuation of the entire EPZ. For a " planned evacuation (i.e. , with all of LILCO's traffic -con-trols in place and operating), 2 runs were made, one assuming 25'.' and the other 50% voluntary evacuation under normal weather conditions. For an " uncontrolled" evacuation (assuming no special controls, but all normal 395/ Dr. Urbanik testified that given the conditions existing on Long Is-land, it may be appropriate to include estimates in the Plan which consider the shadow phenomenon, particularly because of the excess de-mand that would be placed on roadway capacity and the effect of traf- 'fic generated by. voluntary evacuees conflicting with routes taken by evacuees from the EPZ. Urbanik, ff. Tr. 3430, at 8; Tr. 3456, 3458-59 (Urbanik). -389- i lights and signs in place), 3 runs were executed, assuming 25% and 50% vol-untary evacuation in normal weather, and 50% voluntary evacuation in in-clement winter weather. Cordaro et al. (Shadow Phenomenon), ff. Tr. 2337, at 14; Tr. 2552-53 (Lieberman).396/ 573. For the planned scenario, all voluntary evacuees from the East End were assumed to skirt the EPZ by taking Sunrise Highway. For the uncontrolled scenario, 4% of the voluntary evacuees from the East End were assumed to enter the EPZ'on the LIE. The rest were routed to Sunrise High-way. In both cases, the conclusion that most or all voluntary evacuees would not enter the EPZ was based on the assumption that they would heed LILCO's warning messages, and that if people were strongly motivated to evacuate, they would also be strongly motivated to avoid the EPZ. Tr. 2554-59 (Lieberman). 574. In addition, Mr. Lieberman assumed a 4 hoor trip generation pe-riod for traffic originating from areas outside of the EPZ as compared with 2 hours for people living within the EPZ. Mr. Lieberman stated that a major reason for the difference is that siren coverage extends only slightly beyond the EPZ. Thus, La his opinion, the notification time for people outside the EPZ is likely to be longer than for people within the 396/ With respect to the area outside the EPZ, KLD looked at areas extend-ing only 10 miles to the east and 10 miles to the west of the EPZ. According to Mr. Lieberman, this limit was chosen because it reflected a distance beyond which the formation of queues would not affect traf-fic exiting the EPZ. Cordaro et al. (Shadow Phenomenon), ff. Tr. 2337, at 17-18; Tr. 2567 (Lieberman). -390- , . --, - - - - . - -. - . . . . - . ~_--- . - - , - . _. EPZ. Cordaro et al. (Shadow Phenomenon), ff. Tr. 2337, at 16.397/ 575. The results of Mr. Lieberman's computer runs show that for a " planned" EPZ evacuation, the existence of 25*. voluntary evacuation from the 10-20 mile region under normal conditions would lengthen the EPZ evacu-ation by only 20 minutes, from 4 hours and 55 minutes to 5 hours and 15 minutes. If the percentage of voluntary evacuation increased to 50"., then the time to evacuate the EPZ wculd increase by 1 hour and 40 minutes to 6 hours and 35 minutes. M., at 17. For an " uncontrolled" evacuation of the EPZ, voluntary evacuation of 25*. within the 10-20 mile region would in-crease evacuation time by 30 minutes from 6 hours and 30 minutes to 7 hours. For voluntary evacuation of 50*. of the people from the 10-20 mile region under normal weather conditions, the EPZ evacuation time would in-crease by 1 hour and 5 minutes from 6 hours and 3 minutes to 7 hours and 35 minutes. If inclement winter weather is assumed along with a 50*. voluntary evacuation, then the uncontrolled FPZ evacuation time increases by 2 hours and 10 minutes, from 7 hours and 55 minutes to 10 hours and 5 minutes. M.,at 17-18 and Att. 15. 576. Professors Herr and Pigozzi and Mr. Polk disputed KLD's shadow phenomenon analysis. They explained that the methods used in KLD's 397/ This assumption is contradicted by Mr. Lieberman's own work in another study, KLD TM-139, which assumed that word of an accident would spread rapidly both inside and outside of the EPZ. Indeed, KLD TM-139 as-sumed that all people inside and outside the EPZ would be notified within 40 minutes after the sirens sounded. Tr. 2571-72 (Lieberman). -391- computer simulation suffered from all the flaws exhibited in the time esti-mates printed in Appendix A. See findings, supra). They also found that KLD unjustifiably omitted the travel of voluntary evacuees from the East End over Sunrise Highway, even though an 8-mile portion of Sunrise Highway defines the southern boundary of the EPZ. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909, at 46; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 53; Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 6-7. And, they criticized KLD's unfounded assumption that the evacuation trip generation process would extend over a 2-hour period within the EPZ, but over a 4-hour period outside the EPZ. Pigozzi (Direct), ff. Tr. 2909 at 47; Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 53. 577. On the basis of our review of the KLD and PRC analyses, we con-cur with Professor Herr that the PRC estimates more realistically ret esent evacuation times from the Shoreham EPZ than do the KLD estimates. Tr. 3038-39 (Herr). In particular, KLD's results are flawed by the failure to include travel by voluntary evacuees from the East End over Sunrise Highway. Given the testimony we heard regarding the congested conditions likely to occur on Sunrise Highway (Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 6-9), we also conclude that many more than 4*. of voluntary evacuees from the East End will seek to travel on the LIE and, as a result, will enter the EPZ. We further find unjustified and internally inconsistent KLD's assumption that the evacuation trip generation process would extend over a 2-hour period within the EPZ, but over a 4 hour period outside the EPZ. Given the effec-tiveness of the electronic media as a means of communication, it is unre-alistic to assume that people outside the EPZ will learn of the emergency -392- .c_. hours later than those within the EPZ. Herr, ff. Tr. 2909, at 53; Pigozzi, ff. Tr. 2909, at 46-47. We thus conclude that even if the estimates in Ap-pendix A included KI-D's analysis of the. shadow phenomenon (which they do not), they would not.be accurate and reliable.
- 16. Perimeter Control (Contention 23.H) 578. The issue in Contention 23.H is that LILCO's traffic guides will not be able to provide adequate control of access into the EPZ, and that the resulting additional EPZ traffic will increase evacuation times.
Mr. Lieberman acknowledged that the desire of people outside the EPZ to re-unite with their families makes it unlikely that attempts to prohibit entry into the EPZ will be successful. Rather, the Plan calls for allowing peo-ple with a need to enter the EPZ to do so, and for " discouraging" all others. To accomplish this, LILCO plans to station personnel at major EPZ entrances and have them deploy traffic cones that indicate that entry into the EPZ at that location is discouraged. Cordaro et al. (Shadow Phenome-non), ff. Tr. 2337, at 21. Mr. Lieberman and Mr. Weismantle felt that vol-untary evacuees heading west from the East End who encounter these cenes and who have no need to reunite with families will follow a southward route around the EPZ rather than entering the EPZ. Id., at 21-23. 579. The County's witnesses testified that persons may seek to enter the EPZ for reasons other than reuniting with families; for example, be-cause they perceive that they can evacuate more quickly to the west through the EPZ or because they are unaware of the EPZ boundaries. LILCO's traffic -393-u- s guides will be unable to inhibit this traffic into the EPZ with any degree of st5ccess. ~Indeed, the SCPD supplied lists of intersections outside, but near the edge of, the EPZ where traffic guides should 'ce located if entry into the EPZ is to be minimized,. Under the Plan, however, many of these locations will not be manned. Roberts e,t al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 65, 67-68 1 and Atts. 12, 13;.Tr. 3360-65 (Roberts). .The SCPD witnesses also testified that the traffic guides will not be able to discourage access to the EPZ because they lack the authority, training and experience to control traffic effectively. Thus,evacueeswhoaffirmadrelydesiretoentertheEPZwill disregard whatever instructions the traffic guides give them. Indeed, even trained, experienced police officers would find controlling access into the EPZ'to be exceedingly difficult. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2260, at 66. We ., i agree with the testimony of the SCPD witnesses '(who are especially experi-f enced in this area) and thersfore conclude that people will enter the EPZ in greater numbers than LILCO has accounted (for, and that the additional demand placed on i.he evEenatiorI network will increase evacuation times.398/ s , 17. . Conclusions on Contentions 65, 23.D, H 580. Section IV of Ai,pendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that license % qA ,. applicants " provide an analysis of the' time required to evacuate and for ; L; taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within g i 398/ We also note that LILCO'.C Proposed Finding 481 (LILCO Brief, at 226) mischaractarizes the record. ' Contrary to LILCO's assertion, FEMA wit-nessMcIndfredidnotsanctionLILC0(sperimetercontroltechniques. 'N See: McIntire, ff. Tr. 2086, at 3, p: .', 3 . . - , g y n' _ , 1 I - r , ., ;394- i i l the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations." Likewise, NUREG 0654 Section II.J.8 and Appendix 4 require evacuation time estimates that are useful to those in command and control of the emergency response.. In order _to be useful, evacuation time estimates must be accurate and realistic; to be realistic and accurate, they must consider all factors which reasonably could affect evacuation times significantly. Based on our findings above, we conclude that LILCO has not met the requirements of Appendix E or NUREG 0654. Rather, its estimates rest on incomplete input data and numerous erroneous assumptions. If LILCO's time estimates had taken into account the relevant factors that the record es-tablishes will be operative in an emergency, those times would be much higher, as PRC Voorhees indeed found to be the case. If used by those in command and control of a radiological emergency, LILCO's time estimates could well lead to incorrect protective action recommendations which, in turn, could well lead to greater risk of public exposure to health-threatening radiation. B. Road Obstacles and Cars Without Fuel (Contention 66) 581. Contention 66 alleges that the Plan provisions pertaining to re-moval of roadway obstacles and dispensing of fuel to motorists will not be adequate in a Shoreham emergency. The Contention subparts A-F concern: the number of tow trucks needed to remove blockages on evacuation routes; whether tow trucks will be able to remove obstructions expeditiously in light of heavy evacuation traffic; the lack of Plan provisions for -395-I h evacuation of motorists with disabled cars; the realism of LILCO's assump-tion that normal snow removal services will be provided during a ra-diological emergency; and the adequacy of LILCO's fuel distribution system. 582. -LILCO assumes that only 3_or 4 road obstructions would occur during an evacuation. See Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, at
- 81. For reasons set forth in our findings on Contention 65.D (Section IX.A, supra), this LILC0 estimate is-far too low. Thus, in considering the
- subparts of Contention 66, we assume that there will be 141 accidents and 277' incidents of automobiles running out of gas. See Polk, ff. Tr. 2909, at 12-16.
- 1. Number of Tow Trucks (Contention 66.A).
583. In the event of an evacuation of the EPZ, LILCO plans to deploy only 12 " road crews," each of which may use either a tow truck or another LILCO vehicle such as a dump truck to remove roadway obstacles. Cordaro et al. , f f. Tr. 6685,- at 6-7.399/ LILCO chose to deploy only 12 crews based on the number of expected obstructions (4) and the estimated time required to clear obstructions. Id., at 7. However, in view of our holding that 399/ LILCO's witnesses discussed some possible Plan modifications, such as use of large LILCO trucks to bulldoze vehicles off roadways rather than using tow trucks. Tr. 6695-97, 6703-31 (Weismantle, Cordaro, Lieberman). It would be inappropriate to rely on these possible changes as substantive provisions of the Plan. Moreover, based on .their personal experiences in dealing with disabled vehicles, the County's witnesses testified that LILCO's proposal to use vehicles other than tow trucks is not feasible. Tr. 6910-11 (Michel, McGuire). -396- the number of obstructions occurring during an evacuation is likely to be far higher than LILCO estimates, it is clear that the basis for LILCO's de-cision to deploy only 12 trucks is wrong. 584. It is also evident that the number of tow trucks LILCO intends to employ is too few when one considers the land area to be covered and the volume of evacuation traffic. The EPZ covers roughly 160 square miles of land. In an evacuation of the full EPZ, approximately 50,000 vehicles will travel 304,000 vehicle-miles, excluding the effects of the shadow phenome-non. Monteith at al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 7. Relying on their extensive ex-perience, the SCPD witnesses testified that 12 tow trucks are far too few to cover this area and traffic volume. Tr. 6879-80 (McGuire, Monteith, t Michel); 6916-17 (Michel).400/ The SCPD witnesses did not identify the ~ number of trucks that would be necessary, but noted that for a Shoreham demonstration involving about 20,000 people, 8 tow trucks were available. Tr. 6930-34, 6941 (Michel, McGuire, Monteith). 585. The County's testimony concerning the insufficiency of 12 tow trucks for an EPZ evacuation was not substantially controverted by LILCO, other than by the rejected assertion that 12 trucks are sufficient. We find in favor of Intervenors on Contention 66. A. 400/ The County's witnesses, all members of the SCPD, have had first-hand experience with the effects of and remedies for traffic blockages of all types on roadways. Tr. 6925-26, 6928 (Michel). -397- r, i l
- 2. Time Needed To Remove Obstacles (Contention 66.B).
h 586. Contention 66.B questions the ability of LILCO's tow trucks to respond to the scene of an accident in a timely manner. For reasons dis-cussed below, LILCO's deployment plan will not work and we rule for Inter-venors on this contention.401/ 587. The SCPD witnesses testified that under LILCO's deployment strategy, tow trucks are required to travel on evacuation routes in the direction of the evacuating traffic flow.402/ While on evacuation routes, LILCO's trucks will travel only as fast as the evacuating traffic 401/ Crews would be spaced 2-4 miles apart on major evacuation routes; to increase the probability that crews could travel in the opposite direction from the main evacuation flow, the Plan deploys crews in a biased manner to the west and south of Shoreham. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6685, at 10-11; Tr. 6735-37, 6784 (Lieberman, Weismantle). LILCO has not conducted any drills or computer runs to determine how long it would take its trucks to respond to an obstruction. Tr. 6776 (Lieberman). 402/ For example, OPIP 3.6.3, at 42, directs crews to travel to the follow-ing four deployment positions from the Riverhead staging area: to traffic control post 62, requiring travel of 12-13 miles with evacua-tion flow; to post 27, requiring travel of approximately 11 miles with 2 evacuation flow; to post 10, requiring travel of 10-11 miles with evacuation flow; to post 14 requiring travel of 5 miles with evacua-tion flow. Tr. 6931-32, 6937-40 (Michel). Similarly, if an obstruc-tion occurred at or near one of the Riverhead traffic circles, a truck at the nearest deployment point would have to travel with.the evacua-tion flow to get to the obstruction. Tr. 6782-83 (Lieberman). If an obstruction occurred to the east of the intersection of'Nicholls Road and Route 347, the only truck that could respond rapidly would have to travel with the evacuation flow. Tr. 6781 (Lieberman). Finally, even when a truck could travel against the evacuation flow to get to an ob-struction, it would have to travel with the evacuation flow to return to its deployment location. Tr. 6779-80 (Lieberman). -398- (according to LILCO, at an average of 6.8 mph). Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 12. Even when LILCO's trucks travel against evacuation flow, they ,could still encounter substantial delays due to pre-evacuation travel. Tr. 6892-93 (Michel). 588. The LILCO deployment strategy requiring movement in evacuation traffic will result in severe problems. For instance, LILCO's trucks will be unable to move through traffic rapidly because people are unlikely to give them the right-of-way.403/ Thus, the Board finds that despite LILCO's assertions that it will remove obstacles before they become major sources of congestion, it is more likely that the trucks will be able to do little more than sit in and add to the congestion themselves, because they will be unable to reach the obstacles and remove them. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 14.404/ Thus, the Plan fails to provide reasonable assurance that 403/ LILCO trucks w*ill not be perceived as official emergency vehicles. The SCPD witnesses testified as to their extensive experience with mo-torists' failing to yield to clearly marked police emergency vehicles; we agree that it is reasonable to assume that LILCO trucks will be ac-corded even less recognition and deference by the public. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 12, 13. Furthermore, congested traffic condi-tions would make it nearly impossible to give LILCO trucks the right-of-way since slow-moving or stopped traf fic lines offer little maneuvering room to make way for emergency vehicles. Although it may -be possible for trucks to travel on the shoulder of some evacuation routes, such circumstances would be limited. Many of the routes have no shoulders or have shoulders which cannot support a heavy vehicle, and shoulders could be biccked by parked or disabled vehicles, or in-terrupted by bridges and other structures. Where adequate shoulders do exist, evacuees will attempt to utilize them as extra lanes, par-ticularly where traffic flow has been impaired. The shoulders will likely become as congested as the other lanes. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 13. 404/ FEMA's witnesses stated that the Plan's provisions for the removal of obstacles were adequate. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 63; Tr. (Footnote cont'd next page) 399- LILCO's trucks will be able to reach road obstructions expeditiously.
- 3. Evacuation of Persons Whosis Cars Become Disabled (Contention 66.C) 589. LILCO concedes that the Plan does not contain express provisions for transportation of evacuees whose automobiles have become inoperative.
Tr. 6794, 6848 (Weismantle); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6685, at 11-12. They stated that people in this situation could hope to obtain rides from pass-ing motorists, evacuation buses, or LILCO road crews, and that stranded evacuees probably would succeed in evacuating if left to fend for them-selves. Id., at 11-12; Tr. 6794-95 (Weismantle). 590. The County's witnesses noted that most evacuating vehicles will .be filled with family members and their personal possessions, and that evacuees may thus be unable or unwilling to pick up stranded persons. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 14-15; Tr. 6920-22 (Monteith). Relying upon evacuation buses to pick up stranded evacuces is feasible only if they become stranded on a bus route (Tr. 6921 (Monteith)), and evacuation buses (Footnote cont'd from previous page) 12,802 (Baldwin). However, FEMA had not determined whether 12 tow trucks are sufficient, or whether the proposed deployment locations are adequate; those judgments will not be made until an exercise. Tr. 12,803-05, 12,859 (Baldwin, Keller, Kowieski). FEMA has also made no judgments about the appropriateness of the storage locations of LILCO's tow trucks or the le h of time necessary to deploy them. Tr. 12,810-12 (Kowieski). The FEMA testimony on Contentions 66.A and 66.B was based only on the fact that the Plan mentions tow trucks. Tr. 12,818 (Keller). Therefore, we find that the FEMA testimony has no probative value. -400- generally do not traverse the LIE or Sunrise Highway. Tr. 6796-97 b (Lieberman). We thus find for Intervenors on Contention 66.C.405/ l
- 4. Snow Removal (Contention 66.D).
591. The Plan has no provisions for snow removal other than an "an-ticipation" that " snow removal will be provided by local organizations in their normal fashions" during a radiological emergency. Plan, at 2.2-5.
- l. LILCO's witnesses asserted that no letters of agreement with local govern-I ments are necessary. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6685, at 13.406/ We reject LILCO's position.
592. FEMA found the Plan inadequate because it lacked snow removal administrative and operating procedures, and because the Plan failed to refer to applicable public laws or letters of agreement with local snow re-moval organizations. Baldwin et al. , f f. Tr. 12,174, at 64-65; Tr. l 12,819-20 (Kowieski, Baldwin). 405/ LILCO argues that there is no requirement for " express treatment" of such stranded evacuees. LILCO Brief, at 231. We disagree. The pro-tactive action of evacuation can hardly be viewed to be adequate (10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1)) if there is no means to help these people. 406/ LILCO's position on this matter was inconsistent with its solicitation and receipt of an agreement from the Coast Guard and DOE-RAP, both of which are governmental-entities. LILCO's attempt to distinguish its actions concerning snow removal from its actions concerning the func-tions to be performed by DOE and the Coast Guard are not persuasive. Sy Tr. 6803-06 (Weismantle, Cordaro). See also Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearson Harris Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50-400, 50-401, Further Rulings on Admissibility of Offsite Emergency Planning Contentions Submitted by Intervenor Eddleman, slip op. at 34 (June 14, 1984) (NUREG 0654 Criteria J.10.k might call for accounting of means for dealing with snow and ice impediments). -401- 593. The New York and County testimony supported FEMA. First, LILCO has never contacted local entities responsible for snow removal to obtain agreements or to offer training to snow removal personnel. Tr. 6802, 6806 (Weismantle); Monteith et al. , ff. Tr. 6868, at 15-16. Second, it is like-ly that many persons who normally perform snow removal duties will not re-port for work because they will evacuate or shelter with their families. Id.; Tr. 6895-96 (Michel, Monteith). 594. Third, Mr. Gibbons stated that NYSDOT cannot and does not commit that its personnel would operate snow removal equipment during a ra-diological emergency. Gibbons, ff. Tr. 7005, at 2.407/ All snow removal operations on the state highways in the EPZ would cease upon receipt of an evacuation recommendation because the state employees would be directed to evacuate. Tr. 7011-13, 7021, 7034 (Gibbons). Even if some NYSDOT employees attempted to perform snow removal functions during an evacuation, the stop-and-go conditions that would exist, with average speeds of less than 10 mph, would impair the ability of the snow plows to function proper-ly. Tr. 7027-28 (Gibbons). LILCO failed to controvert this evidence. The Board finds that the problems identified with respect to NYSDOT are equally applicable to local jurisdictions and other entities. Tr. 7017-18 (Gibbons). 407/ Mr. Gibbons is Regional Highway Maintenance Engineer in the NYSDOT Re-gion 10 (Nassau and Suffolk Counties). He is responsible for imple-menting snow and ice control procedures on routes within the EPZ, and for allocating all state snow removal equipment and personnel in Re-gion 10. Gibbons , f f. Tr. 7005, at 2; Tr. ' 7016-17 (Gibbons) . In light of his experience we give his testimony great weight. -402- 595. LILCO asserted that even if snow removal services were not pro-vided, unplowed roads would have little or no effect on an evacuation. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6685, at 13-14.408/ We disagree. For example, the State and County witnesses testified, based on personal experience, that many of the major evacuation routes are particularly susceptible to snow and ice hazards; a standard police cruiser cannot navigate those roads safely without four-wheel drive. Monteith ct al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 16-17; Tr. 6899 (Turano), 6899-6900 (Monteith). Snowfall need not he unusually heavy to cause traffic on any EPZ road to come to a standstill; a light dusting could be enough to snarl traffic. Tr. 6898, 6900 (Michel, Monteith); Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 17. In some cases, 4 inches of snow could render a road impassable. Tr. 7026 (Gibbons). 596. The Plan asserts that under severe snow or ice conditions, shel-tering is the preferred protective action "until an evacuation becomes a safe and feasible alternative." Plan, App. A, at II-4. However, it does 408/ LILCO advanced several arguments on this point, including the follow-ing: snow removal operations can be expected to occur at least up to the point when the sirens sound so roads will be reasonably clear at the time of an evacuation; additional snow or ice accumulation would have no effect because the time estimates for adverse winter weather conditions allow for an additional 90 minutes (Tr. 6814, 6819 (Weismantle)); if less than 4 inches of snow were to fall, roadways would still be passable (Tr. 6814-15 (Weismantle)); and if greater snowfalls were to occur, a sheltering recommendation would be issued in " virtually all cases." Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6685, at 13-14; Tr. 6820-22 (Weismantle) and, the deployment of snow removal equipment during an evacuation would be undesirable because snow plows would im-pede traffic and, in the absence of drifting, any snowfall, regardless of depth,_will reduce highway capacity by no more than 30%. Tr. 6815-17 (Lieberman). -403- not take " severe" snow or ice conditions to reduce substantially travel speeds on EPZ roadways. Storms which are less than " severe" will have a substantial impact on travel times if no one is available to clear and sand -the roadways. When cars drive over snow that has fallen onto the roadway surface, icing often occurs, resulting in accidents and greatly reduced travel speeds. The lack of prompt and effective snow removal and sanding capabilities is bound to result in greatly increased accidents and aban-doned vehicles, leading to longer evacuation times. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 16-18. Thus, during or after a snow storm, evacuation would never be "a safe and feasible alternative" in the absence of a snow-removing capability. d , at 17.4_0,9_/ ,I_d.
- 5. Fuel Disbursement (Contention 66.F) 597. Contention 66.F alleges that LILCO will be unable to provide fuel for evacuees and that its fuel distribution scheme will cause conges-tion and delays in evacuation.
598. LILCO contends that its fuel allocation plan will provide ade-quate fuel supplies to evacuating traffic and will not cause delays on evacuation routes. LILCO states that its fuel allocation sites will be in 409/ Mr. Lieberman asserted that regardless of the depth of snow on the highways, capacity would only be reduced by about 30%. Tr. 6816-19, 6858-60 (Lieberman). Mr. Gibbons stated, based on NYSDOT's quarterly engineering newsletter, that snow and ice on roads reduces capacity by approximately 50%, provided that the depth is such that the highway still can be traversed. Tr. 7029 (Gibbons). We therefore reject Mr. Lieberman's testimony. -404- ._m . . . _. __ areas adjacent to major evacuation routes and that to reduce traffic - queues, each person seeking fuel will only be given a 3-gallon allot-ment.410/ Since each fuel truck has 1,200 gallons of fuel, approximately ' 400 vehicles could be serviced, twice the number of vehicles which are pre-dicted to run out of fuel during an EPZ evacuation. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6685, at 14-15. LILCO has identified only general " candidate" fuel dis-tribution locations. Tr. 6688-89, 6837 (Lieberman). There are no agree-ments with the owners of any of its contemplated sites. Tr. 6843 (Lieberman). LILCO has made no plans for dispensing fuel to persons who run out of gas at locations not close to the fuel trucks. Tr. 6848 ~ (Weismantle).411/ ;599. LILCO suggests that no fuel plan is required by the NRC rules and thus any deficiencies are unimportant. LILCO Brief, at 233. However, NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.k requires LILCO to identify and provide means for dealing with potential impediments to evacuation. A vehicle that has run out of fuel would be such a potential impediment. See Metropolitan 410/ LILCO asserted that the 3-gallon limit should discourage persons who do not need fuel from waiting in the gas lines and should also facil-itate rapid servicing of those persons who are in need of fuel to travel out of the EPZ. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6685, at 16. 411/ FEMA's witnesses appeared to support LILCO's fuel allocation plan. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 65. However, FEMA had not deter-mined whether the candidate fuel distribution locations are appropri-ate or whether those locations could give rise to queues which could impede evacuation. Tr. 12,812-13 (Kowieski). FEMA will not evaluate this aspect of the Plan until an exercise is conducted. Tr. 12,816-18 (McIntire, Baldwin, Keller). Thus, the FEMA testimony has no proba-tive value on the implementation issue presented in Contention 66.F. -405-4 - e ,~ , ,-..,-r--v - ,,-,nv w,,. -, ,- .y.. ,v e ,.--.e,--,, -e, e..,,..,,-.---- . -,. - r-Edison Co., LBP-81-59, supra, 14 NRC at 1623-24 (Board addresses merit of fuel service support issue). We find that more precise information con-cerning the rationale for location of fuel distribution sites is necessary before a finding of reasonable assurance can be made.412/
- 6. Conclusion on Contention 66.
600. The Board finds that the Plan does not comply with 10 CFR $ 50.47(b)(8) because the equipment relied upon by LILCO to remove roadway obstructions is inadequate and could not respond to obstructions effec-tively. It fails to comply with Section 50.47(b)(10) because the 412/ For instance, LILCO has proposed no distribution sites along such major evacuation routes as Route 112, County Road 21, County Road 83 and the Sunrise Highway. Motorists from the eastern portion of the EPZ evacuating on Sunrise Highway would have to travel through approx-imately 80% of the EPZ before they reached a fuel depot. Tr. 6917-18 (Monteith); Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 20. In addition, the County witnesses found most of LILCO's candidate locations inappropri-ate. For example, candidate location No. 1 (Sunrise Highway, general-ly somewhere east of Route 112) is about 5 miles west of the EPZ and would be of no use to evacuees who might run out of fuel within the EPZ. Neither Location No. 2 nor No. 7 (Route 25A, generally somewhere east of County Route 83, and the section of North County Road which the Plan contemplates will be converted to 2 lanes of west-bound traf-fic, respectively) could accommodate 2 lanes of traffic and also a queue of vehicles waiting for gasoline. Location No. 4 (on the grass median of the William Floyd Parkway) would be impossible to use in in-clement weather because it gets muddy and soft very quickly and cars would become stuck in the mud. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 20-21. The County's witnesses also testified that LILCO's provisions for handling queues at fuel distribution sites which might impede evacuating traffic are inadequate. A fuel truck road crew consists of only one person (Tr. 6693 (Weismantle)) and there would be more duties than one person could handle, including pumping fuel, maintaining order in queues, enforcing the 3 gallon allotment, and dealing with encroachments upon traffic flow. Tr. 6908-09 (Michel). -406- r evacuation provisions in the Plan do not adequately account for the exis-tence of road impediments, and during an EPZ evacuation it is reasonable to expect that there will be hundreds of incidents involving vehicle accidents and breakdowns. Monteith et al., ff. Tr. 6868, at 23. For the same rea-sons, the Plan does not satisfy NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.k, in that it fails to provide a practical and effective means for dealing with potential bzpediments to use of evacuation routes, including impassability due to snow or ice. In failing to include provisions for snow removal or roadway sanding, the Plan also fails to satisfy NUREG 0654 Section II.A.3, because t l there are no agreements relating to snow removal operations during an emer-gency. There is no evidence that LILCO's proposed fuel distribution system would effectively deal with evacuee fuel problems and it could further ex-acerbate evacuation traffic congestion by causing queues on evacuation routes. For these reasons, as well as those discussed in our findings on Contention 65 (Section IX.A), we find that there is no assurance that evac-i uation under the Plan would be an adequate protective meas tre or that it could be implemented, and therefore LILCO fails to comply with 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1). I C. Vesther (Contention 97.B) 601. Contention 97.B alleges that if a heavy snowfall and a severe accident at Shoreham occur simultaneously, there is no reasonable assurance that the evacuation procedures in the Plan could be implemented. LILCO's response to Contention 97 is two-fold: heavy snows are rare on Long Island; -407- and, if roads became impassable due to heavy snow, sheltering, not evacua-tion, will be the recommended protective action, which can be ordered by the LERO Director from any location even if the EOC cannot be manned. Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 6950, at 8,10; Plan, App. C, at II-4; Tr. 6982-91 (Cordaro, Weismantle). 602. LILCO has basically conceded the validity of most of the con-corns expressed in Contention 97.B by admitting that the Plan's evacuation procedures would not work during severe snow or ice conditions. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6950, at 8-10. There remain two issues to be resolved: wheth-er a LILCO sheltering recommendation during snow or ice conditions could be implemented; and, whether LILCO is capable of making a correct determina-I tion that EPZ roads are passable. 603. First, there is no assurance that the LERO functions normally performed after the EOC is activated could be performed under snow or ice conditions which prevented EOC activation, except possibly in an ad hoc e manner. Tr. 6984-90 (Weismantle). Thus, for example, there would be no way to discover or remedy a PNS malfunction because route alert drivers and the rest of LERO could not be mobilized (Tr. 6983 (Weismantle)), the provi-sions in OPIP 3.6.5 for contacting special facilities by telephone could . not be implemented (Tr. 6984 (Weismantle)), and it might be impossible to inform persons in the EPZ that a radiological emergency was in prog-ress.413/ Tr. 6983-84 (Cordaro). 413/ The FEMA witnesses agreed that the Plan does not take into account the range of possible weather conditions which might prevent LERO from (Footnote cont'd next page) -408- 1 l 604. Second, the LERO Director is to decide whether roads and drive-ways are impassable so as to warrant a sheltering recommendation as opposed to evacuation. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6950, at 8-9; Tr. 6979 (Weismantle).414/ This is an important function since otherwise LILCO might recommend evacuation which would leave motorists exposed to radia-tion, stranded on impassable roads. However, we find the Plan deficient for failing to provide a reliable mechanism for making the foregoing deter-mination. Although LILCO asserted that the LERO Director is to receive from onsite personnel an initial procective action recommendation that would be based upon roadway conditions (see Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6950, at 9), there is no procedure instructing onsite personnel or offsite moni-toring teams to take into account road conditions when making their protec-tive action recommendations. Tr. 6968, 6952-53 (Miele). 605. Furthermore, Mr. Weismantle testified that roads are " passable" a whenever a snowfall is less than 4 inches. Tr. 6814-15 (Weismantle). New York witness Gibbons testified that in some cases, accumulations of less (Footnote cont'd from previous page) mobilizing during a radiological emergency, but merely considers unfa-vorable weather conditions in connection with evacuation time esti-mates. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174 at 100. 414/ LILCO suggests that the Director could receive information by his own observation, or from LERO workers at staging areas, LILCO's offsite monitoring teams, and DOE field teams. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6950, at 9-10. However, as found earlier, roadway conditions may be such that LERO cannot be mobilized. -409- than 4 inches of snow, or any accumulation of ice, can render a road im-passable. Tr. 7022-26 (Gibbons).415/ Mr. Gibbons also disputed LILCO's assertion (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6950, at 9-10; Tr. 6971 (Weismantle)) that since the EOC is approximately 22 miles from Shoreham, the weather and road conditions in the EOC area would be similar to conditions inside the EPZ. Tr. 7029-31 (Gibbons). Weather conditions on Long Island are highly variable. Gibbons, ff. Tr. 7005, at 6; Tr. 7030-31 (Gibbons).416/ Yet the LERO Director would not seek information about road conditions for every road in the EPZ. Tr. 6979 (Weismantle). 606. We conclude that the Plan does not provide reasonable assurance that LILCO will make a correct determination as to road passability and that LILCO has underestimated the likelihood of unfavorable weather ad-versely affecting implementation of the Plan. Further, we cannot endorse a Plan which does not provide for a .nobilized offsite response organization cuzing snow or i*ce conditions. LILCO has failed to demonstrate compliance 415/ Thus, LILCO's testimony regarding historical occurrences of heavy snow is irrelevant. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6950, at 8. Even rela-tively light snow or ice may render roads impassable. 416/ The North Shore tends to accumulate more snow and ice than the South Shore. In addition, heavy snow has f allen ia a swath 10-15 miles wide from Port Jefferson to Patchogue, with no snow in adjacent locations. Thus, a judgment that roads are impassable, based on conditions at the EOC, might not be valid for conditions existing in the EPZ. Tr. 7030-31 (Gibbons). Also, several EPZ roads (e g., Route 25 and Route 25A) are prone to be rendered impassable by drifting snows. Tr. 7024-26 (Gibbons). LILCO conceded that roads on the North Shore could be rendered impassable due to ice conditions, whereas roads in the in-terior could still be passable. Tr. 6976 (Cordaro). -410- with 10 CFR $ 50.47(b)(9) because the Plan fails to provide for the assess-ment of the offsite consequences of a Shoreham emergency which occurs dur-ing unfavorable weather, and with 10 CFR 5 50.47(b)(10), because the Plan does not include protective actions which could be implemented and which would provide adequate protection in snow or ice conditions. In addition, the Plan does not satisfy NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.1.e, A.4 and H.4 because it fails to provide for 24-hour per day emergency response and operations or timely activation and staffing of the Plan's facilities and centers. Indeed, LILCO conceded that in snow or ice conditions LERO may be unable to mobilize at all. The Plan also fails to satisfy NUREG 0654 Sections II.J.2, II.J.9, and II.J.10.k, because it does not ensure that sheltering can be implemented during snow or ice conditions. We therefore rule for Interve-nor3. D. Buses for ths Public (Contentions 24.F.2. 24.I. 67) 607. Intervenors contend that LILCO has planned inadequately for the evacuation of persons without access to automobiles.417/ Under the Plan, school buses under contract to LILCO will be designated as route buses which will travel along predesignated routes in the EPZ to be flagged down by people needing transportation. After completing each run, the route buses are to return to a transfer point (there are a total of 11 in or near the EPZ), and discharge all passengers, who are then loaded onto transfer 417/ Evacuation of the handicapped, school children and persons in special facilities are addressed in Contentions 70-73. -411- l 1 l buses which take them to a relocation center. Plan,-App. A., at IV-73 to 74x. . Transfer buses are to make only one trip to a relocation center dur-1 , ing an evacuation. See Cordaro et a1., ff. Tr. 7980, at 12-13. -Interve-nors allege numerous deficiencies in LILCO's scheme: LILCO has underestimated the number of buse: required; due to a large number of bus runs and traffic congestion, evacuation times will be far longer than those in the Plan; LILCO's proposed transfer points are inadequately located and configured; LILCO has no agreements permitting the use of transfer points not owned by LILC0; and LILCO's agreements with bus companies for school j r buses are inadequate. For reasons set forth below, we agree with Interve-nors on these contentions. j P
- 1. - Contention 67 (a) Number of Buses Needed (Contention 67.A) {
608. The' Plan assumes that 11,097 persons would need bus tra.sporta- . , tion during an evacuation. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7980, at 11. We accept ) that number.418/ The dispute centers on how many buses must be available to transport this number of people. j 418/ LILCO and the~ County presented conflicting evidence whether the number would be much lower (LILCO suggested 6,500 persons) or much higher ' . (the County suggested between 13,000 and 22,000 persons). Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7980, at 7, 11; Tr. 8081-83 (Cordaro, Weismantle); Herr and Michel, ff. Tr. 8150, 9-21; Tr. 8485-504 (Herr). The numbers are necessarily estimates, since they are based, inter alia, on matters .such as predicting how many' commuters would return home to unite with
- their families. See Tr. 8487 (Herr), 8037-41 (Lieberman); Herr and Michel, ff. Tr. 8150, at 16 and Table 6. Under all the circumstances, we are satisfied with relying on the 11,097 number contained in the i Plan, i'
-412- ; 609. LILCO estLaated.the population of each EPZ subzone, the percent of the population which would need bus transportation, and assumed that each 40-passenger route bus would carry 30 passengers.419/ Tr. 8076 (Lieberman); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7980, at 14. LILCO calculated that it would need 333 buses to make 474 trips: 236 route buses (for 377 trips), plus transfer buses (one trip each), which corresponds to an av-erage load factor of 73%.~ Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7980, at 15. 610. The State's witnesses testified that bus " performance"_rather than technical " capacity" should be used in designing a workable bus trans-portation scheme.420/ Based on their experience in using-school buses for adult transportation, they stated that a school bus with a theoretical ca-pacity of 40 adults has a maximum practical capacity for adults with 419/ This assumption represented a 75% load factor, based on an assumed seating capacity of 40 adults. Cordaro et al.,_ff. Tr. 7980, at 14. LILCO assumed no standees to account for storage of suitcases, bedrolls and other possessions in the aisles (Tr. 6419-20 (Robinson)), and asserted that these assumptions were conservative because in a real emergency,' passengers would consist of both adults and children, and 1uggage could be stored on laps, under seats or in aisles. Tr. ~ 8079-81 (Weismantle, Lieberman). 420/ The State's witnesses, all of whom are employees of the NYSDOT, are very experienced in the field of transportation planning. Mr. Acquario provides technical and managerial assistance concerning the design and implementation of route and schedule strategies to all pub-lic transit operators in New York. Messrs. Albertin an Knighton helped devise the transportation plan for the 1980 Olympics and par-ticipated in the field direction of bus operations during those games. Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 8289, at 2-4. In contrast, none of LILCO's witnesses had ever designed a transportation system other than the one proposed in the Plan. Tr. 7981 (Weismantle); 7997 (Cordaro, Weismantle). -413- luggage 421/ of approximately 30. Tr. 8311-12, 8315-16, 8336 (Knighton); Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 8289, at 8. Applying the temporal and spatial distribution reduction factor assumed by LILCO to the maximum practical ca-pacity results in an average practical capacity of 22.5 passengers per route bus. Id., at 8-9.422/ With the State's practical and experienced as-sumptions and using LILCO's demand estimate of 11,097, 503 route trips and 130 transfer trips would be required. Id.; see Tr. 8507, 8509, 8513 (Herr). 611. We conclude that the calculations and opinions of the State ex-parts are persuasive. They present a practical, real life approach to bus loading, which (assuming adequate buses were available) should ensure a margin of conservatism in this area which is necessarily imprecise. Although LILCO may have intended its estimates to be conservative, we find that the reduced capacity of buses means that its estimated need for 333 buses is too low. 421/ The LILCO brochure instructs evacuees to carry blankets, sleeping bags, clothing for several days and other personal items. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,061, at 8. 422/ LILCO's witnesses asserted that the State witnesses had double counted by using 2 reduction factors. Tr. 8366 (Lieberman). We disagree. The State witnesses, with actual experience in this mattor, were per-suasive that a so-called 40 passenger bus is really only a 30 passenger bus when luggage, etc. is considered. Thus, the applica-tion of a temporal and spatial reduction factor to the maximum practi-cal capacity is appropriate. See Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 8289, at 8-9. We note that LILCO has never tried to seat 40 adults with lug-gage and possessions on a school bus. Tr. 8079-81 (Weismantle, Lieberman). -414-t (b) Evacuation Time Estimates (Contention 67.C) 612. This contention alleges that LILCO's evacuation time estimates ; for the transit-dependent population are underestimated because they fail to' teke into account the effects of traffic congestion. LILCO responded that its bus schedules were designed to take into account the congestion predicted by the DYNEV model; maximum travel speeds for route buses were assumed to be 20 mph for the trips between transfer points to pickup areas, and 7'aph within the pickup areas. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7980, at 18-19; Tr. 8102-05 (Weismantle, Lieberman). Based on our findings on Contention 65' (Section IX.A) pertaining to the DYNEV model and congestion, we reject LILCO's assumed 20 mph speeds because-the buses will encounter both mobili- .zation and evacuation traffic.423/ The State witnesses testified that LILCO's predicted 7 mph speed during pick-up is not realistic because the literature on the average speed of buses performing normal pickup and drop-off functions purportedly relied upon by LILCO (Tr. 3110-11 (Lieberman)), does not reflect the conditions that will be present during an evacuation. Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 8289, at 10-11.424/ 423/ Buses are not expected to begin to service their routes until 2 hours and 15 minutes after the declaration of an emergency. Plan, App. A, at IV-74b; but see our findings on Contention 27 (Section IV.B) regarding the mobilization of bus drivers. 424/ Although LILCO conducted drills during which most route drivers com-plated their. assignments in one third the time set forth in the Plan, they drove automobiles rather than buses, they drove at normal lawful speeds, and they did not simulate stopping to pick up passengers or driving through congested streets.. Tr. 7982-91 (Weismantle, Lieberman). This type of drill provides no realistic basis for route time estimates. -415- f 613. Further, the County and State witnesses discussed several real-istic conditions, not accounted for by LILCO, which would cause its dis-patching and routing schedules to break down and its evacuation time esti-mates accordingly to increase even more. They discussed the effects of delays in LERO worker mobilization,425/ service gaps in LILCO's schedules, locations of bus routes and traffic congestion on LILCO's time estimates. Herr and Michel, ff. Tr. 8150, at 23-24; Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 8289, at 7-15, 19 and Atts. B-D; Tr. 8340-46 (Knighton, Albertin); 7992-94 (Lieberman). 614. For the reasons set forth above, as well as in our findings on Contention 65, we find that LILCO's time estimates.for the transit-dependent population are too low. We therefore find for Intervenors on Contention 67.C. (c) Location and Configuration of Transfer Points (Contention 67.D) 615. This contention alleges that the Plan is inadequate because peo-pie are likely to be kept waiting at transfer points where they will be unprotected from weather or radiation. Four of the transfer points are within the EPZ (6 1/2 to 7 miles from the plant) and the other 7 are 4 425/ LILCO conceded that its bus schedules are based on assumptions that bus drivers can drive to staging areas, to bus depots, and to transfer points in a timely manner, and that if a bus arrives at a transfer point " late," the schedules will be thrown of f, headways will be altered, delays will occur, and evacuation times will be longer. Tr. 8091-97 (Lieberman). -416- miles or less from the EPZ. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7980, at 19-21; Tr. 8112-14.(Weismantle); Herr and Michel, ff. Tr. 8150, at 25. 616. FEMA's witnesses testified that the Plan is inadequate because - it lacks procedures for protecting evacuees at transfer points. Baldwin et al., ff.'Tr. 12,174, at 67. Mr. Baldwin testified that it would be prudent to have transfer points outside the EPZ so evacuees would not be at risk. I Tr. 12,885-86 (Baldwin). 617. LILCO asserted there will be no waits at transfer points of more . than 10 minutes (Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 7980, at 21-23), that evacuees will not be exposed to inclement weather because route buses may not dis-charge passengers unless a transfer bus is waiting (Tr. 8115-16 (Lieberman)), and that persons who evacuate by bus will receive the same radiation dose as persons who evacuate by private automobiles. Tr. 7998-99 (Weismantle). l' l, 618. The State and County witnesses stated that the buses will en-counter traffic conditions (see findings on Contentions 65 (Section IX.A) j and 67.C, supra), which will render LILCO's dispatching and routing sched-l l ulos meaningless. Accordingly, all the assumptions upon which its evacua-l- tion time estimates are based will be wrong. Herr and Michel, ff. Tr. l 8150, at 23-24. They also testified that LILCO's failure to plan for transfer point operations, and deficiencies in the location and configura- , tion of specific transfer points render the transfer scheme inadequate and , unworkable 426/ l 426/ For example, the Plan does not address bus and pedestrian ingress and , j ogrer.,s, bus storage, transfer of passengers and crowd control. (Footnote cont'd next page) f -417-t _ _ -_ _ - _ _ 619. The Board finds that the State, County and FEMA witnesses demon-strated that LILCO's transfer point strategy is inadequate. Since we can-not ru le out t eh possibility of evacuees' being delayed at transfer points, the lack of procedures for protecting evacuees constitutes a deficiency in the Plan.
- 2. Agreements for the Use of Transfer Points (Contention 24.I) 4 620. Eight of 11 transfer points are not owned by LILCO. The Plan
' does not include any agreements with owners which permit LILCO to use their properties during an emergency, but LILCO has obtained written agreements. 2 Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at 14-18 and Atts. 22.A-22.H. The
- question is whether such agreements are adequate.
621. The Board finds that LILCO's transfer point agreements are inad-equate for several reasons: most extend only through February or March 1985, and one is a month-to-month lease (Cordaro et al. , Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, Atts. A, B, D, F, G and H); one consists of a letter which states that "any agreement with LILCO respecting this matter should be submitted to this office for approval," and no agreement was ever submitted (id. , at (Footnote cont'd from previous page) 4 Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 8289, at 15-16. In addition, 6 transfer points would be unusable during or following inclement weather, and two are located so that loaded buses must make left-hand turns across the busiest major evacuation routes. I_d., at 17-18; Herr and Michel, ff. Tr. 8150, at 28; Tr. 8121-22 (Weismantle), 8235 (Michel), 8346-47 l (Knighton). -418- ) Att. 22.C; Tr. 6500-04 (Robinson)); one only grants LILCO permission to use the site "for drill practices until the property is sold." Herr and Michel, ff. Tr. 8150, at 29; Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at Act. 22.E; Tr. 6509-10 (Robinson). We find, therefore, that the Plan provides no reasonable assurance that transfer points will be available during an emergency.
- 3. Buses Committed to Schools (Contention 24.F.2) 622. This contention alleges that if an emergency occurred when school was in session, LILCO would not have access to buses to evacuate persons without access to an automobile (including the homebound, nursing and adult home residents, nursery school students and hospital patients) because LILCO's agreements with school bus companies are subject to the preexisting commitments of those companies to school districts.
623. Of the 1,236 buses covered by LILCO's agreements, approximately 938 are subject to prior commitments to schools both within and outside the EPZ. Cordaro et al., Tr. 5/30/84 Vol. II, at 57-59; Tr. 9307-08 (Weismantle). Assuming that none of the 938 buses would be available to LILCO, LILCO would have only 298 buses to transport people out of the EPZ.427/ If an emergency occurred when buses were required by schools, the 427/ As school runs were completed, some of the 938 committed buses could become available and LILCO would ask school districts outside the EPZ to release some buses. Cordaro et al., Tr. 5/30/84 Vol. II, at 57-59. The Plan contains no provisions for such contingencies. Tr. 9297, 9309-10 (Weismantle) . -419- available buses would be required to make multiple runs, taking much more time. See Tr. 9299-9301 (Weismantle).428/ 624. -In addition, State witness Failla testified that NYSDOT records .on the number of buses in service indicate that if a radiological accident were to occur during school sessions, the bus companies could in fact pro-vide LILCO with only about 10% of the number of buses contracted for by LILCO. Failla, ff. Tr. 9948, at 2-3.429/ Thus, we find that LILCO's 298 bus estimate is overstated; if school were in session, even fewer buses would be available to LILCO. 625. FEMA's witnesses stated that if LILCO's bus agreements contained a prior commitment to schools and school districts, as they do, they would be inadequate. Tr. 12,796-99 (Keller).430/ 428/ Mr. Lieberman ran a computer simulation to ascertain the effect of bus driver mobilization times on the bus schedules set forth in the Plan assuming a rapidly progressing emergency, an evacuation of the entire EPZ, and that all school buses committed to schools would be unavailable to LILCO. Tr. 8093, 8117, 8133 (Lieberman). The result is that LILCO could not implement the bus schedule in the Plan because route bus departures from transfer points would be delayed signifi-cantly. Tr. 8092 (Lieberman); SC Ex. 41. 429/ LILCO challenged Mr. Failla's analysis on the basis that he failed to include additional buses that are owned by companies other than those which have executed agreements with LILCO but which have some corpo-rate officers in common. See Tr. 9988-94, 10,006-07 (Robinson); LILCO Ex. 49. The Board rejects this argument. LILCO's contracts are spe-cific and there is no basis for implying additional terms or parties into them as suggested by LILCO. See Failla, ff. Tr. 9948, at 2; Cordaro et al. , Tr. 5/30/84 Vol. II, Atts. ,1-12; Tr. 9953-54, 9967, 9976-79, 10,015-22 (Failla); 10,002-05 (Robinson). 430/ FEMA had not seen any letters of agreement with bus companies; thus its witnesses were speculating when they suggested that LILCO would (Footnote cont'd next page) -420- 626. Based on the foregoing, the Board concludes that LILCO will not have sufficient buses available to implement its Plan if an emergency were to occur while schools are in session. Thus, we rule for Intervenors on Contention 24.F.2. X. RELOCATION CENTERS (CONTENTIONS 24.0, 24.P 74, 75, 77) A. Centers for the Public (Contentions 24.0, 24.P. 74, 75) 627. These four contentions relate to whether relocation centors are available to provide radiological monitoring and decontamination for I evacuees and their vehicles, and to provide food and shelter to those evacuees with no other place to stay. The contentions deal with the unavailability of facilities to serve as relocation centers; the inappro-priate location of centers proposed by LILC0; LILCO's failure to obtain letters of agreement from the ARC (to assure that services relied upon in the Plan will be performed) and from facility owners (to assure buildings will be available during an emergency); and LILCO's failure to demonstrate that the facilities will have adequate space and facilities to provide nec-essary accommodations and services for the number of evacuous that will re-quire them.431/ As we noted during the hearing on these issues, thoro is a (Footnote cont'd from previous page) have enough buses to provide for the evacuation of school children as well as the transit-dependent population. Tr. 12,222-27 (McIntire). 431/ Every version of the Plan, including Rov'aien 3 which is in evidence, designated particular facilities as relocations centors, and the con-(Footnote cont'd next page) ',21 [ %. % T , T s .M)' ;_ ' i , s. < ' void" in the record resulting free LILCO's failure to designate relocation centers. Tr.14,806,-Oh. Accordingly, for the reasons we set forth below, we find in favor of Intervenors on the=e contentions and rule that LILCO has failed to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10, and 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1).
- 1. Identification of Centers 628. The original version and Revisions 1, 2 and 3 of the Plan desig-nated Suffolk County Community College ("SCCC"), BOCES II Occupational Cen-ter ("BOCES II Center"), and SUNY Stony Brook as primary relocation cen-ters, with SUNY Farmingdale and St. Joseph's College as backup relocation centers. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, at 14. The primary relocation centers, and backup centers if necessary, were to provide mass care, food, shelter, medical counseling and social services, and radiological moni-toring and decontamination of evacuees and their vehicles. Plan, at 4.2-1, 4.2-3. On March 2, 3.984, both the County and LILCO submitted testimony on
> these contentions addressing the proposals as set forth in Revision 3. 629. Subsequently, after having recognized that neither SCCC nor SUNY Stony Brook would be available for use by LILCO as relocation centers, 4 (Footnote cont'd from previous page) -4 + s s - tentions were' drafted'to" address LILCO's proposals relating to those facilities. Since, as we describe below, LILCO subsequently abandoned .c ," w3 the proposals in the Plan, some of the facildty-specific issues in the j ; contentiens are no longer pertinent. The tht.st of the contentions, ..." { ' p however,@emains 3 s valid. , } 3 i l, t ' -422-s .~ r . _n , k g q l . . i LILCO abandoned its intention to include SCCC and SUNY Stony Brook in the Plan and instead designated BOCES II Center, SUNY Farmingdale, and St. Joseph's College as primary relocation centers, and Dowling College as ^a backup center. LILCO submitted testimony supporting this version of its relocation scheme on June 15, 1984. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, at 14,
- 24. Soon thereafter, the County filed revised testimony responding to LILCO's revised proposal. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 14,870. The essence
- of the revised testimony was that SUNY Farmingdale and BOCES II Center were unavailable for use by LILCO in a Shoreham emergency based on evidence that officials of those institutions had never agreed, and had no intention of agreeing, to permit LILCO to use their facilities as relocation centers. Id., Atts. 2, 3; Tr. 14,901 (Mayer). 630. LILCO's third attempt to come up with a viable relocation scheme was set forth in testimony. dated July 30, 1984. LILCO conceded that it could no longer rely upon BOCES II Center and SUNY Farmingdale and instead proposed to " work with" the Nassau Red Cross which, LILCO asserted, would sometime in the future designate one or more relocation centers in Nassau County. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, at 15, 22, and Att. 1.432/ 432/ Although LILCO's witnesses testified that they were confident that any State or County facility would respond favorably to a request during an actual emergency that their facilities be made available for use by LILCO (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, at 16, 21), they presented no evidence to support those assertions, and the testimony from the offi-cials in charge of several such facilities indicated precisely the op-posite. Thus, SUNY Farmingdale has insufficient capacity and insuffi-cient security capability to accommodate evacuees as contemplated by (Footnote cont'd next page) -423- 4 631. It became evident during examination of LILCO's witnesses that LILCO's relocation scheme is incomplete, indefinite, and still in the pro-cess of being formulated. It is impossible to determine from the evidence what that scheme actually consists of, must less whether it is adequate or meets the requirements of NUREG 0654. For instance, LILCO witness Rnabury testified that contrary to the statements in the Plan and LILCO's orochure, LILCO's latest intention was to rely on 2 types of relocation facilities -- one or more very large ones called " reception centers," and approximately 50 smaller ones called " congregate care centers." Tr. 14,779 (Rasbury); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, Att. 1. No reception centers have been (Footnote cont'd from previous page) the Plan. SUNY Farmingdale's administration believes that LILCO's proposed use of that facility would negatively impact the campus com-munity, and Dr. Cipriani testified that it would be irresponsible for him to commit his facility to be available for use during an emergen-cy. Furthermore, SUNY policy prohibits commercial organizations such as LILCO from using SUNY facilities. Tr. 14,929-34, 14,938, 14,942, 15,134 (Cipriani, Coyne) . Similarly, BOCES II Center has insufficient capacity and insufficient facilities (little open floor space, no kitchens, no cafeterias, no showers for bathing), and the BOCES II District Superintendent stated that he had several specific reasons for objecting to LILCO's proposed use of his facility. We also note that neither Suffolk Red Cross representatives nor LILCO representa-tives had ever toured BOCES II Center to determine whether it would be adequate as a relocation center. Tr. 15,008-10, 15,016, 15,022-25, 15,034, 15,040-41 (Hines). Thus, we reject LILCO's assertion that its speculation that these facilities would be available "was borne out" by testimony from the facility owners. See LILCO Brief, at 248, n. 106. Furthermore, we note that other State and County buildings pre-viously relied upon by LILCO -- i.e., SUNY Stony Brook and SCCC -- were abandoned by LILCO apparently in recognition of the fact that they were located too close to the EPZ in violation of NUREG 0654 Sec-tion II.J.10.h. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, at 20-22. -424- -, - - . _ - . - _ - - , - - . _ ~ _ . .- designated or identified by LILCO. In fact, Mr. Rasbury refused even to identify the candidate facilities under consideration. Tr. 14,793-94 (Rasbury). Mr. Weismantle testified that LILCO would provide radiation monitoring and decontamination services at reception centers, but LILCO could not put together details or identify precise locations because no de-finitive determinations on the subject had been made. Tr. 14,810-11 (Weismantle).433/ The identities and locations of congregate care centers will not be determined until evacuees appear at reception centers during an actual emergency. Tr. 14,801-02 (Rasbury). Several possibilities, all in Nassau County, were listed in LILCO's testimony, however. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, and Att. 1. Mr. Rasbury agreed that this LILCO scheme rep-resents an "ad hoc approach." Tr. 14,813 (Rasbury). He also testified that the scheme was a developing and growing concept, that he was not com-mitted to it, and that he expressly reserved the right to "think less and less of that option." Tr. 14,804-05 (Rasbury). 632. LILCO's failure to identify any reception or congregate care centers leaves a void in the record. We agree with the FEMA witnesses that relocation cincers must be identified in advance of a radiological emergen-cy. Tr. 14,216 (Kowieski). LILCO's statement in its post-trial filing - that it will designate centers in some future revision of the Plan (LILCO 433/ The FEMA witnesses testified that one monitoring and decontamination facility probably would be insufficient because LILCO's evacuation routes lead in different directions, and that LILCO should establish such a facility in close proximity to each of LILCO's major evacuation routes. Tr. 14,209 (Keller). -425- Brief, at 247) is plainly no substitute for such identification prior to close of the record so that this Board and the parties could consider its adequacy. Thus, we conclude that the Plan, which fails to identify reloca-tion centers and proposes to identify and direct evscuees to such centers on an ad hoc basis during an actual emergency, is in clear violation of NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.
- 2. Location of Centers 633. We have the following observations concerning the proposed loca-tion of the centers;. these observations are in the nature of guidance, in light of LILCO's failure to identify the particular facilities it intends to use. LILCO's witnesses testified that LILCO intends to rely exclusively on facilities in Nassau County, even though the distance from Shoreham to Nassau County's eastern border is at least 30 miles. Tr. 14,816-17 (Weismantle); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, at 22. However, FEMA's wit-ness Keller testified that a relocation center should be located as close as possible to the EPZ because, as a general rule, all evacuees should be
. monitored and decontaminated, if necessary, as quickly as possible. Tr. 14,621-24 (Keller); cf. Tr. 14,211, 14,575-77 (Keller, Kowieski) (a re-location center located 20 or 25 miles from the EPZ would be too far away). We agree with Mr. Keller's general observation, consistent with the NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.h guideline that the centers should preferably be 10 miles or more outside the EPZ. There is no reliable or probative ev!dence in this record to demonstrate that there are no available adequate -426- facilities located closer to the plant than Nassau County but in the range of 10-15 miles from the EPZ.434/ Accordingly, we are unable to make even the kind of predictive finding requested by LILCO that its proposed use of facilities in Nassau County would be appropriate.
- 3. Letters of Agreement 634. Contention 24.P asserts that the Plan is inadequate because LILCO does not have an agreement with the ARC which assures that the ser-vices LILCO expects the ARC to perform at relocation centers will acc,ually be performed. FEMA's witnesses testified that the ARC is a support organi-zation within the meaning of Sections II.A.3 and C.4'of NUREG 0654, and if
.the Plan does not contain a letter of agreement that specifies the interface between the two organizations, the Plan is deficient. Tr. 12,192 (Kowieski);'12,271-72 (Keller). We agree. 635. In response to this contention, LILCO submitted two letters. The first, dated June 24, 1983, was sent by LILCO to the Suffolk Red Cross. .It purported to express LILCO's " understanding" that in response to a Shoreham emergency, the Red Cross would fulfill its usual emergency re-sponse functions, including setting up and operating relocation centers for 434/ Although LILCO asserts that suitable closer facilities are not avail-able "as a result of the political position" of the County and New York (see LILCO Brief,'at 249), there is no reliable evidence before us to support that assertion. LILCO's belief as to the reasons that particular facilities are not available is not relevant; what is im-portant is that LILCO has not demonstrated that there are no appropri-ate _ facilities closer to the plant than Nassau County. -427- ps-. the public. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, Att. 2. The Suffolk Red Cross never responded in writing to LILCO's letter. Tr. 14,754-55 (Robinson). The Plan thus contains no statement by the Suffolk Red Cross that it en-dorses or agrees with LILCO's understanding, that it intends to perform the functions assigned to it by LILCO in the Plan, or that the Suffolk Red Cross' " usual" functions coincide with or include all those expected of it under the Plan. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 10-12. 636. LILCO also submitted a letter from the Nassau Red Cross, which stated that the Nassau Red Cross would set up and staff facilities to be designated in the future. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, Att. 1. Both the County's and FEMA's witnesses testified, however, that the letter inad-equately addresses the interface between LILCO and ARC personnel which is inherent in relocation center operations as proposed in the Plan. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 25-26; Baldwin et al. , ff. Tr.12,174, at 20, 84; RAC Report, ff. Tr. 12,174, at 42; Tr. 14,211-12 (Kowieski). Mr. Keller testified further that a letter of agreement should explicitly de-scribe the extent of the interface at the relocation centers between the two organizations. Tr. 14,573-74 (Keller).435/ 435/ Under LILCO's proposal to ure congregate care facilities, a lesser de-gree of interface may be required at those facilities than would be required at the reception centers. See LILCO Brief, at 116. We can-not find, however, that LILCO's proposal moots the need for coordination between LILCO and the ARC and because LILCO's proposal, at present, is pure speculation. Nevertheless, we are skeptical of LILCO's apparent position that no interface between LILCO and the ARC will be required. Accordingly, we find LILCO's letter of agreement to be inadequate. -428- 4 637. Based on the foregoing, we find for Intervenors on Contention 24.P. The Plan fails to comply with NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.3 and C.4 be-cause thare is-no written agreement which satisfactorily establishes and assures that the ARC will perform the necessary services in the manner con-templated by, and necessary to implement, the Plan. 638. FEMA's witnesses testified that the Plan also must identify re-location and/or reception centers where monitoring and decontamination will occur and must contain letters of agreement with the owners of such facili-ties in order to meet the requirements of NUREG 0654. Tr. 12,269-70, 14,201, 14,221-22,-14,574, (Kowieski, McIntire). We agree. See also our findings on Contention 24.N, Section XI.B infra. 639. LILCO has obtained a letter from the Nassau Red Cross which as-serts that that organization has agreements of some sort with several entities, such as churches and entire school districts. The letter indi- - cates that some unidentified buildings would be available to the ARC for use as shelters during emergencies. However, we have not seen any of the actual agreements, most of the buildings and their specific locations have not been identified, nor is there any indication in this record that the owners or managers of the facilities have agreed to the use of their facil-ities-following a Shoreham emergency as proposed in the Plan, particularly for monitoring and decontamination. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, , Att. 1.436/ Thus, we find that LILCO has failed to comply with NUREG 0654 436/ Indeed, SUNY Farmingdale and SUNY Old Westbury are contained in the -Nassau Red Cross list of relocation centers (Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. ; (Footnote cont'd next page) -429- r Sections II.A.3 and C.4 in that it has failed to submit agreements that as-sure the availability of the facilities necessary to implement the Plan. Tr. 14,611-12, 14,629-30 (Kowieski). See Consolidated Edison Co., LBP-83-68, supra, 18 NRC at 934-35 (1983) (Board finds plans deficient due -to lack of letters of agreements with reception and congregate care cen-ters).
- 4. Capacities and Facilities in Centers 640. Contention 75 alleges that there is no assurance that the relo-cation centers relied upon by LILCO will have sufficient capacities and fa-cilities to provide the necessary services for the number of evacuees that will require them.
641. As a threshold matter, it is clear that it is impossible for us to find in favor of LILCO on this contention since LILCO has not yet iden-tified any specific facilities.it intends to use as reception centers, con-gregate care centers, or relocation centers. Clearly, the Board cannot find, in a factual vacuum, that unidentified buildings have adequate capac-ity or facilities to make them useful and appropriate for the purposes stated in the LILCO Plan and NUREG 0654. Thus, due to the absence of any .(Footnote cont'd from previous page) 14,707, Att. 1) even though Dr. Cipriani and Mr. Coyne testified that there are several specific reasons why SUNY facilities would not be suitable for use'as contemplated by the Plan. Tr. 14,929-34, 14,938, 14,942, 15,134 (Cipriani, Coyne). -430- l specific facts or data upon which to base a finding, we rule in favor of Intervenors on Contention 75. 642. We. recognize that LILCO's witnesses estimated that the maximum number of persons who would use relocation centers would be approximately 32,000 persons, and that the facilities with which the Nassau Red Cross purportedly has agreements have an aggregate capacity of roughly 48,000 -persons. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 14,707, at 18-23. They also stated, how-ever, that although the Red Cross has considered whether there is adequate parking, living space, food facilities, toilets and showers, most of the facilities do not_ meet all the considerations. Id., at 22-25. Further-more, FEMA's witnesses testified that reception centers should have the ca-pacity-to process the entire population of the EPZ in the event that a widespread, radioactive release occurs (see Tr. 14,164, 14,168 (Keller)) and the County's witnesses testified as to several public health require-ments of reception or relocation centers, including the capability of safely collecting, storing, or disposing of contaminated and uncontaminated wastes. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 27-28. These concerns raised by FEMA and the County, which were not addressed by LILCO, further support our finding for Intervenors on Contention 75.437/ 437/ We .also agree with FEMA's witnesses that LILCO's public information materials are inadequate because they fail to advise potential evacuees that, depending on circumstances surrounding a radiological emergency, it might be necessary for the entire EPZ population, not just=those persons needing shelter, to report to reception centers to be monitored and, if necessary, decontaminated, and because monitoring and decontamination facilities must be identified in those materials. Tr. 14,164-65, 14,168, 14,208 (Keller, Kowieski). -431- 643. As we stated at the outset, there is a void in this evidentiary record concerning the important matter of relocation centers. In light of LILCO's failure to identify any such centers, and the vagueness of its ac-tual intentions in this regard, we find for Intervenors on Contentions 24.0, 24.P, 74 and 75. B. Thyroid Monitoring (Contention 77) 644. Contention 77 alleges that the Plan's provisions for measuring thyroid contamination at relocation centers are inadequate due to improper equipment and deficiencies in LILCO's procedures. 645. Under the Plan, thyroid contamination in evacuees is to be mea-sured with an RM-14 meter and a HP-270 probe, using the lowest meter range of 0-500 cpm. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,755, at 6. OPIP 3.9.2 requires monitoring personnel first to measure background radiation levels with the HP-270 shield open, then to monitor individuals with the HP-270 shield closed, and then to subtract the background reading from the survey reading to obtain actual thyroid contamination levels. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,755, at 6.438/ LILCO and FEMA witnesses agreed that LILCO's procedure would result in an inaccurate and non-conservative measurement of thyroid contamination. Tr. 13,777-80 (Miele); 14,287-88 (Keller); see LILCO Brief, at 256. 438/ With its shield open, the HP-270 probe measures both beta and gamma radiation; when closed, it measures only gamma. Tr. 13,767-68, 13,777 (Miele). -432-i 4 n n, zu-- -mw a,s- y- , 646. For normal background readings of 10-15 cpm, the instruments proposed for use at relocation centers are considered sufficiently sensi-tive to measure thyroid contamination levels of 150 cpm. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,755, at 7. 647. OPIP 3.9.2 states that " background radiation levels (should] re-main less than 50 cpm. This is especially important in those areas where monitoring is performed to maintain RM-14 sensitivity." LILCO's witnesses stated that LILCO intends to delete this statement, and asserted that if background is less than 350 cpm, it would not affect survey measurements. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,755 at 7-9.430/ FEMA testified, however, that it 1:s neither desirable nor prudent to attempt to measure thyroid contamina-tion in a background of more than 50 cpm, and that the Plan would be defi-cient if it did not provide that relocation centers would be moved should background exceed 50 cpm. Tr. 14,278-S1, 14,610 (Keller). The Board agrees with FEMA and adopts LILCO's proposal to leave OPIP 3.9.2's state-ment in the Plan. See LILCO Brief, at 256. 648. The RM-14 meter has a fast and a slow response time setting, and OPIP 3.9.2 does not define which is to be used. Tr. 13,763-64 (Miele); 439/ LILCO asserts that an HP-210 probe will be used when a more sensitive instrument is appropriate, e.g., when background readings are high and to monitor childrens' thyroids. LILCO Brief, at 254. LILCO concedes, however, that use of the HP-210 probe is not reflected in the Plan or procedures. Id., at 254, 256; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,755, at 10-11. Even if the HP-210 were used, the threshhold values in LILCO's procedure for sending evacuees to hospitals are incorrect. See Tr. 13,790-91 (Miele). -433-r -- ,---v ----,p 7 w-- , - -,, - , . , , - ., LILCO Brief, at 256. This is a significant omission because the procedure instructs monitoring personrel to measure each evacuee for 5 seconds. Tr. 13,764 (Miele). The LILCO and FEMA witnesses agreed that if the RM-14 is on the slow response time setting, an accurate reading could not be - obtained in 5 seconds. Tr. 13,766-67 (Miele); 14,270-71 (Keller). The LILCO and FEMA testimony also demonstrated that there is substantial uncer-tainty associated with the use of the RM-14 for 5 second measurements as provided in the Plan due to background radiation, statistical variations in the number of counts, and needle fluctuations. Tr. 13,763-64, 13,768-72, 13,777 (Miele); 14,273, 14,278 (Keller). 649. LILCO's procedure states that if thyroid readings equal or ex-ceed 150 cpm, individuals should be sent to the hospital. Although LILCO's witnesses stated that the thyroid scan is intended to provide a "qualita-tive" measure of contamination (Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr.13,755, at 8) and that monitoring personnel would probably take action for readings "in the range" of 150 and as low as 100 -cpm 440/ (Tr. 13,775-77 (Miela)), there are no guidelines in the Plan to help monitoring personnel determine whether .aasurements are within the " range" for which further action would be nec-essary. Tr. 14,274-25 (Keller). Similarly, although the Plan indicates that if any reading above background is obtained for a child, he should be sent to the hospital (Tr. 13,781 (Miele)), Mr. Miele testified that 440/ The trigger point of 150 cpm is equivalent to a value below the 5 rem thyroid PAG. Tr. 14,276 (Keller). -434- . __ . - ___ _ _ -.~_. I .probably no action would be taken for anybody for readings below 100 cpm. Tr. 13,777 (Miele). These inconsistencies in applicable threshholds are confusing and unacceptable. 1 650. The Board finds that the number of deficiencies in LILCO's pro-posed procedure for monitoring thyroid dose in relocation centers renders the procedure unacceptable and unworkable in its present form. Although during cross-examination, LILCO's witnesses stated that some of the identi-fled deficiencies would be corrected (Tr. 13,793-95 (Daverio, Miele)), we hereby require that they all be corrected, and that the revised procedure be submitted to us and to the parties for review and comment.441/ 441/ Given the uncertainty in readings by monitoring personnel and the Plan 3 discrepancies in threshold levels, the Board finds that LILCO's proposal to revise OPIP 3.9.2 (1) to indicate that both the background radiation and thyroid contamination HP-270 readings are to be con-ducted with a closed shield, (2) to indicate that the RM-14 meter with HP-270 probe is to be set on a fast response time, and (3) to include special provision for monitoring children with an HP-210 probe (LILCO Brief, at 256-57) do not provide reasonable assurance that persons will be adequately monitored for thyroid contamination. -435- XI. THE HANDICAPPED, HOSPITALS, AND NURSING HOMES (CONTENTTONS 24.G, J, K, N, 58, 72, 73.A, B) A. Ambulances (Contentions 24.G, 24.K) 651. Contention 24.G alleges that the Plan is inadequate because LILCO does not have agreements with ambulance companies to provide a suffi-cient number of vehicles to enable LILCO to implement an evacuation of the residents of nursing and adult homes, the homebound, and hospital patients in the EPZ. Contention 24.K alleges that the Plan is inadequate because LILCO has no agreements with personnel to provide the medical support ser-vices in buses, ambulances and ambulettes that would be necessary during an evacuation of persons who are handicapped or in special facilities. We find in favor of Intervenors on these contentions, and conclude that there is no assurance that LILCO's proposed evacuation of persons who are handi-capped, homebound or in special facilities can and will be implemented for the reasons set forth below.
- 1. Agreements for Vehicles (Contention 24.G) 652. LILCO states that 113 ambulance trips and 209 ambulette trips are necessary to evacuate the nursing and adult homes and the homebound.
Plan, App. A, at IV-175. LILCO testified that its agreements with ambu-lance companies provide that 63 ambulances and 130 ambulettes will be available to LILCO in an emergency, and thus it will have sufficient vehi-cles to meet LILCO's estimated needs because each vehicle would have to make no more than 2 trips on the average. Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. -436- II, at 7-12. However, LILCO conceded that the vehicle estimates in the Plan do not account for evacuating patier.ts in the 3 hospitals near the edge of the EPZ, due to LILCO's belief that those people would be better off if they were to shelter rather than evacuate. Id., at 12-13; Tr. 6586-87.(Robinson).442/ If it were necessary to evacuate the hospitals, not only would the patients have to wait until the evacuation of the home-bound and persons in nursing and adult homes was completed, but the average number of trips each ambulance and ambulette would have to make would obvi-ously be much greater than 2. See Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at 12-13; Tr. 6480-82, 6444-45 (Cordaro, Weismantle). We find that in excluding the need for vehicles to evacuate hospital patients, LILCO has substantially underestimated the number of trips necessary to implement a , timely evacuation.443/ 1 6 653. Although LILCO has obtained agreements from several ambulance compan'ies to make vehicles available to LILCO in an emergency, we find the agreemeats inadequate for several reasons. First, fewer vehicles than as-sumed by LILCO will actually be available to LILCO. The agreements with ambulances companies each provide that only those vehicles not responding to a public or individual emergency will be available to LILCO. Although 442/ Ve discuss this aspect of LILCO's Plan in our findings on Contentions 60, 63 and 72. 443/ The number of trips required of each vehicle, and therefore the number of vehicles available, is a significant matter because every addition-al trip increases the time necessary to complete the evacuation. We discuss this further below. -437- LILCO asserted that it " expects" a Shoreham emergency would take priority, the decision as to priority would be made by the ambulance company dis-patchers, not by LILCO. Thus, there could well be pre-existing commit-ments, or emergency calls, to which the vehicles would respond before, or in lieu of, being made available to LILCO. Tr. 6433-39 (Robinson); Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at 10. Furthermore, some ambulance companies operate from locat'ons far outside the EPZ, and as a practical matter, they t could not be promptly available to LILCO. For example, the majority of ve- ! I hicles to be supplied by Weir Metro Ambulance Service, upon which LILCO relies for 14 ambulances and 49 ambulettes, are stored in Long Island City, which is approximately 50 miles from the EPZ. Tr. 6608-09, 7787 (Robinson, Cordaro); SC Ex. 36. And 2 ambulance agreements are ineffective, meaning that 8 ambulances and 8 ambulettes cannot be counted on.444/ 654. Second, LILCO's estimates are based upon erroneous assumptions as to the capacities of ambulances *and ambulettes. For example, LILCO as-sumes that 4 people in wheelchairs can travel in ambulettes (it believes the average capacity of those vehicles is 7). Tr. 6420-22, 7784 (Robinson, Lieberman). However, other than the vehicles to be provided by Weir Metro 444/ Transportation With Care and Mercy Medical Transportation Services are not authorized to perform the functions assigned to them in the Plan. Under the terms of their Ambulance Service Certificates and pursuant 'to Section 5010 of the New York Public Health Law (McKinney 1984), those companies are limited to serving areas in Nassau County. Since the Plan requires them to go outside their service territories, the 8 ambulances and 8 ambulettes covered in the agreements would not in fact be available to LILCO. NY Exs. 4, 5; Tr. 6612 (Robinson); Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, Att. 16, 19. ; -438- l-from Long Island City, based on the lists of vehicles provided to LILCO by the ambulance companies, very few, if any, ambulettes have the capacity'for 4 wheelchairs; many hold only 1, and the majority hold only 2. SC Ex. 36; Tr. 7786-87 (Robinson). If vehicles were able to carry fewer than the as-sumed 4 wheelchair patients, additional vehicles, or many more trips per vehicle, would be necessary to implement LILCO's proposed evacuation. Clearly, if no additional vehicles were available, the evacuation times would increase. Tr. 7783 (Liebermun). 655. Thus, we conclude that because LILCO's estimates of the number of trips necessary to evacuate the handicapped and special facilitics are too low, and becuase all the vehicles covered by agreements will not, in fact, be available on a timely basis, if at all, there is no assurance that sufficient vehicles will be available to accomplish a timely evacuation as proposed in the Plcn. The fact that LILCO has excluded hospital patients, and therefore has failed to plan in detail for the potential nebd for vehi-cles to evacuate those individuals, makes this deficiency even more seri-ous.
- 2. Agreements for Staffing (Contention 24.K) 656. LILCO responded to Contention 24.K by stating that its agree-ments with ambulance companies provide that vehicles would be staffed by qualified, trained personnel and that agreements with employees were unnec-essary. Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at 18-19; Tr. 6533-34 (Rob-inson); LILCO Brief, at 260. As a general statement of principle, we do
-439- l l I 4 not disagree. However, on a practical level, we agree with the County's witnesses who testified that despite the agreements between'LILCO and the ambulance companies, there is no assurance that vehicles actually would be staffed by sufficient qualified personnel. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 9-10; Tr. 9576-78_(Harris). See also Tr. 3115-16 (Muto), 3178 (Smith) (existence of contract with bus company does not ensure drivers will per-form). 657. In addition to our finding that such individuals are likely to experience role conflict and may resolve it in favor of attending to their family obligations (see Section I.B, supra), there are other reasons why there is no assurance that vehicles would.be staffed by sufficient and qualified personnel. LILCO has only met with management-level personnel of ambulance companies; the drivers and medical personnel probably do not even know that LILCO would rely upon them to travel throughout the EPZ during a radiological. emergency. Tr. 6532-33 (Robinson). We find that a contract provision that vehicles will be " staffed" fails to provide reasonable as-surance that, during an actual emergency, companies will actually have available sufficient " staff" to enable them to fulfill the contract obliga-tion. We need some indication that the individuals who will be expected to work during the emergency are aware of that expectation and willing to ful-fill it.445/ 445/ Moreover, applying LILCO's philosophy with respect to its own employees, we find that the employees of ambulance companies upon whom LILCO relies should be given an opportunity to volunteer to perform tasks within the EPZ during a radiological emergency at Shoreham. See Babb et al., ff. Tr. 11,140, at 27; Tr. 12,057-58 (Daverio). -440- 658. Furthermore,_although the Plan provides for the evacuation of ~ - substantial numbers of special facility. patients by. buses driven by LILCO employees (Plan, App. A, at IV-173 to 175), the Plan ignores the need for - skilled' health professionals to accompany patients on buses. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 10; Tr. 9586 (Harris). LILCO has no agreements with any entity to provide Emergency Medical Technicians ("EMTs") or any medical' personnel to accompany patients on buses. Tr. 6522-23 (Robinson). ~The' County's witnesses identified this omission as a serious deficiency be-cause there is no assurance _that. evacuation of special facility patients b1 buses will be safe, or that persons in charge of caring for patients in special facilities would release their patients to bus drivers or persons , without health care training. Tr. 9883-84 (Mayer); Id., at 10. '659. Thus,:there is no assurance that persons who are handicapped, homebound or in special facilities will receive essential- competent medical attention during the evacuation. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 10. .v B. Hospitals and Nursing Homes (Contentions 24.J 24.N, 72) , 1. Agreements With Special Facilities (Contention 24.J) 1
- . 1660. Contention 24.J alleges that the Plan is inadequate because it 4
does not include agreements with special facilities in the EPZ concerning the performance of several functions which LILCO assumes will be performed - by_their employees and which are necessary to implement LILCO's proposed evacuation. For the reasons set forth below, we find in favor of i Intervenors on this contention. $ l 1 i -441- 1 661. LILCO concedes that it has not obtained agreements from special facilities, but asserts that special facilities are not " support organiza-tions" within the context of NUREG 0654 Section II.A.3. Cordaro et al., Tr. 5/10/84 Vol. II,-at 7-9; Tr. 9030-31 (Robinson); LILCO Brief, at 261. LILCO cites no legal authority for this interpretation of the regulations, -and we reject it in light of the Plan's provisions. The Plan does not, as LILCO s ggests, limit the actions of special facilities during an emergency to " seeking help from.LILCO." M., at 261. On the contrary, it assumes that handicapped facilities will provide most of the transportation neces - .sary for an evacuation, and that such facilities as well as nursery schools and nursing and adult homes will: (a) agree to LILCO's proposed evacuation ' methods and procedures; (b) properly and adequately prepare their patients or students for such procedures; and (c) identify and make arrangements for appropriate reception facilities or relocation centers. See Plan, App. A., at IV-166 - to 178; Cordaro et al. , Tr. 5/10/84 Vol. II, at 11; Tr. 9087-88, 9056 (Robinson, Weismantle). -Similarly, although LILCO does not plan for an evacuation of hospitals, it assumes that hospitals will implement shel- -taring plans. :See Plan, App. A., at IV-172 to 173. There is no evidence ~ in this record that any of the facilities have agreed either to perform the-tasks assigned to them by the' Plan, or to implement LILCO's evacuation pro-posals as set forth in the Plan. Clearly,.without such agreements, we can-not find that-the Plan could and would be implemented. Accordingly, we find that agreements with the special facilities identified in Contention 24.J'are required. -442- 662. LILCO also argues that agreements are not necessary because the facilities allegedly have been involved in the emergency planning process. LILCO Brief, at 261-62. So-called'" involvement" in a planning process, even assuming it occurred, is no substitute for an agreement to implement proposals contained in the Plan. LILCO provides no legal authority for its suggestion to the contrary. Furthermore, although LILCO testified that it has offered assistance in preparing sheltering and evacuation plans, and in conducting training programs (Cordaro et al. , Tr. 5/10/84 Vol. II, at 7-9; Tr. 10,053-55, 10,060 (Robinson, Miele)), the Plan does not contain any facility-specific plans or procedures for sheltering or evacuating patients (Tr. 9042 (Weismantle)), nor is there any evidence that any LILCO-prepared draft plans have been approved or adopted by facilities for use in a Shoreham emergency. See findings on Contentions 60 and 63. Thus, there is no evidence that the " planning process".has provided the preparedness or assurance of adequate protection required by the regulations. 663. We also find that in the absence of agreements with special fa-cilities concerning implementation of LILCO's proposals, there is no assur-ance that staffs of those facilities would or could implement the proposals set forth in the Plan during a Shoreham emergency. Tr. 9892 (Harris); Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 5-6. Furthermore, even if the staffs attempted to do whatever seemed to be most beneficial to patients at the time of an actual emergency, we cannot find that such an ad hoc, unplanned, and uncoordinated response to an emergency would be adequate, or would not adversely affect the implementation of other aspects of the Plan. Id. See i also Metropolitan Edison Co., LBP-81-59, supra, 14 NRC at 1639-41. l -443- 7
- 2. Evacuation Times (Contention 72.A) 664. Contention 72.A alleges that the time necessary for LILCO to evacuate special facilities, assuming vehicles were available and were mo-bilized, would be too long to provide adequate protection from health-threatening doses of radiation. Substantial delays would occur as a result of the need for multiple trips, traffic congestion, and the time involved in loading and unloading patients from vehicles. The Board finds that LILCO's evacuation time estimates for special facilities are unreliable and unrealistically low, and for the reasons set forth in Section VII above (vehicles provide no shielding), there is no assurance that evacuation would provide adequate protection for special facility residents.
665. LILCO has calculated evacuation time estimates for special fa-cilities other than the 3 hospitals and concluded that, with the exception of residents of the Suffolk Infirmary, special facilities' residents will be evacuated before the last car. leaves the EPZ. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9101, at 5-6, 10. However, we find that LILCO's estimates are based on severall questionable assumptions. First, they are based on an estimate of the time it would take some vehicles to complete their first trips, during which they would transport homebound, handicapped persons to relocation centers and/or hospitals. To estimate the times for trips to and from hos-pitals, LILCO considered trips to only 4 " candidate" receiving hospitals near the EPZ. To estimate the times for trips to and from relocation cen-ters, LILCO used SUNY Stony Brook and SCCC. Tr. 7759-64 (Lieberman, -444-i Weismantle). These assumptions are clearly wrong since LILCO no longer relies upon SUNY Stony Brook and SCCC, but instead intends to rely on fa-cilities in Nassau County (Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr.14,707, at 21-22), and since LILCO's list of " candidate" receiving hospitals consists of many more facilities than just the 4 that were near the EPZ. Tr. 7763-64 (Weismantle). LILCO's list of " candidate" reception hospitals is also speculative, since no hospitals have agreed to accept patients from within the EPZ. See findings in Section XI.B.3, infra. 666. Likewise, the time estimates involving the trips from the spe-cial facilities to the relocation centers are again based on travel times to and from hypothetical relocation centers which LILCO arbitrarily matched up with particular special facilities in the EPZ. Tr. 9129-30 (Lieberman). Relocation centers for special facilities have not even been identified yet, and there is no evidence that during an actual emergency facilities would be paired with relocation centers as assumed by LILCO. Cordaro et al., Tr. 5/10/84 Vol. II, at 15-16, 20, 22; see findings in Section XI.B.3, infra. Thus, LILCO's estimated travel time back and forth to relocation centers is based on speculation and conjecture. We cannot rely upon it and there is no basis to make any finding, even the predictive findings urged ! by LILCO. See LILCO Brief, at 6. Since this travel accounts for the ma- - jority of the evacuation time estimates,446/ we find the estimates to be of i 446/ The trip destination determines the route chosen out of the EPZ, the origin of the return trir to the EPZ would determine the return route, and the' reception cente. location would be a major factor in de-l termining the length of :ime between " waves" of patient pick-ups. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9101, at 7. l -445-i little, if any, practical value. They certainly are not (and, indeed, could not be)'the realistic time estimates contemplated by the regulations. See Commonwealth Edison Co. , LBP-84-2, supra, 19 NRC at 263. 667. Second,.the evacuation time estimates are based on an assumed 4 ambulette capacity of 7 persons. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9101, at 6; Tr. 9113 (Lieberman). LILCO defined the types of persons who would need ambulette transportation as nonambulatory persons, most of whom are con-fined to a wheelchair. Tr. 7788 (Robinson). As we discussed previously under Contention 24.G, other than ambulettes prov'ided by Weir Metro from distant Long Island City, very few, if any, ambulettes have the capacity for 4 wheelchairs; many hold 1 and the majority hold only 2. SC Ex. 36; Tr. 7786-87 (Robinson). Even if 3 people are seated on ambulette benches ~(Tr.'9109-17 (Lieberman, Weismantle)), maximum capacity could only be 4 or 5 under such circumstances. As a result, more vehicle trips would have to be made, and evacuation time estimates would increase. See also Tr. 7783 (Lieberman)-(with respect to evacuation of homebound handicapped persons, where LILCO relied on a lower capacity of 4 persons per ambulette, reduced maximum capacities would have the effect of increasing the number of vehi-cle trips and increasing time estimates). 668. Third, LILCO's evacuation time estimates are limited to normal weather conditions. Tr. 9108 (Lieberman). Finally, LILCO has developed no time estimates for the evacuation of the 3 hospitals near the edge of the EPZ. Tr. 9133-34 (Weismantle); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9101, Att. 2. We -446- . _- _ _ _ . . - . - - _ . . . . . . . _ _ _ . . , _ _ , _ , . . _ _ .- - - _ . . _ ~ _ . . . find that LILCO's failure to develop time estimates for the 3 hospitals, and LILCO's failure to develop sound, reliable time estimates for the other special facilities, contravenes the requirement of NUREG 0654 Section II.J.8 and App. 4, at 4-3, 4-10, that time estimates be developed for spe-cial facilities on an institution-by-institution basis. 669. As indicated in Section IX.A, we have already determined that serious traffic congestion is likely to occur during a Shoreham evacuation. Because LILCO's time estimates for special facilities make assumptions about congestion that we found incorrect in our discussion of Contention 65, we find those estimates unreliable. See Cordaro et al. , f f. Tr. 9101, at 8; Tr. 9128 (Lieberman) (based on the DYNEV model, vehicles were assumed to travel at a mean speed of 6 mph on their trip from the special facility to the EPZ boundary). 670. The County's witnesses also testified that even setting aside the effects of traffic congestion, other factors not properly considered by LILCO, would delay substantially the evacuation of residents of special fa-cilities. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 28-38; Tr. 9899 (Harris). First, the tasks specified by the Plan as necessary to coordinate and im-plement an evacuation would require a substantially greater amount of time to accomplish than LILCO estimates.447/ Second, the time LILCO would need 447/ These tasks include calling special facilities, collecting and trans-mitting to appropriate persons and facilities information concerning their needs, identifying and calling relocation centers, reviewing pa-(Footnote cont'd next page) -447- m _ to load and unload patients _would be much longer than LILCO estimates. ' Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 36-38; Tr. 9900 (Harris).448/ '671. The Board concludes that'LILCO's evacuation time estimates are substantially understated, and due to their reliance on unfounded and in-correct assumptions,'they are largely fictional. For the 3 hospitals, there'are no evacuation time estimates at all. We therefore find in favor of Intervenors on Contention 72.A. ' 3. Relocation Centers (Contentions 72.C and 24.N) 672. These contentions allege.that LILCO's evacuation proposals would not and could not be implemented because LILCO has not identified, or obtained agreements with, facilities to serve as relocation centers for pa-tients in hospitals, handicapped persons, or residents of any special fa- . cilities, other than United Cerebral Palsy of Greater Suffolk, Inc.449/ . (Footnote cont'd from previous page) t tients' records and prioritizing them for evacuation, gathering spe-cial equipment and medication, and dealing with staffing needs. . Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, -at 29-36; Tr. 9799-9803, 9883, 9887 (Harris, 'Mayer); Cordaro et al. , Tr. S/10/84 Vol. II, at 15-16; Tr. l 9078-79 (Weismantle). 448/ For example, it is highly unlikely that special facilities will have , ! enough wheelchairs to accommodate all their nonambulatory patients - .(and ambulettes will not have wheelchairs on board) or that loading . docks at special facilities will be able to accommodate 6 vehicles as assumed by LILCO. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 36-38. LILCO's ; time estimates did not include any preparatory tasks except the order-ly loading of ready, waiting patients into vehicles. Tr. 9123-24 9127 (Lieberman). , i 449/' The remainder of Contentien 24.N, which pertains to relocation of _ school children, is addressed in Section XII, infra. r -448-n-,-~ g vm----.m,,>--g-- -e - - .p r- -,,m,-gem,--~,.m-,-n--w--,,,,-,wmvmy,, .v--,n,-v wa yp ,= .e .mp y 7 ,m, ,,,g .,g._w-, -mm,.w LILCO responded by stating that although LILCO will provide assistance, it is the responsiblity of special facilities to make arrangements with relo-cation centers directly. LILCO has no intention of entering into agree-ments with such relocation centers. Cordaro et al., Tr. 5/10/84 Vol. II, at 11, 15-17, 19, 22; Tr. 9087-88, 9056 (Robinson, Weismantle). 673. The FEMA witnesses testified that the Plan is inadequate in failing to identify relocation centers for patients in special facilities and in failing. to support such identifications with letters of agreement. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 19; Tr. 12,266-67 (Kowieski); 12,927-28 (Keller). The County's witnesses agreed. Harris and Hayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 7. Finally,- the board in the Wolf Creek proceeding recently ruled that letters of agreement are required from health care institutions expected to -receive patients from EPZ facilities. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., (Wolf Creek Generating Station), ASLBP Docket No. 81-453-03 OL, Initial Decision, slip op, at 25 (July 2, 1984). 674. 'We reject LILCO's assertion that there is no requirement that it obtain agreements with relocation centers for special facility residents. First, Wolf Creek is clearly contrary to LILCO's position. See LILCO -Brief, at 264-65. It is clear that the persons in special facilities will have to be taken somewhere after they are evacuated from the EPZ. NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.d explicit 4y requires a means for protecting those persons whose mobility may be impaired due to institutional confinement. LILCO attempts to get around this requirement by stating that it has held -449- [? ~ W . ' r ' 5 .- 3g a .; g i (i , y,,
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.meetin's with special facility representatives, that disaster plans of some ~ g h rt are required'under the New York Hospital Code, that it has lists of p-hospitals that could be called during_an1 emergency, and that, in any event, evacuation is unlikely. See LILCO Brief, at 265-69. None of LILCO's as- _ , .1 o *
- sertio':s, even assuming arguendo thiir accuracy, is a substitute for an
- ( 1 agreement cskcontractuaNeoma.ltm'ent5that provides reasonable assurance that 4 ' pj v.: the necesiarygelocatiod 3 facilities Nf.11::in' u fact be available.450/ g j ^ ,\. \, A > :, r *' ' 675. For(the 3reasons set forth above, the Board finds that the Plan o < \ y n 4 fails to cochly with NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.3 and II.J.10 or 10 CFR i)$50.47(a)(1). ,p ,h a y ,, ,; ; I i ; O , + 4 g y b it ; Lk 0 N n , ,+ x + ~ .. 4 +. s s y \ ;) f ,, Ih,, 450/ LILCO also testifiad Eh t LILCO will compensate by telephoning hospi- .k ~ tals t.t the time of an actual emergency (Cordaro et al., Tr. 5/10/84 _ t- Vol.,II, at&l5-16), and that relocation centers could be identified /'y. _:, 'I- even while special facility patients were enroute. Tr. 9064-65 ( (Yedvab). The Board finds s it unlikely that administrators of special facilities would consent to release patient,s in the face of such un- }'3 certainty. Harris ind 'Mayer, cf. Tr. 9777, \ at 7, 24, 25 ; Tr. 9883-84 ". (Harris). More inhrtantly, i such an ad hoc approach is no substitute + for'the actual preparedness required by the regulations. We also note ,4 - y that'there is no evidencs that any pI4ns' required by New York law, ,M 4 tadopted by sp,ecial faci {ities ut the EPZ, would provide adequate pro-t/it' ion in t. Shoreham emergency. Indeed, the evidence was that exist-id('ididerect" plans of hospitals and nursing homes are general in na-tutt'acd'do not contemplate evacuations during radiological , dmergen'ciis to'other facilities many miles away. 5farris and Mayer,
- ff. Tr. 9777,.aE 25-26t'31; Tr. 9082 (Glaser).
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- 4. Contention 72.D 676. - We address the issues raised by' Contention 72.D in our findings on Contentions 60 and 63. See Section VIII,' supra.
- 5. Ad Hoc Evacuation (Contention 72.E) 677. This contention attacks the Plan provision that instead of plan-ning to provide protection to hospital patients in the event evacuation is recommended, LILCO will evacuate hospitals through an ad hoc expansion of-transportation resources s1 ready committed to other aspects of the special facilities evacuation. Plan, App. A., at II-28, IV-172. LILCO's only re-sponse was that detailed preplanning for hospital evacuations would be "of little benefit," because transportation requirements of hospitals fluctuate
. rapidly, and the 3 hospitals are near the edge of the EPZ and have adequate building shielding factors. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9101, at 11-13; Tr. 91'32-33 (Weismantle); LILCO Brief, at 271-72. The FEMA witnesses agreed. Baldwin et al., ff.~Tr. 12,174, at 78. 678. The Board rejects these arguments. Neither the location of the J hospitals nor the fact-that their transportation requirements may fluctuate are valid excuses for LILCO's failure to plan for an evacuation. NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.d requires such planning, notwithstanding LILCO's as- .sertion that in its view such planning would "be of little benefit." We find in favor of Intervenors on Contention 72.E; in relying on ad hoc ar-rangements to be made during an emergency, the Plan fails to comply with 10 l -451-a, . . .. _ , ___ _ .,_ - ..___ __. _ .-... _ _ _ . . _ _ . ~ . . . , - _ . .,..___ 'l CFR $$ 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10. See also Metropolitan Edison Co., 14 NRC at 1639-41. 679. Furthermore, we disagree with LILCO's assertion that it "has identified adequate transportation resources for evacuating hospitals." See LILCO Brief, at 272. LILCO proposes to ignore the 3 hospitals unless and until everyone else in EPZ special facilities has been evacuated. Only then, and only if resources are then "available," does LILCO propose to turn its attention to evacuation of hospital patients. Plan, App. A., at IV-173; Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 27. As we noted above in dis-cussing Contention 24.G, LILCO has an insufficient number of vehicles to perform its proposed evacuation of special facilities other than hospitals; we certainly cannot agree that its existing transportation arrangements could adequately handle the more than 600 additional patients likely to be in hospitals. See also Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9777, at 25 (the 3 hospi-tals have an average census of approximately 630 persons). Moreover, in light of our finding that LILCO's evacuation time estimates for special fa-cilities are unrealistically low, and the fact that hospital evacuations would not even begin until the vehicles involved in the evacuation of the rest of the population had gone to relocation centers and then returned to the EPZ, we cannot find that there is reasonable assurance that hospital patients would be adequately protected in an evacuation, especially since evacuation would not be recommended unless there were a risk of substantial radiation exposure. Accordingly, we find that the Plan fails to provide for adequate protective measures that could or would be taken for hospital l -452- patients, as required by 10 CFR $$ 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10. s C. Registration of Handicapped Persons (Contention 73. A) 680. Contention 73.A alleges that not all handicapped persons who re- . quire evacuation assistance will be known to LILCO due to defects in its 1 proposed preregistration system: (1) many handicapped persons who require assistance will not be identified through LILCO's postcard scheme; (2) the Plan has no provision for verifying the completeness of the listing com-piled from returned postcards; and, (3) there is no provision for regularly updating the listing. For the reasons set forth below, the Board finds that because LILCO will not have identified a substantial number of the handicapped, there is no assurance that handicapped people will be ade-quately protected as required by NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.d and 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1). 681. LILCO's proposal for registering handicapped people includes: (1) letters asking persons with special needs to return a postcard; (2) a similar request in the Brochure; (3) an article in " Keeping Current" with an address for people to write for assistance; and (4) a similar item in telephone directories. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7526, at 5-8 and Atts. 1-2, 5-6; Tr. 7628-40 (Clawson, Cordaro). LILCO also intends to review its list of customers with special priority for electric service restoration, and to ask in its letters and advertisements that persons inform LILCO of the identities of individuals they know who might need assistance. Cordaro et o -453- _ . _ . _. _ . ~ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ ._ . _ . . _ - , _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ - al., ff. Tr. 7526, at 9. LILCO believes that people who require assistance would return postcards to LILCO because allegedly the postcards and accom-panJing materials: (1) defined " handicapped" in such a way that people would know whether they were handicapped for purposes of evacuating under the Plan; and (2) explained the importance of returning the postcards. Id., at 9-12; see Tr. 7647-59 (Clawson). The FEMA witnesses stated that the Plan is adequate. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 79; Tr. 12,933-38 (Keller, Kowieski). We give little weight to FEMA's testimony, however, because FEMA did not even examine the issues raised by this contention -- that is, whether LILCO's method for compiling the list is reliable or ap-propriate, and whether the listing is likely to be complete enough to as-sure that those persons who actually need assistance would be known to LILCO.451/ 682. Intervenors testified that LILCO's registration scheme is seri-ously flawed. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 15. First, as one of LILCO's own survey-experts admitted, the postcard questionnaire is unclear and poorly worded. Tr. 10,130-31 (Mileti). As a result, it is unlikely to 451/ For example, FEMA's witnesses did not study LILCO's postcard for the purpose of determining its adequacy. Tr. 12,931 (Keller). They had no way of knowing what percentage of handicapped individuals in the EPZ responded to the postcard survey and they metaly assumed that every handicapped person received a postcard, read it and understood it. Tr. 12,931, 12,933-34 (Keller). Although the FEMA witnesses did identify some methods of verifying the accuracy and completeness of the postcard survey, they were not aware whether any of those methods were included in the Plan. Tr. 12,936-38 (Kowieski); Baldwin et al., .ff. Tr. 12,174, at 79. -454- elicit responses that would accurately identify those with special evacua-tion needs. Saegert, ff. Tr. 9574, at 4; Acquario et al. , ff. Tr. 7854 at 7, 9; Tr. 9608-12, 9627-31 (Saegert); 7901-12, 7867-68 (Acquario, Albertin, Knighton); 9626-30 (Harris, Mayer); 7552-53, 7566-67, 7570-74 (Robinson). 683. Second, because LILCO's registration system depends on volun-tary, affirmative action by individuals to be effective, it is unlikely to produce reliable data.452/ For example, a non-response to LILCO's postcard is indistinguishable from a negative response; neither individual would ap-pear on LILCO's list as requiring assistance, although only one of them has indicated he has no need for assistance. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 16; Tr. 9618 (Harris). In addition, many psychological and social fac-tors -would prevent some people from registering with LILCO, even though they would need help during an evacuation. For example, people do not always accurately assess their physical condition. Saegert, ff. Tr. 9574, at 3-4.453/ Similarly, the specific capabilities a person might need in 452/ Mailback surveys are recognized as inefficient and unreliable since they have a low response rate (Tr. 9617, 9620, 9641-42 (Saegert); 9615-20, 9636 (Harris, Mayer)), especially when the object of the sur-vey is to identify sensitive, personal characteristics of an unknown group of persons. Tr. 9642 (Saegert). Dr. Mileti's testimony that mailback surveys pertaining to disasters have high response rates was based on studies involving known, previously identified respondents, not attempts to identify people who might need help in an emergency. Tr. 10,131,32, 10,139, 10,141 (Mileti). . 453/_ Some people regard illness or physical impairment as a sign of person-al inadequacy and cannot, as a matter of pride, admit that they need to rely on help from others. Therefore, they do not label themselves as impaired, even though they may be, because their self-image depends on denying their physical condition. Saegert, ff. Tr. 9574, at 4. [ -455- r order to evacuate might not be apparent to each individual. Acquario et a1. , ff. Tr. 7854, at 7, 9; Saegert, . ff. Tr. 9574, at 4.454/ Furthermore, many people requiring assistance would not return postcards to LILCO be-cause they would fear possible. adverse consequences of a statement that , they are handicapped. Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 7854, at 9; Saegert, ff. Tr. 9574, at 4-5.455/ We also note that many people are unlikely to read or'believe LILCO's materials at all. See our findings on Contentions 15 , .and 16, Section II and VI.E, supra; Saegert, ff. Tr. 9574, at 5-6. There-fore, we conclude that many handicapped residents of the EPZ would not be identified by LILCO's return postcard system. 684. We find'LILCO's other proposed means of identifying those o. needing evacuation assistance to be of little additional value, since they suffer from the same defects as the postcard system. Tr. 9593-94, 9631-32 (Saegert); 7918-7926 (Knighton, Albertin); 7948-49 (Acquario). 454/ For example, an individual might not think about his or her ability to-hear a distant siren, to walk approximately one-half mile with luggage to board an evacuation bus, or to close windows and turn off ventila-tion systems, or what he or she would do if family members normally relied upon were away at the time of a radiological emergency. Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 7854, at 7, 9; Saegert, ff. Tr. 9574, at 4; Tr. 7926-27 (Knighton). l455/ Some people would fear'that registering with LILCO as " disabled" or ~" handicapped" could interfere with future employment opportunities, or ! with eligibility for health or life insurance benefits. More impor-tantly, some people would value their privacy and not want to tell
- LILCO that they are disabled or handicapped. -Saegert, ff. Tr. 9574, .
at 5. Other people might fear becoming victims of vandalism or crime I ~ if they were to reveal their vulnerable condition to the public. Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 7854, at 9. LILCO admitted that there is no assurance of confidentiality in the postcard, the brochure, the news- ~ letter article or the telephone directory 4dvertisement. Tr. 7664-65 (Clawson). -456-r -e,-,r-, ,- , ,e,r,n, w,,,, -- -,n.-,r-, vv.w,-.,gn,,m-en-~.-,,--r,,,,,,---,,--,-,n , w,..,,,--w-- 685. The flaws in the preregistration system could be remedied if .LIICO had a reliable means of verifying the accuracy and completeness of the listing its postcard system produced; however, the Plan includes no such provision. Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 7854, at 9; Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 17. Although LILCO conducted a telephone survey of those re-spondents who had provided a telephone number on returned postcards, we - find that the format and content of the interview questions was biased so that the effect of the " verification" was to reduce, in many cases without , apparent basis, the number of individuals identified as needing assistance. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7526, at 5-6 and Atts. 3, 4; Tr. 7545-46, 7590-91, 7601-02, 7687, 7689, 7692-93 (Robinson, Clawson, Cordaro, Weismantle); 7912-17 (Knighton, Albertin).456/ We also find that LILCO has not made an adequate attempt to determine how many people who need as-sistance failed to return postcards. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 17; Tr. 9593-94 (Saegert, Harris, Mayer).457/ 456/ The State witnesses testified that based on their review of 1980 cen-sus data, they would expect many more individuals to need evacuation assistance than identified by LILCO. Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 7854, at 6-7; Tr. 7856-66, 7875-81 (Acquario, Knighton, Albertin). While the census data do not indicate the precise number of persons who would need help in an evacuation, they do provide some indication of the size of the handicapped population that should be properly sur-veyed by LILCO. We find that the census data support the need for verification of LILCO's listings. 457/ There are many professionally accepted means of cross-referencing a registry of handicapped persons. Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 7854, at 9. Although LILCO contacted the Suffolk County Office of Handicapped Ser-vices and Office of the Aging to learn of agencies dedicated to helping handicapped people, LILCO did not request any information per-taining to the numbers of handicapped persons known by the County agencies to live in the EPZ. Tr. 7660-61 (Robinson). -457- 686. Finally, LILCO's plan to update annually its listing of handi-capped persons, by using its same inadequate postcard system (see Tr. 7599-7600 (Robinson); 9621 (Clawson)), is not acceptable for the reasons we have already stated. See Tr. 9631-32 (Saegert, Harris). 687. Under the NRC's regulations, it is appropriate for this Board to inquire not only whether LILCO has a method for identifying the handi-capped, but also whether that method is successful. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-77, 16 NRC 1096, 1102-03 (1982). 688. The Board concludes that there is no reasonable assurance that LILCO's registration scheme could or would identify the handicapped persons in need of evacuation assistance during a Shoreham emergency. NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.d requires that LILCO provide a means to protect such per-sons. The fact that LILCO may be in the process of developing ways to identify such persons 458/ is not sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the people who need assistance would or could be protected, particu-larly since there was no demonstration of how LILCO intends to rectify the identified deficiencies. Since we have no confidence that LILCO could or would identify the homebound, handicapped persons in the EPZ, we cannot make the necessary reasonable assurance finding; accordingly, we conclude that LILCO has failed to comply with 10 CFR $$ 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.d. 458/ Mrs. Robinson testified that the postcard survey was "just the first step," and that "it certainly is not a complete process yet." Tr. 7547-48 (Robinson). -458- D. Notification and Evacuation of Handicapped Persons at Home (Contentions 58, 73.B) 689. Contention 73.B asserts that the Plan does not contain adequate provisions for the' evacuation of handicapped persons at home. It focuses on LILCO's proposed procedures for notifying handicapped persons and the time necessary to evacuate the homebound handicapped population.459/
- 1. Notification (Contentions 73.B.1, B.3, and B.5) 690. Contention 73.B.1 alleges that LILCO's proposal to notify handi-
. capped persons of a Shoreham emergency by telephone would not be effective. In response, LILCO stated that the telephone contacts with handicapped per-sons at home were designed to supplement siran and EBS notification, to confirm that a vehicle would be dispatched, and to identify the relocation center to which the person would be transported. Cordaro et a,1., ff. Tr. 7698, at 8; Tr. 7754-(Weismantle). Evacuation vehicles would be dispatched regardless whether telephone contact was actually made. Id., at 11-12; Tr. 7720, 7729-30 (Weismantle). Although the County and State witnesses ' testified that telephone contacts may not be an appropriate means of noti-fying all handicapped person (see Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 9574, at 18-19; Acquario et al., ff. Tr. 7854, at 10), we find that LILCO's proposal to supplement EBS and siren notification with telephone calls is adequate, since the Plan, as revised, provides that evacuation vehicles will be dispatched in any event. We find in favor of LILCO on Contention 73.B.1. 459/ We discuss Contention 58 in Section VI.A above. -459- 691. Contention 73.B.3 alleges that since the Plan provides for only _one LILCO employee to notify all handicapped individuals and all reception centers for those individuals, there is no assurance that necessary con- , tacts could be made promptly enough to permit timely evacuation. In.re-sponse, LILCO stated that it could notify the 75 homebound handicapped per-sons it had identified through its postcard survey within 45 minutes, by relying upon administrative support personnel and communicators at the EOC. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7698, at 9-11; Tr. 7747-49 (Weismantle). LILCO does not estimate the length of time necessary to identify and contact re-4 ception centers. The FEMA witnesses agreed with LILCO that the Plan ade-quately provides'for the notification af the homebound handicapped popula-tion. Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,174, at 80. 692. Our concern with respect to this issue does not center on the number of individuals available to make calls, since LILCO has now indi-cated that some people in addition to the one person identified in the Plan will be available;460/ rather, it centers on LILCO's assumption that only 75 people will require phone calls and evacuation assistance. For the rea-sons we set forth in our findings concerning Contention 73. A, we believe - LILCO's assumption is invalid. Since LILCO has not adequately identified 460/ We note, however, that the same administrative personnel are relied - upon by LILCO to perform many other assistance duties in addition to notification of the handicapped. See Tr. 7742-46 (Weismantle); Plan, Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 2.1.1, at 55, 66. See also our findings on Conten- . tion 58 in Section VI.A above. We believe the Plan should be amended to identify specific persons to be available to carry out the neces-
- - sary notification task.
j -460-t < ~ ~ , . . , - - , , - , , - - , - - -,-.n--.m---..,.n., , . -.- , .-,----,,an-,..,-..,-----,n, e , .- - - , - the number of handicapped individuals it needs to notify, we can make no finding as to how long it would take to accomplish that notification. Moreover, the sending of evacuation vehicles to the homes of individuals ~ does not eliminate the concern raised in Contention 73.B.3 because it ig-nores the need for LILCO to identify and contact a sufficient number of re-caption centers to care for the total number of handicapped individuals be-fore the evacuation could be accomplished. Since LILCO has nct yet identified or obtained agreements with any such reception centers (Tr. 7716-19 (Weismantle)), this process could take substantial time during the emergency and would clearly delay evacuation. Since we reject LILCO's as-sumption that only 75 calls need to be made, we find that LILCO has failed to meet its burden of proof on Contention 73.B.3. 693. Contention 73.B.5 alleges that LILCO's proposed notification of .the deaf by route alert drivers would not be timely. LILCO responded by stating that absent a failure of a substantial number of sirens, route alert drivers could notify deaf people at home within 4 hours of a recom-mendation to evacuate. If there were a failure of a substantial number of sirens, route alert drivers could be instructed to notify the deaf after completing their route alerting responsibilities. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7698, at 17-1s; Tr. 7813-14 (Lieberman); 7817-18 (Weismantle). 694. Although LILCO attempts to justify this lengthy notification pe-riod by asserting that "given the saturated roadway conditions that will exist during an evacuation . . . if the deaf were notified within 4 hours l l: -461-l 4 p-- of the order to evacuate then notification would be timely" (LILCO Brief, at 280), we reject its reasoning. Our conclusion in this regard is strengthened by our finding on Contention 56, that the route alert drivers would be unable to complete just their route alerting responsibilities in a timely manner. See Section VI.A, supra. When the regulations clearly re-quire the capability for providing prompt notification, and expressly re-quire that arrangements " assure 100* coverage within 45 minutes of the pop-ulation who may not have received the initial notification," (NUREG 0654, App. 3, at 3-3,) LILCO's need for a minimum of 4 hours to notify the deaf is a clear defect in the Plan. Accordingly, we find in favor of Interve-nors on Contention 73.B.5.
- 2. Evacuation (Contention 73.B.4) 695. This contention alleges that LILCO's proposed evacuation of the handicapped at home will take too long. In response, LILCO stated that its evacuation time estimates indicate that homebound handicapped persons would be evacuated in virtually the same amount of time as the automobile-owning public. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7698, at 13-17; Tr. 7806 (Weismantle).
The Board finds that LILCO's time estimates are based on invalid assump-tions. 696. LILCO's time estimates are dependent upon the assumption that only 75 people will need assistance, derived from the postcard and tele-phone surveys and vehicle capacity estimates (see Tr. 7738 (Robinson); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 7698, at 14-17; Tr. 7756-57, 7781-7791 -462- . . _ . .- -- -- .- ~ - - _ --_~. - . , . - . - _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ . - -___ - (Lieberman)), both of which are flawed. See findings in Sections XI.A and XI.C, supra. 697. LILCO's time estimates for evacuation of the homebound handi-capped assumes further that they can all be evacuated in one wave. How-ever, as a result of LILCO's use of flawed data, LILCO may, in fact, have underestimated the number of trips required to evacuate the homebound hand-icapped. This could, in turn, mean that more than one wave will be re-quired to evacuate them, leading to higher evacuation times. See Tr. 7,759-60, 7,783 (Lieberman) . For these reasons, as well as those we dis-cuss in our findings on Contentions 27, 65 and 24.G, we find that LILCO's evacuation time estimates for the handicapped are without substantial fac-tual basis and are unrealistic and unreliable. LILCO has failed to satisfy its burden of proof on Contention 73.B.4, and we accordingly find for In-tervenors on that contention.461/ XII. SCHOOLS (CONTENTIONS 24.E, 24.F. 24.M. 24.N. 61.C. 68-71) 698. The " school" contentions generally allege that LILCO's protec-tive measures for school children -- early dismissal, sheltering and evacu-ation -- would not and could not be adequately implemented in a Shoreham emergency because the schools have not planned for, and there is no evi-dance that they intend to plan for, such an emergency and because LILCO's 461/ We also note that FEMA's witnesses were not able to state that the Plan's provisions would adequately protect the homebound handicapped. Tr. 12,712-13 (Kowieski). -463- assumptions in the Plan concerning school protective actions are unre-alistic. 699. The Board heard testimony from representatives of 4 local school districts: Middle Country Central School District ("MCCSD"), Middle Island Central School District ("MICSD"), Mt. Sinai School District ("Sinai"), and the Shoreham-Wading River Central School District ("S-WR").462/ The Board found these representatives particularly well qualified because they have direct knowledge of how their schools operate and therefore are in the best position to advise the Board of the status of emergency planning at their schools. 700. Seventeen school districts are covered by LILCO's Plan. Eleven districts (including MICSD, Sinai, and S-WR) have schools in the EPZ; 6 districts (including MCCSD) have no schools in the EPZ but have pupils who live in the EPZ. In addition, there are 2 parochial schools inside the EPZ, 3 parochial schools outside the EPZ that have students who live in the 462/ The witnesses from MCCSD, Sinal and MICSD were sponsored by the Coun-ty; the S-WR witness was sponsored by LILCO. The school witnesses were: for MCCSD, Dr. Jeffers, the Superintendent, and Mr. Rossi, the Transportation Director; for Sinai, Mr. Petr11ak, Vice President of the Board of Education; for MICSD, Mr. Muto, the Superintendent, and Mr. Smith, the Transportation Coordinator; and for S-WR, Mr. Doremus, the Superintendent. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 1; Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 1; Muto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 1; Doremus, ff. Tr. 9491, at 1; Tr. 9490 (Doremus). The Board also heard testimony from New York State witness Mr. Failla; LILCO witnesses Messrs. Cordaro, Lieberman, Miele, and Weismantle, and Ms. Robinson; and FEMA witnesses Messrs. Baldwin, Keller, Kowieski and McIntire. Failla, ff. Tr. 9948, at 1; Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 9154; Baldwin et al., ff. Tr. 12,165. -464- EPZ, and 13 nursery schools covered by Plan. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 12; Plan at App. A. II-10 and Fig. 4. 701. Under the Plcn, individual schools and school districts are relied upon for implementation of early dismissals, sheltering in schools, evacuation / relocation of school children, and retaining of school children in schools beyond the school day. See Appendix A, at II-19, II-20. The particular protective actions recommended depend upon the Emergency Action Level, whether schools are or are not in session, and whether the school is or is not located in the EPZ.463/ 463/ If an Alert or Site Area Emergency is declared but no protective ac-tion is recommended for the general public, schools in the EPZ will be advised to implement early dismissal plans used for snow emergencies. If school is not in session, schools will be advised to cancel classes. If school is in session when a protective action is recem-I mended for the general public, schools will be advised to take the same protective action; however, if some EPZ zones are advised to shelter and otherri to evacuate, all schools will be advised to evacu-ate. Tr. 9248-50 g (Weismantle); Cordaro et al. , f f. Tr. 9154, at 13. If protective actions are recommended for the general public, schools outside the EPZ attended by students who reside in the EPZ will be advised to keep such students after school. If an Alert or Site Area Emergency is declared while schools are opening, and no protective ac-tions are recommended for the general public, schools would be advised to return students to homes. If a protective action is recommended for the general public, schools would be advised to shelter arriving students or to have buses transport them to predesignated reception centers. If an Alert or higher emergency were declered while school was being dismissed, schools would not be advised to take any specific actions. Tr. 9248-50 (Weismantle); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 13. -465- A. Lack of Aareements with Schools (Contention 24.E) 702. Contention 24.E alleges that the Plan is defective because LILCO has no agreements with the schools or school districts to implement any of its proposed protective measures for school children. NUREG 0654 Section II.A.3 is specific in its requirement for " written agreements" with all " support organizations having an emergency response role within the Emer-gency Planning Zones" that " identify the emergency measures to be provided and the mutually acceptable criteria for their implementation . . . ." For purposes of this guidance, schools and school districts within the EPZ con-stitute " support organizations" that have emergency planning roles. There-fore, the requirement that there be written agreements with them is appli-cable. , 703. We reject LILCO's contention (LILCO Brief, at 281) that schools and school districts are not support organizations. Under the Plan, LILCO will recommend protective actions to schools. These recommendations can .only be implemented by schools and school district personnel with the coop-eration of parents. The schools and school districts are thus clearly relied on to carry out emergency functions and, within any reasonable in-torpretation of that term, are " support organizations" under the regula-tions. The Susquehanna Licensing Board squarely held that there is a need for written school evacuation plans and for agreements to carry them out. Pennsylvania Power & Limht Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-30,15 NRC 771, 782 (1982), sua sponte review ALAB-702, 16 -466- ! t NRC 1530 (1982).464/ Moreover, NRC decisions have made clear that a Board must be able to find that schools will implement effective protective ac-tions when the need arises. See id.; Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. (Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-48, 15 NRC 760, 772-73 (1983). This finding cannot be made if there are no school plans and no agreements with the schools that identify the emergency measures that will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. 704. LILCO also argues that no school agreements are needed, relying on the TMI decision. See LILCO Brief, at 281, citing Metropolitan Edison Co., LBP-81-59, supra 14 NRC at 1639. LILCO cites the portion of the TMI decision which states: (a) that FEMA testified [in that case] that letters of agreement were not necessary because it was seeking something superior, i.e., actual school plans for a radiological emergency; and (b) that FEMA as a general propo.icion does not believe letters of agreement with schools within the EFZ are necessary. See 14 NRC at 1639. What LILCO omits to 464/ LILCO attempts to distinguish Susquehanna on the basis that in Pennsylvania there was no State requirement that there be plans while LILCO asserts that in New York, schools are required to have emergency plans and to update them annually. LILCO Brief, at 281. But the testimony is clear that while schools must have emergency plans for matters such as snow days, New York law does not require them to plan for a nuclear emergency. Tr. 11,053-56 (Jeffers). In this regard, we find the testimony of New York school efficials more credible on the subject of legal requirements imposed by the New York Department of Education than the speculation of LILCO emplofees. More important, however, the Susquehanna decision stands for the principle that there must be evidence of actual preparedness, not just proof of a paper requiremont for preparedness, before a license can be issued. There is no such evidence in this case. -467- cite,'however, is the Board's holding: that at TMI, where (like Shoreham) there was much concern about the adequacy of preparedness, the Board re-quired that there be actual school plans, not merely letters of agreement, for each school district for responding to a radiological emergency. With-out such plans, the Board could make no reasonable assurance finding. The Board specifically rejected the notion of relying on ad hoc arrangements. Id. at 1640-41. The Board further rejected FEMA's argument that ongoing discussions with schools about planning and the historic ability of Pennsylvania _ schools to notify parents and bus drivers of unscheduled 1 school closings were sufficient to provide the necessary assurance in the ] absence of school plans. Id. at 1640, 705. Under the TMI decision, this Board must find that there is no reasonable assurance that any protection' actions can or will be implemented for school children in the Shoreham EPZ due to the lack of agreements, lack of plans, and lack of any steps leading in any meaningful way toward pre-paredness. LILCO's request that we rely on ad hoc response by schools using existing snow emergency plans (which schools reject as inapplicable to a Shoreham emergency) is clearly not acceptable.
- 1. The Schools and School Districts Have Not Agreed to Implement LILCO's Plan 706. The record is clear that LILCO has no written agreements, or even informal agreements, with schools or school districts to implement LILCO's emergency proposals. Muto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at
-468- t 2-3; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 31-32; Tr. 9166-70 (Weismantle). LILCO apparently does not contend otherwise. See LILCO Brief, at 281. In-deed, most of the school districts within or near the EPZ have refused to participate in emergency planning with LILCO. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 29-30. Officials of the Sinai, MICSD and MCCSD districts all testified that their districts have no intent of reaching any agreements with LILCO. Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr.11,001, at 2-3; Tr.11,002-03 (Muto); Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 3. Several school boards have passed resolutions critical of LILCO's emergency planning ef-forts 465/ and no school district has endorsed the Plan. Tr. 9203-05 (Weismantle). See also Tr. 11,003-04 (Muto). In short, there appears to be widespread school opposition to the Plan. FEMA's witnesses stated that they were unaware of any school resolution favoring the opening of Shoreham or indicating that any school district will cooperate with LILCO concerning Shoreham. Tr. 12,218-19 (McIntire). 465/ Sinai, MICSD, MCCSD, and Miller Place have passed resolutions saying .that until there is a reasonable resolution of certain emergency plan-ning issues, they oppose operation of the plant. Rocky Point also passed a resolution indicating that no operating license should be l granted until an approved evacuation plan is devised. Tr. 9208-10 (Robinson); Muto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr. 3084, at 5; Tr. 3122-24 (Muto); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 77 (MICSD resolution opposes Plan). See also Tr. 9383-84 (Robinson) (Sinai resolution opposing Shoreham; Sinal feels its early dismissal plan is not an appropriate response to an order to evacuate until certain issues are resolved); 9385-86 (Robinson)(Miller Place resolution critical of Shoreham; Mill-er Place does not favor the opening of the plant at this time; MICSD resolution critical of Shoreham). See also Section II.B, supra. f -469- 707. The Plan provides that in the event of an evacuation recommenda-tion, LILCO employees would drive buses to transport children in nursery schools out of the EPZ. Plan, App. A at II-21. LILCO has obtained no agreements with'aursery schools to permit LILCO employees to drive their children. The evidence also indicates that LILCO's proposal could not be implemented. Thus, while LILCO employees may be licensed to drive buses, they are not certified to drive school buses. See Tr. 3132 (Jeffers). Therefore, school administrators, including the administrators of nursery schools, would not be authorized to permit their school children to be transported in buses driven by LILCO employees. Id.; Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,000, at 15 ; Muto and Smith (Schools), f f. 11,001, at 12.
- 2. LILCO's Efforts to Obtain School Cooperation 708. LILCO asserts that it "has obtained copies of emergency disaster plans for most of the schools in the 10-mile EPZ and has met with the school districts to discuss the updating of individual district plans."
LILCO Brief, at 281-82 (footnote omitted). LILCO also states that it has actually obtained the plans for 10 of the 17 districts plus those of BOCES I and II, and that "(t]hese plans provide adequate assurance that schools will implement whatever protective actions might be required in the event of an emergency at Shoreham." Id., at 281-82. 709. LILCO's assertion must be rejected. First, under the Susarehanna and TMI decisions, supra, this Board certainly cannot find reg-J ulatory compliance on the basis of LILCO's self-serving and unendorsed -470- statements'that the " plans" it has obtained provide reasonable assurance, when the administrators of those districts testify that they are not pre-parad for a Shoreham emergency. Second, entirely apart from LILCO's fail-ure to meet regulatory requirements, the existence of the particular " plans" that LILCO references provides no assurat.ce whatever that adequate protective actions will be taken to protect school children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. These " plans" admittedly are the early dismissal plans that schools have for snow emergencies and similar occurrences. They do not address in any way the subject of radiological emergencies and do not even contemplate that such emergencies may occur. Local school offi-cials have thus testified that LILCO's assertion that the schools either have plans to deal with radiological emergencies or that their existing early dismissal plans developed for snow emergencies and related occur-rences are adequate for use in a Shoreham emergency is wholly unwarranted, and certainly does not have support from school districts, the entities LILCO expects to carry them out. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 7-8; Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 7. Indeed, the lack of school district approval of early dismissal plans or any other plans for use in a Shoreham emergency is significant. In an analogous situation at Indian Point, where the school early dismissal plan had not been adopted by any of the counties in the EPZ, the Board ruled in favor of Intervenors. Consolidated Edison Co., supra, 18 NRC at 985. We do the same here; in the absence of plans approved by the districts charged with implementing them, we rule that there can be no reasonable assurance that the " plans" -471- I l l l proffered by LILCO can or will be implemented in a Shoreham emergency. See also discussion infra concerning Contentions 68 and 69. 710. LILCO also suggests that because its representatives have " met with school districts" (LILCO Brief, at 281-82), this Board should find preparedness. This is unpersuasive. First, the TMI Board rejected so-called ongoing discussions as providing a basis for finding reasonable assurance. See Metropolitan Edison Co., LBP-81-59, supra, 14 NRC at 1640-41. Further, the meetings LILCO has had with school districts re-sulted'in no agreements even to begin planning for an emergency at Shoreham.466/ .Such meetings were first held on an inform.1 basis with school administrators in the Fall of 1983. A full-scale presentation to school officials occurred on January 16, 1984, and another meeting with school officials was held March 7,1984. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 22-23.467/ These meetings were designed to allow LILCO to make a 466/ LILCO did not contact schools to discuss emergency planning before submitting the Plan to the NRC in May 1983. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 21. Rather, on May 19, 1983, LILCO wrote school district su-perintendents within the EPZ regarding the Plan. Beginning in June 1983, LILCO visited schools to obtain copies of existing early dis-missal plans. Meetings were also held with supervisors in BOCES I and II. It was apparent that school administrators did not consider their existing early dismissal plans to be adequate for purposes of a ra-diological emergency at Shoreham. Id., at 22-23. 467/ Before the March 7 meeting, LILCO supplied schools with generic mate-rials on sheltering and sample procedures that reflect LILCO's plan-ning concepts, as well as those used by administrators elsewhere who have done planning for schools. At the March 7 meeting LILCO offered to send a health physicist to each EPZ school to identify the best areas for sheltering. As of the hearing, LILCO had visited schools in (Footnote cont'd next page) -472- presentation and to share information. They were not planning meetings and school officials have made clear that the districts and BOCES were not ac-tively involved in emergency planning with LILCO. Tr. 11,088-90 (Jeffers, Muto); 11,090-92 (Smith, Jeffers, Petrilak).468/ Mr. Weismantle testified that LILCO will pursue planning with the school districts on a one-by-one basis. However, although there have been contacts between LILCO and some of the districts, none has requested LILCO to continue planning. Tr. 9205-08 (Weismantle, Robinson, Miele).469/ It is obvious that there is basic opposition among the school of ficials to Shoreham. Tr. 9214-17 (Cordaro). (Footnote cont'd from previous page) S-WR and Rocky Point. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 26-27. In ad-dition, KLD prepared a " preliminary sample plan" (it is not part of Revision 3) for busing students to reception centers, to give school administrators a format from which a plan could be drawr.. But, no school district has accepted the KLD plan. Tr. 9224 (Cordaro, Lieberman); 9224-25 (Weismantle) . 468/ The attorney for BOCES II conveyed to LILCO the districts' insistence that the meetings were for information sharing purposes only. LILCO must have been aware of the schools' concerns and had no basis for as-suming that the schools were participating in emergency planning. 11,092-94 (Jeffers, Petrilak). 469/ LILCO appears to believe that the acceptance of radios by some dis-tricts is significant, particularly since it means that schools could be contacted if an emergency arose. Tr. 9241-42 (Weismantle). The testimony by school personnel refutes any sittnificance we might other-wise have attached to the acceptance of the radios. For instance, although MCCSD accepted tone alert radios, its supervisor made clear that such seceptance cannot be construed that the district had engaged in " planning" efforts with LILCO, much less that it agreed to imple-ment the terms of the Plan. Rather, the district accepted the radios since they would be available to announco any emergency situations that might occur. Tr. 11,081-82 (Jeffers); 11,081 (Rossi). -473- 711. LILCO also asserts that . it will offer training and dosimeters to school bus drivers and training to teachers. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 60. ,However, LILCO has not even talked with (much less reached agree-ment uith) school districts regarding such training, and has not specifi-cally offered any training to school personnel. Tr. 9317 (Weismantle).470/ See our findings on Contention 24.S. 712. LILCO's training argument is unpersuasive for further reasons. The regulations clearly require that there be training for local school of-ficials and other persons designated to be part of the offsite emergency response. While the training does not need to be complete at the time of a hearina, there must be a basis for believing that a training program is es-tablished and will be carried out. Consumers Power Co., (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-77,16 NRC 1096,1098-1100 (1982); Id. , LBP-83-44, 18 NRC 201, 203-04 (1983). There presently is no evidence that there has been or will be any training for local school officials. This precludes us from finding compliance with 10 CFR $ 50.47(b)(15). See Consolidated Edison Co., LBP-83-16, supra, 18 NRC at 952-53. 470/ No school district has certified LERO bus drivers. Tr. 9317-18 (Weismantle). LILCO does not know the number of licensed teachers or custodians that could be assigned to drive school buses for school districts. Tr. 9318 (Weismantle). Similarly, LILCO has not verified whether teachers' union contracts with districts provide for caring for students in the event of a radiological emergency. Tr. 9444 (Rob-inson). -474- 713. Representatives of the districts outside the EPZ have been present at the meetings sponsored by BOCES II and LILCO hopes that these districts will agree to the use of their facilities as reception centers for students from schools in the EPZ. In addition, to obtain the addition-al buses necessary for an evacuation, LILCO must plan with districts imme-diately outside the EPZ. Tr. 9388-90 (Robinson). However, LILCO conceded that it has not brought these schools into its planning process. Tr. 9390-92 (Robinson). 714. The foregoing establishes to our satisfaction that the meetings that LILCO has had with school officials were of a preliminary and informa- r tional nature only, were not viewed by the participating school officials as planning sessions, and in fact resulted in no concrete planning efforts for a radiological emergency at Shoreham, much less concrete plans or agreements that are adequate to protect school children who reside, or ma-triculate in, the EPZ. It is clear that the vast majority of schools and school districts have not agreed to implement the Plan and are not other-wise taking any significant steps to prepare for a Shoreham emergency. Based on this record, the Board rules that it cannot find that there is or will be adequate preparedness for the schools. l -475-
- 3. LILCO's Speculations As to What School Districts Would Do If There Were A Shoreham Accident Are No Substitute for A Plan 715. LILCO would have this Board ignore the admitted present lack of preparedness and planning on the ground that if the NRC licenses Shoreham, this will convince schools that the plant will operate and they will then commence planning. Until that time, according to LILCO, schools wish to avoid potentially unnecessary planning. Tr. 9214 (Robinson). This may or may not be true as a factual assertion, but the Board cannot accept LILCO's conclusion since the existence of emergenc-/ plans for the schools is a pre-requisite for the issuance of a license for Shoreham. LILCO's prediction (better termed speculation) that the schools will make plans in the future is not itself a plan or even planning. We acknowledge in this regard that the NRC's regulations call for predictive findings, meaning that all as-pects of planning do not need to be perfect for the Board to find compli-ance with Section 50.47. See Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. , AL4B-727, supra, 17 NRC at 770. However, plans must nonetheless exist, and they must describe "the essential elements of advance planning that have been consid-ered and the provisions that have been made to cope with emergency situa-tions." Id. quoting 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, & III. The plans also must i be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate protective measures can and will be taken if there is an emergency. Id. LILCO's speculation and predic-tiens surely do not satisfy the regulations. See Metropolitan Edison Co.,
LBP-81-59, supra, 14 NRC at 1640. r i 9 -476- l 716. LILCO has also urged this Board to find adequate preparedness even without planning: "[T]hs LILCO Transition Plan for schools can be im-plemented even without more planning by the schools. . . . [A]n effective emergency response for those schools (which refuse to participate] can l still be implemented if only the school authorities and administrators are l willing, if an accident ever occurs, to do what is best for the students in ! their charge. . . . We are certain that they will be willing to do that."471/ Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 30-31. Sg also Tr. 9384-85 ,1 1 (Weismantle). This Board cannot agree. The entire framework of the NRC's l L regulations is predicated on planning and preparedness. We think it simply impossible to find that good intentions alone will protect school children t I if the schools themselves undertake no significant preplanning. The TMI Board agreed, rejecting the idea that ad hoc response would substitute for l' preplanning and preparedness by schools. See Metropolitan Edison Co., LBP-81-59, supra, 14 NRC at 1640-41. Thus, the issue is not whether, if Shoreham'were to operate, the schools would "do what is best for the stu-dents in their charge." The issue is whether the schools in fact have planned or are in fact planning to protect their students in the event of a radiological emergency in a manner which this Board can review for adequacy and which would justify issuance of an operating license for Shoreham. We find that by their own admission they have not.472/ 471/ If an accident occurred at Shoreham, the school district superinten-dents testified that the schools would, of course, try to do what is best for their students. Tr. 11,004-05 (Patrilak, Jeffers); 11,009 (Mato). L 472/ See'also Tr. 11,047 (Jeffers)(Hay 30, 1984 State Education Department letter indicates that " lacking total plans developed by and which will (Footnote cont'd next page) -477- ;{# }*, q b '.. s s J 4 k').i , '% ^ f^ . \ Y, { > \ ^)* t ,g N4 } ,[ p , - >j
- t -
B. ,Agreaments to Fr9 vide School Buses (Contentions 24.F.1, F.3) g\ 6 4 f~ ,; a l 717. Contention 24'.F focuses on whecher there are agreements for suf-f; % ' 'i s fi2.ient buses to evacuate the non-school population of the EPZ that does q $ ,,. un. havi; access to, or the ability to drive cars (n, residents of spe-3 '.a 1 i' N 4 :. $2ial facilities, the handicapped and able-bodied persons without access to j , * ^ cars). NRC case (14w establishes that adequate bus arrangements must have .. ;- ; y been made for thers persons. See Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., supra, 15 'NRC at 1570. This Board cannot find that such arrangements have been made, and,'Atherefore, rules for Intervenors on this contention. ~ ~; 4 p 718s As noted above., LILCO asserts that 298 buses will be available n almost immediatet [\ l y to evacuate persons other than school children, and that .s 97 V it can promp.,1y obtain the additional buses necessary to accomplish the 7 tr 4 evacuation because (a) some school districts outside the EPZ will agree to y .- release some of thef r school buses for use in the EPZ, and (b) after school . buses have completed EPZ evacuation of school children, they can return to evactate non-school persons in need of bus transportation.473/ See c + Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 57-59. .f - ,, y (FootnoteIont'dfrompreviouspage) 4 $ be executed lay 3the County there may be little or no prospect for the k,* . 3 actual implemehtation of individual district plans."). It Ib 473/ We address 1.*te question of whether there will be an adequate number of 3< bus, driver 9 Misilable in our findings on Contention 25 (see Section ./I I.B)'d and the' questions of how many buses would in fact be available, Q ; did the' infact bus uhavailability would have on evacuation of persons bwithout cirv, in our findings on Contention 24 F.2 (see Section IX.D). +a i & ' l<[ -478-k~ , , ; 4; 3 L 5
- .11 . , . , - , , - - _ . , - - .-
719. In an emergency LILCO would ask schools outside the EPZ (which have about 553 buses) to release some of their buses to transport persons other than school children in the EPZ. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 58-59. LILCO is confident that the schools outside the EPZ would agree to this. Its opinion is largely based on the testimony of Dr. Mileti regard-ing the way people allegedly behave during emergencies. Tr. 9309-10 (Weismsntle). However, Dr. Mile:1 offered no testimony specifically stating that school officials catside the EPZ have indicated a willingness to release their buses. Morr. importantly, LILCO has no agreements with any districts to release buses for EPZ duty. Tr. 9297-99 (Weismantle). There is no question that these schools would be acting as " support organiza-tions," and that under the express terms of NUREG 0654, 5 II.A.3, " written agreements" are required. Absent some definitive agreements to that ef-fact, we cannot find that all or some unspecified number of buses within the control of districts outside the EPZ will be made available to LILCO as required. 720. The availability of school buses for protective action purposes has been identified as a serious issue in another case. In the Zimmer pro-ceeding, the evidence indicated that there were insufficient school buses available for simultaneous evacuation of all schools. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., ALAB-727, supra, 17 NRC at 772. The Licensing Board found this to be a deficiency; the applicant appealed, arguing that there is no regulatory requirement for simultaneous evacuation. Id. The Appeal Board appeared to agree that a simultaavcus evacuation is not a regulatory -479-b . _ . - ~ l 1 ) l requirement but affirmed the Licensing Board by construing the issue as whether absent such simultaneous evacuation (due to limited number of buses), all students would be efficiently removed from the EPZ. Id. With-out reasonable assurance of an adequate number of buses and drivers, the applicant's time estimates were of little value for dose savings decisional purposes. Id., at 773. '721. In Zimmer, the applicant argued that it was arranging for addi-tional buses to aid in school evacuation by contacting a neighboring dis-trict to obtain buses. The Appeal Board rejected this, saying that "more is needed than this representation of ongoing efforts to enlist assistance" of another district, pointing out that the details of any such arrangement were not in the record. Id., at 773. LILCO's evidence in this case is of a similar nature. LILCO urges that if school buses are needed, it ir, con-fident that districts outside the EPZ will loan buses. But the details of any such arrangement are not in the record; indeed, LILCO has admitted that there are no such arrangements. Accordingly, we give no weight to such LILCO testimony and, like the Zimmer Board (id., at 773) find the evidence insufficient that there will be needed transportation resources. See Louisiana Power & Light Co., LBP-82-100, supra 16 NRC at 1566-67, 1592 (agreements for buses from outside district are required); Metropolitan l Edison Co., LBP-81-59, supra, 14 NRC at 1639-40 (letters of agreement being obtained for buses and drivers from districts outside the EPZ). -480-L l l 722. The number of bus trips involved in a school evacuation is an additional reason for us to find that LILCO has insufficient buses for the non-school population. LILCO estimates that approximately 433 bus trips would be required to evacuate public and parochial school children from the EPZ.474/ The evidence is persuasive that if school districts attempted to implement early dismissals or evacuations, they would need all the buses they could obtain simply to evacuate school children. Since most schools do not provide bus transportation for all children, they would have to ob-tain even more buses for an evacuation than they normally use. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at ff. 4-5.475/ 723. The evidence further indicates that school buses will not be available to LILCO for non-school use for many hours. For example, MICSD has aut agreement with Suburbia Bus Corp. , one of the 12 companies relied upon by LILCO. Suburbia will assure MICSD 91 sixty-passenger buses. This 474/ This number of bus trips was estimated by first determining school populations on a school-by-schcol basis. These populations were re-duced by 5% for daily absences, and by another 3% to account for split sessions. The high school population was reduced an additional 20%, to account for students who drive cars or would evacuate with friends in those cars. LILCO assumed that loading capacities of 60 passengers per bus for elementary and middle schools, and 40 passengers for high sc.hools . Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 55-56. 475/ For example, for an evacuation, MICSD would need more buses than it normally uses, because the district normally does not transport all of its children, as it would have to do in an evacuation. MICSD has 8,564 children. It would require 167 buses to transport the children to relocation centers. The district currently has 91 buses under con-tract which it uses every day, which means that 74 additional buses must be located. Tr. 11,044-46 (Smith). -481-i l 4 i i does not include extra late. runs established on an as-needed basis for after school activities. If MICSD were to attempt to implement an evacua-tion, it would need all of those buses for at least 6 hours. Consequently, they would not be'available to LILCO for non-school purposes for many hours. Most of the remaining buses owned by Suburbia are committed to other school districts, as are most of the school buses owned by other com-panies in Suffolk and Nassau Counties. Muto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001 at 3-4; see Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 96-97. Therefore, LILCO's agreements with bus companies are unlikely to result in many buses actually being available for any non-school.use so long as the schools are in session. 724. If additional buses are not available, multiple bus runs would be needed to provide the 433 trips. The extent to which multiple bus runs can be used depends on the location of the schools needing multiple runs ~ and the location of the reception centers serving these schools. Cordaro et al. , - ff. Tr. 9154, at 56-57. Of course, to the extent that buses must make multiple runs for-school children, they are not available to be used - for the EPZ's non-school population. 725. The foregoing facts, as well as those developed in the context of early dismissal and evacuation, discussed infra, make clear that school dismissals will tie up school buses within the EPZ for as much as 5-7 hours and, therefore, there can be no asssurance that those buses will be avail-able for the EPZ's non-school population. With respect to buses outside -482-I , s - .. , . -_-._2.. _ i the EPZ, there are no agreements with any school districts to provide such buses (even if available) and therefore, again, no assurance that they will be available for the EPZ's non-school population. For these reasons, we ' conclude that LILCO lacks sufficient buses to transport the non-school pop-ulation of the EPZ in a timely manner. C. Lack of Agreements with School Bus Companies (Contention 24.M) l726. Contention-24.M concerns whether there are agreements with school bus companies to implement early school dismissals or evacua-tion / relocation of school children in a Shoreham emergency.476/ LILCO's entire discussion of the substance of this issue in its brief is as fol-lows: LILCO relies on the fact that school districts in New York must by law, and do in fact, have early dismissal plans that require the availability of buses and driv-ers. Under the contracts between Middle Island School District and the bus companies, for example, the bus companies are obligated to come at the District's call to pick up children early; Tr. 3115 (Muto), and they have always met this obligation in the superintendent's experience, Tr. 3116 (Muto). In addition, LILCO has offered to provide training and dosimeters to the driv-ers. Cordaro et al., Tr. 5/30/84 Vol. II, at 60. i LILCO Brief, at 283-84. 476/ For some inexplicable reason, LILCO devotes discussion allegedly to proving that there is no requirement for agreements with individual
- bus drivers. LILCO Brief, at 283. The Board already so ruled (Board Order 8/19/83), and thus LILCO's Finding 601 is irrelevant.
-483-y , , , , --,w.- , . . . - sw.. ,-- -- ,-m e- , u-*.y----en e--nm y w - .. %--3w.---y-wr - 727. The Board rejects LILCO's position and rules for Intervenors on this contention. As noted above, the evidence documents that schools have existing early_ dismissal plans for snow emergencies and the like. However, the evidence is also clear that school officials believe their existing early dismissal plans are inappropriate, and were never intended to be used for a radiological emergency. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 7-8; Muto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 7; Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 7. Thus, it is impossible for this Board to conclude with the necessary confidence that bus companies would agree to a Shoreham early dismissal in circumstances that would clearly be outside the scope of the basic early dismissel plan and their contracts with the school dis-tricts. 728. We feel even more strongly about the lack of agreements for evacuation. Even assuming that there are agreements for early dismissal that would impliedly cover a Shoreham emergency, there is no evidence what-ever that such agreements obligate bus companies _to transport students to relocation centers during an area-wide evacuation. The early dismissal agreements require bus companies to take children to their homes, and to do so under various conditions, none of which involve potential danger to the companies' own employees. Thus, we cannot find that contractually binding arrangements _have been made for the. transport of school children if evacua-tion is required. The fact that the bus companies have always met their obligatiens under their contracts is no evidence that they would voluntari-i ly undertake to do that which their contracts do not require. -484- D. Lack of Agreements for Relocation Centers for School Children (Contention 24.N) 729. Contention'24.N asserts, in part, that because LILCO does not have agreements with facilities to serve as relocation centers for school children, LILCO's evacuation proposals cannot be implemented.477/ LILCO admits that it'has no reception centers for school children who might be evacuated but contends that (1) there is no'NUREG 0654 requirement to des-ignate reception centers for school children (LILCO Brief, at 293) and (2) LILCO will designate reception centers when the plant is operational. Tr. 9287-88 (Weismantle); see LILCO Brief, at 293. 730. The Board rejects both LILCO arguments. First, NUREG 0654, .5 II.J.10, does call for identification of relocation centers. While it does not reference school children by name, it is clear that school chil-dren, if evacuated, will have to be taken somewhere. We hold that it is a requirement of NUREG 0654 and the NRC regulations that the intended reloca-tion centers for school children be designated in an emergency plan since there is otherwise no basis for assessing whether there is or will be ade-quate preparedness. 731. Even if there were no NUREG 0654 requirement for designation of school reception centers, LILCO's argument would be without merit. The 477/ The remainder of Contention 24.N pertains to reception centers for pa-tients in hospitals, handicapped individuals, or residents of special facilities and is addressed in Section XI. -485- W Plan itself is premised on the existence of " predesignated reception cen-ters" for school children. Clearly, implementation of the Plan requires that such centers be identified and available for use in an emergency. The need for designation of relocation centers is particularly acute here since the evidence documents that schools never would allow evacuation as contemplated by LILCO without first knowing, and being satisfied about, where their children were being taken. Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 3-4; Muto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 5; Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 12-13. Thus, without relocation centers for school children, the Plan clearly could never be implemented. 732. This Board also cannot accept LILCO's argument that licensing can proceed based on LILCO's promise to designate relocation centers in the future. This proceeding has been in active litigation for at least a year and a half. Despite its awareness of this contention, LILCO has still never obtained relocation centers for school children. LIf, in the future, it obtains them, it may seek reconsideration of our ruling. Until then, however, we must rule for Intervenors on this contention. See also discus-sion of lack of relocations centers, Section X, supra. E. Sheltering (Contention 61.C.1) 733. Contention 61.C.1 asserts that LILCO's proposal to shelter school children in their schools would not work because: (a) schools have not performed preplanning to make them capable of implementing a sheltering recommendation; and (b) many school buildings do not have proper space for -486- sheltering (such as basements or other well-shielded areas).478/ The Board agrees with these concerns. For sheltering to work, there must be careful preplanning (involving staff training and planning), and selection of the right sheltering locations. There has been no adequate training or other planning by schools and we cannot find on the record before us that such necessary planning will occur in the future. Further, the evidence indi-cates that many EPZ schools lack adequate space for sheltering, making it all the more important that careful preplanning take place. LILCO argues that such preplanning has occurred. But as LILCO notes (LILCO Brief, at 284), much of the preplanning has been by LILCO itself. The schools them-selves have done almost no preplanning. While we do not ignore LILCO's preplanning efforts, it is obvious that unless the schools also preplan -there can be no adequate preparedness.479/ 478/ Contention 61.C.1 also asserted that LILCO will not recommend shel-tering as a. protective action for schools, even if dose projections indicate the need, if an early dismissal has been commenced. We need not. discuss this contention further since LILCO admits that the Plan was in error and will be changed. See LILCO Brief, at 285, citing Tr. 9273-74 (Weismantle). We thus will withhold ruling on this aspect of the contention until we have seen the Plan change and parties have had a chance to express their views on the adequacy of the revision. 479/ LILCO argues that even with no school planning, adequate preparedness can be found. See LILCO Brief at 284. LILCO testified that even though a particular school or school district failed to plan, the sheltering option could still be implemented because sheltering alleg-edly can be accomplished by following relatively simple guidelines that require no advance training or participation. LERO would convey .these. guidelines to the school during an emergency by EBS message. Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 9154, at 50; Tr. 9438-39 (Miele). There is no , evidence that-any school would follow LILCO's guidelines. For reasons already discussed on other school contentions and based on the TMI de-cision, supra,, we reject such speculative assertions. . f_ f -487- f 734. Sinal has not conducted preplanning that would enable it to im-plement a shaltering recommendation in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 4. Similarly, MICSD has not per-formed any preplanning that would make it capable of implementing a LILCO sheltering reccmmendation. Muto and Smith (Schools), f f. Tr.11,001, at 6.480/ 735. In order to adequately shelter children, schools will have to provide food, beds, madical supplies and medical personnel. Sinal has not attempted to determine which medical supplies have to be available to shel-ter the children since the district has not gone through a full planning process for sheltering. Tr. 11,023-24 (Petrilak).481/ Further, the Sinai elementary school building has a small basement area that is used for stor-age, and the junior high building has no basement at all. These school buildings have large windows in much of their space. Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 5-6. LILCO has offered to send a health physicist to survey the school buildings, but Sinai has not accepted LILCO's offer. Tr. 11,021-22 (Petrilak). 480/ If an accident occurred at Shoreham and LILCO advised sheltering, Dr. Muto's only authority regarding the protection of the school-children would be to contact the County government and the State Education De-partment for directions. He would keep the school children inside while he called. Tr. 11,017-18 (Muto). 481/ If S-WR had to shelter students for any significant amount of time, there would not be food to feed their students. Each school does not have facilities for serving meals, since all students bring their lunch each day. Tr. 9550-51 (Doremus). -488- r 736. MICSD officials testified that they lack the capability and re-sources necessary to shelter students safely. None of the district schools have basements that could be used to shelter children, and there is only limited interior space in the district's buildings that might be proper for sheltering. No survey has been conducted of the sheltering capacity of MICSD buildings. District schools do not have adequate staff or supplies to enable them to care for school children for periods of several hours after the end of the school day even assuming that the district's normal < staffing were not reduced because of role conflict. The administration would not be willing to risk the safety of its children by taking LILCO's advice concerning proper sheltering areas. Muto and Smith (Schools), f f .' Tr. 11,001, at 7; Tr. 3109-10 (Smith), 3126-27 (Muto), 11,014-15 (Muto, Smith) (additional problems faced by MICSD if role conflict occurs). 737. Finding proper areas for sheltering is especially important be-cause school children, especially younger ones, are more vulnerable to the effects of radiation than are adults. Tr. 9283 (Miele). In many cases, schools will provide shielding factors much better than 0.6 since institu-tional buildings normally have a shielding factor of 0.2. However, there are schools which have shielding factors less than 0.6. The Plan does not list which schools within the EPZ meet a 0.6 shielding factor or which have . basements. Tr. 9281-83, 9275-77 (Miele, Weismantle), 9305-06 (Miele), 9278-79 (Weismantle). l l -489- 738. LILCO has established some generic sheltering guidelines. Thesc include picking sheltering locations in the lower elevations of the build-ing, picking areas with the minimum number and size of outside walls or windows, and isolating all ventilation or air flow with the outside. Sug-gested locations include auditoriums and gymnasiums. LILCO has offered to survey schools and provide more detailed sheltering recommendations, and has provided surveys for S-WR, Rocky Point School District, South Manor Union Free School District, and Little Flower Elementary School. Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 9154, at 49-50. The surveys which have been performed, and the conclusions drawn by LILCO, document the need for preplanning surveys to identify proper sheltering areas and/or the need for modifications to create proper sheltering areas.482/ Clearly, it is also necessary for the 482/ The evidence indicates that the shielding protection from sheltering varies widely from school to school. For example, LILCO surveyed Lit-tle Flower Elementary School and discovered a basement location which afforded a greater sheltering factor than the school's main corridor. The school must, however, relocate some furniture in one room to fit the remaining people in the basement area. Tr. 9304-05 (Miele). There is no evidence that the modifications have been or will be per-formed. The Middle School in S-WR has a basement which LILCO believes could be modified to accommodate the students and staff. If such modification were made, the basement could provide a shielding factor of approxi-mately 0.3. If modifications are not made, the first floor corridor of the school would have to be utilized to shelter the students, with a shielding factor of 0.7 or 0.8. Tr. 9374-76 (Miele). The modifica-tions have not been made. Tr. 9225 (Weismantle). LILCO believes there is adequate space on the first floor of the Briar Cliff School to shelter all the students. One side of the first floor is underground while the opposite side is exposed and above ground. Although LILCO did not do a detailed shielding survey for the school, (Footnote cont'd next page) L -490- ~ school-officials to. draw their own conclusions about the appropriateness of particular sheltering areas, in light of their knowledge and familiarity with their student's needs and their own buildings. 739. We do not rule that modifications must be made to school build-ings. However, the surveys described in the foregoing footnote document that for sheltering to have any significant dose saving benefit, and thus constitute an adequate protective measure, changes must be made at some schools. If they are not made, LILCO must alter its Plan to recommend sheltering only for those schools where a real dose savings can be pre-dicted. On the record before this Board, we rule that the lack of preplanning, and the evidence that particular school areas are not appro-priate for sheltering, compels a ruling in favor of Intervenors. (Footnote cont'd from previous page) LILCO believes a shielding factor of 0.6 or 0.7 could be achieved, but only after some minor changes have been made. LILCO did not de-termine what the shielding factor would be if those minor changes were not made, but they would be less effective. Tr. 9377-78 (Miele). There is no evidence that the modifications have been or will be per-formed. LILCO visited three Rocky Point schools in March 1984. The Junior-Senior High School has space in the basement which LILCO be-lieves has adequate space for all the students and staff, as well as the students of nearby Rocky Point Elementary School. This area would provide a shielding factor of 0.1. The Joseph A. Edgar School has limited space in a basement room that LICO believes could provide a shielding factor of 0.2. The remaining population could be sheltered in the hallways which have a shielding factor of approximately 0.8. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 75. I -491- . -- _ _ ~ _ ___ .. . _ __ _ _ . - . - - . _ _ _ _ , - - - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ -_- _ _ _ F. Early Dismissal of School Children (Contentions 68 and 69) 740. Contentions 68 and 69 assert that, contrary to LILCO's assump-tion, recommending early dismissal of schools when an accident is first an-nounced will not protect students from health-threatening radiation. The bases for these contentions are: (a) LILCO has no means for altering an early dismissal recommendation, thus creating the possibility that in an I escalating emergency, children will be caught in an exposed location; (b) the Plan includes none of the essential details of the schools' early dis-missal plans; (c) early dismissal will take too'long to be considered an adequate protective action; and (d) parents will not be notified of the early dismissals, resulting in children arriving at home without proper su-pervision. 741. Va agree with the thrust of Contention 69.483/ We are particu-larly concerned because the local school officials who testified clearly stated that existing early dismissal plans were never intended to be used in, and are not adequate for, a radiological emergency. See discussion supra. They also testified that an early dismissal would take far longer than LILCO has predicted, thereby creating a risk that children will become stranded, potentially exposing them to harmful radiation.484/ We accept 483/ Contention 68 is not addressed in detail because it involves the same Plan error we discuss in Contention 61.C.1, supra. We will withhold any-ruling until the Plan revision is issued and reviewed. 484/ The early dismissal plans also cannot be implemented in a timely man-ner because of role conflict and traffic congestion problems as well. See Findings on Contentions 25 and 65, supra. -492- I s th'is testimony as true and, for that reason, cannot find adequate prepared-ness.
- - 1. Adequacy of Existing School Early Dismissal Plans
- _ 742. Schcols are not experienced in dealing with radiological emergencies, but are used to dealing with snow emergencies or other in-
. stances where school buildings need to be evacuated. LILCO equates the kinds of emergencies which are not uncommon, such as bad weather or fires, I with radiological emergencies because (in LILCO's view) the principle of efficiently moving children from an area of potential danger to one of i safety is the same. Tr. 9257-59 (Weismantle, Robinson); 9274-75 l 1 (Weismantle).485/ According to the testimony of local school officials, LILCO's assumptions in this regard are unwarranted.486/ Thus, MCCSD has no early dismissal plan designed for use in a Shoreham emergency, and,- in the opinion of MCCSD's officials, the district's standard early dismissal plan ~ 1 485/ LILCO believes that a particular school which failed to plan for a Shoreham emergency could nonetheless implement early dismissal because
- - it involves (again in LILCO's view) nothing that schools are not al-4 ' ready prepared to do for snow emergencies. Tr. 9268-69 (Weismantle).
For reasons already discussed, we reject such an ad hoc response to a radiological emergency. - 486/ Dr. Doremus did not believe you could equate any two emergencies, for - instance, hurricanes, snow storms, failure of utilities, fires or ra-diological emergencies. Tr. 9532.(Doremus). For example, school chil-dren would have to be supervised at schools and on buses during a Shoreham emergency, whereas when schools send children home in a snow emergency early dismissal, the children are supervised by the bus driver unless the bus has an aide assigned for monitoring duties. Tr. 11,013 (Jeffers); see Tr. 9250 (Weismantle). 4 3 -493- would not work. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 7-8. Sim-ilarly, Sinai's early dismissal plan for snow or other emergencies is not designed, and would not be appropriate, for use in a Shoreham emergency. Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 7; see Tr. 3172-73 (Petrilak) (role conflict in radiological emergency makes the situation far different than a snow emergency). See also Tr. 9486-87 (Cordaro) (admitting BOCES plans re-quire changes).487/ Based on these views of local officials who have had extensive experience in early dismissals, and in the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, this Board cannot conclude that reliance on ex-isting early dismissal plans would provide adequate protection or would constitute satisfactory preparedness.
- 2. Time to Accomplish Early Dismissal 743. LILCO has estimated the following times under normal conditions for school districts to get the students home during a radiologia1 emergen-cy: Rocky Point -- 1 hr. 15 min.; MCCSD -- 3 hr.; Sinai -- 2 hr. 20 min.;
Riverhead Central -- 1 hr. 30 min.; Patchogue-Medford -- 2 hr. 30 min.; and MICSD -- 3 hr. LILCO has not estimated times for the remaining school dis-tricts. Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr. 9154 at 39. Based upon the actual 487/ The emergency "go home" plans for BOCES existed prior to any consider-ation of Shoreham, and according to LILCO's witness Cordaro, would have to be revised to take account of the special circumstances of a radiological emergency. It would not be desirable or the optimum course of action to take the emergency "go home" plans for early dis-missal tbst presently exist for various school districts, and use these plans during a radiological emergency, although it could be done. Tr. 9486-87 (Cordaro). -494- experience of schools in early dismissals, we find these LILCO time esti-mates far too low. 744. Under normal conditions and traffic flow, there is, in theory, a three-hour turn around time for early dismissal in MICSD. However, whenev-er the_ district's plan has actually been implemented, it has almost invariably taken 5 or 6 hours to implement since the early dismissal pro-cess involves administrative decisions, obtaining buses, and multiple bus runs.488/ The announcement of an accident at Shoreham will set up a set of circumstances that are extraordinary. There will be compounded traffic problems because not only the schools, but the parents and everyone else within the EPZ, will be mobilizing. MICSD personnel predicted that there would be no less than a six-hour turn around time for early dismissal of the district (even assuming no role conflict problems), or double the amount of LILCO's estimates. Tr. 11,024-26 (Muto), Muto and Smith .(Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 4, 9. 745. In a normal MCCSD early dismissal, where all goes smoothly, the last student will not leave school until approximately 2 1/2 hours after 488/ Many different factors have caused extra time for MICSD early dismiss-als. For instance, schools often are not able to communicate with all bus drivers to get them to different points on time. In a ra-dialogical emergency, schools would face even more difficulties be-cause the radio would be broadcasting that an accident has occurred and persons would be moving in many different directions, causing many different types of problems. Tr. 11,027-28 (Smith). During an early dismissal, there are approximately 7,000 bus stops and 250 routes that must be driven in MICSD. Tr. 3102-04 (Smith). l l I -495-L the start of the dismissal. But even in those " normal" circumstances, it is not unusual for the last children to leave school 4 to 5 hours after the start of the dismissal, arriving home even later. In severe snow condi-tions it has taken as long as 7 hours for dismissed children to arrive home. In light of the serious difficulties likely to occur in a Shoreham accident, especially traffic-related problems, early dismissals for MCCSD would almost certainly take in excess of 5 hours. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001 at 4, 8; Tr. 11,094-96 (Rossi).489/ Further, Mr. Rossi believed that unavailability of bus drivers could further impair an early dismissal. See Tr. 11,109 (Rossi) (only 3 of 62 drivers surveyed in-dicated they would report).490/ Finally, LILCO's plan for MCCSD to retain 489/ Early dismissals would be slowed by heavy evacuation traffic and staffing shortages which would result from role conflict among school personnel. See Contention 25, supra. Moreover, in more usual but nonetheless serious circumstances, such as severe storms, the degree of confusion during an early dismissal is always high. Many parents arrive to pick up children and children do not find their buses or their parents. Traffic congestion around schools impedes the arrival and departure.of buses. Telephone calls from concerned parents, and locating and singling out children, tie up school personnel. All these factors slow an early dismissal under " normal" conditions. In a Shoreham accident, these problems are likely to be more significant. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), f f. Tr.11,001, st 9; Tr. 3142-43, 3184 (Jeffers); see also Tr. 3131-32 (Rossi, Jeffers) (problems which have delayed early dismissal in the past). 490/ MCCSD provides bus transportation for approximately 125 private school children who reside in or attend private schools in the EPZ, 42 of whom have bus routes which enter the immediate area of the plant. In an early dismissal, MCCSD drivers would have to travel into, and in some cases, almost through the EPZ, to reach the private schools, cope with the confusion which may exist at those schools, and then return to the district through the traffic congestion before they could even i begin the take home process. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 4, 9-10; see Tr. 3189-90 (Rossi) (questioning whether driv-ers would travel through EPZ to pick up children). -496- -m I students who live within the EPZ would result in confusion.491/ 746. A Sinai early dismissal would take several hours and, for a num-ber of reasons, would not allow children to reunite qui.ckly with their fam-111es. First, since the district does not have a senior high school, it sends its 485 senior high students to schools in Port Jefferson. In an early dismissal, 8 district buses -- almost half of the district's fleet -- travel from Sinal to Port Jefferson to pick up high school students and re-turn them to one of the Sinai schools, where they board other buses to go home. In a normal early dismissal, this trip does not delay the Sinai early dismissal because the Port Jefferson administrators usually begin their early dismissal before Sinal's. In a Shoreham emergency, if both districts initiated early dismissals as soon as the accident was announced, that coordination would be impossible. Moreover, in a Shoreham early dis-missal, the round trip bus travel for Sinai high school students would be along two-major evacuation arteries (Route 25A and North Country Road), where the buses are likely to encounter heavy traffic making it a longer trip than normal.492/ The unavailability of those.8 buses for the time 491/ MCCSD has approximately 1200-1300 students who reside within the Shoreham EPZ. They attend at least 18 schools -- 5 in-district schools and 13 additional schools outside the district. Attempting to dismiss part of the school district (i.e., students who live outside the EPZ), while retaining students living in the EPZ would lead to confusion and problems in accountability and safety. Additional con- . fusion would be caused by parents attempting to get their children from schools. Jeffers and Rossi (Supp), ff. Tr. 3087, at 3-4. 492/ In addition to heavy traffic, other problems relating to early dis-
- . missal involve schools' lack of ability to communicate with their (Footnote cont'd next page)
-497- -r required to get the Sinai high school students from Port Jefferson would ' delay the dismissal of the rest' of Sinal's school children. Thus, it could be. hours before early dismissal even began for many Sinai children. Pe-trilak-(Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001 at 7-9; Tr. 11,096-98 (Petrilak). The time of 2 hours 20 minutes estimated by LILCO for a Sinai early dismissal is, -in the opinion of the local officials (who are in the best position to know), less than. half of what it should be. In Sinai's experience, where dismissals were not planned, the time to get dismissed students home ranged from 4 1/2.to 5 1/2 hours. Tr. 11,096 (Petrilak).493/ a 747. LILCO contends that early evacuation and mobilization traffic i will have little effect on the time needed to complete early dismissal be- .cause1under the Plan schools will be dismissed at the Alert stage. LILCO a-ar.serted that most of the public will probably be unaware of the Alert con-dition'because the sirens may not have been activated. LILCO's argument overlooks the. fact that the LERO Director has the opcion to sound the si- -rens in an-Alert. LILCO's argument also ignores the fact that the schools , L (Footnote cont'd from previous page) drivers, accidents on the roads, and the problems of children becoming upset with the emergency situation and the need for supervision. Tr. .11,108-11 (Petrilak, Rossi); see Findings on Contention 65. 493/ S-WR could change its early dismissal plan to be sure buses will be available by parking buses at each school when not in use. Otherwise, buses will have to be picked up at the bus storage area by teachers and bus drivers, requiring more time. The S-WR plan has not been changed to have the buses park at each school, and the bus company has not been approached in this regard. Tr. 9537 (Doremus). -498-i , , - - - - , _ - , , - - , , , - , - - . ~ . . , , . . . . . . . . - , - - . . , , , - _ - , , . _ ,m,.. , , _ _ , _ , . - - _ _ - - . _ _ , . . . . - , , - _ , . - - . _ - . - - - will be notified of the need for an early dismissal via an EBS message. Plan at 3.3-4. 748. LILCO asserts that there will be no significant interference with the normal early dismissal process on account of the impact of parents driving to school to pick up their children. School officials testified, however, that it is normal for there to be severe congestion at schools for reasons which include parents coming to school for their children. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr.11,001, at 9.494/ See also findings in Sec-tion IX, indicating that the early mobilization traffic could be far more severe than LILCO has assumed.
- 3. Homes Without Adults When Children Arrive Home 749. A problem in early dismissals is looking out for children who have no one to return to during the day, for example children with working parents. Many wcrking parents make arrangements for their children's care in early dismissals or other emergencies by providing schools with 494/ In a Shoreham emergency, many parents would go to schools to pick up their children. This has been MCCSD's experience and it is the belief of the parents organization in their district. As a result, school officials would probably be unable to contact many parents or other responsible adults. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 11; Petrilak (Schools), f f. Tr.11,001 at 10. Parents are aware of how long early dismissals take even under normal conditions, and they are likely to believe that the dismissal will be longer in a ra-diological emergency. The conversion of concerned parents on schools would create added traffic congestion and confusion, and buses would be slowed in arriving and departing, and children could more easily miss their buses or their parents, which would cause even more concern
, and distress. Petrilak, ff. Tr. 11,001, at 9. -499-L telephone numbers of persons to care for the children if they cannot be reached. All schools can do is attempt to contact these friends or rela-tives. Schools cannot deliver children to any homes other than their own. Therefore, if schools cannot reach the person designated to care for a child, or that person is unable to get to the child's home, the child could be left unattended at home. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at.10-11; Muto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 10; Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 10-11; Tr. 3143-44 (Jeffers). See also Tr. 3138-41, 3183-85 (Jeffers) (problems of attempting to contact parents). 750. For the general public, approximately 50% of the homes where both parents work have no adult supervision during the day. Tr. 12,217 -(McIntire). Approximately 60-70% of the Sinai homes do not have adult su-pervision during normal school hours.. Tr. 11,029 (Petrilak). The normal Sinai procedures for identifying an alternate adult contact in an early dismissal would not ensure that children would not be left unattended. It would be difficult to contact adults at home or work if there were an an-nouncement of a Shoreham accident. Many parents would go to the schools to pick up their children and would not be at home to receive a phone call, resulting in increased confusion. Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 10-11. 751. It is difficult to predict the number of children who might be left at home without adult supervision.495/ See Tr. 9271-72, 9459-60 495/ Based on a 1977 survey, approximately 41 percent of the S-WR house-holds had no adult present during the school day. Dr. Doremus felt (Footnote cont'd next page) -500- (Lieberman) (estimating small number of children who will be at home for only short time before parents return). This Board finds this to be a rel-atively minor potential problem which does not materially affect our deci-sion on Contention 69.
- 4. Dealing With An Escalating Emergency 752. Dr. Jeffers and Mr. Rossi testified that if an emergency escalates once an early dismissal has begun, some children would be in buses or on foot and would have no access to shelter or to a means of evacuating from the area until they arrived home. The trip home could take a long time during which they would be without substantial protection.
Under these circumstances, the witnesses testified that it is unlikely that school children would receive adequate protection. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 11-12; Muto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 10. , 753. If a sheltering recommendation were received before an early dismissal had been completed, students who had not already left could be sheltered at the school. Students who had already left for home would (Footnote cont'd from previous page) that probably more households are without adults during the day than 41 percent. Tr. 9548-49, 9559-60 (Doremus). However, in an emergency go-home this past winter, only one SW-RC student had to remain in school because no adult was present at home. Tr. 9531-32 (Doremus). The district's administrators have decided that they would not send a child home unless either a parent or some adult could be contacted at t the home prior to dismissing the students. Tr. 9535-36 (Doremus). -501- continue home. LILCO testified that the risk to these students would be small bccause in all likelihood a recommendation to shelter or evacuate would be made before a radioactive plume actually reached the public. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 45-46. 754. Once school children are put on buses under an early dismissal plan, the only way to rescind the decision would be to communicate with the buses using two-way radios. Only a low percentage of buses have two-way -radio capability. Tr. 9394-95 (Robinson). 755. If schools are implementing early dismissal and sheltering is then recommended, some children will be at school while others will be en route home on foot. LILCO believes that children returning home on foot generally live close to the school and can reach home in a short time. LILCO presumes that the child would reach home in time to shelter with the family. Children are treated like members of the general public ,once they have left the school, and they would resume sheltering as the rest of the public would. In addition, early dismissal takes place under an alert sit- .uation where there has not.been a release of radiation. Thus, LILCO be-lieves children would probably reach home and be able to shelter before they would be exposed to radiation. Tr. 9447-48 (Miele, Cordaro). 756. The Board finds that the escalating emergency situation, while a concern, cannot reasonably be avoided under any plan. Thus, we do not find that this concern plays any part in our decision on Contention 69. -502- G. Evacuation of School Children (Contentions 70 and 71) 757. Contentions 70 and 71 assert that LILCO's proposal that schools and school districts evacuate their children is unworkable and would not result in protection for the children. LILCO's failure to arrange for re-caption centers is alleged to render its evacuation proposal unworkable. Moreover, it is alleged that necessary preplanning has not occurred and that the evacuation could not be carried out in an expeditious manner. We agree. First, as held by this Board on Contention 24.N, LILCO has failed to obtain relocation center agreements. Thus, there is no basis for us to find.that an effective evacuation could be implemented. Further, as estab-lished above, there has been no effective school planning. Indeed, school officials testified that effective evacuation could not be achieved. LILCO has responded with nothing more than speculation as to what it believes the schools would or could do; it has not, and cannot, offer any evidence con-cerning actual school planning for an emergency at Shoreham.496/ The fact, however, is that schools have not engaged in any systematic planning, which compels us to rule for Intervenors.497/ 496/ For example, the supervision of children during evacuation and at re-ception centers was raised as a concern. LILCO's answer was two fold: if schools choose their own relocation centers, the Board can presume there will be people to supervise until parents arrive, and schools can ask for teacher volunteers to accompany children. See LILCO Brief, at 296. 'LILCO's answer simply highlights that no preparedness exists and we cannot simply presume that this is merely a " problem to be solved" as opposed to an " insurmountable difficulty." Id. The fact is that there is a problem, and it has not been solved because there is no preparedness. No license can be authorized in such a sit-uation. 497/ Again, it is necessary to refer to our findings on Contentions 25 and 65 for additional bases for our decision. -503-u k T b '758. The school evacuation option under the Plan involves summoning school buses. The only difference from early dismissal would be that in- a i ' stead-of taking the students home, the buses would take them to reception centers. Cordaro, ff. Tr. 9154, at 52. The schools would use their own i transportation resources, except that nursery schools, by prior arrange-ment, would get buses driven by LER0' personnel. But see findings on Con-tention 24.E regarding lack of agreements with nursery schools. LILCO as-v sorts that the evacuation option could be implemented even though a school
- or school district: failed to plan in advance. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.
9154, at 51-52.498/ We reject such an ad hoc approach. See Metropolitan Edison Co., LBP-81-59, supra, 14 NRC at 1640-41. 759. Schools and school districts have conducted little preplanning for implementation of LI'LCO's evacuation recommendations. MICSD has not performed any planning concerning.LILCO's proposed evacuation or the. - 493/ LILCO testified that'it will do a number of things to ensure that the-bus drivers can find the reception areas (assuming the schools fail to plan for_ evacuation). First, LILCO will pick a reception center for ,eachLschool~within the EPZ. Second, LILCO will incorporate these choices into the school's protective action procedures so bus drivers Land other personnel will be aware of the schools' assignment. Third, y LILCO will prepare maps, one for each school in the EPZ, providing a lC recommended best bus-route between the school and its designated re-
- ception' center, ,If schools refuse - to accept these maps in advance of
[ an_ emergency, LILCO will. make available LERO personnel- to deliver the . maps to each school at the time of an emergency and, if necessary, re- ". main to hand out the maps to the bus drivers. Once (or rather if) re-
- ception centers for schools have been designated, that information
,will be distributed annually to households so that parents would know , to which reception center'their children will be bused in the event of an evacuation. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154, at 53-54. l i I -504-i l- subsecuent reuniting of its children with their parents. The Plan contains
- no procedures for reuniting school children with their parents after an evacuation. Muto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 11-12; Tr.
11,044-46 (Smith).499/ Similarly, a Sinal official testified that LILCO's school evacuation proposal would not work and would not result in the pro-tection of school children. Sinai has conducted no planning for school evacuation because the district believes that such an action would be im-possible and would not provide adequate protection for its students. Pe-trilak (Schools), ff. Tr.11,001, at 12. Further, an evacuation would re-quire additional school personnel to supervise and care for school children at schools, on buses and at relocation centers. School districts cannot assure that adequate staffing would be available. Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 12-13. The Plan simply ignores these practical considera-tions. 760. MCCSD has conducted no Shoreham-related preplanning, either for evacuation or reuniting children with their parents.500/ The district 499/ LILCO urges that there is no NUREG 0654 requirement that children and parents be reunited. See LILCO Brief at 294. LILCO misses the obvi-ous point. If relocation centers are not available for reuniting to occur, no district will permit such evacuation at all. See Petrilak (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 14. LILCO also ignores its own acknowl-edgement of the importance of safely reuniting children with parents. See LILCO Brief, at 287; OPIP 3.6.5. 500/ Even though the Plan does not contemplate that the MCCSD would evacu-ate its students, school officials considered the problems that would be involved if an evacuation were attempted in MCCSD or other dis-tricts. Even under the Plan, MCCSD would have to evacuate those dis-trict students who attend private schools in the EPZ. MCCSD does not believe LILCO's proposal to evacuate school children would work. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 12-13. -505- } .z. .. --- . - .. . O g . . -J. , (I .-r s ,( g = d \ N believes, however, that such an evacuation ' would be very difficult, if not % ^ p.-' impossible. Th'a* Plan contains N ' o provisions for supervising children dur- ? ' a%l 6 "3s. ing Yet chilcrcr.',would have to be cared for at schools, on , an evacuation. buses, and at relocation centers until parents arrived. The Plan makes no [. > < ~* N Frovision idt such3- necessary staffing, even though staffing at that level ~ h _'< q i's beyond MCCSD's resources. MCCSD does not believe, moreover, that.such '- staffing could be obtaineF oa lan ad hoc basis during an emergency. Most ~2 j > J .. districts do not normally Meiid thachers or other staff with children on 2 ?! s j buses, nor are teachers or other school staff expected or required to re-s main with children (or accompany thi.m to a new location) for extended peri- .i 4 ods beyond the,end of the school day. Thist of course, would be necessary-if an evacuation were attempted. Jeffers and Rossi (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at p. 14-15. \' d
- 761. The evidence indicates that even more buses would be needed for an evacuation than for an early dismissal. Further, evacuation would in-vdive longer trips since buses would have to travel to reception centers t- 3
. .outsi(e the EPZ, and on return trips they may encounter heavy evacuation 'l j- traffi . Given the shortage of buses already discussed regarding Conten-W .g ^ tion 24.F, supra, it appears questionabl+ v..-ther a timely evacuation could f be accomplished under any circumsta m ,,} .tcularly since more multiple 1,. runs will be required. zMuto and Smith (Schools), ff. Tr. 11,001, at 12-13; 4,t A , q ', Q '.Jeffers,land R,ossi (Schools), ff. Tr.11,001, at 15-16; Petrilak (Schools), ss . o y 1' 'ff. Tr. 11,001, at 13. See Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., ALAB-727, supra, )' -17 NRC at 772 73. LILCO believes this will not endanger the chCdren g t ^ 1 -506-h because they will be sheltered in buildings while waiting for the return of the buses. However, while on school buses, children would be unprotomod. Tr. 9322-23 (Weismantle). 762. LILCO indicates that additional buses will come from the 1,236 buses that LILCO currently has under contract or from school districts out-side the EPZ that will agree to release their buses. As we earlier dis-cussed, however, LILCO in fact has no agreement with any district outside the EPZ to release any buses. 763. LILCO estimates that evacuation of all school children can be accomplished in two or three waves in 6 1/2 hours. Tr. 9460 (Lieberman). We cannot accept this estimate as accurate. For many schools, an early dismissal will take this long (see discussion of Contention 69, supra). Since an evacuation can reasonably be expected to take even longer, a higher evacuation estimate must be assumed. XIII. INGESTION PATHWAY (CONTENTIONS 24.R, 81, 85, 88, 92) A. 50-Mile EPZ (Contention 81) 764. Contention 81 alleges that the Plan contains insufficient proce-dures or other means of implementing the protective actions set forth in OPIP 3.6.6, specifically those dealing with contaminated lactating da.iry animals, contaminated milk, fruits, vegetables, grains, and water supplies, diet restrictions, and condemnation and control of agricultural exports. -507- There was no dispute that OPIP 3.6.6 describes several proposed protective actions (to be chosen on the basis of monitoring, sampling and analyses) which if actually implemented, could be effective methods for protecting the public from consumption of contaminated foodstuffs as required by NUREG 0654 Section II.J.11. Such proposals include removing dairy animals from pasture and placing them on stored feed, withholding milk and poultry from commerce, withholding produce and poultry (especially ducks) from markets, and washing and peeling fruits and vegetables. Having words in a proce-dure, however, does not assure that those protective actions can or will actually be implemented in a way that would provide adequate protection following a radiological emergency, as required by 10 CFR $$ 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(c)(2). Thus, the focus of the dispute regarding the matters raised in Contention 81 is whether LILCO is capable of assuring imple-mentation of its proposed protective actions for the ingestion pathway. 765. LILCO asserts that it will communicate recommended protective actions to farmers, food processors, and other food-chain establishments by telephone and EBS bulletins.501/ In a General Emergency, or following sam-pling of milk and other products showing contamination, potentially affect-ed farmers "will be instructed" to remove dairy animals from pasture and place them on stored feed until further notice, they "will be instructed" 501/ LILCO has compiled listings of dairy, poultry and hog farms, vegetable and fruit growers, farm stands, and food and dairy processors who use agricultural commodities produced in the 50-mile EPZ. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,563, at 10, 23-24, 37-38, Atts. 1-6. -508- ( i to keep all dairy animals indoors and to provide them with uncontaminated 4: feed and water, and they."will be advised" to withhold their milk from com-3 merce,' store it at reduced temperatures, and take a representative sample from each milking; dairy processors "will be advised" to withhold contami-nated milk from commerce, they "may be advised" to freeze and store contam-inated milk for a specified period of time, or to direct fluid milk to the production of dry or evaporated milk, butter or cheese, and they "will be instructed" to store all incoming shipments in separate tanks and take sam-ples-from each shipment; farm stand operators "will be advised".to withhold ~their produce from market until further notice, and "will be instructed" to wash, brush or scrub uncovered produce; and if water samples show contami- i nation, LILCO "will-contact". and " inform" water supply operators. See LILCO Brief,.at 300-03. 'LILCO asserts that it will-thus " undertake to im-plement appropriate protective actions."- LILCO Brief, at 299. 766. LILCO's intent to advise or instruct farmers, producers, proces-sors,Ldistributors or vendors of potentially contaminated foodstuffs not to ; make such food available to.the unsuspecting public,~and its reliance upon
- i. voluntary compliance with such advice, provides no assurance that the nec-l essary actions could or would be taken. LILCO does not suggest, however,
.that it has the authority to impound,-embargo or interdict potentially con- . taminated foodstuffs, or otherwise effectively enforce the implementation g - of those' actions which would be necessary to protect the individuals in the -ingestion. pathway and others who could receive contaminated food from that l pathway. .See.Tr. 13,685-87 (Watts,-Cordaro). j.- -509- . ~ , . . - - . , _ . . _ _ . _ _ ... _ _. _ .. _ , _ , _ . _ . , . , _ . . . . - . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . 767. We find that an inability to assure implementation of ingestion pathway protective actions is a critical deficiency. Ingestion pathway protective actions are designed to protect the public from consumption of contaminated food or produce. Individuals cannot determine for themselves whether food products they purchase or otherwise acquire have been contami-nated; accordingly, one purpose of an emergency plan is to establish a means of assuring that contaminated foodstuffs do not make their way into the food chain to begin with, so consumers can be protected. 768. LILCO's proposal violates NUREG 0654 Section II.J.11, which states that the methods for protecting the public from consumption of con-taminated foodstuffs shall include procedures "for imposing protection pro-cedures such as impoundment, decontamination, processing, decay, product diversion, and preservation" (emphasis added). There has been no sugges-tion that LILCO is vested with any authority to impose any protection pro-cedures upon farmers, food processors, distributors or vendors; there is no mention in the Plan of impoundment, imposition of embargoes, confiscations or condemnation of contaminated foodstuffs. The Plan does not even purport to provide any means of imposing LILCO's advice or recommendations upon the individuals or entities who must implement LILCO's advice if the general consuming public is to be protected. See OPIP 3.6.6. 769. LILCO's proposal to rely upon voluntary compliance wit' its in-gestion pathway advice does not cure the noncompliance with eucion II.J.11, which clearly requires authority to impose controls. LILCO -510- appears .to be suggesting, therefore, that under 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(1), its voluntary compliance program constitutes an adequate interim compensating C measure or that the deficiency is not significant. We must reject any such argument. First, as noted above, we found this deficiency to be signifi-cant. -Second, this is not an interim compensating measure at all but rath-er is to be the ingestion pathway plan for the foreseeable future.502/ .770. Finally, we address LILCO's argument that it may have a means of inducing compliance with its ingestion pathway recommendations. LILCO testified that the Plan includes a " policy" of compensating food-chain es-tablishments for losses sustained as a result of a radiological emergency. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,563, at 14, 19, 24-25, 31-33. The LILCO wit- - nesses testified that such a proposal, if implemented, could eliminate the incentive for a farmer or merchant to sell or distribute contaminated food. Tr. 13,687-88 (Cordaro). While it is possible that an offer by LILCO to purchase products could prevent some contaminated foodstuffs from reaching the public, we do not find the mere statement of a policy or even the exis-tence of a potential economic incentive which individual farmers, proces-sors and vendors may or may not find attractive (assuming arguendo that - they become aware of it in a timely fashion) (see Tr. 13,687-92 (Cordaro)) ( to constitute sufficient assurance that actions necessary to protect public f l l
- 502/ ~LILCO has argued in several contexts that ir expects the State to plan
! with LILCO at some time in the future and thus that the entire Plan is (- an interim measure. We cannot speculate on such matters and assume in this decision that the State and County will continue to decline to implement the Plan. l -511- i l health and safety would in fact be taken. Furthermore, a plan to offer to compensate for losses does not compensate for the NUREG 0654 requirement that there exist procedures for imposing protective procedures tc protect the consuming public. 771. Accordingly, we conclude that LILCO has failed to meet its bur-den of proof on Contention 81, and that the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR $$ 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(c)(2), and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.11. B. Recovery and Reentry (Contentions 85, 88) 772. Contentions 85 and 88 contest the adequacy of LILCO's Plan for recovery and reentry. Contention 85 alleges that no plan exists to provide for recovery and reentry, and Contention 88 alleges that the Plan fails to state the dose criteria that will provide the basis for a determination that it is safe for the public to reenter evacuated areas. The contentions allege non-compliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(13) and NUREG 0654 Section II.M. 773. NUREG 0654 Section II.M requires LILCO to " develop general plans and procedures for reentry and recovery and describe the means by which de-cisions to relax protective measures . . . are reached" considering both existing and potential conditions. Minor, ff. Tr. 15,384, at 3. The Plan, however, does not include even a general plan for recovery and reentry. Instead, it only provides for creation of a Recovery Action Committee that, after its formation, will plan and implement actions for the restoration of -512- l
- i. the affected areas to their pre-emergency conditions. OPIP 3.10.1; see Minor, ff. Tr.15,384, at 3-4; Cordaro et al. (Direct), ff. Tr.15,282, at
- 7. This does not constitute a plan that we can assess or determine is ade-quate or in compliance with the regulatory requirements; it is merely a plan for the creation of a committee whose charter will include planning i
for recovery and reentry actions. Minor, ff. Tr. 15,384, at 4. 774. LILCO testified that OPIP 3.10.1 describes procedures for initiating recovery operations and facilitating reentry of the public into previously evacuated areas. Cordaro et al. (Direct), ff. Tr. 15,282, at 6. Thus, the Plan indicates tnat surveying, monitoring and data analysis could 3 take place, conferences with federal agencies might occur, and the Recovery Action Committee would develop recommendations regarding decontamination, transportation, traffic control, communications, security, and other mat-ters. See, e.g., LILCO Brief, at 307-308. However, a statement that meet-ings and discussions will take place and that recommendations concerning a catalog of areas will be developed, does not constitute a plan for recovery or reentry. Such statements provide no indication that the preparedness required by our regulations actually exists. 775. For example, the Plan does not address necessary recovery activ-ities which should or would be implemented to reduce dose rates in contami-nated areas. See Minor, ff. Tr.15,384, at 4. Similarly, the Plan does not identify or address the use of different decontamination methods that would or could be employed by LILCO during recovery operations, or the -513- c: criteria to determine which methods are necessary or appropriate. Id., at l 4-5; Tr. 15,311-14 (Daverio). LILCO's reliance on " publicly available lit-erature on the subject" (see LILCO Brief, at 308) is an unacceptable sub-stitute for the planning that is required by the regulations. Finally, the Plan fails to specify how the effectiveness of decontamination activities, radioactive wasta disposal, security for contaminated areas, or the adequa-cy of food and water supplies, would be considered by LILCO in determining that protective measures could be lifted, or how actions related to decontamination, security, traffic control, and food and water control, would or could be taken by LILCO as part of recovery operations. Minor, ff. Tr.'15,384, at 4-5. See also findings :n Contention 81 (LILCO's in-ability to impose protective measures results in no assurance that the Plan could be implemented). 776. Thus, we find that the Plan does not constitute a plan at all, and provides no assurance that necessary recovery or reentry actions would or could be implemented after a Shoreham emergency. We recognize that per-taining to recovery and reentry, detailed plans are not required. Given the uncertainties regarding the cause of an accident, detailed planning such as' required by other NUREG 0654 planning standards would be inappro-priate. However, as a condition of licensing, general plans must be developed. 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(13). We find that not even general plans have been developed, and thus rule for Intervenors on Contention 85. -514- 777. On the question of dose criteria for reentry, LILCO testified that if monitoring indicates the public would suffer whole body or any organ dose of 500 mR or more, LILCO would consider the area contaminated. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 15,284,.at 6. The 500 mR figure also represents the level of contamination below which reentry would be appropriate, ac-cording to LILCO. Tr. 15,363 (Watts). 778. While it is not clear that 500 mR is an appropriate threshold for permitting reentry, LILCO cited several sources as the basis for its selection of that threshold. See Cordaro et al. , ff. Tr.15,284, at 7. We have no basis in this record for finding it inappropriate, although we be-lieve that a determination of whether reentry is appropriate should also take into account oth er factors, including the benefits of reducing doses even further. See Tr. 15,376-78; 15,369-70 (Watts , Daverio) . 779. NUREG 0654 Section II.M.4 requires that there Le a method for periodically estimating total population exposure. We find that OPIP 3.10.2 does set forth a method for calculating total population dose; how- [' ever, the accuracy and reliability of the resulting exposure estimates are dependent.upon the accuracy of the population data used in the calculation. We find that LILCO's sources of population data are likely to be inaccurate and unreliable, since they include such things as reports from traffic guides weeks after an emergency. See Minor, ff. Tr. 15,384, at 6; Tr. 15,352-58 (Daverio, Watts) . -515-m 780. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds in favor of -Intervenors on Contention 88 because there is no assurance that LILCO's estimates of t-i total population exposure would be accurate or reliable. C. New York State Plan (Contention 92) 5 781. Contention 92 alleges that there is no New York State emergency plan to deal with an emergency at Shoreham. This point was conceded by LILCO. Cordaro and Weismantle, ff. Tr. 13,899, at 4. The contention al-leges further that in the absence of a state plan for Shoreham, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR $$ 50.47(a)(2), 50.47(b), or NUREG 0654 Sections I.E, I.F, I.H, or II, each of which require the existence of a state plan that has been judged adequate by the NRC and that is integrat-ed with and has provisions for coordination with other entities involved in the emergency response. 782. LILCO offered several responses to Contention 92, beyond its acknowledgement of the nonexistence of a state plan for Shoreham. First, it asserted that no New York plan is necessary because the LILCO Plan does - not rely upon any response from New York. Cordaro and Weismantle, ff. Tr. '13,899,-at 4. Second, LILCO asserted that the absence of a New York plan "is not'a deficiency" in offsite preparedness because, according to LILCO, New York State and Suffolk County would actually participate in the re-sponse.to a Shoreham emergency. Id., at 7.503/ 503/ LILCO's assertion in its Brief that Contention 92 raises the issue ~"whether the State would respond during an actual emergency" (LILCO I' (Footnote cont'd next page) -516- -, e.,y er-w c-e-~ +-w w-e-,--,-e.-e-'+--~..----.--rt-,---rr,--e-r w- m--, --y , e,--, e--..,__+% -- ,, ...- 3 l l 783. The fact that the Plan does not rely upon the existence of a New York plan does not address the issue raised by Contention 92, which is that in the absence of a state plan there can be no compliance with the cited-regulations which deal with the need for an integrated and coordinated re-sponse. Throughout these findings, we address the adequacy of LILCO's Plan with respect to the many specific issues and regulatory requirements upon .which the other contentions are based. There is, however, a separate - requirement in our regulations, upon which Contention 92 rests, which de-- . fines an adequate offsite emergency response plan for a nuclear power reac-tor as a plan which includes emergency preparedness on a state level, and which integrates and coordinates the state's emergency response with all other portions of the offsite response to a radiological emergency. In light of the absence in the record of any demonstrated preparedness on the part of the state, as evidenced here by the absence of a state plan for Shoreham, clearly there can be no finding that there will be an integrated I or coordinated response, or that the response to an emergency would or could be adequate, or even, assuming for the sake of argument (as does Con-tantion 92) a state response were forthcoming, that the response would be (Footnote cont'd from previous page) Brief, at 312) is incorrect. The only mention of a state " response" is in the contention's allegation that "the Plan fails to provide for coordination of LILCO's emergency response with that of the State of New York (assuming arguendo, such a response would be forthcoming)." Accordingly, LILCO's discussion of a portion of a press release by Governor Cuomo and the " notion" of a state response is not relevant to Contention 92. See LILCO Brief, at 313-14. -517- consistent with the LILCO Plan we have evaluated in this proceeding.504/ Thus, LILCO's assertion that its Plan does not rely on a New York State re-sponse is not responsive to the issue. raised in Contention 92. 784. Furthermore, we reject LILCO's assertions that its Plan " allows for participation" of New York officials during an emergency and that therefore the necessary coordination capability exists. See Cordaro and Waismantle, ff. Tr. 13,899, at 8. The stated willingness of one party (here, LILCO) to " coordinate" with another sometime in the future, when countered by the obvious unwillingness of the other party (New York) to co-ordinate,. provides no reliable indication, and certainly no assurance, that such coordination would or could actually occur in the future. It also provides no assurance that the result of actions taken following such hypo-thetical coordination would be consistent with the activities set forth in . the LILCO Plan or would provide adequate protection to the public. There is no evidence on which we could base a finding as to what a " coordinated" response would consist of, and we have no basis upon which to find that a coordinated response would even be possible, much less actually forthcom-ing. To make the findings requested by LILCO (see LILCO Brief, at 313-14) would be purely speculative, and in disregard of the reasonable assurance 504/ Under Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant) CLI-83-13, 17 NRC 741 (1983), LILCO has been given the opportunity to attempt to demonstrate that its own utility-implemented plan could be an adequate substitute for a local governmental emergency response plan. However, neither CLI-83-13 nor any other NRC case law contem-plates the licensing of a plant in the absence of both local govern-ment and state government emergency preparedness. -518- standard articulated in the regulations. Thus, in the absence of a state plan for Shoreham which indicates that a state response would be coordi-nated and consistent with the response contemplated by the LILCO Plan, and in the absence of a state commitment to participate in LILCO's Plan (see Tr. 13,902 (Cordaro)), we cannot find that the required coordination can or will occur in the event of an actual emergency.505/ 785. Finally, although irrelevant to this contention we reject LILCO's unfounded assertion that New York and Suffolk County would in fact respond to a Shoreham emergency. See LILCO Brief, at 313. LILCO's basis for this irrelevant assertion is a portion of a sentence, quoted out of context, from a 4-page press release issued by the Governor in December 1983. Cordaro and Weismantle, ff. Tr. 13,899, at 7. Press releases are 505/ LILCO's reference to the very general "New York State Disaster Pre-paredness Plan," which admittedly does not and is not intended to apply to a Shoreham emergency, (see Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,899, at 4), is inapposite. We cannot make a finding that a state of adequate preparedness for a radiological emergency at Shoreham exists, or that a capability for effective coordination exists, merely because LILCO has quoted what LILCO purports to be a statement of general policy on a broad range of disasters. See LILCO Brief, at 313-14. The few pages of the document submitted by LILCO have nothing to do with LILCO, Shoreham, or the LILCO Plan, and we give those pages no weight. We note further, that the statement of general policy is contingent upon the extent of the State's resources. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 13,899 and Att. 10, at I-3. However, there is no indication in the record that New York has sufficient resources to respond to a ra-diological emergency at Shoreham. To the contrary, for what it is worth, the Governor stated in his press release that New York State does not have sufficient resources to respond to a radiological emer-gency at Shoreham by itself, and even in conjunction with a response by'Suffolk County, New York State might not be able to respond suffi-ciently. See Tr. 13,902 (Cordaro). -519- ff not " evidence," and certainly cannot provide the basis for a conclusion that there is assurance of an adequate response to a radiological emergen-cy. Moreover, there is not even one sentence's worth of " evidence" that New York, or for that matter Suffolk County, would coordinate with, or help LILCO implement its Plan. On the contrary, Governor Cuomo has made it ab-solutely clear that he believes the Plan is inadequate and in violation of New York law, as evidenced by the entire text of his press release,506/ his position in this proceeding, and the actions he has taken in other judicial ~ forums to challenge LILCO's authority to implement its Plan.507/ 786. The question presented by Contention 92 is whether a New York plan exists to deal with a Shoreham accident. LILCO failed to meet its burden of proof on this contention; it conceded that a New York plan for Shoreham does not exist and there is nothing in this record to evidence the willingness or capability of New York to respond to an emergency at Shoreham at all, much less in a manner that would provide adequate 506/ A copy of the full press release was provided to us in the Opposition of Suffolk County and the State of New York to LILCO's Motion for Sum-mary Disposition of Contentions 1-10 (the " Legal Authority" Issues), -dated September 24, 1984, and we hereby take official notice of the full text of that document. 507/ We also reject the suggestion in LILCO's Brief that because New York State and Suffolk County did not present testimony to contradict "the notion" that the State and County would participate in an actual emer-gency at Shoreham, we should find in favor of LILCO on Contention 92. See LILCO Brief, at 314. The State and County were under no obliga-tion to do so; the burden of proof in this proceeding is on LILCO. LILCO's proffer of a " notion," without meaningful evidentiary support, does not satisfy that burden. -520- r. n 4 protection or would be consistent, coordinated, or integrated with the pro-posals made by LILCO in the Plan before us. Accordingly, we find in favor of Intervenors on Contention 92 and determine that LILCO has failed to com-ply with 10 CFR ll 50.47(a)(2) and 50.47(b), and NUPEG 0654 Sections I.E, I.F, I.H and II. D. Connecticut (Contention (24.R) 787. Contention 24.R alleges that LILCO has no agreement with the State of Connecticut under which Connecticut agrees to plan for, recommend, or implement protective actions for the portions of the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ that are in Connecticut. Although the Plan purports to set forth protective actions that could be implemented throughout the ingestion EPZ, since portions of that area are in and under the jurisdiction of Con-necticut, implementation of those actions would require the approval and cooperation of Connecticut governmental officials. OPIP 3.6.6, at le. No offsite emergency response plan for a Shoreham emergency prepared or ap-proved by the State of Connecticut has been presented to this Board, and there is no evidence in this record that any such plan exists. In the ab-sence of such a plan,508/ and also for the reasons set forth in our 508/ In later findings on this contention, we address various letters per-taining to Connecticut. Quite aside from the defects we note in those later findings, we find that it is impossible for us to rely on those letters as adequate preparedness. As noted above, we have not seen or read any Connecticut plan and the FEMA witnesses have reviewed none. Sse Tr. 12,276 (Kowieski). We are not about to find adequate pre-paredness when we do not even have the plan in question in the record. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-580, 11 NRC 227 (1980). -521- findings on Contentions 81 and 92, we cannot make a finding of compliance with 10 CFR 55 50.47(a)(1) or 50.47(c)(2), or NUREG 0654 Section II.J.11. 788. In addition, NUREG 0654 Section II.A.3 requires that the LILCO Plan: include written agreements referring to the concept of operations developed between Federal, State, and local agencies and other support organizations having an emergency response role within the Emergency Planning Zones. Clearly, based on its response to Contention 24.R, LILCO regards Con-necticut at least as a support organization which would participate in the response to a Shoreham emergency. See Cordaro and Renz, ff. Tr. 13,858, at 2-3; Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at 2. See also LILCO Brief, at 315 (one issue is whether letterc of agreement with Connecticut satisfy NUREG 0654). NUREG 0654 further requires that: The agreements shall identif*c the emergency measures to be provided and the mutually acceptable criteria for their implementation, and specify the arrangements for exchange of information. Thus, in this case, any " agreement" between LILCO and Connecticut must cover the ingestion pathway protective actions proposed in the Plan, and must provide assurance that the actions and procedures described in the Plan can and will be taken by Connecticut officials, since that is the plan before us for adjudication and upon which LILCO's license application is based. For the reasons set forth below, we find that LILCO has failed to -522- F produce an agreement from the State of Connecticut which satisfies the requirements of NUREG 0654, and therefore we are unable to find compliance with that section or with 10 CFR 55 50.47(a)(1) or 50.47(c)(2). 789. LILCO's response to Contention 24.R consisted of the presenta-tion by LILCO employees of three letters written by a Mr. Frank Mancuso, who was identified as the Director of Connecticut's Office of Civil Pre-paredness. Mr. Mancuso did not appear as a witness; indeed, no representa-tive of Connecticut appeared or otherwise submitted any testimony or evi-dance to this Board. First, LILCO presented a letter dated December 15, 1983 which was addressed to the New York State Office of Disaster Prepared-ness. Cordaro et al., Tr. 4/6/84 Vol. II, at Att. 28. The letter pur-ported to be an agreement between Connecticut and New York; it is not an agreement between Connecticut and LILCO. Moreover, aside from a reference to accepting requests for assistance from " licensees, federal, state and local (county) agencies," the letter contains no commitment or agreement concerning activities by Connecticut in conjunction or cooperation with LILCO or in any way relating to the Plan. It merely references Con-necticut's willingness to exchange information with the State of New York during an emergency. Id. 790. The December 15, 1983 letter has no significance or relevance to this proceeding. It does not constitute an agreement with LILCO, it does not relate to implementation of the Plan, and its effect{veness, even as an agreement to cooperate or exchange information with New York, was rebutted -523- ~ by the fact that New York officials to whom the letter was addressed stated in a written response that New York had not entered into any agreement with the State of Connecticut concerning actions in the event of a Shoreham emergency. NY Ex. 3; Tr. 13,864-65 (Renz, Cordaro); 6366-67 (Rob-inson).509/ 791. LILCO later submitted another letter from Mr. Mancuso, dated June 14,1984, addressed to LILCO. In that letter, Mr. Mancuso stated that Connecticut would " react" to an accident at Shoreham "by instituting exist-ing emergency plans and resources to protect the health and safety of the residents of Connecticut." Cordaro and Renz, ff. Tr. 13,858, at Att. 2. This letter, like the others, makes absolutely no mention of implementation by Connecticut of the proposals, protective actions, and other procedures set forth in the Plan. Indeed, the witnesses testified that LILCO did not expect Connecticut to implement protective actions based on recommendations issued pursuant to the Plan, and conceded that Connecticut had not agreed 509/ LILCO submitted a second letter from Mr. Mancuso to a New York offi-cial, dated April 18,.1984, which stated that Connecticut "will not become involved in the explosive environment that exists in the State of New York concerning Radiological Emergency Planning," and which conceded that the December 15 letter did not consitute an agreement between New York and Connecticut. LILCO Ex. 48, at 2. The April 18 letter makes no mention of implementing the Plan, nor does it purport to serve as any kind of agreement between Connecticut and LILCO, and accordingly it too is irrelevant and we disregard it. Although the April 18 letter asserts that the December 15 letter "suggest(s] that . . . (Connecticut is] meeting the requirements of NUREG 0654, FEMA REP 1," LILCO Ex. 48, at 2, we place no weight on that self-serving and conclusory assertion. There is no competent evidence that with respect to Shoreham and the LILCO Plan, Connecticut has met the requirements of NUREG 0654 that are raised in Contention 24.R. -524- to implement such recommendations. Tr. 13,877-78 (Cordaro). Instead, even as interpreted by LILCO's witnesses, the June 14 letter indicates only that Connecticut would impisment some other protective actions by instituting some unidentified emergency plans apparently already in existence in Con-necticut. Tr. 13,877 (Cordaro); 13,881-82, 13,891-92 (Renz). As noted al-ready, no such plans have been offered into evidence in this proceeding. Tr. 13,875 (Renz).510/ Accordingly, it is impossible for this Board to find that the actions, which Connecticut states in its-June 14 letter it intends to institute in the event of a Shoreham emergency, constitute ade-quate protective actions, that such actions could be implemented, or that they are consistent with those proposed by LILCO and upon which this license application is based. 792. Furthermore, the June 14, 1984 letter from Mr. Mancuso states that Connecticut would take the actions referenced in its letter in the event of a Shoreham emergency regardless of what New York or LILCO does in the event of such an accident. Cordaro and Renz, ff. Tr. 13,858, at Att. 510/ The LILCO witnesses speculated that the " existing" Connecticut emer-gency plans probably referred to plans prepared by Connecticut relating to nuclear power plants in Connecticut. Tr. 13,891-92, 13,881-82 (Renz); 13,887 (Cordaro). There is no reliable evidence be-fore us to that effect. More importantly, the fact that Connecticut may have plans relating to other plants, even if true, has no rele-vance here. No such plans have been submitted as evidence in this proceeding, and we have no knowledge of their contents or their appli-cability, if any, to the circumstances that would be present in the event of an accident at the Shoreham plant. We, of course, could not -rely on such plans'which LILCO failed even to submit for our review. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. , ALAB-580, supra, 11 NRC at 227. -525-
- 2. -Thus, not only does the letter fail to constitute an agreement on the part of Connecticut to implement the proposals recommended by LILCO as set forth in the Plan, but it statas that Connecticut intends to make its own decisions and recommendations and to take independent rather than coordi-nated or integrated actions in response to a Shoreham emergency. Id. This attitude is the exact opposite of what is required by NUREG 0654, and if we were to place any weight at all on the June 1984 Mancuso letter, it would be to support a finding that Connecticut has refused to agree to implement the Plan.
793. In requesting the issuance of an operating license, the appli-cant has the burden of demonstrating compliance with each applicable reg- 'ulatory requirement. With respect to the ingestion exposure pathway, LILCO has an obligation to establish reasonable assurance that the protective ac-tions set forth in its Plan would and could be implemented. With respect to the portion of the ingestion EPZ in Connecticut, there exists a void in the record. There is no evidence upon which this Board could base a find-ing that prctective actions can or will be implemented in Connecticut or that the protective actions that might be implemented by Connecticut for that portion of the ingestion EPZ are adequate or comply with NRC regula-tions. Put simply, this Board has no idea what protective actions are pro-posed for that portion of the EPZ, or what procedures or resources are available for the possible implementation of any protective actions for that area. Accordingly, LILCO has failed to comply with 10 CFR $$ 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(c)(2), and NUREG 0654 Sections II.A.3 and II.J.11. f -526- XIV. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER (CONTENTIONS 93. 96) 794. _ Contentions 93-96 allege that the Plan must provide for even "the worst possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood." NUREG 0654 Section I.D, at 6-7. This includes a loss of offsite power, which allegedly would not be unlikely in conjunction with a severe accident at Shoreham. The thrust of the contentions is that if there were a loss of offsite power,.the emergency response would be severely disrupted due-to a lack of backup power sources. For reasons set forth below, we rule for LILCO on these contentions. 795. First, while loss of offsite power may be an unlikely event, we do not rest our decision on that fact.511/ Second, LILCO's citation of the 'TMI decision, Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-59, 14 NRC 1211, 1542 (1981), as standing for the proposi- , tion that backup power sources are not required (LILCO Brief, at 319), is not persuasive. While the TMI Board stated "[t]here are no regulatory requirements that prompt alerting systems have backup power sources" (14 NRC at 1542), tho' Board engaged in no legal analysis and merely cited profiled testimony. The Board went on to consider the adequacy of the 511/ 'LILC0~ testified that a Shoreham accident would be highly unlikely to cause a loss of offsite power due to interconnected generating capaci- ~ ty in the LILCO system. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5575, at 5-6; LILCO Brief, at 317. Cross-examination of LILCO's witnesses, however, raised questions regarding the probability that a loss of offsite power might cause or contribute to the risk of a Shoreham accident. Tr. 5580, 5577-78 (Renz). -527- commercial power sources. Id., at 1542-43. Further, the Indian Point Board appears to have held that backup power is an appropriate issue to be considered. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Units 2 and 3), LBP-83-68,18 NRC 811, 938-39 (1983).512/ 796. Therefore, since the proper resolution of the legal question raised by LILCO is not entirely clear, we address the merits of these con- ~tentions. On the merits, we find that the majority of the facilities con-trolled by LILCO have backup power and that some pther facilities have such power as well.52 / Therefore, we find no substantial deficiency in the Plan in this regard. XV. STRIKE BY LILCO EMPLOYEES A. Introduction 797. In July 1984, LI,LCO's union employees commenced a strike which lasted for several weeks. Since approximately 2/3 of LERO workers are union members (LILCO Ex. 71, at 1), the Board was concerned about the 512/ We note, however, that Indian Point was a special NRC proceeding (18 NRC, at 831), and thus it must be applied with care to initial licens-ing. 513/ See, e A , Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5575, at 21; Tr. 5651 (tone alert radios have backup power); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5717, Att. 1 (8 of 11 ambulance companies have backup power); Cordaro et al., Tr. 5/10/84 Vol. II, at 27-28 (hospitals and some nursing and adult homes have backup power); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 5575, at 8-9, 12-13; Tr. 5621-22, 5624-25 (Schiffmacher) (CSO, EOC and some staging areas have backup power). -528- _ . .. .. ~ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ . ._. . . Y effect of a strike on LILCO's ability to respond to a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the. Board admitted sua sponte three questions for the parties
- . to address 514/
(1) Whether LILCO's' ability to implement its offsite emergency preparedness plan would be impaired by a strike involving the majority of its LERO workers; . (2) Whether LILCO should be required to place the re-actor in cold shutdown in the event of a strike by LERO workers; i (3) Whether placing the reactor in cold shutdown dur-ing a strike by LERO workers, after the reactor e has operated at full power, would give " reasonable -assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 798. Prior to trial, LILCO stipulated to the first issue (Tr. 13,989) and in response to the second issue proposed a license condition committing LILCO to bring Shoreham to a cold shutdown mode 24 hours prior to the com-mencement.of a strike, or immediately upon less than 24 hours notice of a strike. LILCO's proposed license condition is as follows: r So long as LILCO shall rely on an offsite emergen-cy response organization consisting entirely or primar-ily of LILCO employees, then'in anticipation of the 4 commencement of a strike by a union representing LILCO 514/ Memorandum'and Order Determining that a Serious Safety Matter Exists, at 3 (July 24, 1984). The Board subsequently ruled that its issues were concerned only with the effects of a strike during its duration. Therefore, though the County raised the concern, the Board does not reach the issue of how a strike or other job actions might af fect the LERO work force (its morale, its willingness to work, and, indeed, its very existence) either before or after a strike. Tr. 14,004-12. Nor do we reach the issue of how a strike by employees of non-LILCO orga-nizations affiliated with LERO would affect an offsite response. -529-1 m employees, LILCO shall bring the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS) to cold shutdown condition using normal operating procedures. LILCO shall commence bringing SNPS to cold shutdown condition 24 hours prior to the commencement of such strike, or immediately upon re-ceipt of less than 24 hours' notice of the impending commencement of a strike, with the goal of having the plant in cold shutdown condition by the time the strike commences. LILCO shall maintain SNPS in cold shutdown condition until the end of the strike except that, with the prior approval of the NRC Staff upon review of written application by LILCO, LILCO shall be permitted: (1.) to take the reactor to a refueling mode to conduct refueling or other operations requiring access to the reactor core if it is shown that such operations cannot result in the occurrence of any events requiring offsite emergency response capability; and (2.) to conduct such other operations as the Staff shall approve if it is shown that the strike does not, in fact, impair LILCO's ability to implement its offsite emergency preparedness plan. This condition shall terminate at such time as any or any combination of agencies of the Federal, New York State, or Suffolk County governments shall provide to the NRC written notice of its or their agreement, under terms and conditions approved by FEt!A, to assume legal
- responsibility for effectuation of offsite emergency response for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
LILCO EP 71, at 3-4. B. The Risks of Cold Shutdown 799. LILCO expects to receive several days notice of any significant strike by LILCO workers. LILCO Ex. 71, at 2. Under normal operating pro-cedures, cold shutdown can be accomplished within 16 hours. If the reactor is manually scrammed, cold shutdown can be achieved within as little as 8 hours. LILCO Ex. 73, at 2, 4. Thus, if LILCO received 24 hours or more -530- advance notice of a strike, there would be time to place the plant in cold shutdown prior' to the commencement of the strike. I_d., at 4. The LILCO witnesses also testified that there would be sufficient non-union reactor-operators to bring the reactor to cold shutdown and maintain it in that mode indefinitely.' Id., at 5; Tr. 15,444-45 (Scalice); LILCO Ex. 78, at 1-2. 800. In light of LILCO's anticipated ability to bring Shoreham to cold shutdown prior to a strike, LILCO asserted that its proposed license condition provided the " reasonable assurance" referenced in the Board's third issue because in the cold shutdown mode no accidents can occur which result in offsite consequences =above PAG limits. The LILCO witnesses based this conclusion on an analysis of the 38 design basis accidents in FSAR Chapter 15. LILCO Ex. 72, at 3-4; Tr. 15,464-65 (Stergakos).515/ LILCO's witnesses believed more serious accidents, particularly core-melt acci-dents, are not " credible" at cold shutdewn because there is more time available to mitigate accidents than at full power, the capacity require-ments of systems designed to mitigate the consequences of the accident are 515/ Three FSAR events could produce offsite consequences below PAG limits: (1). spills and leaks occurring outside primary contai.sment; (2) off gas system failures; and (3) failure of liquid radwaste tanks. LILCO Ex. 72, at 4, Att. 1, at 2. In addition, if fuel handling takes . place following shutdown (see first exception to the license condi-tion), fuel handling accidents are possible. The offsite consequences of such an acciaant would vary depending on fuel burnup and the time since cold shutdown was achieved. LILCO Ex. 72, at 4. Consequently, LILCO would be prohibited from conducting any fuel handling operations until'16 days after cold shutdown. Tr. 15,666-67 (Quay). ; -531-w___________-_____-_____---__-__________ 7 , e. F, ~ greatly reduced, and the radioactive inventory of the core is significantly lower, thus reducing potential radiological consequences. LILCC Ex. 72, at 3; Tr. 15,447-48 (Risert). The NRC Staff witnesses generally agreed with LILCO's proposal. . Tr. ' 15,688-92 (Quay); see letter of September 11, 1984 from the NRC Staff to the Board. 801. Mr.. Minor explained, however,-that while cold shutdown is obvi-ously a safer mode than full power, there is no reasonable assurance that cold shutdown obviates the need for an offsite response organization. Tr. 15,600-03 (Minor). He first observed that LILCO's conclusion that no acci-dents could occur having consequences above PAG 1evels is flawed because LILCO's analysis focused only on the events analyzed in Chapter 15. Yet, there was general agreement that Chapter 15 accidents are not the accidents on which emergency planning should'be based; rather, emergency planning should be based on more severe accidents which Chapter 15 does not consid-er. .Tr.'15,664 (Hodges); 15,602 (Minor); see Tr. 15,471-72 (Cordaro). Such accidents, including core melts, fires, spent fuel pool accidents, so-curity threats, and others, could present consequences requiring the activation of an offsite response organization to mitigate the offsite ef-facts. Tr. 15,600-03 (Minor); see Tr. 15,554 (Scalice) (LILCO has not ana-lyzed consequences of a fuel pool accident). 802. Although the probability of a core melt accident at cold shut-down is low, and despite LILCO's assertion that core melt accidents are not " credible" at cold shutdown.(Tr. 15,461-62 (Cordaro)) LILCO's failure to -532- consider core melt accidents in its analysis clearly concerned Staff wit-ness Hodges. Tr. 15,665-67 (Hodges). As he testified at trial, precursor events to possible core melt accidents at cold shutdown have occurred at other plants. Tr. at 15,665 (Hodges). Thus, when LILCO proposed its li-consing condition, Mr. Hodges expressed his concern to LILCO in a telephone . call. 'Tr. 15,491 (Stargakos); 15,671 (Hodges). After Mr. Hodges' call, LILCO responded with a very limited " scoping analysis," which evaluated only one possible core melt accident (a LOCA) . LILCO's witnesses deter-mined that the LOCA was not credible. Tr.15,466-69 (Rigert, Stargakos); 15,473 (Risert); SC Ex. 94. Mr. Hodges testified, however, that LILCO's analysis was not the kind he would have done. Tr. 15,672 (Hodges). Based on Mr. Minor's and Mr. Hodges' testimony, we find that LILCO's analyses are far from sufficient to test all the accidents which could lead to a core melt that are possible at cold shutdown. Thus, we agree with Mr. Minor that without a much more complete analysis of all possible accident so-b quences, we have no assurance that offsite response and protective actions would be unnecessary if the plant is in cold shutdown. See Tr. 15,603-04 (Minor). 803. Mr. Minor also expressed the concern that core melt accidents could occur during the descent from full power operation to cold shutdown, as well as during the period of full power operation before cold shutdown is commenced. Tr. 15,600, 15,628 (Minor). The same accidents having offsite consequences in excess of PAG limits which could occur at full power can also occur during the descent from full power to cold shutdown. -533- ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ r._ a _ ...m _.w _ - _ _ _. _ - _ _ _ _ _ m _ _ ~ \ , k Tr. 15,469-70 (Stergakos); 15,671 (Hodges); see also Tr. 15,477 (Cordaro). V While LILCO took the position that Mr. Minor's concern was not valid be-cause LILCO would be able to reach cold shutdown before a strike began, Dr. Cordaro conceded that in some cases cold shutdown might not be achieved be- ' fore the commencement of a strike, although he considered it unlikely. Tr. 15,536-37 (Cordaro). Under such circumstances, the plant would be op-t' erating and susceptible to accidents having significant offsite consequenc-( es, without LERO available. Tr. 15,600-01 (Minor). This testimony leads us to conclude that there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protec-tive measures can and will be taken under LILCO's proposal to bring the plant to cold shutdown.5_16/ 1 C. Comparison to Lev Power Risks 804. There was much discussior. at trial, prompted by the Board, comparing operation at 5% powcr (low power) to cold shutdown following full , power operation.' As we noted, an offsite cmergency response organization is not required for low power oper'a tion. Therefore, the question was raised whether the risks of cold shutdown after full power operation are 516/ Another factor supporting our finding is our concern that, between the time a strike has .been declarea' and the time it commences, the avail-ability of union workers to perform difficult and possibly dangerous emergency response tasks for an employer with which they have a labor e dispute is in some doubt. This concern highlights the validity of Mr. Minor's emphasis on potential accidents during the descent from full power to cold shutdown. Tr. 15,619 (Minor). In this vein we note that LILCO experienced vandalism to its property during the course of the recent strike. Tr. 15,457-58 (Cordaro). 4 k% -534- lower than at low power operation. If so, it might follow that the absence of LERO during cold shutdown would offer no greater risk than operation at low power where no offsite organization is required. See Tr. 15,537-39. 805. Testimony revealed that the times available to mitigate an acci-dont are similar at the two modes of operation, but that there are fewer challenges to safety features at cold shutdown. Tr. 15,542, 15,545-46 (Rigert); 15,621-22 (Minor). Thus, the NRC staff testified that cold shut-down would be "as safe as" operation.at low power. Tr. 15,705 (Sears); 15,705-06 (Hodges) ("substantially as -fe as"). The NRC witnesses acknowledge'd, however, that they were tocusing only on the cold shutdown mode and not on intermediate power levels achieved during the descent to cold shutdown. Tr. 15,708-10 (Hodges). 806. Nevertheless, calculations performed by LILCO show that for many days after cold shutdown is first achieved fission product inventory fol- . lowing full power operation is greater'than the fission product inventory at low power operation. For instance, after 24 hours of decay, fission . product inventory at cold shutdown fellowing full power operation is 4.5 times greater than at low power. Even after 7 days of decay, the inventory at cold shutdown is still 1.5 times greater than at low power operation. Tr. 15,631-34 (Stargakos); LILCO Ex. 81. Furthermore, in cold shutdown after. full power operation, some critical fission products remain at levels ' higher than at low power for an sven greater period of time.517/ 517/ For instance, even 30 days after cold shutdown is attained, Iodine 131 is present in amounts twice as great as at low power. Likewise, after (Footnote cont'd next page) -535- .. 807. Mr. Minor testified that the two modes of operatien are not com-parable. This is because a plant which has been operating at full power has a built-up inventory of certain long-lived isotopes which could be re-leased during an accident. Long-lived isotopes are generally not present during low power operation. Tr. 15,613-15, 15,629 (Minor). Furthe rmore , there is no spent fuel in the spent fuel pool during low power operation, nor are there significant chances of load rejection transients at low power because the generator would not be connected to the grid. Tr. 15,614-15 (Minor). Mr. Minor concluded that when the risks of accidents during de-scent from full power are included with the overall risks at cold shutdown, cold shutdown following full power operation presents more safety concerns than low power operation. Tr. 15,621-23 (Minor). 808. Furthermore, Mr. Hodges stated he has seen no evidence that cold shutdown after full power operation would be as safe as any other power level. Tr. 15,703-04 (Hodges). While he offered his professional opinion (Footnote cont'd from previous page) 14 days of decay, Xenon 133 is present at cold shutdown in amounts greater than a reactor at low power. Tr. 15,636-39 (Stergakos); LILCO Ex. 81. Furthermore, LILCO's calculations comparing fission product inventory between cold shutdown and low power neglected to look at Strontium and Cesium which might emerge in a substantial core melt accident as aerosols. Yet, these are precisely the isotopes that would be present in much larger concentrations in a core that had functioned for years, rather than a core that had run at low power for a few days or months. Tr. 15,644 (Stergakos). Mr. Stergakos did not know how much the inclusion of Cesium and Strontium in his calcula-tions would have increased the ratio of fission product inventory at cold shutdown to fission product inventory at low power. Tr. 15,645-46 (Stergakos). -536- .that cold shutdown would be as safe as low power operation (Tr. 15,705 (Hodges)), we cannot base our decision o- this crucial matter on that r alone. In light of this testimony and the evidence that a greater fission product inventory exists in cold shutdown than at low powe. for many days after shutdown, we must agree with Mr. Minor's conclusion. Thus, we cannot find that an offsite organization is not required at cold shutdown on the basis of-the fact that such an organization is not required during low power operation. D. The Language of the License Condition 809. Mr. Minor also noted several problems with the proposed LILCO l 1 license condition. First, several of the terms used are broad and vague. Tr. 15,605-08 (Minor). Indeed, it was clear that neither the LILCO wit-nesses nor the Staff were fully aware of the meaning of certain phrases in the condition. Tr. 15,508-31 (Corda a); 15,675-76 (Quay). Even Dr. Cordaro expressed his initial discomfort with the legalistic style of the LILCO proposal. Tr. 15,506 (Cordaro). 810. We are more concerned, however, with the exceptions to the l license condition, which are open ended and susceptible to broad interpre-tation. Tr. 15,607-08 (Minor). In particular, as confirmed by Mr. Quay, it appears that the second exception to the license condition would permit almost any sort of operation of the reactor up to full power if the Staff concluded that a strike did not impair LILCO's ability to respond offsite to a radiological emergency. Tr. 15,695-96 (Quay); 15,608 (Minor). The -537- license condition also contains no criteria for the Staff to determina whether a strike would impair the response of an offsite organization, nor do we feet the Staff can or should make such a determination. It is the duty of this Board to make the findings required by 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1) and exception number 2 in LILCO's proposed license condition in effect transfers that responsibility to the Staff. We cannot sanction such a re-sult. Thus, we reject the proposed license condition because it is vague and, in light of the exceptions, almost meaningless. l E. Conclusions on Strike Issue 811. The standard we must apply in this case is no different from the standard applied to every other emergency planning issue: whether the Plan provides reasonable assurance that protective actions can and will be im-plemented in a Shoreham emergency. 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). We find that this standard has not been met. While cold shutdown poses less risk of accident than full power operation, LIILO did not sustain its burden of proof that accidents which would require the response of an offsite re-sponse organization could not occur at cold shutdown. We are particularly concerned by LILCO's limited analysis of potential cold shutdown accidents and by its calculations of fission product inventory, both of which ex-cluded any consideration of core melt accidents. Such shortsightedness gives us no reasonable assurance that protective actions can and will be implemented during a radiological emergency. Furthermore, we find that the wording of LILCO's proposed license condition is overly broad, vague, and -538- open-ended. Thus, we reject LILCO's proposed license condition in its to-3 tality, and find that bringing the plant to cold shutdown is not an ade-1 ) quate remedy in the face of a strike by LILCO union employees. CONCLUSION 812. For the reasons set forth above, the Board concludes that the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR $ 50.47 and NUREG 0654. Respectfully submitted, Martin Bradley Ashare Suffolk County Attorney H. Lee Dennison Building Veterans Memorial Highway l Hauppauge, New York 11788 Herbert H. Brown Lawrence Coe Lanpher Karla J. Letsche Michael S. Miller Christopher M. McMurray KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W. Suite 800 Washington, D.C. 20036 Attorneys for Suffolk County MARIO M. CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York FABIAN G. PALOMINO, ESQ. Special Counsel to the Governor of the State of New York BY: ~ }} . Y) ute# RichardJ.Zahn}[lCoEnseltothe Assistant Specia Governor of the State of New York October 26, 1984 Attorneys for the Governor of the State of New York -539-l 1$ g. o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION T4 CCI 29 M2:56 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ~ . sza :Ei ) Me In the Matter of ) ) LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 ) (Emergency Planning) (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Unit 1) ) ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of SUFFOLK COUNTY AND STATE OF NEW YORK PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLANNING, dged October 26, 1984, have been - served on the following this 26th day of October 1984 by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted. James A. Laurenson, Chairman
- Edwin J. Reis, Esq.* 1 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com. Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline
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Administrative Judge Hunton & Williams Atomic Safety and Licensing Board P.O. Box 1535 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7C7 East Main Street . Washington, D.C. 20555 Richmond, Virginia 23212 Mr. Frederick J. Shon
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Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Stephen B. Latham, Esq. Stewart M. Glass, Esq.# Twomey, Latham & Shea Regional Counsel P.O. Box 398 Federal Emergency Management 33 West Second Street Agency Riverhead, New York 11901 26 Federal Plaza Room 1349 New York, New York 10278 ; i .f- ,_ e Ms. Nora Bredes James B. Dougherty, Esq. Executive Director 3045 Porter Street, N.W. Shoreham Opponents Coalition Washington, D.C. 20555 195 East Main Street Smithtown,-New York -11787 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board MHB Technical Associates U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. 1723 Hamilton Avenue Washington, D.C. 20555 Suite K San Jose, California 95125 Hon. Peter F. Cohalan Suffolk County Executive Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq. H. Lee Dennison Building Suffolk. County Attorney Veterans Memorial Highway H.. Lee Dennison Building Hauppauge, New York 11788
- Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Fabian Palomino, Esq.#
Special Counsel to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Governor Panel Executive Chamber U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 229 Washington, D.C. 20555 State Capitol Albany, New York 12224 Docketing and Service Section -Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20555 Karla J. Letsche ' KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W., Suite 800 l' Washington, D.C. 20036 DATE: October 26, 1984
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