ML20235R492
| ML20235R492 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1987 |
| From: | Leugers M HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#487-4537 OL-3, NUDOCS 8710080071 | |
| Download: ML20235R492 (12) | |
Text
-____ .
] 3/ LILCO, October 1,1987 ,
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HtKt%EO LMC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION gg W M ctcir. n \
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board JMigTftg 0$C 1.n a,L l
In the Matter of
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning) l (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) l Unit 1) ) l LILCO'S REPLY TO THE NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS ON RECEPTION CENTERS In accordance with 10 CFR S 2.754(a)(3)(1987) and the Board's schedule for filing proposed findings adopted on July 30,1987 (Tr.19,237), LILCO replies here to the NRC Staff's proposed findings and conclusions of law on the suitability of LILCO's reception centers. The Staff's findings, entitled "NRC Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Con- l clusions of Law in the Form of a Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Planning (Re-ception Centers)" (hereinaf ter "S.F."), are dated September 24,1987. LILCO's proposed findings of September 2,1987 are cited herein as "L.F."
I. Introduction LILCO has few disagreements with the Staff's findings. The Staff's analysis of the record is on the whole a balanced and f air one. The Staff concludes, as LILCO be-lleves one must upon a fair reading of the record, that LILCO's planning is adequate (S.F. at 20), that LILCO's monitoring procedures are adequate (S.F. at 36-37), and that LILCO's traffic analyses provide reasonable assurance that the roadways and intersec-tions are sufficient (S.F. at 45-46, 53). In a few respects, however, the Staff's analysis of the facts differs from LILCO's, and on some of these differences LILCO comments below. Also, the Staff's references to a 30 percent planning basis might result in some 8710000071 871001 PDR ADOCK 05000322 - ,
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confusion; LILCO attempts below to make sure its own position on the planning basis is clear. Finally, the Staff proposes a license condition for traffic control that LILCO be-lieves is unnecessary and unjustified by the evidence.
II. Planning Basis (S.F. at 6-20)
In its proposed findings on the planning basis, the NRC Staff states that it sup-ports FEMA's position that the planning basis for monitoring evacuees is 20 percent.
S.F. at 12,18. Indeed, the Staff twice applies the Krimm Memorandum's 20 percent l l
planning basis to Shoreham to demonstrate that LILCO's planning basis of 20 percent of ]
the EPZ is conservative. S.F. at 11, 16-17. Moreover, the Staff notes that its own wit-ness provided data specific to Shoreham to support the reasonableness of the 20 per-cent figure. S.F. at 18-19. LILCO, in its proposed findings, also supported the 20-percent planning basis for Shoreham. L.F. at 11.
LILCO disagrees with the Staff's statement that the Krimm Memorandum sets forth a " dual concept" of the " planning basis" for radiological emergencies. S.F. at 10-11.II According to the Staff's characterization of the Krimm Memorandum, LILCO's planning basis should (1) provide "a reasonable estimate of the number of people (or percentage of the EPZ population) expected to arrive at the reception centers for mon-itoring and (2) "make provisions for ad hoc measures" beyond this estimated number. l S.F. at 10.
1/ LILCO does believe that the Staff's restatement of the issue at S.F.11119 is a useful attempt to focus the issue on the planning question of what resources should be dedicated in advance, rather than on trying to " predict" how many people might show 1 up on a given day. LILCO does not base its support for the 20 percent planning basis on l a prediction of the number of people who would seek monitoring in the event of a ra-diological emergency at Shoreham, since one would predict that few people, or none at all, would be contaminated. See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 3-4, 10-11. Rather, LILCO supports the 20 percent figure as a reasonable basis for a flexi-ble plan designed to respond to a spectrum of accidents. Id. at 10-11; see also LILCO's l Reply to Interveners' Proposed Findings on Reception Centers, at 10 (Sept. 21,1987) ,
(hereinaf ter "LILCO's Reply"). l l
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LILCO submits that neither its Plan, nor any other emergency plan, is required to include provisions for "a_d hoc" measures beyond the 20 percent planning basis. As the members of this Board have said, "[p]lanning to take an ad hoc action seems to us to be an oxymoron." Prehearing Conference Order (Ruling on Contentions and Estab-11shing Discovery Schedule), at 26 (Oct. 3,1986) (-05 proceeding).
Throughout this proceeding the " planning basis" in the Krimm Memorandum has consistently been interpreted to mean only that detailed planning must be provided to monitor at least 20 percent of the EPZ within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The planning basis is not 20 percent plus ad hoc measures; the planning basis is 20 percent. A_d hoc measures have nothing to do with NUREG-0654 Criterion J.12 or with its 12-hour guideline; they are implemented af ter the planning basis is exceeded. See Tr. 18,422-23 (Keller).2/
It is true that LILCO has provided detailed planning, and resources, for more than the FEMA-recommended 20 percent. It is also true that LILCO presented evi-dence on its ability to expand an emergency response by calling in outside help.3/ But it does not follow that these extra measures are required by law. LILCO has simply done more, and proved more, than the law requires.
2/ As the Krimm Memorandum explains, in a " highly improbable" accident requiring monitoring of more than 20 percent of the EPZ population, " State and local govern-ments" would be expected to develop and implement a_d hoc response measures. FEMA Ex.1. These ad hoc measures are not a necessary element of proof in an NRC proceed-ing. Nevertheless, there is evidence on the subject, particularly since New York State witnesses testified that there are hundreds of volunteer firemen in the State who can monitor evacuees. Indeed, the Shoreham plant is in an exceptionally favorable situa-tion insofar as an ad hoc response is concerned, because the planning basis has been met without relying on State or county resources at all.
3/ See L.F. at 60; LILCO Reply at 28. According to LILCO's procedures, once its primary method could no longer meet the demand placed upon it (that is, once more than 46.6 percent arrived at the reception centers), its augmented plan, with a total of 140 monitoring stations, would be implemented using outside resources. L.F. at 59-61.
If its augmented plan became overstressed, other detailed procedures in the plan would be implemented. Id.
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At several places in its proposed findings the Staff focuses on LILCO's 30-percent trigger point for calling in additional assistance instead of on the 20 percent planning basis. S.F. at 11-12,20,30-31,32 n.11,36. The Staff correctly acknowledges, however, that LILCO has stated that its planning basis is 20 parcent. I_d. at 17.0 It is indeed LILCO's position that its planning basis for monitoring evacuees is 20 percent of the EPZ. But LILCO has the capacity to monitor at least 46.6 percent of the EPZ popu-lation with its primary monitoring method without any additional help. And if, during an emergency, it were projected that more than 30 percent of the EPZ population !
would be sent to its reception centers, LILCO would start calling in outside resources.E i
LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 25-26; L.F. at 58-59; LILCO's Reply at 9 n.5, 33-34.
In its proposed findings the Staff notes that the Krimm Memorandum refers to 1 "20 percent of the population to be evacuated." S.F. at 11, citing FEMA Ex.1, at 2 l
(emphasis added). The Staff points out 20 percent of the EPZ population is greater than j 4
20 percent of the evacuees in all those accidents in which less than the entire EPZ evacuated. S.F. at 16-17. The Staff is correct; one would expect to evacuate the en-tire EPZ in very few of the range of possible accidents. This is another way of high-lighting the conservatism of the planning basis.EI 4/ The Staff also says that the 30 percent figure is "more than adequate." S.F. at i 32 n.11. i A/ Mr. Lieberman explained that he assumed 30 percent for his traffic analysis be-cause li times the planning basis provides a degree of reasonable conservatism. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. T, at 20; see also LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimonyT at 5, 9, 12-13, 19.
!/ In evaluating nuclear power plants in Region II, FEMA bases its concluelons about the adequacy of those plants' reception centers on their ability to monitor 20 percent of the entire EPZ, not just of those expected to be evacuated. Tr. 18,374-75 (Keller).
l LILCO sgrees with the Staff's conclusion that the " shadow phenomenon" issue, whether it be of evacuation or monitoring behavior, has been previously decided by this Board. S.F. at 16. The present survey conducted by Suffolk County witness Cole pro-vides no more insight now into the behavior of peopM during an emergency than his survey did in 1984 when this Board concluded that polls have no literal predictive valid-ity. See L.F. at 27141.
At S.F. 20 n.8 the Staff would have the Board find that an ability to monitor 30 percent (not 20 percent) of the EPZ in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is adequate. At the same time, however, the Staff points out that this finding would be " specific to Shoreham" and would "not constitute a general disagreement with the FEMA guidance contained in the Krimm Memorandum." I_d. This proposed finding would allow the Board to avoid ruling on the adequacy of the 20 percent FEMA national policy, but LILCO submits that it q
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would be unwise to do so. LILCO has asked the Board to rule that 20 percent, not 30 1 I
percent,is an adequate planning basis. Moreover, both FEMA and NRC Staff testimony supports the 20 percent figure. Were the Board to approve 30 percent,it would leave planners for all other nuclear plants uncertain as to whether they must meet a 20-i percent or a 30 percent standard. LILCO can see no good reason to create that uncer- l tainty. 1 III. Monitoring and Decontamination (S.F. at 21-36)
LILCO agrees with the Staff's proposed findings that its monitoring and decontamination procedures are adequate, that the distance of its reception centers from the EPZ does not present radiological health problems, and that the location of ;
l the LERO Family Relocation Center does not interfere with the monitoring activities at the Hicksville f acility. See S.F. at 22,24,30,36. LILCO also agrees with the Staff '
that the Interveners have presented either no evidence or inadequate evidence on sev-eral of these issues. For example, as the Staff noted, the Interveners presented no
evidence on the effect of the LERO Family Worker Relocation Center at Hicksville on LILCO's ability to monitor the public, Id. at 24. In addition, the Interveners did not present any useful evidence on the radiological health effects caused by the increased distance of the reception centers from the EPZ..I! See S.F. at 22.
LILCO also agrees with the Staff that the Interveners provided inadequate evi-dence on LILCO's time estimates for monitoring evacuees in vehicles, because they based their attack on LILCO's monitoring procedures rather than on the time necessary to carry out those procedures. S.F. at 32. The Interveners' evidence is also unreliable because the time estimates they do use are based on New York State's procedures and not LILCO's procedures. In addition, the Staff is correct that the County's evidence on the adequacy of LILCO's decontamination procedures misses the point because the
" County has focused on the extent of the plume to counter LILCO's estimate of the number of people requiring showers, rather than on the form of potential contamina-tion from the plume." S.F. at 36. The Staff also accurately notes that the Interveners failed to rebut the adequacy of LILCO's decontamination method of removing clothing and washing exposed skin surfaces. W. LILCO also agrees with the Staff that there is no time requirement for completing decontamination. Id. at 34.
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l I/ LILCO would not go so f ar as to say that the Interveners provided no evidence at all on this issue. In very general terms Suffolk County witness Radford talked about the effects of exposure and the consequence of delay in decontamination. However, his testimony was not based on any accident scenario and did little more than repeat the 1 obvious fact that the longer a person is exposed, the larger the dose.
LILCO's evidence on this issue is clearly entitled to prevail. LILCO testified, using a specific example, that the dose from body contamination is small compared to the dose from exposure to the plume in the first place. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t a_1. di-rect testimony), at 38-40. LILCO also provided evidence that some reception centers for other nuclear plants are 40 miles from the plants, id. Att. K, and evidence that travel times from the Shoreham EPZ to the rec ^otion centers are not excessive, id. at 7-8, 30-37. Finally, LILCO addressed the biological effects of delay, id. at 39-40.
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The Staff's summary of FEMA's review, S.F. at 29, should not be taken to suggest )
that FEMA found LILCO's Revision 8 monitoring procedures inadequate either because I LILCO monitored evacuees in their vehicles, Ld., or because only the drivers' hands and ]
l feet were monitored, id. In reality, the RAC review of Revision 8 found only that
" driver-only" monitoring was unacceptable. Tr. 18,309-10 (Keller); FEMA Ex. 3, Att.1, p.12 of 15. I IV. Transportation and Traffic (S.F. at 37-54) 1 l
With respect to the NRC Staff's findings on " Transportation and Traffic"(S.F. at 37-54), once again LILCO has little disagreement.EI In one respect, however, LILCO submits that the Staff's findings are unjustified.
To be specific, the Staff proposes that the Board condition its decision on LILCO's establishing " provision for traffic control at the critical intersections":
However, LILCO is to establish in its Plan provision for traf- '
fic control at the critical intersections. This traffic control function may either be performed by LERO traffic guides, or, as is more likely, by the Nassau County Police. We leave to the Staff to confirm, as a ministerial matter, that the LILCO !
Plan is amended to assign traffic control to the intersections I discussed herein, as well as to the offramp from Meadowbrook Parkway to Sunrise Highway.
S.F. at 53-54. The " intersections discussed herein" are (1) Willis Avenue at the Long Is- !
land Expressway (LIE), (2) Broadway (Rt.107) and Old Country Road, and (3) Newbridge i
Road and Sunrise Highway (Rt. 27). See S.F. at 50.
LILCO has no quarrel with the Staff's conclusion that traffic control would be a good thing; indeed, LILCO's consultant KLD has recommended traffic control, and LILCO's Plan calls for LERO to request assistance from the Nassau County Police. But the fact that traffic control is a good thing does not mean it is required by law, and l g/ There appears to be a typographical error at S.F. 47 1 111. The second word in the paragraph should be "FHWA" instead of " FHA."
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there is insufficient basis in the record for making traffic control a condition of the 11-cense. i First, there are already provisions for traffic control in the LILCO Plan. As pointed out in LILCO's proposed findings (L.F. at 113), OPIP 4.2.3 provides for the Di-l rector of Local Response to contact the Nassau County Police and that the Health Ser-vices Coordinator is to inform the police that information about traffic control under the Plan is available at the reception centers; the Reception Center Supervisors are di-rected by the same procedure to provide diagrams and equipment to the police if they j arrive. The NRC Staff findings do not specify why these Plan provisions are inadequate or what more should be done.9 Second, the record does not show that traffic controlis necessary to protect the public health and safety. Of the three intersectionsN addressed by the Staff, the Broadway /Old Country Road intersection was in dispute primarily because of the issue whether motorists would use one or two lanes for lef t turns. But even assuming only one lef t-turn lane, the intersection capacity is still adequate. L.F. at 96-97,112-13, Tr.
18,542,18,739 (Lieberman). Newbridge Road / Sunrise Highway was a concern of Dr. Ur-banik because of the "close proximity to the [ reception center site] and . . . there is some need to fine-tune what's going on." Tr.18,986 (Urbanik).E The Willis 9/ The Staff findings imply that LILCO should either train more traffic guides or, perhaps, secure a letter of agreement with the Nassau County Police. But letters of agreement with the police to perform their ordinary duties are not required by NRC regulations. Moreover, in light of Nassau County officials' current attitude toward Shoreham, seeking a formal letter of agreement might well be a useless exercise.
Providing LERO traffic guides capable of doing what the police would do in a real emergency would be a needless waste of resources and would also raise yet another artifical " legal authority" issue.
1_0/ For the Meadowbrook Parkway ramp the Staff witness did not believe traffic control is " essential to the objective of getting people to the reception center." Tr.
18,987 (Urbanik); see also Tr. 18,967-73,18,986,19,091 (Urbanik), L.F. at 94-95.
11/ Dr. Urbanik's basic concern here was that traffic leaving the reception center be kept from interfering with arriving traffic. See Tr. 18,961,18,977 (Urbanik). But the l (footnote continued)
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Avenue / LIE intersection was fundamentally the reason why the Staff traffic witness in-sisted on traffic control. Tr.19,097 (Urbanik); see also Tr. 18,986, 19,093, 19,095-97 (Urbanik). Even here, he would not say that LILCO's plan would not work, only that the j analyses that had been done did not prove that it would work. Tr.19,096 (Urbanik).EI His feeling was that with traffic control "any uncertainty is taken out of the process," l Tr.19,098 (Urbanik), and that "one's level of comfort . . . is much higher," Tr.19,098 (Urbanik). See also Tr.19,137 (Urbanik). This is not sufficient basis for a license condi-j tion, particularly when the proposed condition is for the purpose of meeting the 12-hour criterion, which in itself is not necessary as a health-and-safety matter. See L.F.
at 31 n.37.
Third, the analyses in dispute have been for levels of traffic well beyond the re-quired planning basis. See, e&, L.F. 98 1 186. When one analyzes for 20 percent of the ,
I EPZ, as opposed to the 30 percent used by Mr. Liebermar., the evacuees can be serviced in five to six hours, not 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et a_1. direct testimony), at 37.
The large measure of conservatism in the analyses means that the concerns over traffic control really address not the meeting of the 20 percent planning basis but rather a level of performance well above that basis.EI (footnote continued) traffic strategy recommended by KLD addresses the dispersion issue that Dr. Urbanik was raising. Tr.18,979 (Urbanik); see also LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimo-ny), at 42, Tr.18,706,18,723-24 (Lieberman). Also, Mr. Lieberman pointed out that there are a number of local streets by which traffic exiting the Bellmore reception center could make its way to Sunrise Highway or Merrick Avenue, Tr. 18,707-09
, (Lieberman). Mr. Lieberman's analysis used conservative assumptions in order to bur-den the next intersection to the east. Tr. 18,720-29 (Lieberman).
12/ The fact remains that the analyses in the record show that the Willis Avenue / LIE intersection could service the evacuating traffic flow within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, whether one as-sumes one or two lef t-turn lanes. See L.F. at 112, Tr.18,542,18,746 (Lieberman). The Staff's expert finds fault with both LILCO's and the State's analysis of this intersection, but there is not better analysis in evidence. ;
M/ The Staff suggests that LILCO's consultant has made "a progress" toward greater reliance on police traffic control. S.F. at 53. However, the first KLD analysis, KLD (footnote continued)
m-V. Conclusion
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For the reasons stated above, and in LILCO's proposed findings and its reply to the Interveners' findings, the Board should render a decision substantially as set out in LILCO's proposed findings or, with the exceptions noted above, as set out in the NRC StafI's proposed findings.
Respectfully submitted, GAM dadfA.o]
J5m N t)/Istmg[
Mary o eugers Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212.
DATED: October 1,1987 ' j.
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TR-192 (Attachment M to LILCO Ex.1), indicated that traffic control by the Nassau County Police was " expected" (LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. M, at 28), and made detailed recommendations for traffic control,id. App. C.
o LILCO, October 1,1987 A
k Uihe CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE C -5 P4 :14 nNMy%'
In the Matter of ANtW LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 I hereby certify that copies of LILCO's REPLY TO THE NRC STAFF'S PRO-POSED FINDINGS ON RECEPTION CENTERS were served this date upon the following by telecopier or by hand as indicated by one asterisk, by Federal Express as indicated by two asterisks, or by first-class mail, postage prepaid.
Morton B. Margulies, Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 East-West Towers, Rm. 407 4350 East-West Hwy. Atomic Safety and Licensing Bethesda, MD 20814 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Jerry R. Kline
- Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.
- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission George E. Johnson, Esq.
East-West Towers, Rm. 427 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East-West Hwy. 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, MD 20814 (to mailroom)
Bethesda, MD 20814 Mr. Frederick J. Shon
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Herbert H. Brown, Esq.
- Board Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
East-West Towers, Rm. 430 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 4350 East-West Hwy. South Lobby - 9th Floor Bethesda, MD 20814 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Secretary of the Commission Attention Docketing and Service Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
- Section Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Counsel to the Governor 1717 H Street, N.W. Executive Chamber Washington, D.C. 20555 Room 229 State Capitol Albany, New York 12224
- i , l g
, L l Mary Gundrum, Esq. Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General New York State Department of 1 120 Broadway Public Service, Staff Counsel ]
Third Floor, Room 3-116 Three Rockefeller Plaza i New York, New York 10271 Albany, New York 12223 i
Spence W. Perry, Esq.
- Ms. Nora Bredes William R. Cumming, Esq. Executive Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Agency 195 Rast Main Street 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 l Gerald C. Crotty, Esq. .
Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Counsel to the Governor i.
New York State Energy Office Executive Chamber State Capitol Agency Building 2 ,
-Empire State Plaza - Albany, New York 12224 j
. Albany, New York 12223 Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq. ** l Stephen B. Latham, Esq. ** Eugene R. Kelly, Esq. i Twomey, Latham & Shea Suffolk County Attorney {
33 West Second Street H. Lee Dennison Building i P.O. Box 298 Veterans Memorial Highway Riverhead, New York 11901 Hauppauge, New York 11787 Mr. Philip McIntire . Dr. Monroe Schneider Federal Emergency Management North Shore Committee Agency P.O. Box 231 26 Federal Plaza Wading River, NY 11792 New York, New York 10278 0
Ma J Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: October 1,1987