ML20096C020
| ML20096C020 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1984 |
| From: | Letsche K, Palomino F KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, NEW YORK, STATE OF, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20096C018 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-4, NUDOCS 8409040467 | |
| Download: ML20096C020 (187) | |
Text
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3-
.7 8/31/84 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00,(METED enc Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 3
'M SEP ~4 mo:,9
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-4 3
-)
(Low Power)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power
)
Station, Unit 1)
)
-)
)
SUFFOLK COUNTY AND STATE OF NEW YORK PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT I.
Relative Safety of Low Power Operation with
)
Alternate Configuration and with Qualified Power Sources A.
Vulnerabilities to a-Seismic Event 3-1.
Several witnesses testified as to the vulnerability of LILCO's proposed alternate AC power configuration to a seismic event.
Christian Meyer, Jose
.osset, and Gregory C.
3 Minor testified on behalf of Suffolk County.
Tr. 2762.
John T.
Christian, Ahmed E. Meligi, and Robert C. Wiesel testified on behalf of LILCO (Tr. 962), as did (to a lesser de-
)
gree) William G. Schiffmacher (Tr. 480), and William J.
Muselar.
Tr. 554.
John L.
Knox and Edward B.
Tomlinson tastified on behalf of the NRC Staff.
Tr. 2337.
l l
).
1 O
G
)
07
-2.
The Suffolk County witnesses who address the seismic 0
vulnerability of L oreham's alternate AC power system were qualified by their. education and exparience to provide the opinions set forth in their testimony.
Dr. Christian Meyer, O
currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Civil En-gineering and Engineering Mechanics at Columbia University in New York, has the equivalent of a Bachelor of' Science in civil O
engineering and a Master of Science and Doctor of Philosophy degree in structural engineering from the University of California at Berkeley.
His employment experience, prior to O
his assuming teaching duties at Columbia University, focused on seismic analysis and design of major structures, including the analysis and design of nuclear power plant structures.
His O
teaching duties cover structura'l analysis and design, and his research activities are concentrated on earthquake engineering, structural dynamics, and computer-aided analysis of structures.
O Tr. 2762-64, 2803-07, 2667-70 (Meyer).
3.
Dr. Jose Roesset has a degree in civil engineering, O
and a degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the Massachusetts In-stitute of Technology with primary emphasis in structures, sec-ondary emphasis in soil mechanics and in syste'ms, and a minor jO in mathematics.
He currently holds the position of the Paul D.
and Mary Robertson Meek Centennial Professor at the University
- i O
a
k of Texas at Austin, where he teaches courses in the general I
);
subjectareasofa[ructuralanalysis,structuraldyndmics,and earthquake engineering.
Prior to that, he was Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin and Pro-
)
fessor in the Department of Civil Engineering at-the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he taught struc-tural engineering, dynamic analysis, and earthquake engineer -
)
ing.
Dr-Roesset has also performed consulting work in the areas of structural engineering, dynamic analysis, and earth-quake engineering with respect to nuclear power plants and on
)
non-nuclear matters.
Tr. 2765-69; 2808-12; 2673-75 (Roesset).
o 4.
Gregory C. Minor has 24 years of experience in the nuclear industry, including design and ' testing of systems for use in nuclear power plants.
His education is in electrical engineering (with a power systems option) resulting in a Bache-lot of Science degree in electrical engineering and a Master of Science -degree in electrical engineering.
His employment in-cludes 16 years as a design engineer and manager of engineering design organizations with General Electric Company.
His responsibilities included the design and qualification testing i
of safety systems to meet seismic criteria applicable to nucle-t ar power plants.
In particular, during his employment with General Electric Company, he was responsible for the seismic
==
h 3
qualification, including dynamic testing and analysis, of 3
electrical equipme t manufactured by General Electric for use in nuclear power plants.
Tr.
2675-76; 2769; 2813-19 (Minor).
5.
LILCO's witnesses Christian, Maligi, an'd Wiesel are 3g also qualified by education and experience to testify as to the
~
seismic capabilities of equipment.
Dr. Christian, who has a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Civil Engineering, is a Senior 3
Consulting Engineer with Stone & W bater Engineering Corpora-e tion, with extensive experience in consulting and teaching in 3
the areas of geotechnicall engineering, earthquake engineering, and computer application.
Tr. 963-66 (Christian).
Mr. Meligi, who is head of the component ' Qualifications Division of Sargent 3
& Lundy, has a Bachelor of Science degree, in Aeronautical Engi-neering and a Master of Science degree in Engineering Mechan-ics.
He is responsible.for developing and implementing envi-3 consental and seismic qualification programs for equipment in nuclear power plants and has extensive experience relating to seismic qualification of equipment.
Tr. 967-70 (Melig i).
Mr.
3 Wiesel, who is a Senior. Structural Engineer with Stone &
Webster Engineering Corporation, has experience in the design and seismic and structural analysis of structural elements and 3
equipment.
He holds Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in Civil Engineering.
Tr. 970-72 (Wiesel).
-4_
S.
u
=.. -. -
=.
D 6.
The methods used to perform a seismic analysis or a
~
,J structural analysis do not vary depending upon the particular structure involved in the analysis.
Tr. 2692 (Meyer).
The training of a structural engineer involves the ability to de-U termine the strength, stiffness, and mass properties of struc-tures and to determine the response of structures to seismic loads.
Tr. 2692 (Meyer).
Therefore, whether or not a struc-O tural engineer had previously analyzed the effect of a seismic event upon a particular type of structure would be immaterial to that engineer's ability to perform a structural analysis or predict the response of such a structure.
7.
Staff witnesses Tomlinson and Knox have never o
performed any seismic qualification of" equipment for use in nu-q, clear power plants nor have they ever reviewed equipment for the purpose of evaluating its seismic qualification.
Tr.
g 1858-1859 (Knox, Tomlinson).
In addition, neither of them has performed any analysis or review of the seismic capabilities or survivabilities of the alternate AC power configuration being 3
proposed by LILCO.
Tr. 1865 (Tomlinson, Knox).
T's NRC Staff has not performed any review of the seismic analysis provided by LILCO concerning the EMD diesel generators and their asso' i-c 3
ated switchgear, nor har the Staff reviewed any seismic analy-sis of the survivability of the gas turbine and its associated switchgear.
Tr. 1865, 2343 (Knox, Tomlinson).
D 5-J
- "*'~~~*"VM,"~~'~~
~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ ~ *
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^
G.
Mr. William G. Schiffmacher testified on behalf of 3)
LILCO.- Mr.Schifkacheristhemanagerofthe'ElectricalEngi-L neering Department at LILCO.
Tr. 480 (Schiffmacher).
Mr.
Schiffmacher's testimony describes the LILCO power supply sys-
[)
tea, the LILCO connections to the regional power grids, the transmission links to Shoreham, ~ the transmission network reliability, the gas turbines at various locations offsite from 3)
Shoreham, the Shoreham 20 MW gas turbine, and the EMD diesels at Shoreham.
Tr. 486-524 (Schiffmacher).
See also Tr. 331-33 (Schiffmacher).
!O l
9.
Until the LILCO austerity measures in early 1984, Mr.
Schiffmacher held memberships in a number of societies and as-sociations.
These memberships were ben'eficial in his opinion
)
because it afforded Mr. Schiffmacher an opportunity to discuss with other utilities things that are being done in the trans-
- O mission area or substation area through regular mediums, and also to deal with manufacturers.
Mr. Schiffmacher was forced to give up these memberships due to the austerity measures.
- o Tr. 353-54 (Schiffmacher).
10.
Mr. William Museler, LILCO's Director of the Office of Nuclear, testified regarding commitments and procedures f0 t
LILCO would adhere to in Phases II-IV of LILCO's low power i
l testing program.
Tr. 554, 558 (Museler).
)
i i
O l e
I b-11.
Mr. Musaler has no' degree in seismology.
In addi-b
, tion,.he'has perto ed no analyses to determine whether any components or structures of the alternate-AC power system will be adversely affected in the event of a design basis earth-quake.
Tr. 529 (Museler).
12.
LILCO originally proposed to supply power to the
)
safety loads at Shoreham in the event of an emergency as fol-lows:
via any_one of.three on-site emergency diesels, each fully safety-related and qualified for the SSE; via an off-site
)
69 KV circuit supplying power from the 69 KV switchyard through the reserve station system transformer ("RSST"); and via a 138 KV circuit. supplying power from the 138 KV switchyard through the normal station system transformer ('"NSST").
Under LILCO's
)
lot
- pcwer proposal, however, there will be no seismically qual-ified on-site emergency power system.
Instead, LILCO proposes
)
to " enhance" its off-site power system by the addition of:
a 20 MW ges turbine supplying power t.o the safety loads via a 13 KV/69 KV transformer in the 69 KV switchyard, from which it
)
then~ supplies power to the safety loads via the 69 KV circuit and the RSST; and four 2.5 MW General Motors diesels which will l
supply their power to the safety loads via a new 4 KV line
)
leading directly into the non-emergency switchgear room (the same room fed by the NSST and the RSST).
Tr. 2771 (Minor).
i )
.., \\
)~
13.
In analyzing the seismic vulnerabilities of LILCO's
)
enhanced off-site ower system, it is not necessary to include enhancements outside of the 69 KV and 138 KV switchyards, such as the addition of black-start capability to the gas turbine at
)
Holtsville.
In a seismic event, such off-site enhancements still must supply their power to Shoreham via the 138 KV or 69 KV switchyards and/or the RSST or NS3T.
If there are physical
)
components along these circuits at or within the respective switchyards which are projected to tail during an SSE, then the fact that the far off enhancements have been made would not af-
)
f act the seinmic reliability of the power supply because a po-tantial failure to supply power to the safety loads would still be predicted.
Tr. 2772 (Meyer, Minor).,
)
14.
In the event of a loss of offsite power induced by a seismic event, the LILCO witnesses testified that response is
)
not dependent upon the availability of AC power.
Rather, the HPCI and RCIC systems are seismically qualified and would oper-ate automatically to ensure core cooling since these systems
)
are steam driven and utilize DC power supplies.
Tr. 310 (Rao, et al.).
Assuming the availability of RCIC or HPCI, core cool-ing wod1d be assured for indefinite periods.
The only need for
)
the restoration of AC power would be for containment cooling and containment and suppression cool limits would not be
).
)
i
},
exceeded.for about 30 days without AC power.
Tr. 311 (Rao).
This LILCO testimo however, did not address the Commission's standard-in CLI-84-8 regarding whether operation of Shoreham would be as safe with the ~ alternate AC power system as.with fully qualified diesels.
(See further discussion of the "as safe as" standard later in these Findings).
)
15.
The following items, which are potential sources of single failures (i.e., an item whose failure will prevent a generating source from supplying power to the safety loads) are
)
critical items in LILCO's enhanced AC power system because their failure could defeat the ability of portions of that sys-tem to provide power to safety loads.
With respect to the four
)
EMD diesels, the critical items of greatest importance, aside from the d'iesels themselves, are:
(1) the common fuel line to the main diesel and those
)
balancing or equalizing lines supplying fuel to each of the four diesels;
)
(2) the battery starting system which must start all four diesels; (3) the switchgear cubicle to which the four EMD die-sels supply power and from which a single cable tray carries power to the non-emergency switchgear room;
)
+
- M* h h
-8
= = = - -
---M f
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.i t
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(4) the cable tray and the cable carrying power from
)
the switchgear. cub.cle to the non-emergency switchgear room; and (5) the non-emergency switchgear room itself, partic-
)
ularly the masonry walls through which the 4 KV EMD diesel power lines must pass.
)
Tr. 2772-74 (Minor).
The failure of any of the five items identified above may prevent the EMD diesels from supplying power to safety loads.
Tr. 2774 (Minor).
)
16.
With respect to the 20 MW gas turbine and the _69 KV system, the critical items of greatest importance (aside from
)
the gas turbine itself) are:
(1) the one million gallon fuel tank which supplies fuel to the gas turbine;
)
(2) the fuel line from the fuel tank to the turbine; (3) the compressor system used to start the turbine;
)
(4) the 13 KV multiple pothead and bus support next to the gas turbine control building; h
) )'
___ ~ ~. -..
f i
O' (5) the :13 KV/69 KV transformer and the 69 KV switch-
'O Q*
\\
yard; I
(6) the buses, circuit breakers, insulators and
- g switches ~ related to the gas turbine and located in the 69 KV switchyard;
'(7) the RSST and its associated equipment; and LO (8) the non-emergency switchgear room, particularly the masonry wall through which the 69 KV/RSST power line must
- O_
pass.
If any of the eight items listed above is severely damaged by a seismic event, power may not be suppligd to the safety loads.
O Tr. 2774-75 (Minor).
17.
There is a bypass line on the 69 KV system which l()
permits operators to direct off-site power to the RSST via a 69 i
KV line without use of the 69 KV switchyard.
This bypass line,
]
which takes several hours to be manually activated, is an addi-
- O tional part of the 69 KV circuit; however, it is only a possi-l ble backup source rather than an initial power source, and it l
1s vulnerable to failures of the RSST and masonry wall in the
- O non-emergency switch room. Tr.
2775 (Minor); 371-73 (Schiffmacher).
- O i O
~
)
18.
With respect to-the 138 KV system, the critical items
)-.
of greatest impor$ bee are:
(1) buses, circuit breakers, insulators and switches in the 138 KV switchyard;
)
(2) the trans, mission towers between the switchyard and the NSST;
)
(3) the NSST and its associated equipment; and (4) the non-emergency switchgear room itself, partic-
)
ularly the masonry walls through which the 138 KV/NSST power line must pass.
Tr. 2775-76 (Minor).
19.
A seismic event can cause dadage to ele.ctrical and
)
mechanical equipment such as that which is critical to the operation of the elements of LILCO's proposed alternative AC 3
power configuration as a result of ground motions which cause structures and equipment to vibrate.
Damage to electrical and mechanical equipment during an earthquake may result from one 3
or more of the following causes:
(1) The stresses and various elements due to the in-ertia forces from the vibration of the equipment may exceed
)
their strength.
This is often the cause of damage or failure to buildings, tanks and other structures.
) )
2
i j
O I
(2) Sliding, rocking, or even overturning of pieces
'O O
of equipment not p0operly anchored or attached to their sup-porting structure may occur.
Cases of sliding, rocking or overturning of equipment at substations have often been-O recorded, particularly with respect to transformers.
(3) Elements connecting separate structures or pieces 9
of equipment with different vibrational characteristics will be subject to differential motions.
These elements may fail if they are not flexible enough to accommodate these relative dis-O placements or strong enough to force the two components to vi-brate together.
This is typically the case for tight or taut cables and will also affect connection elements such as insula-
- ()
tors.
l (4) The soil or foundations under the structure sup-I porting the equipment may fail or experience differential set-
.O tiements.
This problem may be aggravated if there is a poten-tial for soil liquefaction.
Embankments or slopes may also be-come unstable due to ground motion and may endanger nearby lO structures.
Tr. 2776-77 (Meyer, Roesset).
2d.
Experience from past earthquakes indicates that
- ()
structures and components made out of brittle materials are particularly vulnerable to damage because they cannot sustain
- O,
.ww.
I the deformations induced by the seismic disturbance without O-7.~
' breaking.
Example 3 of brittle materials are unreinforced ma-sonry, glass, and ceramics.
Tr. 2777 (Meyer, Roesset).
g 1.
Vulnerability of the Alternate AC Power Configuration to Soil Liquefaction 21.
Soil liquefaction is the reduction of shear strength 9
in a sat'urated soil due to increase in pore water pressure.
under cyclic loading without drainage.
Tr. 2778 (Roesse t).
When granular soils, sands in particular, are shaken by an
()
earthquake, the pressure in the pore fluids increases as a re-sult of the cyclic loads.
The pore pressures can become so large that there is no longer any effective contact stress be-O tween the particles, in which case the" soil becomes, literally, a very dense liquid.
Tr. 959 (Christian)
In addition, because the excess pressures must be released, " sand boils" are O
commonly observed for a period as much as half an hour af ter the earthquake has occurred.
Sand boils are the result of water coming to the surface, carrying particles of sand and O
silt, and spewing up like a a geyser until the sand falls out forming a cone like a volcano on the surface.
Tr. 959-60 (Christian).
O
. O
y
- 22.. The potential for soil liquefaction 'is of particular
)-
concerninareasw[thloose,saturatedsand.
The results of
-soil liquefaction may range, depending on the extent of lique-faction and the size of the area affected, from sand boils and
)-
cracks at the surface to extensive landslides.
For a small to moderate amount of liquefaction at some depth, one would expect at'least some differential motions at the surface.
Tr. 2778 (Roesset).
23.
The soils in the Shoreham area are of a sandy variety
)
which is conducive to liquefaction.
Tr. 2779 (Roesset).
24.
Stone and Webster performed for LILCO an assessment of the potential for soil liquefaction,in the area in which the EMD diesel generators are located.
Tr. 992-95 (Christian).
The results of the Stone and Webster calculations indicate that the soil in that area probably can withstand up to 0.13 g with-
)
out liquefaction.
Tr. 995 (Christian).
25.
Although Stone and Webster predicts that liquefaction
)
will not occur in earthquakes up to 0.13 g, Stone and Webster cannot predict with confidence that liquefaction will not occur at accelerations above 0.13 g.
Tr. 995 (Christian).
)
) ).
.J
O' R
26.
In-the area surrounding the EMD diesels and the EMD H'
?
switchgear buildiny, there is a clear risk of soil liquefaction
^~
if there is a peak ground acceleration of 0.2 g, which is the i
SSE level for Shoreham.
Tr. 2779 (Roesset); 989 (Wiesel).
lO 27.
A number of procedures are available to reduce the
~
potential.for liquefaction.
Each procedure has as its main g
goal an increase in the density of the soil.
Procedures commonly used include excavating the soil and replacing it, compacting it as the fill is placed; compacting or densifying i
-()
the soil by vibroflotation; and drilling vertical or inclined holes in the. ground in a specified pattern and pumping grout into the ground.
Tr. 2784-85 (Roesse t).
- O 28.
According to FSAR SS 2. 5.4. 5 and 2. 5.4.12, the poten-tial for soil liquefaction has been detected under the main
. building and other areas of the Shoreham site.
Tr. 2779-80
- O (Roesse t).
However, measures have been taken to improve the subsurface conditions under seismic Category I structures, such as the major plant buildings, and in the vicinity of the ser-O j
vice water system and the diesel fuel oil tanks.
Tr. 2780 I
(Roesset).
r
- O 29.
Densification has not been undertaken in other areas of the Shoreham site where liquefaction is a potential problem, LO.
n
- g-such as the area in.which the EMD diesels are located and the 2
4 69'~and 138 KV swituhyards.
Tr., 27,80 (Roesset) If densification
~'
techniques were employed at those locations, the potential for soil liquefaction would be greatly reduced.
Tr. 2785
~O '
(Roesset).
If a seismic event occurred, different seismic mo-tions would result in the areas where densification has been i
. performed and those which have not been so improved.
'O
~
Tr. 2780-81 (Roesset).
i 30.
If a small to moderate amount of liquefaction i
()
occurred at some depth in the area of the EMDs, the 69 KV or i
138 KV switchyards, both horizontal and vertical differential 1
motions would be expected.
They could result in tilting of
{()
foundations, poles and transmission toders.
In addition, the stability _ of the embankment located behind the EMD diesels could be impaired and could impact the EMD diesel fuel line and 1
l()
the cable tray related to the EMD diesels.
Tr. 2781 (Roesset).
I j
31.
LILCO's witness Dr. Christian testified that soil l
I liquefaction can cause different kinds of motions.
He X) j testified that although it is very difficult to predict exactly l
what would happen if there were. soil liquefaction in the area around the EMD diesels, the diesels could sink or they could be
- O i
j skewed in some dimension.
Tr. 959-60 (Christian).
Estimates t
l() i h
- O i
....._,~ -,.. _.., -, -,,--- - -..,,...,-.- -.. _. - -__
i
1 1
of movements from several inches to several feet, depending on the extent of'the iguefaction, are not unreasonable.
Tr. 2781 (Roesset).
32.
If soil liquefaction occurred and resulted in a move-3 ment of several inches of key components in the alternate power configuration, many failures would be expected.
Tr. 2782 3
(Meyer).
33.
The fuel line feeding the EMD diesels does not have sufficient flexibility to withstand several inches of relative q~
displacement without failure.
Tr. 2782 (Meyer).
34.
The cable connections on the roof of the EMD 3
switchgear cubicle could fail as a result of large displace-ments from soil liquefaction.
The cables themselves could also f ail, depending upon their flexibility.
Tr. 2782 (Meyer).
D 35.
The fuel line feeding the 20 MW gas turbine does not have sufficient flexibility to withstand several inches of rel-ative displacement without failure.
Tr. 2783 (Meyer).
J 36.
In both the 69 KV and 138 KV switchyards, there are various multiple pothead and bus support st'ructures and circuit J
breakers, which have relatively rigid connections which are very vulnerable to differential motions.
They would not be
'D,
L.)
I
n able to experience several inches of relative displacement O
without failure.
i'r. 2783 (Meyer).
2.
Failures Resulting from an SSE
)
37.
Leaving aside potential failures resulting from soil liquefaction, if the SSE were to occur at or near Shoreham, re-sulting in accelerations of 0.2 g horizontal and 0.13 g verti-cal, there are several structures, components and equipment es-sential to the functioning of LILCO's enhanced AC power config-uration which are likely to suffer damage.
Tr. 2785 (Meyer, O
Roesset).
a.
Vulnerabilities of Gas Turbine and 69 KV Line O
38.
The stone ring wall foundation of the one million gallon fuel tank for the 20 MW gas turbine will fail in an SSE,
()
leading also to a failure of the tank itself.
Tr. 2785-86 (Roesset); SC LP Ex. 53.
39.
The hydrodynamic forces created by the horizontal and O
vertical accelerations in the SSE could also cause elephant foot buckling of the fuel tank.
LILCO has apparently not conducted any dynamic analysis of the fuel tank to determine D
the potential of such a failure.
Tr. 2786 (Roesset).
D.
O
f I
S 40.
The stab lity of the.million gallon fuel tank and its O
foundation may be jurther impaired if the soil underneath has not been densified and is subject to soil liquefaction.
Tr. 2786 (Roesset).
S 41.
Therefore, there is a definite potential for the SSE to cause a failure of the million gallon fuel tank, particular-3 ly if full, thus rendering the 20 MW gas turbine inoperable at least until a new fuel source is installed. Tr. 2786 (Roesset).
42.
Failure of the 4-inch buried pipe between the fuel D
oil tank and the fuel pump and filter for the 20 MW gas turbine is expected to occur at the tank and pump connections in the event of an SSE.
In addition, the 2 in,ch pipe above grade D
whichfeedsthegasturbineisexpectedtofailatthepump connection.
The piping system (valves, filters, meters) in the fuel oil piping station for the gas turbine is expected to fail D
as a result of the non-seismic qualification and design of the components.
Tr. 2787 (Meyer); SC LP Ex. 53.
Therefore, there is a substantial probability of failure of the 20 MW gas tur-J bine fuel line in the event of an SSE.
Tr. 2787 (Meyer).
43.
Although the gas turbine itself is probably capable 3
of withstanding the loads involved in the SSE, there is no evi-dance that LILCO has analyzed the strength of the support pins or the turbine's support frame.
Tr. 2787 (Meyer). 1
- o I.
I 44.
There is a substantial likelihood that the short, O
rigid link which c nnects the air tank and the compressor motor which comprise the air starting unit for the gas turbine will fail in the SSE, thus rendering the starter system inoperable.
O The two components of the air starting unit are not likely to have the same natural frequency, and the link connecting them does not appear to be flexible enough ~ to accommodate this rela-O tive motion nor strong enough to force both components to vi-brate together.
There is no evidence that LILCO has quantita-tively evaluated the likelihood of failure of this link.
C)
Tr. 2788 (Mayer).
45.
The gas turbine switchgear cubicle is connected by buses and insulators to a structure whfch supports potheads and g
buses.
The buses and insulators are unlikely to have the nec-essary flexibility to accommodate the relative displacement re-sulting from the vibration amplitude of the supporting struc-g ture and the switchgear cubicle.
This link which is essential to the provision of power by the 20 MW gas turbine may also fail in the SSE.
Tr. 2708-89 (Meyer).
O 46.
Numerous structures in the 69 KV switchyard, including bus structures, fuse and switch structures, pothead O
structures, battery racks, and lightening arresters, have very 9,
i g
low natural frequencies.
Although recommendations were made to b
LILCO to stiffen $ !~ese structures in order to reduce the dynam-
.,/
ic amplification of ground motion, those recommendations have not been carried out by LILCo.
Tr. 2789 (Meyer); SC LP Ex. 55.
O 47.
The recommen3ation that these structures be stiffened was made because the 69 KV switchyard is predicted to fail in the SSE.
Tr. 2789 (Meyer); SC LP Ex. 56; SC LP Ex. 1.
There g
is at least a 50 percent probability that the 69 KV switchyard would fail in an SSE.
.Tr. 2790 (Mayer).
O 48.
Neither the NSST or the RSST or the spare transform-era onsite are bolted down.
Tr. 475-77 (Schiffmacher).
l,
.s p
49.
A horizontal force due to an ' earthquake of intensity O
0.14 g is sufficient to topple over the 13 KV/69 KV transformer in the 69 KV switchyard, if the force were applied statically.
g An 0.2 g earthquake is likely to rock the transformer on its base sufficiently to damage vital components, such as the rela-tively brittle ceramic insulators.
Although anchoring trans-o formers to foundations is good standard practice and has been recommended to LILCO (SC LP Exs. 55, 57), and rocking and over-turning of transformers have been observed in many earthquakes, Io LILCO has not anchored the 13 KV/69 KV transformer to its foun-dation.
Tr. 2790-91 (Mayer).
,0 o i
.~.
cr i
50.
The RSST transformer has the same potential for 4
rocking on its fouh ation or outright toppling over as the i
13 KV/69 KV transformer, because the RSST is not bolted to its foundation.
Thus, the RSST and its attached components may ex-O perience failure in the event of an SSE.
Tr. 2791 (Meyer).
51.
Mr. Schiffmacher did not know the seismic qualifica-
?g tion of the'RSST.
Tr. 340-41 (Schiffmacher).
The parties stipulated that the RSST was not designed to seismic qualifica-(
tions.
Tr. 341 (Stipulation).
10 52.
The 69 KV system, from the RSST out to the Wildwood Substation is not designed for any specific seismic event.
Tr.
r; 342 (Schiffmacher).
- O I
53.
All of the offsite power generating stations refer-enced in Mr. Schiffmacher's testimony, such as the Holtsville l()
gas turbines, the Southhold gas turbines, and the Port l
Jefferson gas turbines, feed their power to the plant either t
i through the 69 KV or the 138 KV circuits.
Tr. 359
- ()
.(Schiffmacher).
54.
Mr. Schiffmacher testified that LILCO can restore a mile of 69 KV transmission facility within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
By this statement, he meant basically the pole line and this does not
.I i
- O.
1 I
.. J
I include trancformers if any would be involved.
Tr. 376
)-
(Schiffmacher).
$$ the NSST or RSST were damaged and needed to be replaced, it would take on the order of several days in order to replace them, even though there are spare transformers
)
)
at-the Shoreham site.
Tr. 377-78 (Schiffmacher).
If the in-sulators on a transformer were damaged, they could probably be replaced in 4-6 hours.
Tr. 457-58 (Schiffmacher).
)
b.
Vulnerabilities ofs138 KV System 55.
The 138 KV switchyard has a median capacity level of
)
- 0. 2 g.
Therefore, in an SSE, there is at least a 50 percent probability.that the 138 KV switchyard will incur failure.
Tr. 2791-92 (Meyer); SC LP Ex. 56.
+,
56.
The NSST has the potential of rocking on its founda-tion or outright overturning because it is not bolted to its foundation.
Tr. 2792 (Meyer).
)
57.
The transmission towers which hold the transmission lines from the 138 KV switchyard to the NSST may vibrate in re-sponse to ground motion from an SSE.
If soil liquefaction were this to occur.and lead to tilting of the transmission towers,,
aggravating circumstance could -cause the brittle insulators on
)
the transmission towers to fail.
Tr. 2792 (Meyer).
) -,
e
= - - - - -
O c.
Seismic Vulnerabilities of the
.EMD Diesel Generators j
58.
LILCO's. testimony concerning the seismic survivability of the EMD engines is based upon a combination of O
analysis and test results.
Tr. 981 (Meligi).
Although Mr.
Mel.igi described certain tests that were performed by the U.S.
Navy on certain General Motors EMD diesels, he was unable to O
state when the engines that were the subject of the Navy tests had been manufactured or when the EMDs at Shoreham had been manufactured or installed.
He was unable'to state whether the
'O' Navy tests were performed before or af ter the Shoreham EMDs had been manufactured.
Tr. 934, 337 (Meligi).
59.
Me,. Meligi's testimony concefning a walk down to be O
conducted to inspect the EMD diesels, and the similarity be-tween them and machines Sargent'& Lundy has seismically quali-lg fled in the past, does not address the question whether the re-suits of the Navy shock tests upon which he relies in his tes-timony are applicable to the Shoreham EMDs.
Tr. 956-57 O
IM*1191)*
60.
In, addition, the analysis performed by General Motors of EMD diesels, which is discussed by Mr. Meligi in his testi-mony, was performed in the middle or late 1970s.
Mr. Meligi i
i t) 20'
~. -
~
3 did not know when the components that were the subject of that 3
analysisweremant$actured.
Tr. 938-39 (Melig i).
61.
The EMD diesels themselves probably have the capabil-ity of being operable during or at least after a SSE.
In addi-g tion, the EMD diesels themselves do not seem likely to slide on their railroad tie foundations.
Tr. 2793 (Meye r').
U 62.
There is a strong possiblity that the fuel line which supplies fuel to all four EMD diesels would fail in an SSE.
'Tr. 2792-93 (Meyer).
An evaluation by Stone and Webster of the O
ability of the diesel fuel oil line to withstand earthquake effects resulted in a r.ecommendation to bury that fuel line pipe.
Tr. 991-92 (Wiesel).
There is no evidence that this n
recommendation has been implemented by LILCO.
63.
The LILCO witnesses performed an analysis of the po-g tantial for sliding or overturning of the EMD switchgear cu-bicle.
They concluded that there is an adequate factor of safety to prevent sliding or overturning for a minimum ground 3
input of 0.13 g.
Tr. 991 (Wiesel).
However, Mr. Wiesel could not say with the same degree of confidence that an adequate factor of safety exists to prevent sliding or overturning for a 3
ground input of 0.2 g.
Tr. 942 (Wiesel).
The Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) for Shoreham is 0.2 g.
Tr. 989 (Wiesel).
3 i9
O.
64.
Although it is sound engineering practice to tie down 0
a structure such a's the EMD switchgear building to its founda-tion, and LILCO drawing No. F-50268-1 calls for anchor bolts, there are no such anchor bolts in place.
Tr. 2794 (Meyer);
O-2699-2700 (Meyer).
65.
The rigid connection detail for the power outlet on O
top of the roof of the EMD switchgear cubicle is potentially vulnerable to failure in an SSE as a result of differential mo-tion between the cubicle itself and the timber supports carry-O ing part of the cable tray.
Tr. 2794 (Meyer).
66.
LILCO has not qualified the EMD diesels for a seismic p
event.
Tr. 349 (Schiffmacher).
67.
The cable tray carrying the power from the EMDs to the nonemergency switchgear room is supported on wooden timbers O
at intervals of about a-lo feet.
The wooden timbers are not seismically qualified.
Tr. 352 (Schiffmacher).
68.
Mr. Schiffmacher testified that he understands indus-O try experience with respect to transmission lines and earth-quakes to have been that there has been little significant or extensive _ damage to transmission lines due to earthquakes.
Tr.
444 (Schiffmacher).
Mr. Schiffmacher's testimony in this O 1 l
l
1
)..
- regard was strictly limited.to transmission lines.
He had no
.)
knowledge as to wb$ther transformers might have been damaged or experienced damage in seismic events.
Tr. 442 (Schiffmacher).
]
I i
d.
Vulnerability of Non-Emergency Switchgear
)'
Room 69.
The three power sources being relied upon by LILCO (i.e., 69 Kv/ gas turbine, 138 KV, and 4 KV EMD diesel output)
)
are brought together, each at a 4 KV voltage, to permit switching between sources in the non-amergency switchgear room.
This room has masonry block walls up to 25 feet of unsupported
)
height on the' south side.
A failure of this wall which causes failure of one or more incoming lines could render the affected
)
AC power source unavailable.
Tr. 2795(Minor).
70.
The wall in the nonemergency switchgear room which is identified in calculations performed by Stone and Webster for LILCO as "SS-20-6," has a high probability of failing in the SSE.
Falling concrete blocks from such a failure may hit the cable tray from the EMD diesels.
Tr. 2795-97 (Meyer, Roesset);
)
SC LP Exs. 58, 59.
LILCO's witness, Mr. Wiesel, indicated that che seismic capability of this wall was as low as 0.02 g in terms of ground acceleration, and other calculations performed by Stone and Webster show allowable ground motions of 0.11 g and 0.13 g.
Id.
~
) f
,M
_{,
*M-w,
? Mt TPMM
--A--
m MTW* -,-
1 71.
Similarly, walls SS-20-7 and SS-20-4, also in the nonemergency switdYgear room, were calculated by Stone and Webster to have allowable accelerations which would indicate damage resulting from ground accelerations at about the SSE k
level of 0.2 g.
Tr. 2797 (Meyer, Roesset).
I LILCO's Shutdown Proposal e.
k 72.
LILCO has stated that if during low power operation a 0.01 g acceleration is recorded at the Shoreham site, the plant will be shut down.
Tr. 570 (Museler)., Mr. Museler testified I
that by committing to shut the plant down in the event of a recorded acceleration of 0.01 g, LILCO has decreased the like-lihood that a loss of offsite power will occur while the plant
~,
k is operating, and has increased the time available to restore AC power in the event of a loss of offsite power from a seismic event, thereby increasing the safety of its proposed low power operations.
Tr. 558, 571, 572 (Museler).
73.
Mr. Museler has not performed any studies to deter-mine how long in advance of the SSE LILCO would predict there would be some sort of precursor event with a recording of 0.01' g.
Instead, Mr. Museler asked geotechnical engineers at Stone & Webster to perform - such a study.
Their answer was that such precursors did happen occasionally, citing the New o
-_mn,~
m.
I g
Brunswick earthquake of 1982 where an initial tremor was first iO
?
. felt nine hours before the major shock and an, additional tremor was felt one hour prior to the. largest shock.
Stone & Webster in' formed LILCO that such things do not happen in all cases, but
'O do 1.appen occasionally, and on that basis LILCO decided to com-mit to commence shutdown when any such precursor event occurred.
.Tr.
532-33 (Museler).
- O 74.
If a 0.01 g acceleration occurs as part of the main shock of an SSE, the time between the occurrence of a 0.01 g 10 acceleration and the peak-of 0.2 g will be a matter of a few seconds.
Although the maximum duration of the earthquake may be on'the' order of 20 to 40 seconds, the interval between the
- O triggering of the seismic monitor and the peak ground motion will be considerably lass.
Tr. 2798 (Meyer, Roesset).
75.
A warning of several seconds will not permit shutdown 10 of the plant prior to experiencing the SSE.
The 0.01 g seismic shutdown proposed by LILCO is a manual process which will prob-l ably require an instrument reading, conferring among shift per-X) sonnel, and the action of shutting down the plant.
These ac-tions may be decided upon and started within a few seconds, but the plant would not likely be shut down by the time the full t
iO seismic acceleration was reached.
Thus the plant is likely F
!O' I o.
~~ -
+= -
I
(
'still. to be operating or going - through transitions in equipment oper'ating status ( 7d electrical loading during the earthquake peak.
'Tr. 2798-99 (Minor).
76.
If the 0.01 g acceleration is associated with a
.foreshock before a SSE, there may be hours or days between that event and the main shock.
It is extremely difficult to predict the number of foreshocks that may precede an SSE or the time j
interval between their occurrence.
Thus, despite LILCO's tes-timony -that the plant will not be restarted until LILCC con-sults with the NRC (Tr. 572 (Museler)), the plant may be
)
operating again when the main earthquake hits.
Therefore, the reliability and effectiveness of LILCO's proposal to shut down the plant in the event of an acceleration of 0.01 g is ques-tionable.
Tr. 2798 (Meyer, Roesset).
77.
LILCO's originally proposed fully qualified onsite
)
power source, the TDI diesel generators, are supposed to be fully qualified for the SSE.
Accordingly, by definition, the TDI diesels would withstand the SSE and remain operable even
)
after a 0.2 g acceleration.
Tr. 2800 (Minor).
I
_ 31 -
)
i
.u :_ -.-
~
3..
Conclusion
?
- O -
78.
There is a significant potential that as a result of the SSE, the 138 KV system and the 69 KV system (even as en-
- o' hanced with the 20 MW gas turbine) will suffer failure.
This would occur even with three fully qualified on-site diesel gen-erators.
However, if there were three fully qualified diesel
- O generators onsite, they, by definition, would not be predicted to fail in an SSE.
Therefore, after an SSE which knocked out the 138 KV and 69 KV systems, under LILCO's originally proposed
. ()
-qualified source of AC power configuration, there still would be three independent 3.5 MW power sources available, any one of which could meet low power safety load needs. e In contrast, O
under LILCO's proposed alternate AC configuration, Shoreham would be left after the SSE (assuming failure of the 138 and 69 KV systems) with only the EMD diesels, which supply the
- O safety loads via a single cable tray as contrasted with the three independent means of supplying power to the safety loads via.the TDI diesel generators.
Tr. 2801-02 (Meyer, Roesset,
!O Minor).
79.
The E!!D diesels also present a potential,of failure during the SSE, resulting from their fuel line, the potential iO for soil liquefaction, and the potential for failure of the IO 'O.
l J-non-emergency switchgear room walls.
Tr. 2802 (Meyer, Roesset, O
Minor).
80.
Therefore, as a result of the seismic vulnerabilities of LILCO's proposed alternate AC power configuration, operation g
of Shoreham at low power with the alternate configuration would not be as safe as low power operation with three fully quali-fled diesels.
Tr. 2801-02 (Meyer, Roesset, Minor).
3 B.
Reliability of EMD Diesels and Gas Turbine Compared to Qualified Diesel Generators o
81.
Suffolk County presented testimony concerning the re-aliability of the EMD diesels and the 20 MW gas turbine by G.
Dennis Eley, C. John Smith, Gregory C.
Minor and Dale G.
O Bridenbaugh.
Tr. 2572.
82.
Mr. Eley is a Technical Manager with Ocean Fleets O
Consulting Service, Ltd.
Tr. 2572 (Eley).
He began his career with a four year apprenticeship with George Clark and Northeast Marine, a company engaged in building diesel engines.
While 3
employed by that company, Mr. Eley worked in the machine shop, fittings shop and directing shop, participating in the manuf ac-ture of diesel engine components and the engines, and worked 3
for departments involved in the installation of manufactured enginas into ships, both as propulsion units and diesel J 3
1 generator units.- Mr. Eley was responsible for testing the f
.~
engines, analyzing'available data, and ascertaining whether en-
.gines were built to standards and were suitable for the purpose
.for which they were intended.
Mr. Eley also developed a facil-
)-
ity to test diesel engines up to 40,000 shaf t horsepower.
Tr.
2404-05 (Eley).
)
83.
Subsequently, wh'ile working for the company of Austin and Pickersgill, Mr. Eley was responsible for determining whether machinery that would be aboard vessels was suited for
)
the purpose for which it was intended.
Included in the ma-chinery were the main engine propulsion units, diesel generator sets, pumps, compressors and all other items of machinery in-I tended to be onboard vessels.
Tr. 240$ (Eley).
84.
For the next twelve years Mr. Eley worked as a marine angineer with oce:n Transport and Trading, a European shipping
)
company engaged in the carriage of cargo worldwide.
He held all the engineer positions aboard vessels, from junior engineer through chief engineer.
In these positions Mr. Eley was re-sponsible for the overhaul and maintenance of equipment onboard 4
vessels, the efficient operation of the equipment, and determining that the engines were suitably balanced and that they were running efficiently.
Tr. 2408-09 (Eley).
Mr. Eley i.
r
)
).
has also taken and passed fire fighting courses relating to the preventionandmi2Dgationoffiresonboardships.
Tr. 2411-12 (11ey).
- 85. - Mr. Smith began his career as an engineer cadet.
)
During his five year cadetship, he spent two years engaged in college-level' study of mechanical engineering, two years at sea
)
obtaining a basic understanding of the operation of the engi-neering department and all related machinery, and a year in the machine shop for engine maintenance, a chemical testing labora-
).
tory, and a drawing office.
Tr. 2412 (Smith).
His work in the drawing office included the design and preparation of drawings a
for the modification of engine systems, fuel processing plants,
)
and diesel generators.
Tr. 2413 (Smith).
86.
Mr. Smith's experience also includes 16 years as an engineer onboard ships.
During that time, he had experience in the operation, maintenance, inspection, testing and repair of a wide variety of makes of diesel gen'erators.
Tr. 2'573, 2413 (Smith).
For several years, Mr. Smith was the sole person re-sponsible for operating the engine rooms onboard ships, and thus he was responsible for the operation and maintenance of diesel engines and diesel generators.
Tr. 2413-14 (Smith).
His experience includes working with diesel generators with deadline blackstart capabilities.
Tr. 2415 (Smith).
) )
w.-, -
=
)~
87.
Mr. Smith has also attended two recognized fire
).
O fighting courses, "which were run by local fire departments pur-suant to government outlines.
His fire-related training.in-cludes courses on the science of fire and fire fighting, and
)
the management and safety of fire fighting parties.
Approxi-mately fifty percent of his fire fighting training consisted of actually and physically fighting fires.
Tr. 2416 (Smith).
y 88.
In the course of their careers, Messrs. Eley and Smith have operated many different makes of diesel generators
)
-which differ only in minor and superficial ways.
They all have crankshaf ts, pistons, camrods, cylinder heads and turbochargers.
In addition, Mr. Eley testified that each time an engineer goes onboard a new ship, udless it is a class of ship similar to the one he has sailed before, it is likely that the diesel generating equipment will be slightly different.
)
Under those circumstances, if the engineer had not seen that particular equipment before, he refers to instruction manuals, prior test results and running parameters, in order to ascer-
)
tain from those materials how to run the generating plant ef-factively.
Tr. 2436-38 (Eley); 2573 (Smith).
89.
The differences between diesel generators in marine
)
applications and diesel generators in land based applications
)- )
O.
i are very small and not of a nature - that would affect the J{
~
m conclusions in the> testimony of Messrs. Smith and Eley.
Tr.
2443-44 (Eley).
The major components are very similar and the overall engine ~ is similar.
Tr. 2444 (Eley).
Moreover, elec-trical generators are used onboard vessels for exactly the same purpose as are electrical generators on land.
Marine genera-tors are started, run, checked, loaded, run up to speed, paralleled, synchronized, and load shared in a manner similar to that of land based diesel generators, and the operating pro-cedure.s, maintenance procedures, blackout procedures and emer-gency generating procedures for diesel generators aboard ves-sels are very similar to those based on land.
Tr. 2445-46 (Eley).
Most diesel generators, including EMDs, are used in both marine and land based installations.
Tr. 2446 (Smith).
90.
During Mr. Minor's 24 years of experience in the nu-N) clear industry (see Proposed Finding _4 above), his l
responsibilities included equipment and system design, equip-ment qualification, seismic and environmental qualification I)'
testing, and pre-operational testing.
His work in the areas of l
. system and equipment design was largely with safety-related j
equipment, safety systems and control s'ystems for boiling water
[)
reactors in nuclear power plants built by General Electric, including Shoreham.
He also participated in the start-up and
]
check-out of several nuclear reactors.
Tr. 2400; 2574 (Minor).
S
. iO
~.. -
a i
)
1 91.
Mr. Minor's experience includes - design work to 3
achieve the necessiry redundancy, diversity and freedom from single failure to meet the regulations, including the general design criteria, that. apply to. safety-related equipment.
In
)
addition, in performing analyses of the systems and components to assure that they comply with applicable regulations, Mr.
Minor has performed failure modes and effects analyses, in
)
which the effects of postulated failures on system performance were examined and an assessment made of whether the likelihood of postulated failures was large enough to be of' concern or warrant the need for design work to prevent the failure.
Tr.
2401 (Minor).
)
92.
While with MBB Technical Assdciates, Mr. Minor has performed many reviews and assessments of safety systems, of reactor systems in general, and of the overall performance of
)
nuclear power plant system for both safety and control purpos-es.
An underlying concern of all of these analyses is the ability of the planc in question to meet the regulations which
)
apply to it.
Tr. 2401 (Minor).
93.
Mr. Minor has a Bachelor of Science degree in Elec-trical Engineering from the University of California at
)
Berkeley.
In obtaining that degree from he pursued a power 38 -
3
=-
==-
system option, dealing with utility systems and power
- O generation system).
He also has a Master of Science degree in
. Electrical-Engineering from Stanford University.
Tr. 2402 (Minor).
O.
94.
Mr. Bridenbaugh is President of MBB Technical Associ-ates, and serves as a Principal Consultant with that firm.
He
- ()
is a mechanical engineer by education, having received a Bache-loc of Scienca degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1953.
He is a registered professional nuclear engineer in the State of
()
Tr. 2575 (Bridenbaugh).
95.
Mr. Bridenbaugh has more than 30 years experience in
.i the engineering field, primarily in the areas of power plant
,0 i
analysis, construction, maintenance, and operations.
A sub-stantial portion of his experience was as a field engineer supervising the installation, operation, and maintenance of
- O central station power plant equipment, including steam tur-a bines, gas turbines, and emergency power generators.
Tr. 2575 (Bridenbaugh).
i 96.
During his employment with General Electric Company from 1953 to 1976, Mr. Bridenbaugh was involved in the design,
.C) production and testing of aircraft gas turbines, locomotives utilizing diesel drives, and gas turbine drives, large steam i
e
l turbine generators.
Tr. 2162 (Bridenbaugh).
He also was a field engineer an$ field engineering supervisor and as such
- worked primarily on steam turbines and generators as well as gas turbines.
His responsibilities included operator training,
)
test 'procedur e development, supervision of installation, opera-i tional testing, maintenance, start-up testing and trouble shooting in central station power plants, nuclear and fossil, and in industrial plants.
Tr. 2163-64 (Bridenbaugh).
97.
Mr. Bridenbaugh worked in the General Electric Nucle-
)
ar Energy Division for 13 years as Manager of Warranty Service, Manager of Product Service, and Manager of Performance Evalua-tion and Improvement, providing operating service to utilities,
)
and project management for contract codpl.etion at commercial nuclear power plants.
Tr. 2164 (Bridenbaugh).
He was respon-sible for tracking the reliability of nuclear. plants in the '
3 U.S. and developing a performance improvement plan for General Electric to improve the reliability of nuclear equipment.
Tr.
2166, 2403 (Bridenbaugh).
He also worked as a start-up engi-h) neer in at least t.;o nuclear plants.
Tr. 2177-79
)
(Bridenbaugh).
98.
LILCO presented testimony concerning the reliability of the EMD diesel generators by Thomas W.
Iannuzzi and Kenneth 3 '
1 I
f r
r
am
--m--
-n
,,e-
.r
,y--,-,-,es--
v, p----,
h A. Lewis.
Tr. 1160, 1165..Both Mr. Iannuzzi and Mr. Lewis are l
employed by Morrisbn-Knudsen Company, Mr. Iannuzzi as Manager of Engineering of the Power Systems Division (PSD), and Mr.
Lewis-as Technical Services Manager of PSD.
Tr. 1160, 1163
)
(Iannuzzi, Lewis).
PSD serviced the EMD diesels while they were owned by New England Power Company (NEPCO), and PSD also provides service to LILCO with respect to those machines.
Tr.
1169 (Lewis).
99.
Mr. William Gunther testified on behalf of LILCO.
He is the plant operating engineer, having held that, position for one year.
He is responsible for day-to-day operations at Shoreham.
Prior to becoming plant operating engineer, he was
)
the instrument control engineer for eight years at Shoreham.
He holds a Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science degree in electrical engineering from Northeastern University.
Tr.
)
153 (Gunther).
100. The first portion of Mr. Gunther's testimony de-scribes the steps involved in the proposed LILCO low power 3
testing program, Phases I-IV.
Tr. 158, 162 (Gunther).
Phase I consists primarily of moving the fuel into the reactor core.
t-In Phase II, actual criticality testing is performed, at which time the control rods are withdrawn systematically until a i
_ 41 -
reaction is obtained.
This is cold criticality testing, which is conducted withll'he reactor. head still removed from the reac-tor vessel.
In Phase III, the entire vessel internals are installed, including the vessel head, and there is preparation
)
for heatup and pressurization of the pressure vessel.
In Phase III, the reactor is brought up to rated pressure of approxi-mately 1000 lbs. and a temperature of 503 degrees Fahrenheit is
)
achieved.
In Phase IVi there is a continuation of Phase III in the sense that it includes heatup of the reactor vessel and taking the reactor to 5 percent power.
Tr. 164-66 (Gunther).
)
101. Mr. Gunther also testified regarding the procedures that will be utilized to restore AC power to the plant in the
)
event of a loss of offsite power.
Tr..167 (Gunther).
102. The NRC Staff submitted testimony by John L. Knox and Edward B. Tomlinson concerning the reliability of the EMD die-
)
sels and the 20 MW gas turbine.
Tr. 2337.
Mr. Knor is a Se-nior Electrical Engineer (Reactor Systems) in the Power Systems Branch in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and Mr.
Tomlinson is a Mechanical Engineer (Reactor Systems) in the Power Systems Branch in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion.
Tr. 2337 (' Knox) ; 2339 (Tomlinson).
)
- I
e
)
103. Low power operation of the Shoreham plant relying on
)~
LILCO's proposed 6. ternate AC power system would not be as safe as low power operation with onsite emergency AC power sources that were fully qualified and satisfied all applicable regula-
)
tory requirements because the EMDs and the 20 MW gas turbine are not as reliable as the latter.
Tr. 2440 (Bridenbaugh),
2578 (Eley, Smith, Minor, Bridenbaugh),l/ 2580 (Minor,
)
Br idenbaugh).
1.
The EMD Diesels
)
a.
vulnerability to Single Failures.
104. Unlike fully qualified diesel generators, the four EMDs are vulnerable to single failures >
Tr. 2578 (Eley at
)
al.).
They have a number of common critical components such as a single electrical output circuit, a single starter system,
)
and a single fuel supply system, and all the breakers connecting the individual EMD generators to their common bus are located in the single EMD control cubicle.
A failure in
)
any of these systems has the potential to disable the entire four-unit system and there are a number of such failure po ssibilities.
Tr. 2581 (Eley et al.).
)
1/
Bereinafter, testimony jointly sponsored by Messrs. Eley, Smith, Minor ~and Bridenbaugh will be cited as "Eley et al."
)
- )
---;-=--- _-;;_-
-m-__
-m---
- =---- - - -.. _
l 105. Although' Staff Witness Tomlinson testified that the EMD diesel generaCTes "are capable of operating totally inde-pendent of each other," he admitted that the four diesel gener-ators share one control cubicle, one fuel line, one equalizing
)
.line, one set of batterie; and one power cable coming out to the 4 KV. bus.
Tr. 1882, 2348 (Tomlinson).
}
( i)
Single Electrical Output of EMDs 106. The electrical output of each EMD diesel is carried by buried cable' to the EMD control cubicle, where it is con-
)
nected through an electrical breaker to a single three phase bus.
The output of all four EMDs is then carried by two three-conductor cables in a single raceway, which runs approxi-
)
mately 100 yards from the control cubi le to the non-emergency switchgear room.
A quarter of the length of this raceway is proposed to be covered by sand and stucco.
Tr. 2581-82 (Eley
)
et al.).
107. By contrast, the power output of the three qualified
)
diesel generators originally intended to be provided at Shoreham are completely separate and independent.
The diesel generators themselves are housed in separate compartments
)
designed to withstand all design basis loads and phenomena, and each generator also is provided with all necessary auxiliaries
) b
)
and controls for~ independent operation.
The power generated by each of the units'Ys distributed by electrical systems provided with " physical and electrical separation of bus sections, switchgear, interconnections, feeders, load centers, motor con-
)
trol centers, and other system components."
FSAR S 8.3.1.1.1; Tr. 2582 (Eley et al.).
)
108. If the single output circuit for the EMDs became in-operable due, for example, to any electrical malfunctions or mechanical failure in the control cubicle, it would be impossi-
)
ble to transmit power from any of the EMDs to the plant.
Tr.
2583 (Eley at al.).
However, because the power produced by each of the three qualified (iesels is transmitted indepen-
)
dently, the failure of one output line would affect only one generator.
The other two would remain capable of generating and transmitting power.
Tr. 2583 (Eley at al.).
)
109. The EMDs are less reliable than a qualified set of onsite AC generators, because the single failure in the output line would make all four EMDs unable to supply emergency AC
)
power.
Tr. 2583 (Eley et al.).
) )
-l lg-.
r (ii) Common Starting System for EMDs
- O
~
110. The common starting system for the Shoreham EMDs con-sists of a number of components.
Included is a battery array, housed in EMD 402, which consists of a number of individual
- ()
lead acid batteries connected in series, which. provide a total available voltage of 125.
The battery array is connected to a j) stepping switch located in the EMD control cubicle.
The stepping switch is necessary, because the battery array is ca-pable of starting only one EMD at a time.
The stepping switch 1
directs battery power to one EMD at a time, moving to the next lg machine when the first machine starts or fails to start af ter 15 seconds.
Also included. in the starting system is a battery
!O charger located in EMD 402.
Tr. 2583-84 (Eley et al.).
111. There are two electric starter motors on each of the'
~
i EMDs.
The two electric startar motors are not redundant, how-
Tr. 2541 (Eley).
l()
112. By contrast, each qualified diesel generator origi-nally intended to be provided at Shoreham, as described in the FS&R, was equipped with two independent, redundant air starting lO systems.
The air storage tanks, piping between tanks, and air start distributors were designed to ASME Boiler and Pressure
'O ;
-O
-. - - - ~
i Y'
l Vessel Code Section III, Class 3.
Each independent, redundant a'ir starting syst[3' for qualified diesel generators is a suf fi-cient volume to be capable of cranking the engine for a minimum of five. starts without recharging the tanks.
Tr. 2584-85 (Eley et al.).
113. Unlike the three qualified emergency diesel genera-
)
tors, the failure of the single starter system for the package of four EMDs could make it impossible to start any of the EMDs.
Tr. 2585-86 (Eley et al.).
)
114. For example, the failure of the battery array and/or charger could render the EMD starting system inoperable.
Tr.
2586 (Eley et al.). Or, a single failure in the EMD electrical i
equipment, such as a failure of the stepping switch, could pre-vent all four EMDs from starting.
Tr. 2468 (Eley).
Similarly, if the starter control mechanism in the EMD control cubicle
)
failed, although electricity would be available to power the EMD starter motors, that electricity would not be transmitted to the starter motors, and none of the EMDs would be started.
)
Tr. 2586 (Eley et al.).
115. Although the EMDs could be started individually manu-
)
ally, there is no evidence in the record that a failure in the stepping switch can be overridden through manual operation.
. i
O-Tr. 2468-69 (Eley).
Furthermore, LILCO's procedures do not
!O c 11 for.operatort?to be at the EMD units during their operation.
Tr. 2604 (Eley et al.).
zj 116. Because each fully qualified diesel generator is pro-vided. with two independent, redundant starting systems, the failure of one starting system. would not incapacitate even one
- O qualified diesel generator, and the failure of two systems could only prevent the starting of one generator.
Tr. 2586 (Eley et al.).
By contrast, the failure of one starter compo-
- g nent could prevent the entire EMD set from starting and from transmitting any power at all to the plant.
Tr. 2586 (Eley et al.).
!Q (iii)
Fuel System for EMDs 117. Each individual EMD has a 130 gallon " day tank."
The C) day tanks of the four EMDs are joined together by an equalizing l
pipe.
Fuel from all four day tanks flows through the equalizing pipes.in a manner which keeps the fuel in all four
- O day tanks at the same level.
Fuel is supplied to the day tanks l
by two transfer pumps located in EMD 402.
These pumps draw fuel through a single above ground pipeline.
This pipe runs
()
next to the EMDs at the foot of a steep embankment.
The fuel supply pipe passes ~under a temporary ramp constructed to allow
.O
~ :O
r g
C-vehicles to drive up the embankment, and ends at a fueling O
station.
Tr. 258,3'(Eley et al. ).
At that point the pipeline is connected to a flexible hose which, in turn, is connected' to a 9,000 gallon tank truck.
Tr.-2587 (Eley et a1.).
O 118. By contrast, each.of the three TDI diesel generators described in the FSAR has its own fuel system, which is physi-O cally isolated from the fuel systems for the other two genera-tors.
Each system consists of a completely buried tank and two fuel supply pumps housed in their own concrete block house.
O All components are designed to withstand credible seismic events that may occur.
Each system also has its own fuel sup-ply line which is buried.
The tanks, pumps and supply lines jo are protected from common fires and missile events.
Each gen-
\\
erator also has its own day tank, which is isolated from the other generators' day tanks.
Tr. 2588 (Eley et al.).
4
'O '
119. If a failure rendered the fuel system for one of the i
l l
qualified diesel generators inoperable, only one of the three i
i generators would be affected because each qualified generator 70
. has an independent fuel supply system, the other two generators could continue to produce power.
Tr. 2588-89 (Eley et al.).
In contrast, if the EMD fuel supply system failed, all four
- O EMDs would be affected because they all receive their fuel through that single system.
Tr. 2589 (Eley et al.).
N)
- 49 _
O 4
i'
4 S
l 120. Because the fuel for all the EMDs flows through the O
s fuel pump and the day tink in EMD 402, an interruption of the supply in that unit would interrupt the ficw of fuel to all four EMDs.
Thus, if a fire occurred in EMD 402, or if the O
pumps or float switches in EMD 402 failed, fuel would not be transferred from the single supply pipe to the day tanks of any o f the EMDs.
Tr. 2589 (Eleh et al.).
3
'121..Beca 2se all the day tanks are interconnected by the equalizing line, any single failure, such as a rupture due to a seismic event, could adversely affect operation of all four EMDs.
Tr. 2589 (Eley et al.).
If a failure occurred in the equalizing line before the isolating valve in that line, that
)
would be a common failure that would affect operation of all four EMDs.
Tr. 2476 (Eley)'.
122. If there were a rupture in the day tank for any one
~
of the EMDs, that tank could be inolated so that the rupture did not-affect the day tanks of the other EMDs, only if someone saw or otherwise become aware of the rupture.
Tr. 2475 (Smith).
Similarly, if there were a rupture in the fuel supply line feeding the EMDs, the EMDs could be fueled through an,
alternate fill on EMD 402 only if LILCO personnel became aware of the rupture.
Tr. 2476 (Smith).
- )
O-123. LILCO's procedures do not provide for operators to be C.
.s in the EMD units ciring their operation.
Tr. 2604 (Eley et al.).
O 124. The ground on which the EMDs are located is crushed rock which would absorb a large amount of fuel before anyone became aware of it.
Tr. 2477 (Smith).
There is no evidence O
that there is emergency lighting in the area of the EMDs that would be available af ter a loss of offsite power.
Tr. 2477 (Smith). Thus, on a dark night, the EMDs could reach the point O
of fttel starvation before anyone realized that something had gone wrong.
Tr. 2476 (Smith).
125. Fuel for the EMDs is transferred from the tank truck O
into the supply line through a hose running from the truck.
This hose apparently just lies on the ground as it runs from the tank truck to the connection with the supply line.
Tr.
2589 (Eley et al.).
Because the fuel for all four EMDs flows through this single. hose, damage to it coul,d terminate the flow of fuel from the tank truck to all four EMDs.
Tr. 2590 (Eley et al.).
126. The single fuel supply line that carries fuel from 0
the hose to EMD 402 is susceptible to failure due to both ground motion and missile impact.
Tr. 2590 (Eley et al.).
O O'
C) :
I i
127. Even if the fuel supply line to the EMDs were buried, O-the EMDs would sti31' be susceptible to damage from missile im-pact :st the. point where the line came above the surface and at the point of the flexible connection.
Tr. 2478 (Eley et al.).
Cl 128. Because fuel for,all four EMDs flows through this pipeline, damage to it would interrupt the flow of fuel from O.
the tank truck to all'-the - EMDs.
Tr. 2590 (Eley et al.).
(iv) Common Location of Breakers for the EMDs
()
129. All the breakers which connect the individual EM'D generators to their common bus are located in the EMD control cubicle.
Tr. 2581 (Eley et al.)
O 130. The reliability of the EMDs is reduced, because a single event, such as an electrical fire in the control cu-bicle, or missile damage, could disable all four breakers and O
make it impossible to transmit amergency power from the EMDs to Bus 11.
Tr. 2591 (Eley et al.).
O (v)
Fire Detection and Mitigation for the EMDs 131. The onsite emergency generator. system originally pro-posed for Shoreham' includes both fixed fire detection and fixed fire extinguishing systems.
These fire protection systems C1.
O'
f
-include permanent and automatic detectors and fire suppression 1
devices.in each goic:ator compartment, designed-to activate au-
.tomatically the CO2. fire suppression systems which flood the compartments with.CO2 gas.
The fire protection systems also
)J provide immediate alarms in the main control room to assure that follow-up operator-action is initiated.
Because each of the three TDI diesel generators is in its own separate compart-ment, these systems operate independently to enhance the reliability of each unit.
Tr. 2591 (Eley et.al.).
y 132. The EMDs contain no fire detection equipment and no
- fixed,
. ocely. operated fire extinguishing system.
Tr. 2592 (Eley et al.). The only fire extinguishing equipment associated
)
with the EMDs is a small number of hand-held fire extinguishers stored. inside the EMD units and two fire hydrants located in
'their vicinity.
Tr. 2592 (Eley et al.); 1183 (Iannuzzi and
)
Lewis).
133. The lack of fixed fire detection and suppression sys-tems makes the EMDs less reliable than the qualified onsite AC power sources.
Tr. 2592 (Eley et al.).
i 134. It is unlikely that a fire in one of the EMDs would j-be discovered until it was too late to extinguish it expedi-tiously.
Because the EMDs are not fitted with a fire detection l
t
- l l
h system, the first indication of a fire would be smoke or flames
)1
. escaping from the iIousi~ng of an ~ EMD.
Even then detection would only occur when someone happened to' see the smoke or flames.
Tr. 2592_(Eley et al.).
T 135. Although there are surveillance cameras which allow surveillance of the EMDs from the control room, smoke issuing from the housing -of any of the EMDs could be observed on tele-
)
vision monitors only if someone were looking a,t the monitors, and if the area surrounding the EMDs were lighted.
Tr. 2488-89 (Smith).
There is no emergency, DC-powered lighting outside
)
buildings.
Tr. 2477 (Smith).
136. If a fire occurred in one of the EMDs while it was
)
operating, it is difficul't to say when smoke would be pushed out of the engine compartment by cooling air, flowing through the engine.
Moreover, it is possible under some circumstances, for example if the fire were very close to the turbocharger, that the majority of the smoke would actually be drawn inside the engine and wou.d not be visible.
Tr. 2488 (Smith).
)
137. By the time the fire in an EMD is sufficiently well established to cause smoke or flames to issue from the housing,
)
it may be so well established that it would be impossible to enter the EMD housing to apply an extinguishing medium to the
?
--s4 -
)
i o
saat of the fire.
Tr. 2592-93 (Eley et al.).
Without the 3
?
ability to direct' hoses and extinguisher, at the seat of the fire, it is very unlikely that the fire could be extinguished before the EMD was rendered inoperable.
Consequently, person-nel responding to the fire would have to be content with containing it.
Tr. 2593 (Eley et al.).
3 138. The vulnerability of the EMDs to fire is increased by the fact that it is unlikely that the other three EMDs could be kept running if there were a fire in one EMD.
Tr. 2593 (Eley D
e t al. ).
139. Fire fighters responding to a fire in one EMD would almost certainly want to isolate source ~ ~s of fuel from the fire.
D This would mean stopping the flow of fuel from the tank truck as well as isolating the day tank of the burning unit.
As a result, the other three EMDs would have only the fuel that was in their day tanks when the burning unit was isolated.
Tr.
2593 (Eley et al.).
3 140. In addition, operating EMDs draw large amounts of air.
Running the EMDs while a neighboring unit is burning cre-ates the ri.sk of drawing flames into the non-burning machine 3
through the air intakes.
Because fire fighters almost certain-ly would spray large amounts of water on the non-burning EMDs D D
I J
to cool them, there is the risk that water could be drawn into the running EMDs t.Nough their air intakes.
Tr. 2593 (Eley et al.).
L')
141. Despite the fact that the housing for the EMDs was designed to allow the units to operate in adverse weather con-ditions including heavy rains, it is still highly probable that D
water sprayed by firefighters would be drawn inside the housing of any EMDs that remained in operation.
The impact of water from a fire hose on the side of the housing in the area of the D
air intake would be totally different from that of rain or snow.
Tr. 2540 (Smith).
142. A fire in EMDs 401 or 402 could also result in water 3
being sprayed on the nearby EMD control cubicle.
Tr. 2593 (Eley et al.).
To eliminate the risk of electrical injury to fire fighters, the flow of electricity through the switchgear 3
in the control cubicle probably would have to be stopped, thereby preventing the operation of any of the EMDs.
Tr. 2594 (Eley et al.).
143. Thus, the EMDs are less reliable than qualified onsite generators because they are more vulnerable to fires.
3 Tr. 2594 (Eley et al.).
With LILCO's originally proposed die-sel generators any fire ' ould be detected quickly; indeed the w
.) B
s likely precursors to the fire, such as hot gases, might even be D
detected before tr'- fire actually began.
And, once a fire was detected in any one of the TDIs, fixed mitigation systems could quickly attempt to extinguish it.
Tr. 2594 (Eley et al.).
By
]
contrast, a fire in any one EMD almost certainly would incapac-itate that EMD.
One of the originally proposed diesel genera-tors would have a much better chance of surviving the fire.
3 And, while a fire in one qualified diesel would not affect the others, a fire in one EMD would make it very difficult to con-tinue to run the others.
Tr. 2594 (Eley et al.).
D 144. The absence of fire detection and fixed fire suppres-sion equipment is a serious shortcoming in any diesel configu-ration, because operating diesel engines always present a po-tential for fire.
Tr. 2594 (Eley et al.).
This shor tcoming' is especially serious with respect to the Shoreham EMDs, because they are more vulnerable to common fire damage than the diesel g
generator configuration originally proposed by LILCO.
Tr.
2594-95 (Eley et al.).
3 145. Unlike a set of qualified diesel generators, the EMDs are not separated by approved, fire barrier walls.
Instead the EMDs simply sit in a row, with each unit'approximately eight to O
twelve feet from the next one.
Consequen tly, there is a,
O
D greater potential that a fire in one EMD could spread to the 3
other EMDs and pre,ent the entire set from supplying emergency power to the plant.
Tr. 2595 (Eley et al.).
146. It cannot be said, based on the maintenance history of the Shoreham EMDs, that they have not suffered any fires since they have been in operation, because the maintenance records are incomplete.
Tr. 2484-85 (Smith).
147. In addition, the EMD starting battery array poses a threat of explosion and fire.
When the EMDs are started, the D
starter batteries are partially deoleted, and they must be replenished by the battery charger.
While they are being charged, badteries generate both oxygen and hydrogen. gases.
]
The hydrogen gas is a potential source'of explosion.
Tr. 2595 (Eley et al.).
148. The batteries in EMD 402 could produce about 32 cubic feet of hydrogen per hour while being charged, and because the lower explosion limit would be about 4.1 or 4.2 percent by vol-ume, there is a possibility of fire.
Tr. 2492 (Eley).
g 149. Safe operating practice dictates that batteries should be housed in a compartment with no potential sources of 8
ignition, and which is ventilated to outside air either,
D
D-naturally or mechanically in a manner which prevents the 3
accumulation of ei)1osive gases.
In addition, explosion-proof fittings normally are used in the area where batteries are mounted.
None of these practices has been followed with the C)
EMDs.
Tr. 2492-93, 2595 (Eley et al.).
l 150. The starter battery array for' all four EMDs is stored beneath the floor in the engine compartment of EMD 402.
In-O stead of ventilation that carries potential explosive gases to the outside air, gases generated by the starter battery are j) -
vented' into the enclosed engine compartmant of EMD 402.
In the engine compartment of DID 402 those gases are exposed to elec-I trical devices, such as lights, light switches and relays, all J
lg of which could create sparks and ignite an explosion and possibly a fire.
Tr. 2595-96 (Eley et al.).
4 151. An explosion or fire from the battery gases could incapacite EMD 402 and an explosion or fire could also disable the common starting system for all four EMDs by destroying the l
battery.
An explosion or fire in EMD 402 could also incapacite O
the fuel supply system for all four EMDs, which runs through EMD 402.
Tr. 2595-96 (Eley et al.).
O 152. The threat of explosion or fire resulting from the improper ventilation of the starting battery array is a
.O t 4
_a-,
,.3m
,,.f,
-c.
y..y_
,m,
---___.y-.__9-im-___,.,,..,,-,,_y.,i.,,.
p ym.
O l
potantial single failure that could prevent the operation of 3
the entire EMD se[7 There is no comparable threat of explosion associated with the originally proposed diesel generators, be-cause their starting systems utilize no batteries and therefore f
CL there is no source of hydrogen.
Tr. 2596 (Eley et al.).
(vi) Alarms Relating to the EMDs O
153. Inadequacies in the alarm system for the EMDs make it less likely that they will operate reliably than would a set of qualified diesel generators.
Tr. 2600 (Eley et al.).
O 154. When qualified onsite diesels are operating, person-nel in the control room are informed of deviations of the die-sel systems from design parameters (e.g., cooling, fuel, lubri-cation) by alarm systems that are displayed in the control room.
Tr. 2600 (Eley et al.).-
O 155. Early detection of an abnormal condition gives the control room personnel the ability to take corrective action before the condition deteriorates to the-point at which the O
diesel (s) automatically stops.
The operating reliability of the qualified diesels is thus enhanced by adequate alarms.
Tr.
2600 (Eley et al.).
JO 0 1 O
~
i.
156. If an alarm on one of the TDI generators went off while it was -beindused. in an emergency to provide AC power to the plant's emergency cooling systems, the alarm would enable
- the operator to attempt to correct a problem before the problem
)
actually shut the generator down.
Tr. 2498 (Smith).
For exam-ple, if.a lubricating oil filter on a TDI began slowly choking up, and the alarm -went off before the shut down signal were
)
given, the operators could 'see the alarm, go to the generator and rectify the fault.
There would be-no interruption of the electrical power supplied by the TDIs.
Tr. 2498 (Smith).
l 157. Although the EMDs have alarms, all EMD alarm signals
[
except one (" Abnormal Fuel Tank Level") are given only when a problem becomes serious enough to initiate an engine shutdown.-
Thus, all but one of the EMD alarms go off only when it is too late for human intervention to correct an abnormal condition
)
prior.to shutdown.
Tr. 2600-01 (Eley at al.).
Thus, for exam-pie, the icw lubricating oil alarm on the EMDs only goes off
. simultaneously with a shutdown signal.
So, with respect to the
)
EMDs, the first indication received by the operator is that the machine has actually stopped.
Tr. 2498-99 (Smith).
i 158. Thus, with the TDIs there is a possibility of manual intervention before the machine actually shuts down, whereas i L l
t I _
,__.._m._.-._._--
.~.--_., _.._-- _ _...__ __ _ - _. _ --._ _,
almost all the -alarms on' the EMDs give a shutdown signal to the machine, so that r ?nual intervention is less likely.
Tr.
2499-2500 (Eley).
159. The description of the alarm system contained in the Shoreham FSAR sets forth the comprehensive instrumentation-pro-vided for operation and monitoring of a typical qualified onsite AC power system.
Tr. 2601 (Eloy et al.).
160. The FSAR states that surveillance instrumentation provides continuous monitoring of the status of the emergency generators, so as to indicate their readiness to perform their intended function, and that conditions that can adversely af-fact performance of the emergency diesel generators are i
annunciated -locally and in the main coktrol room.
Tr. 2601-02 i
j (Eley et al.).
The FSAR lists 38 individual, specific alarms i
l that are fixed to the TDIs.
Tr. 2603 (Eley at al.).
i 161. By contrast, the EMD alarm system is not suf ficiently i
precise to facilitate the prompt diagnostic and repair actions l
that would be needed to restore to service a failed EMD.
Four i
of the alarm lights on the EMD annunciator panel cover seventeen different shutdown causes.
Tr. 2601 (Eley et al.).
i I
i 62 -
.r-__
.wn-,
-f
-,-,,_--,y-n w...
m,.r-,-
-,r,----_.
ve-,-w--
,.e-7--,,--,.e----w-.r
.y...
1 162. For example, when the " Engine Stop" light and the O
" Generator Breaker s light come on simultaneously, the problem could be low engine lubricating oil pressure, low engine cool-ing water level, excessive crankcase pressure, engine O
overspeed, or an open breaker.
When faced with either of those two ale.tms, the operators would have to check a long list of potential problems in order quickly to repair the EMD.
Tr.
O 2601 (Eley et al.).
163. In addition, the EMD alarms are only annunciated in ea h individual es unit.
The EM alarms ann t be read from O
the control room.
Thus, the 'D(D alarms can only be read if operating personnel actually monitor the individual annunciator panels in each EMD unit, and LILCO's pgocedures do not provide g
for operators to be in the EMD units during their operation.
Tr. 2604 (Eley et al.).
O (vii)
Manual operations Required for the EMDs 164. In United States nuclear practice there is an unwrit-n ten rule that if important safety actions need to be taken within ten minutes, and those safety actions either involve human activities which may be complex, or are so impo r tant that n
one does not want to risk having them performed incorrectly 3
e
l i
1 I
during stressful periods, those safety actions are automated.
3 This rule was appJjed with respect to the TDI generators.
Processes by which they start, synchronize, load, distribute the load to systems which need the power the most, and isolate D
the systems that do not need the power are all automatic.
Tr.
~
2534 (Minor).
165. - The EMD diesels and the 20 MW Gas Turbine are impor-tant to safety, but contrary to the ten minute rule, their operation requires a great deal of human action.
Tr. 2534 (Minor).
166. The amount of time that would be available in.the event of a loss of offsite power during low power operation at 3
Shoreham does not. affect the comparison between LILCO's alter-native proposed AC power system and a set of qualified onsite AC power sources, because in making that comparison one must 3
postulate identical circumstances, including available time, for each situation in which you are judging the two systems.
Tr. 2533 (Bridenbaugh).
D 167. The qualified safety-related onsite emergency AC gen-erators are designed to have power available within 10 seconds of a loss of offsite power.
Tr. 2605 (Eley et al.).
The FSAR Chapter 15 analysis assumes that power would be restored within 3 o
15 seconds.
Tr. 1753 (Hodges).
LILCO's originally proposed I
onsite AC power sC tems were designed to meet these standards.
All the starting and loading functions relating to the TDIs are to be performed automatically without operator assistance.
Tr.
1 2605 (Eley et al.).
168. By contrast', starting and loading of the EMDs is a multiple step process involving many manual actions.
Tr. 2605 (Eley,et al.).
169. Although a start signal is given simultaneously to
)
all four EMDs, because there is only one cranking battery for all four EMDs,
electricity is provided to each EMD's starter motors serially.
The operating manual for the Shoreham EMDs
)-
estimates that for four units to start,' warm up, synchronize and become ready _to receive load, it will take between two minutes twenty seconds and two minutes fif ty seconds.
Tr.
2605-06 (Eley et al.).
170. Although starting the EMDs is automatic, a total of
)
at least 18 manual operations, performed by operators under the potential stress of an emergency situation, are required to connect the EMDs to the necessary electrical loads for the
)
engineered safeguards system.
Tr. 2605 (Eley et al.).
Because operation of the EMDs depends on the actions of operators, the
' )-
n.
t risk of human error is greater with the EMDs than with a
}
qualified onsite k) power system, and this additional risk re-duces the reliability of the EMDs.
Tr. 2607 (Eley et al.).
).
171. Before the breaker from the EMD bus to Bus 11 can be closed to supply power to the emergency loads, a control room operator must isolate the 4 KV buses from the RSST and the - NSST
).
by operating breakers, and must shed the loads from the 4 KV buses.
Tr. 1821-22 (Clifford).
Then, field operators must manually (1) remove three undervoltage program fuses in the
)
service. water pump cubicle, (2) open the gas turbine feeder breaker, the feedwater pump feeder breaker, and the 480V substation feeder breaker, in the non-emergency switchgear
)
room, and (3) go -outside to the NSST and open three disconnect switches on the low side of the NSST.
Tr. 2607 (Eley et al.).
172. LILCO's procedures call for an operator to be dis-patched to perform these actions.
If an operator were to be dispatched from the control room, in order to complete these necessary tasks, he would have to travel nine flights of stairs, pass through approximately fifteen doors (six of which are locked security doors, and require a credit card-like key to open), and he must pass one security station.
The large number of stairways and doors involved in this process
)
~
66 -
O increases the chances that the operator will be unable to O.
complete his assis :ed tasks in a timely manner.
Tr. 2607 (Eley l
e t al. ).
173. In order to go outside to the NSST to open three dis-connect awitches on the low side of the NSST, the operator must leave the building, and climb over the EMD cable raceway.
In order to open the switches, the operator has to use an approxi-mately 20 foot long fiberglass pole with a hook at the end.
Tr. 2608 (Eley et al.); 1830 (Clifford).
O 174. The difficulty involved in performing this task in-creases the risk of delay, and the difficulty of opening these switches under adverse weather or lighting conditions is sig-O nificantly increased because there is no emergency lighting in the vicinity of the NSST.
Tr. 2608 (Eley et al.).
175. The impact of human error potential in the operation O
of the EMDs is further increased, because it is necessary for operators manually to manage the load of the EMDs. LILCO per-sonnel acknowledged during a July 2 demonstration of EMD g
operation that manual control of the loads placed on the EMDs could be necessary to ensur.e that the engines do not run at loads so low as to be detrimental to the machine.
Tr. 2608 g
(Eley et al.).
- F7 -
O-
176. If all four EMDs are operating and connected to the Y
minimum load, the ?are connected to a very low load.
Tr. 2505 (Smith).
Although the Shoreham EMDs have automatic load adjusting systems, there is a big difference between balancing
)
load among machines that are running at 50 or 75 percent load and balancing load among machines running around 5 or 10 per-cent load.
The governors of the EMDs have a difficult time
)
balancing or controlling the machines at very light loads, and when the machines are running at very light loads there is a risk that one of the machines will go into reverse current.
)
This in fact occurred during the July 2 demonstration.
If a machine.goes into reverse current, it shuts down.
That also occurred during the July 2 demonstration.
Tr. 2506-07 (Smith).
)
177. Although if one of the EMDs tripped off due to re-verse current the other EMDs might pick up the load that had been carried by the machine that tripped off, it is not certain that that would happen.
Tr. 2507 (Smith).
178. Manual management of EMD loads must be done from the
)
EMD control cubicle.
This fact increases the risk of human error, especially because the EMD control cubicle contains only one set of' current and power meters.
This increased risk of I
human failure decreases the reliability of the EMDs relative to
i t
l-O
.that of fully automated -power sources.
Tr. 2608-09 (Eley et al.).
O' 179. Although LILCO's witness Mr. Gunther asserted that 3
plant procedures, including SP 29.015.02, Loss of All AC Power, have been revised to incorporate the power sources in.LIIco's alternate configuration and to reflect the availability of the 3
EMDs and-the 20 MW gas turbine (Tr. 853-56 (Gunther)), there is no evidence that the Loss of All AC Power procedure, SP 29.015.02, has been modified or revised to instruct the opera-3 tors to restore power by means of the alternate configuration proposed by LILCO.
Tr. 793 (Gunther).
180. As of the time of the April hearing, no Shoreham con-g trol room operators had received any simulator training I
simulating the events, such as a loss of coolant accident, or i
other events that would utilize either the 20 MW gas turbine or 3
the EMD diesels.
Tr. 368 (Gunther).
181. The only testing of operator Laplementation of proce-3 dures discussed in the LILCO testimony was a July 2, 1984 dem-I onstration.
Tr. 856-59 (Gunther).
That demonstration involved one test to start the EMDs and one test to start the gas tur-l3 bine.
Tr. 1846-47 (Clifford).
All other testing discussed by i
LILCO involves testing of the functioning of the equipment.
i Tr. 856-60 (Gunther).
l )
I);
182. During the July 2 demonstration, only one of the EMD S
diesels was synch;7aized.and able to' carry load.
Tr. 858-59 (Gunther).
.g 183. During the demonstration on July - 2, 1984, the field operators who were sent to perform the various functions required during the demonstration were in the control room at O
the time they were dispa tched. 'Tr. 1834 (Clifford).. There is no evidence that the July 2,1984 demonstration or the review conducted by the. Staff witnesses addressed. the time necessary z) to perform actions set forth in LILCO procedures in the event of an actual loss of offsite power situation, and Mr.
l l
Clifford's conclusions did not relate to any particular. pieces
!O of equipment.
Tr. 1840 (Clifford).
1 184. There is substantial uncertainty as to how much time is necessary for the EMDs actually to get load on line because
!O of the need for human intervention.
Moreover, in a real l
blackout situation it does not matter how many drills have been l
held.
A real blackout would be a completely different situa-10 i
tion because in a real blackout, especially under adverse con-ditions such as night or bad weather, the operator's compliance
.with the operating procedures might be totally different from O
his compliance under ideal test or drill conditions.
Tr. 2504 (Smith).
- 0 2
~
O[
185. The NRC Staff has apparently reviewed only two of the 3
Lprocedures discusi?d by LILCO in its testimony relating to its
Those two procedures are SP 29.015.0'2 (Loss of, All AC Power Emergency Procedure) and TP 29.015.03 (Restora-3 tion of AC Power with Onsite-Nobile Generators Interim Emergen-cy Procedure (54 Power)).
Tr. 1805, 1851 (Clifford); Staff LP Ex. 2 at 13-1.
3-186. The review performed by the Staff witness Mr.
Clifford was based upon Revision 5 of the Loss of All AC Power Emergency Procedure (SP-29.015.02), which does not include any g
instructions or procedures for the use of the alternate power configurations.
Tr. 1805 (Clifford); 793 (Gunther).
O 187. The two procedures reviewed by the Staff were not ac-captable to the Staff.
Tr. 1835 (Clifford).
If a low power license were to be issued, the Staff would insist upon five li-O conse conditions relating just to the two procedures reviewed by the Staff.
Tr. 1834-35 (Clifford).
g 188. Although LILCO's witness Mr. Gunther stated that LILCO intends to implement the procedural changes required by the Staff (Tr. 825 (Gunther)), there is no evidence that. all 9
those changes have been made or that the Staff's concerns have been adequately addressed.
See Tr. 1834-35, 1838 (Clifford).
O O
d-l
-189. In order to keep the reactor below 5 percent power, O
itlis~ essentially?u requirement that the number.1 bypass valve position be kept below 50 percent open.
There_is no procedure which directs operators to maintain the valve in that position.
j O
LILCO does not intend to have a procedure in that regard.
Tr.
'179-80 ~ (Gunther).
Further, there is no standing order to re-quire operators to maintain the bypass valve in that position, O
.although Mr.- Gunther testified that he might issue such an order or a similar mechanism to ensure that the license condi-tions of 5 percent power are met.
Tr. 180-81 (Gunther).
3 (viii)
Surveillance Test Procedures for EMDs 190. LILCO's proposed EMD surveillance. test procedure does O
not provide for regular testing of the automatic starting, synchronizing, and load sharing mechanisms of the. EMDs, as those devices would be required to operate during a loss of O
of fsite power, loss of coolant accident.
Tr. 2495 (Smith);
2597 (Eley at al.).
Consequently, LILCO's proposed surveil-lance testing of the EMDs would not identify potential problems with key automatic elements of the EMD configuration, and as a result that testing does not provide an accurate indication of the reliability of the EMD system.
Tr. 2597 (Eley et al.).
O O
n.
v
_~
191. LILCO's proposed EMD surveillance test procedure does not ' provide for a',>isual inspection of each EMD prior to starting the engine.
Such an inspection is good operating practice, because it permits the operators to ensure that the l
required amount of vital fluids is present, and that equipment failures or human errors have not left the engine mechanically unsound.
Starting the engine without a visual inspection in-4 creases the risk that the machine will be damaged and rendered inoperable.
Tr. 2598 (Eley et al.).
192. The General Motors operating manual for the Shoreham 3
EMDs states that prelubrication of the EMD engine is a "neces-sary and important practice for any engine which has been inoperative for more than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />."
LILCO's proposed EMD sur-
)
veillance tes't procedure does not require the "necessary and impo r tan t" prelubrication.
Tr. 2598 (Eley et al.).
193. Although LILCO's witness Mr. Lewis testified that in surveillance testing the EMDs at Shoreham should be run at full load approximately one hour per month (Tr.1123 (Lewis)),
LILCO's proposed EMD surveillance test procedure does not indi-cate how long each of the EMDs should be run once it has been started and connected to electrical loads.
Thus, it is possi-i ble that the EMDs will not be run long enough at their normal
) '
~
,k operating temperature to allow temperatures to stabilize in individual: componi Yts. Estopping a diesel engine before temper-atures stabilize in individual; components reduces component life and' operating reliability.
Tr. 2598-99-(Eley et al.).
T..
194. LILCO's proposed EMD surveillance test procedure does not call for a visual inspection of the EMDs while they are
)
running.
Such an inspection is important, because many developing mechanical problems can only be detected while the engine is running.
If no one inspects the machine while it is
)-
operating,'such problems could go undetected, and the operators would not have the opportunity to repair the problems before they became serious enough to make the machines inoperable.
)
Tr. 2599 (Eley et al.).
e, 195. LILCO's proposed EMD surveillance testing procedura does not call for a visual inspection of the EMDs af ter comple-
)
tion of the test.
Thus, the LILCO procedure passes up another opportunity to discover developing problems with the machines.
A post-test visual inspection also serves to verify that the f
soak back lube oil pump for the turbocharger is operating prop-i j
erly.
Failing to verify that the soak back pump is functioning f
increases the risk of damage to the turbocharget.
Tr. 2599
)
(Eley et al.).
I i
l
) -
)
L l
196. Each of the deficiencies in LILCO's proposed EMD sur-D veillance testing 7tocedure results in a missed opportunity to discover developing problems in the EMDs, increased risk of damage to components, or reduced operating life of components.
Consequently, all these deficiencies reduce the reliability of
~
the EMDs.
Tr. 2600 (Eley et al.).
197. There is no evidence that the NRC Staff has reviewed or approved any of the surveillance testing procedures proposed by LILCO for the alternate AC power configuration.
3 198. In its Safety Evaluation Report, the Staff identified seven changes to LILCO's proposed testing of the EMDs which must be made and incorporated into the Shoreham Technical Spec-ifications or preoperational test program before the LILCO pro-posal is acceptable to the Staff.
Staff LP Ex. 2 at 8-3 to 8-5.
J 199. Although LILCO's witness Mr. Gunthor testified that procedures relating to testing of the EMDs had been 3
" finalized," there is no evidence that the deficiencies identi-fled by the County's witnesses or the NRC Staff have been ade-quately addressed or eliminated.
Tr. 853-54 (Gunther).
,3
, O
D 200. Although LILCO's witness Mr. Gunther testified that 3
training has been ?rovided to operating crews covering surveil-lance testing of the EMD diesels and the 20 MW gas turbine, he was unable to identify what versions of such procedures were 3
covered in the training.
Tr. 855; 807, 809 (Gunther).
The training and walk-throughs of procedures took place in April and May, 1984.
Tr. 788-89 (Gunther).
There is no evidence 3
that the versions of surveillance procedures which LILCO in-tends to rely upon during low power testing have in fact been the subject of operator training.
D (ix) Manufacture of the E4Ds 201. Messes. Iannuzzi and Lewis testified that evidence of proper manufacturing processes is one of the factors to be con-sidered in evaluating the reliability of diesel generators.
Tr. 1170 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
O 202. The Shoreham EMDs were manufactured in 1967 and 1968.
Tr. 1068 (Lewis).
However, Mr. Iannuzzi did not visit the EiD 3
manufacturing facility or observe the process by which EMD en-gines are made until early 1983 (Tr. 1045-46 (Iannuzzi)), and PSD did not perform quality assurance audits of the EMD 3
manuf acturing facility before 1974.
Tr. 1171 (Iannuzzi, Lewis). '
e
~
D (x)
Maintenance of the EMDs O
203. Messrs.
ewis and Iannuzzi testified that the inspec-tion and maintenance history of a specific diesel generator is a factor which allows them to assess the reliability of the 3
g ener ato r.
Tr. 1170 (Lewis, Iannuzzi).
204. Mr. Iannuzzi testified that he reviewed the mainte-O nance records for the Shoreham EMDs from 1978 through 1983, and reports of work performed on those EMDs back to 1974.
Tr. 1173 (Iannuzzi).
Mr. Lewis testified that he was responsible for O
the units now at Shareham since 1981 and that he had reviewed maintenance records before that.
Tr. 1173 (Lewis).
Mr.
Iannuzzi also testified that he felt he and Mr. Lewis knew the O
maintenance history of the EMDs at Shoreham.
Tr. 1058 (Iannuzzi).
205. The LILCO witnesses ascerted t$1at the maintenance g
records upon which they base their testimony consist of reports filled out by PSD field personnel each ti.ne they visited the g
site of the diesels, and maintenance log books for each indi-vidual EMD unit, which according to the LILCO witnesses reflected each repair and each inspection.
Tr. 1049-52 (Lewis,,
o Iannuzzi).
C)
_ 77 _
j
y k
206. Mr. Lewis did not review the maintenance log books in b
detail in preparii',0 his testimony, and Mr. Iannuzzi did not re-view any maintenance log books.
Tr. 1052 (Lewis, Iannuzzi).
In preparing his testimony, Mr. Iannuzzi reviewed only the
)
field service reports and.s' nopses of log books that were pre-y pared by LILCO personnel.
Tr. 1052-53 (Iannuzzi).
Mr.
- Iannuzzi did not know how the LILOO synopses had been prepared.
)
Tr. 1053 (Iannuzzi).
1 207. Messes. Iannuzzi and Lewis testified that since 1978 p
the Shoreham EMDs were ' maintained in accordance with the PSC maintenance service contract.
Tr.1173 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
Into 1983, PSD personnel made at least twelve visits per year to the Massachusetts site at wt.ich the tShoreham EMDs were then
)
installed.
Tr. 1070-71 (Lewis).
208. However, contrary to the assertion by Messrs. Lewis
)
and Iannuzzi, the service records relied upon by the LILCO wit-nesses do not contain reports of all the visits that.were made by PSD personnel to the site at which the Shoreham EMDs were previously installed.
Tr. 1072-74 (Lew!.s).
Similarly, the l
maintenance -log boofs for the Shoreham 3MDs do not include en-1 l
l.
tries for all the repair work described in the PSD reports.
1 Tr. 1079-84 (Lewis).
There are several areas where there are
- f. :
--.__._4-
,_r.,,.w.._v,_.,_,.r.+_,y
,,.y.,_,ym..r%.._m,
,.m.%m..,,,,..,._.,,,,,,,m,,,_y_,
,..,_--,,m,,,
,-ra
1 I
O-discrepancies in the maintenance history of the Shoreham EMDs, C) and' they do not pt ivide a full history of the machines.
Tr.
2442, 2470 (Smith).
Mr. Lewis admitted that the maintenance records for the Shoreham EMDs should be better than they are.
C).
Tr. 1084 (Lewis).
209. Although Mr. Iannuzzi testified that he had seen no problem with parts provided by EMD that did not perform proper-ly (Tr.1171-72 (Iannuzzi)), he also stated that the service records for the Shoreham END diesels show a number of instances of cracked cylinder heads.
Tr. 1174 (Iannuzzi).
210. The LILCO witnesses testified that while the EMDs were at NEPCO, there were few problems and no shutdowns for O
major repairs because of an operating Sondition.
Tr. 1178
( Lewis).-
They also testified that they were aware of no in-stances in which the units shut down for repairs during O
operation at NEPCo.
Tr.1179 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
211. Contrary to the assertion by the LILCO witnesses, the maintenance records relied upon by them indicate that at 10,992
)
hours a turbocharger failure on EMD 4 caused the engine to smoke heavily, and maintenance personnel started removing parts for changeout.
Tr. 1062-63 (Lewis).
A turbocharger failure
)
could not have caused the engine to start smoking heavily if E.
O I
7 i
l'
,33 -
the engine were not operating at the time of the failure, and O'
in order for the r71ntenance personnel to begin removing parts
'for changeout the engine had to have been shut down.
Tr.
1063-64'(Lewis).
Il 212. Similarly, at 11,622 hours0.0072 days <br />0.173 hours <br />0.00103 weeks <br />2.36671e-4 months <br /> the turbocharger on EMD 4 i
was replaced because it had failed.
The maintenance records relied upon by the LILCC witnesses indicate that at the same
.O time, both aftercoolers on EMD 4 were replaced due to leaking from impact of turbo compressor parts.
Tr. 1066 (Lewis).
A f ailure of a turbocharger that resulted in parts being able to g
impact the aftercooler with a force sufficient to cause leaks could not have happened urless the engine was operating at the time.
In eder f r the failed turb charger to be replaced the O
engine had to be shut down.
Tr. 1066-67 (Lewis).
4 213. An EMD diesel generator of the type installed at O
Shoreham would not be capable of carrying full load without an operable turbocharger.
Tr. 1060-61 (Iannuzzi).
214. The maintenance records for the Shoreham EMDs also z) indicatr, that at 9,407 hours0.00471 days <br />0.113 hours <br />6.729497e-4 weeks <br />1.548635e-4 months <br />, Unit 4 experienced a dust bin blower failure, causing generator failure, and that maintenance g
personnel began preparation for removal of the generator and dust bin blower on Unit 4.
Those removals could not have been
'O' 30 -
ut
__j.___
_.._....,r.
--,,y.
,-,n,, - _. _ _,,_,,,,
1
,J accomplished unless the engine was shut down.
Tr. 1067-68 O
(Lewis).
Mr. Lew!> testified that without a generator a diesel generator cannot generate electricity.
Tr. 1088 (Lewis).
215. Messrs. Lewis and Iannuzzi stated that they had no U
reason to doubt the accuracy of the maintenance records reflecting the failures of the two turbochargers and generator and dust bin blower.
Tr. 1063, 1068 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
O 216. Although Messrs. Iannuzzi and Lewis testified that they knew of no catastrophic failures of the pressure bound-O aries related to auxiliary equipment that had caused EMD die-sels of the Shoreham design to shut down (Tr. 1181-82 (Iannuzzi, Lewis)), Mr. Iannuzsi clarified that it was not O
their testimony that there had never b$en any leaks or failures associated with the pressure boundary related to auxiliary equipment on EMDs with the Shoreham design.
Tr. 1087 3
(Iannuzzi).
217. Mr. Lewis testified that PSD had no complaints from NEPCO about the operation or maintenance of the EMDs that are now at Shoreham.
Tr. 1060 (Lewis).
218. Although Mr. Lewis testified that any time NEPCO had 8
any type of problem with the EMD diesels they notified him.
O
O right away (Tr. 1118 (Lewis)), he also testified that depending O
cut the cause of a 3bebocharger failure on the Shoreham EMDs while they were owned by NEPCO, the failure may not have come to his attention.
Tr. 1118-19 (Lewis).
He further testified O
that even if a turbocharger failure had been due to lack of maintenance, the failure might 'not have been brought to his at-tantion.
Tr. 1118-19 (Lewis).
O 219. Lewis testified that only two of the Shoreham EMDs have UTEX engines.
Tr. 1068 (Lewis).
The maintenance records for the Shoreham EMDs indicate that all four of the Shoreham l
)
EMDs have replacement UTEX engines.
SC LP Exs. 45-48.
220. The maintenance records for the Shoreham EMDs for the O
period 1974 through 1983 show that exclusive of replacement parts and scheduled maintenance periods,17 cylinder heads, 21 power assemblies (a power assembly consists of a complete cyl-O inder, piston and cylinder head), 3 turbochargers, and 13 starter motors have had to be replaced.
From 1974 through 1983, the Shoreham EMDs have operated an average of 2,255 hours0.00295 days <br />0.0708 hours <br />4.21627e-4 weeks <br />9.70275e-5 months <br /> O
per machine.
The failure of this number of major ccmponents over an average of 2,255 hours0.00295 days <br />0.0708 hours <br />4.21627e-4 weeks <br />9.70275e-5 months <br /> per machine is greater than ex-pacted for reliable diesels.
Tr. 2609 (Eley, Smith).
O 3
' D
O 221. The PSD service agresient states that an engine should be replaced;3 ter 72,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operation; however, f
jg all four of the Shoreham EMDs received replacement engines at operating times from 6,030 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> through S,070 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br />.
Tr. 1211
'O.
(Iannuzsi, Lewis); SC LP Exs. 45-48.
222. The EMD operating manual states that repowering should take place af ter 12,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operation.
PSD states O
in its maintenance agreement with LILCO that repowering should take place after 16,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Tr. 2609-10 (Eley, Smith); Tr.
1210 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
- O 223. The maintenance records for the Shoreham EMDs show l
that EMDs 401 and 403 ran only 6,900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> before requiring
!()
repowe ring.
Tr. 2610 (Eley, Smith).
224. At 12,932 hours0.0108 days <br />0.259 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.54626e-4 months <br /> (i.e., only 6,900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> af ter having been fitted with a replacement UTEX engine), the engine in EMD
!O 401 was repowered.
Eighty-seven hours later, power units 4, 6, I
10, 11,13 and 18 had to be changed again on EMD 401 because of damage to the cylinder pistons that had occurred shortly af ter iO the repowering.
(A power unit consists of a cylinder head as-sembly, cylinder liner, system assembly, carrier assembly, connecting rod assembly and all related gaskets and seals.)
%)'
11 was Af ter a further 15 minutes of running, power unit No.
i i
!O-i f
a O
8 again changed because of cylinder / piston damage.
For this O
number of componer.2s to be changed so soon af ter overhaul, when they would be expected to last approximately 12,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />, in-dicates that either the maintenance or components were of poor
)
quality.
Tr. 2611.(Eley, Smith).
225. EMDs 402 and 404 have run only 6,300 and 5,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> 3
respectively since they were fitted with replacement UTEX en-gines.
Nonetheless, after their installation inspection at Shoreham, PSD had concerns about the mechanical condition of j)
EMDs 402 and 404 and stated in its installation inspection re-port that the " engine components are used and approaching over-haul."
Tr. 2610 (Eley, Smith); SC LP Ex. 49.
3 226. The PSD service agreement states that turbochargers have an expected life before required changeout of 16,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Tr. 1210 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
Tne normal expected life D
of a turbocharger is 32,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Tr. 2611 (Eley, Smith).
The turbocharger on EMD 404 failed 'at 10,992 hours0.0115 days <br />0.276 hours <br />0.00164 weeks <br />3.77456e-4 months <br />.
Tr. 2611 (Eley, Smith).
P 227. Seven hundred four hours af ter a turbocharger on EMD 404 failed, the new replacement turbocharger failed in such a fashion that pieces of the broken turbocharger pierced the af tercoolers, requiring them to be changed also.
Tr. 2611 1
l !
~
_ = -.
- -- n.
0 (Eley, Smith).
These failures, coupled with the fact the EMD O!
turbochargers havGhad a history of problems, indicate that this component of the Shoreham EMDs has low reliability.
Tr.
2612 (Eley, Smith).
O 228. In light of the fact that the EMDs have required the replacement of parts due to failures as well as repowering much more frequently than is recommended or than would be expected, it is likely that there is some serious deficiency either in some of the machines or in the manner in which they have been maintained.
This means there is an increased risk of mechani-cal failure, which is made worse by the fact that LILCO's test procedure is not adequate to discover developing mechanical problems.
Tr. 2612 (Eley, Smith).
g 229. Messrs. Lewis and Iannuzzi testified that whether the manufacturer's recommended replacement schedules have been O
followed is another factor to be used in assessing a diesel generator's reliability.
Tr. 1170 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
230. Mr. Lewis testified that his understanding of General O
Motors' maintenance recommendations is that regardless of the type of turbocharger, a turbocharger on a machine which is run in excess of 50 percent load should be changed-out every 8000 O
operating hours.
Tr. 1121-22 (Lewis).
Messrs. Iannuzzi and 0 l LO
']
\\
l Lewis also testified that the PSD maintenance secvice schedule U
meets or exceeds i'.e maintenance' schedule published by EMD.
Tr. 1173 (Iannuzzi and Lewis).
231. The PSD maintenance schedule, however, calls for g
replacing turbochargers after 16,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operating, even though Mr. Lewis testified that the Shoreham EMDs were run at O
110 percent of rated load while at NEPCO.
Tr. 1178 (Lewis);
1210.
232. Mr. Lewis testified that PSD strictly uses UTEX parts O
(Tr.1126 (Lewis)), and that NEPCO always replaced parts with new parts when available, and used UTEX parts only when new parts were not available.
Tr. 1180 (Lewis).
However, the O
maintenance records for the Shoreham EMDs indicate that on some occasions neither new nor UIEX components were used as replace-ments, but instead used components were installed.
SC LP Ex.
O 47.
233. Although Mr. Lewis testified that he had " absolutely 9
no problems with UTEX parts," he admitted that he had had some "small" problems with UTEX parts, and that there were quality control problems with EMD UTEX parts.
Tr. 1126-27 (Lewis).
D e O
m,a 234. Massrs. Iannuzzi and Lewis testified that in 1981, 0-EMD recommended tr ~jt the. viscous dampers on diesels of the model at Shoreham be replaced.
Tr. 1173-74 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
(g 235. Mr. Lewis testified that failure of a viscous damper could lead to excessive wear on gear teeth, which in turn would lead to Laproper pumping of lubricating oil, inoperability of water pumps, and improper operation of the governor drive, g
which would probably stop fuel from going into the engine.
4 Tr. 1089-90 (Lewis).
[3 236. Although Mr. Lewis testified that he had not seen any damper failures, he testified that PSD had seen wear on gear trains that had run approximately 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> af ter a viscous O
.. damper had become out-of-date.
Tr. 1090 (Lewis).
Lewis fur-ther testified that if a damper is out-of-date, it should be replaced.
Tr. 1092 (Lewis).
O 237. Messrs. Lewis and Iannuzzi testified that the viscous dampers on three out of the four EMDs at Shoreham have not been lg replaced in.accordance with the 1981 EMD recommendation or the EMD maintenance schedule.
Tr. 1092 (Lewis), 1174 (Iannuzzi, d
Lewis).
In addition, the PSD service schedule for the Shoreham 33 EMDs does not call for regular inspections of the viscous damp-ers.
Tr. 1201-11 (Iannuzzi, Lewis). IO
p-
_s.,,.
.,..a.__
u
-4
. '~
I j
238. Mr. Lewis testified that EMD recommends changing both y
its standard turbc3harger and its high capacity turbocharger every 8,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Tr. 1121-22 (Lewis).
In contrast, the PSD maintenance schedule recommends changing turbochargers only
)
every 16,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Tr. 1210 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
Mr. Lewis also testified the. lower the load at which the engine was run the more. frequently the turbocharger should be replaced.
3' Tr. 1153 (Lewis).
(xi) Starting Reliability 3
239. Messrs. Iannuzzi and Lewis testified that EMD diesel engines of the model used at Shoreham "are extremely reliable in starting."
Tr.1178 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
Their testimony is based upop " fast-start" tests performed by' EMD and Bruce GM Diesel the predecessor of PSD and for convenience hereinaf ter referred to as "PSD"), a 1967 " report" by EMD, and "PSD experi-ence."
Tr. 1176-78 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
240. The fast-start tests performed by EMD were performed
)
in -1968 through 1970 on Model 999 EMDs.
EMDs which were subjected to the fast-start tests had two redundant air start systems and two redundant fue~1 pumps, one electric and one
)
engine-driven.
Tr. 1096, 1098, 1176-77 (Iannuzzi).
The fast-start tests' performed by PSD from 1971 through 1973 also had
)
' )-
=
}.
-redundant air start systems and redundant fuel pumps.
Tr.
)
(Iannuzzi)?
1176-77 241. The Shoreham EMDs are not equipped with redundant air
)
start systems and they do not have an electric backup fuel pump.
Tr. 1101-02 (Iannuzzi).
' 242. Mr. Iannuzzi spoke with Art Kornichuk, the EMD Re-gional Sales Manager about the EMD f ast-start tests.
Mr.
Kornichuk stated to Mr. Iannuzzi that although the Shoreham EMDs have the same engine, they do not have the dual air start system of the Model 999.
Therefore, Mr. Kornichuk stated that the fast-start tests are not directly applicable to the Shoreham units, and that starting reliability of the Shoreham EMDs can only be based on previous unit history.
Tr. 1099, 1104 (Iannuzzi).
Mr. Kornichuk stated in his conversation with Mr. Iannuzzi that the General Motors fast-start tests do not
)'
prove that the Shoreham EMDs have the same starting reliability as a Model 999 EMD would have.
Tr. 1104 (Iannuzzi).
/.
243. In ' addition, Mr. Iannuzzi testified that he had reviewed the report entitled " Starting Reliability of EMD Model i
999 Diesel Electric Generator Sets," November 1,1971.
That report indicates that the starting features which are present in the Model 999 EMDs but not in the Shoreham EMDs were 'added l i
J expressly for the purpose of attaining high starting 23-reliability.
Tr.'2105-06 (Iannuzri).
See also SC LP Ex. 9.
.244. Mr. Iannuzzi testified that a diesel generator equipped for fast start would probably be more reliable than a g
non-fast start unit such as those at Shoreham as a result of the enhancements made to the fast start unit such as the redun-g dant start system and the backup fuel system.
Tr. 1158 (Iannuzzi).
245. Mr. Iannuzzi also testified that "[i] n 1967, EMD '
repor.ted a success rate of 29,136 starts in 29,362 attempts on i
electric start units, or 99.234."
Tr. 1177 (Iannuzzi).
Howev-er, Iannuzzi did not know whether any of the electric stait
~
O EMDs referred to in the EMD " report" had the same starting sys-tem as the Shoreham EMDs.
He had no knowledge concerning how tha units referenced in the " report" were setup.
Tr. 1106
'O (Iannuzzi).
Mr. Iannuzzi also did not know who had collected the data referred to in t.he EMD " report," the source of the i
data, or the time period covered by the data.
He had no knowl-O edge as to what EMD meant by " successful start" in the "re-po r t. "
Tr. 1107-08 (Iannuzzi).
{)
246. Mr. Iannuzzi testified that his knowledge concerning the 1367 data is derived from a letter dated November 2, 1971 C),
e
1_
f' i
)-
from tha-EMD Manager of Reseller Sales.
That letter states
-only -
i%
f It is of interest to note in addition
)
to the enclosed report (relating to
)
fast-start tests], Electromotive files on starting reliability of the EMD Model MP-type, equipped with single electric start motor, indicates that information has been obtained as of December 11, 1967, which reveals from a total of 29,362 start
)
attempts 29,136 start attempts have been successful indicating 99.234 successes.
LILCO LP Ex. 2; Tr. 1137 (Iannuzzi).
)
247. Mr. Iannuzzi testified that the' letter on which he relied contained information that PSD would use in talking with a new customer to convince him that these are indeed reliable
)
unitsi Tr.1131 (Iannuzzi). The lettec, was written to PSD at a time when EMD was in the process of selling four diesel, genera-toes to PSD.
Tr. 1135 (Iannuzzi).
)
248. Mr. Lewis testified that ""SD experience shows that electric start units are reliable."
However, Mr. Lewis had no specific data concerning the total number of starts and total number of failures to start in electric start EMDs subse-quant to 1967,.he did not know how many electric start EMDs there were in service, he did not know how many start attempts I
have been made on electric start EMDs, and he did not know how 4 ~
=,
O~
manyf failures to start-have been experienced throughout the o
industry on electr*c start EMDs.
Tr. 1093-95 (Lewis).
249. Mr. Schiffmacher testified that for the period 1982-83, the starting reliability of the EMD diesels was 279 9
starts out of 279 attempts.
In four instances out of the 279 times,.the units were removed from service.
Mr. Schiffmacher i
testified that if you included those as failures to start, you
- O would have 275 successes out of 279 attempts.
Tr. 463 (Schiffmacher).
O 250. The figures relied upon by LILCO to indicate that the Shoreham EMDs have started 275 times out of 279 attempts, are a only taken over the last couple of years during which time the O
Shoreham EMDs have only run about an av'erage of 150 to 200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br />.
Tr. 2472 (Smith).
251. The Staff's testimony concerning the reliability of
The data set forth in the Staff testimony were received by the Staff from LILCO.
Tr. 2348-1882 (Tomlinson).
The Staff wit-nesses did nothing to satisfy themselves that the LILCO data were accurate prior to relying upon them in their testimony.
Tr. 1883 (Tomlinson).
.O
!O :
O, l
252. The maintenance procedures for the Shorehan IMDs
!O never call for a 53^ ole -starter motor replacement.
They only call for inspection at 16,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> and, if necessary, replace-ment of individual components of the starter motor.
- However,
'O the maintenance records show that approximately 13 starter motors have been replaced on the Shoreham EMDs, all after less than.13,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.
Tr. 2609 (Eley, Smith); 2542 (Smith); SC LP O
Exs. 45-48.
I 2.
The 20 MW Gas Turbine i
'O 253. The 20 MW gas turbine is not capable of being started by the control room operator at Shoreham..It can be started by the system operator in Hicksville.
The,GM diesels on the other "O
~
hand are started by the control room operator and not by the system operator.
Both the diesels and the gas turbines are designed to start automatically.
The control room operators O
control tying in the GM diesels to the plant system, whereas the system operator in Hicksville has control of the rest of the transmission system outside of the RSST and NSST, which in-O cludes the 20 MW gas turbine.
Tr. 368 (Gun ther ).
254. There is no evidence that the gas turbine test proce-
'O dures proposed by LILCO, TP 24.307.04, SP 24.307.07 and TP 24.307.08, constitute an effective surveillance program for the iO :O
O
'I new service assigned to the gas turbine.
Tr. 854 (Gunther);
O 2613-14' (Minor, Bt2denbaugh).
255. The apparent purpose of TP 24.307.08 Revision 1, July 2, 1984, ("Six Month Surveillance on 20 MW Gas Turbine Genera-tor No. 2") is to demonstrate the ability of the gas turbine to start and carry some, safety-rela'ted load in the event of a loss
^
of off-site power.
During this test the gas turbine is yQ required to carry the load of only one or two operating RHR,
1 pumps from the 103 emergency bus.
These two pumps have a total power rating of 1998 KW, so that if both are run simulta-g i
neously, this would load the gas turbine only to approximately 10 percent of its rating.
The procedure is silent as to how long the load should be carried.
Tr. 2613 (Minor, g
Br.idenbaugh).
256. The six month testing of the gas turbine at only five I) to ten percent of its rated capacity for a non-defined period of time does not sufficiently tax the unit to verify its reliability.
The test is too easy.
Tr. 2614 (Minor, O
Bridenbaugh).
-257. The position that the proposed surveillance testing g
is not sufficient to verify the ability of the gas turbine to supply the necessary loads is supported by the NRC Staf f's l,
l0
.w..
~.
O-review of this. issue reported.in the Safety Evaluation Report.
C)
The Staff expresstit concern regarding the possible imposition of non-safety loads on the gas turbine that could result in a total load of 17 MW on the unit.
The Staff has stated that 40 more frequent full load testing and monthly testing to verify that the normal 69 KV and 4.16 KV load will automatically dis-connect are necessary modifications to the Shoreham Technical O
Specifications.
Staff LP Ex. 2 at 8-2; Tr. 2614-15 (Minor, Bridenbaugh).
258. There is no evidence that the NRC Staff has reviewed
. )
or approved the surveillance test procedures SP 24.307.07 and TP 24.307.08.
O 259. Although LILCO's witness Mr. Gunther testified that Procedures SP 24.307.07 and 24.307.08 have been " finalized" (Tr. 853-54 (Gunther)), there is no evidence that the O
deficiencies described by the County's witnesses or the 4RC Staff have been adequately addressed or eliminated.
1 1
j) 260. The only indications available in the Shoreham con-
~
trol room from which operation of the gas turbine can be inferred is the indication of voltage on the 69 KV line and the lg lights which indicate whether the 20 MW gas turbine breaker or the RSST supply breaker is open or closed.
Tr. 856 (Gunther);
1812-16 (Clifford); 2615 (Minor, Bridenbaugh).
i (0 lO
\\
)..
.261. Thus, as with the EMDs, the operators in the control
)-
roomcannotmonittji the operation of the gas turbine in the manner made possible by the comprehensive alarm monitoring sys-tem associated with the originally proposed onsite AC power
)
system.
Tr. 2615.(Minor, Bridenbaugh).
262. With the. gas turbine, the operators do not have the
)
same ability to intervene and rectify developing problems with unit operations that they have with respect to the originally proposed onsite AC power system.
Tr. 2615 (Minor,
)
Bridenbaugh).
263. Under most conditions the gas turbine can only be op-erated at the local control panel at the gas turbine or by the LIICO system operator in Ricksville, ik the control is set up for remote control.
There is no way to start the 20 MW gas turbine manually from the Shoreham control room, short of artifically creating a loss of power event by isolating the 69 KV line.
Tr. 2615-16 (Minor, Bridenbaugh).
l i
264. The control room operator cannot directly start or initiate a restart attempt of the gas turbine as a precaution-ary or. supplemental measure.
The only way that the gas turbine
).
can serve the needs of Shoreham in a timely manner is if its controls are lef t in the proper auto start position, and it i
,-.-.,..-,-,-.....n...,-...w.,
,,.-.,_.n.,.,,
~.
O performs correctly during a loss of offsite power event.
If 3
the gas turbine ft ',eled to star t properly, the only way to de-termine the status of the machine and attempt a restart would be to dispatch an operator to the gas turbine.
Tr. 2616 3
(Minor, Bridenbaugh).
265. The NRC Staff has stated that if the gas turbine is not on line within 10 minutes then the process for placing the
,J EMDs on line should begin.
Tr. 2556-57 (Minor); 2351-52 (Knox).
O 266. According to the LILCO procedures, if the gas turbine fails to start or come on line as expected, initiation of the EMDs is begun, and one of the first steps of that process is to 3
isolate tne rest of' the electric systed, including the gas tur-bine.
Tr. 2558 (Minor); 1850 (Clifford); 2351 (Knox); Staff LP Ex. 2 at 8-4.
O 267. LILCO's procedures do not provide for the dispatch of an operator to the gas turbine if it does not come on line as 3
expected.
If someone were dispatched to the gas turbine to re-pair it, that process would probably take longer than the 10 l
[
minutes within which the gas turbine is supposed to be on line.
l Tr. 2557-58 (Minor).
3 l
l 3 l
)
~,
.. =.
Cj 268. The gas turbine is'not enclosed by anything other O
than a weatherproc}- enclosure, and therefore its operation is vulnerable to missiles such as those that could be generated by i
falling aircraft.
Tr. 2616-17 (Minor, Bridenbaugh).
10 269. The gas turbine is not designed to satisfy the single failure criterion.
Because the gas turbine is a single unit,
'the failure of any one of many critical components could pre-
.O vent or interrupt its operation.
Of particular importance is 4
tha reliance of the gas turbine ~on a single starting system and a single fuel supply line routed to it from the fuel tank ap-
- O proximately 40 yards away.
This fuel line can be severed by missile impact, such as falling transmission towers or lines or out-of-control motor vehicles.
Tr. 261,.7 (Minor, Bridenbaugh).
'O 270. The Staff's testimony concerning the reliability of the 20 MW gas turbine relates only to starting reliability.
jO Tr. 2346, 1870-71 (Tomlinson).
However, the basis for the Staff's testimony concerning starting reliability was data pro-f vided by LILCO to the Staff, and the Staff did nothing to ver i-O fy the accuracy of the data.
The Staff did not do any indepen-dent analyses or attempt to discover any additional information i
concerning reliability of the gas turbine.
Tr. 1871 O
(Tomlinson).
l O
' l l
$6
~
m-
~
I
- OL T
271. The Staff witnesses testified that the gas turbine I) has been refurbisi20, and that most of the major mechanical parts on the unit have been replaced since the unit was installed at Shoreham.
Tr. 2346, 1872 (Tomlinson).
The Staff O
testified without any explanation or stated basis that replacing parts automatically results in enhancement of the i
reliability of the unit.
Tr. 1873 (Tomlinson).
- O 272. The past performance of the gas turbine does not pro-vide assurance that it will perform reliably in the future, be-
- O cause although this unit had several thousand hours of operations in the past, it was moved to Shoreham only in the spring of 1984.
Coincident with this move, the control and z) starting equipment necessary to provide black start capability was added to.the unit.
Thus, it is essentially a new installa-tion with the inherent start up " bugs" still to be worked out.
LO Tr. 2617 (Minor, Bridenbaugh).
273. The 20 MW gas turbine is not as reliable as the orig-i inally proposed onsite AC power system because it does not meet
- O
[
the single failure criterion, it is not qualified to withstand any of the necessary design basis phenomena, and it is not under the control of the Shoreham control room operators.
In iO addition, LILCO's proposed test procedures do not adequately
!O i h
u 1
w
-_u _
i I
O>
. assure the reliable operation of the gas turbine, and its alarm J3 -
monitoring is ina('::quate.
Tr. 2618 (Minor, Bridenbaugh).
274. None of these vulnerabilities and inadequacies pras-ent-in the 20 MW gas turbine configuration are present in the
)
originally proposed onsite AC power system.
As a result the gas turbine is not as reliable as a fully qualified source of onsite power and, therefore, low power operation and reliance on the proposed alternate AC power system would not be as safa as low power operation in reliance on a. fully qualified source of onsite AC power.
Tr. 2580 (Minor, Bridenbaugh).
g 3.
Complexity of the Proposed Alternate AC Power System __,
0 275. The electrical connections adsociated.with the alternata AC power system proposed by LILCO are more complex l
than those associated with the originally proposed onsite AC
- O power source.
Tr. 2618-19 (Minor).
i-276. The EMDs are not connected directly to the smergency-i g) load centers (buses 101, 102 and 103).
To reach those centers, i
AC power frot any EMD aust pass through three circuit breakers and two buses.
Tr. 2619 (Minor). Output from the 20 MW gas
()
turbine must take an even longer and less certain route in order to reach the safety loads connected to the emergency 4 KV O
- 100 -
O-
.g Q
l buses.
Power from the gas turbine must pass through three
!O Tr.
circuit breakers, ihree' switches and two transformers.
2619 (Minor).
t
- O 277. ay contrast, AC power produced by one of the origi-nally proposed fully qualified onsite diesel generators must p.tss through only one intervening device, a single cir: ult
- O bceaker, in order to reach safety loads connected to an emer-gency 4 KV bus.
Tr. 2619 (Minor).
278. The increased complexity of the proposed alternate AC 4
<O Power system reduces its reliability relative to the originally proposed onsite AC power system.
In general, the less complex a system is, the more likely it is to be able to perform its
- O assigned task.
A less complex system involves lower potential l
for f ailure of intervening hardware and less need for l
coordination of automatic and manual actions; as a result, a
)
less complex system is more reliable.
Tr. 2619-20 (Minor).
279.. The greater number of devices and the increased com-O plexity of necessary procedures involvea in the LInco proposed alternate AC power system makes that system subject to greater i
i potantial for human error in its design, implementation and O
operation, than is the originally proposed AC power system.
Tr. 2620 (Minor).
O' 101 -
O l
. -.1
I 4.
Other Aspects of Alternate AC Power Configuration which Render it Les's Safe thr -a Qualified _AC Power Configuration t
280. LILCO's witnesses Iannuzzi and Lewis admitted that the EMD diesels at Shoreham do not comply with all technical
).
requirements for qualified nuclear grade diesels.
Tr. 1170 (Iannuzzi, Lewis).
They also testified that the Shoreham EMDs and diesel generators which have been qualified for use in nu-f clear power plants have different auxiliary equipment, including such items as piping, valves, pumps, heat exchanJers, tanks, supports and electrical equipment.
Tr. 1152, 1181
)
(Iannuzzi, Lewis).
281. Messrs. Iannuzzi and Lewis know of no touc-unit die-
)
sel generator packages, such as that installed at Shoreham, that are being used or have been used to supply emergency onsite AC power to a nuclear power plant.
Tr. 1112-13
)
(Iannuzzi, Lewis).
They were aware of two-unit packages of nu-clear qualified EMDs in use at nuclear power plants, but unlika the EMDs at Shoreham, those qualified EMDs in other nuclear
)
plants are equipped with fast-start capability.
Tr. 1113 (Lewis).
In addition, Mr. Lewis testified that, unlike those l
at Shoreham, each of' the nuclear qualified EMD diesel gener.1-h tors has its own control cubicle.
Tr. 1153-54 (Lawis).
l
- 102 -
i
m,..
..n.
)
282. In reaching their opinions about the single failure
)1 vulnerability of tJTe EMDs and the 20 MW gas turbine, Messrs.
Eley,. Smith, Minor and Bridenbaugh considered the E 1Ds and the 20 1Hf gas-turbine as a combined system for providing electrical
)'
power to Shoreham.
Tr. 2461-62 (Minor).
283. The gas turbine and the EMDs cannot be 'used together;
)
they cannot both supply power at the sama time.
Tr. 2449, 2457 (Eley).
LILCO's procedures call for attempting to bring loads in from the gas turbine first.
The procedures provide that be-
)
fore the EMDs are used the gas turbine must be isolated.
Tr.
2456 (Eley); 2464 (Minor).
There is no method for paralleling the EMos and the 20 MW gas turbine.
Tr. 2449-50 (Eley).
)
284. Although a single failure in t.he EMD starting system would not affect the ability of the 20 MW gas turbine to start, I
LILCO will not rely on the EMD set unless the 20 MW gas turbine has failed to provide power.
Tr. 2464 (Minor).
285.' Each of the three TDI generators in the ocigloally
)
proposed system could supply power to the systems indepen-dently.
Tr. 2457 (Eley).
Although the TDI generators do not l
pacallel each other, each of them has a separate bus system.
Tr. 2460 (Eley).
1
- 103 -
l n..
-.,.,--s'
a
-.w...
+,. -
't
)
286. Although Staff witness Knox testified that the gas turbine and the E[.D diesels have independent routing of power which meets the single. failure crite:Lan, he admitted that the gas turbine and the EMD diesels are subject to single failures
)'
l and single events th'at could cause the loss of both sources of power.
Tr. 2350, 1886 (Knox).
)
287. Staff witness Knox testified that the EMD diesels and the 20 MW gas turbine are both independent of the normal offsite power system at Shoreham, by which he meant the 69 KV
)
line and the 138 KV line.
Tr. 2344, 1868 (Knox).
However, he admitted that power supplied by the 20 MW gas turbine is supplied on the 69 KV line, so that power, from the gas turbine.
shares a common line with a portion of*.the normal oEEsite power
)
system.
Tr. 1868 (Knox).
See also Tr.
359 (Schiffmacher).
288. In testifying that the gas turbine and the EMD die-
)
sels are as " independent" from the of Csit.4 p >< t systan as the TDIs would be, the Staff witness Mr. Knox did not take into ac-count the fact that the gas turbine shares common equipment
)
with the offsite power system.
He merely intended to indicate that both the TDI diesel generators and the gas turbine, prior to a loss of offsite power, sit in a standby condition, with
)
open breakers, and therefore are in that sense only
" independent" of the offsite. system.
Tr. 1870 (Knox).
f
- 104 -
1 s.
.- a..
y____.__
)
289. The comparison of operation with the alternaVe A0
)
power configuratiog. to that with a qualif ted configuration is premised upon the loss of all offsite AC power.
The offsite gas tuebines, such as at Holtsville, are part.of such offsite 3
power and therefore, are not - relevaat to - the comparison of non-offsite sources of power.
In addition, the offsite power sys-tem, that is, the 69 KV and 138 KV lines,. ace subject to a mul-
)
titude of events that could cause the loss of-offsite power that is the underlying presumption of the comparison mandated by the Commission.
Power from the far offsite gas turbines is transmitted to Shoreham o'er the transmission lines which are 3
v part of the offsite system.
Thus, given a postulated loss of offsite power, the existence of femote gas turbines would have
)
no impact on the availability of AC power at Shoreham because there would be no means of transmitting power from the remote sources to Shoreham.
Tr. 2536-38 (Minor).
)
290. There is an automatic transfer between the two normal
~
offsite power circuits at Shoreham.
With that automatic trans-fer in place, a common failure of the off.stte power circuits, the 20 MW gas turbine, and the EMD diesels is possible.
Tr.
2354-55 (Knox).
)
)
- 105 -
)
- =- -
y _
ai:. - _ - ::
- - = + = - -
0 291. As presettly configured, there is a potential for
,0 -
.m common failure of ~4ne normal offsite circuits.and the EMD die-sal circuits and common failure of the gas turbine and the EMD diesels,- resulting. from a. fied. -There is, no - fire barrier nor
!O is there 50-feet of separatio'n between the cables associated with the EMD diesels and the RSST and the NSST.
Tr. 2354-55 (Knox).
- O 292. LILCO has not p'.fovided the Staff with any information regarding the quality and design standards to which the 23 altecnata AC' power configuration equipment and associated circuits were design /d.
Staff LP Ex. 2 at 8-6.
Such a quality assurance program is needed to assure that maintanance, tasting lO and operation of the gas turbine, EMD diesels.and their associ-
{
ated circuits is performed in accordance with their design l
l specifications, with documentation, to assure their continued O
reliability.
Tr. 2355 (Knox).
293. Mr. Schiffmacher does not know whether the RSST was i
lO designed to Appendix B quality assurance standards or whether it was constructed to such standards.
Tr. 341 (Schiffmacher).
None of the items in the 69 KV system, including trans foc ners, i
switches, breakers, circuits, and buses, ara designed or
.O manufactured or are installed in accordance with Appendix 3 to l
l C).
- 106 -
l 3
a.---
=
+
.~.
4
=_
6
-Part.50.
Tr. 342.(Schiffmacher).
The same applies for the 138 O
KV line and the N{?T.
Tr. 342-43 (Schiffmacher).
Mr.
Schiffmacher does not believe that :tha T4D diesels were subject to a quality assurance program in accordance'with Appendix B O
when they were installed at New England Power.
Tr.
407 (Schiffmacher).
294. LILCO has provided to the Staff no evaluation of a
)
design basis event fire in the non-emergency switchgear room, through which both alternate AC power circuits (20 megawatt gas turbine and EMD diesels) pass.
The circuits associated with g
the gas turbine and the EMDs are not protected in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R.
Staff LP g)
Ex. 2 at 8-8.
295. Before the proposed low power, opecation would be ac-captable to the Staff, four license conditions must be imple-mented by LILCO:
i j
(1)
The automatic transfer between the two normal
- g offsite power circuits at Shoreham must be removed or disabled; i
i
{
(2)
A fire barrier or 50 feet of separation must be provided betwaan the cables associated with the E:40 dissals a.13 the RSST and NSST; f
L
- 107 -
J
--.._-.x=.=,.
.. = -
c-(3)'
A' quality assurance program for the gas turbine, D
BMD. diesels, and rye associated circuita commensurate with their importance.to safety must be initiated and implemented;
~
and nJ (4)
The circuits associated with the gas turbine and the EMD diesels located in the non-emergency switchgear room must be protected in accordance with the requirements of Appen-dix R or a procedure must be available so that power can be re-established around the switchgear room within 30 days from one
.of the alternate AC power' sources.
Tr. 2354-55; 1887 (Knox).
296. As presen*1y configured, the, low power operation pro-posed by LILCO is not acceptable to the Staff.
Tr. 1887 (Knox).
3 297. The Staff's Safety Evaluation Repore sets forth 15 separate technical specification requirements - that the Staff believes must be imposed upon LILCO before the proposed low 3
power operation would be acceptable to the Staff.
Staff LP Ex.
2 at 8-2 to 8-8.
There is another specific technical specifi-cation requirement that will be imposed by the Staff set forth in the Staff's testimony.
Tr. 2347 (Tomlinson).
Ths Staff
- 108 -
,J O
--3 2 -
_;.2 :
=-
g.
testified that there could be many-additional technical
<}
specification regt?caments. that the Staff might have to impose upon LILCO as a result of LILCO's proposal to use the gas tur-l bine and the EMD diesels, even though they have not been iden-lO tified in' the Safety Evaluation Report or the Staff testimony.
=,
Tr. 1879 (Knox).
The imC Staff has not yet issued technical specifications for Shoreham, nor have they yet been sent to 0-LI LCO.
Tr. 1881 (Knox).
298. There 1:s no evidence that the modifications which the t)
Staff has stated are required to make the proposed alternate configuration acceptable to the Staff have been implemented by LILCO.
!O 299. All existing means of supplying power to emergency buses by means of the EMDs result in powering a bus located in the non-emergency switchgear room.
Tr. 862, 812 (Gunther).
f-300. LILCO's witness Mr. Schiffmacher stated that LILCO has come up with a conceptual idea for an alternate routing of O
power from the EMD diesels into the emer.jem y selb N aar room; 4
however, no such capability exists at the plant today.
Tr.
863, 813 (Schiffmacher); 2539 (Bridenbaugh).
The " conceptual Il drawing" submitted with LILCO's testimony (Tr. 867) does not show how cables would be connected to the EMD switchgear
~O
- 109 -
i IO
- u..
w-
.= - - - - - -
d}
. cubicle, how cables are to be tied into the emergency switchgear room, C71ch elements of the conceptual idea would be Lnstalled before, as opposed to after a seismic event, or which portions would be completed before, rather than after, Phase n
III of LILCO's proposed low power testing.
Tr. 819-20 (Schiffmacher).
No cable raceways now exist for this conceptu-al alternate routing.
Although there are several diffacent 0
.vays that cable raceways could be supported, LILCO has not yet picked out which method it intends to use.
Tr. 814 (Schiffmacher).
O 301. LILCO's conceptual proposal to install an alternate electrical output faed from the EMD control cubicle to the
'O e.necJency switchgear room has not resoived the question of how the alternate feed can be tied into the emergency switchgear room and brought to the outside of the plant on the outer wall
- O of the emergency diesel facility without reducing :he ral bibili?.y of operations inside the emergency switchgear r aou.
j Such a connection, if made, would be very unusual.
Tr. 2539
'O (Minor).
302. LILCO has specifically considered two options with respect to the proposed conceptual alternate routing of EMD
'O power to the emergency switchgear room.
Tr. 832
()
- 110 -
~O
=
1 3
'(Schiffmacher)._ However, LILCO has nct yet decided which of
~)
thosa two options '-$o _ utilize.
In addition, if there was anoth-er option that was attractive frin a technical point of view or had some other merits, LILCO would also consider that option.
3 Tr. 838-39-(Schiffmacher).
303. Even after a decision were made as to how the concep-3 taal altarnate tie-in would be made, the engineering for the tie-in would have to be completed, and hardware changes would have to be implemented.
Following that, there would also have 3
to be changes made in procedures, and procedures would then have to be reviewed and approved by the Raview of Operations Committee.
Then additional training would have to be performed 3
for operators with respect to revised hrocedures.
Tr. 839-40 (Gunther).
The LILCO witnesses were unable to state what pro-cedures or training would need to be revised or wuat revisions 3
would be necessary in order to implement the conceptual peapos-al described in the testimony.
Tr.
840 (Gunther).
304. The Staff has not reviewed any engineering drawings
,v or documentation submitted by LILCO concerning any proposed alternate routing for the EMD diesels.
NRC Staff did not know whether any such alternate routing has actually been constructed or installed.
Tr. 1896 (Knox).
3
- 111 -
)
- =.
=
1 J
305. LILCO witnessess Rao, Eckert, Dawe, and Kascsak 3
testifled regardir.7 their review of all events considered in Chapter 15 of the Shoreham FSAR to compare the effects on pub-lic health and safety of operation of the Shoreham plant ducing 3
fuel load, cold criticality testing, and low power operations, l
with the effects at full power operation.
Tr. 274-75 (Rao, et i
al.).
This testimony regarding a comparison of low power 3
operation and the risks theceof with full power operation and the risks thereof does not address the standard.ennunciated by the Commission in CLI-84-8, nar.ely a comparison of low power 3
operation with the alternate AC power system versus low power operation with a fully qualified AC power system.
J 306. Using very conservative regu$atory assumptions, LILCO's witnesses concluded that for a LOCA event, there will be approximately 370 minutes in Phase III and 86 minutes in 3
Phase IV before any operator action is taquired in order to maintain adequate core cooling and containment integrity.
Using "more realistic assumptions," the calculated operator ac-3 tion times are greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for Phase III and 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> for Phase IV.
Tr. 297-98 (Rao, et al.).
The conservative analysis referred to above used all the models that are 3
required by 10 C.F.R.
S 50.46 and Part 50, Appendix K.
Under the " realistic analyals," some but not all of the maj or
- 112 -
D l
c
-- /
- g== ;=: :.
.. -. =
.]
4 conservatisms that exist in Appendix K analyses were removed.
mO Tr. 303-04 (Rao, e al.).
Using more conservative calculations (a peaking factor of_5 rather than 3.38) would lead to a re-quirement of power within 55 minutes in order to keep within tha 10 C.F.R. S 50.46 limits.
Tr. 307-08 (Rao)._
307. Staff witness Hodges testified that 'if Shoreham were
.C)
' operating at 5 percent power with qualified TDI diesels and there was a loss of offsite power and a LOCA, the peak cladding temperature has been calculated to be 550*F.
He also testified
)
that if there was a LOCA and a loss of offsite power without i
qualified diesels, assuming that the EMD diesels started'in 30 minutes, the peak cladding temperature is calculated to be O
1086* F.
Tr. 1788, 1749-50 (Hodges).
'Mr. Hodges testified that-in terms of the cladding temperatures, there is less mar-gin of safety with the alternate configuration than there would O
be with qualified TDI diesels.
Tr. 1751 (Hodges).
308. Mr. Hodges' conclusion that operation at 5 percent 3
power is as safe with the alternate configuration as with qual-ified diesels is dependent upon the assumption that AC power is restored within 55 minutes using the alternata configura' ion.
t 3
Tr. 1788, 1751-52 (Hodges).
3
- 113 -
O
s _.
f'
).:
309. The' Staff's discussion of the consequences of Chapter 15 accidents ducir.7 low power operation is a couparison of the
- consequences during 100 percent' power operation to the conse-quences during 5. percent operation.
Tr. 1789-1792, 1754-1758
)
(Hodges).
That testimony does not' address the safety of 5 per-cent power operation with a qualified source of onsite power as compared to 5 percent operation with the alternate configura-
)
tion proposed by LILCO.
310. = In the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report, it was noted
)
that two 3/4 inch diameter valves require prompt closure capa-bility to assure containment integrity.
Those valves are nor-mally-powered by AC power, although they can be clossi maka-
)
ally.
The Staff found that containment integrity was threatened in the event of a breach in the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System inside the containnteat coincident
)
with a LOCA, assuming no offsite power was available, and as-suming the alternate power configuration proposed by LILCO.
Therefore, in order to assure containment integrity in a timely
)-
. manner, it was necessary for LILCO to commit to station an assigned equipment operator to the reactor building whenever the reactor vessel is pressurized during Phases III and IV.
It
)
would not be necessary to utilize an equipment operator to per-form this function if there were a qualified source of AC power
)
lls -
)
s' available.
Staff LP Ex. 2 at 15-6; Tr. 1765 (Hodges).
This D
assigned equipment operator will be required by the Staff as a license condition or a technical specification zuendnent.
Tr.
1765-66 (Hodges).
J 311. The Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) is dependent upon the availability of AC power.
Tr. 1767 (Quay).
In the 3
Staff's Safety Evaluation Report and in Staff witness Quay's testimony, the impact of loss of the SGTS is discussed.
If there were a fuel handling accident resulting in a calease of 3
fission products, and there were no SGTS available due to a loss of offsite power, the mitigative effects of that system, which is designed to reduce the quantity of radioactive' iodine J
released to the environment, would not be available.
Tr. 1769, 1797 (Quay).
312. Although Staff witness Quay assertad tha t to his opinion it is " highly unlikely" that LILCO would be moving fuel during low power testing, he stated that he hsd a very limited knowledge in the area of low power test programs.
Tr. 1746,
.J 1772 (Quay).
He has never reviewed any results of low power test programs conducted at nuclear power plants.
Tr. 1775 (Quay).
He also admitted that it would be necessary to. nova
,J fuel during low power testing if changes to the core were 3
- 115 -
e
- .=.
~-
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.=
. a. :
+-
- . sg _
=
^
Q-required or if it were necessary-to check. core support 3
. s tr uc tur es. - Tr. i>6 8 (Quay).
313. The Staff tastified that if the alternate power C) sources at Shoreham. failed to survive a seismic event, repairs could be made or additional sources of AC power could be made j
available to the site well within the time needed.
Tr. 2343 C)
(Knox, Tomlinson).
There is no-evidence, however, that the
" additional sources of AC power" referenced by the Staff --
'that is, a generator from the Army Corps of Engineers -- would O
in fact be available, that the use of such equipment would be feasible, that the equipment would be compatible with the Shoreham plant or its pr.oposed operation, or that LILCO has any 3
intention of relying on such a source of AC power. Tr.1867 (Tomlinson).
II.
Exigent Circumstances 3
A.
LILCO's Asserted Training Benefits 314. LILCO's witness Mr. Gunther testified that LILCO's 3-proposed low power test program would provide operators addi-tional training "beyond the normal training benefits gained dur ing low power testing."
Tr. 846 (Gunther).
O
- 116 -
3
w
= _.
5 1
-l 315. Fuel loading and pre-criticality testing which will j
take ' place during ,hase I involves the performance of water chemistry surveillance testing, control rod drive stroke time and friction tests, installation, calibration and utilization
)
of special start-up neutron instrumentation, source range moni-tor testing' and alignment tests, core verification instrument operability checks, local power range monitor (LPRM) sensitivi-1 ty testing, seco power radiation surveys, recirculation system instrument calibration checks, control rod drive scram time testing, and cold MSIV timing functional tests.
Tr. 846-48
)
(Gunther).
Each of those tests are required, and set forth in the Shoreham FSAR or the Shoreham Technical Specifications.
Tr. 757-63, 846-48 (Gunther).
The tests are part of the stan-
)
~~
dard power ascension program, and they would be performed when-ever low power testing were conducted, whether that took place because LILCO obtained an exemption or because LILCO had com-
)
plied with GDC 17..
Tr. 761-62; 764 (Gunther).
316. Mr. Gunther testified that the experience and
)
training gained from Phase I testing ac'tivities will be a Shoreham specific augmentation to pre-operational training pre-viously received by reactor operators; he admitted, however,
)
that such augmentation would be received by those operators whenever low power testing took place.
Tr. 849, 764-65 i;
(Gun the r).
1
)
- 117 -
)
- __3_ _. 3 - - - --
317. There is no evidence that Phase I of LILCO's proposed
)
.w low power testing dr.ogram would result in any additional or augmented training beyond that which would be received by oper-ators if low power testing were to take place without an exemp-
)
tion.
318. Phase II of LILCO's low power testing program in-
)
volves cold criticality testing.
Tr. 849 (Gunther ).
Phase II is part of the power ascension program which has been scheduled by LILCO, and which involves tests and a series of operations
)
within the plant that must be performed.
Tr. 766 (Gunther).
319. Mr. Gunther testified that LILCO plans to provide ad-ditional training for operators during Phase II by having cer-
)
tain activities repeated.
Tr. 849-50 (Gunther).
The addition-al training during Phase II will take place during a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period.
It is intended to provide an opportunity for each j
operating shift to perform criticality maneuvers.
Tr. 850, 770-71, 776 (Gunther).
f 320. Beginning whenever an operating license is granted to LILCO, whether as a result of an exemption or not, the Shoreham operators must annually perform a minimum of 10 reactivity con-trol manipulations.
Mr. Gunther testified that operators would be able to perform some of these required manipulations during
(
- 118 -
)
x x-3 1
the low power test program.
Tr. 849, 765 (Gunther).
All
)
s
~
Shoreham reactor cjsrators would perform a minimum of 10 reactivity control manipulations during the first year of Shoreham's operation regardless of whether low power testing
)
begins as a result of the grant of an exemption or as a result of LILCO's having complied with all regulations.
Tr. 765 (Gunther).
)
321. LILCO estimates that there will be 5,000 total man-hours of training accomplished during Phases I and II.
Tr.
)
850 (Gunther).
The 5,000 total man-hours of training includes the additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> proposed for the performance of addi-tional criticalities during Phase II Tr. 773-74 (Gunther).
)
The hundreds of man-hours involved in khe additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> are included in the total of 5,000 man-hours of training to be involved in Phases I and II.
Tr. 837 (Gunther).
)
322. The total of 5,000 man-hours of training is spread among 31 licensed operators and supervisory personnel, five en-gineers and six shift technical advisors from the Reactor Engi-neering Department, and maintenance personnel and instrumen-i l
tation and control personnel.
Tr. 774 (Gunther).
323. Mr. Gunther testified that operating personnel and instrument and control technicians receive valuable training 119 -
___-x
[
and experience during Phases-III and IV of LILCO's low power
}
test program.
Tr.3851 (Gunther).
324. The tests to be performed during Phases III and IV are required according to the FSAR, and would be performed whenever low power testing were conducted.
Tr. 774-75 (Gunther).
Phase IV would involve either two or three reactor heatups, but would not involve performance of the main turbine
)
roll.
Tr. 775-76 (Gunther).
325. LILCO has not scheduled any additional time or
)
training into Phase III of its low power testing program.
It has, however, scheduled three days at the conclusion of Phase IV testing for reactor operators to perform three to five addi-
)
tional/ reactor heatups.
Tr. 851-52, 7I'7-78 (Gunther).
326. LILCO only intends to perform such additional reactor
)
heatups at the end of Phase IV if additional time is available af ter the completion of the low power test program.
Tr.
777 (Gunther).
If LILCO had its full power license by the time it
)
had finished two or three reactor heatups as contemplated in Phase IV, however, LILCO does not intend to perform any addi-tional reactor heatups at the end of Phase IV to provide addi-
)
tional training.
Tr. 777 (Gunther).
)
- 120 -
)
=: =_ -. p
==
a.
- =-
O 4
327. The training involved in the performance of three to
)
five extra reactotiheatups would occur whenever testing - above five percent power occurs, since higher power testing calls for a multiple number of reactor startups, shutdowns, and heatups.
O Tr. 777 (Gunther).
328. The 6,000 manhours of training which will occur dur-O ing Phases III and IV are spread among 31 licensed operators and supervisory personnel, five engineers and six shift techni-cal advisors, maintenance personnel, instrumentation and con-z) trol personnel, and health physics technicians.
Tr. 774, 777'-78 (Gunther).
B.
LILCO's Asserted Good Faith Efforts to Comply O
with GDc 17 329. LILCO's witness Brian McCaffrey testified that "LILCO's extensive efforts" to meet the requirements of GDC 17 are among the exigent circumstances that justify granting I
LILCO's exception request.
Tr. 1702-03 (McCaffrey).
The ef-forts he discussed relate to the original design of the
.O Shoreham plant, efforts relating to the reliable performance of the diesel generators manufactured by Transamerica Delaval In-corporated ("TDI"), and the acquisition of diesel generators O
manufactured by Colt Industries.
Tr. 1703-04 (McCaffrey).
i
- O
- 121 -
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=:
3=
g =_; _ 3 a.
. ~ -.
I
)
330. Mr. McCaffrey has had no direct experience in the de-
)
sign of diesel engl,nes and he was not involved in preparing the purchase specifications for the TDI diesels.
He has had no ex-perience with the manufacture of a large diesel engine and he
)
has never personally operated one of the diesels at Shoreham, although he has supervised individuals who witnessed diesel testing.
Tr. 1423-26 (McCaffrey).
).
331. Mr. McCaffrey testified that Shoreham's design in-cluded three emergency diesel generators intended to meet all
)
applicable regulatory requirements for onsite power sources.
The specifications for the machines were developed by Stone &
Webster and LILCO with all applicable regulatory requirements in, mind.
Tr. 1705 (McCaffrey).
332. The performance rating'of each of the emergency die-sel generators which LILCO procured to constitute the on-site D
electric power system for Shoreham was continuous 8,760 hours0.0088 days <br />0.211 hours <br />0.00126 weeks <br />2.8918e-4 months <br />, at 3,500 KW.
The rating for overload for the emergency diesel generators was two hours per 24-hour period at 3,900 KW.
The ratings are set forth in the FSAR S 8.3.1.1.5.
Tr. 1446-47 l
(McCaffrey).
l) 333. The basis for Mr. McCaffrey's testimony that the pur-l chase specification, as reflected in Section 8.3 of the FSAR, i
- 122 -
I
~
n--
.=-
,.n-
)
was intended by LILCO to provide for compliance with GDC 17 is based upon McCaffrjy's reading of the preliminary safety analy-sis report and the specification as reflected in the FSAR.
Mr.
McCaffrey testified that the specification containing the per'-
)~
formance ratings reflected. in the FSAR was intended by LILCO to provide diesel generators that complied with the requirements of GDC 17.
Tr. 1455-58 (McCaffrey).
)
334. LILCO intended that the TDI diesels it procured, using a specification that related to performance requirements, 3
would assure that the core would be cooled and containment in-tegrity and other vital
- functions would be maintained in the event of postulated accidents.
Tr. 1440-41, 1443 (McCaffrey).
. 335. Mr. McCaffrey testified that when LILCO purchased the three diesel generators from TDI, LILCO required that the ma-chines be manufactured in accordance with the LILCO specifica-
)
tion.
Tr. 1705 (McCaffrey). The purchase order from LILCO was the first order ever received by TDI to provide an emergency diesel generator for a commercial nuclear power station.
SC LP
)
Ex. 17, p. 2.
336. Mr. McCaffrey testified that when the engines were
)
being procured from TDI, to ensure that the engines would meet the performance rating in the FSAR, LILCO utilized its quality i
- 123 -
e
33;.
. g. _ --;
- g.
I h
assurance organization and programs, and those of its
~
- O architect /engineeG'to oversee the manufacturer's quality pro-grams.
He stated that in general those quality programs re-quire documentation, inspections, and examinations to provide O
assurance that the equipment is being delivered in compliance with the programs; however, Mr. McCaffrey stated that he did not know all the elements of what LILCO did to assure that the f0 TDI diesels were being manufactured in a way that would make them capable of the performance set forth in the specification.
Tr. 1459-60 (McCaffrey).
337. Mr. McCaffrey testified that there were physical in-
~
spections of the TDI quality assurance program by agents of e
- O LILCO during the manufacturing process;, Tr. 1465-66 (McCaffrey).
He did not know how many inspections LILCO or its agents carried out to make sure that the rating of the engines
]O was proper.
Tr. 1460-61 (McCaffrey).
l 338. Although Mr. McCaffrey testified that LILCO sent peo-pie to TDI to observe the testing of the diesels, he did not
- O know how many hours Delaval tested the engines to determine
).
whether they could perform for 8,700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br /> as required by the specification.
He also did not know whether LILCO made any ef-iO fort or attempt to determine how many hours Delaval tested the
'eng ines.
Tr.
1469 (McCaffrey).
lO
[
- 124 -
- O i
. I
_____._--.__._._______.__,___,____._n___.-.__,_____._____
7
- __. ~ -
j_ _ -
i i
339. In August 1983, the crankshaft on TDI diesel genera-
)
tot 102 failed.
E,'.;11owing the failure, LILCO hired Failure
' Analysis Associt.tes to determine the cause of - the crankshaf t failure.
Failur 's Analysis Associates determined that the cause j.-
of the failure involved torsional fatigue, and also determined that the crankshaft design was definitely inadequate.
Tr.
1470-71 (McCaffrey). LILCO reported to its NRC that the results of its crankshaf t failure investigation revealed that the crankshaf t had been improperly designed, and had failed because the loading function used in the original design calculations i
was too small.
SC LP Ex. 18, p. 5.
340. Mr. McCaffrey did not know how LILCO used its best
.a efforts to determine whether the crankapafts in the engines e
were adequately designed.
He also did not know whether LILCO's attempts to ensure that the engines would meet the requirements of GDC 17 included a review of the design of the crankshafts.
l l
Tr.
1470-72 (McCaffrey).
l l
341. Af ter the diesels were delivered to LILCO, LILCO did not determine whether the crankshaft design was adequate.
Af ter delivery, the machines were placed in storage.
Tr. 1472 l
( McCa f fr ey).
1
- 125 -
il-
)-
,342. Mr. McCaffrey testified that LILCO used a building block approach to Jte-operational testing of the TDIs, and that such testing included enhancements imposed by LILCO to provide additional measures of the engines' reliability above and be-yond the regulatory norms.
Tr. 1706-07 (McCaffrey).
343. On May 26, 1982, LILCO performed a pre-operational 3
test of TDI diesel generator 102.
The test was performed to verify the diesel generator's capability of running at its two hour rating.
Although the acceptance criterion in LILCO's test
- )
procedure specified this rating to be 3900 KW, the LILCO proce-dure step used to verify that this criterion was met specified that the generator be run at a load between 3850 KW and 3900 KW D
for two hours, and that data be recorded at 15 minute inter-vals.
SC LP Ex. 16, p. 4.
The engine upon which this test was run was the same engine which suffered a crankshaft breaking in
[)
two pieces in August 1983.
Tr. 1480 (McCaffrey).
344. When LILCO performed the test on May 26, 1982, load values did not meet either the acceptance criterion or the pro-D cedure step, in that data recorded at 15-minute intervals for the two-hour period indicated a range of load values from 3500 KW to 3850 KW.
Nonetheless, the LILCO Test Engineer and Opera-O tional Quality Assurance inspectors signed and accepted the results.
SC LP Ex. 16, p. 4.
9
- 126 -
D
-.: ^
- =
^
f I
J.
345. As a result of LILCO's conduct relating to the May 3
26, 1982 test, th(}.NRC issued a Notice of Violation of severity level III, and levied a fine of $40,000 upon LILCO.
SC LP Ex.
16.
The Staff stated that "the approval of the results of a f) test performed to confirm a safety system's capability of meet-ing design safety requirements when, in fact, test results presented to the Joint Test Group (JTG) have not sati.sfied all requirements, is of significant concern to the Staff."
SC LP Ex. 16, p. 1.
- g 346. The NRC Staff also stated
2 i
while we have considered [LILCO's proposed]
remedial actions, the diesel generator testing violation demonstrates a lack of g
aggressiveness on the part of, LILCO to pur-sue,. identify and ' resolve associated prob-4 j
less that can affect the reliability of the diesel generators, including attention to detail during performance data review, and approval of the test results of (LILCO's]
O PreoPerational test program.
These actions are necessary to demonstrate that the com-ponents will perform satisfactorily in ser-vice.
+
!()
SC LP Ex. 16, p. 2.
347. Mr. McCaffrey did not know whether the proper perfor-mance of the test at 3900 KW would have made discovery of the O
crankshaft deficiency more likely in May 1982 rather than in
()
- 127 -
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. August _1983 when the crankshaf t actually broke.
Tr. 1480-82
)-
(McCaffrey).
]*
348. In March 1983, following a review of LILCO's docu-
)
ments and reports, and after having observed and witnessed LILCO's testing of.the TDI diesels, the NRC Staff told LILCO, and issued a report which stated, that "the reliability for 3
continuous operation and for standby electric power is ques-tionable at this point [with respect to the TDI diesels]."
SC LP Ex. 17, at 6.
McCaffrey read that report when it was issued
)
in March 1983.
Tr. 1492 (McCaffrey).
349. The March 1983 NRC report listed some -of the problems which arose with the Shoreham TDIs during* pre-operational
)
testing, but six months before the crankshaft broke.
The Staff listed 47 incidents and/or failures that had occurred in the year preceding March 1983, just according to LILCO's own Defi-
)
ciency Reports.
SC LP Ex. 17, p. 7.
It was Mr. McCaffrey's judgment that the number of problems which occurred in the TDIs during that time period was on the high side of what would be
)
expected during a normal shakedown process.
Tr. 1492 (McCaffrey).
)
~350. In March 1983, the Staff raised several concerns with LILCO relating to the TDIs, including the following:
)
- 128 -
)
_=.
O an apparent overall excessive. vibra-tion problem exists with all three of the g'
TDI dietj.:1s; there are many apparent causal factors underlying the numerous incidents that have occurred to the TDIs; O-further-trend analysis of these inci-dents and occurrences is required to re-solve the continuing high incident rate of problems and failures to the TDIs.
4 i'
According to the Staff in March 1983, its findings at that time I
constituted "an immediate concern to the NRC."
SC LP Ex. 17 at 6, 8.
O 351. In March 1983, 'in response to the NRC's concern about r.eliability of the TDIs, LILCO implemented a diesel operability o
review program, which was aimed at addr,essing the entire histo-cy of problems that arose in. prior testing of the TDIs.
Tr.
1492-93 (McCaffrey).
However, despite the operability review 0
program which was implemented in March, the diesels were never i
disassembled until after the crankshaft on engine 102 broke in 4
I August 1983.
Tr. 1495 (McCaffrey).
O
]
352. When the engines were disassembled in August 1983, i
LILCO found that the crankshaf ts in the other two TDI engines, numbered 101 and 103, also had cracks in them.
In addition, lO l
other defects were found in engine 102, including cracking in i
i i0
- 129 -
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.--.+,,.,.-..w-,
,,m
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-,, ~. -...,
.,,-..--~~.-v-.2..-,,~s.yr.
,,..-,--r----.
m
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I the camshaft galley, cracks in the piston skirts, and cracks in 3
the connecting rod. bearings.
Tr. 1493-95 (McCaffrey).
j 353. LILCO reported to the NRC that its preliminary find-ing concerning four failed connecting rod bearings which were discovered when the TDIs were disassembled, was that the fail-ures occurred because the bearing material did not meet speci-fications, and the bearir.g loads had not been properly 3
accounted for. SC LP Ex. 18, p. 5.
354. Mr. McCaffrey said he did not know whether, if in re-3 sponse to the NRC's March 1983 concerns about the reliability of the engines LILCO had disassembled and inspected those en-gines, it might have found those defects and cracks earlier.
3 Tr. 1496 (McCaffrey).
355. The enhancements that LILCO imposed prior to the crankshaft failure to provide additional measures of the die-3 sel's reliability above and beyond regulatory norms were the performance of a 72-hour endurance test and a detailed vibra-3 tion and balance testing.
Tr. 1504 (McCaffrey).
The vibration and balance test was not initiated until af ter the issuance of the NRC's March 1983 report concerning reliability problems with the TDIs.
Tr. 1505 (McCaffrey).
Mr. McCaffrey did not know the load profile used for the 72-hour tests; however, Mr.
O
- 130 -
O
n.-.-.
=-
t I
3 i
l McCaffrey did not believe that the 72-hour test showed any problems.
Tr~. 15CJ606 (McCaffrey).
356. Prior to the August 1983 failure of the crankshaf t, 3
LILCO did not make any effort to determine whether a crankshaft of the design that broke had been installed in any other TDI engines of the same model as the Shoreham engine.
Tr. 1483-84 3
(McCaffrey).
Mr. McCaffrey did not know (a) whether LILCO's agents ever had any discussi'ons or correspondence with TDI regarding the design of the crankshaft in the shoreham engines, 3
( b) whether Delaval ever told LILCO or anyone else that the crankshafts in the shoreham engines had been found to be un-qualified for those engines by the American Bureau of shipping, 3
or (c) whether prior to the time the crankshaft broke TDI ever told LILCO or any of its agents that a new, larger size crank-shaft was available for' use in engines of the model used at 3
Shoreham.
Tr. 1484-87 (McCaffrey).
357. Mr. McCaffrey did not know whether LILCO communicated with other owners or operators of TDI diesels, prior to the 3
crankshaf t failure and during the time that the NRC was setting forth its concerns, to determine whether other owners or opera-tors were having problems with those engines.
LILCO did not 3
join a group of other TDI diesel owners to exchange information J
- 131 -
.]
.=
t on difficulties with the machines until January 1984.
Tr.
I 1500-02(McCaffrerje.
358. LILCO has a number of mechanisms in place to obtain information about failures of components such as diesels at other nuclear power plants or from vendors.
Mr. McCaffrey per-sonally was involved in the company's overall efforts to re-ceive documents from the Institute.of Nuclear Power Operations g
(INPO) and Mr. McCaffrey's organization disseminates signifi-cant event Leports and significant operating experience reports g
received from INPO throughout the company.
LILCO also partici-pates in a program called NPRDS which allows a company to search out operating experience relating to particular equip-
)
ment.
In addition, Mr. McCaffrey, as 4,ILCO's primary NRC con-tact, receives all bulletins', circulars and information notices from the NRC.
These mechanisms also result in LILCO receiving h
reports from utilities under 10 CFR 50.55(e) or Part 21.
Tr.
1510-12 (McCaffrey).
359. The INPO and NPRDS programs were in effect at LILCO
)
prior to the time that the crankshaft broke.
Tr. 1522 l
(McCaffrey).
Mr. McCaffrey did not know whether information relating to the TDI diesels actually came through the NPRDS or INPO systems.
Tr. 1524 (McCaffrey).
l
- 132 -
I
-y 360. Mr. McCaffrey is the chairman of LILCO's Independent Safety EngineerinCf. Group (ISEG).
Tr. 1528 (McCaffrey).
ISEG evaluates industry experiences and issues recommendations to the plant for engineering organizations where improvements in safety or reliability are appropriate.
Mr. McCaffrey did not know whether ISEG put information concerning the TDI. diesels into a package or issued any recommendations on that subject before the crankshaf t broke at the LILCO plant.
Tr. 1528-30 (McCaffrey).
g 361. On February 13, 1984, the NRC Staff issued Board No-tification 84-020 which contained a written summary by the Staff of TDI operating experience for both nuclear and
- )
non-nuclear applications.
SC LP Ex. 18, That Board Notifica-tion includes information concerning problems with TDI diesels at the San Onofre nuclear plant in April 1977 which occurred 3
prior to August 1983 when the crankshaft at Shoreham broke.
The TDIs at San Onofre were declared operational in April 1977.
SC LP Ex. 18.
McCaffrey did not know whether prior to the 3
failure of the Shoreham crankshaft LILCO was aware of the prob-less experienced with the TDI diesels at San Onofre.
Tr.
1525-26 (McCaffrey).
He also did not know whether the problems J
encountered at San Onofre were taken into account by LILCO in its efforts to determine whether the TDI diesels could be 3
- 133 -
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assured to meet the requirements of GDC 17.
Tr. 1526 (McCaffrey).
'2' 362. Mr. McCaffrey also did not know whether. LILCO made
)
any effort to, or actually did, find out about the problems with TDI engines at the Grand Gulf nuclear plant, which also occurred before the crankshaf t broke.
Tr. 1527 (McCaffrey); SC
)
LP Ex. 18.
363. Pre-operational testing of TDIs at Grand Gulf began in 1981.
In Board Notification 84-020, the NRC Staff stated
)
that the Grand Gulf TDIs experienced significant problems in completing the pre-operational test program, had several major failures and many minor failures.
At least 12, and possibly
)
more, of the problems at Grand Gulf occurred before the crank-shaft failure at Shoreham.
SC LP Ex. 18, p. 3-4.
)
364. Mr. McCaffrey did not know whether LILCO did anything to ascertain information concerning problems involving TDI die-sel generators in non-nuclear marine applications, as set forth
)
on pages 6-20 of Board Notification 84-020.
SC LP Ex. 18; Tr.
1530 (McCaffrey).
i 365. Information available from the State of Alaska, U.S.
)
Steel, and Titan Navigation, Inc. indicates that TDI diesels in
)
- 134 -
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'O marine service for those organizations have experienced severe 0
reliability probigs, relating to faulty cylinder heads, pis-tons, cylinder l'iners, turbochargers, cylinder blocks, connecting rods, connecting rod bearings, main journal O
bearings, and camsharts.
sC LP Ex. 18, p. 7-20.
366. Although Mr. McCaffrey testified that the TDI diesels i
O are n w available to perform their intended functions (Tr.
1705 (McCaffrey)), the blocks on diesels 101 and 102 currently have cracks in them.
Tr. 1497 (McCaffrey).
O 367. Although LILCo believes that the Colt diesels could l
be ready' to operate as emergency on-site electric power systems by May 1985, it does not presently intend to connect the Colt
- o l
diesels and use that equipment until the first refueling out-i age; instead, LILCO will use the TDI diesels for full power operation until the first refueling outage.
Tr. 1499-1500 (McCaffrey).
o C.
LILCO!s Asserted Undue Burden from NRC j
Licensing Proceedings
'O j
368. Mr. McCaffrey testified that the " unusual burdens placed upon LILCO over the years' during the NRC licensing pro-
!O cess are among the exigent circumstances that justify granting
{
LILLO's exemption request because in weighing equities and
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considering the long licensing process " fairness dictates" that LILCO should be gi3nted an exemption.
Tr. 1702, 1730-31 (McCaffrey).
)
369. Mr. McCaffrey testified that during the period 1976 to 1979, LILCO without technical justification was conslatently held by the NRC Staff to a different standard than other
~
)
plants.
He stated that in his opinion, the intervention in the Shoreham licensing proceeding affected the Staff review, for example, because "often the staff review would include issues
)
raised in Intervenor contentions because the Staff knew it would have to prepare testimony on these issues."
Tr. 1716 (McCaffrey).
a 370. In Mr. McCaffrey's opinion, t:Ihe Staff, in the course l
of its shoreham review, would ask far more questions of LILCO J
than it would of other utilities.
In addition, according to Mr. McCaffrey, when LILCO would provide technical arguments for compliance with a regulatory requirement, the Staff was less inclined to accept alternative approaches from LILCO than it would be from other utilities.
Tr. 1545 (McCaffrey).
In Mr.
McCaffrey's view, the Staff held LILCO to a higher burden of proof and had no technical justification for doing so.
Tr.
)
1547-48 (McCaffrey).
- 136 -
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~371. Mr. McCaffrey also stated that the Staff was more in-clined to have LIT"O follow the standard review practicea, and r
that he does 'not believe that the Staff held LILCO to a stan-dard that violated the regulatory requirements.
Tr.
1545-46
-(McCaffrey).
372. Mr. McCaffrey's opinion that the Staff imposed a higher burden of proof upon LILCO was based upon the fact that the NRC Staff rejected some of the alternative approaches pro-posed by LILCO and did not accept some of the answers provided by LILCO to Staff questions without asking additional ques-tions.
In LILCO's view, during the period 1976 to 1979, the NRC Staff did a different type of review for the Shoreham plant than the review that it did for a non-c,ontested plant.
Tr.
1547'(McCaffrey).
373. Mr. McCaffrey could only think of one example, during the period 1976 'to 1979, of an issue upon which, in his view, LILCO was held by the Staff to a higher standard without tech-nical justification.
Tr. 1551, 1559 (McCaffrey).
The example involved a steam bypass issue relating to a testing requirement to demonstrate the ability of seals around the primary contain-i l
ment drywell area to withstand a LOCA.
LILCO made technical i
arguments to the Staff to support its request for a reduction i
- 137 -
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i in the testing requirement.
The Staff did not agree with O
LILCO's proposed approach.
Mr. McCaffrey testified that he ggg{gggs pggggghe ggaff{g4ggs{gggn ggg,gggggped by the inter-p g
374. LILCO objected to the Staff's actions on the steam g
bypass issue by making presentations to various technical branches at the NRC.
Tr. 1551-54 (McCaffrey).
However, the NRC Staff did not change its mind in response to L7LCO's objec-g tions, nor did the Staff agree that its requirement of LILCO on the steam bypass issue was without technical justification.
Tr. 1554 (McCaffrey).
9 375. The NRC Staff never told LILCO that it was requiring something of LILCO on the steam bypass issue that it was not O
Tr. 1556 (d' Caffrey).. Mr.
requiring of other plants.
c McCaffrey could not recall whether the Staff indicated to LILCO any reason that it was taking the position it did on the steam O
bypass issue with. respect to the Shoreham plant.
Tr. 1556 (McCaffrey).
Mr. McCaffrey was 'not aware of any other plant that made the same proposal to the NRC Staff on the steam by-O pass issue that LILCO did; thus, he did not know that any other plants were held by the Staff to a different standard than LILCO on the steam bypass issue.
Tr. 1558-59 (McCaffrey).
O
- 138 -
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376. Mr. McCaffrey also could not recall whether the steam
~O
.m bypass issue was arcontested issue in the 1976 to 1979 r
J Meere.
Tr. 1554 (McCaffrey).
The steam bypass issue, how-ever, is related to substantial problems with the Mark II con-
~O tainment (such as that at the Shoreham plant) which had been l
identified a number of years prior to 1979.
The problems o
- O relating to the Mark II containment had not been resolved as of 1979.
Tr. 1554-55 (McCaffrey).
377. Mr. McCaffrey's testimony included no other facts or lO data to support his assertions concerning the actions of the Staff from 1976 to 1979.
i 37'8. Mr. '5cCaft' rey stated that in,his opinion, the Staff's
- 0 Safety Evaluation Report, which was issued in April 1981, could.
l have been issued in early 1979 or late 1978 (prior to the Three Mile Island accident), had it not been for the effect of the
,0 intervention process.
Tr. 1560, 1716-17 (McCaffrey).- Although j
Mr. McCaffrey believes that in late 1978 and early 1979 the i
Staff had sufficient information to issue a safety EvaJ untion'
.O Report, the NRC Staff did not indicate to LILCO in late 1978 that it was satisfied with the submittals made to that date by LILCO on the issues that the Staff was then reviewing.
Tr.
1561 (McCaffrey).
I O
- 139 -
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)'
l 379. When the April 1981 SER was issued, there were 60
)
outstanding open 'J.eas in addition to the items related to the TMI accident.
Tr. 1563 (McCaffrey).
Mr. McCaffrey testified that in his opinion the status of open items was the same in
'1978 as it was in April 1981 when the SER was issued.
Tr.
1563-64 (McCaffrey).
)
380. Mr. McCaffrey's testimony included no facts or data to support his assertions concerning the issuance of the SER.
381. Mr. McCaffrey participated in meetings with the NRC
)
Staff related to the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfor-mance (SALP) program, and he 'is familiar with SALP reports.
Tr. 1586-87 (McCaffrey).
SC LP Ex.19 sets forth in a summary a
fashion the performance evaluation by t'he Office of Nuclear Re-actor Regulation (NRR) of LILCO's performance, during the peri-od July 1, 1980 to June 30, 1981.
The document was prepared by
)
Jerry Wilson, who was the NRC project manager during that peri-od.
Tr. 1587-88 (McCaffrey).
)
382. The NRC project manager for the Shoreham plant char-acterized LILCO's responses and r.ubmittals to the NRC Staff during the period July 1,1980 through June 30, 1981 as "below
)
average."
SC LP Ex. 19.
)
- 140 -
' ~ ^ ^
~~ -
. ~.
0 383. In the NRR performance evaluation for the July 1980 O
through June 1981Cieriod, the NRC project manager stated that "the. Shoreham FSAR and amendments provide insufficient informa-
-tion to provide a clear understanding of plant design," and
- 0 that LILCO's " answers to generic letters and requests for addi-tional information are usually not responsive to staff con-cerns."
SC LP Ex. 19.
iO 384. In the NRR Performance Evaluation, the NRC project manager stated that during the latter portion of the period
- O July 1, 1980 to June 30, 1981, LILCO "put in a great deal of effort in responding to open items in the shoreham SER and the responses usually met our time schedules.
However, the appli-10-cant's responses were frequently inadequate.
Therefore, each open item required several meetings, phone conversations and letters to achieve resolution."
SC LP Ex. 19.
- O 385. In the NRR Performance Evaluation for July 1,1980 to June 30, 1981, the NRC project manager stated that LILCO "had many long-standing open items throughout [the] appraisal peri-
)
od.
Because the applicant had not neared completion of con-struction, they opposed many Staff positions in the hope that the Staff would back off."
SC L? Ex. 19.
)
- 141 -
l t)
L l
1 S.
I 386. The NRC project manager stated in the NRR Performance
)
Evaluation that a.j70f June 30,1981:
The applicant has not kept the FSAR up to date and representative of the actual
[]
plant.
There is poor control of construc-tion activities resulting in ever-increasing discrepancies between the plant, the design and the FSAR.
The appli-cant continues to generate E6DCRs on the construction of the Shoreham facility which
[)
now totals 35,000.
This is causing a po-tential for an ever-widening gap between the actual planc and the analyzed improved design.
I doubt that either Stone and Webster or LILCO fully understand the capa-bility of this facility with such a large O
discrepancy between the plant and the A/E approved design.
SC LP Ex. 19, p. 2.
387. Although the NRC project mana$ger stated that during the period July 1,1980 to June 30, 1981, LILCO was "an active and technically knowlegeable applicant," he also stated that "they lack BKR operating experience and they are frequently re-calcitrant."
SC LP Ex. 19, p. 2.
p 388. Mr. McCaffrey testified that some Staff actions dur-i ing the period 1978 (when he believed the SER should have been issued) to April 1981 (when it was issued) were not technically justified.
The only examples he could give were the steam by-l pass issue discussed above, and an issue having to do with
))
i
- 142 -
l e
I
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whether the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) should D
include an automa Jc, rather than a manual switchover of the r
RCIC pump from the condensate storage tank to the suppression pool.
Tr. 1567-68 (McCaffrey).
D 389. LILCO objected to the Staff's handling of the RCIC issue, but the Staff did not agree with LILCO that its require-
[]
ments of LILCO were without technical justification.
Tr. 1569 (McCaffrey).
There is no evidence that the RCIC issue was the subject of an Intervenor contention during the time period 1976 O
to 1981.
390. Mr. McCaffrey discussed the fact that LILCO and its consultants were required to respond to numerous document re-O quests and interrogatories, prepare res'ponses to hundreds of contentions, and devote substantial time to developing affida-vits and'other supporting materials for motions for summary D
disposition.
Tr. 1718 (McCaffrey).
However, Mr. McCaffrey ad-mitted that the contentions were filed pursuant to NRC regula-tions, that the licensing proceeding was being presided over by an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, and that the contentions j
concerning which discovery was conducted and summary disposi-tion motions were prepared had been admitted for litigation by the then pcesiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
Tr.
1570-72 (McCaffrey).
- 143 -
l
- __f.
~ _ _,, _
---~____2 f
'O i
391. Mr. McCaffrey also testified that during 1979 to
- O 1981, new contenti)hs were filed on matters related to Three Mile Island.
Tr. 1718 (McCaffrey).
The-TMI Action Plan, NUREG 0737, identified a large number of issues and matters to be iO.
evaluated by the NRC Staff as a result of lessons learned from the Three Mile' Island accident.
Tr. 1575 (McCaffrey).
Mr.
McCaffrey did not suggest that the contentions filed on matters-
- 0-related to TMI were improperly admitted by the Licensing Board.
Tr. 1575 (McCaffrey).
LO 392. Mr. McCaffrey characterized as " massive" the discov-l ery that took place in the first half of 1982.
Tr. 1719 (McCaffrey).
He admitted, however, that that discovery was O
conducted pursuant to an order by the shen sitting Licensing l
Board.
Tr. 1576 (McCaffrey).
Nk. McCaffrey did not suggest that the discovery was not conducted in accordance with the NRC
!O r egulations.
Tr. 1576 (McCaffrey).
In addition, LILCO i
objected frequently to the discovery and LILCO's objections were sometimes sustained and sometimes not sustained by the Li-13 censing Board.
Mr. McCaffrey admitted that LILCO used the reg-ulatory process and the rules that govern the conduct of that process to protect LILCO's rights during the discovery and lO hearing process.
Tr. 1576-77 (McCaffrey).
l
- 144 -
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)
i 393. Although Mr. McCaffrey asserted that the Licensing
)
Board which ruled',Dn objections made by LILCO during discovery provided Intervenors " tremendous leeway," he also stated that
.the provision of leeway does not violate the NRC's regulations, b.
nor is it in any way improper.
Mr. McCaffrey asserted that the Licensing Board was affected by the intervention process and that the Board wanted to mak'e every effort to assure that the Intervenors were provided every possible avenue to create their case.
Mr. McCaffrey's testimony included no facts or data to support his opinion concerning the reason the Licensing Board acted and ruled as it did.
Tr. 1577-78 (McCaffrey).
394. Mr. McCaffrey referenced a particular request for
)
quality assurance documents as an example of the County having "used LILCO's filing of testimony as a pretext for additional I
document requests."
Tr. 1720, 1580 (McCaffrey).
However, Mr.
McCaffrey admitted that with respect to that' request, LILCO agreed to produce certain of the documents and the Licensing l
l Board directed LILCO to produce certain other of the documents requested.
Tr. 1582 (McCaffrey).
i l
395. Mr. McCaffrey agreed that a request for documents I
following the filing of testimony is permitted by NRC regula-
[
tions, and that the Licensing Board's rulings granting the
)
- 145 -
i l
l
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~~
g
' County's requests for documents following the filing of O.
testimony by LILCrudoes not violate the NRC's regulations.
Tr.
1580-81 (McCaffrey).
O 396. Mr. McCaffrey testified that the operating license hearing process has "placed a considerable drain on LILCO and its consultants' resources at a time the Company was attempting g
to complete the plant and the NRC Staff review process."
Tr.
1722 (McCaffrey).
He stated, further, that " personnel with first hand knowledge of the systems or components at issue and i
O associated documents.were involved in developing a response to contentions," and that "many times these were the same people
[who were] responsible for designing and completing the sys,
O tems, testing them and making them rea(y for operations."
Id.
He stated that "at a time when LILCO was attempting to finish the plant, critical personnel were being diverted to the liti-
'g gation arenas."
Tr. 1726 (McCaffrey).
397. Mr.
McCaffrey admitted that LILCO never requested a stay of the operating license proceeding so that its critical O
personnel could finish the plant.
Tr. 1631 (McCaffrey).
398. Mr. McCaffrey asserted that challenges to construc-O tion permit extension requests, and to shipment of new fuel to the site by Suffolk County were " frivolous" and were efforts to O
~
- 146 -
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-...~.
- :- ygggg
. - - ~..... -.
delay, licensing of Shoreham because, in his opinion, permit estensions and rec;ipt of new fuel onsite "are routine matters that any knowledgeable person recognizes as havin'g no safety impacts on the public."
Tr. 1723 (McCaffrey).
However, Mr.
1 McCaffrey was unable to identify when such challenges were made by the County, the basis for any such challenges, or whether the challenges in fact were based upon the safety impact of LILCO's proposed activities.
Tr. 1616, 1619 (McCaffrey).
Mr.
McCaffrey did not review any documents in preparing his testi-1 mony or in reaching his opinion that the referenced challenges filed by Suffolk County were frivolous.
Tr. 1617, 1619 (McCaffrey).
He also does not assert that the challenges
" delayed the licensing of the plant.
Tr. 1618 (McCaffrey).
l 3b9. The shipment of new fuel was stayed by the Licensing Board "in view of the apparent relevance of the material li-conse to at least those contentions in this licensing proceed-ing relating to LILCO's Security Plan."
In addition, the stay issued by the Licensing Board was not lif ted until LILCO had agreed. to implement additional security measures which met the County's concerns, and the Staff had reviewed and found the proposed resolution of the security concerns acceptable.
SC LP Ex. 22.
- 147 -
j,___._.
L i;'
m.
_m_
O 400. Mr. McCaffrey testified that the Marburger Commission 0
appointed by Govet,'.br duomo resulted in a drain upon LILCO's resources because the County discussed before that Commission j
many of the same health and safety issues that had been liti-O gated before the Licensing Board.
Tr. 1724, 1595 (McCaffrey).
The Marburger Commission hearings took place in 1983, at a time when there was no suggestion by LILCO that it had need of an O
exemption from Commission regulations.
Tr. 1597 (McCaffrey).
i The Marburger Commission hearings had nothing to do with onsite or offsite power at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant.
Tr. 1595
- O (McCaffrey).
401. Indeed, neither the creation of the Marburger commis-O sion nor the subjects it chose to address, were the responsi-bility of Suffolk County.
On April 19, 1983, the Governor of New York proposed the creation of a " Fact Finding Panel" on the O
Shoreham nuclear power facility to develop clearly derived, re-liable and objective information on tha economic costs and safety of the Shoreham plant.
SC LP Ex. 20.
The Panel was 3
charged by the Governor to examine:
1.
The projected impact on Long Island Lighting Company's (LILCO) ratepayers assuming that Shoreham would or would not operate, and 3
- 148 -
3
)
assuming various ratemaking scenarios including thc3e in which' shareholders may be responsible
.for a part of. the construction costs; 2.
The projected revenue impacts on local govern-j.
ments and the projected impacts on the Island's
. economy under these scenarios;
)
3.
The amount and potential sources of revenue required to service the debt on Shoreham and to enable LILCO to meet its normal operating costs;
)
4.
The nature and manner of assessment of risks as-sociated with the operation of a nuclear power
)
p1' ant and especially thd, Shoreham facility; 5.
The requirements of the Federal government with regard to the development and implementation of
)
off-site emergency preparedness plans, and to what degree Suffolk County has met or exceeded these standards and the rationale therefore.
)
SC LP Ex. 20 at 1.
402. LILCO presented testbmony and information to the Marburger Commission concerning the particular subjects which I-
)
- 149 -
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I the Governor requested the Marburger panel to examine.
Tr.
)
1602-03 (McCaffrey[.
Thirteen witnesses employed by LILCO ap-peared at the hearing, whereas only five employed by Suffolk County appeared.
SC LP Ex. 20 at 7-2, 7-3.
)
403. Although Mr. McCaffrey asserted that the County's i
claims before the Marburger Commission were " baseless," he ad-
)
mitted that it was not the consensus opinion of the Marburger Commission that the positions taken by Suffolk County in those hearings were baseless.
Tr. 1614 (McCaffrey).
)
404 The Marburger Panel worked hard to discover points of agreement, and the section of its report titled " General Con-clusions" sets forth paragraphs that were carefully worded to 3
reflect that agreement.
SC LP Ex. 20 at 35.
The general con-clusions, which reflected " coagulations of consensus in the
)
thick stew of interpretive viewpoints set forth in the Panel's meetings and hearings," included those set forth in the pro-posed findings that follow.
1.
Suffolk County adopted its position relating to offsite emergency planning for shoreham af ter commis-sioning studies of reasonable quality.
The County consul-
,)
tants are reputable in their fields, and their reports in-dicate deep and relevant technical knowledge of the issues with which they dealt.
SC LP Ex. 20 at 35.
)
- 150 -
T 1
. - -., _ _ =.
= _ = _ _.
O-The Shoreham plant will probably prove to have 4.
~O been a mistai3' in the sense that everyone might have been
}
better off if the plant had never been built.
The loca-tion probably would be regarded as unsuitable as a site 5_)
y for a nuclear power station and would not be acceptable as a licenseable site under current siting practices.
Esti-
)
mates of demand for electricity, the price of oil and the
- O cost of construction all turned out to be grossly inaccu-i rate, leading to a pattern of rates and expenses that no 4
one, including LILCO, wanted.
Opinions as to how much blame LILCO must accept for creating such a situation
{
vary, but many now feel that LILCO must be held responsi-ble for allowing the Shoreham disaster to happen.
SC LP O
Ex. 20 at 35.
3.
LILCO did not prepare itself adequately for its lO move into the technology of nuclear power and still lacks f
credibility as an operator of a nuclear power plant.
SC f
LP Ex. 20 at 36.
- O l
4.
The Marburger Panel viewed nuclear power as a high technology industry that demands a "zero defects"
)
management attitude similar to that in the aerospace in-dustry.
What the Panel learned about LILCO training lC
- 151 -
Q 1
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9 programs, quality assurance structure, and management j,.
u experience w22h relevant nuclear reactor operation led many to question whether such an attitude is present.
SC LP Ex. 20 at 3.
5.
The Panel stated that the NRC practice of defer-ring consideration of off-site emergency response planning I3 feasibility until after completion of construction does not make sense.
Such consid'erations were~in fact intro-duced in Shoreham construction licensing hearings but were-O dismissed by the hearing officer as irrelevant at that time.
It is clear that the existence of a completed nu-clear power.. plant is, a powerful incentive to ' find reasons to grant an operating license.
ie is too late for a O
change of construction licensing practice to affect the Shoreham case, but the philosophy of answering significant O
site-related questions before construction is too advanced may be applied to the current low power licensing situa-tion.
The governor's request of the NRC that a low power C
operating license not be issued before the off-site plan-ning impasse is resolved is consistent with this philoso-phy.
SC LP Ex. 20 at 36.
O
- 152 -
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OI 6.
The Panel expressed reservations abo'ut LILCO's g
ability to implement an offsite emergency response plan that achieves an adequate state of emergency preparedness.
SC LP Ex. 20 at 37.
!O i
7.
The Panel found that the projections for Long Island's future electrical energy needs on which the shoreham construction schedule was originally based were obviously overestimates.
The Panel was persuaded that ample LILCO generating capacity exists to satisfy probable O
demand for at least the next decade, and probably longer.
Such estimates are of course subject to the same uncertainties that cause the orig'inal projections to be so
.o o
wrong.
But, the Panel concluded tihat it is difficult to
~
see how the demand for electricity could be so great as to require a shoreham-sized plant within a decade or more.
O SC LP Ex. 20 at 36.
405. Mr McCaffrey stated that the length and cost of the O
'shoreham licensing proceeding demonstrate "the unusual burdens" placed upon LILCO over the years by Intervenors' use of the NRC Licensing process.
Tr. 1730, 1635 (McCaffrey).
However, his O
testimony does not address the cost or burdens imposed on any other party that have resulted from the LILCO li' censing i
)
153 -
S
y.
_. =
._=
process.
Tr. 1635 (McCaffrey).
In addition, his testimony does not compare Gry burdens placed on.any other applicants to burdens placed upon LILCO, resulting from the NRC licensing l
processes.
Tr. 1636-37 (McCaffrey).
)
406. Mr. McCaffrey also testified that the extended hear-ings have and will continue to delay the Shoreham plant's fuel
/
load date.
Tr. 1730 (McCaffrey).
However, he also stated that the Shoreham plant was not capable of loading fuel until April or May 1984.
Tr. 1632 (McCaffrey).
i 407. Fuel load is dependent upon the issuance of a license by the NRC permitting loading of fuel, and the issuance of such a license must await the issuance of an ' exemption' because of f
the failure of LILCO's TDI diesels and the nonavailability of an onsite power source-that complies with GDC 17.
Tr. 1632 (McCaffrey).
408. The reason that fuel load did not occur in April or May of 1984 and i'n fact has still not occurred to date is not because of extended hearings, but rather because the Commission has not issued a license permitting such fuel load.
Tr. 1632 (McCaffrey).
+
- 154 -
U
p ig_7_ a
-7 i
409. Mr. McCaffrey testified that the protracted licensing
)
L process has creatCII the perception that the Shoreham licensing proceeding may never end, and that this asserted perception is
\\..
also among the exigent circumstances which justify granting LILCO's request for an exception.
Tr. 1729 (McCaffrey).
1 410. The perception discussed by Mr. McCaffrey was that of j
i LILCO, the nuclear industry, and the general public as per-ceived by Mr. McCaffrey.
His conclusion as to the public per-caption is not based upon any studies or surveys or polls on i
that subject, nor is Mr. McCaffrey a social scientist or sta-tistical analyst who is qualified to opine upon public percep-tions.
Tr. 1633-34 (McCaffrey).
411. Mr. McCaffrey asserted that a public perception that the proceeding may never end could contribute to that actually happening.
Tr. 1635 (McCaffrey).
Mr. McCaffrey was unable to state,what such a perception has to do with LILCO's noncompliance with GDC 17.
Tr. 1634-35 (McCaffrey).
III. Public Interest A.
LILCO'~s Asserted Foreign Oil Benefit 412. Cornelius A. Szabo testified on behalf of LILCO con-cerning the alleged benefit of reduced dependence on foreign
- 155 -
e
=.. _
.z_
I oil'which might result from the earlier commencement of
)
commercial full pCJer operation of the Shoreham plant.
Tr.
1216 (Szabo).
)
413.
Mr. Szabo is Manager of Resource Valuation for LILCO, whose responsibility includes forecasting of oil and coal _ prices and availability.
Tr. 1217 (Szabo).
Mr. Szabo's f
prior experience included consulting for six public service commissions in the area of fuel prices, fuel supply and oil availability.
Tr.
1218 (Szabo).
By his own admission, Mr.
)
Szabo is not a military expert and is not qualified to opine as to the likelihood of a cut-off of foreign oil. supplies as a re-sult of the Iran-Iraq war.
Tr. 1219 (Szabo).
~
414.
LILCO claims that the earli r performance of low power testing which could r,esult from the grant of the exemp-tion, in turn, might lead to an earlier date for commercial
)
full power operation.
Tr. 1330 (Szabo).
Mr. Szabo testified that because LILCO is heavily dependent on imported oil, to the extent that commercial operation of the Shoreham facility dis-
)
places foreign oil, there would be a benefit from such oporation.
Tr. 1235 (Szabo).
)
.415.
Mr. Szabo conceded, however, that only if low power operation leads to earlier commercial full power operation
)
- 156 -
.w
==-..a=-
-= -:
..
.w..--- - -
p y
would there be a benefit arising out of reduced dependency on g
foreign oil.
Tr. 1236 (Szabo).
Accordingly, if earlier low power testing has no effect on when commercial operation, if
)
ever, occurs, LILCO's testimony concerning dependence on for-eign oil is not relevant to whether the requested exemption should be granted.
Tr. 1236.(Szabo).
)
~
416.
A necessary predicate to LILCO's hypothesis of a benefit to the public from the grant of the exemption is the assumption that both the TDI diesel generator proceeding and
)
the-emergency planning proceeding will be concluded at approxi-mately the same time and that they will both be concluded favorably to LILCO.
Tr. 1249-50 (Szab ).
417. Whether there will continue to be a glut of oil, or whether there might be a disruption in the, supply of foreign
)
oil such as would affect LILCO in any way, consists of no more than " speculation on speculation."
Tr. 1247 (Judge Miller).
418.
Mr. Szabo was unable to state whether a disruption
)
in the availability of foreign oil would be likely to occur now, within the next three months, or within the next ten years.
Tr. 1273 (Szabo).
Specifically, Mr. Szabo testified
)
that there was an equal probability that a serious disruption would occur within the next ninety days as within the next ten years.
Tr. 1275 (Szabo).
- 157 -
)
m h-419.
Mr. Szabo's principal basis for concern about a pos-
)
siblefuturedisrb)tioninoilsuppliesistheongoingwarbe-tween Iraq and Iran in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf.
Tr.
1337 (Szabo).
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the war has
)
been ongoing for approximately four years, Mr. Szabo conceded that there is presently a glut of oil on the market.
Tr. 1271
)_
(Szabo).
420.
Moreover, Mr. Szabo acknowledged that non-OPEC oil-producing countries have been increasing their productive capacity in recsnt years.
Thus, for 1983, the non-OPEC oil-producing countries have increased their capacity by "about a million barrels a day '
Tr. 1277 (S abo).
421.
There has been established in the United States a strategic petroleum reserve.
The level of the reserve is about
)
400 million barrels at this time.
Such a level would be enough to replace approximately (a) ninety days of average United States imports from all sources; or (b) nine hundred days of
)
U.S. imports from the Persian Gulf; or (c) seven months of net imports from all OPEC nations.
Tr. 1277-78 (Szabo).
422.
Mr. Szabo also testified that the price of oil has been.5cclining over the last several years.
Thus, during the fourth quarter of 1980, the spot price of oil was $38.40 a
)
- 158 -
)
k barrel and in the third quarter of 1983 the spot price was
$28.90 a barrel. 7the contract price has declined from about
$34 a barrel in 1981 to $29 a barrel in 1983.
Tr. 1279 (Szabo).
)
423.
In order for a major disruption to have any impact on LILCO, insofar as the grant of the exemption is concerned,
)
the disruption would have to occur during a period beginning about two months before the commencement of commercial operation of shoreham and. persist.for three months thereafter.
}
Tr. 1302-1303 (Szabo).
424.
Mr. Szabo's conclusions concerning the effect of
)
LILCO's dependency od foreign oil are based on a " myriad of unpredictable factors" and are of a " tenuous nature."
Tr. 1287 (Judge Mille,r); SC LP Exs. 12-13(A-I).
Given the uncertainties
)
as to the supply and price of oil, there is as much probability that the price of oil would continue to decline as that it would increase.
'5r.1247 (Judge Miller).
)
425. If the current oil glut were to continue and the price of oil continued to decline, there would be no benefit from earlier full power commercial operation of Shoreham.
Tr.
1246 (Szabo).
- 159 -
)
.n z--
O'
'426.
Although Mr. Szabo's testimony dealt with the poten-
')
.s tial of a major d;Jruption in the supply of oil from the Middle East, it turns out that only a small fraction, one percent or maybe less, of LILCO's oil is derived from that area.
The rest of LILCO's oil is derived from Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil.
Tr. 1268-69 (Szabo).
D 427.
Mr. Szabo testified that there were available alter-natives to the commercial operation of Shoreham that could pro-tect LILCO from the effects of a substantial disruption in the
- O availability of foreign oil.
Thus, LILCO could increase the -
amount of reserves that it is required by the New York Public Service Commission to have on hand.
Tr. 1319 (Szabo).
Addi-O tionally, LILCO could purchase futures contracts on oil to as-sure itself of a supply in the event of a near term disruption in the oil market.
Tr. 1320-21 (Szabo).
O 428.
In the aggregate, Shoreham would displace less than half of LILCO's present purchases of oil.
Tr. 1322 (Szabo).
And, in the absence of a major disruption of oil supplies,
)
LILCO will have no difficulty in obtaining foreign oil.
Tr.
1300 (Szabo).
O 3
- 160 -
3
. _ ;[ -
~.-
[,
^
^
-T - ~ ^
.Q B.
Economic Impact of the Grant of the Exemption O
.s
%Y 429.
The following witnesses testified as to whether there would be any economic benefit to the public as a result O -
of the granting of the exemption:
Jamshad Madan and Michael D.
Dirmeier on behalf of Suffolk County; Richard Kessel on behalf of the State of New York; and Anthony. Nozzolillo on behalf.of O
- nynco, 430. Mr. Madan is a principal in the fira Georgetown Con-4 O.
8ulting GC up, Inc., which provides financial and management consulting services with special emphasis on utility regula-i
. tion.
Mr. Madan received his Bachelor of Science degree in
.O electrical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a Master of Science degree in management from J
the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management of the Massachusetts
'O Institute of Technology.
From the period 1968 through April of 1979, Mr. Madan was primarily employed by Touche, Ross & Co.,
an international auditing and management consulting firm.
He
()
became a principal in that firm in 1977.
While at Touche, Ross, Mr. Madan provided expert testimony or consulting relating to a number of hearings involving fuel prices, the o
setting of fuel clauses and the policy for fuel clauses in sev-eral states.
Mr. Madan has also testified in a number of
!O
- 161 -
t
.f) i
_-_..-u_.-;.-_..____-
--- - E - -. : c - c- - - --
u-x - - jn-----
z O
proceedings which have involved the regulatory treatment of 3
l nuclear plants.
has testified in about 15 different ju-risdictions in the area of utility regulation.
For approxi-mately six months, from October 1975 through March 1976, Mr.
O Madan was employed as the General Manager of Corporate Develop-ment for Public Service Electric & Gas Company of New Jersey, g
one of the largest utilities in the country.
Testimony, 1-3 and Attachment 1; Tr. 1917-20 (Madan).2/
431. Mr. Dirmeier is also a principal in Georgetown Con-O
-sulting Group, Inc.
He received a Bachelor of Science degree in physics from Texas A&M University, and a Master of Business Administration degree in finance from yne University of O
Chicago.
Mr. Dirmeier has been employe'd by Bendix Corporation and Touche, Ross & Co.
While with Touche, Ross, Mr. Dirmeier participated in operations analyses of nonregulated corpora-tions as well as in utility rate setting matters.
Since 1979, when Mr. Dirmeier joined Georgetown Consulting Group, Mr.
Dirmeier has had experience in regulation involving nuclear O
2/
The profiled testimony of Messrs. Dirmeier and Madan was not bound into the transcript of the hearing.
According-ly, citations to their prefiled written testimony will b'e as follows:
" Testimony,-
(Dirmeier, Madan)."
Cita-tions to their oral testimony will be to the pertinent transcript page.
3
- 162 -
O I
d
=_
=.
=--
t I
plants, nuclear economics, the potential abandonment of nuclear q
plants, accidents.st nuclear plants, fuel clauses, decommissioning of nuclear plants, and the operation of a nu-clear plant.
Testimony, 3-4 and Attachment 1; Tr. 1920-21 (Dirmeier).
432. LILCO's witness Mr. Nozzolillo is the Manager of the f
Financial Analysis and Planning Department of LILCO.
Mr.
Nozzolillo has a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engi-neering from the Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, and a Mas-
[
ter of Business Administration degree from C.W. Post Center of Long Island University.
Mr. Nozzolillo has been employed by LILCO since 1972. 'He has been in the company's Planning De-partment and has been Manager of the System Planning Division.
Mr. Nozzolillo's responsibilities include the development and maintenance of LILCO's financial modeling systems.
He is also involved in the development and analysis of financial options and in the analysis of various system development plans for economic impact on both the company and its customers.
Tr.
1402-04 (Nozzolillo).
433 The State of New York's witness Richard M. Kessel is
)
the Executive Director of the New York State Consumer Protec-tion Board, which is the State of New York's consumer affairs
)
- 163 -
)
..- : :.~
- _-- 4 1
O agency.
He was appointed to that position 'by Governor Mario
.O g
Cuomo. 1k. KesseJ has been a consumer advocate working in the public interest for approximately ten years.
He has taught
- O.
consumer economics at Brooklyn College, and has developed at Brooklyn College a curriculum on consumers and energy which he taught for several years.
Mr. Kessel has represented the Bo'r-ough of Manhattan and the City of New York before the New York
- D Public Service Commission on matters relating to rate increases for con 9olidated Edison and New York Telephone Company..He has also participated on behalf of the public in several hearings
- O relating to LILCO rate increases, and has filed a number of ge-neric petitions, which have been adopted and accepted by the New York State Public Service Commission, including one which establishes the right of the public to submit economic evidence to be considered by the Public Service Commission in evaluating
{O the public interest.
Tr. 2879-80 (Kessel).
t 434.
Although in its application for an exemption, LILCO initially clataed that granting the exemption would be "in the O
public interest because it will result in economic benefits of l
$90-$135 million"'(Application, 20-21), Mr. Nozzolillo testified that the alleged economic benefic to LILCO's custom-
!O-ers will be either Sa million or $45 million, depending on the timing of LILCO's receipt of certain tax benefits.
Tr.
O'
- 164 -
- O 4
[
r 1357-1362, 1407, 1410 (Nozzolillo); Testimony, 6 (Dirmeier, I-s Madan).
?
435.
Both the $8 million figure and the $45 million fig-ure reflect possible benefits which would accrue if the h
l
' granting of the pending exemption application would enable Shoreham to go into commercial operation approximately three I
months earlier than would otherwise be the case.
Tr. 1354, 1405 (Nozzolillo); Testimony, 6 (Dirmeier, Madan).
436.
The financial models on which LILCO bases its claimed $8 million to $45 million benefit to its customers com-pare the potential impact on ratepayers of commencing commer-cial op ration'on July 1, 1985 (as presently projected by LILCO) with commencing commercial operation on October 1, 1985.
Tr. 1354, 1406 (Nozzolillo)'; Testimony, 6 (Dirmeier, Madan).
Mr. Nozzolillo conceded that these models "are not the real world, today."
Tr. 1377 (Nozzolillo).
437.
The financial models consist of computer-based cor-porate financial models of sales, revenues, expenses, balance sheets and cash flows covering the years 1984-2000 prepared by l
LILCO.
SC LP Ex. 63; Testimony, 7 (Dirmeier, Madan).3_/
1 I
3]
Two working days before suffolk County's testimony was due to' have been filed, LILCO furnished the County with re-
- (Footnote cont'd next page) l l
.- 165 -
~
_ -.. _ =
. _ _. _ =-
.. = _
438.
The models were developed for three alternative hy-g pothetical dates k$F which Shoreham would be considered to be "in service" as follows:
O commercial operation In-Service for Tax Purposes July 1, 1985 December, 1984 July 1, 1985 January, 1985 October 1,1985 March, 1985 O
Por each alternative, LILCO computed the revenue requirements
( that is, the amount LILCO must receive from ratepayers), ex-penses and other financial indicators in each of the years g
1984-2000.
Tn order to compare the financial results, LILCO then computee tae net present value of the revenue requirements under each alternative.
SC LP Ex. 63;,Tr. 1355, 1405-6 O
(Nozzolillo); Testimony, 7 (Dirmeier, Madan).
439.
LILCO's present value analysis, or "present worth of O
f ature dollars," discounts a future stream of revenue require-ments to a present date, given certain assumptions as to O
(Footnote cont'd from previous page) vised computer runs.
Tr. 2032 (Dirmeier).
Due to the testimony filing deadlines, Suffolk County's experts were unable to incorporate the new runs into their prefiled 7) testimony.
Id.
However, both LILCO's and Suffolk Coun-ty's witnesses agreed that the two sets of computer runs onded up with "results... is, the same order of magni-tude," and did not change the witnesses' overall conclu-sions.
Tr. 1372 (Nozzolillo); 2032 (Dirmeier).
D
- 166 -
^
~
~~
~
~Z 5
~~
n._
interest rates.
Tr. 1357 (Nozzolillo).
A higher net present 3
value equates to 1.igher revenues and is, therefore (all other things being equal), less desirable, from a ratepayer's or cus-g toner's point of view, than a lower net present value.
Testi-mony,. 7 (Dirmeier, Madan).
440.
LILCO's minimum claimed benefit of $8 million from D
the grant of the exemption is based on the assumption that Shoreham will be in service (i.e., " synchronized") for tax pur-poses in 1985, and represents LILCO's projected effect of be-O ginning commercial operation three months earlier than would be, the case without the grant of the exewption.
Tr. 1360, 1410 (Nozzolillo); Testimony, 8 (Dirmeier, Madan).
3 441..
LILCO's maximum claimed benefit of $45 million starts with the $8 million effect of a three-month change in O
the timing of full power operation plus an additional $37 mil-lion benefit which could be obtained only if Shoreham can be declared in service for tax purposes in 1984 rather than in 0
1985.
Tr. 1361, 1410 (Nozzolillo); Testimony, 9 (Dirmeier, Mad an).
442.
Thirty-seven million of the $45 million potential O'
benefit postulated by LILCO is based on the assumption that Shoreham is in service for tax p'urposes on or before December
)
- 167 -
b l
a,
.u.-y---
. w - --
,---+
--- ~
n--.
._f_
. _ - - - + - -
31, 1984.
If Shoreham is not in service by that date,
.x however, the $37 niillion differential disappears, and the only potential benefit is $8 million.
Tr. 1361, 1410 (Nozzolillo);
Testimony, 9 (Dirmeier, Madan).
443.
The $8 million figure represents the present value of the differential in rates necessary to cover revenue re-
)
quirements for all items other than tax depreciation (including, for example, the estimated fuel savings), based on commencing commercial operation of Shoreham on July 1,1985 in-f stead of October 1, 1985.
Testimony, 9 (Dirmeier, Madan).
444..
In the first twelve months after Shoreham begins commercial operation, LiLC Os re8enue requirements will be in-
~
creased by over $800 million.' Tr. 1931 (Madan); Testimony, 10 i
(Dirmeier, Madan). This increase, which, in turn, must be recovered from ratepayers, arises from the need to recover car-l rying charges associated with Shoreham and the related depreci-i ation, operations and maintenance expenses.
Testimony, 11 l
l (Dirmeier, Madan).
1 445.
If Shoreham goes into commercial operation on July l
1, 1985, customers will pay approximately $166 million more in revenue requirements in 1985 than if commercial operation be-l gins Octoba-1, 1985.
Tr. 1364-65 (Nozzolillo); Tr. 1931 i
(Madan); Testimony, 11 (Dirmeier:, Madan).
- 168 -
- - :--- - -- ------ --- ::L
.=
446.
There is a greater revenue requirement associated with a July 1985 3mmercial operation date, as opposed to an October 1, 1985 commercial operation date, because there will exist three mora months'in 1985 at which the higher (approxi-mately $800 million) revenue requirement amount will be charged to ratepayers.
Testimony, 11 (Dirmeier, Madan).
447. On a cumulative basis, according to LILCO's own com-putations, even assuming a July 1985 commercial operation date (with a January 1985 synchronization) as opposed to an October 1985 commercial operation date, LILCO's customers would not begin to receive any economic benefit from the earlier commer-cial operation until the year 1997, at the earliest.
Tr. 1372 (Nozzolillo); Tr. 1931 (Madan); SCLPha.14.
448.
Moreover, the $8 million net present value of the benefit identified by LILCO would likely result from any three-month difference in the timing of the commencement of full power operation, not just from the three month differen-tial assumed by LILCO to be attributable to the grant of an ex-emption.
Testimony, 12 (Dirmeier, Madan).
449.
LILCO's claimed benefits are greatly overstated; in-deed, based on LILCO's own analysis, an economic detriment of
$49 million would result from the grant of the exemption.
Tr.
1933 (Madan); Testimony, 12 (Dirmeier, Madan).
- 169 -
,J 450.
Shoreham could not be in service for tax purposes during LILCO's prc'fosed low power testing program, which is all that would be authorized by the requested exemption.
Tr. 1930
)
(Madan); Testimony 13-15 (Cirmeier, Madan).
3 451.
In order to be in service for federal income tax purposes, Shoreham has to generate sufficient electric power to O.
the LILCO grid such that the electric output from the plan ex-ceeds the amount taken from the grid to run the plant (i.e.,
the net output has to be a positive figure to the grid).
Tr.
O 1358-1359 (Nozzolillo); Testimony, 14 (Dirmeier, Madan).
452.
Since the Shoreham generator will not even be con-nected to the LILCO grid during the low power testing proposed O
by LILCO, there is no possibility that Shoreham will be in ser-vice ' or federal income tax purposes prior to the issuance of a f
full power license.
Tr. 1359, 1373 (Nozzolillo); Testimony, 15 (Dirmeier, Madan).
453.
In order to place the Shoreham plant in service for O
tax purposes, LILCO must obtain a full power operating license which would require final NRC decisions on the outstanding emergency planning and TDI diesel issues.
Testimony, 13 3
(Dirmeier, Madan).
3
- 170 -
O
.:-- 3
- [
f.
7 3... -
=
)
454.
By LILCO's own admission (see Application for Exemp-
)
tion at 21), and [t is clear from the current schedules for litigation of those issues, such decisions are unlikely prior to the.end of 1984.
Testimony, 15 (Dirmeier, Madan).
455.
Thus, it does not appear to be possible for Shoreham to be in service for tax purposes in 1984, which means that $37 I
million of the $45 million maximum claimed benefit cannot be
.obtained.
LILCO's claimed economic benefit, therefore, is'in reality at most, only $8 million.
Testimony, 13 (Dirmeier,
)
Madan).
456.
LILCO's postulated $8 million benefit is overstated and is actually a detriment of up to $49 million.
Testimony,
)
13 (Dirmeier, Madan).
457.
Achieving comme'ecial operation three months earlier would result in an economic detriment of up to $49 million be-cause of:
(a) a mismatch in LILCO's analysis which erroneously favors earlier full power operation by an amount having a net f
present value of approximately $26 million; and (b) a failure to recognize an energy-savings offset having a net present value effect of $31 million arising out of LILCO's arbitrarily terminating its financial analysis at the year 2000.
Tr. 1932, 1933 (Mad.at); Testimony, 15-21 (Dirmeier, Madan).
i
- 171 -
p_
s__.
l 458.
The mismatch in LILCO's analysis consists of the l'
-~'
following:
LILCO I analysis shows that the cash cost of Shoreham decreases by $59 million if full power operation is moved up by three months.
This reduction in cash cost is achieved-because expenses and revenue requirements are in-creased as costs are charged to custoners rather than charged to the cost of Shoreham.
LILCO.s analysis further shows, how-
)
ever, only a $31 million increase in expense when shoreham is operated three months earlier, although the cash cost of the
)
plant is decreased by $59 million.
Testimony, 15 (Dirmeier, Madan).
459.
Therefore, there is a 028 million mismatch in LILCO's analysis that erroneously favo s the economica of ear-lier full power operation, because it either understates reve-nue rechuirements associated with a July 1, 1985 start-up date or overstates revenue requirements associated with an October l
1,1985 start-up.
Testimony, 15 (Dirmeier, Madan).
In either event, correction of this error, which has a net present value l -
of $26 million, reduces LILCO's $8 million benefit claim to an l
Testimony, 16 (Dirmeier, Madan).
l
$18 million detriment 460.
LILCO's financial models show that three months ear-l' lier commercial power operation decreases the capitalized cash
)
- 172 -
i-
.=
a
=
. ~ -. -
y i
cost of Shoreham by $59 million.
Correspondingly, the amount
)
~
_ expended if operas;on is three months earlier should be $59 million greater to balance the lower capitalized cash cost.
However, LILCO's own financial projections show only a $31.1 million increase in expence, and therefore the capital cost is improperly not balanced by equal increases in expenses.
Testi-many, 16-17 (Dirmeier, Madan).
461.
Messrs. Dirmeier and Madan examined the impact on revenue requirements if expenses in the October 1 model were
)-
decreased by the $27.9 million difference between capital change.($59 million) and expense change ($31.1 million).
According to their analysia, if expenses are lower, revenue re-
)-
quirement.s will be lower by a similar bount to achieve the same earned rate of return on investment.
Accordingly, th.e net present value of revenue requirements for the October 1
)
operation alternative is reduced by $26 million, thereby improving that alternative's economic effect.
Testimony, 17-18 (Dirmeier, Madan).
In other words, under the company's analy-
)
sis, LILCO's customers would be better off if the commencement of Shorehan's commercial operation.were delayed by three months.
)
)
- 173 -
- 1. 2.
- }f$[.
J :-
^
- ==-
==
i
- O i
462.
LILCO's second error results from its decision to LO stoptheeconomic3nalysisintheyear2000, rather than ana-lyzing the effect of early operation over Shoreham's antici-i pated full-life cycle.
This error results in.an implicit as-r0 i
sumption that early low power operation results in greater lifetime energy production from Shoreham.
Correcting this error results in a reduction in the benefit of up to $45 mil-
.O lion.
Testimony, 16 (Dirmeier, Madan).
i 463.
Allowing Shoreham to operate commercially three O
months earlier in 1985 creates an increase in revenue require-I ments in that year of $166 million, because any fuel savings that may be achieved are far outweighed by increasca in base
.:O rates to provide for depreciation, rathen, operation and main-tenance of the unit.
If Shoreham begins commercial operation three months earlier, then it should correspondingly be assumed lO that the plant would be retired three months earlier.
The an-ticipated life of Shoreham is currently thirty years.
Early operation in 1985 results in increased revenue requirements in O
the year 2015, because early retirement will result in lower fuel savings in that year.
Testimony, 1G, 20 (Dirmeier, Madan).
lO 0
1
- 174 -
O -
O 464.
A proper and consistent economic analysis of O
Shoreham's early sjeration would examine the trade-offs between the higher rates in 1984, and the lower rates in 2015, as well as the differences in revenue requirements in the intervening years.
Testimony, 18-19 (Dirmeier, Madan).
465.
In the long run, LILCO's claim of fuel savings can O
only be true if earlier operation results in a change in the operating life of Shoreham.
Whether Shoreham operates for thirty years from July 1, 1985 or from October 1, 1985 should O
result in no difference in the overall amount of fuel that Shoreham will save, because the date of shutdown of the plant will change by a corresponding amount of time.
Testimony, O
20-21 (Dirmeier, Madan).
466.
Even if there were no fuel offsets in 'the year 2015, LILCO's analysis would still show a $4 million detriment due to early operation of Shoreham.
Testimony, 19 (Dirmeier, Madan);
SC LP Ex. 23.
3 467.
In short, LILCO's analysis fail's to. support any claim of economic benefit from early operation of Shoreham.
In
. fact, there is an economic detriment of up to $49 million asso-3 ciated with earlier operation of Shoreham.
Earlier operation of Shoreham, if it leads to earlier rate recognition, will 3
- 175 -
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f 0-I simply result in placing that increased burden on customers -
.O earlier rather the;sr later.
Testimony, 21 (Dirmeier, Madan).
C.
Other Results of the Grant of the Exemption that are Contrary to the Public Interest
'O 468.
Mr. Kessel, Executive Director of the Ndw York State Consumer Protection Board, testified on whether, in the view of
- O.
the state of New York, the public interest would be served by
't granting the exemption., Tr. 2877-2919 (Kessel).
469.
The' function of the agency headed by Mr. Kessel is to represent the public interest.
Tr. 2885 (Kessel).
470.
Mr. Kessel testified that the State of New York has O
already taken a number of measures to enduce the state's depen-dency on foreign oil, including, the development of a statewide energy conservation plan, the encouragement of coal conver-13 sions, and the use of hydro-electric power as an alternative to oil.
Tr. 2890-91 (Kessel).
471.
LILCO's proposed exemption is not in the public in-
.O terest because it is not _ in the public interest to permit con-tamination of a nuclear facility before the uncertainties sur-rounding its future operation have been reso1ved.
Tr. 2912
)
i (Kessel).
Permitting the contamination of the Shoreham plant i
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before resolution of the uncertainties surrounding its future
)
.s commercial operat.c,'n would not be in the public interest be-j i
cause, if Shoreham were to be opersted at low power and subse-quently abandoned, costs would increase unnecessarily.
Tr.
2912 (Kessel).
For example, the value of the nuclear fuel would be substantially reduced, and the salvage value of the irradiated equipment would be reduced.
Tr. 2912-13 (Kessel).
472. LILCO's rush to license Shoreham has already resulted in a decline in the quality of service to its customers, and
)
further expenditures'will'eause further unacceptable deteriora-tion of electric service which is.not in the public interest.
Tr. 2913-14 (Kessel).
)
473. Austerity measures that have been and will be imple-l mented by LILCO have already affected its non-nuclear operations.
LILCO's proposal to accelerate low power testing
)
will likely require the expenditure of additional funds, which LILCO would have to obtain by further reducing its non-nuclear related costs; that would impair even more the already reduced
)
quality of service being provided to LILCO's custcmers.
- Thus, LILCO's proposal to accelerate low power testing will cause further unacceptable deterioration of electric service which is
)
not in the public interest.
Tr. 2913-14 (Kessel).
)
177 -
~
l l
474. It is not in the pubile interest to allow a finan-cially weakened m)I nearly bankrupt company to operate a nucle-ar facility.
Tr. 2916 (Kessel).
475. Consumers' fears regarding Shoreham's operation will not be alleviated with the knowledge that LILCO's financial condition may preclude it from expending the funds necessary to operate Shoreham safely.
Tr. 2916 (Kessel).
476. LILCO's financial problems have recently caused a strike of the company's unionized employees.
This indicates that LILCO's precarious financial condition has already under-mined the reliability of its personnel and operations.
Tr.
2916 (Kessel).
477.
There is no dispute that LILCO is presently in a fi-nancially serious condition.
Tr. 1378-1386 (No zzolillo).
At the time of the filing of its annual report with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 10-K (i.e., on or about March 30, 1984), the company believed it only had "on hand sufficient cash and short-term investments to continue the company's operations until the fall of 1984."
SC LP Ex. 24, at 6.
478.
In its quarterly report to the Securities and Ex-change Commission on Form 10-Q for. the three months ended March
- 178 -
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31, 1984, LILCO identified August 31, 1984 as the dare beyond
- O which it will not ) ave " sufficient cash and short-term invest-monts to continue the company's operations."
SC LP Ex. 26, at
- O.
22.
479.
The Form 10-Q also reveals that $90 million of LILCO's outstanding bonds will mature on September 1,1984.
SC b
LP Ex. 24, at 6; Tr. 1381 (Nozzolillo).
j 480.
LILCO has unilaterally ceased construction payments i
for its share of Nine Mile Point Two, even though such action
- O threatens acceleration of $500 million of LILCO's outstanding i
debt.
SC LP Ex. 24, at 58.
- O 481. LILCO has instituted austeri6y measures intended to i
save $100 million in cash.
SC LP Ex. 24, at 2.
L 482. LILCO's financial situation has forced it to omit
- O l
common stock dividends, which would otherwise have amounted to approximately $180 mill.ian, during the remainder of 1984.
SC f0 LP Ex. 24 at 6, 42.
483.
LILCO's financial situation has deteriorated to the point that its outside auditor, Price Waterhouse, qualified its
[3 report on the company's financial statements to the effect that the opinion was " subject to the company's continued financial O
- 179 -
l
l i
viability.*
SC LP Ex. 24, at 49.
'In its report to LILCO, I
)
Price Waterhouse h erated specific matters, the outcome of which was indeterminable, as were their effects on the finan-cial position or results of operation of LILCO.
Specifically, Price Waterhouse noted:
(a)
That the staff of the New York Public Service
)
Commission, on February 10, 1984, alleged " serious misman-agement and inefficiency throughout" the Shoreham project; (b)
That LILCO had been notified that other partici-
)
pants in the Nine Mile Point Two project consider LILCO to have defaulted in its financial obligations to the project; that LILCO's suspension of its payments for.Nine Mile Point Two may have constituted a violation of LILCO's agreements with lending l
l banks; that the banks have effectively given LILCO a renewable (at the bank's option) 30-day grace period; and that in the ab-sence of such a grace period, other "long term debts of the
{
company could become due and payable as a result of cross-defaults and result in rights of acceleration of
(
maturities of such debt"r and (c)
That recovery of $118 hillion in costs of
~
abandoned nuclear projects and $111 million advanced to a sup-plier of uranium concentrates were (as evidenced elsewhere in the Form 10-K) uncertain.
SC LP Ex. 24, at 49.
)
l l
l
- 180 -
I
.- --- - - -.--.- -- ~ -.. -
~
484.
Price Waterhouse concluded, therefore, that LILCO
'"cannot give any [faurance of its ability to meet its capital and operating requirements."
SC LP Ex. 24, at 49.
)
485.
LIICO has stated that it would require $700 million in 1984 casa to meet anticipated capital expenditures and re-funding requirements.
SC LP Ex. 24, at 46.
As of December 31,
)
1983, the company had approximately $275 milliot in cash and temporary cash investments ( M. at 52); by February 20, 1984, the $275 million figure had been reduced to $214 million (SC LP
)
Ex. 25, at 1); and by March 31, 1984~, cash and short-term in-vestments amounted to only $174 million.
SC LP Ex. 26, at 4.
486.
According to LILCO's Form 10-K, all of LILCO's ex-
~
isting lines of credit have been drawn down.
SC LP Ex. 24, at l
8.
I 487.
LILCO's.?orm 10-K states
. given the various adverse factors now impacting,the company, little or no assur-l ance can be given regarding the company's ability to raise ad-ditional funds in 1984 and in future years in order to meet construction and other capital requirements and other opera-t tional needs.*
SC LP Ex. 24, at 6.
l
- 181 -
1 l
J 488.
The New York Public Service Commission is " currently 3
investigating the frudency of costs incurred by the company in the construction of Shoreham."
SC LP Ex. 24, at 22.
In that g
proceeding, the Staff of the PSC has recommended that "no more than $2.296 billion of the Shoreham costs be allowed in rate base" because of LILCO's alleged " serious mismanagement and in-3 efficiency.throughout the project.
SC LP Ex. 24, at 48.
The estimated overall cost of Shoreham is $4.1 billion.
Id. at 19.
The PSC Staff's recommendation, if adopted by the PSC, would y) mean that LILCO would have to absorb $1.8 billion of Shoreham-related costs.
According to LILCO's Form 10-K, any disallowance has a potential to " jeopardize the company's abil-LO ity to meet its binancial obligations."
Id., at 23.
489.
On February 9, 1984, LILCO suspended payments for its 18% share of construction costs of Nine Mile Point Two, a o
nuclear generating unit under construction near Oswego, New York.
The co-tenants of Nine Mile Point Two, in addition to LILCO, are Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, who acts as agent O
for the co-tenants, New York State Electric and Gas Corpora-tion, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, and Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation.
SC LP Ex. 24, at 27.
As O
a result of this suspension, " Niagara Mohawk has notified the company that it considers the company to be in default of its~
J
- 182 -
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O obligations to the other co-tenants and has demanded payment."
S Id.
Niagara also IIas advised LILCO that Niagara Mohawk "may institute litigation against the company.
(which] would result in encumbering, diminishing or eliminating" LILCO's in-D terest in Nine Mile Point Two.
Id.
As of Decerber 31, 1983, the cost of LILCO's share of Nine Mile Point Two was $585 mil-lion.
_I_d..
- 490, Counsel for the banks who made loans to LILCO for purposes of Nine Mile Point Two has questioned whether LILCO's O
suspension of payments for Nine Mile Point Two violates the
~
terms of LILCO's debt obligation.
SC LP Ex. 24, at 57.
In order to forestall immediate acceleration of LILCO's debt,' how-
[)
ever, LILCO and the landing banks for Nine Mile Point Two have agreed that for so long as holders of two-thirds of the Nine Mile Point Two debt continue to,tgree, no default on the debt
)
will be declared for successive 30-day periods beginning April l
27, 1984.
Id.
491.
As of December 31, 1983, LILCO had invested $585 l
million (including payments for fuel and debt service) in Nine l-Mile Point Two.
Since then, it paid $11.5 million in January i
1984.
LILCO is obligated to pay an additional $65 million in financing costs for Nine Mile Point Two during 1984.
SC LP Ex.
24, at 27.
[)
l
- 183 -
i 9
492.
As revealed in LILCO's recent report to the Securi-D ties and Exchange 2ommission on Form 10-Q, the total estimated cost for completing Nine Mile Point Two has risen to about $5.1 billion.
SC LP'Ex. 26, at 8.
LILCO's 184 share of that amount D
is estimated to be $918 million.
As noted, LILCO is already in default in the payment for.its share of this project.
Tr. 1385 (Nozzolillo).
31 493.
It is not in the public interest to allow a finan-cially weakened and nearly bankrupt company to operate a nucle-O ar facility, since LILCO's financial conditiori may preclude it from expending the funds necessary to operate Shoreham safely at low power.
It does not make sense, nor is it in the public interest, to impose additional safety responsibilities upon a company which is so close to insolvency.
Tr. 2916 (Kessel).
f Respectfully submitted, Martin Bradley Ashare 4
Suffolk County Department of Law Veterans Memorial Highway l
Hauppauge, New York 11788 j
S l
! 10 l
Berbert H. Brown v Lawrence Coe Lainpher I
Karla J. Letsche
)
Cherif Sedky KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, I
CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.,
Suite 800 Washington, D.C.
20036
)
Attorneys for Suffolk County i
- 184 -
~
3
/
/
/
l j
A d s$&
Fabian G. Palomino
..s Special Counsel to the Governor of New York State Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Bui1 ding Albany, New York 12224 Dated:
August 31, 1984 Attorney for Mario M. Cuomo Governor of the State of New York
)
O
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j-9 UNIT 5D STATES OF A11 ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before The Atomic Safety And Licensing Board a t,. c.- -
unc
'84 SEP -4 NO M1
)
In the Matter _of
)
)
g,j..
L' r.
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-4 jy,['E -
)
(Low Power)
~
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Brief of Suffolk County in Opposition to LILCO's Motion for Low Power Operating License and Application for Exemption and Suffolk County and State of New York Proposed Findings of Fact have been served on the following this 31st4 day of August 1984, by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted.
Judge Marshall E.
Miller, Chairman
- Edwin Reis, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Counsel for NRC Staff U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Executive Legal Washington, D.C.
20555 Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Judp Glenn O.
Bright Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Edward M. Barrett, Esq.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Long Island Lighting company 250 Old Country Road Judge Elizabeth B.
Johnson Mineola, New York 11501 Oak Ridge National Laboratory P.O.
Box X, Building 3500 Honorable Peter F. Cohalan Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Suffolk County Executive H.
Lee Dennison Building Eleanor L.
Frucci, Esq.
Veterans Memorial Highway Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Hauppauge, New York ll76S U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 0
By Hand, 8/31/84 L
1
(
Fabian Palomino, Esq.
James B.
Dougherty, Esq.
l l
Special Counsel to the Governor 3045 Porter Street, N.W.
{
Executive Chamber' Washington, D.C.
20008 Room 229 State Capitol Mr. Brian McCaffrey Albany, New York 12224 Long Island Lighting Company Shoreham Nuclear Power Station W.
Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.
P.O.
Box 618 Anthony F.
Earley, Jr.,
Esq.
North Country Road Robert M. Rolfe, Esq.
Wading River, New York 11792 Hunton & Williams
}
P.O. Box 1535 Jay Dunkleberger, Esq.
707 East Main Street New York State Energy Office Richmond, Virginia 23212 Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Mr. Martin Suubert Albany, New York 12223 c/o Congressman William Carney 1113 Longworth House Office Bldg.
Stephen B.
Latham, Esq.
I Washington, D.C.
20515 John F.
Shea, Esq.
Twomey, Latham and Shea J
Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
33 West Second Street l
Suffolk County Attorney Riverhead, New York 11901 H.
Lee Dennison Building Veterans Memorial Highway Docketing and Service Branch Hauppauge, New York 11783 Office of the Secretary U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 r~'\\
)
Kar'la J. Letscf KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.,
Suite 800 Washington, D.C.
20036 DATE: August 31, 1984 i
_2_
_ _ _ _ _.