ML20236J155
| ML20236J155 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1987 |
| From: | HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236J160 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#387-4147 OL-5, NUDOCS 8708060072 | |
| Download: ML20236J155 (388) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA L. p NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board t. In the Matter of )
. . . -)
. LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise) m (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,. ) .
Unit 1) ) LILCO'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT !. . AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE FEBP.UARY 13,1986 EMERGENCY g, PLANNING EXERCISE FOR SHOREHAM HUNTON & WILLIAMS 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 August 3,1987 8708060072 DR 870803 ADOCK 05000322 PDR
L t i L L q UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
]
q l 1 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
- f. ) :
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 -
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) l Unit 1) ) H
,. LILCO'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE FEBRUARY 13,1986 EMERGENCY PLANNING EXERCISE FOR SHOREHAM v
HUNTON & WILLIAMS 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 August 3,1987 g,;
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J UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION i I Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board k '
. In the Matter of -- )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
.(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) ) LILCO'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE FEBRUARY 13,1986 EMERGENCY PLANNING EXERCISE FOR SHOREHAM_ TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1 Introduc tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................. I.1 Procedural His t ory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 H. Legal S t a nd a rd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 T he C o n te n tio ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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I.' Scope of the Exercise (EX 15.A-1, K. M; 16.A-L,N)..,............................................. 12 A. Standards for Judging Full Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 B. Plan Elements Allegedly Omitwd From the Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 C. The Shoreham Exercise and the Regulatory Requirements for " Full Participation" Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 I Sample Size (EX 21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 L II.= .
'111. Roadway Impediments (EX 41. A, B, E). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 66 IV. Backup Route' Alert Notification (EX 34) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
g , m Page V. Mobilization'of Traffic Guides (EX 40.A, B, E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
. VI.: Wind Shif t (EX 36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
- VII. Monitoring at Nassau Coliseum (EX 22.A; 49). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 A. ' Avallabillt" of Nassau Coliseum (EX 22.A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 B.- Timely Monitoring of Evacuees (EX 49) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 VIII. Registering, Monitoring, and Decontaminating Evacuees f rom Special Facilities (EX 47) . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 IX. ' Adequacy of Public Information (EX 38; 39; 40.C; 2 2.F ; 4 4 ; 4 9. C ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8 A. ENC Operation (EX 38. A-J, L-Q) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 B. Rumor Control (EX 39.A-C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 C. Shadow Phenomenon (EX 40.C; 22.F; 44; 49.C). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 X., Training (EX 5 0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8 A. Contention EX 5 0 Subparts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 B.1 A t t ri tio n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 7 C. LERO's Performance in the Exercise Was as j- Good or Be'tter Than Other Offsite Emergency L Response Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 Appendix A: Text of Contentions Appendix B: List of Witnesses l
l Appendix C: List of Exhibits I l l'
l i i
. INTRODUCTION I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY I
- 1. This Decision addresses the question whether the February 13,1986 Exer-cise of the offsite emergency plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station revealed a i fundamental flaw in that Plan. In deciding that question, we are mindful of the NRC regulations governing emergency planning, namely 10 CFR S 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, !
I Appendix E, and we give considerable weight to the FEMA-NRC guidelines in NUREG 0654/ FEM A-REP-1 (Rev.1,1980).
- 2. This case represents the first time that an NRC applicant has had to take the entire responsibility for offsite emergency preparedness. Long Island Lighting Company ("LILCO") has done this by preparing an offsite emergency response plan, known as the "SNPS Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan," ("LILCO Plan"), and by setting up an organization that would implement the Plan in an emergen-cy, known as "LERO" (Local Emergency Response Organization). LERO is composed primarily of LILCO employees and contractors, working with support organizations such as the American Red Cross, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Department of Energy, and various bus, ambulance, and service companies. See LILCO Plan Chap. 2.
- 3. Onsite preparedness was addressed in " Phase 1" of this proceeding, when Interveners Suffolk County, the Shoreham Opponents Coalition, the North Shore Coall-tion, and the Town of Southampton raised " sues about LILCO's onsite emergency plan, as well as those elements of offsite preparedness for which LILCO has responsibility and which could be litigated at that time, before the preparation of an offsite plan. l Those matters were resolved in November 1982, when the Interveners refused to go for-ward with the litigation of those issues and were held in def ault. Long Island Lightine Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-115,16 NRC 1923 (1982). .
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- 4. The adequacy of offsite preparedness was extensively considered by the Licensing Board in proceedings spanning 1983 through 1985. Interveners Suffolk Coun--
l ty, the Shoreham Opponents Coalition, the Town of Southampton, the North Shore Co-alltion, and New York State raised issues regarding virtually every planning aspect of j i the LILCO Plan. Af ter hearing 86 witnesses during 80 days of hearings, spanning and j amassing a record of over 15,714 transcript pages plus 7,519 pages of prefiled written I testimony, the Licensing Board issued a Partial Initial Decision ("PID") on offsite emer-gency planning. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), 21 NRC 644 (1985). The PID included findings of fact and conclusions of law on i issues of human behavior, credibility, conflict of interest, EPZ boundary, LERO workers, training, notification, information to the public, sheltering, protective action recommendations, evacuation, special facilities, schools, ingestion pathway, loss of offsite power, strike by LILCO employees, and legal authority issues.
- 5. Af ter further hearings on the issue of relocation centers, the Licensing l Board issued a concluding Partial Initial Decision on emergency planning, ruling on the relocation center issues and on whether the LILCO Plan provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological l I
emergency at Shoreham. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, i Unit 1), LBP-85-31, 22 NRC 410 (1985). The Board found that it did not. The Board found that there is not "anything unique about the demography, topography, access routes or jurisdictional boundaries in the area in which Shoreham is located. To the contrary, the record fails to reveal any basis to conclude that it would be impossible to ] fashion and implement an effective offsite emergency plan for the Shoreham Plant." The Board noted that its inability to find reasonable assurance stemmed in large part l from Suffolk County's and New York State's opposition to the plant. Ld. at 427. Por-tions of these decisions on offsite emergency planning were appealed; certain
s J aspects were remanded for further consideration before another Licensing Board, and some are still pending appeal.1
- 6. On June 20, 1985, the NRC Staff, at LILCO's request, asked FEMA to con- j duct an Exercise to test.offsite emergency preparedness at .Shoreham based upon the LILCO Plan. On February 13, 1986, a team of- 38 Federal evaluators observed and
. graded LERO's performance pursuant to that Plan, in a one day Exercise held between 5:30 AM and 4:00 PM. The results of the Exercise are set forth in a Post-Exercise As- ,
sessment issued by the Federal Emergency Management Ager.cy on April 17, 1986 (" FEM A Report").
- 7. In a motion dated March 7,1986, Suffolk County, New York State, and the Town of Southampton (" Interveners") requested that the Commission advise the parties ;
- to this proceeding of their procedural responsibilities concerning any hearings on the
'1/ LILCO took appeals on three issues from the PID (legal authority, conflict of in-terest, and lack of state plan) and one issue from the concluding PID (concerning the number of persons who might seek monitoring). Interveners appealed a host of issues from both PIDs. The Appeal Board severed LILCO's legal authority appeals trom the factual appeals, and affirm 6 the Licensing Board's findings on LILCO's peemption, re- ,
' alism, and immateriality arguments. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear I Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-818, 22 NRC 651 (1985). On review the Commission re-versed, deferring consideration of the preemption question while remanding on the re-alism and immateriality arguments. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22 (1986). The Licensing Board has not yet initiated proceedings on the realism remand.
. The Appeal Board initially took up only Interveners' f actual appeals; it affirmed the Licensing Board on most findings but remanded four issues: (1) EPZ size; (2) tole conflict / school bus drivers; (3) hcspital evacuation plans; and (4) den'al l of discovery and evidentiary rulings relating to reception center issues. Long Island Lightine Co.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832,23 NRC 135 (1986). On petitions for review the Commission accepted review of just three issues, two concerning EPZ size and the third concerning hospital evacuation plans. Order of September 19, 1986. { Commission review is pending. Upon the Commission's suggestion in CLI-86-13, the Appeal Board considered LILCO's appeals. ruling in LILCO's favor on conflict of inter-est and remanding on the absance of a state plan. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham z Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-847,24 NRC 42 (1986). The issue of the number of persons expected to seek monitoring was litigated recently before the 03 Board; that
.. Board has yet to respond to the Appeal Board's state plan iuling. 'o
1 J February 13, 1986 Exercise. LILCO and the NRC Staff responded later that month, LILCO requested the appointment of n Board to hear exercise-related matters and the con'd uct of expeditr,d hearings. On June 6,1987, the Commission ordered "immediate initiation of the exercise hearing to conside" evidence which Interveners might wish to ' offer to show that there is a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Emergency Plan;" directed the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel to appoint a Board to do so, reappointing members of the earlier Board if available; ano directed that Board "to expedite the hearing to the maximum extent consistent with f airness to the parties, and to issue its decision upon the completion of the proceeding." Long_ Island liccang
% (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-11,23 NRC 577,582 (1986).
- 8. The litigation of the Exercise issues proceeded. On August 1,1986, the Interveners U submitted 162 pages of contentions, numbered one through 50 with nu-merous subparts. Some parts of the contentions were ruled inadmissible by the Board.W The remaining contentions are addressed in this Decision.S
- 9. The hearings began on March 10, 1987 and cor.iinued over the course of four months, until June 18, 1987, when the record was closed. Thirty-four witnesses testified, many of them on multJple issues;5,! the transcript numbered 8,694 pages, not counting pre-filed written testimony which added 3,218 pages more, and the exhibits, which numbered 149.0 i
j 2/ In this phase of the emergency planning litigation, Suffolk County, New York State and the Town of Southampton were the parties sponsoring contentions. We refer to therr. throughout this decision as " Interveners." The Town of Southampton did not participate in the hearings. 3/ Prehearing Conference Order, Oct. 3,1986. 3/ The text of the admitted contentions is Appendix A to this Decision. l J 5/ The list of witnesses is Appendix B to this Decision. I S/ The list of exhibits is Appendix C to this Decision. i 1 I 1
- 10. On this extensive record the Board concludes that none of the issues raised in the Exercise litigation identified a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan that would be a bar to issuance of a full power, full term operating license for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
- 11. All of the proposed findings of f act and conclusions of law submitted by i the parties have been considered in formulating this Decision. Those not incorporated I directly or inferentially in this decision are rejected as' unsupported in f act or law or as unnecessary to the rendering of this Decision.
- 12. This Decision is limited to resolving contested emergency planning mat-ters that arose from events that occurred during the February 13, 1986 Exercise and that have been admitted in this proceeding. All other matters that need to be consid- ,
ered before the issuance of an operating license are the responsibilities of other Licens-Ing Boards or the NRC Staff.
- 13. The Board evaluated the testimony of each witness in light of the follow-ing f actors: education, experience, reputation in the field of expertise, f amiliarity with I
I the underlying facts, corroboration, bias, and interest in the outcome. In many cases, the apparently conflicting opinions among witnesses for different parties can be 1 attributed to divergent assumptions of underlying facts. In some irrstances, well quall- j fled experts in a particular field of study gave an opinion in an unrelated area without foundation to support that opinion. When called upon to reconcile conflicting testimony, the Board has explained the basis for selecting the evidence of one party over that of another,
- 14. Whi: "MA did not reach an overall, or " bottom line ' finding regarding the February 13, 1986 Exercise 2 we nevertheless interpret 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(aX2) to )
I/ Indeed, in our decision on Contention EX 19, we conclude that TEMA was not le-gaily required to make a " bottom line" finding. i f l
-G-J l
require us to afford a rebuttable presumption to the f actual findings contained in FEMA's Post Exercise Assessment the Shoreham Exe'cise. Where FEMA's evidence was { V \ a deciding factor in the ruling on a contention, the Board has set that forth in this ) Decision. II. I,EG A L ST A N D A R D 15, lit the outset it will be helpful to state certain principles of emergency planning that arise out of the NRC regulations and case law, and to explain more fully the limited scope of this proceeding. Predictive Nature of Emergency Planning Findings i
- 16. Emergency pMnning, findings are different from other safety findings that Licensing Boards must make in the extent to which they are inherently predictive.
Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, f 17 NRC 1076,1103 (1983). The applicant is not required to prove, and the Board is not required to find, that the present state of emergency planning at the time of a licens-ing proceeding is fully adequate. [d. Rather, the Board is required only to find that there are no " insurmountable difficulties" to the successful completion of planning, no
" barrier . . . that cannot be feasibly be removed." Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo l Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756, 764 (1982);
Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076,1104 (1983).
- 17. In mandating these hearings on the February 13, 1986 Exercise, the Come mission reiterated that emergency planning . findings are predictive:
1 [ We disagree with the [ Interveners'] proposition that re-l striction of any emergency planning exercise hearings re-I quested by Interveners to " fundamental flaws" requires rulemaking or is otherwise inappropriate. In the preamble to the rule reviewed by the UCS court, and in our rule change responding to the court's decision, we emphasized the predictive nature of emergency planning findings. S_ee e ________-_-________-_L
7_ l 47 Fed. Reg, 30232. (July 13,1982): 50 Fed. Reg.19323 (May 8,1985). . The court never questioned this concept. The court alsc observed that there was nothing to prevent the Commission from excluding from exercise litigation any issue which was not material to licensing decisions. See 735 F.2d at 1447-18. Under our regulation and practice, staff review cf exercise results is consistent with the pre-t dictive nature of emeigency planning and is restricted to de-F termining if the exercise revealed any deficiency which pre-cludes a finding of reasonable assurance that protective ! measures can and will be taken, b, fundamental flaws in the plan. Since only fundamental flaws are material licens-ing issues, the hearing may be restricted to those issues.
' Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-11,23 NRC 577, 581 (198o). Thus, we are called upon in this exercise litigation, as in prior emer-gency planning litigation, to make predictive findings. _
Reasonable, Not Absolute Assurance
- 18. Reasonable assurance, as required by NRC regulations, does nct mean per-fcct assurance or zero riek. Indeed, an underlying assumption of the emergency plan-ning regulations is that in a serious accident some people might receive harmful doses of radiation. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10,17 NRC 528,533 (1983).E The objective of emergency plan-ning is " maximum dose savings." Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Povver Station, Unit 1), ALAB-727,17 NRC 760, 770 (1983). One Licensing Board has observed that under worst case f ast moving accidents no emergency plan can be expected to work very well. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point . Plant),
f LBP-83-44,18 NRC 201,207 (1983). i H/ As a general matter, "the courts have long accepted the Commission's definition of its statutory mandate . . . as requiring not a risk free environment, but a reasonable assurance . . . that the reactor could be safely operated at the proposed location." Carstens v. NRC, 742 F.2d 1546 (D.C. Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.1136 (1985); s_e_e also Union Electric Company (Calloway Plant, Unit 1), LBP-83-71,18 NRC 1105.1112 j (1983) (it is not a governmental requirement that emergency response plans formulate protective actions for every conceivable development during a radiological release). V _ -____ _ _ 2
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- 19. Thus, the NRC does not require that LILCO provide a perfect emergency l
plan or perfect assurance, and many of the shortcomings Interveners sought to develop in this litigation are immaterial. Indeed, many items raised by the IntGrvenors show only'that problems may arise in implementing an emergency plan -- f. point that may l I well be conceded without shedding any light 07 whether NRC regulations are met. In l light of the principles outlined above, we do not spend much time in this Decision cn the sorts of planning details that are best lef t to planners, but focus instead on the lim-ited question of whether the Exercise revealed any fundamental flaws in the LILCO Plan. Fundamental Flaw
- 20. As we stated initially, our charge was "to consider evidence which Inter-
.venors might wish to offer to show that there is a fundamer . flaw in the LILCO j Emergency Plan," Lonc [sland LIRhting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577 (1986). The Commission traditionally has viewed emergency planning exercises as relevant only to the extent that they reveal fundamental defects in the way an emergency plan is conceived. Union of_ Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F 2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.1984), cert, denied. 469 U.S.1132 (1985).
- 21. A fundamental flaw is a pervasive, systemic, conceptual flaw in a plan that, because it substantially affects public health and safety, would prevent issuance of a license if lef t untended. A fundamental flaw is not readily correctable by equip
- ment or training or simple, straightforward plan changes, but requires more basic changes to a pian becau.se it is a fundamental defect in the way an emergency plan is conceived.
- 22. Thus, in considering the allegations raised by Interveners in the conten-tions, we have applied a three part test in determining whether a fundamental f!aw has been established. First, ooviously the alleged flaw must be "f undamental." The heart of i
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an emergency plan is the protection of the public health and safety, Therefore, the threshold test is this: If the exercise had been a real emergency, would the alleged
" flaw" have substantially affected the health and safety of the public?
- 23. Second, the problem must be systemic or pervasive, rather than merely one or more isolated and essentially independent problems. Interveners must have shown that an essential component of the Plan is flawed conceptually; " minor or ad hoc problems occurring on the execcise day" are not fundamental flaws in an emergency plan. , Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearen Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-49, 22 NRC 899 (1985); LBP-86-11, 23 NRC 294 (1986). Problems "which only reflect the actual state of emergency preparedness on a particular day in question" are not funda-mental flaws. Enlon of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d.1437 (D.C. Cir.1984),
cert, denied, 469 U.S.1132 (1985).
- 24. Third, the alleged problem must not be readily cc rectable by means of additional Jaining, the purchase of new equipment, or some other reliable and verifiable method. Rather it is a problem that is susceptible of correction only through substantial, potentially far-reaching revision of the written emergency plan. Even so, there is no obvious reason why a fundamental flaw should be thought of as being irremediable; as with any other shortcoming, whether it has been corrected turns on the f acts of the remedial action taken.
- 25. Nor is there a fundamental flaw simply because FEMA has identified a
" deficiency" or other shortcoming. FEMA classifies problems it observes during an ex-ercise as " areas recommended for Improvement," " areas requiring corrective actions (ARCAs)," or " deficiencies." Sie FEMA Guidance Memoranduin EX-1, Remedial Exer-cises (July 15. 1985). Under FEM A's definition and usage, none of these characterize-tions automatically corresponds to the NRC concept of " fundamental flaw."
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- 26. By definition, individual "ARCAs and " areas recommended for improve- I ment" do not constitute "' fundamental flawr." FEMA defines ARCA as a " demonstrated and observed inadequacy of state and local government performance which, although its correct!on is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, is not considered by itseu to adversely impact public health and safety." FEMA Guidance Memorandum l-EX-1 at 1. " Areas recommended for improvement" denotes a problem area observed !
l during an exercise that is not considered to adversely impact health and safety. Ld. at i 1-2. Neither of these terms indicates a problem that adversely affects public health and safety, and neither indicates a conceptual flaw in a plan rendering the emergency response unimplementab'e. Thus, neither constitutes a fundamental flaw. l
- 27. A " deficiency" does not automatically constitute a fundamental flaw.
FEMA defines deficiencies as " demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would i cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide rea- , sonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public." FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-1 at 1. While a deficiency obviously is more serious than an ARCA, a deficiency is not necessarily the same thing as a " fundamental flaw." Some problems meeting the definition " deficiency" , may be readily correctable. (If a deficiency is demonstrably correctable, FEMA does not require a remedial exercise.) More importantly, a deficiency under FEMA's defini-tion merely describes a present condition that is "not adequate" to provide reasonable assurance, but that does not necessarily require a far-reaching change to a plan to rem-edy; a " fundamental flaw," under the Commission's definition, describes a present con-dition that " precludes" a finding of reasonable assurance and thus requires basic changes to the PVi o remedy. See Long Island Lightina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577, 581 (1986). , 1
- 28. We applied the " fundamental flaw" standard as a threshold pleading requirement at the outset of this proceeding to the contentions submitted by Interve-nors to determine whether they should be admitted. LILCO and the NRC Staff argued that few of the contentions submitted by Interveners alleged " fundamental flaws."
Over their objections, we admitted most of the contentions submitted, in accordance with the Commission's directive "to admit only those Intervenor contentions which satisf[ led] the specificity and other requirements of 10 CFR 2.714 by (1) pleading that the exercise demonstrated fundamental flaws in LILCO's plan, and (2) prnviding a basis for the contentions which, if shown to be true, would demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the plan." Long Island Lightine Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-11,23 NRC 577,581 (1986) (emphasis added).
- 29. Applying the fundamental flaw test to the r.ow fully developed record, however, we find that Interveners have not identified any fundamental flaws in the LILCO Plan. To be sure, the Exercise highlighted details that could be improved and j adjustments from which the Plan might benefit. But none of these items rises to the level of a fundamental flaw -- a conceptual problem in the Plan requiring basic revi-sions and threatening the public health and safety if not changed.
- 30. Having sif ted the evidence, however, we find that the Plan xould benefit from making the following Improvements to emergency planning at Shoreham:
- 1. A Traffic Engineer position should be added to the EGC traffic group.
l 2. LiLCO should stress lateral and vertical communication throughout the traffic group in the EOC in its training. 3 Additional copying machines should be added to the ENC.
- 4. LILCO should continue to work on improving the mobilization speed of its field workers particularly Traffic Guides and Road Crews.
- 5. LILCO should provide radiological training to school bus drivers, l For reasons set out in more detail below, these are all items that can be lef t to the l
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NRC Staff and routine FEMA evti;uation process for verification and do not require a formal remedial exercise prior to issuance of a full power license.
- 31. A contention by contention analysis follows.
THE CONTENTIONS I. SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE (EX 15.A-i. K. M; 16.A-L. N)
- 32. Contentions EX 15 and 16 allege that the February 13, 1986 Exercise of the LILCO Plan was not a " full participation" exercise as defined in NRC regulations.
Interveners allege that the Exercise did not yield meaningful results on implementation capability as required by 16 C.F.R. S 50A7 in that it did not include (1) demonstrations or evaluations of major portions of the LILCO Plan or (2) the emergency response capa- i bility of many persons and entities relied upon for Plan implementation.E In resolving these issues, we will focus on whether given activites were performed by LERO and ob-served by FEMA during the February 13 Exercise; we will not address whether given objectives were met during that Exercise.
- 33. Both FEMA and the NRC Staff agree with LILCO that the February 13, 1986 Exercise was a full participation exercise. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 105; NRC EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 7. For the reasons deteiled below, we concur and ac-cordingly, find for LILCO on Contentions EX 15/10.
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i 2/ These latter allegations regarding the lack of participation by various individu- l als and entities were '" consolidated" or " subsumed" in our December 11.1986 Order with i the allegations concerning the lack of demonstration of various elements of the Plan. l Memorandum and Order at <. i 1
w - A. Standards'for Judging " Full Participation" l
- 34. The primary areas of controversy on these contentions center on deter-mining the applicable regulations, regulatory guidance and other guidance for judging
.whether the Shoreham Exercise was a " full participation" exercise and then inter-preting the language of those sources. Consequently, we begin by identifying the regu-lations and regulatory guidance that may bear on the question of what is a " full partici- l
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pation" exercise. We.will then address three major areas of controversy among the parties: (1) whether FEMA guidance has any applicability to our decision on whether the Shoreham Exercise was a " full participation" exercise; (2) what the phrase "the i major observable portions" means in 10 C.F.R. Part. 50, App. E S IV.F.1. n.4; and (3) whether 10 C.F.R. Part 50. App. E S IV.F.1 requires plants not yet possessing full power licenses ("near term operating licenses" or "NTOLs") to conduct more comprehensive
" full participation" exercises than plants with full power operating licenses. Finally, we will decide whether a report prepared by International Energy Associates Limited
(" LEAL Report"), that prioritizes FEMA's 35 standard exercise objectives, should be used
- in our determination of whether the Shoreham Exercise was " full participation."
Regulatory Provisions j 35, The Commission's emergency planning regulations are set out in 10 C.F.R. < S 50.47 and Part 50, Appendix E. Section IV of Appendix E delineates requirements generally for the " Content of Emergency Plans" and contains specific provisions per- ! taining to exercises of Emergency Plans in paragraph F.1 and accompanying footnote 4. The regulations provide, in pertinent part, that:
'1. A full participation (Footnote 4) exercise which tests as much of the licensee. State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participa-tion shall be conducted for each site at which a power reac-tor is located for which the first' operating license for that site is issued af ter July 13, 1982. This exercise shall be can-ducted within two years before the issuance of the first op-erating license for full power (one authorizing operation
- - - - - - - . - - - - _ _ _ _ E_
above 5% of rated power) of the first reactor and shall in-clude participation by each State and local government within. the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. If the full par-ticipation exercise is conducted more than one year prior to l 1ssuance of an operating license for full power, an exercise which tests the licensee's onsite emergency plans shall be j conducted within one year before issuance of an operating i license for futi power. This exercise need not have State or local government participation. ! 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E S IV.F.1.; 52 Fed. Reg. 16,823,16,329 (May 6,1987) (emphasis added). Footnote 4 provides:
" Full participation" when used in conjunction with emergen- l cy preparedness exercises for a particular site means appro- i priate offsite local and State authorities and licensee per-sonnel physically and actively take part in testing their integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. " Full partic- ;
ipation" includes testing the major observable portions of l the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other resources i_n sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the , accid 3nt scenarin. 5 IV.F.1. n.4 (emphasis added).
- 36. FEMA also has regulations defining " full participation" exercises:
(j) " Full participation" refers to an exercise in which: (1) State and local government emergency personnel are en- ! gaged in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to i respond to the actions required by the accident scenario;(2) the integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant is tested-and (3) the implementation of the observable portions of l state and/or local plans 8 tested. 44 C.F,R. S 350.2(j)(emphasis added).
- 37. There is no NRC caselaw that interprets the term " full participation" ex-ercise. Thus, any applicable regulatory guidance is particularly helpful in this proceed-ing. l l
l l
Regulatory Guidance Joint NRC/ FEMA Guidance - NUREG-0654 38.' NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Rev.1, Nov.1980), entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Prepared-ness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," is a joint NRC-FEMA document used for evaluating emergency preparedness. Sef Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-37,20 NRC 933,939 and n.2 (1984). It has been adopted as Reg-ulatory Guide No.1.101 by the NRC Staff. It is used by FEMA, as well, in evaluating ra-dialogical emergency preparedness.
- 39. NUREG-0654 contains 16 Planning Standards conforming to the 16 stan-
. dards set forth in 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b) for emergency response plans, plus Evaluation Criteria providing guidance as to their detailed application. While NUREG-0654 criteria are intended for use primarily in draf ting and reviewing emergency plans (the general subject of Appendix E S IV), FEMA has said that NUREG-0654 criteria might also be used as guidance to evaluate emergency planning exercises (the subject of S F.1 and footnote 4 of 5 IV). See 48 Fed. Reg. 44,332, 44,334 (September 28, 1983).10 In-t- deed, one of the 16 Planning Standards in NUREG-0654 - Standard N - deals with "Ex-ercises and Drills." See LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at Att. C. Planning Standard N, which correlates to S 50.47(b)(14), states:
Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities . . . 4 l The Evaluation Criteria for this Planning Standard further state: 1 l l LQ/ FEMA has also said that NUREG-0654 "is intended to be consistent witn the NRC emergency planning rule [10 C.F.R. Parts 50 (Appendix E) and 70, as amended]." 48 Fed. Reg. at 44,333 (September 28, 1983). _ _____________-________L
i
- 1. a. An exercise is an event that tests the integrated capabili-ly and a maior portion of the basic elements existing within. emergency preparedness plans and organiza-l tions . . . .
- b. An exerc'.se shall include mobilization of State and local personnel and resaurces adeauate to verify the capability to respond to an accident scenario requiring response . .
.. The scenario should be varied from year to year such that all' maior elements of the plans and preparedness organizations are tested within a six-year period . . . .
NUREG-0654 at 71 (as revised by GM PR-1)(emphasis added). j l FEMA Guidance
- 40. FEMA, to which the Commission looks for guidance on emergency planning matters, publishes a periodically updated series of Guioance Memoranda (GM) dealing with radiological emergency preparedness generally. Among these are specific GM containing substantive, though non-binding, criteria for periodic exercises.N
- 41. The FEMA Guidance Memorandum relating to exercises that was in effect at the time of the Shoreham Exercise was GM PR-1. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont.
EX 15/16), at Att. E. GM PR-1 states that for the biennial offsite exercise required by . t NRC regulations, "the scenario should be varied from exercise to exercise such that the major elements of the plans and preparedness organizations are tested within a six year periort." Ld. at Att. E, p. 2. The Guidance Memorandum further states that: , Scenarios for periodic exercises should be sufficiently varied so that all of the major elements of the plans and prepared- l ness of offsite organizations are tested within a six year ; period. Ld. The six year period over which all of the major observable elements should be tested begins, according to GM PR-1, with the initial licensing exercise for an op-erating plant or an NTOL. Ld. I 1 I M/ The applicability of FEMA Guidance Memoranda to an Appendix E " full partici-pation" determination is discussed below.
--------__J
- 42. GM PR-1 incorporates by reference the 35 standard FEMA exercise objec-tives contained in a August 5,1983 Memorandum from Dave McLoughlin to the FEMA Regional Directors and Acting Regional Directors, LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont.
EX 15/16), at Att. F. These 35 objectives correspond generally to the observable ele- l ments of emergency plans described in NUREG-0654 and, according to FEMA, encom-pass all the major observable elements of offsite emergency plans. See i_d. at Att. E, p. I 2 and Att. F, p. 2. Thus, GM PR-1 does not require that all, or indeed any specified number, of the major emergency planning elements be fulfilled in connection with any one exercise, or in an initial exercise, but (like NUREG-0654) merely that they all be tested over a six year period. Exercise scenarios are, according to FEMA, to be pre-pared from the universe of 35 standard exercise objectives.
- 43. While GM PR-1 was in effect at the time of the Shoreham Exercise, a sub- ,
sequent draf t document called GM EX-3 (August 15, 1986), LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at Att. G, may supersede previous Guidance Memoranda on this sub-ject. I_d. at Att. G, p.1. Draf t GM EX-3 contains a slightly revised version of the 35 standard objectives to be incorporated into the design of exercises. According to this draf t, the objectives for a particular exercise should be selected from this list of 35 objectives in order to test "a significant portion" of emergency response capabilities. Id. at Att. G, p. 3. Moreover, in draf t GM .EX-3 the 35 standard objectives are prior-itized into two groups. " Group A," numbers 1-13, are deemed " core" objectives that are to be demonstrated in each biennial exercise; " Group B," numbers 14-35, are to be in-cluded in at least one exercise during a six year period. I_d. at Att. G, pp. 8-12. The
" core" objectives are deemed of a " fundamental nature" to emergency response; the others are not so fundamental and may be tested over the course of six years. I_d. at i
Att. G, p. 3. 12/ At this juncture, GM EX-3 is still in draf t form, although FEMA counsel stated that it would be finalized shortly. Tr. 5901 (Cumming).
l I Applicability of FEMA Guidance To " Full i Participation" Determinations Under Appendix E l
- 44. Interveners argue that the FEMA and NRC regulatory schemes are entirely
~
~ distinct, and that since the FEMA Guidance Memoranda do not expressly state that they provide guidance for Appendix E " full participation" determinations, they apply only to l FEMA's own Part 350 determinations and shed no light whatever on the standards for- i full participation exercises under the Commission's regulations. NYS EX Exh.'1 (Test.
Cont. EX 15/16), at 29. Indeed, in questioning LILCO witnesses, counsel for Suffolk County went so far as to suggest that, along with FEMA Guidance Memoranda, Planning Standard N of NUREG-0654 was inapplicable since it does not explicitly mention Appendix E " full participation" requirements. Tr. 6184, 6189, 6222, 6223, 6224,' 6226, 6243 (Lanpher).
' 4 5. On the other hand, LILCO witnesses argued that FEMA Guidance was directly applicable, as is NUREG-0654 Planning Standard N. They pointed (1) to explic-
. it references in FEMA Guidance Memoranda to the NRC's Appendix E regulations, Tr.
b 6199, 6200, 6222, 6235-38, 6242, 6804-05 (Daverlo, Behr); (2) to language appearing in Appendix E that is echoed by language in FEMA Guidance Memoranda, Tr. 6822-23 (Behr), and in NUREG-0654 Planning Standard N, Tr. 6184-85 (Daverio); and (3) to their
. understanding of the real world inter-relationship between FEMA and NRC as a result of their practical experience in the emergency planning area. Tr. 6184-85, 6190-92,
' 6231-33, 6242-44, 6815-23 (Daverio, Behr).
- 46. FEMA and NRC Staff witnesses agreed that the FEMA guidance documents and NUREG-0654 were applicable here. See FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 89-90; NRC EX Exh. I L
(Test. ( int. EX 15/16), at 5; Tr. 7492 (Keller), 7620-21 (Keller, Kowieski). h .
- 47. We agree with LILCO, FEMA and the NRC Staff. First, NUREG-0654, a joint FEMA /NRC document, is clearly applicable. NUREG-0654 was specifically con-
! sidered in the Commission's 1980 rulemaking proceeding in which the NRC's emergency t:_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
planning regulations were adopted, and was incorporated in those regulations in then footnote 1 to S 50.47(b) and then footnote 4 to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E S IV. See Tr. 7501 (Kowieski), 7620-21 (Keller); LILCO EX Exh.19. NUREG-0654 has also been held to carry " considerable weight." D_ uke Power Co. (Catawb3 Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-37, 20 NRC 933, 939 and n.3 (1984). In its 1984 rulemaking revising the emergency planning regulations, the Commission reiterated that NUREG-0654 "will continue to be used by reviewers in evaluating the adequacy of emergency preparedness at nuclear power sites" despite the deletion at that time of reference to NUREG-f'654 j l in the footnotes to the regulations. 49 Fed. Reg. 27,733,27.734 (July 6,1984). Indeed, l Intervenor witnesses have stated that "[r}elevant data regarding [ full participation] exercises are also found in NUREG-0654, particularly Section II.N." NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 10.
- 48. Second, as Interveners concede, the regulatory schemes of the NRC and FEMA pertaining to full participation exercises contain parallel (albeit not identical) provisions and terminology. Point 1 of 44 C.F.R. S 350.2(j) corresponds to the second sentence in footnote 4 to Appendix E; point 2 of the FEMA regulations corresponds to the first sentence of footnote 4. Point 3 corresponds also to the second sentence of footnote 4 Tr. 7085-91 (Petrone). Thus, even if FEMA guidance were limited by its own terms to 44 C.F.R. Part 350, it would be helpf ul here.
- 49. Third, contrary to suggestions by Intery ars, we agree with LILCO that FEMA Guidance Memoranda do expressly state that they are germane not only to FEMA's Part 350 process, but also to NUREG-0654 and the NRC's emergency planning rules contained in 10 C.F.R. Part 50. See LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at Att. E, pp.1-2; Tr. 6220-26 (Daverio. Behr). 7492 (Keller), 7617, 7621 (Kowieski, Keller, Baldwin). Moreover, as counsel for FEMA stated on the record, all FEMA Guidance Memoranda are forwarded to the NRC for its concurrence before being finalized. Tr.
5901 (Cumming).
- 50. Fourth, when viewed in conjunction with one another, Appendix E, the FEMK guidance documents and NUREG-0654 Standard N, are all talking about the same concept. Just as Appendix E refers to testing "the major observable portions" of offsite emergency plans, NUREG-0654 Standard N refers to exercises evaluating " major por-tions of emergency response capabilities" and "a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency preparedness plans." NUREG-0654 at 71. Draf t FEMA GM EX-3 similarly states that exercise objectives should be selected in order to test "a sig-nificant portion of the emergency response capabilities" of the offsite organization.
LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test Cont. EX 15/16), at Att. G, p. 3. There is simply no way Interveners can succeed in divorcing Appendix E full participation requirements from these FEMA guidance documents.
- 51. Finally, the Commission has explicitly endorsed the use of FEMA Guidance Memoranda in evaluating emergency preparedness exercises, in order to ensure that uniform procedures exist for NRC and FEMA to evaluate those exercises. See 49 Fed.
Reg. 27,734 (July 6,1984). Responding to comments filed in connection with the July 6,1984 revision to the ernergency planning rules, which stated that there was a need for uniform FEMA /NRC exercise evaluation procedures, the Commission stated: The Commission concurs with the commenters. In order to provide for uniform evaluation of emergency preparedness exercises, FEMA has developed and now uses a document ti-tied " Procedural Policy on Radiological Emergency Prepared-ness Plan Reviews, Exercise Observations and Evaluations and Interim Findings." These procedures were forwarded to the FEMA regions for use on August 5,1983. 49 Fed. Reg. 27,734. The referenced FEMA document is the August 5,1983 McLoughlin Memorandum that is incorporated by reference in GM PR-1, and is one of the very FEMA guidance documents that Interveners argued was inapplicable to any proceeding involving Appendix E full participation determinations. i i l _ ________ ____-__ _ D
J l 5L In sum, we decline Interveners' invitation to interpret the " full participa-tion" language of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E in a vacuum. Instead, we will use NUREG-0654 and the FEMA guidance documents in determining whether the Shoreham Exercise was a " full participation" one. Interpreting the Phrase "the Major Observable Portions" of an Offsite Emergency Plan
- 53. Another fundamental disagreement among the parties has been the inter-pretation of the statutory phrase pertaining to testing "the major observable portions" of an offsite emergency plan. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E S IV.F.1. n.4. The Com-mission has never stipulated precisely which or how many elements of an offsite plan must be tested in order to satisfy this requirement. The task has thus fallen to others to determine which elements of a plan are fundamental to emergency planning and which are not. The various FEMA Guidance Memoranda discussed above have divided the observable parts of offsite emergency plans into 35 standard exercise objectives and have attempted to create a hierarchy among those objectives.
- 54. It has been Interveners' position, however, that whether, how many and how LERO tested these standard FEMA exercise objectives is irrelevant. Instead, they have argued that (1) to be " full participation" an exercise must include all major observ-able elements (which they equate with the term " portions") of an emergency plan, Tr. 7127-28 (Baranski), 7219 (Papile); NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 35; (2) each of the 35 standard exercise objectives is a " major observable portion" of a plan, see Tr. 7127-28, 7231 (Baranski); (3) all of the major observable portions of an offsite plan are not encompassed in the 35 standard objectives (e.g., distribution of the public information brochure), and thus, even if an exercise tested most or even all of the stan-dard objectives, that does not ensure a full participation exercise, Tr. 7122.7231,7235 (Baranski Papile): NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 30; (4) every element of the LILCO Plan allegedly omitted from the Shoreham Exercise is a " major observable
portion" of the Plan that had to be tested for the Exercise to have been full participa-tion, NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 42,55; Tr. 7219 (Papile); and (5) the con-cept delineated in GM PR-1 and NUREG-0654 of a six year cycle in which all major observable elements must be tested is at worst wrong and at best inapplicable to NTOLs like 'Shoreham, NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 34-35. Interveners argue in short that the Shoreham Exercise did not meet Appendix E requirements for full 1 participation exercises since not every " major portion" of the LILCO Plan that could ' have been reasonably tested without mandatory public participation was tested.
- 55. LILCO witnesses, on the other hand, distinguished between the terms " ele-ments" and " portions" arguing that (1) Appendix E does not require that all major ob-servable elements of a plan be tested in each full participation exercise, and that'no single plan element or exercise objective is, in isolation, an absolute must Tr. 6121-23 (Hockert), 6808 (Daverio); (2) one must look at an exercise in its entirety to see if the
" major portions" requirement has been met, Tr. 6130, 6132-34 (Hockert), 6808, 6812-14 (Daverio); (3) the 35 standard exercise objectives include all the major observable ele-ments of offsite emergency plans, Tr. 6100 (Hockert), 6233-34 (Daverio); (4) testing most or all'of these standard objectives thus provides evidence that one has tested "the major observable portions" of the Plan, Tr. 6130 (Hockert), 6234-35 (Daverlo, Behr);
(5) testing of all the major observable elements of an offsite plan, as required in ' GM PR-1 and NUREG-0654, is cumulatively done over the course of several years and not in every full participation exercise or in the very first exercise, Tr. 6853 (Daverio); and (6) not every observable element of the Plan or standard FEMA objective is a
" major portion" of a plan, Tr. 6806-08, 6855 (Daverio).
- 5 6. FEMA witnesses agreed with LILCO that (1) the 35 standard exercise objec-tives and NUREG-0654 are interrelated, Tr. 7483 (Kowieski); (2) the 35 objectives encompass all the major observable elements of offsite emergency plans, Tr. 7483, i
7516, 7519-20 (Kowieski, Baldwin); (3) the 35 objectives must be tested over a 6-year cycle rather than in each individual exercise, Tr. 7516 (Baldwin); (4) testing most or all of the FEMA objectives provides evidence that "the major observable portions" of a Plan have been tested, Tr. 7517-20 (Baldwin, Kowieski); and (5) not every element of a plan is a " major observable portion," see Tr. 7690 (Baldwin).
- 57. We find LILCO's interpretation of the regulatory scheme to be the more credible one. Hence, we conclude that to be " full participation," an exercise must test a significant number, though not all, of the standard exercise objectives. Exactly what this number is we do not find it necessary to establish, since by any reasonable test the February 13, 1986 Exercise tested a significant number of standard FEMA objectives.
See Section C, inf ra.
- 58. Although the Appendix E phrase pertaining to testing "the major observable portions" is admittedly somewhat ambiguous, under Interveners' interpretation one may as well replace the word "the" with the word "all." We do not think this a reasonable interpretation. When the footnote containing this phrase was added to the regulations in July 1984, exercises had not historically tested every emergency planning element, and yet were considered " full-scale"- a term used before, and apparently interchange-ably with, the present term " full participation." Tr. 7039-42 (Papile), 7099-100 (Petrone), 7104-12 (Baranski, Papile); see Tr. 7645 (Kowieski). Had it been the Commis-ston's intent to alter this practice, surely it would have been more explicit in doing so.
Requirements Pertaining to NTOLs
- 59. Interveners also argue that the Commission's regulations impose disparate requirements on sites with full power operating licenses and sites, like Shoreham, not yet possessing full power licenses ("near term operating licenses" or "NTOLs"). NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 24-25. They argue that in addition to testing "the major observable portions" of offsite emergency plans, and mobilizing emergency
personnel and resources "in sufficiant numbers to verify capability to respond to the ac-cident scenario," a full participation exercise, for NTOLs and NTOLs alone, must test "as much of the licensee, state and local emergency plan as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation" pursuant to S IV.F.1 of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Ap- l pendix E. Id. at 9,35; Tr. 7127 (Baranski),7096 (Petrone), 7134-35 (Minor).N In short, for NTOLs an especially comprehensive initial exercise is required. NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 25-26. Intervenor witnesses argue that in this way, the ini-tial exercise can be used to determine the effectiveness and implementability of the emergency plan, and future exercises can remedy any weaknesses identified on the basis of this " track record." ld. at 25-26 and n.9; Tr. 7127 (Baranski).
- 60. LILCO witnesses argue that the " full participation" requirements for exer-cises for operating plants and NTOLs are identical, and that while all the major observ-able elements of an emergency plan must in fact be tested -including those that are !
" reasonably achievable"- this may be done over the course of six years, not in the very first " full participation" exercise. Tr. 6853 (Daverio).
- 61. The FEMA witnesses were not aware of any differing regulatory require-ments for NTOLs and operating plants. Tr. 7622 (Baldwin, Keller), 8513-14 (Baldwin, Keller, Kowieski). Nor, to the knowledge of any of the FEMA witnesses, had FEMA ever distinguished in practice between the two in framing the scope of an exercise. Tr.
8514 (Kowieski). While NRC witness Schwartz gave somewhat conflicting answers, see Tr. 8816-17, 8832-34, when asked whether, in his experience, the scope of full partici-l pation exercises was different for operating plants and NTOLs his final answer was: "I don't see any difference." Tr. 8835-36 (Schwartz). 1_3/ They also argue that the regulations place special requirements regarding inges-tion pathway testing on NTOLs. We address this issue in Section B, infra.
- 62. We are unable to conclude that the Commission intended to impose differ-ent requirements for full participation exercises at NTOL3 than for those at already op-erating sites. None of' the FEMA Guidance Memoranda distinguishes between operating plants and N'lOLs. Tr. 6239-41 (Behr, Daverio), 7622 (Baldwin, Keller). Indeed, as LILCO witnesses point out, and Interveners concede, in paragraph 1 of GM PR-1, the sh year span over which all of the 35 observable elements should be tested begins with the initial licensing exercise. Tr. 6824-25 (Behr), 6853 (Daverio), 7129, 7132 (Baranski).-
Interveners argue in their testimony, however, that the six year period specified in GM PR-1 conflicts with Appendix E requirements if applied to NTOLs. See NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 35. We disagree. Their witnesses, none of whom has any expertise in NTOL exercises, see Tr. 7047,7232 (Baranski, Papile, Czech), base tais opinion on mere conjecture. Moreover, Planning Standard N of NUREG-0654 similarly states that "[t]he scenario should be varied from _ year to year such that all major ele-ments of the plans and preparedness organizations are tested within a six year period," and makes no distinctions from NTOLs. ~ NUREG-0654 at 71 (as revised in GM PR-1 at 2). l
- 63. We also reject Interveners' argument that as a matter of policy, the initial full participation exercise should be " ultra comprehensive" in order to provide a basis for plan revision or modification. Emergency plans are subjected to intense scrutiny by emergency planning experts during FEMA's RAC review process. They are also poten-
' tially studied in detail in NRC proceedings such as the extensive Plan litigation that took place in these proceedings. Exercises serve only as a final " double-check" on those earlier detailed reviews. Hence, there are no compelling reasons to make initial exer-cises' extremely detailed. In f act, Intervenor whness Petrone could point to no specific example (aside from a vague reference to the Indian Point plant) where significant plan modifications or revisions were made as the result of an initial exercise. Tr. 7220-23 (Petrone).
1 i
e
- 64. .More importantly, as was also brought out in the record, reviewing the gen-esis of the current regulations points to LILCO's interpretation as the correct one. The 1 l
Commissica's regulations, as originally adopted in 1980, contained a requirement that ) offsite exercises for all plants - whether achieving their full power licenses for the first time or already licensed - must test "as truch of the licensee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation." The regulations then in effect stated: i The plan shall describe provisions for the conduct of emer-gency preparedness exercises. Exercises shall test the ade-quacy of timing and content of implementing procedures and , methods, test emergency equipment and communication net- l works, test the public notification system, and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their du-ties. Each licensee shall exercise at least annually the emer-gency plan for each site at which it has one or more power reactors licensed for operation. Oth full-scale and small scale exercises shall be conducted a..d shall include participa-tion by appropriate State and local government agencies as follows:
- 1. ' A "Iull-scale" exercise which tests as much of the 11-consee. State, and local emergency plans as is rea-sonably achievable without mandatory public participa-tion shall be conducted:
- a. For each site at which one or more Dower reactors are located and licensed for operation, at least once every five years and at a frequency which will enable each State and local government within the plume ex-posure pathway EPZ to participate in at least one full-scale exercise per year and which will enable each State within the ingestion pathway to participate in at least one full-scale exercise every three years.
L b. For each site at which a power reactor is located for which the first operating license for that site is is-sued af ter the effective date of this amendment, with-in one year before the issuance of the operating license for full power, which will er'ble each State and local government within the plume exposure EPZ and each State within the ingestion pathway EPZ to participate. 45 Fed. Reg. 55,402-13 (August 19,1980) (emphasis added). This condition applied to a ll offsite exercises until the July 1984 amendment. During this period, exercises deemed i
i 1 Ii
" full scale" omitted various elements such as ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry.
S_ee e Tr., 7208-12 (Papile, Baransni).
- 65. In July 1984, the Commission revised its emergerty preparedness regula-tions to relax the frequency of full participation exercises for sites with operating 11-i censes. See 49 Fed. Reg. 27,733-35 (July 6,1984). In so doing the Commission revised the language of 1 F.1 to read essentially as it appears today, aside from a few unrelated i differences. As a result of this 1984 restructuring, Intervenor witnesses argue that retention of the clause "which tests is much of the emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory participation" for NTOLs, in effect imposes special requirements for full participation exercises on those sites. Tr. 7127-28 (Baranski).
LILCO witnesses reply that the July 1984 rule change addressed only the frequency of exercises and was not intended by the Commission to make substantive changes in the f scope of full participation exercises for operating plants and NTOLs. Tr. 6219-20 (Behr), 6191, 6853 (Daverio).
- 66. The sentence placement of the clause in question is ambiguous, confusing as it does the grammatical rules concerning restrictive and non-restrictive clauses.
However, whatever potential for confusion is apparent on the literal fact of the sen-tence is largely cleared up by the sentence's derivation which shows that (1) the phrase
" full participation" exercise (and its apparently synonymous predecessor " full scale" exercise) applied to both NTOLs and plants which already held full power licenses, (2) l l \
exercises run during that period omitted various plan elements, yet were still found to , l comply with the Commission's regulations and (3) there was no intent on the part of i 1 the Commission, evident from the Statement of Consideration in the rule's 1984 amend- j 1 ment, to alter the phrase's general applicability or meaning. Thus, we conclude that the 1984 revision to me regulations was intended by the Commission merely to change ) the frequency requirement for full partic}pation exercises at operating plants, and not
F; 1
~28-to create additional substantive " scope" requirements for full participation exercises at preoperational sites.UI
- 67. In sum, we find that the scope requirements for full participation exercises for NTOLs are the same as those for operating sites. Accordingly, we agree with
- LILCO and FEMA. that the emergency planning scheme contemplates that while a_ll major observable elements of an emergency plan (as encompassed by the 35 FEMA exercise objectives) must be exercised at some point, this can be done over the course of several years, not in every full participation exercise or in the very first exercise.
M/ Our holding finds support in the preface to the Commission's latest revision to these rules. S_ee 52 Fed. Reg. 16823-29 (May 6,1987). When the Commission revised its l rules in~1984, it did not make a similar change regarding the required frequency of full partic!pation exercises at. sites without full power operating licenses. However, con-cerned about scheduling burdens as a result of the UCS case as well as the resource bur-den placed on state and local governments by the requirements for annual full partici-
. pation exercises, the Commission on May 6,1987 revised its rules to require a full participation exercise within two years prior to the full-power licensing of a power plant - the same scheduling requirement mandated for full participation exercises af ter licensing. 52 Fed. Reg. at 16,824.
In response to comments filed by citizen groups that opposed this latest rule change on the basis, inter alia, that it ignored a previously drawn distinction between pre- and post-operational exercises, the Commission said there was no reason to treat NTOLs and operating plants differently: The Commission has . . . been lef t with a regulatory scheme for frequency of full participation emergency preparedness exercises that treats sites with an operating license differ-ently than sites without an operating license. The Commis-sion does not believe this disparity in treatment is war-ranted.... 52 Fed. Reg. at 16,826 (emphasis added). As in the 1984 rulemaking, there is no discussion in the Statement of Considera-tion of imposing any special additional substantive requirements regarding the scope of exercises for NTOLs. Such additional requirements are a concept the Commission al- i most surely would have mentioned in the context of its remarks had it intended a sub- ! stantive scope change for NTOLs, especially in light of the f act that in practice, no dis- i tinction had historically been made between operating sites and NTOLs. l
Non-Regulatory Guidance - the IEAL P.eport
- 68. LILCO witness John Hockert presented a report, entitled "Importance Ranking of Various Aspects of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness" (November 15,1985) (" LEAL Report"), that attempted to rank in an objective f ashion FEMA's 35 standard exercise objectives delineated in GM PR-1 according to categories of relative importance. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at Att. L. The Report was based on responses to a detailed questionnaire, which asked the respondents to make pairwise comparit about the 35 FEMA standard exercise objectives. The !
I questionnaire was sent to FEv.,a and NRC headquarters and regional staff, RAC mem-bers, other federal, state and local emergency planners, and members of various con-cerned interest groups. Ld. at Att. L, p. 1-1. Using the methodology described in Appendix A of the Report, the standards were ascribed quantitative importance weightings and ranked. Ld.
- 69. Although the detailed rankings varied, there was a general consensus on a group of seven exercise objectives that were considered "very important" by the major-ity of respondents. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 28. Dr. Hockert con-cluded that the "very important" category contemplates that these objectives would be demonstrated most frequently, but that testing additional less important objectives could offset the omission of one or more of the "very important" objectives. Ld. at 29.
Dr. Hockert further testified that one can determine whether an exercise is " full par-ticipation" based on whether a sufficiently large percentage (on a weighted basis) of objectives had been tested. Tr. 6130 (Hockert). He justified this conclusion on the basis that the methodology used to produce the rankings in the IEAL Report had previously been applied to study the relative intensity of light and relative distances and that in each case, the judgments of experts correlated quite well with physical reality. Tr. 6135-36 (Hockert).
i
- 70. Suffolk County witness Simon challenged Dr. Hockert's conclusion that the weight; assigned to objectives could be summed to determine whether an exercise was
" full participation." See SC EX Exh.110 at 4. Dr. Simon did not question the validity of the methodology used as the basis for the IEAL Report, Tr. 8902 (Simon), nor that the methodology had previously been shown to be a good predictor of distances or light in-tensity, Tr. 8887-88, 8851 (Simon), nor that in the case of distances, the assigned weights could be summed to draw broader conclusions about overall distances, see Tr. 8887-88 (Simon). Dr. Simon also did not challenge the manner in which the method-ology had been applied in the IEAL Report, Tr. 8895, 8902 (Simon), nor in any substan-tive way, the expertise of people who had responded to the IEAL questionnaire, Tr. 8902 (Simon). Instead, Dr. Simon questioned what he understood was Dr. Hockert's expressed view that the weights or values ascribed to the standard FEMA objectives corresponded to some physical reality. See SC EX Exh.110 at 2-3. This, he argued, was erroneous, since where there is no physical reality against which to correlate results, there is no means to ascribe real weights to particular topics. Tr. 8884, 8889 (Simon).
Put another way, Dr. Simon contended that if there is no measurable physical quantity, then one cannot assign meaningful weightings to a set of obserWions. As a result. Dr. Simon concluded that contrary to Dr. Hockert's claims, enercise objectives were not fungible and objectives could not be summed to draw conclusions about whether a full participation exercise had been conducted. SC FX Exh.110 at 1-2,4. ! I
- 71. At the outset, we note that neither in his testimony nor in the IEAL Report does Dr. Hockert contend that the weights that have been ascribed to FEMA's standard objectives correspond to some physical reality. Dr. Simon conceded that he inferred this from the fact that Dr, Hockert said that objectives could be exchanged for other !
objectives of the same weight. Tr. 8884 (Simon). More importantly, Dr. Simon has I failed to demonstrate that the methodology used in the IEAL Report cannot be used as i l
Dr. Hockert suggests to assign weights to items that cannot be physically measured. He has not convincingly explained how the perception of an expert judging something like distance is any different than that of experts in emergency planning judging the impor-tance of emergency planning objectives. See Tr. 8898-900 (Simon). Accordingly, we find that the methodology used and conclusions drawn in the IEAL Report are not flawed as Interveners' suggest, and thus the Report provides a useful tool for de-termining whether an exercise is full participation or not. B. Plan Eleinents Allegediv Omitted From the Exercise
- 72. Having identified the standards for judging whether an exercise is " full par-ticipation," we turn to the alleged omissions in Contentions EX 15/16. Interveners con-tend that each of these alleged omissions constitutes an omission of a " major portion" of the LILCO Plan, and hence that each, if f actually demonstrated, would establish that the Exercise was less than full participation. Contrary to Interveners' position, we have already held that no one of the alleged omissions can be so vital to Plan imple-rentability as to ren the Exercise fatally flawed. Instead, the Exercise must be viewed as a whole t. 3termine whether "the major observable portions" of the Plan were tested. ;
I Public Notifica51on Procedures (EX 15.A: 16C, D)
- 73. In Sontention EX 15.A. the Interveners contend that the scope of the Exer-cise was too limited because it did not adequately test the public notification system.
This Contention subsumed EX 24, alleging failure to activate the sirens. and EX 16.C and D, alleging lack of participation on the part of WALK radio and other EBS radio L stati?ns. l l l l h
- 74. LILCO witnesses testified that during the Exercise, LERO personnel dem-onstrated the ability to implement all the administrative elements of an EBS system, i and took all steps necessary to activate the prompt notification system short of actual-ly physically sounding the sirens and broadcasting an EBS message. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 31-32; Tr. 6875-80 (Daverio, Behr). The witnesses argued that the mechanical capabilities of the public notification system can and will be tested in a separate FEMA-REP-10 test, and that LILCO has committed to perform such a test prior to exceeding 5% power. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 32-33; Tr.
6875 (Daterio). Finally, the witnesses testified that the only reason that the sirens were not sounded and the EBS system not activated was because a Suffolk County ordi-nance, which was in effect until three days before the Exercise, prohibited those activ-ities. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 16-17.
- 75. Intervenor witnesses testified that at least in all recent NYS exercises, sirens had been sounded and EBS messages broadcast. NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont.
EX 15/16), at 41. They argued that the testing of the public notification system at Shoreham was inadequate because no call was made to the radio station that was sup-posed to broadcast the EBS message (WALK Radio). NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 40-41.E They also contended that the actual sounding of the sirens and I broadcasting of an EBS message in a test that was separate from an exercise was not sufficient, since the " integrated capability" (human and mechanical interaction ele-i ments) of the system would not be adequately tested. Ld. at 44, 45, 47; Tr. 7171-85 (Baranski, Minor, Papile). l l l l 1 I l M/ During cross-examination New York State witness Baranski exhibited a total lack of knowledge about what actions LERO had taken with regard to public notification l during the Exercise. See Tr. 7171-72 (Baranski). l l
- 76. FEMA witnesses testified that, while sirens are normally sounded and EBS !
messages broadcast during exercises in New York State (although in one Region II exer- l clse they were not sounded) Tr. 7553-56, (Keller, Kowieski), 7580-81 (,Kowieski), 8379 (Keller), this is not always the case in other FEMA Regions. The witnesses testified that of tentimes at exercises outside Region II the sirens are sounded and the EBS mes-sage is broadcast in a separate FEMA REP-10 test. Tr. 8525-26 (Keller). The witnesses explained that the sounding of the sirens and the broadcasting of an EBS message are not major components of a Plan, see NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 46, and that a separate FEMA REP-10 test would satisfy this part of the public notification ob-jectives, Tr. 8378 (Baldwin). During cross-examination they added that, to be consis-tent with Region II practice, FEMA would have preferred to have seen me sirens sounded on the day of the exercise in order to test the integrated capability of the sys-tem. Tr. 8521-22 (Kowieski).
- 77. We find that the Exercise was not less than full participation because it did not include the physical sounding of sirens and broadcasting of EBS messages. During the Exercise, the command and control decisions to sound the sirens and broadcast EBS l
messages were made, see Tr. 7180 (Minor), and all actions short of physically sounding the sirens and broadcasting the EBS messages were taken. The sounding of sirens and i broadcasting of EBS messages during the Exercise was not vital to assuring Plan imple-rentability since LILCO has committed to test the mechanical capabilities of the sys-I tem at a later date pursuant to a FEMA REP-10 test. While it might have been opti-mum to sound the sirens and broadcast the EBS during the Exercise, the f act that this I was not done does not make the Exercise less than full participation. In at least one l NYS exercise, and in exercises in several other regions, it was not essential for licens- ! ing purposes to test the " integrated capability" of the system by sounding the siren or broadcasting an EBS message on the same day as the Exercise. NYS EX Exh.1 (Test.
Cont. EX 15/16), at 41t Tr. 8525-26 (Keller). Further, as we describe below, the sound-ing of sirens and . broadcasting of EBS messages would not have been " reasonably achievable" given the hostile political climate. See Section C, inf ra. Procedures for Public Notification in the Water Portion of the EPZ (EX 15.B: 16.B) 78, in Contention EX 15.B. Interveners contend that the Exercise was less than full participation because it did not adequately test procedures for public notification in tae. water portion of the EPZ. This contention subsumed EX 16.B. which alleges that the Coast Guard did not adequately participate.
- 79. LILCO witnesses argued that the fact that not every aspect of the LILCO Plan to notify persons in the water portion of the EPZ was implemented on the day of the Exercise does not render the Exercise less than full participation. They testified that the Coast Guard received notification from and communicated with LERO on Mth the primary and back-up communications modes throughout the Exercise. The Coast Guard also simulated establishing a Maritime Safety Zone for the water part of the EPZ and simulated making emergency radio broadcasts to all ships on the distress frequencies. In addition, the Coast Guard dispatched a patrol boat and was kept in-formed of th'ehypothetical accident. The only action tut taken by the Coast Guard was the broadcasting of a messcge on marine band radio. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont.
EX 15/16), at 33-34.
- 80. Intervenor witnesses did not challenge these f actual claims, but argued that a proper demonstration should have beluded closer FEMA evaluation of Coast Guard performance, NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16). at 120 n.54. and that such
" face-to-face" evaluation had taken place at other exercises in New York State. Ld.
1
- 81. FEMA witnesses testified that LERO's ability to coordinate notification of the public and access control in the water portion of the EPA with the Coast Guard ,
was satisfactorily demonstrated. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 110. The witnesses further 'I
testified that FEMA's decision to limit its observation to communications between LERO and the Coast Guard was based on the recommendation of the Department of i Transportation RAC member. Ld. at 108.
- 82. We find that on this issue, Interveners are simply challenging the extent of FEMA's evaluation of the Coast Guard, and not the Coast Guard demonstration itself.
The fact that the Coast Guard did not actually broadcast a message on marine band i radio does not render the Exercise inadequate since the Coast Guard has ample experi-ence in using marine band radios and sending emergency messages over that system. In addition, LILCO has a letter of agreement with the . Coast Guard that confirms the Coast Guard's willingness and intent to implement protective active recommendations in the water portion of the EPZ. See L:LCO Plan, Appendix B at B-8. As for FEMA's failure to observe the dispatch of the Coast Guard vessel, there was no need for such observation since the Coast Guard routinely dispatches boats and frequently broadcasts messages to boaters. Procedures for Impleineudng Protective Actions for Transients and People on the Water (EX 15.H)
- 83. Interveners allege in Contention EX 15.H that LILCO did not demonstrate l the capability to implement protective action recommendations for people on the wa-ters of the plume exposure EPZ or transients on beaches or in parks. This contention subsumes EX 16.B and 18 C (iv), alleging that the Coast Guard did not fully participate.
l
- 84. LILCO witnesses contended that during the Exercise LERO demonstrated its ability to effect an evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ. They argued, again, that the Coast Guard, which is responsible for notification of waterborne traffic, was contacted by LERO on both the primary and backup modes of communication, and dis-patched a patrol boat. They pointed out that transients on beaches and in parks would be notified in an emergency via the prompt notification system. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 34.
I l J
- 85. Interveners' testimony on this contention was largely cumulative of its tes-1 timony on Contention EX 15.B.
- 86. FEMA witnesses testified that during the Exercise, LERO demonstrated the !
k organizational ability to coordinate with the Coast Guard regarding protective actions for the water portion of the EPZ. As for transients in parks or on beaches, FEMA wit-nesses testified that the Shoreham siren system was capable of providing an audible i alert signal throughout the 10-mile EPZ including beaches and parks. FEMA EX Exh. 5 al' 110.
- 87. This subpart does little more than retread issues raised in EX 15.A and B. ;
Since we have already found that failure to actually sound the sirens did not constitute a fundamental flaw in the Exercise, and that the Coast Guard demonstration was ade-quate, we find no merit in this subpart. Procedures for Pubile Education (Ex.15.p_) ;
- 88. Interveners allege in Contention Ex 15.C that the Exercise was too limited in scope because it did not include distribution of the public information brochure. !
- 89. LILCO witnesses admitted that the public information brochure was not disseminated before the Exercise, but argued that LILCO was not required to do so prior to operations exceeding 5% of rated power. Moreover, they argued that to have distrib-uted the brochure prior to the Exercise would have been unnecessarily wasteful and i
! costly since the text of the draf t brochure contained a paragraph on the legal authority , to implement the LILCO Plan, an unresolved issue that could well necessitate revision of the brochure. Finally, the witnesses argued that there was insufficient time to print and mail the brochure in the two days prior to the Exercise af ter the Suffolk County Ordinance had been enjoined as unconstitutional. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 35. l
~
37_. 1
'1 90 Intervenor witnesses argued that the public education program is one of the _
I"majdr observable portions" of an emergency plan. As such, its exclusion rendered the Exercise less than full participation, especially since it had been nandard Region II l practice to include two public information objectives in exercises. NYS EX Exh. I 1 (Test. Cont. EX.15/16), at 54-5.5 and n.25.
- 91. FEMA witnesses pointed out that distribution of the brochure and testing of ;
I the public's awareness of the public information program are not standard FEMA objec- ) tives. Tr. 7545, 8424-25 (Keller); see also 8349 (Kowieski), 7545-46 (Keller) (public in-1 formation objectives were added to Region II exercises during Mr. Kowieski's tenure as RAC Chairman; under the new RAC Chairman the objectives are not used). They explained that in Region 11 exercises, two public information were generally added to determine if people understood what the brochure said. Tr. 7542,7547 (Kowieski). The witnesses added that a determination of the brochure's understandability and readability had already made as part of the RAC review, FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 112; Tr. 7548 (Keller), and that the inclusion of the two objectives only served as a' double-check. They fur-ther stated that the readability of the brochure was a planning issue that could not have rasulted in a deficiency during We Exercise. Tr. 7551 (Kowieski). The witnesses added that the p@lic information Nochure need only be distributed prior to commercial op-eration. Tr. 7550, 8382 (Keller), 8387.(Kowleski). We find the failure to distribute the public information brochure prior to
- 92.
the Exercise - an activity that is not even a standard FEMA objective, and that would have been impossible to accomplish given the time constraints posed by the Suffolk County Ordinance -- did not render the Exercise deficient in scope It is sufficient that p LILCO has committed to distribute the brochure prior to commercial operation. l L
l Procedures for Evacuating the EPZ Hospitals (EX 15.D)
- 93. Interveners contend in EX 15.D that the Exercise was too limited in scope because procedures for evacuating hospitals in the EPZ were not exercised. Subsumed within this Contention were EX 16.H, I and J, alleging that officials from these hospi-tals and hospitals outside the EPZ did not participate in the Exerciso.
- 94. LILCO witnesses testified that while evacuating the EPZ hospitals was not an Exercise objective, evacuating the " institutionalized mobility-impaired" was an ob-jective and was tested. According to LILCO witnesses, FEMA used free play messages and chose two special facilities where a' simulated evacuation was demonstrated suc-cessfully for the mobility-impaired population. Although these were not hospitals, LILCO witnesses argued that the type of institution chosen is not relevant to de-monstrating LERO's ability to evacuate the mobility-impaired population. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 35-36. In addition, the witnesses testified that unue:
the LILCO Plan, evacuation is only n backup protective action for hospitals, to be rec-ommended only if the primary protective action - sheltering - is determined to result an excessive dose in a particular emergency. Ld. at 36. ,
- 95. Intervenor witnesses argJed that the Appeal Board has ruled in this pro-ceeding that hospital evacuation cannot be ignored, despite LILCO's earlier planning decision that sheltering will be the preferred protective action. NYS EX Exh.1 (Test.
Cont. EX 15/16), at 92. They contended that during the Exercise LERO should, as a minimum, have actually called hospital administrators and discussed protective action 1 options, including evacuation, with them. I_d. at 101.
- 96. FEMA witnesses testified that evacuating hospitals p_er e s_e wrs not included as an objective in the Exercise since (1) the primary protective action for hospitals is sheltering; (2) FEMA does not typically evaluate hospital "sub-level" evacuation plans, which are reviewed by certification and licensing authorities; and (3) FEMA Region II,
as a matter of practice, does not require hospitals to participate in emergency exer-cises. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 113-15.
- 97. Although the Appeal Board has reversed and remanded the Licensing ,
J Board's decision on the issue of evacuation of hospitals, the Appeal Board ordered the I romand held in abeyance pending further Commission direction, long Island Lighting ! Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,154-57,163. The Commission has accepted review of this issue and thus the issue still remains in its hands. Accordingly, we agree with LILCO that evacuating the EPZ hospitals per se was_ not required to be an objective in the Exercise since it is a backup protective action under the LILCO Plan. In any event, we find that the Exercise adequately tested evac-uation of the mobility-impaired population. Procedures for Sheltering School Children, for Implementing Early Dismissal of Schools and for Evacuating Children (EX 15.E. F. G)
- 98. Interveners contend in EX 15.E, F, and G that there was insufficient dem-onstration of procedures relating to sheltering, early dismissal and evacuation of school children. These contentions subsume EX 16.F, G and Ex 26,30 and 18.C (v), which al-lege that school officials and school bus drivers, in districts other than the Shoreham-Wading River School District (SWRD), did not participate in the Exercise,
- 99. LILCO witnesses argued that schools do not rely on LERO resources for sheltering, early dismissal or evacuation, and that schools have their own emergency plans. They added that these emergency pl'.ns are frequently performed by schools dur-ing the school year and need not be exercised in order to assess whether they can be carried out in a radiological emergency. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 36-38. They contended that sheltering was a simple, straightforward activity that did not need to be exercised to determine its implementability. The witness also argued that LERO did, in fact, demonstrate the decisional ability to implement early dismissal and the physical means to assist schools in an evacuation. Moreover, they argued that
l schools were not part of the offsite response organization, and since the NRC regula-tions do not require the mandatory participation of the "public " an Exercise cannot be I I found to be deficient because some school districts do not participate. Tr. 6844-45 (Daverio). They noted that the December 15, 1986 RAC Report issued by FEMA con-cluded that LILCO's commitment that schools other than Shoreham-Wadhig River will participate in future exercises was an adequate response to this exercise issue. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 38. 100. Intervenor witnesses testified that there have been more extensive demon-strations of school preparedness at other exercises in NYS, and that the notification and participation of only one school district was inadequate. NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 60-63. The witnesses argued that insufficient numbers of school personnel, school buses and school bus drivers had participated in the Exercise. Ld. at
- 79. In addition, they claimed there was too minimal a demonstration of early dismissal and no demonstration of sheltering. Ld. at 61. Further, they argued that future com-mitments regarding schools were insufficient to make this Exercise " full participation."
Ld. at 70-71. Finally, Interveners alleged that FEM A's evaluation of school preparedness was too limited. Ld. at 68-70. 101. FEMA witnesses t'stified e that as a matter of policy, FEMA does not evalu-ate school emergency plans as part of its normal review process. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 116, 123 They added that adequate school emergency plans are required by the New York State Board of Education as part of the school certification process. Ld. On cross-examination, the FEMA witnesses admitted that they could not verify the capa-bility of schools beyond Shoreham-Wading River to respond based upon. what transpired at the Exercise, and that one school district was a "little small" when compared with other exercises in New York State. Tr. 7584-88, 7602-03 (Keller, Baldwin). On the other hand, they also testified that not every public school district is contacted and
, ; p
,i eva$uated during .other New York State exercises,1r. 7581, 7585 (Keller), and that to include only a single school district in a " full-scale" exercise is "very consistent with j what we have done in the State of New York," Tr. 7583 (Kowieski).
'102. We hold that, during the Exercise, LERO demonstrated its ability to make and implement decisions regarding school protective actions and to assist schools in ef-fecting an evacuation. While the demonstration of school preparedness might have been more extensive (although it is difficult to see how, given the attitude of school oistricts other than SWRD and the inability of LILCO or New York State to require their participation, see Section C, infra), LILCO's commitment to rectify this in future exercises is sufficient to ensure Plan implementability.
Procedures Concerning Protective Actions for the Ingestion Pathway EPZ (EX'151) 1 103. In Contendon EX 15.1, subsuming EX 37 (A-D), Interveners allege that the Exercise was less than full participation because of the lack of protective actions for the ingestion pathway EPZ. Also subsumed in these contentions was EX 16.A, alleging that the State of Connecticut did not participate. 104. LILCO witnesess admitted that, with minor exceptions, ingestion pathway ,, activities were not tested during the Shoreham Exercise, See Tr. 6919 (Daverio). How-ever, they argued that there has never been a full-scale test of ingestion pathway ac-tivities in New York State, LILCO EX Exh.'12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 39, yet, New York State plants such as Nine Mile Point and Ginna.have bean allowed-to continue to operate despite the lack of an exercise which included a full-scale test of ingestion pathway activities, Tr. 6928 (Behr, Daverio). LILCO witnesses further contended that the NRC regulations place no special requirements on NTOLs for full-scale testing of i the ingestion pathway, Tr. 6849-52 (Daverio), and that the provision in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E S IV.F.1, which requires each State in the ingestion pathway to f
" participate" in the exercise, merely requires participation to the extent required by
i the exercise scenario. Tr. 6850-52 -(Daverio). They testified that this requirement was satisfied in the Shoreham Exercise by a call being made to the border state of Con-necticut, which has four operating units. Tr. 6851-52 (Daverio). Finally, LILCO wit- . nesses contended that ingestion pathway activities do not have an immediate effect on the protection of the public within the 10-mile EPZ - the first priority in a radiological emergency. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 23. The witness added that LlLCO was willing to demonstrate ingestion pathway activities, but that FEMA decided not to include them in the Exercise. I_d. at 39. 105. Intervenor witnesses conceded that there has never been a full-scale test of the ingestion pathway in New York State, Tr. 7208-09 (Papile). However, they at-tempted to distinguish these exercises by arguing that other New York State exercises were not for NTOLs, and that various early exercises in New York State did include some objectives for the ingestion pathway which were evaluated by FEMA. Tr. 7232-33, 7240-41 (Baranski, Czech). The witnesses argued that ingestion pathway ac-tivities must be tested in an initial licensing exercise for an NTOL. Tr. 7104, 7135-37, 7231-33 (Baranski), 7239 (Czech), 7207-08 (Papile). They so argued despite also admit-ting that New York State had ceased to test ingestion pathway because of the lack of guidance irom FEM A. Tr. 7232-33 (Baranski), 7210 (Papile). 106. FEMA witnesses agreed with LILCO that exclusion of ingestion pathway objectives did not render the Shoreham Exercise less than " full participation." FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 125. FEMA witnesses testified that the omission of ingestion pathway ob- i l jectives from the Shoreham Exercise was consistent with the other full-scale exercises i i in Region iL Tr. 7540-41 (Kowieski). They testified that a major factor in their deci-sion not to include ingestion pathway objectives was the NRC's directive to concentrate i
)
on the 10-mile EPZ. Tr. 7539 (Kowieski); see FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 90. FEM A witnesses acknowledged that there had never been a full-scale test of ingestion pathway in New l 4
s York State. Tr. 7526 (Kowieski). They stated that the New York State exercises that had included limited ingestion pathway objectives had been haphazardly performed, and had been performed using now outdated guidance. Tr. 7527-28 (Keller), 7539 (Kowleski). Because there is no FEMA guidance on testing ingestion pathway, FEMA witnesses said the State had refused to -schedule ingestion pathway exercises until this Fall. Tr. 7527-28 (Keller), 8595-96 (Kowieski).. Finally, they stated that as FEMA Region II I Director, Mr. Petrone had never suggested that ingestion pathway objections needed to ! be included in the the Shoreham Exercise. Tr. 8476-77 (Kowieski). 107. The Board finds that ingestion pathway testing is not so vital to Plan impla- .l rentability that 'the failure to test it fully makes an exercise less than full participa-tion. All .New York State plants from 1981 to' the present have been allowed to continue to operate, without having had a full-scale test of the ingestion pathway ac-tivities. Tr. 7039-42, 7208-09 (Papile).- 7104-10 (Baranski, Papile). Moreover, we con-clude that the ingestion pathway requirement placed on NTOLs by the regulations merely requires th6 " participation" by each state within the ingestion exposure path-way EPZ, and not the full-scale testing of the ingestion pathway EPZ, which mu 'w l done every five years for operational and pre-operational plants alike. We further hold that to the extent the regulations place special requirements on NTOLs, the Shoreham Exercise met them, given the telephone calls to Connecticut and the various other in-gestion pathway activities that LERO began to perform. Finally, we do not see how In-tervenors, including the NYS witnesses, can complain about the exclusion of ingestion pathway activities from the Exercise, given LILCO's willingness to include them, FEMA's decision not to, and New York State's ongoing refu, sal to test them given the lack of FEMA guidance.
b' 44_ Procedures Relating to the Ridlological Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees from Special Facilities (EX 15.K) 108. In Contention EX 15.K Interveners contend that LERO failed to demon-strate adequate procedures for monitoring and decontaminating evacuees from special
' facilities who would be sent to special reception / relocation centers., and that his failure rendered the Exercise less than full participation.
109. LILCO witnesses argued that the monitoring and decontamination function was in fact adequately tested since monitoring and decontamination procedures were
- demonstrated at the Reception Center, even though not especially for evacuees from special f acilities. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 40.
110. Intervenor witnesses contended that no means of transport, places for relo-cation or means of registering, monitoring and decontaminating these patients were : Ci ven consideration or coordinated with hospital officials and nursing homes during the Exercise. NYS EX Exh.1 (Test Cont, EX 15/16), at 101. 111.- FEMA witnesses agreed with LILCO that the process of mohitoring and decontamination is the same regardless of the location of the monitoring site. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 127. 112. We find this contention subpart to be without merit. The monitoring and decontamination methods used for evacuees from special facilities are the same as those for emergency workers or the general population. The only major difference is the location at which monitoring and decontamination takes place. The failure to dem-onstrate monitoring and decontamination at more than one facility does not prevent us from finding the Exercise to be a " full participation" one. Proced g res Concerning Recoverv/Re-entry (EX 15.M) 113. Interveners allege in Contention EX 15.M that the exclusign of recovery and re-entry activities from the Esercise rendered it less than full p' a rticipation. {
114.. LILCO witnesses testified that recovery and re-entry activities were dellb-f
' erately excluded from the scope of the Exercise by FEMA, LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test.
Cont.' EX .15/16), at 40, and that recovery and re-entry is a relatively non-compelling protective action not even contemplated until evacuation and all other applicable short-term protective action measures have been completed. Id. at 40-41. They fur-ther testified that recovery and re-entry activities were conducted to a degree at the i Exercise. Ld. 115. Interveners testified that recovery and re-entry constitute " major observa-ble portions" under Appendix E, and that whatever LILCO did in this regard, it was not enough to satisfy regulatory requirements. NYS EX Exh.' 1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 154-55; Tr. 7231 (Baranski). 116. FEMA witnesses testified that it is not necessary to test recovery /re-entry activities in every enercise and that not testing those activities during the February 13 Exercise is consistent with what has been done in other Region 11 exercises. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 128; Tr. 7679 (Keller). They further testified that there were reasons why re-covery/re-entry could not have been tested at the Shoreham Exercise. Tr. 7673-75 (Keller, Kowieski). Specifically, they explained that the federal government had not yet promulgated acceptable doses for re-entry of evacuated areas making it difficult to impossible to judge acceptable performance, and that because of this lack of guidance, New York State has objected to including recovery /re-entry objectives in their exer-cises since August 1983. Tr. 7673-74 (Keller). They added that although RAC reviews of emergency pla_ns_ subsequent to 1983 have included evaluation of recover /re-entry, this is fundamentally different from evaluating those activities in an exercise. Tr. 7677-79 (Keller). They stated that as FEMA Region II Director, Mr. Petrone had never suggested that recover /re-entry activities needed to be tested during the Shoreham Exercise. Tr. 8476-77 (Kowieski). They also testified that NRC's directive to l _ --___.-___-_______________a
focus on the 10-mile EPZ was an additional factor in their decision to exclude these ob-jectives. Tr. 7675 (Kowleski); see FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 90. 117. We find that the exclusion of recovery /re-entry activities from the Shoreham Exercise does not make it less than a full participation exercise. Recov-
)
ery/re-entry activities are not even contemplated until evacuation and all other appil-cable short-term protective action measures have been completed and the affected population is safe, Consequently, we agree with LILCO that it is a relatively non-compelling protective action. Moreover, it is disingenuous of Interveners to com-plain of the exclusion of recovery /re-entry activities from the Exercise when they con-cede that New York State has ceased including these objectives in exercises because of the lack of FEMA guidance. Participation of Marketinst Evaluations. Inc. (EX 16.E) 118. Interveners allege in EX 16.E that the Exercise was too limited in secpe be-cause of the lack of participation of Marketing Evaluations, Inc., a contract organiza-tion relied upon for verification of siren operFion and evaluation. 313, Under the LILCO Plan, Markdtit g Evaluations, Inc. is to conduct post-activation telephone surveys to verify :h.tt the sirens worked properly. OPIP 3.3.4, S 5.2. LILCO witnesses argued that there was no reason to have Marketing Eval-uations, Inc. participate in the Exercise, since the sirens were not actually sounded. They added that Marketing Evaluations' activities were part of the backup notification system that is not required by NUREG-0654, and that, in any event, this function will be part of the FEMA REP-10 test. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 41. 120. Interveners did not further elaborate on this contention either in their written testimony or during the hearings.
i 121. FEMA witnesses stated that since there was to be no siren activation, there would have been no reason to evaluate the performance of Marketing Evaluations, Inc. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 129. 122. The function to be performed by Marketing Evaluations, Inc. could not have been performed without siren activation. Since we have previously concluded that the failure to sound the sirens during the Exercise did not render the Exercise less than full participation, we likewise conclude that Marketing Evaluations' failure to participate does not do so either. In any case, Marketing Evaluations will participate in the future REP-10 test. Participation of Certain Bus Companies (EX 16.K) 123. Interveners allege in EX 16.K, subsuming EX 18.C(i), that the Exercise was deficient in scope since not every bus company mentioned in the Plan participated. 124. LILCO witnesses did not disagree that all bus companies had not partici-pated in the Exercise. Instead, they argued that under the LILCO Plan, buses will be used on an as-needed basis during emergencies; that valid contracts are in force with the bus companies; that the only function of the bus companies under the Plan is to supply buses (the drivers come from LERO)- a simple function that need not be tested; and finally, that some bus companies did participate in the Exercise by making actual equipment availabic. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 42. 125. Intervenor witnesses testified that, of the 20 bus yards that LILCO relies on in its Plan,12 were not contacted during the Exercise, and that those which did partici-pate had been alerted in advance. They argued that the Exercise provided no evidence ! l that, in a real emergency, LILCO would be capable of contacting the other bus yards, l let alone securing buses from them. NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 136. l l l 1 i
i l 126. FEMA witnesses testified that it has been standard practice to test a sam-pie of bus companies listed in an emergency plan at " full participation" exercises. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 130. 127. We find that the participation of bus companies in the Exercise was ade-quate. These companies pcrform simple, straightforward roles under the LILCO Plan. There is no reason to believe these companies will fall to live up to their contracts to suppy buses in an actual emergency. Participation of Certain Ambulance Companies (EX 16.L) 128. In Contention EX 16.L subsuming EX 18.C (11), Interveners allege that the Exercise was less than full participation because not all ambulance companies men-tioned in the Plan participated. 129. LILCO witnesses again argued that valid contracts are in force with the ambulance companies, and that a comprehensive test of their abilities was not needed since under the LILCO Plan, these companies are relied on to perform nothing more than their normal daily activites. Furthermore, LILCO witnesses contended that had the entire complement of ambulance and ambulettes been mobilized, the public would have been affected thus contradicting the provision of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E that mandatory public participation not be required. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 42. I 130. Intervenor witnesses argued summarily that LILCO had contractual ar-rangements with 11 different ambulance companies but that prior to the Exercise only 3 were contacted, and only 2 of actually participated in the Exercise. NYS EX Exh. I j (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 96,106. 131. FEMA witnesses testified that FEMA does not require that all transporta-tion resource suppliers listed in the Plan be involved in each federally evaluated exer- j l- cise. FEMA EX Exh. 5 (Test Cont. EX 15/16), at 136.
l i l'o2. We agree with LILCO. Ambulance companies perform routine activities-under the LILCO Plan, making it relatively unimportant that these actioris be demon- { strated during an exercise. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe the non-participating ambulance companies will f ail to live up to their contractual agreements. 3 I Participation of Nassau County and Nassau County Red Cross (EX 18.C (vi).18.C (iii)) 1 l' 133. In Contentions EX 18.C (iii) and 18.C (vi), Interveners contend that the Ex-ercise was less than full participation because of the lack of participation by Nassau County and by the Nassau County Red Cross. 134. LILCO witnesses argued that there is no regulatory requirement for partic-ipation of an adjoining county, unless that county falls within the 10-mile EPZ. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 42-43. They also challenged the factual asser-tions in these contentions by arguing that Nassau County did participate by virtue of supplying the Nassau County Veterans Memorial Coliseum (a county-owned f acility) for l use as the Reception Center, Ld. and that the Nassau County Chapter of the Red Cross I participated by activating and manning two congregate care centers in Nassau County and by providing the Red Cross Coordinator, who was located at the LERO EOC. Ld. 135. Intervenor witnesses did not elaborate on these contentions. FEMA witnesses testified that at least ore representative of the Nassau 136. County Red Cross participated at the EOC throughout the Exercise to coordinate Red Cross activities with LERO. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 139. They further testified that the Red Cross Coordinator maintained contact with the Reception Center and Red Cross Chapter Headquarters in Mineola. Ld. 137. We find that there was adequate participation of Nassau County and the Red Cross in *he Shoreham Exercise.
)
C. The Shoreham Exercise and the Regulatory Requirements for " Full Participation" Exercises 138. Since we have now found that none of the alleged omissions in Contention - EX 15/16, by itself, renders the Shoreham Exercise less than full participation, we turn to the final question of whether they jointly do so. In deciding this question will exam-
. ine the scope of the Shoreham Exercise in its entirety, using the standards we identified in Section A above. We will break our dJscussion into three parts, corresponding to tne arguable tests of 1 F.1 of Appendix E: (1) whether "the major observable portions" were tested, (2) whether emergency response personnel were mobilized "in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario," and (3) whether .
as much of the emergency plan was tested "as is reasonable achievable without manda-tory public participation." Testing "the Major Observable Portions" of the Offsite Emergency Plan
-139. We previously concluded that there are 35 exercise objectives that corre-spond to the major observable elements of offsite emergency plans, and that to be full participation, an exercise must test a fair amount of these, but something less than all 35.
, 140. LILCO witnesses testified that during the Exercise the vast majority - 2_2 - of the 3_5 standard objectives (and several additional objectives) were tested; that among the objectives tested were all of the " core" objectives in draf t GM EX-3; that
' the exercise objectives deemed "most important" in the IEAL Report were, with one possible exception, tested during the Exercise; and that if one summed all the weighting factors ascribed by the IEAL Report to the objectives that were tested, the Exercise as a whole tested 79 to 87% of the total importance of objectives. LILCO EX Exh.12 ~ (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 20-30; Tr. 6148-49 (Hockert).
141. FEMA witnesses concurred that the vast majority of the standard FEMA objectives, including the " core" objectives of GM EX-3 had been tested. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 94-104. They stated that the Exercise was " greater in scope" than other Re-gion II " full participation" exercises not only in terms of LERO personnel mobilized, but l-also in terms of the number of standard FEMA objectives tested. Tr. 7545-46
- (Kowleski). They also pointed out that at no time during preparation fr" the Exercise did Mr. Petrone, the then FEMA Region II Administrator, express concern about the scope of the Exercise other than to note the lack of state and local participation.
Tr. 8476-77 (Kowieski). Nor did the NRC RAC member adversely comment on the scope of the Exercise af ter reviewing the Exercise objectives. Tr. 8444 (Keller). 142. With the exception of the items specified in the contentions, Intervenor witnesses did not dispute that these standard exercise objectives had been tested. 143. LILCO witnesses concluded based on the above that the Exercise tested "the major observable portions" of LILCO's offsite emergency plan. FEMA and NRC Staff witnesses reached the same conclusion. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 105; NRC EX Exh. l' (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 7; Tr. 8851-53 (Weiss, Schwartz). We agree. Based on our re-view of all the parties' testimony, we conclude that the Shoreham Exercise did test the vast majority of the standard FEMA exercise objectives, and among those the " core" objectives as well as most of the very important IEAL objectives. Whatever the Com-mission intended by requiring an exercise to test "the major observable portions" of an emergency plan, we cannot but conclude that the Shoreham Exercise has done so. l 1 1 1 l l i
l Mobilization of Response Personnel and Other Resources in Sufficient Numbers to Verify Capability to Respond to an Accident 144. Interveners have mounted scant challenges to the fact that emergency workers were mobilized "in sufficient numbers" to verify LERO capability to an acci-l dent. Interveners have basically contended that the Exercise was less than a full par-l ticipation exercise because, for example, not every bus .or ambulance company men-tioned in the PP.an participated in the Exercise. See NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 27,125,136,138. l l 145. LILCO witnesses argued, however, that the Shoreham Exercife was unique in that it far surpassed any other exercise in terms of the magnitude of emergency re-sources mobilized. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 18-19. LILCO witness-es testified that over 1000 emergency response personnel, including virtually all field workers, participated in the Exercise. Ld. at 18. l 146. FEMA agreed that LERO mobilized "its personnel and resources in suffi-cient number to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario," and that "the Shoreham exercise was equal or greater in scope compared to any other full-scale exercise evaluated by FEMA Region II to date." See FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 105; Tr. 7633-35, 7645-46, 8476, 8491, 8515-16, 8533-34 (Kowieski), 7638 (Baldwin). 147. Based on our review of the parties' testimony. we conclude that the Shoreham Exercise mobilized emergency resources in unprecedented numbers. We find that LERO personnel and other resources were mobilized "in sufficient numbers" to verify capability to respond to an accident. Indeed, we find that, as FEMA witnesses said, the Exercise was equal to or greater in scope than other Region II exercises. Testing As Much of the Emergency Plan As Is " Reasonably Achievable" 148. ' interveners argued that the Shoreham Exercise was less than full participa-tion since it f ailed to test all the Plan elements that were " reasonably achievable with-out mandatory public participation." Thus, they allege in their written Testimony, NYS _ -_ ___ L
- EX Exh.1, that the sirens should have been sounded (p. 49), the EBS message broadcast
'(p. 49), the brochure distributed (p. 58), and more schools contacted (p. 69).
.149. 'LILCO witnesses argued that where a particular element of the LILCO Plan I was not demonstrated, .it was attributable to one of the following reasons: (1) mandato-ry participation by members of the public or non-LERO organizations would have been required; (2) FEMA had identified the element as being non-essential for this Exercise; l
or (3) the political / legal situation on Long Island made the demonstration of an item in-advisable. LILCO EX Exh.12.(Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 16. Hence, according to LILCO, the Exercise tested as much of the LILCO Plan as was " reasonably achievable" given the practical and legal restraints. [d. 150. As Lfor the sirens, EBS broadcast and the public information brochure, LILCO witnesses testified that a legal cloud existed over those aspects of any exercise to be performed by LERO that could have involved contact with the public as a result of the decision of the New York Supreme Court in Cuomo v. LILCO (Consol. Index 84-4015). That decision held that " implementation" of the LILCO Plan by LERO would involve unlawful exercise by it of New York State's police powers. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 16. The pubile-contact aspects of these public notification i' activities posed the possibility of such conflict.~ Ld. i 151. LILCO witnesses further testified that seven weeks prior to the Exercise, the Suffolk County legislature edacted Local Law 2-86, which imposed heavy civil and criminal penalties for participation in any exercise activity that could affect the gen-eral population. LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 17. Issuing the bro- ! l 'chures, sounding the sirens, and broadcasting an EBS message were activities clearly
. proscribed by the local law according to LILCO witnesses. Ld. This law, which shaped I
the scope of the Exercise, was in effect until'the evening of February 10,1986, when j the U.S. District Court enjoined it as unconstitutional. LILCO v. County of Suffolk,628 l
F. Supp. 654, 666 (E.D.N.Y.1986). LILCO witnesses further testified that printing and distributing the brochures would have been impossible in the two days between the en-joining of the local law and the date of the Exercise, LILCO EX Exh.12 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at 17. There was also concern that without the brochures having been dis-tributed beforehand to inform people about the meaning of the sirens, public confusion would result. Seeid. 152. As far as more schools being contacted and included in the Exercise, LILCO witnesses testified that they did not contact school districts other than SWRD given the hustility evidenced by those districts, and the unlikelihood of their agreement to partic-ipate. Tr. C973-75 (Daverio). They argued that schools are not part of LERO, and, therefore, as part of the public could not be mandated to participate, even to the ex-tent of receiving a phone call. Tr. 6844-45 (Daverio). 153. FEMA witnesses acknowledged that there was much controversy regarding the r)egree of school participation they thought should and could be included in the Ex-ercise. They said that New York State had previously maintained (1) that NYS schools have minimum requirements for emergency planning and are responsible for their own emergency plans, and (2) that school districts in New York State are separate political entities from the State, which the; State cannot force to participate in emergency plan- I ning exercises. Tr. 8407-08, 8597-98 (Kowleski); FEM A EX Exh. 7. 154. While contending that the Exercise was deficient for omitting these various activities that were ostensibly " reasonably achievable," Interveners concede that let-I ters from schools attached to Interveners' testimony and predating the Exercise evi-denced hostility toward LILCO; that the State has concluded that school districts are separate political entitles which the State cannot coerce with respect to participation in emergency planning exercises; that there was governmental hostility toward LILCO in the form of a local criminal ordinance; and that during the weeks immediably
preceding the Exercise there was concern by FEMA staff about being criminally prose-
' cuted for participating in the Exercise. See NYS EX Exh.1 (Test. Cont. EX 15/16), at Att. 7; Tr. 7210-18 (Petrone, Baranski, Papilch 7189 (Papile).
155. We find that it was not " reasonably achievable" to have issued the brochure in the two days' time af ter the local ordinance was declared unconstitutional. Nor was it " reasonably achievable" to have had more school districts participate, given their i avowed hostility toward LILCO and toward any such participation. School districts are not part of the LERO organization or part of the LILCO Plan, and cannot be required to participate in an exercise in contravention of the regulation's proscription against requiring mandatory public participation. Regarding the sounding of the siren and bNadcast of the EBS message, we agrea with LILCO that to have done these things dur-ing the Exercise may have created unwarranted public confusion and would have been virtually meaningless in light of the fact that the brochure explaining the significance of the sirens would not be distributed until a later date. Conclusion 156. For the reasons outlined above, we conclude that the February 13, 1986 Shoreham Exercise was a " full participation" exercise under the Commission's regula-tions. II. S AMPLE SIZE (EX 21) l 157. In Contention EX 21, Interveners question whether FEMA had sufficient data to support its conclusion that certain objectives were met or partly met during the February 13,1986 ExercLse. Interveners challenge the reliability of FEMA's conclusions , about a series of field activities that were performed during the Exercise, alleging that (1) FEMA's evaluation of three of 60 Route Alert Drivers (EX 21.A), cight of 333 general population bus drivers, two school buses reporting to Shoreham-Wading River High l l
-____--- _____-__-___-__________ a
School and one bus reporting to Ridge Elementary School (EX 21.C), one ambulance and one ambulette driver (EX 21.D), and 32 of 165 traffic guides was of too limited a sample (EX 21.E); (2) the number of impediments simulated during the Exercise was insufficient a to reflect the number that would occur during an actual emergency (EX 21.F); and (3) the two congregate care f acilities involved in the Exercise were not part of the Plan and were not a large enough sample for FEM A to have observed (EX 15.L,16.N 22.K, 32). 158. While all parties agreed on the number of field workers observed by FEMA during the Exercise, they took decidedly different tacks in arguing about the adequacy of those samples. Interveners' attack was based solely on the ground that the samples chosen by FEMA were not statistically significant. Their testimony was sponsored by a statistician, Dr. Gary Simon, who freely admitted his lack of expertise in emergency planning, Tr. 7359-60 (Simon). Indeed, Dr. Simon testified that in preparing his testi-mony on Contention EX 21 he gave minimal consideration to both FEMA's Exercise ob- , jectives and the criteria FEMA evnluators used in judging LERO's performance with regard to those objectives. See Tr. 7361-66 (Simon). Dr. Simon argued that FEMA did not employ appropriate statistical considerations in determining the size of the sample it would observe at exercises. See SC EX Exh. 99 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 16-19. Dr. Simon also stated that small samples, regardless of the size of the population group being studied, produce results that are subject to wide statistical variation. Id. at 17; Tr. 7369-71 (Simon). 159. LILCO and FEMA agreed with this basic tenet of statistics. See Tr. 7300 (Daverio),8480 (Kowieski). Both argued, however, that FEMA need not observe "statis-tically significant" samples to draw valid conclusions about LERO's ability to perform given functions during an emergency. See Tr. 7300-03 (Daverio), 8480 (Kowieski). LILCO argued that Interveners had misperceived the role of sampling in judging overall I l
f organizational competence in a given response area. LILCO EX Exh. 21 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 7. LILCO contended that response functions involve a broad spectrum of subactivities including information gathering and evaluation, decision making, and im-plementation in the EOC, Staging Areas, and the field. I_d. LILCO argued that in at-tacking the samples observed by FEMA, Interveners Ignored the majority of this spec-trum of activity, focusing on the final field spot check as though it were the only activity observed. Ld. Finally, LILCO argued that FEMA, as the expert agency, had conducted enough exercises to know the size of the sample it must observe to render valid judgments about a response organization's capability. Ld. at 8. LILCO urged us to defer to FEMA's expertise. Id. 160. FEMA argued that the magnitude of its observation of the Shoreham Exer-cise was equal to or greater than that of other FEMA Region II exercises. Tr.8476 (Kowieski). FEMA witnesses noted that the Shoreham Exercise was the only exercise, to their memory, where the entire complement of field workers was mobilized and FEMA was allowed to choose randomly the workers it would observe. See Tr. 6491-92 (Kowieski). The witnesses also acknowledged that FEMA decided how many field workers it would observe; LILCO had been willing to perform as many field demonstra-tions as FEMA desired. Tr. 8477-78 (Kowieski). The witnesses explained that their choice of sample size was based on their professional judgment and expertise, Tr. 8480 (Kowieski), and on their use of f ree play messages that added randomness to the evalua- ) J tion process. Tr. 8488-92 (Baldwin, Kowieski). Finally, the FEMA witnesses agreed with LILCO that FEMA's review of offsite exercises was designed to judge organiza- , tional response, not individual response. See Tr. 8536-38 (Baldwin, Keller). j l i 161. As we will discuss in more detail below, we agree with FEMA and LILCO that FEMA need not observe statistically significant samples of field workers in order to make predictive findings about LERO's ability to implement the LILCO Plan during l I l
an actual emergency. As both correctly point out, the key question to be answered by a
'an Exercise is whether the response organization can carry out its assigned functions. !
j
'In answering that question, FEMA makes predictive findings about the preparedness of an organization. It does not ensure with scler tific precision the accuracy of its obser-vations; that is not possible, given the fact that mandatory public participation is not required in emergency planning exercises. Thus, FEMA must review all parts of an or-ganization and not expend disproportionate resources observing field functions that are generally far more routine than other decisionmaking and managerial positions. We find that FEMA followed the same approach it used in other exercises in positioning its evaluators and in choosing the samples it would observe during the Shoreham Exercise. .We have been given no basis for second guessing FEMA's expert judgment on these mat-ters. Accordingly, we find Contention EX 21 to be without merit.E!
Route Alert Drivers (EX 21.A)- 162. Contention EX 21.A asserts that FEMA's observation of three out of 60 Route Alert Drivers was of an insufficient sample size on which to base its conclusions that objectives FIELD 5, SA 9 and EOC 15 were met or partl' met. Briefly, the three objectives cited in the contention relate to LERO's capacity to demonstrate in the field the ability to provide backup public alerting, if necessary, in the event of partial siren failure (FIELD 5); to LERO's ability at the Staging Areas to dispatch and direct emer-gency workers in the fleid (SA 9); and to LERO's capability at the EOC to provide both an alert signal and an informational or instructional message to the population on an f r.?ea-wide basis throughout the 10-mile EPZ withm 15 minutes (EOC 15). See FEMA EX Exh.1 at 10,13,14. M/ The Board will not address the ancillary issues raised by Contention EX 21 con-cerning the factual merit of FEM A's conclusions about given Exercise objectives. Those issues are discussed in other parts of these findings: LERO's Route Alert Driver perfor- i mance is addressed in Contention EX 34 infra: Bus Driver performance and LERO's ac-tions regarding school dismissal and evacuation are discussed in Contention EX 50 infra: and Traf fic Guide performance is discussed la Contentions EX 40 and 50 inf ra. L I'
163. In assessing the merit of Interveners' claims, it is useful to review briefly I the Plan provisions for backup notification in the event of a siren failure. The process begins in the EOC where (1) Public Information personnel contact Marketing Evalua-tions, an outside consultant, and ask it to conduct a telephone survey to identify which sirens may have failed to activate, OPIP 3.3.4, S 5.2, and d the Special Facilities Evac-uation Coordinator contacts th3 Riverhead Electric Service Section to obtain a list of sirens that did not have electrical feed, OPIP 3.3.4, S 5.3. Once Ma'rketing Evaluations or the Riverhead Electric Service Section identifies f ailed sirens, the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator, using OPIP 3.3.4, Att. 3, determines the Staging Areas to which the failed sirens are assigned and directs those Staging Areas to dispatch Route Alert Drivers to the affected areas. Ld. 164. At the Staging Areas, Route Alert Drivers are mobilized at an Alert classi-fication, issued dosimetry and given public address systems to mount on their vehicles. OPIP 3.3.4, 5 5.3. Upon receipt of route alert assignments from the EOC, the Lead Traffic Guide designates Route Alert Drivers for the failed siren areas and dispatches them. Ld. In the last step of the process, Route Alert Drivers, using maps, drive slowly through the failed siren area informing residents to listen to the EBS station for emer-gency information. OPIP 3.3.4, Att.1. 165. Contention EX 21.A addresses the last step of this backup notification pro-cess. But the field activities of Route Alert Drivers were one part of a larger organi-zational response concerning backup notification; FEMA observed all activities involving the backup notification process in the EOC and Staging Areas, save calling Marketing Evaluations which could not have realistically participated since sirens were not sounded. See LILCO EX Exh. 21 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 9-10; Tr. 8167 (Keller),8472 (Kowieski). Thus, FEMA had an ample basis for drawing conclusions about EOC 15 and SA 9 as they relate to the backup notification process.
i 166. The sample of Route Alert Drivers observed by FEMA was sufficient to en-sure that the applicable component of objective FIELD 5 was met. FEMA observed one siren coverage area from each of the three Staging Areas. This method of evaluating l LERO's Route Alert Drivers was consistent with FEMA's practice at other Region II exercises. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 141; Tr. 8477 (Kowieski). Moreover, the field activities to be demonstrated'did not require FEMA to observe all 60 Route Alert Drivers to make predictive findings about these activities. The field activities of Route Alert Drivers essentially require them to drive their cars at 5 miles per hour through the siren cover-age area using a map as a guide. These are not unusual activities that require extensive observation to evaluate whether they can be performed. 167. Furthermore, Route Alert Drivers are needed under the LILCO Plan only if there are failed sirens. LILCO EX Exh. 21 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 10. Since backup notification is not required by NUREG-0654, PID at 759, provisions for backup notifica-tion are not essential elements of an emergency plan and a limited demonstration of that function does not prevent a finding of reasonable assurance. See Findings on Cont.
. EX 34, infra.
Bus Drivers (EX 21.B) l 168. Interveners allege in Contention EX 21.B that FEMA's observation of eight , out of 333 general population bus drivers was of an insufficient sample on which to base : 1 conclusions on objectives FIELD 9 and EOC 16. The objectives cited in this subpart deal with LERO's ability to demonstrate a sample of ield resources necessary to imple-ment an orderly evacuation of all or part of the _0-mile EPZ (FIELD 9) and with the l EOC's ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ, including the water portion (EOC 16). FEM A EX Exh.1 at 10,14. 169. Again, we begin with a brief discussion of the relevant Plan provisions. Bus operations begin in the EOC where Transportation Support Group personnel must
initially contact each of the 20 bus yards under contract to LERO to determine bus '! availability. OPIP 3.6.4, S 5.3. Then, depending on the prestaging or evacuation order, the EOC Bus Coordinators determine the number of buses required at each transfer point and the bus yards from which these vehicles should be obtained to minimize trav-el times from Staging Areas. Ld. Once this matching process is complete, dispatch in-structions are sent to the Staging Areas. Ld. 170. Bus Drivers are mobilized at a Site Area Emergency and are issued dosimetry as they arrive at the Staging Areas. OPIP 3.3.3, Att.1; OPIP 3.6.4, Att. 2. Af ter dispatch instructions are received from the EOC, Bus Dispatchers at the Staging Areas assemble and brief the Bus Drivers and provide them with information packets that designate their assigned bus yards and transfer points. OPIP 3.6.4, S 5.5. In the final steps of this process, the Bus Drivers trevel from the Staging Area to their as-signed bus yards, pick up their buses, and proceed to their assigned transfer pcints. OPIP 3.6.4, Att. 2. At the transfer points, Transfer Point Coordinators assign the Bus Drivers specific routes and dispatch them in accordance with the bus schedules. Once the Bus Drivers have completed their assigned routes, they proceed to the Reception Center with their evacuees. Ld. 171. Contention EX 21.B focuses solely on Bus Drivers' activities af ter they leave the Staging Areas. It thus neglects major ,nortions of FEMA's review of the over-all functioning of LERO's bus organization. FEMA completely observed all of the steps involving the bus operations in the EOC and Staging Areas. See Tr. 8472 (Kowieski). Thus, Interveners' claim that FEMA had an insufficient basis for making a finding about objective EOC 16 is meritless. 172. -In the field FEMA observed eight out of the 333 Bus Drivers. This sample is consistent with those FEMA has observed at other exercises. See Tr. 8478 (Kowieski), in fact. FEMA witnesses testified that FEMA's evaluation of bus drivers at
the Shoreham Exercise was more rigorous than that of other Region II exercises be-cause FEMA was able to select randomly the eight drivers to be observed from the en-tire complement of 333 Bus Drivers. Tr. 8477, 8479-80 (Kowleski), 8490-92 (Baldwin, Kowleski). All LERO Bus Drivers are licensed bus drivers in the State of New York and therefore have passed practical and written tests. LILCO EX Exh. 21 (Test. Cont. EX
- 21) at 14. FEMA's purpose in accompanying these drivers was to see whether the driv-ers were able to find bus yards and transfer points, receive a bus route, follow it in an accurate and timely manner, and travel from the transfer point to the Reception Cen-ter. These activities could be adequately assessed based on the sample chosen by FEMA.
School Evacuation Plans (EX 21.C) . 1 173. In Contention EX 21.C, Interveners allege that FEMA's failure to observe LERO's ability to effect an early dismissal of schools and its " limited" observation of two school buses reporting to Shoreham-Wading River High School and one bus re-porting to Ridge Elementary School was of too small and " irrelevant" a sample to justi-fy its conclusions concerning objectives FIELD 15, FIELD 16 and EOC 20. These objec-tives relate to LERO's ability to demonstrate a sample of field resources necessary to effect an early dismissal and an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ (FIELD 15 and 10) and to the EOC's ability to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ (EOC 20). FEMA EX Exh. I at 10,14. 174. As we have previously found in the PID, schools in the Shoreham EPZ do not normally rely on LERO for assistance in an early dismissal or an evacuation during a radiological emergency. S_ee e PID at 858-59. Under the LILCO Plan, school children are evacuated using the school buses customarily used to take them home each day and in emergencies pursuant to the schools' own dismissal plans. App. A, pp.11-19 to -20. As a backup, LERO has the ability to provide additional buses to aid school evacuation if so l 1 l
i L requested by school officials. OPIP 3.6.5, S 5.10. In the PID, we found that school emergency plans coupled with LILCO's planning efforts provide adequate assurance i that school children will be protected in an emergency. PID at 858. Thus, the allega-tion that a larger sample size of regular school buses should have been observed by FEMA in order for it to conclude that school children could have been evacuated in an emergency is erroneous, since FEMA was merely observing either ordinary school re-sources or a backup system provided by LERO. 175. In addition, the procedures used by FEMA to evaluate LERO's ability to im-piement school evacuation are consistent with the evaluations done at other New York State exercises. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 149. i l Ambulance Operations (EX 21.D) j 176. Contention EX 21.D asserts that FEMA's observation of one ambulance driver and one ambulette driver was of too small a sample for FEMA to draw valid con-clusions about objectives FIELD 13 and EOC 16. Those objectives require a demonstra-tion both of a sample of field resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of the institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals within the 10-mile EPZ (FIELD 13) and of the EOC's organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ, including the water portion (EOC 16). FEMA EX Exh.1 at 10,14. 177. The LILCO Plan provides that at a Site Area or General Emergency, the Ambulance Coordinator in the EOC contacts the ambulance companies to determine the number of ambulances available for emergency service and directs the dispatch of those vehicles to the EWDF. OPIP 3.6.5, 5 5.6. Upon their arrival at the EWDF, Ambu-lance /Ambulette Drivers are issued dosimetry, briefed, and directed to proceed either to a health care facility or to pick up homebound evacuees based on a priority system. OPIP 3.6.5, S 5.6, Att. 4. The drivers take the evacuees to designated reception centers or hospitals. Id. When each assignment is completed, they return to the EWDF for further dispatching. Id.
178. Contention EX 21.D focuses on the last aspects of LERO's demonstration of its ability to evacuate institutionalized, mobility-impaired individuals. FEMA eval-uators observed all of the ambulance coordination ac'tivities in the EOC. LILCO EX Exh. 21 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 18; Tr. 8167 (Keller). FEMA witnesses testified that the EOC Staff expeditiously handled the free play messages involving ambulances. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 137. FEMA evaluators also observed the availability of personnel and re-sources to effect the dispatch of ambulance personnel from the EWDF. LERO notified and mobilized six ambulances and six ambulettes. FEMA evaluators observed the briefing and dispatch of all of these drivers. LILCO EX Exh. 21 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 18; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 137; see Tr. 7333 (Daverio). Thus, Interveners' argument that FEMA lacked sufficient data to make a finding on objective EOC 16 is baseless. 179. FEMA's observation of one ambulance driver and one ambulette driver ac-tually driving to a special f acility and simulating the evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals was sufficient to draw conclusions about LERO's ability to evacuate those individuals during an actual emergency. The pickup function is nothing more than am-bulance and ambulette drivers doing their normal, everyday jobs. See LILCO EX Exh. 21 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 18; Tr. 7334, 7338 (Daverio). Furthermore, since exer-cises are designed so that normal public activities are not affected, see 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, S IV~F.1, it is appropriate that only a small number of ambulances and ambulettes were used in the February 13 Exercise, leaving the vast majority available to respond to real emergencies. Traffic Guides (EX 21.E) 180. Contention EX 21.E contends that FEMA's review of LERO's ability to pro-vide traffle guidance during an emergency was inadequate because it did not observe a large enough sample of Traffic Guides. The contention focuses on FEMA's conclusions about objectives FIELD 6, EOC 16 and EOC 19. SC EX Exh. 99 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at
l )
- 60. Those objectives require LERO to show its field capability to establish and staff ac- 1
\
cess control points with Traffic Guides in a timely manner (FIELD 6), the EOC's organi-sational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of the EPZ (EOC 16), and the EOC's organizational ability to control access to an evacuated area (EOC 19). FEMA EX Exh. I at 10,14. I 181. The sample size selected by FEME was equal to or greater than that used at other FEMA Region II exercises. FEM A EX Exh. 5 at 152. Indeed, in his written testi-i many, Suffolk County's witness, Dr. Simon, stated that he could not conclude that the Traffic Guide samples were too small. See SC EX Exh. 99 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 62-63. Given these facts, the Board believes that no issue exists concerning the adequacy of FEMA's sample of Traffic Guides. FEMA observed all of the EOC and Staging Area ; activities and an adequate sample of Traffic Guides in the field. I_mpediments (EX 21.F) 182. Contention EX 21.F asserts that the number of impediments simulated dur-ing the Exercise was insufficient to reflect the number that would occur during an ac-tual emergency. Interveners also question LERO's ability to respond to two hypotheti-cal accidents. This subpart is addressed in our decisicn on Contention EX 41. Congregate Care Facilities _ LEX 15.L,16.N. 22.K. 32) { 183. Contentions EX 15.L,16.N, 22.K and 32 contend that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed because (1) the two facilities used as congregate care centers during the Exercise are not identified in the Plan as congregate care centers, and were not a large enough sample for FEMA to have observed; (2) there are no congregate care f acilities identified in the Plan; and (3) there are no agreements to use congregate care f acilities in the Plan. I The number of congregate care centers evaluated during the February 13 184. Exercise was consistent with the number observed at other FEMA Region II exercises. f 3 l \ - - -. - - - - - - -
. FEMA -EX Exh. 5 at 157. The Red Cross keeps a list of congregate care centers and supporting agreements in its own files. LILCO EX Exh. 21 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 23-24.
The failure to include that list in the Plan does not constitute a flaw in the Plan. The
- two congregate caro centers activated during the Exercise were both on the list of Red 4 Cross centers. LILCO E', Exh. 21 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 24. Since the Red Cross's con- '
gregate care activities are the same as it follows in any type of emergency, FEMA's ob-servation of two congregate care centers was not unreasonable. 185. As to Interveners' claims that no congregate care facilities are identified in the LILCO Pian and no agreements exist with those f acilities, we find that these are not issues that arose frcm Exercise events, but.rather are planning issues. .In a recent ]
'd decision, the Commission refused to reopen the record in this proceeding to discuss !
LERO's agreements, or lack thereof, with the Red Cross and congregate care centers. i See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-87-05, slip op. at.4-9 (June 11,1987). Accordingly, we decline to accept Interveners' invitation to explore those issues. I III. ROADWAY IMPEDIMENTS (EX 41.A. B. E) 1
.186. In Contention IX 41, Interveners allege that LERO failed to demonstrate that it has the ability to remove impediments from roadways in a timely manner and that changes made to the Plan since the Exercise do not eliminate the problems exhib- )
J lted during the Exercise. Contention EX 22.I, which was litigated as part of Contention EX 41, argues that FEMA introduced an insufficient number of impediments into the Exercise. 187. In general, the testimony on this contentions presents few factual I 11 / Direct cases on Contention EX 41 were presented by LILCO, Interveners and I FEMA, and were cross-examined on 7 hearing days: LILCO, March 10-13,1978, Tr. l 269-1125, and April 1,1987, Tr. 2273-320; Interveners, March 17,1987, Tr.1129-316, I and April 1,1978, Tr. 2321-49; and FEMA, June 12, Tr. 8145-267. l
I disputes about what occurred on the day of the Exercise. Instead, the disagreements on Contention EX 41 center on whether such weaknesses as were observed in LERO's per- ) formance resulted from individual errors, or from problems created by the way FEMA introduced the impediment free play messages into the Exercise, or from flaws in the Plan itself. Based on the record before us, we conclude that the LILCO Plan is not fun-damentally flawed as it relates to the removal of impediments during a radiological emergency. Rather, inadequacies in LERO's performance during the Exercise were largely the result of poor performance by a single individual whose fallings then im-pacted other aspects of LERO's response. These problems were magnified by the man-ner in which FEMA introduced the impediment messages into the Exercise. Plan Provisions for the Removal of Impediments 188. Before addressing the specific subparts of Contention EX 41,it is helpful to review briefly the provisions in the LILCO Plan for the removal of roadway impedi-ments. The LILCO Plan specifies that a maximum of twelve Road Crews will be as-signed to remove roadway obstructions during an evacuation of the Shoreham EPZ. These Road Crews will be dispatched to different locations throughout the EPZ, princi-pally the intersections of major east-west and north-south evacuation routes. LILCO Test. Cont. Ex 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 5; Roberts e_t ab (Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 23-24; OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 8, p. 4 of 5. The total number of Road Crews that will actually be assigned in a given emergency depends on the zones to be evacuated. During the L February 13 Exercise, all 12 Road Crews were dispatched. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 5. 1_8/ In discussing this contention, we use the ter.m " Road Crew" to refer to those LERO workers who were assigned to tow trucks during the Exercise. As used in the j LILCO Plan, " Road Crew" also applies to LERO workers who are assigned to fuel trucks and to a rack truck which is used to assist in the conversion of a segment of roadway to one-way flow. The simulated establishment of this one-way flow is discussed in our res-olution of Contention EX 40, infra. 1
g
.s, 189. The specific procedures for responding to roadw , impediments are .
contained in GPIP 3.6.3 OPIP 3.6.3 provided that the Traffic Control Coordinator was initially to instruct the Road Logistics Coordinator to implement road crew operatio'ts. OPIP 3.6.3, 5 5.5.1. Following an evacuation recommendation, the Road Logistics , n Coordinator was then to identify the road crew posts to be manned, given that recom- ,
}
mendation, and to notify the Lead Traffic Guides in the three staging areas of the man-ning decision. OPIP 3.6.3, SS 5.5.3 to 5.5.5. The Lead Traffic Guides would, in turn, , brief and dispatch the appropriate road crews. OPJP 3.6.3, S 5.09. Upon arriving at their vehicles, Road Crews were reqdred to check in by radio with the Evacuation Sep-port Communicator in the EOC, OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 2, and then to maintain periodic con-tact with that communicator following their arrival at their assigned posts. OPIP 3.6.3, S 3.5.9. 190. Revision 6 of the LILCO Plan also provided general instructions regarding response to roadway impediments. When an accident report was received in the EOC, the Evacuation Route Coordinator could either dispatch a Route Spotter to the accident location to verify the impediment or, if the initial report was deemed trustworthy, no-tify the Road Logistics Coordinator who, in turn, would dispatch the appropriate equip-ment. Bnth the Evacuation Route Coordinator and the Road Logistics Coordinator were instructed by procedure to report problems affecting evacuation to the Traffic Control Coordinator who was to provide periodic updates to the Evacuation Coordinator. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 6; OPIP 3.6.3 S 5.5.9 and 5.6.7. Revision 6 did not contain specific instructions about rerouting traffic around roadway impediments or about broadcasting an EBS message concerning such rerouting. It did not prohibit these actions, but was silent on them. Id.
Contention EX 41.A 191. Contention EX 41.A alleges that during the Fxercise, LERO was unable to f E mobilize its Road Crews in a timely manner, demonstrating a fundamental flaw in the l LILCO Plan. Linder the LILCO Plan, Road Crews are notified to report to the Staging l Areas following the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. OPIP 3.3,3, Att.1, p. 2. As they arrive at the Staging Areas, they are given dosimetry; and following an evacuation recommendation to the general public, they are given their specific assignments and dispatched into the field. OPiP 3.6.3, S 5.4.1 to 5 4.6. 4 192. These procedures were followed during the February 13 Exercise. Roberts { g aj. (Test Cont. EX 41), f f. Tr.1134, at 18-19, 22-23. The times at which Road Crew ' I members were called out, arrived at the Staging Areas, and were dispatched to their l I field locations are not in dispute. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 22-23, Att. E; Roberts et al. (Test Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 19-20, 24, Att. 2.1 The fol-lowing Exercise facts are of particular relevance in resolving Contention EX 41.A: a) Road Crews were notified to report following the declaration of a Site Area Emergency at 8:19; b) An evacuation recommendation was made to the general pub-lic at 10:24; c) At 11:00, all four Road Crews were dispatched from the Riverhead 5taging Area;20/ { 19/ In both interveners' and LILCO's written tes!.imony, the arrival times of Road Crews at the Staging Areas differed from those listed in Cont. EX 41.A. See Roberts et al.(Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 20 n.6. Intervenor witnesses explained that the differences resulted from additional facts being learned during the discovery process. I_d. Thus, for these findings, the Board relies on the arrival times presented in the writ-ten testimony rather than those contained in the contention. 20/ We use the term " dispatch" to refer to the time when Road Crews lef t the Staging Areas for their field positions. We would have preferred to use the times Road l Crews arrived at their field locatiors for judging mobilization timeliness, but those records do not exist. See Roberts e_t aj. (Test. Cont. EX 41), f.f. Tr.1134, tit 24-25. We do not consider this lack of data *o be determinative, since the additional travel times would have been short and the Road Crews were available to respond to impediments from the time of dispatch since eat was equippeo with a radio, i l
d) At .11:28.- all four Road Crews were dispatched from the Patchogue Staging Area; e) At 11:59, three Road Crews were dispatched from the Port ! Jefferson Staging Area, LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, Att. E.6. Two of those crews were sent to LILCO's Brentwood f acility to pick up equipment, see Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr 1134, Att. 2. They departed that facility for l their field locations at 12:40. The final Port Jefferson Road l Crew vras dispatched at 12:20, 1 193. The parties differed on how those mobilization times should be interpreted. LILCO witnesses argued that the LILCO Plan provides an oversupply of Road Crews -- 12 Road Crews have been provided to respond to the four accidents predicted to occur 1 during an evacuation of the entire EPA (not all of which would require a tow truck re-sponse). LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 22-23; Tr.1060-62 (Lieberman). They therefore contended that it was not essential for gli road crews to be mobilized and dis-patched at the moment an evacuation recommendation was made rather,it was impor-tant that some Road Crews be dispatched shortly af ter that recommendation. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 23. LILCO witnesses argued that LERO had certainly met this test during the Exercise. 194. In contrast, Intervenor witnesses contended that a_Il 12 Road Crews needed to be at their posts in a " timely manner." Tr. 1166-67 (McGuire. Roberts). In the wit-cesses' view, timeliness should be determined in reference to the order to evacuate. They argued that, at a minimum, Road Crews should be in position in the field before an evacuation recommendation was given. Tr.1167 (Roberts). Since dispatch had occurred af ter that recommendation during the Exercise, Road Crew rnobilization, in their view, was untimely. 195. FEMA's written testimony stated that no problems had been identified with regard to the mobilization, staffing, and dispatching of LERO Road Crews. FEM A EX Exh. 5 at 16. During cross-examination. FEMA witnesses explained that FEMA's . I
standard for judging the timeliness of LERO field worker mobilization was that the workers should be in the field within three hours of their initial callout. Tr. 8154 (Keller)t se_e PID at 723. When shown the dispatch times contained in Att. 2 to Inter-venors' testimoi.y, Mr. Keller stated that the mobilization of Road Crews was a " serious - problem. Tr. 8170-71 (Keller). He refused to classify it in terms of a " Deficiency," saying that to do so he would need more information, including whether or not the LILCO Plan provided an oversupply of road crews. Tr. 8517, 8738 (Keller). 196. In the PID, the Licensing Board accepted LILCO's mobilization scheme for field workers, including its 12 road crews. PID at 723-25. The Licensing Board Iound that LERO "could substantially complete its mobilization in about 3 hours." Id. at 723. In addition, the Board concurred with LILCO that during an evacuation few accidents would occur that would require tow truck assistance. PID at 795-98. As we discuss in our decision on Contention EX 22.I, intra, LILCO's estimate of four accidents, not all of which would require tow truck assistance, is a reasonable one. Given that number of predicted accidents, we agree with LILCO that the LILCO Plan provides an oversupply 1 of Road Crews. Accordingly, the question to be answered in judging the timeliness of Road Crew mobilization is whether some of the Road Crews are dispatched shortly af ter an evacuation recommendation is given to the general public. LERO clearly met this test. While we agree with Interveners and FEMA that the mobilization of a few Road Crews, particularly those dispatched from the Port Jefferson Staging Area, was not as expeditious as it could have been, we do not believe that those delays would have 1 prevented adequate protectiva measures from being taken in an actual emergency. Thus, we dismiss Contention EX 41.A. I i i i j
l l l ContentionLEX 41.B j
-l
. LERO's Response to the Exerci,se Impediments l 1
197. Resolution of Contention EX 41.B rests on an understanding of the factual events relating to LERO's response to the two roadway impediments. LILCO's written 1 testimony contained a detailed chronology of those events. See LILCO Test. Cont. { I EX 40, ff. Tr. 272, at 7-18, Att. B and C. Interveners' testimony did not include a simi-lar chronology but instead contained selected references to Exercise f acts. See Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 33, 35-38, 42-44, 46-49. In fact, two Interve- : i nor witnesses admitted that the LILCO testimony included a more complete set of Ex-ercise documentation. See Tr. 1141-42 (Roberts, McGuire). In developing the following I account of LERO's actions in respor.se to the two roadway impediments, we have relied primarily on LILCO's chronology. Where appropriate we have supplemented that chro-l ' nology with material from Interveners' written testimony and from the oral testimony I on this issue. 198. During the Exercise, FEMA controllers handed two free play impediment f messages to the Evacuation Route Coordinator in the EOC. The first message was given to him at 10:39, approximately 15 minutes af ter the initial evacuation recommen- i dation was made. The message read: 1 A loaded gravel truck with a broken driveshaf t, which is up-right, but turned sideways in the road is blocking the north and south bound lanes and both shoulders of Yaphank-Middle Island Road approximately (50) yards north of the caution light at the "Y" intersection of Yaphank-Middle Island Road, Main Street and Mill Road (in the vicinity of TCP #324). This is a multiple vehicle accident also involving three passenger cars that are blocking both the r 3rth and south bound shoul-ders of the road. There are n_o injuries of any individuals. The LERO responder to the site of this impediment should loccte 'the FEMA evaluator who will be wearing a colored armband. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at Att. B.1 (emphasis in original). A second message was given to the Evacuation Route Coordinator at 11:04. The message read:
l l 1 On Route 25A, approximately 75 yards east of the inter-section with Miller Place-Yaphank Road, (in the vicinity of Traffic Control Post #41), a fuel tank-truck has jackknifed ' and turned over on its side blocking both eastbound and westbound traffic lanes, as well as both shoulders of the road. - In the course of the accident, the fuel tank was ruptured and is leaking fuel. There is a possibility that the fuel eculd ignite causing fire. There is n.Lo fire at present and po injuries to any individuals. d The LERO responder to the site of this impediment should locate the FEMA evaluator who will be wearing a colored arm band. I_d. at Att. C.1 (emphasis in original). Neither message wa!., supplied by FEMA evaluatots/ controllers to any field personnel. 1 Gravel Truck Impediment 199, Af ter receiving the free play message for the gravel truck impediment at i 10:39, the Evacuation Route Coordinator checked the traffic control point and route spotter maps and asked the Evacuation Support Communicator to have a Route Spotter verify the accident. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 8. The Evacuation Route Coordinator's message to the Communicator excluded any indication that the sceldent involved multiple vehicles. Roberts e_t al. (Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 34. The Communicator reported back to the Evacuation Route Coordinator that at 10:56, the Route Spotter had reported that no one was at the location and that he had returned to I his assigned route. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 9. The Route Spotter failed to rendezvous with the FEMA evaluator because the evaluator was situated in a parking lot 50 yards east of the accident scene in a position that was not visible from that scene. See id. at 9; Tr. 557-58 (Wilm). 200. Since the Route Spotter had failed to link up with the FEMA evaluator, a FEMA controller in the EOC gave the Evacuation Support Communicator a handwritten note at 11:04, indicating that the FEMA evaluator was east of the accident scene. The
)
Route Spotter was again dispatched to meet the FEMA evaluator. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, f f. Tr. 272, at 9.
201.. At 11:35, the Transportation Support Coordinator in the EOC notified the Bus Dispatcher at the Riverhead Staging Area of the gravel truck impediment. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 9, Att. B.5. The message contained a partially con-fileting mix of information from the original free play message and from the later clar-ifying note of the FEMA controller. Upon receipt of that message, the Bus Dispatcher determined that Zones L and M could be affected by the impediment and notified the appropriate Transfer Point Coordinators of the possible impediment, Ld. at 9, Att. B.6. 202. At 11:40, the Route Spotter arrived at the FEMA evaluator's location. Tr.1099 (Wilm). At approximately 11:50, he reported to the EOC that the gravel truck impediment was 50 yards east of the "Y" intersection, not north of that intersection. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 9, Att. B.7. At about the same time that this report was received in the EOC, the Road Logistics Coordinator instructed the Evacua-tion Support Communicator to dispatch a Road Crew to the impediment. Ld. at 9. Att. B.8. The Road Crew, equipped with a compressor truck, lef t its field post to respond to the accident at 12:00. Ld.; Tr. 739-41 (Wilm). 203. At 12:13, an Exercise controller in the EOC informed the Evacuation Coordinator that there was a " blocked road" in the EPZ. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 10, Att. B.9. The Evacuation Coordinator immediately proceeded to the traffic control area where he met with the Traffic Control Coordinator, Evacuation Route Coordinator, Road Logistics Coordinator and Traffic Control Point Coordinator. I Following a brief discussion, the Evacuation Coordinator concluded that the accident would not affeet evacuation flow since the accident was east of Yaphank-Middle Island I l R-oad on a route that carried little or no evacuation traffic. Ld. at 10. 204. Af ter the FEMA controllers were informed of this conclusion, they in-structed the Evacuation Coordinator to assume that the gravel truck impediment was located at tha position specified in the original free play message. LILCO Test. Cont.
EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 10, Att. B.9. Given that instruction, the Evacuation Coordinator formulated a rerouting scheme with the Traffic Control Point Coordinator,W and at 12:20 the Traffic Control Point Coordinator instructed the Lead Traffic Guide at the Patchogue Staging Area to implemen; that scheme. Ld. at 10, Att. B.10. At 12:31, the Lead Traffic Guide in the Patchogue Staging Area advised the EOC that the appropriate traffic guides had been informed of the rerouting instructions. Ld. 205. Af ter taking a series of actions to respond to the fuel truck impediment, the Evacuation Coordinator asked his staff, at 12:55, to inform the Coordinator of Pub-lic Information in the EOC that an EBS message needed to be prepared on both the gravel and fuel truck impediments. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 11, Att. B.11. At 13:37, the Manager of Local Response discussed the rerouting schemes with the Director of Local Response. Tr. 762-63 (Weismantle). At 13:45, the Director ap-proved the EBS message and its broadcast was simulated shortly thereaf ter. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 12, 206. At 12:55, the Bus Coordinator in the EOC asked the Bus Dispatcher at the Riverhead Staging Area whether bus operations were being affected by the gravel truck impediment. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 11, Att. B.12. Ten minutes later, the Bus Dispatcher responded that the appropriate transfer points had been informed of the gravel truck accident but that no proclems were being reported on bus routes. Ld. at 11, A tt. B.13. i i 207. At approximately 13:20, the Manager of Local Response telephoned Mr. l Lieberman, a traffic engineer who had prepared the traffic related aspects of the LILCO Plan, to get his concurrence with the rerouting decision for the gravel truck i \ \ l 2_1/ The scheme called for Traffic Guides at existing traffic control points to divert traffic at Route 25 and at Bartlett Road to prevent all southbound flow into the impedi- . ment scene. l l i l _ _____________-___O
1 i l Impediment and to inquire about that impediment's effect on evacuation times. LILCO a l Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 11, Att. B.14. Mr. Lieberman noted his agreement with the rerouting scheme and estimated that the evacuation time for evacuees using Yaphank-Middle Island Road would have been increased by approximately one hour. He i i added that this increase probably would not have an impact on the total evacuation times, since Yaphank-Middle Island Road was not a critical evacuation route. I_d. ! i 208. While these activities were occurring in the EOC, the Road Crew was trying to find the FEMA evaluator located near the gravel truck impediment. The Road Crew's initial attempt failed, but af ter further direction from the EOC, it met with the evaluator at 12:45. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, at 11-12, Att. B.2. At 13:30, the Road Crew reported to the Road Logistics Coordinator in the EOC that the gravel truck had been cleared from the roadway and that traffic had resumed in both directions. I_d. at 12, A tt. B.15. Following this message, the Evacuation Route Coordinator instructed that the rerouting strategy be removed so that evacuating traffic could follow its nor- i mally assigned routes. Id. at 12. Fuel Truck Impediment 209. Af ter receiving the free play message at 11:04, the Evacuation Route Coordinator instructed the Evacuation Support Communicator to have a Route Spotter confirm the presence of the fuel truck accident. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, l at 14, Att. C.2. Af ter trying and failing to raise the Route Spotter on his radio, the Communicator sent a message to the Port Jefferson Staging Area at 11:15, inquiring simply whether the specific Route Spotter had been dispatched. Ld. at 14, Att. C.3. The Port Jefferson Staging Area responded promptly that the Route Spotter had not 1 been dispatched. I_d. 210. At 11:40, the Transportation Support Coordinator in the EOC notified the Bus Dispatcher at the Port Jefferson Staging Area of the possible fuel truck accident. l _____._.______________o
LILCO Test. Cont.~ EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 14, Att. C.4. At 12:05, the Bus Dispatcher re-ported to the Transportation Support Coordinator that a visual check of the fuel truck impediment scene indicated no problem with traffic control or evacuation completion. [d. at 14, Att. C.S. This message was relayed by a member of the Transportation Sup-port Group to the Evacuation Route Coordinator. I_d. at 14. 211. At 11:49, the Port Jefferson Staging Area informed the EOC that all Route Spotters had been dispatched. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 15, Att. C.6. At 12:02, a Route Spotter was instructed to proceed to the scene cf the fuel truck impedi-ment. Ld. at 15, Att. C.2. By 12:23, the Route Spotter had met with the FEMA evaluator and had been released. Ld. at 15, Att. C.7. 212. As noted above, at 12:13, the Evacuation Coordinator was informed by a FEMA controller about the existence of roadway problems. The first actions of the Evacuation Coordinator and the Traffic Control Group focused on the gravel truck im-pediment. Af ter completing those actions and discussing the fuel truck impediment, they quickly concluded that there was no quick way to remove the impediment from the roadway. Therefore, LERO initiated two different actions. First, a rerouting strat-egy was devised,D and at 12:47, instructions were sent to the Lead Traffic Guide at the Port Jefferson Staging Area to implement that strategy. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, f f. Tr. 272, at 15, Att. C.8. At 12:57, the Lead Traffic Guide in the Port Jefferson i Staging Area informed the Traffic Control Point Coordinator that Traffic Guides were rerouting traffic. Ld. Second, efforts were undertaken to contact the Miller Place Fire Department to request that they respond to the fuel truck impediment to eliminate the fire hazard. In addition, a LERO worker was dispatched to the scene of the accident l 2J/ The strategy called for a Traffic Guide at an existing traffic control point to di-Vert evacuaticn traffic onto North Country Road where it would later be directed by a l l Traffic Guide, using his normal evacuation orders, back onto its original evacuation 1 i path. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 15; Tr. 694-96 (Lieberman). j l l l l . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
with dosimetry to monitor any exposure to the responding firemen. Ld. at 16. A mes-sage to this effect was sent to the Lead Traffic Guide at the Port Jefferson Staging Area at 12:37; a Route Alert Driver was dispatched with dosimetry 13 minutes later. Ld. at 16, Att. C.10. 213. At 12:55, the Evacuation Coordinator instructed a member of his staff to ask the Coordinator of Public Information in the EOC to prepare an EBS messagt on f both impediments. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 16, Att. C.11, 214. At 12:56, the Bus Coordinator in the EOC again asked the Bus Dispatcher at the Port Jefferson Staging Area about any traffic problems that bus drivers may be en-countering, especially on routes potentially affected by the fuel truck impediment. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 16, Att. C.12. The response, received 15 minutes later in the EOC, indicated that no routes were being affected. Ld. at 16, Att. C.13, 215. Following receipt of the rerouting order, the Traffic Guide at TCP #40 as-sessed the roadway geometry and, at 13:10, radioed the Lead Traffic Guide at the Port Jefferson Staging Area that an additional Traffic Guide and six additional traffic cones were needed to effect the rerouting. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 16, Att. C.14. An additional Traffic Guide with the necessary equipment was dispatched from the Port Jefferson Staging Area at 13:32. Ld. at 16, Att. C.15. 216. At 13:20, the Manager of Local Response contacted Mr. Lieberman to ob-tain his concurrence with the rerouting strategy for the fuel truck impediment and to inquire about the accident's affect on evacuation times. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 17, Att. C.9. Mr. Lieberman concurred with the rerouting scheme and esti-mated that the fuel truck impediment would increase evacuation times by approxi-mately one hour for evacuees affected by the impediment. Ld. at 17,18. __ .- __N
{ J i 217. At approximately 13:30, the Route Alert Driver carrying dosimetry for the j Miller Place Fire Department met with the FEMA evaluator at the scene of the fuel truck impediment. This contact was delayed by the f act that he had initially passed by the evaluator's location without seeing him. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at I 16-17. The Route Alert Driver was released by the FEMA evaluator at 13:54. Ld. at 17, Att. C.16, 218. At 13:37, the Manager of Local Response discussed the rerouting schemes with the Director of Local Response. Tr. 762-63 (Weismantle). At 13:45, EBS message
#8 was approved by the Director. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 17, Att.
C.17. - 219. At approximately the same time, the Road Logistics Coordinator dis-patched a Road Crew to the fuel truck impediment to provide assistance to the re-sponding firemen as needed. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, if. Tr. 272, at 17. In addition, at 14:00 the Traffic Control Coordinator instructed the Logistic.t Support Coordinator to contact Hess Oil Company to inform them that one of their tankers was overturned and to request off-loading assistance. Ld. at 18, Att. C.20. At 14:15, the Logistics Sup-port Coordinator informed the Traffic Control Coordinator that Hess had made ar-rangements with a local environmental contractor to transfer the load and that all ap-propriate agencies were being notified in accordance with Hess's procedures. Id. at 18, 1 Att. C.21. 220. At 14:45, the Evacuation Support Communicator relayed to the Road Logis-ties Coordinator the Road Crew's report that the fuel spill had been cleared, the truck was off the roadway, and the rcadway was clear. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 18. Att. C.22. At 14:57, the Evacuation Coordinator instructed the Traffic Control Coordinator to reroute traffic back onto the original evacuation routes. Ld. at 18, Att. C .9. 1 L ___
LILCO Testimony 221. The parties disagreed on how these f acts should be interpreted. LILCO wit-nesses argued that LERO largely demonstrated its ability to respond to roadway impedi-ments. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 19. They pointed out that during the Exercise (1) the Evacuation Route Coordinator immediately attempted to verify both accidents; (2) following verification of the gravel truck impediment, a tow truck was promptly dispatched; (3) af ter verification of the fuel truck impediment, steps were I taken to eliminate the fire hazard and to off-load the vehicle; (4) once the Evacuation Coordinator became involved., decisions were promptly made on rerouting schemes; (5) rerouting schemes were rapidly and effectively implemented in the field and then re-moved once the impediments were cleared; (6) an EBS message on the impediments was prepared and broadcast (simulated); and (7) the Transportation Support Group recog-nized the potentialimpact of the impediments on bus operations and promptly informed the appropriate field personnel of the possible problems. [d. 1 222. LILCO witnesses acknowledged the existence of delays in LERO's response and attributed them to two causes: first, the Evacuation Route Coordinator's failure to perform as effectively as he should have and second, the manner in which FEMA intro-duced the impediment messages into the Exercise. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 19-22. The witnesses admitted that the Evacuation Route Coordinator's f ail-ure to inform his co-workers and superiors in the EOC of the roadway impediments de-layed LERO's response. Id. at 20; Tr. 966-67 (Wilm). They testified that his omission of information in transmitting the original free play messages to field personnel resulted in delays and confusion because field personnel were unaware of the need to meet with the FEMA evaluators. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 20. This led to incor-rect reports either that no impediment existed or that the impediment had been cleared. [d. q l l I
---------_-a
l 22M LILCO witnesses criticized the FEMA evaluator assigned to the gravel truck impediment for not being at.the scene of the impediment. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 21. They also challenged FEMA's method of inputting the free play message, arguing that FEMA's total f ailure to identify the impediments in the field prevented LERO workers who passed by the scene of the accidents within minutes of their hypothetical occurrence from noticing them .1d reporting them to the EOC. LILCO witnesses contended that had there actually been an accident, or hi, FEMA clearly indicated that an accident had occurred, then multiple reports would have flowed into the EOC and more rapid response would have resulted. I_d.; Tr. 404-05 (Weismantle). Finally, they argued that FEMA's failure to inject appropriate responses to the inquiries by the Transportation Support Group led to reports of "no problem" and I consequent delays in response. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 21. 224. The LILCO witnesses also addressed each of the factual assertions in Con-tention EX 41.B. In response to subpart B(1), the witnesses agreed that the Evacuation Route Coordinator did not inform field personnel that the gravel truck impediment in-cluded multiple vehicles or that the fuel truck impediment posed the possibility of fire or was blocking bcth shoulders of the road. However, they argued that these omissions were unimpor' tant and did not delay LERO's response since the omitted f acts could have been resdily observed and factored into the responders' actions. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 24: Tr. 734,800-01 (Wilm). LILCO witnesses took exception to the three factual allegations contained in subpart B(ii). They argued that Exercise docu-ments revealed that the Transportation Support Group was aware of both impediments at least an hour before the contention's alleged time of 12:40. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, f f. Tr. 272, at 25. With regard to the delay in the dispatch of a Road Crew to the fuel truck impediment, the witnesses contended that the Road Logistics Coordinator knew of the possible need for equipment shortly af ter 12:13, but that a
1 conscious decision was made not to dispatch a tow truck to the scene until the fire de- 1 partment had first eliminated the possibility of fire and the fuel had been off-loaded from the overturned tanker. Id. at 25-26. Indeed, when the Road Crew was sent to the scene at 13:45, it was to stand by and provide whatever assistance it could. Id. at 17; 1 Tr.1024-25 (Wilm). Regarding the timing of the EBS broadcast, LILCO witnesses con- J ceded that the message was not timely if one looked solely at the time needed to have j it prepared and approved, Tr. 653-54 (Weismantle). However, they argued that its timing was not an important factor in protecting public health and safety since evacuees would have been directed by Traffic Guides and cones onto alternate routes i designed to avoid the accident locations. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, if. Tr. 272, at 26; Tr. 908 (Wilm). They argued that while an EBS message was helpful,it was not required by the circumstances. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 26; Tr. 650-54,903-04, 1012-16 (Weismantle). 225. With regard to subpart B(iii), the LILCO witnesses strongly disagreed with FEMA's evaluation of the adequacy of the equipment sent to remove the gravel truck impediment. They argued that the key goal in responding to an impediment is to open a path for evacuating traffic and that this could probably have been done by removing a single vehicle.N LILCO Test Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 26. As for the need for a scraper truck, the witnesses argued that this was an invention of the FEMA evaluator since the free play message did not mention gravel on the roadway and it specifically stated that the truck was upright. Ld. at 27. The witnesses stated that had the re-sponding Road Crew been informed of the need for a scraper truck, then LILCO could have summoned one of its many such trucks to respond. M; Tr.1019-23 (Weismantle, ; 2_3/ The witnesses noted that FEMA never provided a description of the gravel truck accident so that one could only speculate on how the gravel truck and the three cars were spread across the roadway. See Tr. 734-40, 744 (Wilm). l _ _ _ .
1 Wilm). Finally, with regard to the dispatch of a Route Spotter to the scene of the fuel , 1 truck impediment, the witnesses conceded that LERO's actions could have been more 1 1 expeditious. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr 272, at 27-28; Tr. 321 (Wilm). They ar- ! gued that the delay was not the result of a flaw in the LILCO Plan but rather of an in-complete message that merely asked if the Route Spotters had been dispatched from the Port Jefferson Staging Area. Had the message been clearer, the witnesses con-tended that an available Route Spotter could have been expeditiously dispatched. LILCO Test, Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 27-28. Intervenor Testimony 226. Intervenor witnesses argued generally that the LILCO Plan was inherently unworkable as it applied to the removal of roadway impediments and that LERO per-sonnel were incapable of responding to, much less removing, roadway impediments. Roberts e_t al. (Test. Cont. EX 41). ff. Tr.1134, at 6. In support, the witnesses primarily relied on the factual allegations contained in Contention EX 41.B. Specifically, the witnesses claimed that the Evacuation Route Coordinator failed to communicate the impediment information to field workers. Ld. at 34, 43-44. They argued that verifica-tion of the fuel truck impediment was delayed by problems in dispatching a Route Spot-ter from the Port Jefferson Staging Area. Ld. at 44. 227. Intervenor witnesses contended that problems still occurred af ter the Evacuation Coordinator was informed of the impediments. In paracular, they argued, with regard to the gravel truck impediment, that (1) the Transportation Support Group was not informed of the impediment until 12:40. (2) an EBS message was not broadcast about this impediment until 13:45, (3) the rerouting scheme chosen by LERO was im-proper and inadequate because it did not use the best rerouting approach and because it failed to provide for evacuees trapped in the queue behind the accident, and (4) the equipment sent to remove the gravel truck impediment was inadequate. Roberts et a_1. 1 i 4
I
)
(Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 36-38. With regard to the fuel truck impediment, the witnesses contended that (1) as of 13:48, the Road Logistics Coordinator had not dispatched needed equipment to the site of the accident, (2) an EBS message was not broadcast until 13:45, (3) the rerouting chosen by LERO was improper, inadequate, and untimely, and (4) the equipment sent to assist in the removal of the fuel truck impedi-ment was inadequate. Ld. at 46-49. 228. Finally, the Intervenor witnesses argued that FEMA had made the two im-pediments too easy since it had included far more information in the message than would normally be received, and bypassed certain steps in the normal chain of com-mand. Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 31-33, 42; Tr.1314-15 (Michel). However, during cross-examination, Interveners' witness Roberts did agree that if the FEMA evaluator v'as not at the exact scene of the accident and was sitting in his car, then the test was not a f air one. Tr.1313 (Roberts). Rerouting Schemes 229. An issue that was discussed in some detail in Interveners' written testimony and during oral examination of both LILCO and Intervenor witnesses was the adequacy of LERO's rerouting schemes and of the alternative schemes presented by the Interve-nor witnesses.W Indeed, following the presentation of LILCO's and Interveners' direct cases, we requested each to present further oral rebuttal testimony on the fuel truck rerouting schemes. While there were some differences, the witnesses generally agreed j on the criterio that should be considered in assessing rerouting strategies. These criteria include: (1) interception of traffic along the path to the impediment. i l 2_4/ Interveners' proposed scheme for rerouting traffic around the gravel truck im-pediment involved directing evacuees onto Walters Street, to Everett Drive, and final- I ly, unto Main Street. Roberts et al. (Test. Ccnt. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 51-53. For the l fuel truck impediment, the Intervenor witnesses proposed rerouting traffic down Radio l Avenue onto Canal Road and other roads out of the EPZ. Ld. at 57-61. l
. Tr.1089-90 (Lieberman), s_eg Tr.1210 (Michel); (2) use of the same class of roadways, Tr.1091 (Lieberman), se_e Tr.1191 (McGuire); (3) limiting number of turns, Tr.1091 (Lieberman); (4) familiarity with the new route, Tr. 2280 (Lieberman),1191 (McGuire),
1188-89 (Roberts); (5) minimizing conflicts with evacuating traffic, Tr.1184 (Michel), 1188 (Roberts); (6) the total distance of rerouting, s_e_e Tr. 2278 (Lieberman); and (7) returning evacuees' to their original evacuation route. Tr.1188 (Roberts), 2317-18 (Lieberman), but see 1225 (McGuire). 230. Intervenor witnesses argued that their rerouting schemes were the only correct solutions and went so far as to argue that they were unique. Tr. 1184-85 (Roberts, Michel). They generally criticized LERO for falling to consider alternative rerouting strategies, Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 62-63, and for failing to provide assistance to evacuees queued between the impediment and the rerouting point, id. at 63-64. As for the gravel truck impediment, they criticized LERO's failure to use Walters Street for rerouting, which they viewed as a "give away" solution. Id. at 52-53; Tr.1209 (Michel, Roberts). The witnesses argued that LERO's rerouting scheme for the fuel truck impediment f ailed to account for the large popula-tion living north of the road. chosen as LERO's rerouting path Roberts e_t al. (Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 56-57, and that evacuees using LERO's path would be tempted to turn back into the impediment queue, Tr. 2325-26 (McGuire). Finally, the witnesses argued that the problems with LERO's rerouting schemes highlighted the need to .make rerouting decisions in the field, rather than at the EOC. Tr. 2338-39 (McGuire); s.e_e Tr. 1193-200 (Dormer, McGuire, Michel). 231. LILCO witness Lieberman responded that rerouting schemes are generally not unique. Tr. 2273-74 (Lieberman). He stated that most highway networks present multiple choices for diverting traffic and that the Exercise demonstrated this fact, since LERO and Intervenor witnesses had developed different rerouting schemes for
each impediment. I_d. LILCO witness Wi!.m contradicted, in part, Interveners' assertion I that no alternative rerouting schemes were considered by LERO. Mr. Wilm testified that he considered the Walters Street rerouting for the gravel truck impediment pro-posed by Interveners but rejected it as more difficult to implement than the scheme ul- I timately chosen, since additional Traffic Guides would be needed. Tr. 616-23 (Wilm). He acknowledged that he did not consider alternatives to the fuel truck rerouting be-cause he felt that his initial choice was a good on'e. Tr. 805-06 (Wilm). LILCO witness-es acknowledged that LERO did not take any action with regard to evacuees trapped between the impediment and the rerouting point, but instead argued that such actions were unnecessary since evacuees take actions to extricate themselves. Tr. 638 (Lieberman), 806-07 (Wilm). 232. While Mr. Lieberman agreed that Interveners' rerouting scheme for the gravel truck impediment was " viable", Tr.1112 (Lieberman), he still preferred LERO's scheme tacause Interveners' scheme would have taken evacuees too close to the acci-dent, Tr.1090 (Lieberman), and would have added one hour to the evacuees' evacuation time, Tr. 1112-14 (Lieberman). In the case of the fuel truck rerouting, Mr. Lieberman again commented that Interveners' scheme was " viable", but he preferred the rerouting chosen by LERO. Tr. 2274-75,2280 (Lieberman). Mr. Lieberman explained that LERO's route was shorter in terms of total distance; it involved fewer turns; it utilized a higher class of roadway; more evacuees would have been familiar with LERO's route; and LERO's rerouting would have returned evacuees to their original route. Tr. 2278-86, 2317 (Lieberman). 233. Finally, the LILCO witnesses challenged Interveners' position that rerout-ing decisions should be made in the field. They argued that decisionmaking in the EOC ensured a coordinated response that took into account overall information about traffic control posts, evacuation routes and evacuation times. Tr.1102 (Weismantle). They
i l trgued that in a nuclear emergency a global plan is needed and that emergency workers need to be aware of the implications their actions may have on that plan. Tr. 2289 (Lieberman), As examples, they offered that Intervenor witnesses had rejected North Country Road as a rerouting scheme around the fuel truck impediment because of an in-correct assumption about the likely congestion on that road during an evacuation, Tr.1093, 2282 (Lieberman), that Intervenor witnesses had proposed the rerouting of traffic from the fuel truck impediment onto County Road 83 based on their views about the quality of the roadway, when, in fact, that route would be f ar more congested dur-ing an evacuation than the route chosen by LERO, Tr. 2287-88 (Lieberman), and that In-tervenors' alternative fuel truck rerouting scheme would have rerouted traffic into the queues caused by the gravel truck impediment, Tr. 2288-89 (Lieberman). {EMA Testimony 234. The FEMA witnesses testified that the lack of internal communication in the EOC, not LERO's field response, was the basis for. their finding of a " Deficiency" with regard to LERO's response to the roadway impediments. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 17, 155-56; Tr. 8194 (Kowieski). The witnesses also testified that an additional ARCA was given because the Road Crew was not properly informed of the severity of the gravel truck impediment. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 156. On cross-examination, the FEMA witness-es indicated that they generally agreed with the factual assertions in Contention EX 41.B. but that they cculd not agree with the conclusions. Tr. 8178-81 (Keller, Kowieski). They stated that LERO's response in the EOC " appreciably improved" af ter l the Evacuation Coordinator became involved. Tr. 8252 (Keller). l l 235. The FEMA witnesses agreed that the manner in which the impediment mes-sages were input and evaluated contributed to the delays in LERO's response. Specifi-cally, the witnesses noted that the FEMA evaluatcr's f ailure to be at the scene of the gravel truck impediment led to confusion and delay. Tr. 8220 (Baldwin). They also l
1 recognized that problems were caused by FEMA's failure to provide inputs to the bus i operations personnelin the field. Tr. 8265-67 (Baldwin, Keller). Finally, they acknowl-edged that in future exercises they would reevaluate "in great detall" how the impedi-ment messages were input. Tr. 8237-38 (Kowleski). Conclusion 236. The Board has considered all arguments relating to LERO's response to the i two roadway impediments. In general, we believe that LILCO and FEMA have done the j better job of weighing the Exercise facts and identifying the root causes of the delays in LERO's response. This approach is particularly useful in cases like this where given actions are contingent upon other, prior actions. _ l i 237. Clearly, the Evacuation Route Coordinator's failure to communicate imme-diately information about the two impediments to his co-workers and his superiors in the EOC represented poor judgment and significantly delayed LERO's response to the two impediments. To a lesser degree, his failure to communicate all information to field workers also delayed the responso, particularly to the extent field workers were confused about the need to find a FEMA evaluator. 238. In addition, we agree with LILCO that the manner in which FEMA input the free play messages, and the way they graded them in the field, affected LERO's re-sponse. LILCO correctly notes that had accidents of the severity hypothesized actually occurred, reports of their existence would have flowed to the EOC from numerous sources and would have highlighted the need for immediate action. FEMA should reevaluate its procedures for injecting impediment messages into exercises to try to make the process more realistic. 239. Beyond these two major problem areas, we find that, with minor excep-tions, LERO workers took appropriate and timely actions in responding to the two im-pediments. With regard to the specific factual concerns presented in subpart B, we
find that some unnecessary delay resulted in the dispatch of a Route Spotter from the Port Jefferson Staging Area. This delay was the result of a non-descriptive communi-cation from the EOC Communicator and not some falling of the LILCO Plan. Next, the equipment sent to the scene of the gravel truck impediment was not per se inadequate.
' Here, the FEMA free play message was ambiguous and LERO was entirely correct to as-sume that if the responding Road Crew needed further assistance, it could request that aid. Such aid would certainly have been available during the Exercise. We view the j rerouting schemes of LERO and Intervenor witnesses to be equally plausible. All of the schemes have some merit; none is uniquely correct or clearly superior, nor is any so de-ficient as to be rejected as inadequate. Thus, we do not find LERO's actions to be defi-cient in this area. With regard to the delay in broadcasting an EBS message on the im-pediments, we agree with Interveners that the broadcast was unduly slow. However, we agree with LILCO that an EBS message, while helpful, was not required by the situa-tion aad that in any event, the delay in broadcasting the message would not have af-fected public health and safety since rerouting schemes had long been in place. Finally, Interveners' remaining claims that the Transportation Support Group and the Road Lo-gistics Coordinator were unaware of the impediments for unreasonable periods of time are refuted by the facts. Similarly, there is no factual basis for Interveners' claim that i inadequate equipment was sent to respond to the fuel truck impediment.
240. In conclusion, we find that LERO's response to the two impediments could have been better on the day of the Exercise. These shortcomings do not, however, indi-cate a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. t i j l l
Contention EX 41.E 241. Contention EX 41.E alleges that the Plan revisions made since the Exercise do' not eliminato the flaws that were revealed by the Exercise. Since the Exercise, LILCO has added to the EOC staff a trained traffic engineer who is familiar with the Shorcham Plan. In addition, OPIPs 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 have been revised to provide more ' l detailed instructions for dealing with traffic impediments. These changes place greater emphasis on the importance of reporting traffic problems up the chain of command and 4 provide explicit instructions on rerouting traffic and preparing EBS messages should the need arise. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 28-30. , 242. Since we have previously concluded that the Exercise results did not reveal fundamental flaws in the Plan's provision for responding to roadway impediments, we do not need to decide the merits of this subpart since it proceeds from the assumption that flaws are present. Nonetheless, the Board believes that the changes to the LILCO Plan will enhance LERO's ability to respond to roadway impediments and are therefore useful additions. Contentions EX 22.1 and 21.F 243. In Contention dX 22.1, Interveners argue that in developing the Exercise scenario, FEMA incorrectly assumed that LERO only needed the capability to respond to two impediments. They further imply that Suffolk County accident statistics from the two week period of February 6-20, 1986 - a period that including the Exercise i date - indicate a much higher accident rate. Contention EX 21.F raises a virtually l identical concern that by injecting only two impediments into the Exercise FEMA failed I i 1 to observe a sufficiently large sample to draw meaningful conclusions about LERO's l ability to respond to impediments. The contention also alleges that the impediment lo-cations chosen by FEMA were unrepresentative. Finally, Contention EX 21.F argues that given FEM A's findings about LERO's ability to respond to the roadway 1 ; I
l l impediments, FEMA could not have drawn the conclusions it did about a number of Ex-ercise objectives. 244. Here, we will deal only with the question of whether the two roadway im-pediments imposed by FEMA on the day of the Exercise were an adequate test of LERO's ability to respond to roadway impediments. We will not address Contention EX 21.F to the extent it raises issues about the conclusions that should be drawn from LERO's response to those impediments. Those issues have already been decided above.W 245. In the previous emergency planning proceeding there was extensive litiga-tion about the number of impediments that could be expected during an evacuation of , the Shoreham EPZ. There, the Licensing Board accepted LILCO's argument that four accidents could be expected to occur during an evacuation of the entire EPZ and that not all of these accidents would require tow truck assistance. PID at 795-96, 811. We are bound by that decision unless Exercise events somehow change it. Exercise events do not command a different result. Since there was no evacuation by the public during the Exercise, no accident statistics were developed for an evacuation of the Shoreham EPZ. The accident statistics presented by Intervenor witnesses, see Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 70-71, Att 14, do not indicate that a higher acci-dent rate is appropriate. First, their proffered accident data suffers from the same in- ! firmity as accident data offered by Interveners in the earlier planning litigation, name-ly, Interveners have supplied the Board only accident totals; they have not provided other pertinent data, such as tht: vehicle miles traveled by Suffolk County motorists during the period in question, so that accident rates can be calculated. Second, to the 25/ Neither LILCO nor Interveners presented separate testimony on Contention EX 21.F. Instead.. each merely cited their testimony on Contention EX 41. See LILCO EX Exh. 21 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 22-23; SC EX Exh. 99 (Test. Cont. EX 21) at 65. i
i ) I l i extent Suffolk County's data can be used, they indicate that less than two accidents would be predicted to require tow truck assistance during the evacuation of the entire Shoreham EPZ - a rate in keeping with the one we accepted in the PID. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 30-31. 246. Based on the accident rates the Licensing Board previously approved in the PID, we conclude that FEMA's insertion of two impediments !nto the Exercise was an appropriate test of LERO's ability to respond to roadway impediments. As LILCO wit-nesses pointed out, the two accidents imposed by F'EMA were very unlikely given their severity and the fact that each blocked an entire roadway. See Tr.1084 (Lieberman). Furthermore, while we agree with the Intervenor witnesses that locating accidents on other roadways could have resulted in . longer delays in total evacuation times, see Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 41), ff. Tr.1134, at 69-70, we do not see how such reloca-tions would have provided a better test of LERO's IV. BACKUP ROUTE ALERT NOTIFIC ATION (EX,3_4) 4 247. The issue raised by Contention EX 34 is whether the 45 minute time fraine for prompt notification, which is provided in NRC and FEMA guidelines and memoranda, applies to backup route alerting systems. LILCO and FEMA interpret the 45 minute time period as a goal for completion of discretionary backup route alerting. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 34, ff. Tr.1327, at 3-9, Att. B; Tr. 1413-15 (Daverio), 1425-27 (Daverio, Weismantle), 8008 (Kowieski). Interveners' testimony was inconsistent as to whether completion of backup alert and notification within 45 minutes is a regulatory requirement or recommendation. Tr. 1504-06,1536 (Michel)(uncertain about whether a l requirement or recommendation); but see Tr.1502 (Michel), 1527-28 (Roberts) (recom-i mendation); contra Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 34), ff. Tr.1495, at 6; Tr 1537 (Roberts) (requirement). 'lhe Board finds that it is a recommendation, not a regulatory requirement.
l 248. The LILCO Plan meets NRC primary alert and notification requirements with the sirens, the EBS network, and tone alert radios. PID at 759; LILCO Test. Cont. EX 34, ff. Tr.1327, at 5-6; Tr.1361 (Daverio),1500 (Michel). Failed sirens will be de-tected by a review of electrical circuits or a telephone survey conducted by an outside consulting firm. The electrical circuit review can be accomplished quickly but might not locate the failure of an individual siren; the telephone survey will take approxi-mately 90 minutes to complete. PID at 758; sE also Tr.1515 (Michel). Route Alert Drivers provide a backup to failed sirens. PID at 758-59; sE also Tr.1536 (Michel, Roberts). 249. During the February 13 Exercise, the failure of three of LILCO's eighty-nine sirens was simulated in a free play message, and a Route Alert Driver was dis-patched to provide backup notification on each route. FEMA EX Exh. I at 57, 64, 74; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 141; SC EX Exh.19 A-D. Each of these Route Alert Drivers took longer than 45 minutes to complete his route, and the FEMA Report rated backup route alert notification an " area recommended for improvement." Tr. 8000 (Keller, Kowleski); FEMA EX Exh. I at 58, 68, 75-76. 250. Originally, Exercise evaluators rated Route Alert Driver performance as an
" area requiring corrective action." Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 34), ff. Tr.1495, at 7;-
Tr. 8000 (Baldwin, Kowieski). However, a clarification of FEMA policy on evaluating backup route alert driving was issued af ter the Shoreham Exercise and prior to the issu-ance of the FEMA Report; it stated that "if the completion of a route for redundant route alerting takes more than a reasonable amount of time, only an ' area recommended l 2_f/ Intervenor witnesses testified, based solely on a deposition of the FEMA witness- , es, that when backup route alerting took longer than 45 minutes at other power plants it was considered a Deficiency. Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 34), ff. Tr.1495, at 7-8; Tr.1511-13 (Michel, Roberts). The FEMA witnesses disagreed; they had confirmed by a review of exercise reports that they had never identified a Deficiency for backup route alerting. Tr. 8010 (Kowieski), 8010-16 (Keller). i
i 1 for improvement' designation should be made."E! LILCO Test. Cont. EX 34, ff. Tr. , i 1327, at Att. B; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 142-43; Tr. 8005-10 (Kowieski), 8025-26 (Keller, Kowiaski). This clarification was based on FEMA's recognition that "there are no mini-mum time frames" for backup route alerting. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 34, ff. Tr.1327, at Att. B; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 142-43; Tr. 8004-05 (Baldwin, Kowieski), 8007-08 (Kowleski). 251. Licensing Boards have consistently held that NRC regulations and guide-lines do not require any backup notification system.2_8/ See PID at 758-59 ("If no such (bhckup) procedures are needed, a fortiori, no standard time limit need be met."); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-26,20 NRC 53, 67 (1984), af f'd, ALAB-798, 21 NRC 357 (1985). Since NRC regulations and NUREG guidelines do not require any backup to the prompt notification system, we find that the 15 minute and 45 minute time limits for pubile notification, set out in 10 C.F.R. S 50.47,10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, and NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, do not ap~ ply to the discretionary backup route alerting provided under the LILCO Plan. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 34, ff. Tr.1327, at 4-6; Tr. 8004-05, 8008 (Kowieski), 8004 (Baldwin); see PID at 759. i M/ Interveners were unsuccessful in their Ettempts to show that FEM A's issuance of the policy clarification was influenced by LILCO or that the purpose of FEMA's policy clarification an backup route alerting was to give a better rating to the Shoreham Exer-cise. See Roberts et al., ff. Tr.1495, at 7-8. The FEMA witnesses testified that the l policy clarification was made to reflect FEMA's interpretation of NUREG-0654. Tr. 8007-08 (Kowieski). And, LILCO witnesses stated that they had no contact with FEMA about the evaluation of route alert drivers prior to the issuance ot the FEMA Report, I and were unaware of the clarification memorandum until long af ter the FEMA Report ' was issued. Tr. 1474-77 (Daverio, Weismantle). They attributed the impetus for FEMA's policy clarif' cation to the Shoreham PID. Tr.1476 (Weismantle). 28/ The Intervenor witnesses were unsure about whether a backup to the prompt no-tification system is required. Tr.1501,1535-36 (Michel) (unsure); but see Tr.1537 (Roberts) ("a back up system is a requirement"). They had not reviewed NPC cases, including the Licensing Board's findings on backup route alerting under the LILCO Plan, which state that backup notification is not required. Tr. 1510-11,1540 (Michel).
I l 252. FEMA Guidance Memorandum AN-1 ("GM AN-1"),E which " elaborate (s) upon the accepted FEMA interpretation and application of alert and notification sys-tem design objectives" in NUREG-0654 and discusses backup route alerting, FEMA EX Exh. 4 at Att. I-1, I-5, is consistent with this and other Licensing Board interpretations of NRC regulations and NUREG-0654.E It states that there is "no hard and fast time requirement for completing the backup route alerting process." FEMA EX Exh. 4 at I-5. When viewed in that context, GM AN-l's " suggested objective" of 45 minutes is FEMA's opinion of a desirable goal for performance of backup route alerting; it it not a regulatory requirement. FEMA EX Exh. 4 at I-5; s_e.Le also Tr. 1399-1400 (Daverio). As ; noted in GM AN-1, the 45 minute time limit mentioned in NUR.EG-0654, App. 3 applies only to initial notification of certain isolated areas within 5 to 10 miles of the site that may take more than 15 minutes to notify, see NUREG-0654, App. 3-3; FEMA EX Exh. 4 at Att. I'2, I-3; Tr. 8004 (Baldwin), 8004-05, 8008 (Kowieski), and not, as Interveners 4 suggest, to backup route alerting, see Tr. 1538-39 (Roberts). Requiring the same speed for backup route alerting would not make regulatory sense. Under the interpretation urged by Interveners, a licensee would be required to provide a discretionary backup no-tification system that essentially meets the criteria of the mandatory primary system that has f ailed. Tr. 1413-14 (Daverio). FEMA's practice in other exercises of allowing more extended time limits for backup route alerting confirms that 45 minutes is a goal and not a requirement. See Tr. 1413-14 (Daverio). M/ A draf t of GM AN-1 was identified as SC EX Exh.18 on March 18,1987. FEM A issued AN-1 in final form on April 18, 1987. The final version was identified as FEMA EX Exh. 4. M/ Agency interpretive rules, such as FEMA Guidance Memorandum AN-1, that have not been published ur+r the riotice and comment procedures of the Administra-tive Procedure Act,5 U.5.C. S 553 (1982), do not have the same regulatory force as reg-ulations and guidelines that have been subject to notice and comment. See FEMA Ex. Exh. 4 (GM AN-1) cover memorandum: cf,mpare 44 Fed. Reg. 9768 (Feb.13,1980) (N UREG-0654) and 50 Fed. Reg.19.324 (May 8,1985) (10 C.F.R. 5 50.47).
253. Both LILCO and Intervenor witnesses agree that backup notification by l Route Alert Drivers within the stated goal of 45 minutes bI may not be attainable in the event of a rapidiv escalating emergency. Roberts et at (Test. Cont. EX 34), ff. l
' Tr.1495, at 15-16; Tr.1357,1387 (Weismantle). But in addition, Intervenor witnesses think that the LILCO Plan will never realize this goal. Roberts e_t al. (Test. Cont. EX 34), ff. Tr.1495, at 15-16. We acknowledge that the 45 minute goal may not be met; l neverthciess, for the majority of accidents, the backup route alert system will enhance the p'obability of timely notification of the public. Forty-five minutes is an " optimal time" that LERO should strive to meet. Se_e Tr.1386-87,1413 (Daverio). LILCO has made efforts to reduce the route alerting times clocked during the Exercise by training j LERO personnel to split up the routes among multiple drivers. LILCO Test. Cont. EX ,
1 34, ff. Tr. '1327, at 9-10; Tr.1455,1456,1468-69 (Daverio). Regularly scheduled training drills in December did use multiple Route Alert Drivers, but the 45 minute goal was not reached. SC EX Exh. 20. If necessary, other ameliorative meast:res should be devel-oped to reduce the time needed to complete backup route alerting. Se_e Tr. 1386-87, 1457 (Daverio). V. MOBILIZATION OF TRAFFIC G.UIDES (EX 40.A. B, E) 254. Contention EX 40 alleges that Traffic Guides were not mobilizedN in a
- 1 M/ LILCO and Interveners agreed that the 45 minute period begins at the time ,
LERO is notified of siren f allure. See Tr.1384 (Daverio),1509 (Michel).
;g/ We use the terms " mobilize" and " mobilization" in the same manner they were used in the earlier plat. dng litigation:
Mobilization is defined as the activities that take place be-tween the determination that particular offsite emergency response personnel should be notified and the reporting of such personnel with necessary equipment to the locations where emergency functions will be performed. PID at 716. j 1
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p ,-\ l 3 sufficiently timely. manner during the Exercise to protect the public health and safety. Specifically, Intervenous allege (1) that Traffic Guides were not notified to report to I' their assigned staging areas until a Site Area Emergency was declared and that they
'were slow in' reporting to the staging areas following that declaration (EX 40.A), (2) that Traffic Guides were not dispatched from the staging areas and did not arrive at their traffic control posts in a timely manner-(EX 40.B), and (3) that Plan revisions since the Exercise do not remedy the problems allegedly identified during the Exercise (EX 40.E).EI 255. The parties' testimony raised few material factual disputes. The witnesses generally agreed on when LERO Traffic Guides were notified to report on the day of the Exercisei when they artCved at the staging areas, when they-were dispatched into the field, and when they arrived at their assigned traffic control points. 'Instead, the dispute.on this contention centered on how those times should be interpreted and par-ticularly, what standard should be used for judging the timeliness of traffic guide mobi-lization. Based on the record before us, we find that during the Exercise LERO demon-strated the ability to mobilize its Traf fic Guides in a sufficiently expeditious manner to ensure 'a safe and efficient evacuation of the entire Shoreham EPZ. We believe that LERO can improve on its Exercise performance and should continue to strive to do so, but we do not find that the Exercise results reveal a fundamental flaw in the LILCO ;
Plan. Accordingly, for the reasons described below, we find for LILCO on Contention EX 40. _1 l l i M/ We denied admission to subpart D of Contention EX 40. Prehearing Conference .J Order at 22 (October 3,1906). We will address subpart C of Contention EX 40 in our ' resolution of Contentions EX 38 and 39, infra. z o I
1 l l j i i Standard for Judging Mobilization Timeliness 25G. The major dispute among the parties on this contention centered on the test, or tests, to be used in judging the timeliness of LERO's mobilization of Traffic j Guides. Intervenor witriesses made the far-reaching argument that Traffic Guides
)
needed to be at their posts in the field at the outset of the evacuation process. See l i Roberts e.J al. (l'est. Cont. EX 40), ff. ir. 2180, at 11,15, 30,35; Tr. 2195-205 (McGuire, ) Michel, Roberts). They defined the outset of the evacuation process as the time when the first EPZ residents began to evacuate, even if those residents evacuated before being advised to evacuate. Tr. 2 (95-205 (McGuire, Roberts), 2255-56 (McGuire). At points during cross examination, the witnesses appeared to retreat from this position by arguing that Traffic Guides needed to be at their posts when an evacuation recommen-dation we made. See Tr. 2201-02 (McGuire, Michel, Roberts), 2206 (Michel), 2254 (Roberts). W Furthermore, Interveners contended that regardless of the time deadline chosen, the pertinent inquiry was whether all Traffic Guides were at their pcsts at that time. Tr. 2257 (Michel); see also Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 40), ff. Tr. 2180, at 22-23: Tr.1753 (Sutko), 2256 (Michel). 257. In addition, Interveners, Jn the text of Contention EX 40 and in their cross examination of LILCO's witnesses, suggested that the times needed to complete certain components of the mobilization process (such as arrival at the staging areas, job briefing, equipment procurement, ar4d travel from staging area to field post) were 3 3_F Intervenor witnesses appear to premise this assertion on their belief that the ! LILCO Plan assumes that Traffic Guides will all be in place at the inception of an evac-uation. Robe ts e_t al. (Test. Cont. EX 40), ff. Tr. 2180, at 17, citing Plan, App. A at V-2. Under the version of the Plan and Procedures in effect during the Exercise, how-i ever, Traffje Guides were to wait at their staging areas until an evacuation recommen-dation was given. Only then were they to receive job briefings, Pick up their field equipment, and depart for their posts in the field. OPIP 3.6.3, SS 5.3 and 5.4. Thus, i contrary to the witnesses' belief, the LILCO Plan clearly contemplated that Traffle [ Guides would not be at their posts when an evacuation recommendation was first given. 1
-990 relevant to determining whether Tlaffic Guides were mobilized in a timely manner.
See Tr.1642-65 (Sutko, Weismantle). But when questioned about the relevance of the completion times of the various mobilizanon subparts, Intervenor witnesses seemed to reject this approach for judging the timeliness of Traffic Guide mobilization, see Tr. 2208-14 (McGuire, Michel), 2256-57 (Roberts), and expressly refused to offer any standards for judging the timeliness of the completion of individual subparts, see Tr. 2215-16 (Michel). 258.. LILCO witnesses argued that the important inquiry in judging the timell-ness of mobilization was when Traffic Guides arrived at their control posts. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 4. They contended that individual components of the mobilization process were relevant only if the overall mobilization was untimely. M. As for the standard against which the manning of traffic control points should be judged, the witnesses began by noting that the LILCO Plan does not provide a time frame within which Traffic Guides must be at their traffic control posts. Ld. at 6. In-stead, they pointed out that in the PID the Licensing Board found that mobilization of LF.RO field workers, including Traffic Guides, could be substantially completed in about 3 hours. Ld., citing PID at 723. They also offered a second mobilization standard that was linked more closely to public health and safety - namely, that mobilization time required to achieve a " controlled" evacuation.3J/ n I other words, Traffic Guides needed l 3J/ The LILCO Plan included two sets of evacuation time estimates that the Licens-ing Board accepted in the earlier emergency planning litigation. PID at 781-809; see _ OPIP 3.6.1, Att. 2. One set of estimates described a " controlled" evacuation, that is, l one in which Traffic Guides are in place at the time they are able to affect the evacua-l tion times. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 6. At the other end of the spec-l trum are evacuation time estimates describirig an " uncontrolled" evacuation, that is, l one in which all traffic control points remain unmanned throughout the evacuation. These estimates represent the maximum time necessary to complete an evacuation. Ld. For an evacuation of the entire Shoreham EPZ under normal weather conditions, the difference between these evacuation time estimates is 95 minutes. See i_d. at ?; PID at 724.
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-100-to be at their posts at the onset of congestion, which is predicted to occur one hour af ter an evacuation recommendation is given. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 6-8; se_e PID at 720. The witnesses added that since the mobilization test is whether a " controlled" evacuation would have been achieved, then the pertinent inquiry is not whether all Traffic Guides were at their traffic control points at the beginning of con-gestion, but rather whether the " critical" traffic control points were manned at that time. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, If. Tr.1548, at 7. The LILCO witnesses classified 47 Of the 128 traffic control points specified in the LILCO . Plan as " critical," [d. at 10-11,E defining " critical" traffic control points as those that (1) increase the capaci-ty of highway sections, (2) serve a heavy volume of traffic and in addition serve traf fic evacuating from within the two-mile zone, and (3) in a few instances, serve more than one evacuation path, with the Traffic Guide helping to ensure that the capacity of each evacuation path is fully utilized. Ld. at 10.b 259. On cross examination, counsel for Interveners attempted to have the LILCO witnesses admit that a_1_1 traffic control points were critical to public health and
} safety. See Tr.1708-60 (Lieberman, Weismantle). While LILCO witnesses admitted that all traffic control points served useful purposes, they refused to agree that L11 3_6/ The Intervenor witnesses did not provide a comparable list of " critical" traffic control points, but their testimony contained a non-exhaustive list of eight "criticalf' intersections that they argued were not manned in a timely manner. Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 40), ff. Tr. 2180, at 29, 41-42. Only one of these eight posts was identk l fled as critical by LILCO witnesses. Tr. 2267 (Roberts). 31/ Tne witnesses testified that while use of the term " critical" was new to them, the concept of " critical" traffle control points was not. Tr.1864-65 (Lieberman). Mr. Lieberman explained that in the earlier planning litigation the importance of various traffic control points was discussed in terms of " key posts" (see PID at 724) and that these " key posts" were used to develop the priority manning lists contained in OPlP j 3.6.3, Att. 7. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 10; Ti.1864-65 (Lieberman). A review of Attachments B, C, and D to LILCO's Testimon';, which reproduce the priority manning lists and identif y the " critical" traf fic control points, confirms that " key" and
" critical" traffic control points are one in the same thing.
I l
-101-1 traffic control points are " critical" to the protection of public health and safety, par-ticularly since the manning of those traffic enntrol points would not affect evacuation times. Tr. 1708-60 (Lieberman, Weismantle), 1859-61 (Lieberman).
t 260. The FEMA witnesses testified that FEMA measures an organization's per-formance against the relevant Plan provisions. Tr. 8140-41 (Kowieski). The witnesses noted that the LILCO Plan assumes that Traffic Guides will be in the field one hour af ter an evacuation recommendation. Tr. 8098-99 (Keller). The FEMA witnesses also testified that the " Deficiency"in the FEMA Report relating to the mobilization of Traf-fic Guides was the result of Riverhead Traffic Guides spending too much time in line obtaining their equipment. Tr. 8131-34 (Baldwin, Keller). j 261. Af ter carefully considering all parties' positions, we find that LILCO has articulated the proper tests for judging the timeliness of Traffle Guide mobilization. In the PID, the Licensing Board accepted as reasonable a mobilization time of three hours for fleid workers, including Traffic Guides, PID at 723, recognizing that uncertainty ex- { i ists since "many workers will arrive at duty stations earlier and some later than esti- f mated." PID at 724. Thus, we will use this three-hour test somewhat flexibly in judging the timeliness of Traffic Guide mobilization on the day of the Exercise. 262. In addition, we agree with LILCO that an important second test of mobill-i zation is whether Traffic Guides were in place in time to effect a " controlled" evacua-tion. Under this test, we will look to see if Traffic Gulcies were at their posts one hour j l af ter the evacuation recommendation. See PID at 720. We will not look to see if all { Traffic Guides were at their posts at this time, but rather whether the " critical" posts that can affect evacuation times were manned at that time. 263. We reject Interveners' argument that mobilization is untimely unless Traf-fic Guides are in place at the time the evacuation process begins. This argument is l l nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt by latervenors in relitigate issues they raised i l 1 1
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-102-l l
and lost in the earlier planning litigation. See PID at 722-25. There, Suffolk County claimed, as it does here, that "for evacuation to be effective, the full roster of person-nel required for emergency response must be at their posts before the beginning of {
)
evacuation." PID at 722-23. The Licensing Board rejected that argument, finding gen- I erally that: There is no need to alert [ bus drivers, traffic guides, route spotters, and road crew personnel] at the unusual event or alert stage of an emergency. Driving bus routes and guld-Ing traffic, for example, are evacuation specific. These ac- I tivities will only be required in a general emergency in which evacuation is recommended. PID at 717. With regard to Traffic Guides, the Licensing Board accepted LILCO's argu-ment that: All traffic guides . . . need not be ready to depart the staging area at the time an order to evacuate is given. Modeling work on traffic assumes that traffic guides will be in place when congestion begins to occur approximately 1 hour af ter the order to evacuate. PID at 720. We are bound by those findings, unless Exercise events prcve that the as-sumptions underlying the previous Board's conclusions were wrong. Since no public evacuation oceurred during the Exercise, we have no basis for concluding that the as-sumptions underlying those earlier findings were incorrect, therefore, we reject Inter-venors' argument. 264. Finally, we conclude that if the times at which Traffic Guides arrived at their traffic control posts are adequate, there is no need to inquire into the times re-i l quired to complete certain subtasks in the mobilization process. Therefore, we do not j separately resolve subpart A of Contention EX 40, which addresses the mobilization I subtasks of notification and reporting to staging areas, Lecause we find below that the overall mobilization of Traffic Guides was timely. I l I
-103- - Mobilization Times Durinst the February 13 Exercise 265. . Before analyzing the arrival times of Traffic Guides at their control posts, it ls helpful to review the sequence of emergency events that occurred during the Exer-cise. The accident simulated was an unusually f ast-breaking one, progressing relatively i . rapidly from the declaration of a Site Area Emergency to an evacuation recommenda-tion. The Site Area' Emergency was declared at 8:19. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. , Tr.'1548, at 11. The initial evacuation recommendation came approximately two hours later at 10:24. Ld. Accordingly, had an evacuation actually.taken place,: congestion iwould.have been expected to begin to appear in the EPZ at about 11:24,'only three hours af ter the mobilization of Traffic Guides had begun. Ld. at 11-12. - As we noted -
above, this three-hour period was found by the previous Licensing Board to be the' mini-mum time needed ,for LERO to substantially complete the mobilization of its field-
. workers. Thus, regardless of whether one uses the three-hour. test for mobilization or the one-hour test based on the onset of congestion, the Exercise provided a rigorous test of LERO's mobilization capabilities.
266. In addition, we must acknowledge that the Shoreham Exercise provided an unprecedented test of an offsite emergency response organization's ability to mobilize Its field workers. In most exercises, the offsite organization only mobilizes those field workers that FEMA wishes to observe. Tr. 8515-16 (Kowleski). During the Shoreham . Exercise, LERO called out its entire complement of field workers, which comprise ap-proximately 150% of the number of workers actually needed to carry out the LILCO Plan. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548. at 3. During the Exercise, a full staff of 165 Traffic Guides needed to man every traffic control point was fully processed at the staging areas and dispatched into the field. Ld. . Thus, the Exercise provided a literal and accurate picture of LERO's ability to mobilize its Traffic Guides. 1
-104-Patchosrue 267. The parties agree on the times at which the traffic posts staffed from the
- Patchogue Staging Area were manned. By 11:25, about three hours af ter the Site Area bargency was declared and approximately the time that congestion would have been ;
anticipated to begin along the roadways in the Shoreham EPZ,18 of 28 traffic control posts, including all of the " critical" ones, were fully manned. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, if. Tr.1548, at 13. Within the next five minutes, all but two traffic control posts were ! i manned. Ld. By 11:40, just an hour and 16 minutes af ter the evacuation recommenda-tion was made, all traffic control posts staffed from the Patchogue Staging Area were fully manned. Ld. at 13-14; Roberts et aj. (Test. Cont. EX 40), ff. Tr. 2180, at 22. We { l find that these Exercise results demonstrate LERO's ability to' mobilize Traffic Guides l l t from the Patchogue Staging Area in a timely manner. i Port Jefferson l l 268. The parties agree that the mobilization of traffic control posts staffed l !. from the Port Jefferson Staging Area took longer than the mobilization of posts staffed 1 : from the Patchogue Staging Area. Port Jefferson Traffic Guides assigned to critical traffic control posts began arriving at their posts at 11:25, or approximately one hour af ter the evacuation recommendation was given. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 14-15, Att. C; see Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 40), ff. Tr. 2180, at A t t. 11. Four of the 17 critical traffic control posts were manned by 11:30, and 12 were manned by 11:45. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 15, Att. C. By 11:58, about one-half hour af ter the anticipated onset of congestion, all but two critical traf-fic control points were manned. Another was manned at 12:00, and the last critical ] traffic control point was manned at 12:13, 49 minutes af ter the anticipated onset of l congestion. Ld. The manning of non-critical control points took considerably longer 1 with the last Port Jefferson traffic control point being manned at 13:26. [d. at 14; see l Roberts e_t aj. (Test. Cont. EX 40), ff. Tr. 2180, at Att.11.
i 1
-105-269. While these mobilization times certainly could have been improved, they would not have significantly affected the overall evacuation times. The Licersing Board in the Plan litigation held that to the extent Traffic Guides assigned to capacity-enhancing traffic control posts arrive at their posts af ter congestion began, but before I
the evacuation was completed, the overall evacuation time would lie somewhere be-tween the " controlled" and the " uncontrolled" evacuation time estimates. PID at 724. Mr. Lieberman testified that the extension of evacuation time would be a linear func- ( tion of the delay in Traffic Guides arriving at their posts and of the difference between the " controlled" and " uncontrolled" evacuation time estimates. LILCO Test. Cont. ; EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 8. 270. By way of example, Mr. Lieberman postulated a scenario using the esti-mates for an evacuation under normal weather conditions that were previously accept-ed by the Licensing Board. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 8-9. Under these estimates, a " controlled" evacuation would take 4 hours and 55 minutes, and an
" uncontrolled" evacuation would take 6 hours and 30 minutes. Id. Congestion is ex-pected to appear under both evacuation estimates about one hour af ter an evacuation recommendation is made. Thus, the " controlled" evacuation would proceed under con-gested conditions for roughly four hours. Under Mr. Lieberman's example, all Traffic Guides were assumed to arrive at their traffic control posts 49 minutes af ter the onset of congestion - a delay which corresponds to the time that the last of the critical Port Jefferson trsffic control posts was manned during the Exercise. In that case, the evac-uation would proceed under an " uncontrolled" scenario for roughly 20% of the relevant time (49 out of 240 minutes). The actual evacuation time, then, would be extended by about 20% of the difference between the " controlled" and the " uncontrolled" estimates, or about 19 minutes (20% of 95 minutes). Thus, even if no Traffic Guides had manned their posts until 49 minutes af ter the onset of congestion, evacuation would have taken
-106-just 19 minutes more than the " controlled" evacuation time estimate. Ld. The actual extension of the evacuation time, however, would have been less during the February 13 Exercise, because 12 of the 17 critical traffic control posts assigned out of the Port Jefferson Staging Area were manned approximately one-half hour before 12:13 and all but two were manned about 18 minutes before that time. See Ld. We do not find this extension in evacuation times to be significant.
271. In addition, we find that the mobilization times for the Port Jefferson Staging Area during the Exercise overstate actual mobilization times. LILCO witness Welsmantle testified without contradiction that Traffic Guides reporting to the Port , i Jefferson Staging Area during the Exercise were instructed not to park in sceas adja- I cent to the power station, althou;;. they would park in those areas in an actual ra-dialogical emergency. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 16. Instead, they parked in a more remote lot about 10-15 minutes by foot from the Port Jefferson power station. Ld. We have no reason to disbelieve this testimony, and accordingly find that in an actual emergency, mobilization times for Traffic Guides assigned to the Port Jefferson Staging Area would be as much as 20-30 minutes shorter. 272. Consequently, while the mobilization of Port Jefferson Traffic Guides could have been completed in a more expeditious manner, we find that the mobilization times would not have had a detrimental effect on public health and safety and hence, do not reveal a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. Riverhead 273. The relevant documents recording the times at which Riverhead Traffic Guides reported to their traffic control posts have been lost. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, j ff. Tr.1548, at 16. Based on the information available, however, we find that the mobi-lization of those Traffic Guides would not have had a detrimental effect on public l health and safety.
274. Riverhead Traffic Guides that were dispatched at the first recommendation to evacuate W were given their control point assignments from 10:52 until 11:08. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 17, Att. E.3; Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 40), ff. Tr. 2180, at 22; s_ee e Tr.1658 (Weismantle). In the Plan litigation, the Licens-ing Board found that af ter receiving their assignments Traffic Guides should take about 10 minutes to obtain equipment and between 5-40 minutes (with an average of 20 minutes) to travel from the staging areas to the traffic control posts. PID at 719,723, 725. Using these times, then, the Ruerhead Traffic Guides would have manned their posts from 11:07, less than one hour af ter the evacuation recommendation was made, t until 11:58, une hour and 34 minutes af ter that recommendation was made. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 17. Mobilization of all traffic control posts within this time frame would have been sufficient to meet substantially the " controlled" evac-nation time estimates. In fact, FEMA reported that equipment procurement took an average of 30 minutes and that travel times from the staging area to traffic control points were better than anticipated, taking "up to twenty (20) minutes." FEMA EX E::h.1 at 74. Thus, FEMA's observations generally confirm the times expected by the previous Licensing Board. 275. The known manning times also support our conclusion that the " controlled" evacuation time estimates could have been met. The FEMA Report states that the { Riverhead Traffic Guide 3 observed by FEMA reported to their assigned traffic control posts between 11:50 and 12:10. FEMA EX Exh. I at 71. A LILCO observer who 3_8/ The evacuation simulated during the February 13,1986 Exercise occurred in two waves. The iirst, which began at 10:24, affected zones A-M, Q, and R. The second wave began at 11:46 and involved zones N. O, P. and S. All of the traffic control posts manned out of Patchogue and Port Jefferson were staffed as a result of the initial evac-uation recommendation. Most of the Riverhead traffic control points viere manned in the first wave as well, though some were manned as a result of the second evacuation recommendation. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 11; Roberts e_t al. (Test. Cont. EX 40), ff. Tr. 2180, at 22. I l 1
-108- ' y, ,
accompanied the FEMA evaluator generally agreed with the FEMA Report, but noted that Traffic Guides arrived as early as 11:15. LJLCO Test. Co'nt. EX 40, if. Tr.1548, at-18, Att. E.7, p. 3. This discrepancy is of little moment since we find that all Riverhead traffic control posts were probably manned by approximately 12:10 -- a time similar to when the " critical" traffic control points were manned from Port Jefferson. 276. Finally, FEMA found a Deficiency in the mobilization process at Riverhead between the time that Traffic Guides were dispatched to obtain equipment and the time they reported to their traffic control posts. FEMA reported that "[t]he time be-tween deployment of Traffic Guides from the staging area and their arrival at TCPs
' was excessive, taking between fitty (50) and seventy (70) minutes." FEMA EX Exh. I at
- 74. Approximately 30 minutes of this time was the result of lines at the Staging Area.
Ld. LILCO witnesses admitted that backups occurred at the equipment trailer because of a single doorway on the trailer. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tr.1548, at 20. That problem has been remedied since the Exercise by an addition of a second door to the trailer. Ld. at 20-21. Accordingly, LILCO witness Weismantle testified that the prob-lem observed at the Riverhead Staging Area did not rise to the level of a " Deficiency." If. at 19. The Board agrees. In evaluating the Riverhead mobilization process, FEMA did not focus on the proper issue - the effect of the mobilization times on the evacua-tion. Since - 1 Riverhead mobilization times would not have substantially extended the controlled evacuation time estimates, and any delays appear to have been remedied by the modification to the equipment trailer, the Board finds that the Exercise revealed no 1 fundamental flaws in the mobilization of the Riverhead Traffic Guides. I i 0: l
-109-Conclusion on Contentions EX 40 A and 40.B 277. We find overall that there is not a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan re-garding the mobilization of Traffic Guides. The f act that mobilization was entirely completed for the Patchogue Staging Area within the time accepted by the prior Li-censing Board indicates that those times are achievable. The delays that occurred at the Port Jefferson and Riverhead Staging Areas are not so significant to have us con-clude that the Plan is unworkable. Indeed, they point to the wisdom of prioritizing the manning of traffic control points so that the most important posts are manned first.
However, LERO should continue working to improve the mobilization times for those two f acilities. Modifications to the Mobilization Procedures (Cont. EX 40.E) 278. As noted above, since the Exercise, LILCO has modified its Traffic Guide dispatching procedures to ensure that those traffic control posts servicing evacuees liv-ing within two miles of the plant are manned even more rapidly in the future. A c-cording to the Plan in existence at the time of the Exercise, Traffic Guides waited until an evacuation recommendation was made before obtaining traffic control post assign-ments and picking up their equipment. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 40, ff. Tc.1548, at 20. Under subsequent revisions, Traffic Guides assigned to traffic control posts servicing traffic evacuating from areas within two miles of the plant are given the control point assignments and pick up their equipment before an evacuation recommendation is made. Ld. This revision affects most of the traffic control posts designated as "criti-cal." 279. In Contention EX 40.E. Interveners assert that these modifications are in-adequate to cure the alleged defects in the LILCO Plan. Interveners do not suggest that the modifications will not decrease the mobilization times for those Traffic Guides affected. Nor could they, because it is clear that they will. Instead. Interveners argue
-110- i l
l that the improvements will not be enough since Traffic Guides will still not be at their 1 posts in the field when an evacuation r3 commendation is made. Roberts et al. (Test. Cont. EX 40), ff. Tr. 2180, at 41, 280. Contention EX 40.E depends on a finding that the LILCO Plan was funda-mentally flawed as it relates to Traffic Guide mobilization. Since we have previously concluded otherwise, we do not need to decide the merits of this subpart. Moreover, we have already held that Traffic Guides need not be at their posts when an evacuation recommendation is given, thereby negating Interveners' premise for Contention EX 40.E. VI. WIND SHIFT (EX 36) 281. Interveners allege in Contention EX 36 that LERO personnel at the EOC had "no apparent basis" during the Exercise for their decision to continue recom-mending that people in the original downwind zones,4, A-M, Q and R, evacuate when the EOF was projecting that a wind shif t would direct the plume away from those zones. Interveners assert that "it may have been more appropriate, and resulted in more dose savings, for individuals who had not yet lef t their homes by, for example, 2:00 or 3:00, to remain sheltered in their homes until af ter the wind had shif ted." Minor, ff. Tr. 2612, at 4-5,14-22. We find that the protective cetion recommendations made during the Exercise were appropriate for the scenario, and therefore we find no fundamental flaws in the LILCO Plan regarding protective action decisionmaking. 282. LERO's protective action recommendations on the dcy of the Exercise were f l made pursuant to the guidance provided in OPIP 3.6.1 of the LILCO Plan. That guld-ance provides for making protective action recommendations based on the EPA Pro-tective Action Guides (PAGs) or plant conditions or both. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 5-6; Tr. 2405-0" (Watts).
1 l -111-283. The EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs), which have been adopted in OPIP 3.6.1, call for evacuation "unless constraints make it impractical" if the projected dose is 1 rem or more to the whole body (or 5 rem to the thyroid). LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 5. 284. Attachment 5 to OPIP 3.6.1, which contains figures commonly referred to by LERO as " pie charts," provides guidance for evaluating protective actions based upon plant conditions. T.ILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 6; Tr. 2410-11,2417-24 (Watts). The appropriate protective action recommendation for various zones given plant conditions and wind direction is designated accordingly in Attachment 6 to OPIP 3.6.1. I_d. 285. During the Exercise, the Radiation Health Coordinator began performing computer dose projections at approximately 8:00 a.m., using both actual monitor readings (as they were being provided by the scenario) and hypothetical readings that could result from degrading plant conditions. Tr. 2405-10 (Watts). 286. At 9:04 a.m., dose projections based upon the calculated dose to a child's thyroid (assuming a nine-hour exoosure duration) and a hypothetical release concentra-i tion of 1000 microcuries per cubic centimeter indicated a child thyroid dose of 7.88 l rem, which is above the 5 rem threshold for which the EPA Protective Action Guide I recommends evacuation "unless constraints make it impractical." See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 7, Att. D; Minor, ff. Tr. 2612, at Att. 3. 287. LERO personnel at the EOC regularly received updates regarding plant conditions. At 9:46 a.m. LERO personnel at the EOC were notified by onsite personnel that the radiological emergencp'had escalated to a General Emergency and at 10:02 they were notified that the plant was experiencing engineering problems that were af-fecting safety systems. The Nuclear Engineer advised that if the situation continued there would be dramatic radiation release consequences. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36. ff. Tr. 2364, at 6-7; Tr. 2412-15 (Watts). l
-112-
-288. When evaluating the impact of plant conditions on protective action rec-commendations pursuant to OPIP 3.6.1, LERO personnel are trained to consider the re-lease duration. Tr. 2418-19, 2422-23 (Watts). If a long-term release is projected, the condition is similar in nature to a Condition III and evacuation is the protective action recommended for all zones designated in OPIP 3.6.1,' Att. 6 in accordance with wind di-rection. Tr. 2419-24 (Watts); see LILCO Test Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 10.
289. The Director of Local Response made the initial decision to evacuate zones A-M, Q and R at 10:10 a.m. af ter consulting with the Nuclear Engineer, the Radiation Health Coordinator, the Manager of Local Response, and the individual simulating the position of County Representative at the EOC. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 6. 290. The initial decision at 10:10 a.m. to evacuate zones A-M, Q and R was based primarity on plant conditions and LERO's belief that it was f aced with a probable - long-term' release, and calculations done to determine projected radiological dose con-firmed that evacuation was the appropriate protective action recommendation. LILCO - ; Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 6-7; Tr. 2405-07 (Watts),2590-93 (Kessler). 291. Following the initial evacuation recommendation for zones A-M, Q and R at 10:10 a.m., LERO continued to monitor plant and environmental readings and ran j computer dose projections at the EOC throughout the day. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, I ff. Tr. 2364, at 4,8; Tr. 2446 (Watts). Personnel were regularly informed of radiological j i and meteorological developments. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 4, 8; s_ee e
]
Tr. 2404-33 (Watts). 292. LILCO w.itnesses testified that LERO personnel responsible for developing ) protective action recommendations consider the impact of a variety of events on pro-tective action recommendations, LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 4; Tr. 2592 (Kessler); that LERO personnel at the EOC were aware that a wind shif t was projected
)
-113- !
to occur sometime between 3:00 and 6:00 p.m.; and that they considered the impact of the wind shif t on protective action recommendations. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 4, 8; Tr. 2515-18 (Kessler, Watts). The projected wind shif t was not suffi-ciently compelling, however, in their view to cause LERO to consider changing the pro-tective action recommendatie from evacuation to sheltering. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 4, 7-8. 293. Developments following the initial evacuation recommendation confirmed LERO's position that evacuation continued to be the appropriate protective action rec-commendation for zones A-M, Q and R. Ld. First, LERO knew that it was faced with a probable long term release and that it was important, therefore, for the evacuation to proceed. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 8-9; Tr. 2452-53 (Watts), 2592-93 (Kessler). LERO personnel at the EOC were aware that substantial radioactivity had q been released in the plant reactor building and that the reactor building would continue to release radioactivity for several hours or possibly days. [d.t Tr. 2420, 2601-03 (Watts). We find that, contrary to Interveners' suggestion, sheltering would have been an inappropriate protective action recommendation in these circumstances. 294. Second, subsequent plant release rates and offsite dose rates resulting from the Exercise scenario reached levels that were even higher than those assumed in for-m'ulating the initial decision to evacuate. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 4, 8-9; Tr. 2446-52, 2453-56 (Watts). The release rate at 12:11 p.m., for example, was more than six times higher than that assumed in formulating the initial decis >n to evacuate. Tr. 2446-51 (Watts). Subsequent computer calculations reflected only slightly lower release concentrations. Tr. 245152 (Watts). Thus, it was not necessary to do a shelter versus evacuation calculation since it was evident that evacuation re-mained the appropriate recommendation. Tr. 2446-47. 2507-09 (Watts).
-114-295. Finally, the purpose of emergency planning is to minimize the potential for confusion in emergency response. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 13. LERO workers have been trained to avoid confusing the public. Ld. at 11; Tr. 2531 (Watts).
LILCO witnesses testified without contradiction that changing the protective action recommendation from evacuation to sheltering in the middle of the evacuation would have confused the public, in contravention of good emergency planning practice, LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 4,11-13; Tr. 2527-36 (Mileti, Watts, Weismantle), and that once a general evacuation is underway, an evacuation recom-mendation should not be changed except under exceptional circumstances, LILCO Test. Cont. EX 36, ff. Tr. 2364, at 13-15. FEMA witnesses testiffed that wind shif ts routinely are included in exercise scenarios and that they knew of no exercise where a wind shif t resulted in a changed protective action recommendation. Tr. 8530-31 (Keller). 296. It is true, as Interveners contend, that LERO personnel at the EOC did not perform any calculations specifically comparing a shelter dose to an evacuation dose af ter 10:36 a.m. Tr. 2507-08 (Watts). The Radiation Health Coordinator testified that it was not necessary to perform such comparative calculations af ter that time, howev-er, because it was readily apparent that the original evacuation recommendation re-mained valid. Tr. 2507-09 (Watts). He testified that the situation actually became much more serious than originally anticipated when the initial decision to evacuate was made, as reflected by the fact that actual plant radiation release levels were signifi-cantly higher than the release level hypothesized in formulating the initial evacuation recommendation at 10:10 a.m. Ld. He testified further that evacuation was essential given the long-term nature of the release and the high radiation release levels. Ld. 297. The FEMA Report states that " appropriate protective action recommenda-
' dons were made by the accident assessment staff in the LERO EOC," that "the Radia-tion Health Coordinator and the Nuclear Engineer demonstrated good judgment in
-115-I making correct PAG determinations," and that "the protective action recommendations made by the Radiation Health Coordinator were consistent with the EPA PAGs for child thyroid dose which was the appropriate dose pathway for this exercise scenario."
FEMA EX Exh. t at 30-31, 33. In addition, FEMA witnesses testified that LERO made appropriate protective action recommendations. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 24 -25. 298. Based upon this record, we find that LERO's decisions regarding protective l l action recommendations were appropriate and adequately considered the wind shif t projected in the Exercise scenario. Given the scenario, a change from an evacuation recommendation to a sheltering recommendation would have been imprudent. In addi-tion, we agree with LILCO and FEMA witnesses that a change of that sort should be made only under the most unusual circumstances, and that those circumstances were not part of the Exercise scenario. l VII. MONITORING AT N ASSAU COLISEUM (EX 22.A: 49) A. Availability of Nassau Cnliseum (EX 22.A) 299. In Contention EX 22.A, Interveners contend that the Exercise and FEMA's conclusions were based on the " false assumption" that the Nassau Coliseum would be available as a Reception Center, and therefore the Exercise cannot support a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in an emergency at Shoreham.E For the reasons stated below, we find for LILCO on this contention. M/ Contention EX 46, which was not separately admitted but was dealt with in sub-stance under EX 22.A. reiterates Interveners' allegation that the use of the Nassau Coll- ' seum is an " essential premise" of the Exercise and that its current unavailability invall-dates FEMA's conclusions about activities that took place there during the Exercise.
-116-300. At the time of the Exercise, LILCO had a valid agreement to use the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum as the Reception Center to which general popula-tion evacuees from the 10 mile EPZ around Shoreham would be directed for registra-tion, monitoring, and (if necessary) decontamination in the event of an emergency.
LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 6; Tr. 2744 (Robinson); se_e Lonz _ Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-31,22 NRC 410 at 415-17 (1985).E Accordingly, LILCO used the Nassau Coliseum as the general popu-lation reception center during the Exercise. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 6. 301. It is undisputed that on June 16,1986, more than four months af ter the Ex-ercise, the Nassau County Board of Supervisors passed a resolution nullifying the agree-ment between LILCO and Facility Management of New York, Inc.E for use of the Nassau Coliseum as an emergency reception center.S Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 37-38 and Att. 4; LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 7; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 22,23. Intervenor witnesses testified that the effect of that resolution here 40/ The Nassau Coliseum was the subject of two days of hearings in June 1985, which were held "for the narrow purpose of admitting the identity of LILCO's proposed f acill-ty and for assessing its functional adequacy to serve as a relocation center." Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-31, 22 NRC 410, 415 (1985). The Board found the Coliseum adequate in most respects, but required LILCO to (1)" provide more detail concerning the size of the areas and available facili-ties, and how that relates to the number of people that must be processed," i_d. at 419, and (2) " plan for monitoring of all evacuees from the EPZ who seek monitoring, wheth-er or not those evacuees seek shelter." Ld. at 431. LILCO appealed the latter finding; the Commission declined to take review, Memorandum from Samuel J. Chilk (June 23, 1987), and the issue is being litigated in the 03 remand phase of the 03 proceeding. 41/ LILCO's agreement was with Hyatt Management Corporation of New York, Inc. which managed the Nassau Coliseum for Nassau County. Facility Management of New York, Inc. is the successor to Hyatt Management, Inc.
,4_2/ LILCO has replaced the Coliseum in its Plan with three new Reception Centers, at LILCO's Roslyn, Bellmore, and Hicksville operations centers. The adequacy of the new Reception Centers is the subject of litigation before the Licensing Board in the 03 proceeding.
-117-l is that the Exercise no longer provides a basis for a conclusion that an " orderly evacua-tion".would or could be implemented because "there is no facility available to be the I end point of that evacuation." Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 39.
302. LILCO witnesses testified that the Exercise demonstrated LERO's ability organizationally to provide and use facilities and people to respond in an emergency as required, whether or not the Nassau Coliseum is still designated as the Reception Cen-ter. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 7-8; Tr. 2746-48 (Robinson). l Among the organizational functions LILCO demonstrated at the Coliseum were setting up and staffing a reception facility, using monitoring procedures and equipment l properly, transporting evacuees who need transportation to a place where they can be monitored and (if necessary) decontaminated, documenting the monitoring and decon-tamination effort (M, registration), and notifying the public about the Reception Cen-ter. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 4. LILCO testified that the Ex-ercise provides sufficient basis for a predictive finding that LILCO and LERO will likely be able to conduct those activities again, regardless of the location of the reception l center. Ld. at 7. 303. FEMA witnesses agreed with LILCO's testimony and directly contradicted the testimony of Drs. Harris and Mayer. FEMA witnesses testified that "an orderly evacuation does not depend on the specific location of a reception center (s) to which evacuees are directed." FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 21. FEMA further testified that at the time of the Exercise the Coliseum was available for LILCO's use and that LERO person-nel " correctly directed (simulated) evacuees to that f acility." Ld. at 23. FEMA witness-es concluded that the FEMA Report " accurately reflects the evaluation of what occurred during the exercise" and that "the shif ting situation has nothing to do with the results of the exercise." Ld. at 22.
i
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304. We agree with LILCO and FEMA that the results of the Exercise were not invalidated by the actions of the Nassau County Board of Supervisors four months af ter the Exercise. We rely to a large degree on FEMA's experienced view that what this (or j any) exercise is intended to demonstrate is the responding organizations' organizational I capability to implement an emergency plan and that such an overall demonstration is not dependent upon the particular buildings or resources used on the exercise day. We hold that FEMA's conclusions concerning the functions at issue here remain valid despite post-Exercise changes in the location at which those functions take place.E! B. Timely Monitoring of Evacuees (EX 49) 305. In Contention EX 49 Interveners assert that the Exercise demonstrated , that LERO cannot register and monitor evacuees arriving at the Reception Center within 12 hours as prescribed in NUREG-0654 S II.J.12. Specifically, Contention EX , 49.A' alleges that LERO personnel at the Reception Center " frequently" took up to five minutes to monitor each evacuee - well over the 90 seconds provided for in the LILCO Plan.W Contention EX 49.B provides that because LILCO did not demonstrate any por-tions of its " alternate" monitoring procedures, by obtaining additional monitoring per-sonnel from outside agencies and by utilizing a modified backup monitoring method, the Exercise does not provide any basis to conclude that they could or would be implemented. We deal with EX 49.A and 49.B separately. ( 4J/ We attach little weight to the testimony of Drs. Harris and Mayer on this issue because they have no experience whatever in developing, participating in, observing, evaluating, or even attending radiological emergency drills or exercises, Tr. 3011 (Harris. Mayer), and have no knowledge about any other radiological emergency plans in q general, Tr. 3015 (Harris, Mayer). 4_4/ Contention EX 31, which was not separately admitted but was subsumed under EX 49.A, raiterates Interveners' assertion that it took 4-5 minutes to monitor individual evacuees, and therefore the Exercise demonstrated LILCO's inability to perform the re-quired registration and monitoring of evacuees arriving at the reception center within 12 hours.
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-119-Individual Monitoring Time (EX 49.A) 306. During the Exercise, in accordance with Revision 6 of the LILCO Plan, 78 LERO monitors were positioned in the concourse area of the Nassau Coliseum to moni-tor evacuees. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 6. Under the LILCO Plan, monitors are expected to monitor each evacuee in approximately 90 seconds, Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 43; LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 8; Tr. 2773 (Watts), thus enabling LERO to register and monitor its planning basis num-ber of evacuees (32,000) within 12 hours. The 90-second monitoring time is an approxi-mate average of personnel monitoring times used in the industry, Tr. 2774-75 (Watts),
and LERO personnel are trained to monitor evacuees within that time, Tr. 2774 (Watts). 307. Intervenor witnesses based their conclusion that LERO monitors "fre-quently" took five minutes to monitor each evacuee on the FEMA Report, the written comments of two federal evaluators who were present at the Nassau Coliseum (Att. 5 to Interveners' testimony), and discussions with counsel. Tr. 3032-33 (Harris, Mayer). The FEMA Report, however, says only that "cn several occasions" personnel monitoring took four to five minutes. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 8-9; 1 FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 29. In fact, the LILCO and FEMA witnesses testified that out of the 100 or so simulated evacuees monitored during the Exercise, the only ones for whom monitoring took more than 90 seconds were the three FEMA evaluators.E [d.; i l M/ Two federal evaluators actually graded Coliseum activities; a third, Mr. Kowleski, visited and played the role of an evacuee. Intervenor witnesses noted that the evaluation forms of the two federal evaluators both say without qualification that I personnel monitoring took about 4-6 minutes. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 45 and A tt. 5. FEMA's testimony that this phenomenon occurred on only three occasions is based on conversations that Mr. Keller and Mr. Kowieski had with the FEMA evaluators subsequent to the Exercise. Tr. 7982-85 (Baldwin, Keller, Kowieski). LILCO's testimo-ny to this effect b based on Mr. Keller's statements and the personal observations of two of LILCO's observers at the Coliseum. Tr. 2761-64 (Watts). We note that both evaluators concluded that the reception center objectives had been fully met. Harris
.and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at Att. 5. In fact, FEMA evaluator Bernacki rated the op-(footnote continued) l L _. _
l
- l. -120-seg Tr. 2763 (Watts), 7729, 7982-83 (Keller). This is consistent with FEMA's conclusion i
that "the facilities at the Reception Center . . . were capable of handling thirty-two j
\
thousand (32,000) evacuees within the required twelve (12) hour time period." FEMA I ( EX Exh.1 at 80; Tr. 7984 (Kellerk l 308. LILCO witnesses attributed the icw instances of untimely monitoring to the fact that this w;is a non-emergency situation, lacking the urgency that would exist dur- J ing a real emergency if there were thousands of evacuees waiting to be monitored. i LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 4-5, 9. Moreover, the LERO moni-tors, cognizant that they were being graded, monitored the evaluators more slowly and 1 exactingly in order to demonstrate the monitoring technique. Tr. 2777-79 (Watts). ) i LILCO witness Watts has seen the same type of behavior in other drills and exercises. ! LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 10; Tr. 2778, 2781-87 (Watts). If there were a real emergency, and more people were waiting to be monitored, LILCO l witnesses contend that LERO monitors would monitor individuals on a timely basis LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 10. 309. Intervenor witnesses say they have no basis to agree with LILCO's explana-tion, and that in their view the pressure of having more evacuees waiting in ilne should cause monitors to move more slowly. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 48-49.E If I monitors did proceed more quickly, Drs. Harris and Mayer would be concerned about l l (continued from previous page) l l eration of the reception center as "quite good" and FEMA evaluator Slagle rated it as "very good." I_d. Only upon subsequent consideration did Mr. Kowieski decide to assess an ARCA for Reception Center activities because he thought that every single evacuee should have been monitored within 90 seconds. See Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 44-45; Tr. 7985 (Keller, Kowieski). 4G/ But Dr. Mayer himself said that he becomes more efficient when working under the pressure of having a long line of people waiting for his services. S_eg Tr. 3047 (Mayer). i I
. . . _ ...._.n
-121-the thoroughness and quality of the monitoring. Ld.b 310. We find for LILCO on Contention EX 49.A. It appears that the instances in which monitoring took 4-5 minutes were not " frequent" but instead were isolated occur-rences. Moreover, it is understandable that LERO monilors were somewhat nervous when monitoring FEMA evaluators, and that they proceeded more slowly than would be the case in a real emergency. We agree with LILCO and FEMA tha* LERO's perfor-mance at the Nassau Coliseum during the Exercise does not reveal a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan regarding LERO's personnel monitoring procedures.$
LILCO's Alternate Monitoring Methods (EX 49.B) l l 311. Contention EX 49.B asserts that LILCO did not demonstrate, and FEMA did not evaluate, LILCO's backup monitoring procedures, which LILCO anticipates imple-i menting li more than 32,000 evacuees are expected to arrive at the Reception Center for monitoring. 312. LILCO's Plan, OPIP 4.2.3 S 5.11, provided a modified monitoring technique should it be necessary to monitor more than 32,000 evacuees at the Reception Center. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 10. ThJs backup method had LERO ' personnel monitoring the hands and thyroid of the driver of each car coming to the 4_I/ Intervenor witnesses al3o testified that LILCO's monitoring times failed to allow for monitor fatigue and the need for monitors to take breaks. Id. at 46. This assertion was directly contradicted by LILCO witness Watts, in response to a Board question, when he said that one of the precise reasons why extra personnel are mobilized is to l allow for cebstitution of monitors when necessary. Tr. 2776-77 (Watts). j l 48/ We gave little weight to the testimony of Drs. Harris and Mayer on the moni-toring time issue. Although both have extensive experience in general public health practices, the record shows that (1) neither has had any training in radiological moni-taring, Tr. 3012-13 (Harris, Mayer); (2) neither is familiar with procedures for ra- ! diological monitoring or decontamination at other New York plants, Tr. 3014-15 (Harris, Mayer); and (3) neither has monitored or decontaminated evacuees during an actual ra-diological emergency, Tr. 3028 (Harris. Mayer), or practiced doing so in drills or exer-cises. A, I with the exception of D r. Harris' participation in a Navy atomic bomb / chemical warf are class in 1957.
i-
-122- -Reception Center, and taking.a swipe sample of the car hood and wheelwell to deter-Jmine whether additional monitoring might be required. Ld. at 10. If contamination was
- detected on the driver or the car, or if there was any question at all as to whether there was contamination present, the passengers would be sent inside the Reception
. Center for the full, detailed rnonitoring ordinarily provided urder LILCO's normal moni-toring procedures. Tr. 2795,2798-99 (Watts). If more than 32,000 evacuees are expect-ed to arrive for monitoring, LILCO also has the option of calling additional monitoring personnel from other utilities through INPO, DOE, and other entitles. LILCO Test.
Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 11N 313. LILCO witnesses testified that the alternate monitoring methods were in fact implemented during the Exercise, although they conceded that FEMA did not for- l mally evaluate them. Tr. 2790 (Watts). LILCO witnesses testified that when Reception Center personnellearned that about 100,000 evacuees had been directed to the Recep-tion Center, they instituted the modifled monitoring method, demonstrating it on LERO emergency workers driving their own cars. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 10. In addition, during the Exercise LERO's Manager of Local Response made numerous calls to INPO and DOE, and obtained commitments for more than 200 addi-tional monitoring personnel to augment the LERO monitoring contingent. Ld. at 11-12; i Tr. 2800-08.N LILCO witnesses testified that, using its modified monitoring proce-dures and additional monitoring personnel from INPO and DOE, LERO could have i 4_9/ LILCO witnesses testified that LILCO is one of the utilities participating in the INPO Emergency Voluntary Assistance Agreement, which provides for mutual aid in re-sponse to a radiological emergency. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at
- 11. INPO provides a 24 hour emergency number for requests that INPO coordinate the response and assistance from other utilities. Ld.
I 5_0/ The numbers of additional monitoring personnel used during the Exercise were actual numbers pledged during a January 30, 1986 drill as the result of calls actually ; made during that drill by INPO to member utilities. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49. I ff. Tr. 2690, at 12. l 1 1
. _ _ _ ______-_-_______________O
-123-monitored within 12 hours the 95,000-100,000 evacuees that were advised to report to the Coliseum for monitoring during the Exercise. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 22.A and 49, ff. Tr. 2690, at 10; Tr. 2800 (Watts).
314. Intervenor witnesses testified that the alternate evacuee monitoring proce-dure was not evaluated at this Exercise, citing the FEMA Report. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 50. Further, although they admitted that actual calls were made to INPO l and other entities during the Exercise to request additional monitoring personnel, Inter-Vener witnesses testified that INPO and the other entities relied upon by LERO did not actually pa ticipate in or provide personnel during the Exercise. Ld. However, Drs. Harris and Mayer cited no affirmative reason to believe that INPO, DOE or the other entities relied upon would not be willing or able to provide the promised personnel. Tr. 3035-36 (Harris, Mayer). 315. FEMA's testimony was especially significant on this issue. FEMA testified l that "LERO personnel recognized the need to use the alternate method described in the Plan" and that the alternate procedure was in f act implemented (simulated); but, "since the implementation of the alternate procedure was not an exercise objective, . . . there was no evaluation of that procedure." FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 30. In addition, FEMA testified that LERO contacted DOE and INPO and was promised additional monitoring personnel by those organizations. Ld. at 31. However, as with the modified monitoring I procedures, FEMA testified that the Exercise "was not designed to actually demonstrate the capabilities of other agencies." Ld. 316. We find based on the evidence presented that during the Exercise LILCO j adequately demonstrated the ability to implement its alternate monitoring proc 's l even though FEMA did not evaluate these activities. It cannot be said that the Exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan siniply because FEMA did not eval-uate activities that it did not require LILCO to demonstrate.
-124-VIII. REGISTERING, MONITORING, AND DECONTAMINATING
_ EVACUEES FROM SPECIAL FACILITIES (EX 47) 317.~ . Contention EX 47 alleges that LILCO did not demonstrate the ability to register, monitor, and decontaminate evacuees from special facilities ddring the Exer-cise, and thereby failed to meet FEMA FIELD objectives 13 and 21. Interveners con- i tend that this f ailure results from gaps in the LILCO Plan, including the lack of identi-fjed reception centers for special populations and the lack of agreements between the ! reception centers and the special facilities that would use them, lntervenors further
- contend that gaps in the LILCO Plan c: dst with respect to planning for school children I and hospital evacuation. For'the reasons stated below, we find that no fundamental i flaw is shown by the issues raised in this contention.
318. During the Exercise,- LILCO gathered and disseminated information about evacuating the special facility population, and dispatched over 60 emergency vehicles to simulate evacuation of special facilities. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 47, ff. Tr. 2879, at 6. LEliO workers also monitored hundreds of emergency workers at the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility (EWDF). Ld. at 8. LILCO witnesses viewed these ac-tivities as demonstrating the organizational ability to evacuate, register, and decon-taminate special facility evacuees. Ld. at 6-8. Intervenor witnesses disagreed: They testified that special facility evacuees require special treatment and would, at the very least, take longer to monitor than the normal population. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. l 2992, at 25-26; Tr. 3030-31 (Harris, Mayer). In addition, LILCO witnesses testified that the demonstrations described I 319. 1 above satisfied or exceeded those required by FEMA in its Exercise objectives, LILCO { i Test. Cont. EX 47, f f. Tr. 2879, at 7,9 Tr. 2886 (Daverio), FEMA witnesses agreed that l registering, monitoring, and decontaminating special f acility evacuees was not an Exer-L cise objective, Tr 8532 (Keller), and that during FEMA graded exercises at other plants a l
< j
s
-125-f in New York, special facilities are tested by nothing more than phone calls. Tr. 8533 (Kowleski).
320. With respect to FIELD objective 13,b Intervenor witnesses argued that LILCO was required to send vehicles to a specified special facility reception center to meet the objective. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tro 2992, at 351 This testimvny was not sup-ported by the facts developed on the record. LILCO witnasses testified that the dis-patch of an ambulance and att ambulette, which FEMA evaluc+ed, was aU that FEMA l required to satisfy this objective, LILCO Test. Cont. EX 47. f". Tr. 2879, at 7, and I FEMA agreed that FIELD objective 13 was met by tMs demor.stration. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 151; see also FEMA EX Exh. I at 43. We therefore find that FIELD objective 13 was met. 32L Interveners also allege that LILCO did not meet FIELD objective 21.E According til the LILCO Plan, special f acility evacuees are monitored at reception cen-ters other than those identified for the general public. See OPIP 3.6.5, Att. S. Interve+ nors recognized this f act, Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 12, but argued that FIELD objective 21 was not met because no monitoring of specisl facility evacuees was dem-onstrated at these other facilities. Ld. at 34-36. FEMA witnesses testified that FIELD objective 21 did not encompass monitoring at reception centers other than the Nassau Coliseum, FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 26; Tr. 8532 (Keller), and that monitoring at special f a-cility reception centers was not an Exercise objective. Tr. 8532 (Keller). Thus, we find, contrary to the allegations in Contention EX 47, that FIELD objective 21 did not l I require monitoring of special f acility evacuees. j 1 l l FIELD objective 13 provides: " Demonstrate a sample of the resources necessary i 5_1/ to effect an orderly evacuation of the institutionalized mobility-impaired individuals l Within the 10-mile EPZ." l 1 5_2/ FIELD objective 21 provides:" Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for regis-tration. radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees and vehicles inejuding adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste at the Reception Cen-l- ter." ; I t
]
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-126-I E ~
l' 322. In subp3rts A-E of Contention EX 47 interveners allege that various I l changes IA Revision 7 of the LILCO Plan regarding the treatment of special populations i do not compensate for the alleged deficiencies in this area exposed by the Exercise.
< .Because it is now clear on the record developed before us that these matters raised are outside the scope of the Exercise, we do not address their merits. l 323. First, LILCO witnesses testified that the Revision ' proposals discusse'J in -
subsections of the contention were responsive to'RAC comments on the LILCO Plan, not to Exercise events. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 47, ff. Tr. 2879, at 3. Intervenor wit-neaser did not contradict this statement either in written testimony or at the hearing. l LILCO witnesces further testified that the Revision 7 proposals had been superseded by a draf t proposal to monitor special facility evacuees at the Emergency Worker Decontamination facility. LILCO Test, Cont. EX 47, ff. Tr. 2879, at 11. And, FEMA , witnesses took the position that these co' tention a subsections raised planning issues unrelated to the February 13,1986 Exercise. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 28. ) 324. Our charge in these hearings is to determine whether a fundamental flaw . exists in the LILCO Plan as exercised on February 13, 1986. The Plan revisions on which these subsections of Contention EX 47 are founded were not exercised on that day, do not arise out of Exercise events, and are no longer under consideration by LILCO. We therefore reject Contention EX 47.A-E, because the facts developed on the record provide no basis from which we might discern a fundamental flaw. I 325. For similar reasons we will not evaluate LILCO's draf t proposal for moni-toring special facility evacuees here. That proposal is equally unrelated to Exercise events. 326. Second, LILCO's planning for special f acility evacuees was extensively liti-gated in the planning phase of this proceeding. There the Licensing Board concluded that LILCO's planning for special facilities was adequate, aside from the lack of I
-12 7-'
1
' recepilon centers and the lack of agreements between reception centers and the spe-
" clai facilities who would make use of them. PID at 840; Long Island Lighting Co.
~
'(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-31,22 NRC 410,429-30 (1985). The -
Licensing Board concluded, referencing Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-26,20 NRC 53,71 (1984), that these planning issues must be resolved prior to full power operation of the Shoreham plant. PID at 840; see L6P-85-31, 22 NRC at 429-30. Nothing in the Exercise hearing record indicates that
' LILCO cannot meet these licensing conditions, and therefore we have no basis for find-i l
ing a fundamental flaw.
- 327. The Licensing Board in the planning litigation also found that LILCO was required- to identify reception centers for schoolchildren. PID at 860. Interveners testified in this proceeding that such reception centers have not been identified.
Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 17,33. LILCO agreed. Tr. 2923 (Daverio). We main-tain the licensing condition set by the Licensing Board and find that LILCO must identi-fy reception centers for schoolchildren prior to full power operation. We also find, however, that this present gap in the LILCO Plan does not constitute a fundamentM flaw as revealed by the Exercise. , 328. As to the allegations about hospital evacuation, LILCO's planning for hospi-l tals identifies sheltering as a first choice of protection action. PID at 829,841-44. The Licensing Board approved this planning basis during the Plan litigation. PID at 843. LILCO testified in this hearing that the Exercise scenario . called for sheltering hospital ) j patients, LILCO Test. Cont. EX 47, ff. Tr. 2879, at 9, and that as a result, LILCO's plan- j i ning for evacuation of hospitals is not implicated by Exercise events. Ld. We agree. !
'5_3/ Whether LILCO is required to undertake additional planning for evacuation of hospital patients is presently being reviewed by the Commission. Unpublished Commis-sion Order, No. 50-322-OL-3 (Sept.19,1986).
l I
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-128-4
, 4 zThe issue raised in Contention EX 47 relates only to LILCO's plann ing bas is and thus is . !
i outside'the t l
.IX. ADEQUACY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (EX 38: 39: 40.C: 22.F: 44: 49.C) ]
l 329. In Contentions EX 38 and 39 and th'e accompanying Contentions EX-22.F, a1 ' 42.C & G, 40.C, 44, and 49.C, Interveners attempt to establish a fundamental flaw in - , the LILCO Plan's public information program, They allege that the performance of i public information personnel at ENC press briefings and in Rumor Control and Media Monitoring during the Exercise created an inconsistent, inaccurate, confusing, and un-timely information pool that would have resulted in substantial shadow phenomenon had
.the information been given to the public in an emergency.
330. W review of the fully developed record, however, leads us to conclude that-
'the details cited in the contentions do not rise, individually or in the aggregate, to the.
level of a fundamental flaw in the LILCO pdblic information program. Tne Licensing; Board approved that program in the PID, PID at 688-701, 756-70. LERO's imple-mentation of the program during the Exercise was adequate to support those predictive findings on' the program itself and on the likely effect it would have on minimizing any
.' shadow evacuation by the public.
331. This is not to say that the program itself, and LERO's implementation of it, car:not be improved. LILCO witnesses cited several adjustments they have made to the program as a result of Exercise experiences, including form changes, ENC map revi - sions, and additional copy machines. We fitid that these changes should be made and willimprove the public information program. 332. We discuss below, first, the specific allegations in Contention EX 38 about l l public information activities at the ENC: second, the allegations in Contention EX 39 regarding responses to Rumot' Control inquiries; and third, the likely effect of the Exercise performance on shadow phenomenon.
l
-129-A. ENC Operations (EX 3S. A-J. L-Q) 333. In Contention EX 38, Interveners assert that during the Exercise "LILCO was. unable to provide timely, accurate, consistent and ren-confusing information to l 1
the news media at the Emergency News Center (" ENC")." The numerous subparts to Contention EX 38 allege specific problems, such as untimely sctivation of the ENC, un-
)
timely distribution of hard copy press releases, ineffective performance at press con-
. ferences by LERO representatives, and inadequate copying capability.b Intervenor witnesses also asserted generally that LILCO's concept of press relations is inappropri-ate and by its very design f alls to give reasonable assurance that LILCO can effectively deal with the mediab during a Shoreham emergency. We address this general asser-tion first, and then discuss specific issues raised in the contention.
The Media's Role in Emervency Public Information 334. The LILCO and Intervenor witnesses hold different views concerning the media's role during an emergency. While LILCO witnesses cite the importance of providing accurate information to the media, they believe that the top priority in an emergency public information network ~is the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS), which uses EBS network radio broadcasts to. disseminate emergency information direct- ! ly to the public. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39,(f. Tr. 3207, at 8. LILCO attempts to focus the public's attention on the EBS messages because they contain the information 54/ Several other contentions - EX 42.C and G, 40.C, 22.F, 44 (first sentence only), and 49.C - were dealt with under the rubric of Contention EX 38 although we did not separately admit them for litigation. The issues raised in Contentions EX 42.C and G are addressed in our findings on Contention EX 50.A, infra. Contentions EX 40.C,22.F, . 1 49.C, and 44 are addressed below in part IX.C (Shadow phenomenon). j 5/ By the term " media" we are referring to the press, both print and broadcast, in ' their usual capacity of reporting and distribution of information of their choice on mat-ters which they consider newsworthy, as distinguished from the role of radio and televi-sion broadcasting stations as orompt relayers of efficial emergency information as part ' of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).
-130-that is essential to the public, such as the status of the emergency, the potential risk ;
essociated with emergency events, and protective action recommendations. Ld. at 8-9; Tr. 3236,3261 (Mileti). LILCO witnesses assert that the primacy of the EBS network in the overall emergency public information scheme is underscored by the NRC require-ment that EBS messages go out in 15 minutes. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. l 3207, at 9; Tr. 3234 (Daverio), and by the lack of any comparable requirements for press i conferences or news releases. 335. In LILCO's view, other means of communicating emergency information to the public are of secondary importance when compared with EBS messages. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 12. Thus, although the LILCO Plan provides l detailed procedures for operating a news center, conducting joint LILCO/LERO press conferences, and disseminating both LERO and LILCO news releases, the LILCO wit-nesses consider these functions a less important means of communicating emergency I information to the at-risk public. I_d. They view the media mainly as a vehicle to fol-low up and elaborate on EBS messages. Ld at 13. LILCO witnesses testified that the
- media's primary function during an emergency is to cover the event, not to provide in-formation to enhance the public's health and safety. Tr. 3357 (Patterson).
336. Consistent with this position, while LILCO witnesses concede that there were some problems in ENC activities during the Exercise (e.g., late distribution of l news releases), they argue that these problems do not rise to the level of a "fundamen-tal flaw" because they constitute minor and localized mishaps in the . secondary and ter-tiary pub, a information vehicles and not in the EBS system. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 8,12,14,15-16. According to LILCO witnesses, the na-ture of the public's response to the emergency simulated during the Exercise would have been primarily a function of the quality of LERO's EBS messages, id. at 12, and, except for a few minor problems pointed out in LILCO's testimony, the EBS messages I were clear, consistent, and complete. Ld. at 14-16.
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-131-1 337. Interveners assign much more importance to the media's role in an emer-gency situation. Intervenor witnesses. testified that it is the media's responsibility to do exactly what LERO uses its EBS messages to do: "to provide the public with timely, precise and easily understood information on the basis of which members of the public can make rational individual decisions on the best course of action to insure their per-sonal health and safety." Evans e_t al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 38. Interveners assert that LILCO has put too much emphasis on the EBS system, Tr. 4087, 4089-90 (Rowan), and that "the media is now and would be in a crisis the primary conduit to the public."
Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 88. In short, Intervenor witnesses argue that LILCO "does not understand the media, does .not really want to deal with the media, and does not comprehend how good media relations would be essential in a real crisis." Evans et al., l ff. Tr. 3786, at 79. 338. The FEMA witnesses agreed with LILCO that the EBS system is the "pri-mary means of giving necessary emergency information to the public." FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 32. They elaborated that whereas "EBS messages serve as the primary means for providing essential emergency information and clear instructions to the public," the purpose of news releases is to " reinforce" the EBS messages. Ld. at 35, 39. In FEMA's view, aside from the EBS messages, "the rest is window dressing." Tr. 7780 (Keller). We agree with LILCO and FEMA on the comparative roles of the media and ! 339. EBS during a radiological emergency. Their position that the top priority in any ra-diological emergency public information system is prompt public notification and emer-gency warnings, using EBS systems for disseminating emergency public information, is l firmly supported by NRC regulations and FEMA guidance. See 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(5) l l and Part 50, App. E S IV.D.3; s_e_e also NUREG-0654 S II.E.3,5-7 and App. 3. It also fol-lows from the f act that EBS member stations commit themselves, in their capacity as l EBS stations, to provide dedicated lines for the dissemination of official, controlled l
-132-p information'during an emergency, while ordinary members of the print and broadcast media do not.
340.~ We find LILCO's articulation here of its priorities in disseminating 'emtr-gency public_ information to be reasonable and proper. Wa interpret LILCO's stated ; press policy as LILCO's commitment to satisfy our regulations and FEMA guidance on - ; emergency.public notification as a first priority during an emergency, before attending. to the needs and requests of' mecia representatives and individuals. We do not believe that LILCO's approach evidences either the naivete or cavalier disregard of press rela- i tions that Interveners have argued was shown during the Exercise. Specific Flaws Alleged in EX 38 u Timeliness of ENC Activation and First Press Conference (EX 38.A) 341. Contention EX 38.A alleges that LILCO was untimely.in activating the ENC 1 and in initiating the first press conference.N According to Interveners, in, a real emergency this delay would result in " substantial confusion, speculation, rumor genera- l tion, lack of confidence in LILCO's ability to deal with the emergency, and refusal to believe information, advice or instructions subsequently disseminated by LILCO person-nel." 342. The times involved in EX 38.A were not disputed. During the Exercise, the emergericy classification levels were declared onsite at the following times: Unusual Event - 5:40; Alert - 6:17; Site Area Emergency (SAE) -- 8:19; and General Emergency -- 9:39. The first EBS message was broadcast (simulated) at 6:52, the ENC
- was declared operational at 8:25, and the first press conference began at 8:40. I 5_Q/ . The ENC is an onsite (LILCO) f acility, but offsite (LERO) public information per-sonnel also report and function there. Thus, press conferences include both LERO and LILCO Spokespersons, and each has his own staff. Although in Contention EX 38 Inter-venors sometimes used "LERO"'and "LILCO" interchangeably, we have tried to use "LERO" when referring to the offsite organization or personnel and "LILCO" when re- - ferring to the onsite organization or personnel.
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.1
-133-343. LILCO witnesses testified that ENC activation was initiated at the Alert level, according to LILCO. procedures, and that the 8:25 activation time is reasonable given that LILCO and LERO staff had to be mobilized, the facilityN had to be set up, equipment had to be tested, and information had to be gathered from onsite and offsite sources. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 16-17; Tr. 3421 (McCaffrey).
LILCO witnesses added that the ENC was actually ready to activate at 8:08, but the LILCO Emergency News Manager waited to declare it activated because one staff member had not arrived. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, f f. Tr. 3207, at 17. Had there been a real emergency, the ENC could have been activated at or before 8:08. Tr. 3423 (McCaf f rey). 344. LILCO witnesses also asserted that the first press briefing was timely, es-pecially since there were other avenues of information flow from LERO and LILCO prior to the 8:40 press conference. The first two LILCO (onsite) press releases were is-sued at 6:25 and 6:39,E respectively, and the first EBS message was broadcast at 6:52. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 17-18. Moreover, LILCO's Corporate Communications Department (CCD), which staf fs telephone lines 24 hours a day, seven days a week, would also be available to give information to callers before the ENC is of-ficially activated. I_d. ht 18; SE Tr. 3436-42 (McCaffrey, Robinson). 345. Importantly, LILCO witnesses noted that although no NRC regulation or FEMA guideline prescribes an acceptable activation time, NUREG-0654 supports their 5_7/ At the tinte of the Exercise, LILCO's ENC was located in a portion of the Holl-day Inn in Ronkonkoma that LILCO leased for that purpose. As of April 1987 LILCO's ENC is located in a new LILCO-owned building in Central Islip, N.Y., other parts of which house LILCO training headquarters. 5_8/ LILCO Press Release No.1 concerned the Unusual Event declaration and No. 2 concerned the Alert declaration. Had there been a real emergency, both would have been transmitted to news agencies via the AP and UPI wires at the times noted. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, f f. Tr. 3207, at 17. During the Exercise this process was sim-ulated. Tr. 3426-27 (McCaf f rey).
-134-position on the timeliness of ENC activation and the first press briefing. LILCO wit-ness Daverio cited a table of suggested offsite response actions in NUREG-0654, App.1, p.1-12, which recommends that joint press briefings be provided at the Site Area Emergency level. Tr. 3354 (Daverlo). As Mr. Daverlo noted, the corresponding table for the Alert stage (p.1-8) does not mention press briefings. Ld.
346. In contrast, Intervenor witnesses testified that LILCO's " casual, stylized, and programmed" activation procedures proved too slow and insensitive to the needs of the press, especially during the early morning hours when the Exercise scenario was in-itiated. See Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 41-42. Intervenor witnesses say that, at the first hint of a nuclear accident, in this case the 6:52 EBS message, every news organi-l zation in the area would immediately mobilize all available resources to cover the I event. Ld. at 41.E! They claim that by 7:30 or 7:45 a.m., a sizable group of reporters would have arrived at the ENC, all clamoring for more information; LILCO's failure to accommodate them until 8:25 or 8:40 would frustrate and anger the media, and force them to seek information from unofficial, probably less informed sources. Ld. at 44-46. l This would irreparably damage LILCO's credibility with the press for the duration of the accident, Ld. at 46-47, 54, regardless of what information was provided previously or subsequently. Ld. at 47-49, 55-59, 347. The FEMA witnesses testified that ENC activation was timely and "done very well," FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 32; Tr. 7757-58 (Keller), and the FEMA Report states that "the activation of the LERO functions and the mobilization of the staff at the ENC were demonstrated in a timely manner." FEMA EX Exh.1 at 52. The FEMA witnesses 5_9/ LILCO witness Patterson disputed this assertion. He noted that in 1986 there were about 209 Unusual Event declarations and about 10 Alerts in this country. Tr. 3353 (Patterson). Mr. Patterson asserted that the press was therefore used to such events and considered them as a " common thing," and as a result the press does not ex-pect an ENC to be set up at those early stages of an emergency. Id.
-135-J noted that although the first press briefing did not begin until 8:40, the primary means of disseminating emergency information to the public, the EBS system, was activated almost two hours earlier, at 6:52. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 32. They added that a press briefing held within 15 minutes of ENC activation, as it was here, is adequate. Ld. at
- 33. The FEMA witnesses concluded that the activation procedures used during the Exercise were adequate and consistent with those used at all operating plants in Region II. Ld. at 32.
348. We find that the ENC was timely activated during the Exercise. First, we give considerable weight to FEMA's observations and conclusions, both in the FEMA Report and in its testimony. FEMA noted no problems in the timeliness with which the ENC was activated and the first press briefing initiated. l 349. Second, LILCO's position here is supported by NUREG-0654. The ENC was activated at 8:25, only six minutes af ter the SAE declaration, and the media were briefed for the first time 15 minutes later. These times are reasonable in light of the I guidance in NUREG-0654 that press briefings be provided at the Site Area Emergency level. 350. More generally, we find the LILCO and FEMA witnesses' testimony more persuasive on the specific issues here - i_.A, timing of ENC activation and press briefing - than Intervenor witnesses' testimony. Interveners take the position that as soon as reporters arrive at the ENC, LERO and LILCO representatives should provide formal briefings, regardless of whether all pertinent information has been collected and sifted.N We disagree; we believe that ENC activation should be keyed to the emergency information needs of the public, not to the arrival times of a few reporters. 60/ Interveners do not explain why the seemingly ad hoc contacts they advocate would be mure beneficial (or even advisable) than waiting until a more organized, fully operational ENC can be activated to inform the media. We agree with the FEMA wit-nesses that -"before you can hold a press briefing you have to know what you're going to talk about generally." Tr. 7766 (Keller).
-136-351. Finally, much of Intervenor witnesses' testimony concerns the intense media interest that would accompany a Shoreham emergency, and the lengths the media will go to find other sources of information, especially during the early stages of the emergency. We accept as a given the proposition that a serious radiological emer-gency at Shoreham would spur great media interest. But we also accept as inevitable the fact that the media would seek out diverse sources of information regardless of what LILCO and LERO did at the ENC. Indeed, both parties agreed that reporters would seek out sources other than LILCO, including antinuclear scientists and activists, to report "both sides" of the story. S_ee, e e.g., Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 61-63; LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 11-12; Tr. 3749 (Mileti).b In short, although l Intervenor witnesses say that the media would turn elsewhere for information because LILCO did not confront the press sooner, Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 50, we believe the media would seek multiple sources and viewpoints of information anyway, regard-l less of ENC activation time.
LERO News Releases (EX 38.B. C. D. and G) 352. In Contentions EX 38.B. C, and G, Interveners allege that LERO news re-leases were distributed too late and were out-of-date and inconsistent witn EBS mes-sages in the public domain at the time of distribution. Contention EX 38.B concerns , LERO news release no.1 EX 38.C concerns news release no. 2, and EX 38.G concerns LERO news releases 3-7. Contention EX 38.D alleges that insufficient copying capabil-ities contributed to delays in the distribution of news releases an-j other hard copy in-formation. l 61/ The Intervenor witnesses testified that reporters are " skeptical about business executives 'n general and nuclear power plant management in particular," Evans et ah, i I ff. Tr. 3786, at 89. and that they would seek out non-utility sources "immediately upon broadcast of the first EBS message." Ld. at 61. f i 1
- -- - - a
-137-
-353. LILCO witnesses disputed the f acts in EX 38. B, asserting that LERO news release no.1 (concerning the Alert stage) was not provided to the press at 8:21 but at sometime af ter 8:25. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 19; Tr. 3445 (Robinson). .LILCO witnesses also disputed FEMA's statement that the ENC learned o' f I i
the Site Area Emergency at 8:19, testifying instead that the LERO ENC staff learned of ; the SAE sometime between 8:21 and 8:25. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 19-20; Tr. 3445-46 (Robinson). The Intervenor witnesses did not dispute LILCO's factual corrections, and counsel appeared to concede them at hearing. ~Tr. 3445-46 (Letsche). Therefore we find for LILCO on EX 38.B and proceed to consider the news release issues in EX 38.C and G together.E 354. Interveners' basic grievance with the LERO news releases is that, although they contain virtually the same information as the EBS messages,' during the Exercise they were distributed to the press well af ter the corresponding EBS messages were broadcast. See Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 65-71. Thus, Interveners say, reporters at the ENC would have been confused because by the time LERO news releases were dis-tributed they were out-of-date and inconsistent with information already in the public domain. Ld. at 67, 69-70. 355. LILCO's answer was three-fold. First, LILCO witnesses argued, the LERO news releases are a low priority when compared to the EBS system and live press con-ferences. See Findings on Cont. EX 38 and 39, suora; see also LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 8-9,13, 20, 22, 28-30. Hard copy news releases are basically for historical, recordkeeping purposes; reporters do not expect them to contain the most
'6J/ LILCO presented separate testimony on each contention (EX 38.B. C, D, and G).
Interveners' testimony addressed the four contentions as a group. Since Interveners be-lleve that the issue raised in these contentions is a generic one, and LILCO presented similar arguments in defense of each of the separate contentions, we chose to address them as a group. l- .
-138-up-to-date information and do not rely on them for that purpose. Ld. at 29-30. LERO disseminated each of the EBS messages within 15 minutes, and therefore fulfilled the highest priority function.. Ld. at 15-16, 29; FEMA EX Exh. I at 34. ,
'l 356.. Second, since the EBS messages did go out promptly, had there been a real emergency the media would have heard the same information that is in the news re-leases much earlier. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 13,22,29. Inter-venor witnesses agreed. Evans e_t al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 69. Moreover, LILCO argued, there were frequent press conferences at which EBS information was explained and questioned. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 9,13, 20-21, 23, 29.
. Therefore, the media received the information contained in news releases before they 4 actually received the hard copy releases.
357. Finally, the LILCO witnesses assert that the delay in distributing news re-
-leases was due primarily to the copy machine breakdown, which is the subject of EX 38.D. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, if. Tr. 3207, at 30. Both of LILCO's copying machines at the ENC broke down during the Exercise, causing widespread delays in distributing hard copy information. Ld. at 6, 23-24. Indeed, the copier failure was the root of FEMA's Deficiency for the ENC,in that " insufficient copying capabilities at the ENC resulted in delays in the distribution of information." FEMA EX Exh. I at 53.
358. We find that the copying problems cited in EX 38.D do not indicate a funda-mental flaw in the LILCO-Plan, but rather are the result of correctable mechanical failures. We also note LILCO's testimony that in recent drills the copiers have not malfunctioned to the same degree. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39. ff. Tr. 3207, at 24. In any event, LILCO has made available three additional copy machines as primary and secondary backups at its new ENC, and has modified its procedures so that less copying is required there. Ld. at 24-25. We agree with LILCO that these and other improve-ments should reduce or eliminate copying problems of the ilk experienced during the Exercise.
- _ - _ - _ = _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
-139-I On the news release issue, FEMA witnesses testified that there are no es-359.
tablished maximum time frames within which hard copy of news releases must be is-sued, and that, although it might be helpful if they were available to the media as soon as possible af ter the EBS broadcasts, in a real emergency the media would have re-ceived the same information in a timely manner through EBS messages. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 35,39.E l 360. We agree with LILCO that the function of providing hard copy news re- l leases to the press is not an essential one. No party has cited any NRC regulation or i FEMA guideline that requires such press releases, and FEMA witnesses testified that there are no established minimum times within which they must be issued, FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 35. In any case, we are not persuaded that the press would have been con-fused, or that press relations would have been seriously damaged, by the fact that they did not receive hard copy news releases instantaneously, especially since they were receiving the same information through frequent EBS messages and live press confer-ences at the ENC. Moreover, LILCO's seosequent improvements to its copying capabili-ty and hard copy distribution procedures assure that in the future, news releases and other hard copy information will be distributed more quickly. News Conferences (EX 38.E. H, I, J, M, and N) 361. In Contentions EX 38.E, H, I, J, M, and N, Interveners criticize the manner in which LILCO and LERO briefed the press. Centention EX 38.E alleges that insuffi-cient maps and displays in the media briefing room contributed to the dissemination of unclear and confusing information. Contention EX 38.H alleges that it was improper for LERO personnel to wait 47 minutes to inform the media of the full EPZ evacuation 9/ The FEMA witnesses also testified that if EBS Information were already in the public domain, there should be no reason to Delieve that subsequent hard copy confir-mation of that information would confuse anyone. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 39.
)
-140-I l
recommendation. Contention EX 38.I alleges that LERO personnel waited too long to inform the media of the in'struction for LERO workers to ingest KI, and then improp-erly asked reporters not to print that information. Contention EX 38.J alleges that ENC personnel were unable to answer questions or provide information on certain top-ics. Contention EX 38.M alleges that LERO personnel were unable to respond to ques-tions about the fuel truck impediment. Finally, Contention EX 38.N alleges that LERO personnel frequently misstated facts and provided inaccurate information. We deal with each below. Maps and Displays (EX 38.E) 362. Contention EX 38 E references the FEMA Report (FEMA EX Exh.1) at pages 52 and 54, where FEMA suggested that LILCO add a new EPZ map and emergency status board to its media briefing room. Contrary to the contention, the FEMA Report does not say that the absence of the map and display caused confusion, and the FEMA witnesses disputed Interveners' assertion that LERO personnel disseminated confusing and unclear information to the media. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 37. In any case, LILCO wit-nesses testified that LERO has added the new map and display suggested by FEMA. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 25. We do not believe that the absence of the map and display constituted a fundamerital flaw in the LILCO Plan, but whatever deficiency existed before has been resolved to our satisfaction by LILCO. Notification to Media of Full Evacuation (EX 38.H) 363. The facts in EX 38.H were not disputed. In an EBS broadcast simulated at 12:00 noon, LERO recommended that the entire EPZ evacuate. LERO ENC staff were informed of this recommendation at about 12:22. Instead of informing the assembled media immediately however, ENC personnel waited until the next formal press confer-ence at 12:47 to tell them about the full evacuation recommendation. Intervenor wit-4 nesses speculate that, af ter the EBS message, reporters would have demanded l
-141-
"immediate confirmation and elaboration" concerning ?.he evacuation, and would be "in-furiated" at not receiving it. Evaris e_t aj., ff. Tr. 3786, at 34-85.
364. LILCO witnesses testified that it is within the LERO Spokesperson's discre-i lion to determine when to make such LERO announcements, and that decision would be sensitive to demands of the press such as those described by Interveners. Tr. 3511 I (Robinson). Since EBS messages were not actually broadcast during the Exercise, there was no stimulus for the reporters at the ENC to demand such confirmation and elabora-tion. i 365. The LERO Spokesperson testified that her decision not to make au immedi-ate announcec.;ent does not indicate a serious flaw in the LILCO Plan, for three rea-sons. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 31-32. First, as the contention states, the public would have been informed directly of the full evacuation recommen-dation in the 12:00 noon EBS broadcast, and every 15 minutes thereaf ter. M. at 31. l Second, as all parties agreed, in a real emergency reporters at the ENC would have l l l heard the EBS message themselves, and thus would have obtained immediately the same !
-information that they obtained at 12:47 during the Exercise. Ld.; see Evans et al., ff.
Tr. 3786, at 69, 84; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 40. Finally, LILCO witnesses testified that under revised LERO procedures the media will receive hard copy confirmation of new emergency information very soon af ter LERO obtains that information. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 32. 366. We believe that it would have been preferable for the LERO Spokesperson to make herself available to the press immediately af ter the 12:00 EBS message was broadcast in order to elaborate on the message and answer questions. The Spokesperson is free to do so, and presumably would have, had the press demanded it. But we do not believe that the 47 minute delay by one person at issue here reflects a fundamental l flaw in the LILCO Plan, especially since in a real emergency the EBS messages would l 1
-142-have been broadcast to the public (including media representatives) every 15 minutes beginning at noon. Thus, the public would have received the essential information contained in that message - M, the recommendation for the entire EPZ to evacuate -
well before the 12:47 press conference in which the media were officially informed.b Potassium Iodide (EX 38.I) 367. During the Exercise, at approximately 9:45, LERO workers were instructed to ingest (simulated) potassium iodide (KI). In Contention EX 38.I. Interveners assert that LERO ENC personnel told the media of that fact at about 1:05, and then asked the media not to print it. LILCO witnesses disputed the facts in EX 38.I, saying that the press were never briefed on the KIissue and were never asked to refrain from printing such information if they had it LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 33. Intervenor witnesses " recognize [d] that there are disputes about the facts," and their testimony appears to assume the accuracy of LILCO's statement of facts. See Evans e_t a_1., ff. Tr. 3786, at 71-72. Accordingly, our consideration focuses (as did Interveners' testimony) on the asserted consequences of LERO's decision n_ot to disclose KIinforma-tion to the press. 368. LILCO witnesses testified that LERO does not inform the press or the pub-lie about K1 ingestion by LERO workers because under the LILCO Plan the public does not receive KI, and therefore that information is irrelevant to them. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 33-34. The FEMA witnesses agreed, adding that it is " unnecessary and inappropriate that information which is of no direct value to the 34/ Moreover, we do not understand why the media would require " confirmation" of , information being repeated every 15 minutes in LERO's official EBS messages. 6_5/ LILCO witnesses noted that NRC regulations and NUREG-0654 do not require that the public be provided with KI, and that New York State's own Radiological Emer-gency Plan says that " distribution (of KI] to the general population is not recom-mended." LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 33-34.
.____________________________________________O
-143-public should be disseminated via the media." FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 41; Tr. 7834 (Kowieski).EE! Intervenor witnesses asserted that the media would likely find out about the KI instruction, however, and the concealment they would perceive would " poison press relations." Evans e_t a_1., ff. Tr. 3786, at 75. Intervenor witnesses further testified that the media's discovery of that information would generate questions about the KI recommendation that "would arise at every press conference." Ld. at 72. LILCO wit-nesses agreed that reporters would learn of the KI instruction, but added that LERO would (and during the Exercise was prepared to) answer such questions. LILCO Test.
Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 34; Tr. 3757-58 (Mileti). No reporters asked ques-
- tions about K! ingestion during the Exercise. LILCO Test. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at
. 34.
369. Clearly, the issue of whether to tell the public when LERO workers have been instructed to ingest KI is one that LILCO has considered at length. Although the parties had different viewpoints concerning whether LERO voluntarily should have briefed the media on KI, both parties envisioned that the press would ask questions about it, and the LERO Spokesperson was prepared to handle those questions. We do not believe that LILCO's policy would " poison" press relations, so long as LERO was prepared and willing to field those questions if they came up. And since the KI infor-i mation does not involve the public, LILCO's policy would have no discernible affect on ) public health and safety. 1 l. l j l
)
63/ In addition, the FEMA witnesses could not recall any other exercise in which the ; fact that emergency workers had been asked to simulate KI ingestion had been an-nounced to the media at the ENC. Tr. 8564 (Baldwin. Keller, Kowieski). 4
-144-Ability to Answer Questions and Provide Information (EX 38.J. M. N) 370. These contentions allege that LERO ENC personnel were unable to answer questions or provide information on cer'tain subjects (EX 38.J and M),N and that when information was provided, LERO personnel " frequently misstated facts and provided inaccurate information"(EX 38.N).
371. During the Exercise, LILCO and LERO held seven joint press conferences between 8:40 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., lasting at least two hours. LlLCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 9, A tt. P.W Approximately 100 reporters and their staffs were j present at the ENC at any given time, with a total of about 200 over the course of the day. Tr. 3751-54 (Robinson). Included among the reporters present were representa-tives of most local and New York City television channels, the New Yor>c Times, the Washington Post, Newsday, local newspapers, and Long Island radio stations. Tr. 3751-52 (McCaffrey, Robinson). FEMA found that the ENC press briefings "provided re-quested information and answered questions presented by media representatives." FEMA EX Exh.1 at 53. 372. The ENC press conferences were videotaped; a transcript of the tapes was entered into the record. S_ee e LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at Att. P. We have rev!ewed the transcript and the parties' testimony on tnese contentions, and
$_7/ Contention EX 38.J alleges that during press conferences LERO personnel (1) could not satisfactorily answer questions about evacuation, (2) were unable to provide any information to the media on traffic conditions, conditions on the water portion of the EPZ, or protective actions for the correctional f acility in the EPZ, (3) were unable to answer questions about manpower at bridges and tunnels on evacuation routes and the activities of the Nassau County police, and (4) were unable to contact Marketing Evaluations, Inc., in a timely manner. Contention EX 38.M alleges that LERO ENC per-sonnel could not answer questions about the fuel truck impediment at the 1:48 press conference.
63/ LERO also made one LERO-only announcement, at around 10:35, to inform the press of the first evacuation recommendation. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39. ff. Tr. 3207, at 9: Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 83.
-145-conclude that the allegations in the contentions are not borne out by the r "rd. More-over, we agree with the LILCO witnesses that even if a few of the answers given were indeed incomplete or insufficient or could be improved in some way, as Interveners sug-gest, they do not support a conclusion that the entire LERO/LILCO press conference operation is fundamentally flawed. See LILCO Te.st. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, l at 37.
373. Specifically, with respect to EX 38.J, tht:. record shows that the LERO Spokesperson answered numerous questions relating to evacuation, and provided infor-mation about evacuation activities on the land and water portions of the EPZ. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 38-39, Att. Q. The Spokesperson also gave ad- ! equate answers to the questions about bridges and tunnels in Nassau County and the protective actions being taken for local correctional facilities. Id. at 39-42. FEMA witnesses testified that, overall, LERO personnel responded satisf actorily to questions about the evacuation. Tr. 7842-43 (Keller). Finally, with regard to Marketing Evalua-tions Inc.,N LILCO witnesses testified that participation by that firm was simulated by LILCO personnel or contractors, and that difficulty in contacting the simulators was experienced only once. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 42-43; Tr. 3561 (Robinson). Marketing Evaluations was not expected to participate in the Exercise be-cause the sirens were not to be sounded. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 42-43. 6_9/ The FEh1A witnesses were not aware of any bridges or tunnels on the evacuation routes that require manpower. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 42. 10/ LERO employs Marketing Evaluations, Inc., to determine by means of telephone surveys which sirens, if any, have f ailed, and to confirm that EPZ residents havs evacu-ated. Tr. 3560 (Robinson). FEM A witnesses testified that "since the sirens were not ac-tivated during the exercise there was no reason to evaluate the performance of Market- q ing Evaluations, Inc.." FEM A EX Exh. 5 at 42. I l l i i _ _____ ____ _ _ -______-_____ a
1
-146-374. In regard to EX 38.M, the record does not support Interveners' allegation that the LERO Spokesperson was unable to provide any information or answer questions about the fuel truck impediment. See Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 97. Although the Spokesperson did not know specific details about the truck's condition, sucil as whether there had been a fuel spill, she did tell the press the information that was most impor-tant for public health and safety, M, that the truck was broken down and was blocking the road at that point, and that traf fic was being diverted around it. .LILCO Test. Cont.
EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 44-45. . 375. Finally, we agree with LILCO that EX 38.N concerns three isolated mis-statements singled out of a great mass of information disseminated during the Exercise, and that the misstatements did not involve essential information. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 46. We find that the examples of LERO's alleged "fre-quent" misstatements of fact cited in EX 38.N E are too inconsequential to arouse se-rious concern. 376. Intervenor witnesses testified generally that during Exercise press confer-ences LILCO conveyed to reporters an impression of evasiveness and ignorance of unfolding events. Evans e_t a_1., ff. Tr. 3786, at 97. The witnesses stated that the ENC Spokespersons of ten did not have at their fingertips information that the press would expect them to have. Ld. at 98-99. While it is true that the Spokespersons sometimes did not have certain details, and promised to "get back to" the reporters,N we do not L1/ In particular, FEMA witnesses testified that the one-time misstatement about when the Site Area Emergency had been declared (a four minute discrepancy between the actual declaration time and the time announced by LILCO)"would have no measur-able and practical impact on the overall effectiveness of (the] ENC." FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 45; s!Le LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 45-46. Dr. Mileti agreed. Ld. at 46. l 12 / Interveners attempted on cross-examination to point out other misstatements by the LERO Spokesperson, e.g., concerning the wind shif t. Tr. 3565-69 (Robinson). The Spokeperson's statements on the wind shif t were shown to be largely correct. Ld. 13/ For example, at one point a reporter asked at what speed the evacuees were traveling. The LERO Spokesperson replied that she did not have that specific informa-(footnote continued) I
.______________ _ _j
-147-l believe tnat either LERO or LILCO conveyed an impression of evasiveness, deceipt, or ignorance.
Hard Copy EBS Messages (EX 38 F) 377. Contention EX 38.F alleges that copies of EBS messages provided to report-ers at the ENC contained extraneous information that should have been deleted, and thus were unclear, confusing, and inconsistent with radio broadcasts. The FEMA Re-port says only that some copies contained extraneous information which should be omitted to avoid possible confusion. FEMA EX Exh. I at 54. The FEMA witnesses agreed with LILCO that the hard copy EBS messages were sufficiently clear and that no evidence exists that anyone was actually confused by.them. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 38; j LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 27; Tr. 7809 (Keller). Further, the FEMA witnesses testified that they were unaware of any inconsistencies between hard copy EBS messages and radio broadcasts. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 38. LERO no longer plans to distribute the hard copy EBS messages to the media. LILCO's Test. Cont. EX 38 and ' 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 27. We find that the record does not support the allegations in EX 38.F. Inaccurate Information in ENC Log (EX 38.L) 378. Contention EX 38.L alleges that an ENC log contained inaccurate informa-tion that, if released, would have misled the public. Specifically, EX 38.L says that the log recorded at 12:01El that the gravel truck impediment was being removed, when in fact it was not yet being removed. I _ 1 i (continued from previous page) k tion but would get it later. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at Att. ! Q.3. Mr. Patterson testified that such responses are acceptable to reporters as long as i LILCO and LERO did not lie or willfully withhold information from them. Tr. 3361-63 (Patterson). B/ LILCO witnesses testified, and the log in question showed, that the referenced entry was at 12:11 not 12:01.
-148-379. The contention itself says that this information was not released to the public. Obviously, no harm would have occurred as a result of a piece of information that went no further than a staff member's log. Even if it had been released at that time, however, LILCO witnesses testified that it would have had only a negligible ef-feet on public safety, because there were LERO Traffic Guides at the scene f facilitating traffic flow around the accident. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 44; Tr. 3563 (Mileti).
380. Litigation of this contention and of EX 38.J did, however, raise a more ge-l neric question about the sufficiency of the ENC's information sources. The LERO Spokesperson obviously experienced some difficulty in providing information ahuut the traffic impediments. S_!te Tr. 3538-39 (Robinson) and our discussion of EX 38.M, supra. Whereas LILCO and FEMA witnesses attributed this difficulty to problems experienced by those EOC and field personnel actually dealing with the impediments, Tr. 3539 (Rob-inson); FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 43, Interveners' counsel attributed it to the ENC's lack of di-I rect information ties to the field. Tr. 3548-49, 3558 (Letsche). 381. The ENC does not have direct communication links with Traffic Guides or the staging areas; LERO ENC personnel get their information from the EOC and LILCO ENC personnel get their information from the EOF and TSC. Tr. 3548-52, 3559 (Daverio, Robinson). Public Information staff at the EOC can glean field information by monitoring the Traffic Guides' radio frequency, although it is not apparent that the , l staff is aware of this capability. Tr. 3549 (Daverio), 3551 (Robinson). ' 382. The question raised in our minds is whether it is sufficient for LERO ENC i personnel to receive their field information through the EOC instead of directly from l the field. The record shows that during the Exercise the LERO Spokesperson was un-able to discuss fully the traffic impediments because her source -- the EOC -- had in-complete information on that subject. This dependence upon the EOC for field i 1 i i
-149-information might cause us serious concern if it caused chronic lapses in information available at the ENC. The record, however, shows no such chronic lapses or shortages of information. The impediment information gaps appear to be isolated instances at- ]
tributable to the acknowledged problems in handling the impediments themselves. Ac-cordingly, we do.not believe that these events demonstrate a fundamental flaw in ENC procedures or capabilities, and therefore find for LILCO on EX 38.L. Media Monitoring (EX 38.0) l 383. Contention EX 38.0 alleges a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO press releases 4 and 5 were received at the ENC at 8:45 and 9:05, respectively, but were not given to LILCO's Media Monitoring personnel until 9:31. 384. Media monitoring is part of LILCO's (onsite) Rumor Control organization. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 47. Media Monitoring personnel moni-tor and tape radio and television coverage of the emergency, and note any instances in which media reports are inaccurate or inconsistent with LERO and LILCO statements. Id. Media Monitors use LILCO news releases as an information source, along with LERO 1 l news releases, EBS messages, and the press conferences. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 47-48; Tr. 3593-95 (McCaffrey, Robinson). If inconsistencies or inaccuracies in media reports are discovered, the LERO or LILCO spokespersons (or News Manager) make corrective announcements to the press at the ENC. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 47: Tr. 3595-96 (McCaffrey, Robinson). 385. LILCO witnesses advanced several reasons for their view that it is not sig-nificant that Media Monitors did not receive LILCO news releases 4 and 5 sooner. First, the media monitors had other sources of LERO- and LILCO generated 15/ Under new procedures, Media Monitors will no longer receive hard copy text of the EBS messages. They will receive the new summary information sheets, in addition to the LERO and LILCO news releases and press conferences that they already can use. Tr. 3594-95 (McCaf frey, Robinson).
-150-Information available to them. That is, they could have listened to the EBS broadcasts and press conferences for the latest information. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff.
Tr. 3207, at 48. There are radios and closed-circuit monitors in their area for that pur-pose. I_d.; es_ee Tr. 3754-55 (Daverio). In any case, the LILCO witnesses testified, the news releases contain mostly technicalinformation about plant conditions that is not of utmost concern or significance to the public in terms of their making protective action decisions. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 48. 386. We find that Interveners have not established a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in EX 38.0. Had there been a real emergency, the Media Monitors would have been able to perform their functions using the broadcast EBS messages and live press conferences as their source of LERO and LILCO information. Moreover, they would also be taping the media reports, so even if the monitors themselves did not know which media information was inaccurate, the LERO and LILCO public information per-sonnel supervising them would have known.E! Subseauent Plan Improvements (EX 38.Q)E 387. Contention EX 38.Q criticizes a few of the improvements LILCO has made to its ENC operation subsequent to the Exercise, namely, the new summary sheet pro-cedures and copying machine reinforcements.E This contention has no merit. Since we have found no fundamental flaws arising out of ENC activities, there is obviously no H/ We note also that delays in distributing LILCO news releases stemmed from the same copy machine problems that delayed distribution of LERO news releases and EBS messages. Tr. 3472 (McCaffrey). LILCO's fixes to the copy machine problem should therefore improve the flow of LILCO news releases as well. H/ Contention EX 38.P concerns Rumor Control. Our findings on EX 39 dispose of i the issue raised in EX 38.P. H/ EX 38.Q also criticizes LILCO's " proposal to add an extra LERO spokesperson at the ENC." LILCO explained that the procedure does not add a LERO spokesperson but ; merely formalizes the title of the existing spokesperson. ,S_ee LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 l and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 50. i
-151-need to determine the adequacy of LILCO's improvements. In any case, however, it seems self-evident that the addition of three copy machines as backups to the two dedi-cated ENC copiers, and the other copying enhancements LILCO has made, can only bol-ster the reliability and capacity of LILCO's ENC copying capability. See LILCO Test.
Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 23-25; s_e_e also our discussion on EX 38.D, supra. Although Interveners dispute whether the copier f ailure was the sole cause of time lags in distributing hard copy information, Evans ej al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 77, LILCO's improve-ments in this area give us reasonable assurance that any copying-related ENC problems have been resolved. l l 388. As to the summary sheet issue, LILCO witnesses testified that its new sum-mary sheets are not a substitute for news releases but a supplement to them. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 2207, at 50. Reporters at the ENC will still receive full LERO news releases, which mirror the EBS messages; the procedure change is that l now the reporters receive one-page summaries of the latest emergency information (usually taken directly from EBS messages) in advance of receiving the regular hard copy news releases. Ld.: see also id. at 21. Interveners' apparent concern that LILCO now gives the media less information instead of more is unfounded.EI B. Rumor Control (EX 39. A-C] 389. Interveners allege in Contention EX 39 that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed because LILCO's Rumor Control personnel consistently had outdated information (EX 38.A), responded too GJowly to simulated inquiries from the public (EX 38.B), and h were unable to answer public inquiries accurately or with reasonable advice or informa-tion (EX 38.C). For the reasons stated below, we reject these allegations. D/ LILCO witness Robinson testified that reporters at the ENC still receive the same information, although they get less paper. Tr. 3509 (Robinson). 1 I
-152-390. LILCO's Rumor Control network is headquartered in the ENC, with person-l nel in each of LILCO's eleven District Offices and four Customer Service Call Boards. I LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 52.N LII CO instructs members of the public to call any of the District Offices or Call Boards with their questions during an f I
emergency; if the Rumor Control personnel at those offices cannot answer the ques-tions they forward them up an established chain of command to the ENC, and if neces-sary, the EOC (for LERO-related matters) or onsite facilities (for LILCO matters) for i answers, l_d. at 52-56. Although Rumor Control personnel answer every inquiry re-ceived, the main function of Rumor Control is to spot potential rumors (usually indi-cated by two or more questions on the same topic) and dispel them with corrective an-nouncements at the ENC. Ida at 51-56. 391. Contention EX 39.A cites five instances in which LILCO's District Offices and Call Boards had superseded information. Intervenor witnesses contend that if the media or the public called LILCO's Rumor Control network and got outdated informa-tion then there would be an increase in the circulation of rumors and the development of confusion and fear which would damage LILCO's credibility. Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 121-25. LILCO witnesses called two of the examples in EX 39.A misleading, j because they concern receipt of information by the District Offices or Call Boards be-fore they were even required to be activated. LILCO attributed the other three exam-ples to the copier failures at the ENC which prevented prompt copying and telecopying of news releases and EBS messages to all offices. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. l Tr. 3207, at 58-60. Dr. Mileti testified that even if the Exercise had been a real emer- , l I l l gency, this problem would have had little impact on the public health and safety be-cause of the overriding effect of the EBS system. Id. at 60. As we discussed above in i jl0/ Rumor Control is an onsite function run exclusively by LILCO personnel. LILCO ! Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39 ff. Tr. 3207, at 52. l 1 ------_--a
1
-153-1 our findings on Contention EX 38, the copying-related failures illustrated in EX 39 do l l
not show a fundamental flaw in the Plan because they stem from easily correctable me- j chanical breakdowns, and LILCO has corrected them. l 392. Contention EX 39.B alleges that LILCO took too long to respond to public in-quiries, and cites 13 examples (out of 35 inquiries) in which responses took from 18 to 58 minutes. Intervenor witnesses attributed the delays to the rigidity and inefficiency inherent in LILCO's " cumbersome system" for responding to public inquiries. Evans et g., ff. Tr. 3786, at 128. Callers would not wait for responses during a real emergency, Intervenor witnesses testified; they would ignore LILCO's instructions and act on their pre-existing fears instead.W Id. at 129-30,138. LILCO witnesses, however, testified i that Rumor Control's responses were timely, emphasizing accuracy over speed, and that the timeliness of response depends on the nature of the information sought in the question. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 61. FEMA witnesses agreed that accuracy of response is more important than immediacy of response. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 51. We find that LILCO responded to public inquiries within an acceptable time period given the overriding need for accuracy and the diverse nature of the f actu-al information sought. 393. Contention EX 39.C alleges that Rumor Control personnel provided insecu-rate and unreasonable advice or information to the public. In addition, Intervenor wit-nesses testified that LILCO's corrective measures (copier fixes, use of TSO computer and summary sheets) have not corrected this problem. Evans et a_1., ff. Tr. 3786, at 135-38. LILCO witnesses disputed the facts in five of the seven examples in EX 39.C (subparts 1,11, iv, y, and vil), saying that either the f acts are wrong or that the advice , al/ Intervenor witnesses testified that members of the public would cali LILCO for information, but would not wait even 15 minutes for a response. Evans et M., ff. Tr. 3786, at 138. In the Board's opinion, if the " simplest question" is worth calling LILCO for, the answer would be worth waiting for as well.
-154-given was proper. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 65-69. LILCO wit-nesses conceded that the information given in the remaining two examples (subparts ill and vi) was out-of-date but blamed the copter breakdowns at the ENC for that problem.
Ld. at 68-70.N They added that subsequent improvements have corrected this problem. We find that the relatively minor problems set forth in Part C stem from the same > copter failures that we have already held do not constitute a fundamental flaw and which, in any case, have been sufficiently corrected. 394. FEMA's Deficiency for the ENC rested in part on Rumor Control problems, i See FEMA EX Exh. I at 53. FEMA witnesses testified that Rumor Control personnel l l I could not adequately answer questions in some instances because they-had not received accurate up-to-date information, a result of the ENC copier f ailures. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 47; Tr. 7882 (Baldwin), 7906 (Keller). But the FEMA witnesses also testified that many of the cited Rumor Control problems are " exercise artifacts;" in a real emergency the EBS messages would have been broadcast, allowing the District Offices and Call Boards access to that information in real time. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 50. FEMA witness-es testified that LILCO's Rumor Control system " functioned as des'igned in the plan." Ld. at 51, 395. The Board concludes that Contention EX 39 does not demonstrate a funda- i mental flaw in the LILCO Plan. The minor problems that did exist in Rumor Control were caused primarily by the broken copiers and LILCO has given us reasonable assur- ! ance that they have been sufficiently corrected. Even without the corrections, howev- ! er, the problems do not rise to the level of a fundamental flaw given the overriding 8_2/ The FEMA witnesses testified that in three of the seven examples (1.11, v) the response given was appropriate: in one example (111) that it is irrelevant that the re- , sponse was out-of-date; in two examples (iv, vi) that responses were out-of-date be- ) cause of the copier f ailure; and in the final example (vii) that, assuming certain f acts disputed by LILCO, the response was inappropriate. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 52-54. s 1 l
._________-__________w
4 7
-155-I importance of the EBS system in providing necessary information to the public. LILCO !
has adequately demonstrated that it has " coordinated arrangements for dealing with ru-mors." See NUREG-0654 S II. G.4.C. C. Shadow Phenomenon (EX 22.F: 40.C: 44: 49.CJ 390. In the remaining contentions consolidated with EX 38 and 39, Interveners l l ' assert that due to the alleged deficiencies described in Contentions EX 38 and 39, there would be a substantial shadow evacuation that would further hinder LILCO's ability to carry out its Plan. ) 397. In the planning phase of this litigation, the Licensing Board heard extensive testimony on shadow phenomenon, including sociological data on human behavior in emergencies and several public opinion polls taken on Long Island by Interveners and offered in support of their assertion that people would evacuate even when it was not recommended that they do so. The Licensing Board concluded that (1)"a rational public will behave predominantly in accordance with public information that is disseminated at the time an emergency happens," PID at 670, and (2) that public opinion polls "have i no literal predictive validity because the residents of Suffolk and Nassau Counties do not now have that additional information [that would become available at the time of an accident] that respondents would need to determine their actions in En emergency." PID at 667t see PID at 655-71. In its concluding Partial Initial Decision, the Licensing Board held that LILCO had given adequate consideration to the evacuation shadow phenomenon in its emergency planning process so .j that the LILCO evacuation plan for Shoreham is technically adequate in that respect if implemented as LILCO has out-lined. But the Board's finding to that effect depends on there being clear, nonconflicting notice and instructions to the pub-lic at the time of an accident. If confused or conflicting in-formation were disseminated at the time of an accident the evacuation and protective actions planned for could be jeop-ardized. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _a
-156-Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-31,22 NRC 410, 429 (1985). LERO's performance during the Exercise does not lead us to alter these conclusions.
398. Interveners argue that our conclusions should be modified for several rea-sons. First, they point to the alleged inaccuracies and inconsistencies cited in Conten-tions EX 38 and 39 for support that LERO did not disseminate clear, consistent infor-mation as promised and therefore that shadow phenomenon would result. For the , reasons discussed in detailin this Decision on Contentions EX 38 and 39, we do not con-sider the cited examples individually or in aggregate to rise to the level of inconsistent information that would adversely affect the ability to implement the Plan as written. We find that, taken as a whole, the emergency information disseminated (simulated) during the Exercise was accurate, clear, and consistent. 399. Second, Interveners submitted a new public opinion poll to support their as-sertion that the Exercise information, if disseminated to the public, would cause a large shadow. Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 152-66, Att.14. Interveners' based the questions in the poll on the information contained in the Exercise EBS messages. Ld. at 153-54; Tr. 3788-90 (Cole). We admitted the poll into evidence, over LILCO's and NRC Staff's objections, to consider whether the poll reflected emergency information such that the results could be used in predicting likely shadow, and to consider whether the poll could be used to gauge potential public confusion from the text of the EBS messages. See Memorandum and Order (Ruling on LILCO's and Staff's Motions to Strike Suffolk Coun-ty's Testimony on Contentions EX 38, EX 39, EX 22.F, EX 44, EX 40.C, and EX 49.C), at 4-5 ( April 17,1987); Tr. 3190 (Judge Shon). 400. We conclude from the record developed that the survey submitted by Inter-venors does not adequately reflect either the full emergency information that would be disseminated during an emergency or the language of the EBS messages used by LERO i
-157-during the Exercise. We note in particular that Intervenor witness Cole, who authored and administered the poll, conceded that the survey questions did not repeat the full i
text of the EBS messages. Evans el a_1., ff. Tr. 3786 at 154; Tr. 3806-07,3809 (Cole). In i fact, Dr. Cole testified that he " cleaned up" the EBS messages considerably, excising l l portions that he believed were confusing, unnecessary, or repetitive. See Tr. 3809, l i 3846-48 (Cole). As a result, Dr. Cole admitted, "you can't tell from the survey whether { there are inconsistencies in the messages." Tr. 3857 (Cole). Consequently, the survey cannot accurately reflect whether members of the public would actually find the EBS messages clear or confusing, consistent or inconsistent. Since the poll sheds no light on the issue it was admitted to enlighten, we give it no weight. 401. Third, Interveners submitted " focus group" transcripts to support their as-sertions that (1) the te:.t of the EBS messages would confuse the public, and (2) that people would not follow LERO's recommendations in an emergency. See, e.g., Evans e_1 al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 172-77,194-97, 201-04. We reject the focus group testimony as unreliable. We agree with LILCO witnesses that it is just as inappropriate to use focus group interviews to predict behavior as it is to use polls for that purpose. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 75-77. In addition, af ter exploring on cross-examination the inconsistencies in the various transcripts made from the tapes of In-tervenors' focus group interviews, Intervenor witness Cole stated in response to a Board question that "in analyzing [the focus group transcripts], it's very useful to be there which is why I did the moderation myself, because it is hard to follow and to know which person is which. And, the only easy way to do it is if you are there." Tr. 3935 i' (Cole). Dr. Cole also admitted that there was no way to precisely determine the accu-racy of the focus group results. Tr. 3942 (Cole). Given these qualifications, we decline to give the focus group testimony any weight.
-158- )
In Contention EX 40.C, Interveners allege that LERO's fif th and succeeding EBS messages were f alse because they said that LERO Traffic Guides were in place to f acili-tate the evacuation, when in fact they were not, and that this would have increased' l shadow evacuation. See Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 241-48. LILCO witnesses testified that these EBS messages were not false and misleading, and that Interveners were mis-interpreting LERO's mobilization strategy, the basic goal of which is to have Traffic' Guides at their posts about one hour af ter evacuation is first recommended. LILCO j Test. . Cont. EX 38 and 39, ff. Tr. 3207, at 70-71; s_ee Tr. 3713-16 (Daverio, Mileti). FEMA suggested that the referenced EBS messages "should be reworded to include statements to the effect that Traffic Guides are being dispatched to assist evacuation
' traffic." FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 70. We find that these messages do carry a slight poten-tial for confusing the public, but that the effect of any such confusion would not be great. We direct LILCO to reword the messages as FEMA suggests; FEMA and the Staff should confirm that these corrections have been made.
- l. 402. Finally, in Contention EX 49.C, Interveners allege there would be a sub-stantial " monitoring shadow," Le a , a large number of persons voluntarily reporting to reception centers for monitoring despite not having been advised to do so, based upon
- the same survey and focus group data discussed above in connection with shadow evac-uation. We reject this contention for the same reasons we rejected Contentions EX 22.F and 44.
X. TRAINING (EX 50) 403. Contention EX 50 consists of nine subparts (A-I) which allege, by reference to other contentions and portions of the FEMA Report, that the Exercise revealed a large number of training flaws.O Indeed the contention states that " virtually every M/ The alleged training-related problems in EX 42 were subsumed in EX 50, and the bases for EX 45 were consolidated with EX 50. Contention EX 23, concerning a 21/2 (footnote continued) i
-159-error made by a LILCO player during the exercise involved to some degree a failure of the LILCO training program to prepare personnel adequately to perform necessary ac-tions." The contention also alleges that changes made to the procedures and training program will not eliminate the problems exhibited during the Exercise.
404. At issue in Contention EX 50 is whether the alleged problems with training establish a systemic problem or pattern of defects with the LERO training program rather than a group of isolated, independent problems.W To establish a systemic prob-lem or pattern of defects with the training program, the incidents must be attributable to a training failure, not to a f ailure of procedures or equipment,E and a similar prob-1 lem m'tst be repeated with sufficient frequency to ensure that it is due to defective training rather than to human error or chance. One, or even a few, similar events,
)
would not necessarily establish a pattern. . l (continued from previous page) hour delay in correcting an erroneous dose data announcement, was not separately ad-mitted but was considered under EX 50.C. Contentions EX 27 and 28, concerning the familiarity of ambulance /ambulette and school bus drivers with dosimetry and proce-dures for K1 usage and excess exposure authorization, were not separately admitted but were dealt with under EX 50.H. 8_4/ Intervenor witness Rowan agreed with LILCO, LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 12-13, 32, Att. B; Tr. 5019-22, 5028, 5035 (Lindell), that one must look to see whether there are similarities in alleged problems before one can assess whether they demonstrate a training inadequacy. Tr. 6611 (Rowan). Intervenor witness Zook dis-agreed. Tr. 6563 (Zook). 8_5/ We reject Interveners' position that equipment failures and procedural failures indicate a flaw in a training program. S_ee e LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 12-13, A tt. B; Tr. 5005-06 (Lindell), 8290 (Baldwin); contra SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50) at 87-91; Tr. 6526-27 (Colwell). Our finding that there is no fundamental flaw in the training program rests only in small part on this distinction; more significantly, In-tervenors have not presented us with an analysis that demonstrates there was any pat-tern of defects.
-160- j l
-405. Interveners sought to show this alleged pattern of defects by citing a litany of Exercise incidents pulled primarily from the FEMA Report,L6/ ncluding i problems with equipment and procedures, SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50)'at 87-91; Tr.
6526-27 (Colwell), and asking us to conclude that this demonstrates a fundamental flaw
.in the LERO training program. Interveners have indeed pointed to many specific fail-ures of LERO personnel, equipment and procedures. But, like the Licensing Board in the quality assurance litigation, we will not "become involved in a ' numbers game' of l counting beans of different colors" in reviewing the examples of training problems relied on by Interveners. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57,18 NRC 445, 579 (1983). We have focused on the overall perfor-mance of LERO.b! Our perception is that it has not been perfect, but perfect perfor-mance is not expected in any drill, exercise or emergency, and is not necessary for an effective response. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 7-8; Tr. 6431 (Perrow). Experience has shown that emergency organizations accomplish their objec-tives during an emergency despite poor performance on the part of some individuals.
See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 8,10-11.b 86/ Interveners' litany also included incidents not even noted by FEMA. Tr. 6526 (Colwell). 81/ In assessing LERO's performance we were mindful that LERO successfully notified and mobilized all LILCO-employed field personnel (approximately 1000 field workers), a full complement of EOC, Staging Area, and Reception Center personnel, and a substantial number of ambulance company personnel. This is markedly different from other exercises where only a fraction of the total emergency work force is.mobi-lized for FEMA evaluation. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 7: Tr. 4465-68, 4471 (Daverio), 4468-70 (Goodkind), 8491 (Kowieski). The notification and mobilization of the entire organization, and FEMA's opportunity to choose, at random, any member of the organization to evaluate, made the February 13 Exercise an extremely realistic test of LERO's ability to respond to an emergency. I_d.; see also Tr. 8491-92 (Baldwin, Keller, Kowleski). Despite the f act that so many people were mobilized for evaluation, only an average number of errors were found by FEMA. Tr. 8534-36 (Keller, Kowieski), 8719-21 (Keller). L8/ The sociological literature is replete with examples of multi-organizational net-works which emerged ad hoc in response to an emergency and which accomplished (footnote continued) i I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ 1
-161-406. In assessing the effectiveness of the LERO training program, we agree with LILCO and FEMA that the appropriate unit of analysis is organizational performance not individual performance.b See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 11; Tr.
4979-80 (Lindell, Mileti), 8536-38 (Baldwin, Keller). For the reasons discussed, we find that, overall, the LERO organization effectively performed its function on the day of the Exercise, that LERO could effectively achieve its goals in a radiological emergen-cy, and that the LERO training program was not fundamentally flawed. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 7; Tr. 4986-88 (Lindell);N see also Tr. 8314-16, 8534-36 (Kowleski). 407. Interveners' testimony and cross-examination have not controverted our conclusions and opinions.W We have acute reservations concerning Dr. Perrow's , (continued from previous page) their overall objectives without specialized training. Tr. 4501-07 (Lindell); s_e_e also Tr. 6405 (Perrow). In response to the derailment of a traic containing hazardous materials, an ad hoc emergency response organization was developed in Mississauga, Ontario, f rom municipal authorities, police officials at the provincial and municipal level, and nursing homes; it managed to evacuate effectively approximately 250,000 people. Tr. 4501-06 (Lindell). 89/ To the extent that the observable behaviors are at the individual level, one has io look a't individual behavior to draw conclusions about the ability of an organization to accomplish its tasks, functions and goals. Tr. 4979 (Mileti), 4980, 4693-94 (Lindell, Mileti). In some instances a collection of individud performance errors could be the result of inadequate training, but might also be attributable to equipment problems, materials problems, or procedure problems. Tr. 4983, 4992-95 (Lindell, Mileti). M/ Dr. Lindell concluded af ter reviewing the videotapes, workbooks, and other training materials and the performance of LERO personnel on the day of the Exercise, that there could not be a fundamental flaw in the LERO training program. Tr. 4516 (Lindell). M/ We note that Interveners chose not to differentiate among their witnesses as to the sponsors of each answer. Accordingly, as we indicated during voir dire of Interve-nors' witness panel, Tr. 6358, we gave no weight to the testimony of the witnesses who have no expertise on the matters being discussed. Messrs. Rowan and Evans are ex-perts in media relations, but Dr. Colwell and Dr. Perrow are not. Tr. 6255 (Colwell), 6285 (Perrow). Dr. Perrow, Mr. Rowan and Mr. Evans have no expertise in traffic di-(footnote continued)
- - - ________- ___ ~
-162-testimony. Dr. Perrow's academic qualifications in sociology, especially in the area of organizational structure and theory, are beyond reproach. .However, Dr. Perrow virtu-ally conceded a bias against nuclear power plants in general and Shoreham in partico-lar. Specifically, Dr. Perrow stated his belief that all nuclear power plants in the U.S.
- including Shoreham - are inherently unsafe, Tr. 6365-66, 6368 (Perrow), and that even the best emergency organization is not good enough to handle the " inherent haz-
[ ards" of some ofganized activities, including those associated with nuclear plants, Tr. l 6370. (Perrow). Finally, when asked whether he had ever evaluated a trainirig program before, Dr. Perrow replied "not in such a way as to be relevant to a program of this sort." Tr. 6283 (Perrow). Accordingly, we have given limited weight to Dr. Perrow's testimony. A. Contention EX 50 Subparts 408. Close examination of the Contention EX 50 subparts reveals that Interve-nors rely on basically three incidents - the impediments, the ENC. and Rumor Control
- to support their allegation that the LERO training program is fundamentally flawed.
Rather than address these incidents repeatedly under each subpart, we deal with them once. Our conclusions here apply to all subparts of Contention EX 50.E l l 1 i (continued from previous page) rection and rerouting. Tr. 6275, 6285 (Perrow), 6327 (Rowan), 6594 (Evans). Inspector Cosgrove's and Mr. Zook's area of expertise is law enforcement training. Tr. 6302-04, ', 6772 (Cosgrove), 6340 (Zook). None of Interveners' witnesses, except Mr. Zook, had any training in radiation exposure control or the use of dosimetry. Tr. 6255 (Colwell),6275, 6285 (Perrow), 6299-6300 (Streeter), 6304-05 (Cosgrove), 6327-28 (Rowan), 6594 (Evans). M/ The impediments are relied on to support Contentions EX 50.A, B. C, D, and E. Contentions EX 50.A B, C, E, and F look to Rumor Control and the ENC for support.
-163-I Traffic Impediments j 409. Intervenor witnesses testified, without considering all of the evidence on Contention EX 41, that LERO's response to the traffic impediments was inadequate and untimely because LERO personnel f ailed to communicate information about the im- ,
pediments to other LERO personnel, to request specific information about the impedi-ments, to explore alternatives for verifying the existence of the impediments, to exer-l cise prompt judgment regarding what kind of equipment to deploy to clear the impediments, to send adequate equipment to the impediments,W and to consult with persons familiar with the roads in the area of the impediments to develop a proper rerouting scheme. These mistakes, in Interveners' view, were the result of inadequate training for dealing with unanticipated and unrehearsed events, communicating infor-mation, following procedures, and exercising good, independent judgment. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 61-68,104-10,127,152-53. LILCO witnesses agreed that the response to the impediments could have been better, but testified that the problems ! were largely the result of one individual's f ailings and the low fidelity simulation of the impediments by FEMA. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 36-38; se_e LILCO_ Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 19-21. 410. The two traffic impediments were fully litigated under Contention EX 41. See Findings on EX 41, supra. All that is relevant here is the implication (if any) of LERO's response to the impediments on its training progr, m. We found, in the context of Contention EX 41, that LERO's response to the two traffic impediments was general-ly adequate; once the LERO players verified the existence of the impediments, they 93/ Interveners admitted that they had reviewed only their own prefiled testimony on Contention EX 41, Tr. 6689-90 (Zook),6683 (Cosgrove); that testimony did not pro-vide a fully accurate picture of the impediments, see Tr. 1141-42 (Roberts. McGuire). jL4/ In our opinion, the equipment sent to the impediments was not p_er e se inade-quate, see Findings on EX 41, supra. i
-164-responded appropriately with a rerouting scheme and equipment to remove the impedi-ments. See Findings on EX 41, supra; LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 36-39; :
see also Tr. 8252 (Keller). We also found that the inadequacies in LERO's performance in the Exercise were largely a result of poor performance by a single individual (the Evacuation Route Coordinator) whose fallings then affected other aspects of LERO's response. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 36-38; LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 19-21; Tr. 5547-51 (Weismantle). 411. Interveners'. allegations of training problems relate primarily to the Evacu-ation Route Coordinator's failure to communicate information about the impediments l to his superiors ar,d co-workers and his failure to communicate all information about the traffic impediments to field personnel. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 64, 105-108. 127. The unrealistic means FEMA used to introduce and simulate the impedi-ments also caused problems which Interveners attribute to poor training; we find that FEMA's simulation not poor training hampered LERO players in their efforts to identify and send e julpment to respond to the impediments. See Findings on EX 41, suora; LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 37; Tr. 5497-98 (Daverio, Weismantle); s_ee e also Tr. 6686-87 (Zook). 412. Although neither the Plan nor LERO training specifically addressed severe impediments that block entire roadways, the Evacuation Route Coordinator failed to follow the intent of the LILCO PlanN and showed poor judgment when he did not communicate the information about the impediments to his superiors and co-workers. We would be concerned about the training of LERO personel, absent the ability to deal with unexpected traffic impediments exhibited by the remainder of the traffic group at M/ The Evacuation Route Coordinator's actions were not inconsistent with his pro-cedures, which required him to verify accidents; he just failed to appreciate the severity of the accident and its consequences. Tr. 5549 (Weismantle); but see Tr. 966-67 (Wilm).
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-165-EOC, who attempted to verify the existence of impediments with Route Spotters and Transfer Point Coordinators, developed and implemented a rerouting scheme, promptly dispatched Road Crews, requested aid from the Miller Place Fire Department and Hess Oil, and contacted LILCO's Traffic Engineeer, who exhibited encyclopedic knowledge of ,
l the roadways, to confirm the logic of the rerouting scheme, see LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 38-39; LILCO Test. Cont. EX 41, ff. Tr. 272, at 8-19; Tr.1089-92, 2275-86 (Lieberman). In the present context, particularly since there had been no training on respording te mis type of impedimentE we believe that the problems that arose with the impediments were primarily attributable to the actions of one person - the Evacuation Route Coordinator - and were not incilcative of a pervasive failure by LERO workers to follow the Plan and procedures, to communicate necessary and suffi-cient information or to inquire and obtain such information, to exercise good judgment and to deal appropriately with unanticipated and unrehearsed events. The response to the impediments does not exhibit the pattern of defects necessary to demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the LERO training program. g ENC 413. All of Interveners' ENC-related training allegations boil down to Interve-nors' assertion of the primacy of ordinary electronic media (rather than the EBS Sys-tem) the media's role in disseminating emergency pubile information, see SC EX Exh. 95 (Test Cont. EX 50) at 176, n. 67. We have considered and rejected that position in f avor of LILCO's (placing EBS messages above media contacts in importance), which is sup-ported by NRC regulations and FEMA guidance. See Findings on EX 38, suora. Specifi-cally, Interveners allege that the Exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program g/ Indeed, FEMA instructed the few LILCO perronnel who knew that there would be impedinant free play messages not to permit instruction on them, on the theory that the time (a few days before the Exercise) was too close to permit genuine training. Tr. 8229-30, 8538 (Kowieski). ___________________________a
-166- i has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to deal with the media or J otherwise provide timely, accurate, consistent, and non-conflicting information to the public' through the media (EX 50.F). Interveners also allege that the LERO Spokesperson did not deal effectively with the traffic impediment inquiries from' the media as unanticipated and unrehearsed events (EX 50.A); that ENC personnel failed to 1
implement the Plan and procedures (EX 50.B); and the ENC personnel failed to exercise good judgment (EX 50.E). Interveners relied o'n their testimony on EX 38 'to support their allegations. Tr. 6693-94 (Rowan). 414. The LILCO witnesses testified, consistent with their testimony on EX 38, that LERO personnel were able to provide the public with timely, accurate information I at.vut the emergency during tne Exercise. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 5758. FEMA generally agreed. S_e_e Tr. 7823-24 (Keller), 7824-25, 7934 (Kowieski). In' Contention EX 38, we found LERO's approach to media relations sound and agreed with the priority placed on notifying the public first through the EBS System. The actions of LERO personnel at the EOC reflect that approach. See Findings on EX 38, suora. Gen-erally, LERO personnel did provide the public with timely, accurate information. To the extent there were delays in transmitting information to the media at the ENC and to Rumor Control personnel at the ENC, the District Offices, and Call Boards, we agree with FEMA'that they were generally attributable to the malfunctioning copy machines, . i not training. Tr. 7824-25, 7908, 7917-20 (Kowieski); sp also LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 57-58. In short, we find no evidence that LERO's training program has not trained personnel to deal effectively with the media. 415. Interveners' position that the LERO Spokesperson's responses to traffic im-pediments inquiries is indicative of a failure to train LERO personnel to respond to unanticipated and unrehearsed events, SC EX Exh. 95 (Test Cont. EX 50), at 74, n. 41, again reflec .i their view that the ordinary electronic media rather than EBS should be
-167-the primary conduit to the public for timely, precise, and easily understood informa-tion. With respect to the specific charge that the LERO Spokesperson should have used the phone or other means to obtain all the facts pertaining to the impediments that were sought by reporters, Ld., it appears that the Spokesperson did not seek out that level of detail because she deemed it not important to the protection of the public I health and safety. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38, ff. Tr. 3207, at 35-46. As a general 1
rule, the LERO Spokesperson mainteins continual pnone contact with offsite informa- ] tion sources and would be able to obtain information to respund to press inquiries. See 1 Tr. 3530-32, 3544-47 (Patterson, Robinson). We find that the impediments situation does not show the Spokesperson to be inadequately trained to handle unexpected 1 events. 1 416. We also I'nd that ENC personnel did not lack judgment. First, the ENC was ; I activated in a timely manner; therefore, we cannot find that the ENM showed "ex-tremely poor judgment" in waiting for a staff member to arrive before declaring the ENC operational.E Second, the LERO Spokesperson's decision not to inform the media of the full 10 mile evacuation immediately was not a serious problem. The public would have received the important health and safety information in the EBS message, as would the media. The spokesperson's decision in that instance does not demonstrate a fundamental flaw in her judgment or training. See Findings on EX 38, suora. Third, Dr. Brill, an employee of Brookhaven National Laboratories, is not trained by LERO. Tr. 3571-72,3574-75 (McCaffrey, Robinson). His statements, made in his capacity as an in-dependent scientist at the ENC, in no way implicate LERO's training program. Fourth, the copy machine problem is purely an equipment problem, s_e_e 'Ir. 5006 (Lindell), 8285 g/ The ENC is an onsite facility and the Emergency News Manager is an onsite player. Therefore, any de'iciency in his performance does not implicate the LERO training program.
.x
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!(Keller), and, in any case, LERO workers did exercise some independent judgment in at-tempting to resolve.it, although the measures taken were not very successful. Tr. 3471-72 (Robinson). Finally, only some of the EBS messages distributed to the media contained crossed out information. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 38, ff. Tr. 3207, at 26-27. LERO's decision to distribute information to the media through messages they (and FEMA)E believed to be clear, does not affirmatively establish a lack of good judgment in LERO workers.E In short, we agree with LILCO that these examples show nothing-more than that Interveners' judgment differs from the judgment exercised by LERO players at the ENC during the Exercise. In most instances, we find the LERO players' judgment to be reasonable under the circumstances. , 417.- Interveners did not specify which ENC events or activities purportedly demonstrate a failure to follow the Plan and procedures nor does their referenced testi-- mony on Contentions EX 38 and 39.N Obviously, in some Instances Interveners dis-l agree with the judgments made by ENC personnel; however, Interveners did not estab-lish any widespread,'significant failure by ENC personnel to follow procedures. We found no fundamental flaws in EX 38; we find here that the actions criticized in the In-tervenors' testimony on that contention are neither similar nor of sufficient frequency I to support a finding of a fundamental flaw in LERO's training program.
)
M/ FEMA's observer found that the material marked for deletion was clean. Tr. 7809 (Keller), and FEMA found no training problem associated with these messages. Tr. 7919 (Keller). M/ We note, however, LILCO's intent to enhance the training already offered to
' ENC personnel, Tr. 4661-62 (Mileti); we find such efforts laudable.
100/ The referenced EX 38 and 39 testimony centers on late ENC activation, untimely distribution to the press of hard copy EBS messages and news releases, withholding of KI information from the press, inadequate performance by LERO and LILCO spokespersons at press conferences, and Dr. Brill's statements, Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 26-29, 66-79, 81-85, and 91-100; it does not discuss which procedures or Plan provisions LERO personnel allegedly violated or f ailed to follow. Nor could Interveners' training witnesses, when questioned, cite any examples other than their testimony on EX 38 and 39. Tr. 6699 (Evans).
.l
.)
-169-i Rumor Control 418. Interveners' example of LERO responses to rumor control inquiries, does not show that LERO's training is fundamentally inadequate. Rumor Controlis an onsite operation, and personnel are trained by LILCO's onsite organization. See Tr. 3605 (McCaffrey), 6695-(Evans); pe_e also findings on EX 39, supra. The performance of Rumor Control does not reflect on LERO training. Moreover, as the record on Conten-tion EX 39 shows,E! the Rumor Control system functioned well and appropriate re-
' sponses were given within a reasonable time frame, except for a few instances in which responses were out-of-date because of malfunctioning copying machines. We agree with FEMA that there were no training problems and no procedural problems relating to the performance of Rumor Control personnel.102/ Tr. 7908 (Kowieski).
- l. 419. We address each subpart of the ConW. lion and its specific allegation of l
fundamental flaw below. Response to Unanticipated and Unrehearsed Events (EX 50.A). 420.' Contention EX 50.A alleges that the Exercise demonstrated that the LERO training program failed to prepare emergency workers to respond effectively to unanticipated and unrehearsed situations likely to arise in an emergency and cites in support Contentions EX 38,39,41 and 42, and FEMA comments. For the reasons stated below, we find for LILCO on EX 50.A. J_01/ 0 Interveners relied on their EX 39 testimony for their conclusions about the ade-quacy of training. Tr. 6693-94 (Rcwan). 102/ FEMA testified on EX 39 that many of the asserted Rumor Control inadequacies are Exercise artif acts, and in any case, that the Rumor Control system functioned as i i designed in the Plan. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 51. FEMA's Deficiency concerning Rumor Control was based on the f act that up-to-date information was not always available to Rumor Control personnel, and that problem is directly attributable to the copy machine breakdown. Tr. 7870, 7882 (Baldwin) 7906 (Keller). FEMA also testified that Rumor Control personnel used " good judgment" in answering the Dan Rather question. Tr. 7903-04 (Keller), 7911-12 (Baldwin). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ -__m
-170-421. Intervenor witnesses defined an " unanticipated or unrehearsed" situation as one that M hot expected or planned for specifically. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50),
at 56; Tr. 6564,6568-69 (Cosgrove). In LILCO's view, nearly everything that happened
~ during the Exercise had'an element of surprise and was therefore an " unanticipated or unrehearsed" event. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, if. Tr. 4368, at 34; Tr. 5400-02 '(Daverio),5477 (Weismantle). Intervenor witnesses agreed; when asked to point out the unanticipated and unrehearsed events that occurred during the Exercise, Dr. Colwell replied that "most of them were unrehearsed and unexpected and came as a surprise" I
because the players "had never actually gone through a full exercise evaluated by FEMA." Tr. 6564 (Colwell).N Interveners focused on the traffic impediments and on rumor control inquiries as examples of unanticipated and unrehearsed events; we will
, not rediscuss these incidents. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 60-77: Tr. 6569-72 . (Cosgrove, Evans).104/
422. Other than the impediments and Rumor Control, Interveners' witnesses testified only that inadequate responses from LERO Traffic Guides to simulated inqui-ries from the. public demonstrated an inability to deal with events that . were unanticipated. The inquiries were unanticipated, according to Interveners, because they were not covered in the Traffic Guide Procedure. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 75-77. We agree with LILCO's witnesses that this minor problem is readily 103/ But s_ge SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 60 ("we need to stress that there were not a great number of major unrehearsed or unanticipated events during the Exer-cise"). Intervenor witness Cosgrove found it difficult to give examples of unanticipated and unrehearsed situations because by definition, "if [he) could think of them, then they're anticipated." Tr. 6568 (Cosgrove). 104/ Interveners' testimony did not link many of the items, g.g., Contentions EX 38 and 42, referenced in Contention EX 50.A to a failure of the training program to teach personnel to respond effectively to unanticipated and unrehearsed situtation. Never-theless, we reviewed the examples referenced in EX 50.A and find that they do not sup-port a finding that the LERO training program is fundamentally flawed. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, f f. Tr. 4368, at Att. B.
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l > J I correctable by revision of the Traffic Guide Procedure to direct evacuees to listen to the EBS radio station for information, inclusion of that direction on the LERO identifi-cation badges.that serve as job performance aids, and instruction on the revisions to the i Traffic Guide Procedure in the training program.N LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. I 4368, at Att. B, Att. I. Taken together, the response to the impediments and the re-sponse of Traffic Guides to inquiries from motorists do not establish the pattern neces-sary for us to find that EX 50.A demonstrates a fundamental flaw in the LERO training program. Ability to Implement the LILCO Plan and Procedures (EX 50.B) 423. Contention EX 50.B alleges that the Exercise demonstrated that LERO's training program failed to train LERO personnel to follow and implement the LILCO Plan and procedures. The Contention references EX 36-39, 41, 42, 45, and 49, and a se-ries of FEMA DeficiencJas and ARCAs as support. For the reasons stated below we find for LILCO on EX 50.B. 424. Interveners' testimony lists literally dozers of alleged examples of LERO workers' inability to follow the LILCO Plan and procedures. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Ccnt. EX 50), at 99-118. Indeed, Interveners seem to believe that every mistake - small or large - committed by a LERO player constitutes a failure to follow procedures, which in ; urn demonstrates a failure in LERO training.106/ LILCO admitted that there were sporadic instances during the Exercise in which LERO workers did not correctly imple-ment their procedures, Tr. 5521 (Daverio), but argued that those ir. stances show no 1_05/ The RAC Report of December 15, 1986, found that LILCO's proposal to modify the Traffic Guide Procedure and to conduct follow up training adequately addressed this Exercise issue. FEMA EX Exh. 3 at Table 3.6, p.10 of 19. 106/ One could characterize every instance of less-than perfect performance during the Exercise as a f ailure to implement the Plan, since the Plan prescrit'es what is deemed to be an ideal response. But all that is important here is whether those in-stances demonstrate a fundamental flaw in LERO's training. We find that they do not.
-172-pattern of pervasive failures that would indicate a training program failure. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 41. We have considered, but will not discuss, all of J the examples cited by Interveners. While they seem numerous, we find that many do not relate to training and those which do seem to be training-related are of ten of no consequence; none are of any consistent type or pattern that would indicate a training )
f ailure.107/ 425. We have previously discussed the traffic impediments, ENC and Rumor l Controlincidents, which are the major groupings that Interveners rely on for their EX j 50.B testimony. Interveners testified briefly about four other examples in support of EX 50.B: (1) LERO's response to the Ridge School free play message:108/ (2) alleged im-l proper handling of communications relating to releam data and dose projections;109/ l (3)' alleged inability by LERO staging area personnel to deal appropriately with emer-gency data;110/ and (4) the Traffic Guides' alleged lack of information necessary for , 107/ Interveners list, on pp.103-04 of their testimony,19 examples that allegedly support EX 50.B, but nowhere do they explain why these examples demonstrate "the in-effectiveness of LILCO's training program in instructing personnel to follow and imple-l ment the LILCO Plan and procedures." Inspection of the testimony's FEMA Report ref-i erences indicates that these were sporadic instances of misstatements or failure to follow procedures to the letter every time they were implemented. We expect these human errors in any organization. They do not indicate a fundamental flaw in the Plan. 108/ Since Interveners and LILCO both addressed the Ridge school bus activities in detail under EX 50.C, we deal with it there. 10.9/ Interveners say that "LERO personnel failed to designate clearly on the EOC dose assessment status boards the distinctions between DOE RAP monitoring data and LILCO field monitoring data." SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 115, citing FEM A EX Exh.1 at 29-30. LILCO has revised the status board to separate the DOE and LILCO data. LILCO Test. on EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at Att. B. We agree with FEMA that this is an equipment, not a training problem. Interveners also cite the erroneous reporting of sample readings at a downwind distance of 7,000 meters instead of 700 meters. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50L at 115, n. 51. Obviously, a decimal point was misplaced in converting miles to meters; the error was corrected within five minutes. FEMA EX Exh. I at 33. We find this to be an ordinary error in calculation, not a f ailure to follow procedures. LILCO's agreement with DOE to report all downwind distances in miles in the future should prevent similar errors. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 48; Tr. 5574 (Daverio). 110/ Interveners cite but three unrelated examples. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 116-17. At Riverhead, the use "in several cases" of insuf ficient status forms (an L (footnote continued)
-173-Plan implementation.W SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 114-18. We find that these examples do not singly or collectively show a pervasive or systemic inability to follow procedures. In some instances they show nothing more than equipment problems and in others occasional, isolated lapses in following procedures or listening to direc-tions. Such instances are human error and do not indicate a fundamental flaw in LERO training. They do not support Interveners' allegation of a fundamental flaw in LERO training to implement the Plan and follow procedures.
426. We find that the Exercise actions and events relied on by Interveners do not support the charge that personnel were not trained to follow the LILCO Plan and ! Procedures. During an 11 hour period, about 1000 LERO personnel mounted an emer-gency response in accordance with the LILCO Plan; we agree with LILCO that this demonstrates that LERO personnel were trained to follow the Plan and Procedures. Communicating Necessary Information (EX 50.C) 427. Contention EX 50.C alleges that the Exercise demonstrated that the LILCO training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to (continued from previous page) ARFI) and the f ailure in some instances to include the time when posting new informa-tion on a status board (an ARCA). FEM A EX Exh. I at 72-73. The Patchogue Bus Dis-patcher's incomplete statements about the dose levels at which Bus Drivers were to call in. I_d. at 68-69. And, finally misdirection of one of the Bus Drivers dispatched by the BNL Transfer Point Coordinator. [d. at 65, 67. We find that none of these minor, iso-lated occurrences evinces a pervasive or fundamental f ailure of the training program to train LERO workers to follow procedures. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 49-50, 63-64. 1_11/ Some Traffic Guides did not know the location of the Reception Center. Since the Traffic Guide Procedure did not include a requirement to inform evacuees of the Reception Center is located, this incident cannot illustrate a failure to train personnel in procedures. Some Traffic Guides were unclear about the chain of command for ex-cess exposure authorization. but most Traffic Guides questioned understood the chain of command for excess exposure. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 53; FEM A EX j Exh.1 at 59, 68-69, 76-77. This does not establish any pattern that would indicate a failure of the training program to teach procedures. . I I 1 l l
i
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1 communicate necessary and sufficient information, to inquire and obtain such informa- l tion, or to recognize the need to do so. Interveners cite EX 34,36,38,39,41,42,and 45, and numerous FEMA conclusions for support. For the reasons stated below, we find for LILCO on EX 50.C. 428. Again, Interveners cite the traffic impediments as their primary example. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 127. We rely on our prior findings to conclude
- that, although LERO's poor response to the impediments was due largely to the Evacua-tion Route Coordinator's failure to communicate the impediments information to his co-workers and superiors, LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 36-38; LILCO Test.
Cont. EX 41, if. Tr. 272, at 19-21; Tr. 5547-51 (Weismantle), this communications lapse _ does not implicate the training program's overall effectiveness in training LERO workers to communicate. 429. Interveners'second example is LERO's response to the Ridge School free play message.112/ SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 128-29. Interveners' primary complaint about this episode is that, although Reception Center personnel were asked by the Public School Coordinator to call when the Ridge bus had arrived, they never did so. See Tr. 5564-65 (Daverio). LILCO witnesses responded that without actual school 112/ The facts surrounding that message can be summarized as follows: At approxi- i mately 10:30 a free play message was inserted at the EOC requesting a bus to evacuate 40 children. from the Ridge Elementary School. This request was relayed to the Patchogue Staging Atea at 10:50, and a Bus Driver was dispatched at 11:23. The Bus Driver arrived at the school at 12:14 and then drove to the Reception Center. Mean-while, however, the Public School Coordinator at the EOC called the school district su-perintendent (simulated) at 11:28, telling him that a bus had been sent and asking that the superintendent call back when the bus arrived. Apparently the superintendent did not call back, but when the Public School Coordinator checked with the Superintendent at 13:23 he learned that the bus had already arrived and lef t for the Reception Center. The Public School Coordinator called the Reception Center at 15:09 to confirm the bus' arrival, but Reception Center personnel could not provide confirmation. He called again at 16:11 and 16:23, but the bus' arrival still could not be confirmed. LILCO wit-nesses later learned that the bus had arrived nearly three hours earlier at 13:51. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 46-47, Att. G; s_ee also FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 63-64; Tr. 5555-57, 5560-64 (DaverioL l
-175-children the' Ridge' school bus was indistinguishable from the 12 other buses arriving'at the Reception Center. Tr. 5565-66 (Daverio). Since the Reception Center personnel could not recognize the Ridge bus, they did not know to call. M. We find that these .
circumstances demonstrate a problem in simulating exercise activities, not a funda-mental flaw in LERO's communications training.113/ On the whole, we believe the Ridge free play message demonstrates LERO's ability to communicate effectively. The Public School Coordinator diligently gathered and transmitted information concerning the whereabouts of the bus. 430. Interveners' remaining examples are either equipment or procedure prob-lems or if training-related are isolated and relatively minor problems.I Interveners cite as communication failures LERO's difficulty in contacting the FAA, and failure to contact the LIRR. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 130. LERO in f act attempted to contact the FAA, but the number listed in the procedure was not the best number to call. LILCO Test.' Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 48; Tr. 5572 (Daverio). LERO proce-dures did not require that the LIRR be called. Ld. We see these as procedural problems, ' not training problems, and the procedures have been modified appropriately. LILCO Test on EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 48, 113/ FEMA testified that the purpose of the Ridge free play message was to test the knowledge of the bus driver concerning the location of the school and the reception center; it was not designed to check the ability of reception center personnel to verify whether the bus had arrived. Tr. 8306-07 (Kowieski). FEMA does not believe that the apparent delay in confirmation was a serious problem. Tr. 8306 (Keller). 1_14/ ' Interveners again cite the communications relating to release data and dose pro-jections, event status forms, incomplete bus dispatcher announcements, and BNL misdi-rection of a bus driver as examples of the training program's failure to train workers to communicate. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test Cont. EX 50), at 130-33. Our factual findings in Contention E'X 50.B are applicable here. Some of these events showed only equipment deficiencies, and the remaining problems were not pervasive enough to show fundamen-tal flaw in the way LERO workers are trained to communicate necessary information. Similarly, the lack of key events or evacuation status boards in the command room is an - equipment not a training problem. Indeed, FEMA did not consider this to need correc-tion, labeled it an ARFI, and suggested only that " operations could be improved" if such ' status boards were added in the command room. FEMA EX Exh.1 at 30,42.
i
-176-- '!
i 431. ' Interveners also claim a failure of the communications training program is demonstrated by the secretary who answered the LERO Director's teleph'one when he was absent from the command room, Indicated he would return the call, but did not im-mediately deliver a message in writing to the Director. SC EX Exh 55 (Test, Cont. EX
, 50), at 131.115/ We agree with LILCO that the secretary contravened no existing proce-i dures, and that had the calls been urgent the caller could have so stated. LILCO Test.
- Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, 48-49; Tr. 5576 (Daverlo). However, like FEMA, we urge that training stress the importance of prompt delivery of messages. FEMA EX Exh.1 at 31.
432. Finally, Interveners fault the LERO training program for the inconsistent information concerning assistance by the SCPD. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 133-35. Mr. Behr, who actually observed the FEMA simulators, testified that the confu-sion over SCPD assistance arose because the FEMA simulators (playing the role of ' Suffolk County officials) gave inconsistent input to LERO players about whether the police were going to assist LERO. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 50-51; Tr. 5587-90 (Behr); s_ee_ also FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 88. The confusion was FEM A's, not LERO's; this confusion does not demonstrate a fundamental flaw in LERO training. 433. We find that the examples in EX 50.C, do not establish any pattern of com-J
- munication problems and, when viewed in the context of a day-long Exercise with over !
1000 players mobilized, about 650 message forms, countless telephone calls, briefings I and other information transmissions, do not show that LERO's training is fundamentally unable to train personnel to communicate. No fundamental
- raining flaw has been shown in EX 50.C.
115/ Interveners testified that some of the calls that went unanswered by the Direc-tor were RECS calls. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test Cont. EX 50), at 131. LILCO witness Daverlo, who was familiar with the details of the LILCO Plan, contradicted that testi-mony, saying that the RECS line is not located in the command room. Tr. 5575 (Daverio).
-177-Following Directions of Superiors (EX 50.D) 434. We reject the allegations in Contention EX 50.D that LERO's training pro- 3 gram has not trained personnel to follow directions given by superiors as unsupported l
by e!ther the Exercise results of Interveners' testimony. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 149-50. The instances of failures to follow directions of superiors were so negligible that we do not doubt that instructions will be followed.III We agree with LILCO that LERO's eilective operation during the Exercise indicans that LERO per- j sonnel generally did follow the directions of their superiors. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 51-52; Tr. 5600-01 (Daverio). Therefore, we conclude that interveners have not demonstrated through EX 50.D any problem with the LERO training program. Exercising Common Sense. Good Judgment, and Irdcpendent Judgment (EX 50.E) 435. Contention EX 30.E alleges that the Exercise demonarated that the LERO { training program has not effectively trained LERO personnel to exercise independent ! judgment or good judgment or common sense in dealing with situations presented during an emergency or in implementing procedures. In support the Contention cites Conten- 1 tions EX 34, 36, 38-42, and 45. 436. The LILCO witnesses testified that the training program does not attempt to train LERO workers to exercise common sense, and that it would be impossible to do 1 1_16/ Intervenor witnesses adnlitted that they had insufficient evidence to support Contention EX 50.D. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. 50), at 149. 1_11/ Interveners' testimony cites three examples of alleged faijures to follow the in-structions of superiors. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 149. LILCO witnesses agreed that the Transfer Point Coordinator at the BNL Transfer Point had neglected to relay instructions f rom the Staging Area's to one of the bus drivers. Tr. 5593 (Daverio). But they disputed that either the f ailure of personnel to read their dosimeters every 15 minutes or the delayed dispatch of a Route Spotter to the fuel truck impediment were failures to follow instructions from superiors. Rather, LILCO's witnesses testified that these examples indicated a f ailure to follow dosimetry procedures, which is f airly com-mon in FEMA exercises, LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, f f. Tr. 4368, at 62 Att. D: Tr. 5592 (Daverio); see also Tr. 8535 (Kowieski), and perhaps an inappropriate priority placed on the request for the Route Spotter, Tr. 5593-94 (Weismantle).
i 178-so. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 54-55; Tr. 5623 (Daverio), They further i testified that only responsible individuals are recruited for membership in LERO, and 1 those individuals are then trained :o implement the Plan. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, ai 54-55, i l I 437. The LILCO witnesses did believe that LERO workers can be, and are, trained to ust independent judgment and good judgment and that they exhibited good judgment in the Exercise. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 55-56; Tr. 5623 (DaveriM. At the same time, however, LILCO witnesses stressed that LERO workers -- particularly those in non-management positions - are not supposed to be a group of free-thinking improvisors; they are trained to implement their procedures, not to re-l Spond 31 h_oc in the field. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 55; Tr. 5625-26 (Daverio). Field workers ai'e not supposed to make many independent judgments be-cause LILCO feels that most decisions should be made only by those managers (at the EOC in most cases) who have an overview of the whole emergency response. Tr. 5625 (Daverio). FEMA agreed that a strur .ured, procedural response - not widespread inde-pendent action - should be fostered. Tr. 8272-73 (Keller); se,e Tr. 8207-08 (Kowieski). 438. Interveners' testimony relles, virtually without exception, on the traffic I impediments, certain Rumor Control responses, and other ENC activities as de-monstrating a failure to use indegndent or good judgment. These three major groupings - the traffic impediments, Rumor Control, and the ENC - were discussed j previously.E See $C EX Exh 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 151-59. We have considered M/ Interveners also gave as an example of poor judgment LERO's " failure" to con-tact the I.ong Island Railroad (LIRR). SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50). at 156. LERO's procedures did not require that contact, but FESIA witness Kowieski testified that LERO personnel should have called the LIRR anyway. Tr. 8271 (Kowieski); 31r. Heller agreed, but cautioned against the use of independent judgment in general in the course of emergency planning and response. Tr. 8272-74 (Keller). If anything, however, we see this example as a minor procedural problem. not a symptom of poor training.
-179-all the evidence and find that EX 50.E fails to show a fundamental flaw in LILCO's ,
training program.II9I c Dealing with the Media and the Public (EX 50.F) 439. Contention EX 50.F alleges that the Exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has not successfully c:' effectively trained LERO personnel to deal with the media or otherwise to provide timely, accurate, consistent, and non-conflicting information to the public through the media. For support the Contention references Contentions EX 37,38 and 40.C, but Interveners rely primarily on their Con-tention EX 38 ENC testimony to suppo. the allegation in Contention EX 50.F. Our findings on Contention EX 38 and on ENC training apply here. 440. Interveners presented no direct testimony on the relationship of EX 40.C to EX 50.F. But s_e_e LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at Att. .B. Contention EX 40.C, which was heard under EX 38, alleges that LERO personnel improperly dissemi-nated an EBS message containing f alse information about traffic guide deployment, and then failed to correct or retract that information. The potentially mjsleading informa-tion was part of the form EBS messages; it reflects a procedure rather than training problem. See Findings on EX 38, supra. We found that that minor problem did not 1_13 / Two additional comments on EX 50.E are in order. First, it seemtd to the Board i that EX 50.B and E are somewhat contradictory. That is, in EX $0.B Interveners point out many examples of LERO players not following the letter of their procedures, while in EX 50.E Interveners criticize LERO players for not showing enough independent judgment to abandon tnose procedures and improvise. This contradiction was particu-larly evident when the result of a player following .or not following a procedure was positive - e.g., when Patchogue personnel violated procedures by using second floor phones when first floor phones were insufficient - and yet Interveners still criticize the player's action. Se_e, f1&, Tr. 5538 (Daverio). Second, while Interveners pointed ont numerous examples of LERO players " falling" to use independent judgment, they ig-nored examples shcwing the use of independent judgment, e.g., (1) Patchogue players' use of available upstairs phones, (2) the Radiation Health Coordinator's decision not to j complete his worksheet according to procedure in favor of using actual smear data from the field, allowing him to obtain a more accurate calculation, Tr. 5666-67 (Daverio), and (3) a Bus Driver's decision, upon discovery that he was et the wrong bus yard, to rent a bus with his own personal credit card, Tr. 5639 (Daverio).
i
-180- 1 constitute or reflect a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan as it relates to dealings with the *dia, and, in any case, LILCO agreed to modify the wording of such messages to eliminate any possible confusion concerning when Traffic Guides would be at their posts. Consistent with these findings, we find here that EX 40.C does not show any problem with the way LERO trains its workers to deal with the media.
441. We agree with LILCO that Contention EX 37, which was admitted only as l part of EX 15.1 and which alleges that LERO f ailed to determine, recommend or imple-ment protective actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of the radiological re-lease in the ingestion pathway, has nothing to do with dealing with the media or training and does not support EX 50.F. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 58-59. . Interveners presented no direct testimony on the connection, if any, between EX 37 and EX 50.F. In sum, we find that Interveners have not established a fundamental flaw with Contention EX 50.F. Training of Persons and Organizations Relled on to implement the LILCO Plan (EX 50.G) 442. Contention EX 50.G alleges that LILCO failed to provide training to per-sons in outside organizations relied on for the implementation of its plan. Interveners cite Contentions EX 27 and 28 and ARCAs referenced in those contentions as support i for Contention 50.G. Those contentions allege generally that training in the use of l dosimetry, the use of KI, and the procedure for authorization of excess radiation expo-i sure was not provided to school bus drivers or to all ambulette drivers. LILCO Test. Cont. E.X 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 59-60; SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 188-189.12W R0/ Intervenor witnesses misapprehended the purpose of Brookhaven scientist Dr. Brill, when they cited him as an example of a person f rom an outside organization who had not received adequate trainir.g. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50). at 189-90. Dr. Brill is not and should not be trained by LERO: he is at the ENC to provide his opinion as an independent scientist. Tr. 3571-72, 3574-75 (McCaffrey, Robinson). l
-181-l 443. Ambulance and ambulette drivers had received LERO training, but due to attrition not all those who participated in the Exercise were trained. LILCO Test.
Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 60; FEMA EX Exh. I at 44-45. We find that LILCO's plan to combat attrition by making training available on a monthly basis adequately reme-dies the problem. See id.; Tr. 5685-88 (Daverio). 444. LILCO' witnesses acknowledged that the training program developed for school bus drivers had not been provided to drivers other than those that service the Shoreham-Wading River School District at the time of the Exercise because the other school districts had refused, many.of them on the ground that the plant was not yet 11-censed to participate in emergency planning for Shoreham. PID at 856, LILCO Test. I Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 61; Tr. 5680-82 (Daverio); se_e also Tr. 7603-04 (Baldwin, Keller); FEMA EX Exh. I at 44-45. 445. We do not find a fundamental flaw in the LERO training program based on Contention EX 50.G. With the exception of school bus drivers, LILCO has provided training to all other non-LILCO personnel relied on to implement the LILCO Plan. Tr. 5679 (Daverio). LILCO has developed a training program for school bus drivers and has made efforts to provide that training to the drivers; however, in cooperation with the County and State governments which' oppose Shoreham's licensing, many schools and i i bus driver associations have refused to accept such training and apparently still do. We ) I will not create a Catch-22 by requiring training before issuance of a license where schools refuse to plan because the plant is not licensed. We rely on the Staff and FEMA to ensure that school bus drivers have received training prior to operation of the plant at full power.121/ J21/1 FEMA's evaluation of LERO's commitment to provide training and equipment to school bus drivers indicates FEMA's intent to ensure that school bus drivers are in fact , trained. FEMA EX Exh 3 at Table 3.1, p.12 of 16. l
-182-Dosimetry and Radiation Exposure Control (EX 50.H) 446. In Contention EX 50.H, Interveners allege that the Exercise demonstrated .
J that LERO training is deficient in the area of dosimetry, exposure control, KI, and un-derstanding radiation technology and related areas. In support of EX 50.H. Intervenor witnesses cite the lack of training of soma school bus drivers and some ambulance per-sonnel as well as the failure of some LERO-trained, LILCO personnel to demonstrate comprehensive knowledge of dosimetry and exposure control procedures. SC EX Exh. ; 1 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 191-194. Intervenor witnesses suggest that the number of problems with dosimetry. and related areas found in a small number of the LERO workers evaluated by FEMA indicate that such problems are widespread. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 193-94. 447. Looking at the same examples, LILCO witnesses concluded that the person-al radiological procedure problems noted during the Exercise were examples of individ-ual failures of training but did not indicate a fundamental flaw in the training program. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 53,63-64.122/ 448. Generally, the objective of demonstrating the ability to monitor and con-I trol emergency worker exposure, including the proper use of dosimetry, was demon-strated during the Exercise. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 62-64; Tr. 5699-5706 (Daverio); FEMA EX Exh.1 at 44, 59, 68-69, 76-77, 79-80. We agree with LILCO and FEMA that the cited instances of breaches in personal radiological proce-dures by LERO personnel, though less than optimal, do not individually or collectively demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the LERO training program. Dosimetry and related 122/ Although approximately one-third of all the ARCAs identified by FEMA at the Exerci.;c concerned dosimetry or related areas, their number alone does not indicate a significant problem. The number of the ARCAs indicates that dosimetry was closely evaluated and that problems were identified at each of the three staging areas as well as at the EOC. See Tr. 5690 91 (Daverio).
-183-areas are a chronic problem at FEMA exercises because people find it hard to remem-ber detailed information that they rarely use and because in a simulated emergency sit-uation people are less attuned to the need to monitor their own exposure to radiation. ;
LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 31-32, 62, Att. D; Tr. 5690-91, 5693-95 (Daverio); see also Tr. 8535 (Kowieski), 5015-16 (Lindell).' Significantly, instances of field workers not reading their dosimetry or ingesting their KI would in no way impair protection of the public health and safety. We find that LILCO's approach to cor-recting the problem through the use of identification badges, which list personal radiological procedures on the back for quick reference in the field, coupled with in-creased emphasis on training on personal radiological procedures, should be an effective l l solution to the problem. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 62-63, Att.1; Tr. l 4537-38, 5015-16, 5186-88 (Lindell). 1 Correction of Problems Revealed By the Exercise (EX 50.I) 449. Contention EX 50.1 alleges that LILCO's proposals to modify training mate-rials and procedures will not correct the flaws revealed by the Exercise. 450. According to LILCO witnesses, the Exercise revealed that the LERO training program prepared emergency personnel to do their jobs effectively, and that no systemic or pervasive failure in any aspect of the training program was revealed. Therefore, they contended major changes in the concept and format of the LERO training program were unwarranted. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 64-65; Tr. 5710-12 (Daverio), 5729-30 (Behr). 451. In contrast, Interveners maintained that serious, widespread problems dur-ing the Exercise revealed an inherent problem with the structure and content of the LERO training program, and that only a complete restructuring of LERO and a corol-lary restructuring of the training program would be an effective remedy. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 42,198-217. Interveners also claimed that incidents in
1
-104- !
l i i post-Exercise drills support their position that the proposed changes to the LERO training program will. not remedy the problems revealed in the Exercise. SC EX Exh. I 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 43-50, i 452. The substance and structure of the LERO training program was litigated at length in the emergency plan proceeding. The Licensing Board found the LERO training program, which begins with videotape and workbook classroom presentations ! and is followed by drills and exercises in which controllers and observers critique LERO workers performing their LERO jobs, appeared to be an effective training methodology. PID at 745-47. Exercise events did not show to the contrary. 453. We disagree with Interveners' characterization of the severity or scope of problems in the Exercise, and therefore with Interveners' charge that the changes made to the LERO training program are too minor to solve its problems. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 42-43,198-217; SC EX Exh. 96 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at Att.10; but see LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at Att. B; FEMA EX Exh. 3. Of course, l LERO's performance in the Exercise was not without mistake, nor would we expect it to be. We find problems that occurred during the Exercise can not all be attributed to problems with the LERO training program (several concern equipment or procedures); those that were training problems were not of sufficient severity, scope, or repetition to establish a fundamental flaw in the LERO training program. Overall, we find perfor-mance was adequate. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 7; Tr. 8283,8314-16 (Kowleski); Tr. 5127-32 (Mileti). Given the Commission's mandate, we need go no fur-ther to explore such issues as the post-Exercise drills reports, for if the LERO training program is not fundamentally flawed, it does not need to be fixed. Nonetheless, we have heard evidence on drill reports, observer comments, and criticisms of the 123/ As they did with the Exercise, Interveners selected incidents of poor perfor-mance from the drill reports. See SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 44-50, 93-99, (footnote continued)
-185- :
)
I enhancements to LERO training. We find that LILCO has responded conscientiously to l a FEMA's findings with procedural and training changes that should enhance LERO's ef-1 festiveness. In reaching this conclusion, we give substantial weight to RAC's largely j favorable, substantive review of the training enhancements.124/ LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 65-66, Att. B; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 74; FEMA EX Exh. 3. 454. We are unclear whether Dr. Perrow's allegation that LERO's organizational structure is irremediably flawed relates solely to Interveners' challenge to the effec-tiveness of changes to LERO training (an issue which is beyond our mandate) or whether it attempts to establish an independent basis for a finding of fundamental flaw. If the latter, LERO's organizational structure was at issue in the plan litigation, and we are bound by that decision. See, e_L, PID at 730-31, 735-37. Exercise events do not re-i open that issue for our review here. In any event, we find Dr. Perrow's theories, that LERO's organizational structure is inappropriately centralized with large spans of con-trol and that interactive complexity and tight coupling will prevent the LERO organi-zation from functioning are not persuasive.125/ SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at (continued from previous page) 118-124, 138-47, 161-64, 194-95. If the drill reports were relevant, we would need to painstakingly review all these comments in context to determine whether a pattern of defects was established. We fear that Interveners' testimony on the drill reports suffers from the same f ailure to establish a pattern as the Exercise testimony. 124/ We recognize .that the positive findings of the RAC review are subject to confir-mation in subsequent exercises, FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 74; Tr. 5709-10 (Daverio), but we
- have no reason to believe that the changes detailed by LILCO will not be effective. See LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at Att. B; FEMA EX Exh. 3. The members of RAC have had extensive experience in reviewing emergency plans, and we rely on their professional judgment as well as the testimony of LILCO's witnesses.
125/ Dr. Perrow defined interactive complexity as unanticipated interactions be-tween different parts of a system that take place because of f ailures or because intend-ed behavior in one part effects another part in an unforseen manner. He defined tight coupling, by example, as highly time dependent processes or an inability to provide buffers, to stop the system or to provide adequate substitutes. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 211-12.
-186- (
202-17; Tr. 6369-70 IPerrow). 455. We find that LERO is structured to meet NRC and FEMA regulatory guid-ance, that LERO's structure is similar to that of other offsite emergency response orga-nizations, and that that organizational structure is likely to be effective. Our conclu-si:n is confirmed by D_r. M11eti's research in NUREG/CR-3524, Organizational Interface in Reactor Emergency Planning and Response (1984), SC EX Exh. 57, which concluded that three basic factors determine whether or not an emergency response organization will be effective.126/ LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 14-17; Tr. 5067 (Mileti). 127/ 456. Dr. M_ileti applied the NUREG/CR-3524 factors to the FEMA Report Tr. 4663,5119-20 (Mileti), and concluded that the f actors were demonstrated by LERO in the Exercise, that the LERO training program produced an organization with high potential for effectively responding to an emergency, and therefore that the training i program could not be fundamentally flawed. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at ! ? l l 126/ The three facters outlined in NUREG/CR-3524-a clear understanding about what to do, flexibility in approach, and a good idea about the interorganizational response-were derived by identifying, from approximately 60 empirical studies of or-ganizational effectiveness in both emergency and non-emergency situations, common attributes of effective organizations. The centrality of those factors was then con-firmed in a review of emergency plans at 17 nuclear plants, two case studies at nuclear plants, and the observation of a test exercise. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 14-17; Tr. 4658-59, 5071-72 (Mileti); SC EX Exh. 57. The factors in NUREG/CR-3524 are factors that sociologists, who study the response of organizations to actual emergencies, have concluded to be the factors that most enhance organizational emer-gency response effectiveness. Tr. 5147 IMileti). Intervenor witnesses essentially agreed that the three factors are important to an gffective emergency response. Tr. 6746, 6749-50 (Colwell). However. thev felt that Dr. Mueti's three factor analysis did not completely address their criticisms of LERO's performance. Tr. 6750 (Colwell), 6751-52 { Rowan). 127/ Viewing LERO as an interorganizational response network in which each organi-zational subdivision, such as the EOC and each of the staging areas, was treated as a separate organization, Dr. Mileti reviewed the FEMA comments for each objective against the factors in NUREG/CR-3524. The ratings were used as checklist for as-Sessing performance with reference to the NUREG/CR-3524 sociological factors. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 18-20; Tr. 5087,5096,5126,5128 (Mileti).
-187-17, 20-21, Att. F; SC EX Exh. 58; Tr. 5068-69, 5126-29, 5131-32 (Mileti).128/ We agree with his overall conclusion.
B. Attrition 457. In addition to claiming that the substance of LERO's training program was fundamentally flawed, Interveners contended that LERO does not have an adequate number of trained workers. SC EX Exh. 95 (Test. Cont. EX 50), at 35,51-52; Tr. 6375 (Perrow). However, Interveners admitted that during the Exercise staffing was ade-quate in number, 6375-78 (Perrow), 6381-82 (Colwell), and that their charge of inade-quate staffing was based solely on references in post-exercise drill reports to new per-sonnelin the LERO training program. Tr. 6375-76,6379,6382 {Perrow). We find such references unremarkable; the entry gf new personnelin an ongoing training program - especially in an organization of LERO's size - is not surprising and does not substanti-ate Interveners' claim of an attrition problem.129/ Absent any evidence of an attrition problem and in light of FEMA's findings that facilities were adequately staffed with trained personnel, see FEMA EX Exh.1 at 27-28 (EOC),43 { ambulance),47-48 (BHO),55 (Port Jefferson),60 {Patchogue),71 (Riverhead),78 (EWDF), and 80 (Reception C_ enter), we find that LERO possesses an adequate number of trained LERO workers. 128/ Dr. Milati testified that his analysis demonstrates that there were no systematic patterns of negative ratings for the factors gf NUREG/CR-3524. Dr. Mileti therefore concluded that there could not be a fundamental flaw in the training program and that the training program was adequate. Tr. 5128-29, 5131-32 (Mileti); seg e also Tr. 5089 (Mileti). 129/ When questioned Interveners were unable to provide gny information about the attrition rate in either LERO or LILCO. Tr. 6379 (Perrow).
-188-i i
C. LERO's Performance in the Exercise Was as Good as or Better l Than That Of Other Offsite Emergency Response Organizations 458. The LILCO and FEMA witnesses agreed that LERO did as well as or uter than other offsite emergency response organizations and, with the exception of the im-pediments, the }cinds of training problems identified at Shoreham were similar to those l identified at other sites in FEMA Region II. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 10, ff. Tr. 4368, at 8, 27, 29-32, Atts. C-D; Tr. 8534-36 {Keller, Kowieski), 8719-21 (Keller), 5297-98 (Goodkind). While we believe that each mistake must be viewed in its own light, its cruse determined independently, and its relationship, if any, to other mistakes assessed to determine whether a pattern gf defects exists, we do find that LILCO and FEMA's testimony confirms our independent view that LERO performed well overall and that th3 training program is not fundamentally flawed. 459. LILCO witnesses attempted to quantify their gssessment that LERO did as l w ll as or better than other gifsite emergency response organizations by comparing F,_EMA's assessment of LERG130/ with its exercise assessments of other offsite emer-gency response organizations for plants operating in FEMA Region II. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 27-31; SC EX Exhs. f2-67, 69-78. The first comparison showed that the average number of ARCA's and Deficiencies for the 16 gxercises was 45 as compared to a total of 47 ARCA's and Deficiencies at Shoreham,I3 and that the 130/ LILCO witnesses used the FEMA Report as the data base for their analyses both _because it provided a comprehensive and cohesive picture of Exercise events based on the observations of objective gvaluators and because it was the only data source tha: could be meaningfully compared with other FEMA post-Exercise Assessments. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 9; Tr. 4517-18 (Lindell), 4526-27 (Behr, Daverio, Goodkind). 131/ The terms used by FEMA to describe problems in exercises have changed some-what over time. For exercises during the 1981-82 period, FEMA pf ten did not catego-rize its recommendations in terms of significance; LILCO's analysis treated these cita-tions as a combined category of ARCA's and Deficiencies. For exercises where FEMA (footnote continued)
-189-i number of Deficiencies cited at Shoreham - four - was equalled or exceeded at Salem j (1984), Indian Point {1986), and Oyster Creek (1982). LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr.
4368, at 29, Att. C. The second comparison of FEMA's notations of a need for training i in various functional categories showed the average number gf training categories cited was 6.4 with a range of 4 to 11.132/ I_d. at 30, Att. D. A_t Shoreham, a need for training was cited in six of the twelve categories. 460. Interveners vigorously contested the validity of both of these analyses. We used them only as background material, and do not rely on them for our conclusion that th:re was no fundamental flaw in the LERO training program. In our view, however, th3 analyses do provide some confirmation gf the opinions held by both FEMA and LILCO that the performance exhibited in the Shoreham Exercise showed a level of training and preparedness comparable to that of gther exercises for operating plants in l FEMA Region II, 461. LILCO also took the position that FEMA's assessment gf LERO's perfor-mance in the February 13 Exercise was positive gverall and, therefore, that the LERO training program was not fundamentally flawed. Mr. Pursell attempted to quantify FEMA's conclusions in the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment by using the critical in-cident analysis technique 133/ gnd by calculating the number of Exercise objectives (continued from previous page) f distinguished significant deficiencies from minor or gther deficiencies, and areas of > weak performance from areas of gdequate performance, significant deficiencies and weak areas were tabulated as Deficiencies, and minor deficiencies and gther deficiencies were tabulated as ARCA's. LILCO Test. on Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 29; Tr. 5311-13 (Goodkind). There was some question as to whether the definition of .
"other def!clencies" or " minor deficiencies" also included items now classified as
~
ARFI's. Tr. 5327-36 (Goodkind). For more recent exercises, the gnalysis did not include the ARFI classification. Tr. 5314, 5323-24, 5335-36, 5338 (Goodkind). _13_2/ The results of the analysis reflect the number of categories in which a need for training was cited, but do not reflect the number of citations in a category. Tr. 4403-04 (Goodkind). 133/ With the critical incident technique, data gbout observable behavior are j gathered by evaluators who record the " critical incidents". The critical incidents are ! l (footnote continued)
-190-FEMA said were met. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 21-26; Tr. 4561-62 (Pursell).
462. In applying the technique to the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment, the ; criticalincidents were g611ected by FEMA evaluatork,134/ 3 list of criteria for' classi-fying the incidents was developed, and two three-man teams analyzed the FEMA Re-port for positive and negative incidents. The Indian Point Compensating Exercise gf August 24-25, 1983, was also analyzed. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 22-23, 'Att. E; Tr. 4688-90 (Pursell). Based on the better than 80% positive ratings of the anal-yses,135/ Mr. Pursell concluded that the LERO organization functioned well during the February 13 Exercise and that the training program was effective. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 25-27; Tr. 4565-66 (Pursell); seg also Tr. 4565 (Lindell). 463. There was lengthy cross examination about the critical incident analysis technique and how it was applied to the Shoreham and Indian Point Post-Exercise As-sessments. Af ter reviewing all of the gvidence, we find that the critical incident anal-ysis technique is too subjective for us to rely gn in the context of this proceeding. Its results, however, were not necessary to our conclusion that there is no fundamental flaw in the LERO training program. (continued from previous page) then characterized as either positive gr negative in the attainment of the objectives, and finally, the data are compiled to assess the performance. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, II. Tr. 4368, at 21-22; Tr. 4486, 4678-81, 4700-01 {Pursell). 134/ The f act that FEMA evaluators were not pretrained in the griticalincident tech-nique does not, in our opinion, detract from the analysis. FEMA was an objective gb-server, and the observation of behavior does not require special training in the critical incident technique as long as the observers are knowledgeable about the behavior they observe. Tr. 4690, 4885-86, 5271-74 (Pursell). 135/ Team one found that 82% of the criticalincidents noted in the Shoreham report were of a positive nature. Team two found that 83.1% were positive. The criticalinci-dent. analysis of the Indian Point Post-Exercise Assessment showed that 87.2% of the critical incidents were positive. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 25; Tr. 4480 (Pursell).
-191-464. A second analysis, based on FEMA's evaluation of LERO against the Exer-cise objectives, revealed that for 74.4% of the observations the objectives were gom-plStely met and for 95.9% of the observations the objectives were either completely or partially met. LILCO Test. Cont. EX 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 26; Tr. 4561-62 (Pursell); SC EX Exh 59. We find that these percentages indicate that FEMA assersed LERO's over-all performance in the Exercise as meeting the gbjectives. See Tr. 4563-66 (Pursell),
4565 (Lindell).136/ Conclusion 465. The Board has considered all the arguments relating to problems with i LERO's training program. While not perfect, we find LILCO's training program to have been effective in teaching LERO personnel to implement the LILCO Plan and proce-dures and to respond to a radiological emergency at Shoreham. The mistakes that occurred in the Exercise do not establish a systemic failure or pattern of defects that indicate a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. 13_6/ We recognize that this analysis does not account for the fact that some of the objectives c'ealt with more important areas of gmergency response than others. Tr. 4572-73 (Pursell). We also recognize that for four of the ten subunits of LERO, including the EOC and ENC, the percentage of objectives completely met f all below the gverall 74.4% average. See Tr. 5225-26 (Pursell). Nonetheless, we find this analysis to be useful background against vthich to assess Interveners' claim that the Exercise dem-onstrated that the entire LERO training program was fundamentally flawed.
!i:- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,- Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of ).
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Unit 1) )
.ii APPENDICES TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW L
HUNTON & WILLIAMS 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 j
-1 August 3,1987 i
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
.LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Unit 1) ) APPENDICES TO FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW HUNTON & WILLIAMS 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 August 3,1987 l l l
n._--.-..-. . - . . - . , ~ . - - APPENDlX A I i i
.J
f' \; l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board f
)
'In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise) '(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )- _ .) Emeroency Plannino Contentions Relatinq to the February 13, 1986 Exercise March 2, 1987 Filed by: Suffolk County, The State of New York, and The Town of Southampton 1
EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS RELATING TO THE FEBRUARY 13, 1986 EXERCISE TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace I. Contentions EX l-7: LILCO's Lack Of Legal Authority Is A Fundamental Flaw................. 1 II. Contentions EX 8-14: Lack Of Active Governmental Participation Is A Fundamental Flaw............-............................... 1 III. Contentions EX 15-19: Limited Scope Of The Exercise Precludes Reasonable Assurance Finding......................................... 1 IV. Contentions EX 20-22: FEMA's Conclusions Preclude A Reasonable Assurance Finding......... 25 V. Contentions EX 23-32: Many ARCAs Identified By FEMA Constitute Fundamental Plaws............ 42 VI. Contentions EX 33-34: Fundamental Flaws Relating To Notification........................ 43 VII. Contentions EX 35-37: Fundamental Flaws Relating To Protective Action Recommendations.4 . 44 VIII. Contentions EX 38-39: Fundamental Flaws Relating To Public Information.................. 46 IX. Contentions EX 40-45: Fundamental Flaws Relating To Implementation of Protective Actions................................... ..... 68 X. Contentions EX 46-49: Fundamental Flaws Relating To Post-Evacuation Services For Evacuees........................................ 81 XI. Contention EX 50: Fundamental Flaws In LILCO's Training Program........................ 89
March 2, 1987 EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS RELATING TO THE FEBRUARY 13, 1986 EXERCISE I. CONTENTIONS EX 1-7: LILCO'S LACK OF LEGAL AUTHORITY IS A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW Contentions EX l-7. Not admitted. II. CONTENTIONS EX 8-14: LACK OF ACTIVE GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION IS A FUNDAMENTAL FLAW Contentions EX 8-14. Not admitted. III. CONTENTIONS EX 15-19: LIMITED SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE PRECLUDES REASONABLE ASSURANCE FINDING Contentions EX 15 and EX 16: (The matters set forth in suboart C of EX 18 are admitted as additional alleaed defici-encies in the exercise; and the matters alleced in EX 20 are deemed covered by EX 15 and 16]. The scope of the February 13 cxercise of the LILCO Plan was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results on implementation capability as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), in that it did not include demonstrations or evaluations of major portions of the LILCO Plan and the emergency response capabilities of many i
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------------_a
parsons and entities relied upon to_ implement the LILCO Plan. The data-set forth in subparts A-I, K, and M of Contention EX 15 and A-L and N of Contention EX 16 individually and collectively establish that the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. The exercise results do not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could or would be implemented, and the exercise results preclude'a finding that there.is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Thus, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. Specifically, several critical aspects of offsite emergency preparedness, and major substantive portions of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Neither the exercise scenario (which LILCO prepared), nor responses by players during the
' exercise, nor any FEMA evaluation or observation, addressed the . elements identified in EX 15 A-I, K and M of emergency prepared-noss required by the referenced sections of the NRC's regulations and NUREG 0654.
The failure of each of the persons and entities identified in:EX 16 A-L and N below to participate in the exercise both individually-and collectively me9ns that the exercise did not comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and did not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2). Rather, the exercise results were so l l limited that they demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the scope of the exercise and in the implementability of the Plan and preclude
a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a , Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Other than LILCO and its personnel, the majority of the or-ganizations, entities, and individuals relied upon in the LILCO Plan for implementation of that Plan did not participate in the exercise. Thus, the exercise did not address the willingness, availability, training, equipment, capability, or adequacy of performance of the entities and individuals identified in EX 16 A-L and N below, each of which is necessary to implement the portions of the LILCO Plan referenced in each subpart. The fact that each of these entities and individuals did not participate in the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan is capable of implementation or a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. EX 15.A. (Subparts C and D of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart; and the failure to test sirens as alleced in EX 24 will be considered as an example of an additional omission]. Procedures for actual notification of the public and actual issuance of emergency information and protective action recommendations to the public, as set forth in OPIPs 3.3.4, 3.8.1 and 3.8.2, and at pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, 3.8-4, 3.8-6 and Appendix A, pages IV-2 and IV-3 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that sirens, the m____ .
l LILCO EBS system, and WALK Radio were not tested, used, l demonstrated, or involved in the exercise. Thus, neither the 1 notification capabilities of LILCO or WALK Radio personnel, nor l the notification capabilities of LILCO's EBS system, were evaluated during the exercise. Such capabilities are required by l 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, App. E S IV.D; NUREG 0654 l l SS II.E and F, and Appendix 3, and were required to be demon-1 strated in the exercise. Objectives EOC 14 and 15. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken 1 in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally , flawed. LILCO's suggestion that the conduct of a " prompt notification test" would correct this deficiency (nga letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Enclosure 1 at 4) is incorrect. Such a test, assuming one were conducted in the future, would deal with siren operability; it would not test or demonstrate the ability of LILCO's offsite response organization to integrate that single portion of an emergency response with the remaining actions necessary in an emergency, nor would it test or demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could be implemented. Ei 16.C. (This suboart subsumed in basis A of EX 15]. WALK Radio did not participate in the exercise. It is relied upon for initial notification of the public of an emergency as well as for issuance to the public of protective action recommendations and i
other-emergency information. Ego LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, and 3.8-6; OPIP 3.3.4; OPIP 3.8.1; OPIP 3.8.2. ) EX 16.D.. (This suboart subsumed in basis A of EX 11]. No j l
< other radio stations participated in the exercise. Under the ]
LILCO Plan, stations WBLI, WCTO, WGLI, WGSM, WLIM, WLIX, WLNG, WRCN, WRED, and WRIV are relied upon to constitute LILCO's EBS system; therefore they are relied upon for initial notification of, and communication of protective action recommendations and other emergency information to, the public. Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a; App. B. J EX 24. [Not seoarately admitted but failure to test' sirens will be dealt with as an additional examole of an omission under gghpart A of EX 15]. EOC ARCA 7 refers to the fact that there was no activation of the siren system during-the exercise. FEMA Report at 41. The siren system is the central feature of the prompt notification system in the LILCO Plan. Egg Plan at 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4. Its exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding that LILCO can and will provide early notification of an emergency to the public as required by 10 CFR S.50.47(b)(5), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S D.3, and thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate l-protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. EX 15.B. (Suboart B of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart). Procedures for notification of, and issuance of protective action recommendations to, the members of the public in the water V - _ _ _____ - _-__-_ __-_-_______- -
portion of the plume exposure EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2-2a and 3.3-5 and Appendix A at IV-4 and IV-6 of l the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that the U.S. , Coast Guard did not participate in the exercise (other than i perhaps the receipt of one or more telephone calls) and FEMA l 4 never evaluated Coast Guard performance (assuming arouendo there ) was any). Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 SS II.E and F, Appendix 3, and the exercise was supposed to'(but !
.did not) test the alleged Coast Guard commitment under the LILCO Plan to notify water-borne traffic in the EPZ. Sgg, n , FEMA Report at 9; objective EOC 16. The water portion of the EPZ constitutes nearly 50 percent of the physical area of the plume EPZ. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise pre-cludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective i
.q measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emer-I gency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, . the l LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 15.H. (Subpart B of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart). Demonstration of the capability of implementing protective action ) recommendations for the public on the waters of the plume , exposure EPZ, or for transients on beaches or in parks or similar areas in the EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.8-1 thru 3.8-3, and Appendix A at IV-4 1 and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, was excluded from the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 10.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J, and objectives FIELD 9 and EOC 16 required a t demonstration of the ability to evacuate all or part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water portion. There in fact was no demonstration of any ability to effect an evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ. This exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally " lawed. EX 16.B. ['Jhis suboart subsumed in bases B and H of EX 15]. The U.S. Coast Guard did not participate in the exercise beyond perhaps receiving phone calls. It is relied upon for initial notification of, and communication and implementation of protective action recommendations to, members of the public in the water portion of the plume exposure EPZ, and for private and commercial vessel traffic control and access restriction on the water portion of the EFZ. Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-2a, 3.3-5; OPIP 3.3.4. The water portion of the EPZ constitutes approximately 50 percent of the entire EPZ. FEMA did not observe or evaluate the Coast Guard's performance of any of these activities, including, if it occurred in fact, the dispatching of any Coast Guard i vessels into the EPZ. I EX 15.C. Procedures for public education and the dissemi- l nation of information ts the public on a periodic basis, as set forth in OPIP 3.8.1, and at pages 3.8-1 thru 3.8-4 and Appendix A l at IV-3 thru -4, IV-70 of the LILCO Plan, and a demonstration of the adequacy of public education materials, were excluded from ! the exercise. Such programs and materials are required by 10 CFR I 1 l l
}
S 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.G. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. EX 15.D. (fuboarts H, I, and J of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart]. Procedures relating to evacuation of EPZ hospital patients and patients in the Suffolk Infirmary, and a demon-stration of the capability of implementing such an evacuation, were excluded from the exercise. There are approximately 850 patients in the Central Suffolk, St. Charles, and John T. Mather Hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2), of which approx!mately 155 are designated maternity, newborn, or pediatric. Procedures to evacuate these persons and the capability and resources to implement them are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.J.9 and'10. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable as-l surance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally , l flawed. l 1 EX 16.H. {This suboart subsumed in basis D of EX 15). Officials from hospitals located in the EPZ -- Central Suffolk ! l Hospital, St. Charles Hospital, John T. Mather Hospital -- and j l the Suffolk Infirmary did not participate in the exercise. Such l l I _g_ l - _ _--_- -- ---- - - a
officials are relied upon for determination and implementation of' protective action recommendations for hospital patients. Egg App. A at IV-172; OPIP 3.6.5 5 2.0 (Note); OPIP 3.6.1 5 5.3.2. EX 16.I. (This suboart subsumed in basis D of EX 15]. Officials and personnel from the nine nursing and adult homes located in the EPZ did not participate in the exercise. Such personnel are relied upon for implementation of protective action i recommendations for the residents and patients in such homes. ! Egg-App. A at II-28 thru -29, IV-173 thru -176; OPIP 3.6.5. EX'16.J. (This suboart subsumed in basis D of EX 15]. Officials from hospitals, nursing homes, and similar facilities l outside the EPZ relied upon for relocation services and necessary health care for special facility evacuees did not participate in the exercise. The LILCO Plan fails to include agreements for l such facilities which indicate an ability to provide necessary reception services, in violation of NUREG 0654 S II.J.10; instead, the Plan merely includes a list of such facilities and indicates LILCO's reliance upon them for relocation services and necessary health care for evacuees from hospitals, nursing and. l ( adult homes in the EPZ. Egg App. A at IV-166a thru -168, IV-172 thru -178; OPIP 3.6.5. EX 15.E. (Suboart F of EX 16 subsumed in this suboart). Procedures relating to the sheltering of school children (ggg OPIP 3.6.5; OPIP 3.6.1; App. A at II-19 thru -21) were excluded from the exercise. Such procedures, and the resources and capa-bilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10.
J Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of the protective action of ( sheltering have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of implementing such an action during a Shoreham emergency. The exclusion of LILCO's proposed school sheltering procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. EX 15.F. (Suboarts F and G of EX 16 and EX 26 subsumed in ; this suboart]. FEMA did not observe any demonstration of the organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of i schools, even though such a demonstration was one of the exeteise i objectives. See objective EOC 18; FIELD 15; FEMA Report at 38. Under the LILCO Plan, early dismissal is one of the primary pro ~ tective actions for school children. LILCO Plan at 3.6-7; App. A at II-19 thru -21; OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, prccedures relating to the <
\
early dismissal of schools and the ability to implement them are i ! required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J. Offici-als of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of early dismissals have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effec-tively implementing an early dismissal during a Shoreham acci- ) i dent. FEMA's failure to observe any demonstration of the ability l l to implement LILCO's proposed protective action of early dismis- j j sal during the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable l l ) l l
l assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is funda-mentally tiawed. EX 15.G. (Suboarts P and G of EX 16, EX 21, and EX 30 subsumed in this suboart). Procedures relating to the evacuation of school children, as set forth in OPIP 3.6.5 and in Appendix A at II-19 thru -21 of the LILCO Plan, which refer to non-existent school plans and rely upon school officials to locate and mobi-lize necessary personnel and equipment to implement an evacua-tion, were excluded from the exercise. Such procedures and the capability of implementing them are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.Je9 and 10. Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of school evacuations have stated-that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effectively implementing an evacuation of school children during a Shoreham accident. And the one free play message in the exercise purportedly involving simulated evacuation assistance for the Ridge Elementary School did not even purport to demonstrate the resources or capabilities of officials of that school or of the Longwood School District to implement an evacuation, and thus failed to demonstrate the resources or capabilities necessary to implement the proposed procedure for evacuation of school children set forth in the LILCO Plan. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate pro-i
-m. i
'tective measures can and'will be taken in the event of a Shoreham
' accident, asLrequired by-10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1), and precludes any finding that objectives'EOC 20 and FIELD 16 were met. According-
'ly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
EX 16.F. (This suboart subsumed in bases E, F, and G of
,EX 15].. Other than one or two persons from the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school officials and personnel, including teachers, from the two parochial schools, 13 nursery schools, and
-33 public schools located in the EPZ, as well as those from the seven school districts outside the EPZ but with children'who reside within the EPZ,'did not participate in the exercise.
Personnel from such' schools are relied upon for implementation-of
-protective action recommendations for school children'under the LILCO Plan. Egg App. A at II-19 thru -21, IV-169 thru -171; OPIP 3.6.5.
EX-26. [Not seoarately admitted but will be dealt with { under suboarts F and G of EX 15]. EOC ARCA 9 refers-to the fact that only Shoreham-Wading River Central School District partici-pated in the exercise. FEMA Report at 41. According to the LILCO Plan, all protective actions for school children are to be implemented by school-district and schcol personnel, not by
&ILCO. OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at II-19 thru -21. There are 33 public schools, 15 private and nursery schools, and one BOCES supervisory district within the EPZ; in addition, there are seven-school dintricts outside the EPZ with children who reside within the EPZ, plus three private schools and one BOCES supervisory district with buildings located just beyond the EPZ. App. A at
1 ( II-19 thru -21 and'IV-169'thru -171. The LILCO Plan relies upon I I these school officials and personnel, and their failure to j participate in the' exercise constitutes a deficiency.which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for school children in the eventoof a'Shoreham' accident. EX 30. [Not seoarately admitted but will be dealt with un-der suboart G of EX 15]. Patchogue SA ARCA 5 refers to the fact that it took 40 minutes'to dispatch a LILCO bus' driver to pick up a bus to use to simulate the evacuation of 40 children from the Ridge Elementary School. FEMA Report at'67. Under the LILCO Plan, such procedures, involving the use of LILCO bus drivers for evacuation, are relied upon for evacuation of special facilities I and nursery schools (OPIP 3.6.5), although with respect to all other schools including Ridge, LILCO assumes that regular school bus. drivers would perform necessary driving duties. This defi-ciency demonstrates LILCO's inability to promptly communicate transportation needs of members of.the public and to effectively L implement procedures to effect evacuation of special facilities. i' Thus, it precludes a finding that LILCO has adequate provisions for prompt communication among response personnel as required by l 10 CFR-5 50.47 (b)(6), or that the protective action of evacua-1 tion can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10). It also precludes a finding of reasonable assur-ence that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. . 1 I
EX 16.G. (This suboart subsumed in bases F and G of EX 15]. Other than two drivers from the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school bus dt-ivers did not participate in the exercise. School bus drivers from 10 school districts, as well as from numerous private and nursery schools, are relied upon for imple-mentation of the protective actions for school children of early dismissal and. evacuation. Seg LILCO Plan, App. A at II-19 thru
-20; OPIP 3.6.5.
EX 15.I. [Suboart A of EX 16 and EX 37 subsumed in this suboart]. Procedures for determining, issuing, and implementing protective action recommendations for the ingestion pathway EPZ (aside trom the single recommendation that dairy animals be placed on stored feed), as set forth in OPIP 3.6.6 and at pages 3.6-1 thru 3.6-4 and 3.6-7a thru 3.6-8a of the LILCO Plcn, were excluded from the exercise in that the State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise and L1LCO did not implement such procedures even for the portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ located in the State of New York. Such capabilities are required t by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F, and NUREG 0654 S II.J, and by objectives EOC 9, 12. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the 1 event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. EX 16.A. [This suboart subsumed in basis I of EX 15). The State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise beyond perhaps receiving a phone call from a LILCO " player" at approxi-macely 10:30. Connecticut is relied upon for issuance and imple- l nuntation of protective actions for the portion of the ingestion 1 pathway EPZ located within its borders. SS.a LILCO Plan at 3.6-8; OPIP 3.6.6. l EX 37. [Not seoarately admitted but incorporated into subpart I of EX 15). The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the uERO players did not determine, recommend or implement the protective actions necessary to mitigate the consequences of the radiological release in the in-gestion pathway, as required by OPIP 3.6.6, 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.ll. For the reasons set forth below, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 8 and 12 and the exercise results preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accic ent, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). , Specifically, during the exercise the LERO personnel at the EOC failed to perform any of the following actions: EX 37.A. LERO personnel failed to extend protective action recommendations for the ingestion pathway beyond the 10-mile EPZ and thus failed to mitigate the radiological consequences of the l q accident, as required by OPIP 3.6.6., SS 1, 2 and 5. According to OPIP 3.6.6., when a Site Area Emergency is declared, it is to
]
be immediately recommended that milk-producing animals in those
)
zones within two miles of the plant be placed on stored feed. I 1 __-_-_A
I OPIP 3.6.6, S 5.1.1.1.b. During the exercise, LERO made this l recommendation for zones A-F at 8:19 when the Site Area Emergency was announced. At that time, there had not yet been a signifi- i cant release and no protective actions had yet been recommended for people (except for the dismissal of school children). Pursuant to OPIP 3.6.6 5 5.1.1.1.c, at 10:24, when a General l l Emergency was declared, LERO expanded its earlier recommendation to include milk-producing animals in the entire 10-mile EPZ. At that time, LERO was recommending evacuation of the public from only zones A-M, Q and R. However, when LERO's evacuation recommendation was expanded to cover the entire 10-mile zone, well after there had been a substantial release, and there were : projections of substantial doses out to the 10-mile boundary, there was no further expansion of the recommendation to shelter milk producing animals outside the EPZ boundary and place them on stored feed. Documents generated at the EOC fail to indicate that such a recommendation was ever even considered. This failure violates OPIP 3.6.6 5 5.1.1.1.a, which expressly provides: In the early stages of an emergency, the milk pathway is the most significant. Thus, early protective actions for preventing contamina-tion of milk in the affected area are recom-mended prior to obtaining confirmatory data. LILCO's failure even to consider whether to expand its recom-mended protective measures to include the milk pathway beyond the 10-mile EPZ demonstrates LILCO's noncompliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 5 II.J.ll. E , EX 37.B. LERO personnel never recommended any protective measures for other than dairy animals, such as, for example, pigs, lambs, commercially grown ducks, turkeys, and other poul-try, either inside or outside the EPZ, and thus failed to miti-
. gate the radiological consequences of the accident as required by OPIP 3.6.6. In light of the releases projected during the exer-4 cise, such animals could have become contaminated. There is no indication that LERO personnel even considered the need for protective measures to cover these elements of the food chain.
The failure to consider and to make protective action recommen-dations for non-dairy animals constitutes noncompliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.11. EX 37.C. LERO personnel failed to make protective action recommendations concerning drinking water, fruits, vegetables and i other food chain items, contrary to OPIP 3.6.6, S 5.4.3.1. That OPIP provides that if (1) a release is in progress and (2) off-site dose projections have been completed, the public should be advised that such items may be contaminated. During the exer-cise, there was an early release (at approximately 8:30), fol-lowed by a larger release when the core melt began (at approxi-mately 11:30). Dose projections were available by 11:49. However, LILCO never warned the public of possible food chain y contamination, even though the LILCO players were told that approximate 2.y 18 percent of the public had not yet evacuated from the 10-mile EPZ by 2:40. l i _ 17 _
EX 37.D. During the exercise, LERO personnel apparently never completed the " Ground Deposition Calculation Worksheet for Particulate Radionuclides Releases," OPIP 3.5.2, Att. 3, although the necessary data were apparently available and completion of such a form is required by OPIP 3.5.2, S 5.3, and OPIP 3.6.6. For the foregoing reasons, the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan complies with 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.ll, and precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. EX 15.J. Not admitted. EX 15.K. Procedures relating to the radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees from special facilities who, ac-cording to the LILCO Plan, are to be evacuated to special recep-tion centers, were excluded from the exercise. Such procedures, and the resources and capabilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8), (b)(10); NUREG 0654 S II.J.9 and 10 and objective FIELD 21. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. EX 15.M. Procedures relating to recovery and re-entry and activities to implement recovery and re-entry, as set forth in OPIP 3.10.1 and at pages 3.10-1 thru 3.10-2 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(13), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S IV.H, and k ,.
I NUREG 0654 5 II.M. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is l
)
fundamentally flawed. EX 16.E. According to FEMA, Marketing Evaluations, Inc. did ) not participate in the exercise. FEMA Report at lii. It is relied upon for verification of siren operation and evacuation. l Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-4g, App. A at V-9, and App. B; OPIP 3.3.4. l EX 16.K. The following bus companies or yards did not participate in the exercise: (1) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- East Northport Yard (50) (2) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- Amityville Yard (74) l (3) Huntington Coach Corp. (100) (4) Herman E. Swezey Co., Inc. (29) (5) United Bus Corp. -- Ronkonkoma Yard (46) (6) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. -- Lakeland Yard (40) (7) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. -- Bayshore Yard (147) (8) Coram Bus Service -- Coram Yard (39) (9) Coram Bus Service -- Rocky Point Yard (27) (10) Louis A. Fuoco Buslines, Inc. (39) (11) Starlite Bus Co., Inc. (60) i
(12) Seaman Bus Co, Inc. (35) They are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each listed entity would provide for LILCO's use the number of buses indi-cated in parentheses above. Egg LILCO Plan, App. B.; OPIP 3.6.4. EX 16.L. The following ambulance companies did not partici-pate in the exercise: (1) Bi-County Ambulance and Ambulette (8) r' (2) Gosline Ambulance Service (5) (3) Mercy Medical Transportation Service (7) (4) .Nassau Ambulance Service (11) (5) New York Patient Aids, Inc. (18) (6) Orlando Ambulance and Ambulette Service, Inc. (6) (7) Peconic Ambulance Service, Inc. (10) (8) Transportation With Care (9) (9) Weir Metro AmbuService, Inc. (62) They are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each company will provide the number of ambulance and ambulette vehicles, manned with the necessary personnel, indicated in parentheses in the above list. Egg LILCO Plan, App. B.; OPIP 3.6.5. EX 16.M. Not admitted. EX 18.C. (Admitted as further deficiencies in sucoort of EX 15 and 16]. The exercise did not ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties. As 1
described below and in Contention EX 16, the organizations and personnel listed in Contention EX 16 did not participate in the exercise and the participation of certain other organizations was so limited that the exercise did not ensure that the personnel of J l such organizations, relied upon for implementation of the LILCO ] Plan, are familiar with their duties. Specifically: 1 (1) The " participation" of the following bus companies or yards in the exercise consisted merely of receiving a tele-phone call and a request that only four buses be prepared for LILCO's use-(the LILCO Plan assumes each yard actually will pro-vide the number of buses listed in parentheses): (a) Bruno Bus Company (30) i (b) Educational Bus Transportation, Inc. (100) (c) Suburbia Bus Corp. -- Setanket Yard (80) (d) Suburbia Bus Corp. -- Middle Island Yard (110) { (e) United Bus Corp. -- Yaphank Yard (64)' (f) United Bus Corp. -- Coram Yard (90) (g) Baumann & Sons Buses,'Inc. -- Westhampton Yard (5) 4 (h) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- Bohemia Yard (90) (ii) The " participation" of the Medibus, Inc. and Stat Equipment Corp. ambulance companies consisted only of providing 12 vehicles (six ambulances and six ambulettes). Those companies 4
are relied upon in the LILCO Plan, however, for 11 ambulances and 45 ambulettes, all 57 of which are supposed to be properly manned by trained workers. LILCO Plan, App._ B;.OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 6. (iii) The only " participation" by the Nassau County Red Cross in the exercise was the presence of two individuals in the EOC and perhaps a small number at the Nassau Coliseum. The LILCO Plan assumes that the Nassau Red Cross will provide personnel at the' reception center to identify congregate care centers, to assign evacuees to such centers, to open and operate as many congregate care centers as are necessary to handle the total number of evacuees, and to provide shelter management, food services, clothing, registration, information, nursing, medical services, and counseling. LILCO Plan at 2.2-2, 3.6-7, and 3.6-7a. (iv) The only " participation" of the U.S. Coast Guard in the exercise was to engage in telephone conversations. No actions were taken by the Coast Guard to implement or to demonstrate the capability of implementing the LILCO Plan, despite the fact that the LILCO Plan relies upon the Coast Guard ] for notification of, and communication of protective action , i recommendations to, the public on the waters of the EPZ as well as private and commercial vessel traffic control and access control on the water portion of the EPZ. LILCO Plan at 2.2-2a; App. A at IV-6. ] (v) The " participation" of the Shoreham-Wading River l School District in the exercise was limited to one or two telephone calls to one school official (the District Superin-l iime m _awmm_mmamm-m_._
tendent), and interviews with two school bus drivers located at one of the district's schools. No early dismissal, sheltering or evacuation was performed; no children were moved or otherwise involved; no teachers, principals, or other school personnel were involved; and, the two bus drivers did nothing but drive their buses to the high school when requested to do so by the Superin-tendent. The LILCO Plan, however, relies upon actions by school officials and school personnel from all the district's schools, and substantially all the school bus drivers, and the cooperation of parents, to implement an early dismissal, sheltering, or evacuation of school children. OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at II-19 thru i 1 -22. 1 1 (vi) The " participation" of Nassau County in the exercise was limited to the receipt of phone calls. According to the LILCO Plan, however, Nassau County is expected to receive regular briefings (OPIP 3.1.1, Att. 1 at 10), and to provide police officers to perform traffic control on the public roads near the Nassau Coliseum, to perform traffic control and supervise parking at the Coliseum (OPIP 4.2.3 5 2.5), and to provide security at the Coliseum. Plan at 3.6-7, 4.7-1. In addition, during the exercise, LERO personnel pretended to request that Nassau County provide social service assistance. In the exercise, Nassau County performed none of these functions. 1
t l Contention EX 17. Withdrawn. Contention EX 18.A. & B. Not admitted. l l o Contention EX 19. (Admitted for lecal arcument]. The exercis'e demonstrated a fundamental flau in the LILCO Plan resulting from FEMA's inability to make a reasonable assurance finding in LILCO's favor regarding the implementability of the LILCO Plan. FEMA stated in advance of the exercise that it would not be able to make a favorable reasonable assurance finding based on the exercise results. Egg, e.a., Letter from Samuel W. ( Speck, FEMA,.to William J. Dircks, NRC, October 29, 1985. After the exercise, FEMA reiterated this point. Egg, e.g., FEMA Report l at ix. In fact, however, FEMA's former Region II Director, Frank Petrone, stated on February 15, 1986, that a "no reasonable ascurance" finding was necessary: "Since this Plan cannot be implemented without state and loca7 3overnment participation, we { FEMA] cannot give reasonable assurance under NUREG 0654 that the public health and safety can be protected." The NRC's regulations require, as a prerequisite to licensing, that the NRC have and review FEMA " findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether thert.is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented . . . ." 10 CFR $50.47(a)(2) (emphasis added). The exercise results were so limited that FEMA was unable to make the required reasonable assurance finding. Accordingly, the i 1 exercise confirmed a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan, i.e., that i i
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the Plan, as exercised, cannot provide a basis for a FEMA
- 2asonable assurance finding. Thus, the exercise precludes the NRC from finding reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
IV. CONTENTIONS EX 20-22: FEMA'S CONCLUSIONS PRECLUDE A REASONABLE ASSURANCE FINDING Contention EX 20. Not admitted. Contention EX 21. (Suboart L of EX 15, suboart N of EX 16, suboart K of EX 22, and EX 32 constitute additional bases of EX 21 relatino to concrecate care centers). FEMA had no basis or insufficient data to support its conclusion that certain exercise objectives identified in subparts A-F below were met or were partly met during the exercise in that even with respect to the events and activ'ities which FEMA did observe, the samples which FEMA reviewed were much too small to permit valid generalizations or to support FEMA's conclusions concerning these objectives. Therefore, FEMA's conclusions on such objectives cannot support a finding of reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2). Thus, the t exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that I adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a Shoreham j (' accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). The L1LCO Plan is, therefore, fundamentally flawed. , I i t EX 21.A. Under the LILCO Plan, 60 Route Alert Drivers are expected to be available to drive through the EPZ to notify the j public of an emergency in the event of siren failure. Sea Plan, l Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 3.3.4, Att. 1. Specifically, a total of 20 j Route Alert Drivers are to be available at each of the Port i Jefferson, Patchogue and Riverhead Staging Areas to drive 33, 26 f l and 30 routes, respectively. Egg Plan, Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP.3.3.4, j Att. 3. During the exercise, however, only three Route Alert Drivers (one from each Staging Area) were dispatched by LILCO and observed by FEMA. FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74; ggg also FEMA Report at 20. Based solely on these observations, FEMA . concluded that objectives FIELD 5, SA 9, and EOC 15 were met or partly met. FEMA Report at 34, 56, 57, 62, 64, 72 and 74. The sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions was much too small to justify FEMA's generalizations with respect to all Route Alert Drivers, or LILCO's ability to notify the public in the entire EPZ. Furthermore, even with respect to the small sample observed by FEMA, FEMA found that the time necessary to brief, deploy, and drive even one route (i.e.t, assuming only one failed siren for each Staging Area) was excessive. FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74. In light of the small sample reviewed by FEMA and its conclusions even with respect to the three Route Alert Drivers it did l 1 observe, FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectives FIELD 5, SA 9, and EOC 35 are without basis and invalid. The exercise , f
results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.. EX 21.B. According to the LILCO Plan, evacuation of the transit-dependent population requires 333 LILCO bus drivers to retrieve 333 buses from 20 bus company locations, and to make 377 bus trips (using 236 buses) over 43 separate routes within the EPZ, plus 97 trips to the Nassau Coliseum. Egg OPIP 3.6.4; App. A at IV-74a thru -165d. According to the Plan, 108 bus drivers are required to make 169 bus trips from the two transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Port Jefferson Staging Area, 100 bus drivers are required to make 139 bus trips from the five transfer points-under the jurisdiction of the Riverhead Staging Area, and 125 bus drivers are required to make 166 bus trips from the four transfer points under the jurisdiction of the Patchogue Staging Area.. Egg OPIP 3.6.4, Att. 11; gf. Plan, Fig. 2.1.1. During the exercise, FEMA observed only hw2 bus drivers from each of the Riverhead and Port Jefferson Staging Areas. FEMA Report at 58, 74. After retrieving a bus from the assigned bus company yard, they each drove one EPZ route, then returned to their assigned transfer point and proceeded to the Nassau Coliseum. Based solely on its observation of two bus drivers making one run each, FEMA concluded that objective FIELD 9 was ! met by the Port Jefferson and Riverhead Staging Areas. FEMA ' Report at 58 and 74. In addition, FEMA observed four bus drivers I from the Patchogue Staging Area attempt to retrieve buses and i drive hus routes. FEMA Report at 64-65. FEMA concluded, on the l 4
basis of those drivers' inability to pick up buses or to drive rottes properly or in a timely manner, that objective FIELD 9 was Q21 met at the Patchogue Staging Area. Id. Nonetheless, based upon its observations of eight drivers making a total of eight bus runs, at least three of which were judged unsatisfactory by FEMA, FEMA concluded that objective EOC 16 was met. FEMA Report at 34. In light of the small sampling of bus drivers reviewed by FEMA, and FEMA's conclusions regarding the entire sample of bus i i i drivers reviewed at the Patchogue Staging Area, FEMA's conclu-sions as to objective FIELD 9 for Port Jefferson and Riverhead, and as to EOC 16 for the entire EPZ, are without basis and invalid, and fail to justify FEMA's generalizations about all LILCO bus drivers under the LILCO Plan. The exercise results concerning those objectives thus preclude a finding of reasonsble assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. EX 21.C. Eleven school districts (with 33 schools), one BOCES supervisory district, two parochial schools, and 13 nursery schools have school buildings located within the EPZ. In addi-- tion, there are seven school districts with no school buildings l within the EPZ but whose district boundaries include residences ; within the EPZ (i.e,, with children who live in the EPZ); and, there are three parochial schools and one BOCES supervisory dis-trict with buildings located just beyond the EPZ boundary. See OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 3; cf. App. A at IV-169 thru -171. During the i CXercise, FEMA observed two buses report to one school (Shoreham-i I
i l I I Wading River High School), where two bus drivers allegedly re-ceived maps and instructions. FEMA Report at 43. FEMA was not I i
.able to observe the organizational ability to effect an early dismissal of schools, however. FEMA Report at 38. FEMA also observed one bus, driven by a LILCO employee, arrive at the Ridge Elementary School (almost three hours after it had been "rc-quested" in a free play message). FEMA Report at 38.
Neither of the two Shoreham-Wading River buses observed by FEMA drove any early dismissal or evacuation routes or transported any children, nor had either of the bus drivers received any training or information concerning any plans for protecting or evacuating school children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Egg FEMA Report at 44-45. The free play message " requesting" a bus to Ridge Elementary School was injected by FEMA at 10:30; h0 wever a bus driver was not dis-patched to pick up a bus until 40 minutes after tne request was received by the Patchague Staging Area. F'MA E Report at 66. The bus did not arrive at the school until 1:23 (FEMA Report at 38) and, according to LILCO, even as late as 4:23, it had not arrived at the Reception Center. The bus did not transport any children, and neither the driver, the FEMA evaluator, nor any other exercise player, had any contact with any officials from the. Ridge School or the Longwood School District. The FEMA evaluator merely observed the bus arrive at and leave the school. Based solely upon these observations, however, and despite FEMA's acknowledged failure to observe LILCO's ability to effect an early dismissal, and the irrelevance of the situation postulated in the Ridge School free play message to the evacua-tion procedures in the LILCO Plan, FEMA nonetheless concluded thst objectives FIELD 15 and 16 and EOC 20 were met. FEMA Report at 38, 43. The limited observations and irrelevant sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions do not justify FEMA's generalization about the ability to evacuate all schools, school districts, and school children in the EPZ and the ability to accomplish an early dismissal of all such schools, districts and children in the event of a Shoreham emergency. In light of FEMA's limited observation, the irrelevance of the Ridge School free play message, and the size of the sample reviewed oy FEMA, FEMA's conclusions as to objectives FIELD 15 and 16 and EOC 20 are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding.of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event ; of a Shoreham accident. EX 21.D. According to the LILCO Plan, evacuation of the institutionalized, mobility-impaired population in the EPZ (excluding residents at facilities which LILCO assumes would not require transportation assistance and those in the three hospitals and the Suffclk Infirmary (cf. App. A at IV-175 and OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2)) requires 23 ambulances and 178 ambulettes fron 11 ambulance companies to make runs from the approximately j 10 special facilities in the EPZ requiring transportation assistance from LILCO (there are, altogether, 19 health care ; L__- _ _ - __ _ .
facilities, excluding hospitais, at 23 locations throughout the EPZ) to unidentified reception centers outside the EPZ. See OPIP l 1 3.6.5; App. A at IV-166a thru -168, IV-173 thru -178. During the exercise, FEMA observed only one ambulance driver and 2ng ambulette driver each drive one route. Based solely on ) its observation of these two activities, FEMA concluded that objective FIELD 13 was met. FEMA Report at 43. The sample upon j which FEMA based this conclusion was auch too small to justify 1 l FEMA's generalization abottt all ambulance and ambulette drivers j and LILCO's ability to evacuate institutionalized, mobility-1 impaired individuals from all the special facilities located in j the EPZ. In addition, based upon its observation of two drivers, l FEMA concluded that objective EOC 16 was met with respect to all j i the institutionalized, mobility-impaired residents of the EPZ. FEMA Report at 34. In light of the size of the sample reviewed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions as to objectives FIELD 13 and EOC 16 { are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that f adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. EX 21.E. Under the LILCO Plan, 165 Traffic Guides are expected to man 130 traffic control points (TCPs) in order to implement an evacuation of the EPZ. OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. More specifically, 72 Traffic Guides from the Port Jefferson Staging Area are expected to man 58 TCPs; 41 Guides from the Patchogue Staging Area are expected to man 28 TCPs; an6 52 Guides from the Riverhead Staging Area are expected to man 44 TCPs. LILCO Plan,
Fig. 2.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. During the exercise, however, FEMA apparently only observed a total of 27 TCPs manned by 32 Guides (10 TCPs with 10 Guides from Port Jefferson; nine TCPs with 14 Guides from Patchogue; and eight TCPs with eight Guides from Riverhead). Egg FEMA Report at 57, 64 and 74. Based solely on these observations, FEMA concluded that objectJves FIELD 6 and 11, SA 9, and EOC 16 and 19 were met or partly met. FEMA Report at 34, 38, 56, 57, 62, 64, 65, 72, 74 and 75. The sample upon which FEMA based these conclusions was much too small, however, to justify FEMA's generalizations with respect to all Traffic Guides, all TCPs, and evacuation and access control of the entire EPZ. Furthermore, even with respect to the small sample observed by FEMA, FEMA found (i) that the time between deployment from the staging area and arrival at TCPs was excessive -- i.e., two hours after declaration of a general emergency and well over an hour after the first evacuation recommendation -- for the eight TCPs from the Riverhead Staging Area (FEMA Report at 74); (ii) that only one out of the 14 Guides interviewed from the Patchogue Staging Area knew the location of the Reception Center (FEMA Report at 64); and, (iii) that communications between the Port Jefferson Staging Area and Traffic Guides were sometimes difficult due to poor radio reception (FEMA Report at 56). In addition, FEMA acknowledged that it was unable to render any evaluation regarding the timeliness of TCP set-up with respect to any of the 10 TCPs within the Port Jefferson Staging Area's jurisdiction. FEMA Report at 57. In light of the small sample
j 1 l reviewed by FEMA and its conclusions even with respect to the few ' TCPs it did observe, FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectiven FIELD 6 and 11, SA 9, and EOC 16 and 19 are without basis and invalid. The exercise results concerning those objectives preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. EX 21.F. During the exercise, FEMA chose only two locations to observe LILCO's ability to deal with impediments to evacuation (objective EOC 17). These two locations -- in the vicinity of TCPs 41 and 124 -- both involved simulated traffic obstructions; they were the result of a simulated accident involving a gravel truck and three cars (TCP 124) and a simulated accident involving G fuel truck (TCP 41). FEMA Report at 30, 36-38. FEMA was unable to observe LILCO's response to the fuel truck impediment (see FEMA Report at 37, 57-58), found LILCO's response to the gravel truck impediment inadequate (FEMA Report at 36-38), and concluded that objective EOC 7 was only partly met and objective EOC 17 was not met (FEMA Report at 29-30, 36-38). FEMA nonetheless concluded that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area were met and that objective FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area was partly met (FEMA Report at 34, 58, 65). Those conclusions are without basis and invalid, in light of the following facts: A.
(i) FEMA never even observed LILCO's response to the
' fuel truck impediment (which occurred within the Port Jefferson Staging Area's jurisdiction (agg App. A, Fig. 8, and FEMA Report at.57-58);
(ii) LILCO did not respond to the fuel truck impediment until more than three hours after the free play message had been injected at 11:00 (FEMA Report at 36-37, 57.) ; 4 (iii) There were substantial delays in LILCO's response l to the gravel truck impediment (which occurred within the i Patchogue Staging Area's jurisdiction, agg App. A, Fig. 8, and FEMA Report at 65); (iv) The response was inadequate for removal of the gravel truck impediment (only one tow truck was dispatched even though the simulated accident involved three cars and the gravel l truck, and no scraper was sent to remove spilled gravel from the road) (FEMA Report at 37, 65); (v) At least two hours elapsed before LILCO's Transportation Support Coordinator was informed that a bus evacuation route was potentially blocked by the gravel truck I impediment (FEMA Report at 36). In addition, the sample upon which FEMA based its conclu-sions regarding objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area was much too small to justify FEMA's generalizations with respect to the entire EPZ and LILCO's ability to implement an evacuation during a Shoreham accident. Under the LILCO Plan, 165 Traffic Guides are expected to man 130 traffic control points in 4 j
order to implement an evacuation of the EPZ. App. A, Fig. 8; OFIP 3.6.3, Att. 4. These locations are manned by LILCO because traffic must be kept moving through them in order to permit evacuees to follow the routes presctibed in the LILCO Plan. The i evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise were premised on the assumption that such prescribed routes were in fact available for full capacity use throughout the~ evacuation process. Thus, there are a substantial number of places where impediments are likely to occur because of I anticipated heavy traffic, and where their occurrence would have significant impact upon the ability to implement an evacuation, but which were ignored in FEMA's evaluation of LILCO's ability to remove impediments. Furthermore, the two locations actually chosen for the impediment demonstrations during the exercise are virtually the only locations on the evacuation routes chosen for the impediment messages which would allow easy re-routing of r evacuation traffic around the t'affic impediments, assuming arcuendo, LILCO had been able to respond to the locations of the impediments in a timely manner. In light cf the small sample of traffic impediment locations observed by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions with respect to the single attempted impediment response it did observe, and.the unique and unrepresentative impediment locations chosen by FEMA, FEMA's conclusions with respect to objectives EOC 16, FIELD 9 for the l Port Jefferson Staging Area and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area are without basis and invalid, thereby precluding a i finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. EX 15.L. [To be litioated as an additional basis of EX 21). A demonstration of the availability, accessibility, and adequacy of facilities designated to be used as congregate care centers for evacuees under the LILCO Plan (see,.e.o., OPIP 4.2.3, pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.6-7 thru 3.6-7a, 3.7-2, 3.9-6, and 4.8-1 and Appendix B of the LILCO Plan) was excluded from the exercise, in that the two facilities involved in the exercise are not among those identified in the Plan. Egg FEMA Report at 82-83. Such facilities are also not referenced in any letter of agreement from the Red Cross. Such facilities and agreements guaranteeing and demonstrating their availability, accessibility and adequacy are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10); NUREG 0654 SS II.A.3, C.4, J.10.a. and g., and J.12; and objectives FIELD 18 and 22. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by l 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is )
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fundamentally flawed. EX 32. [Not seoarately admitted but will be dealt with as an additional basis for EX 21.]. The Congregate Care Center ARCA ( refers to the fact that the two facilities used during the exercise are not part of the LILCO Plan. FEMA Report at 83. Indeed, there are no congregate care facilities identified in the LILCO Plan, nor are there agreements in the Plan which indicate
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I that any such facilities exist or are available for LILCO's use j I during a Shoreham accident. Thus, this deficiency precludes a i i finding that LILCO has adequate facilities to support the emergency response as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8), as well as a finding that the protective action of evacuation would be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10). It also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a , Shoreham accident. EX 22.K. [Not seoarately admitted but will be considered under EX 21 to extent that the basis concerns the fact that only ' two centers were activated). During the exercise, the LILCO players pretended that approximately 15 non-LILCO facilities, in addition to the two facilities observed by FEMA, were available to serve as congregate care centers, and that such facilities had a total capacity of approximately 34,900. Apparently, the LILCO players engaged in this pretense based on an assumption that the owners of such facilities, primarily schools in Nassau County, had agreed to allow LILCO and the Red Cross to use their I l facilities after a Shoreham accident. That assumption is false, i l There are no agreements between LILCO or the Red Cross and the I owners of the facilities mentioned during the exercise permitting their use as part of the LILCO Plan or following a Shoreham accident and the Red Cross has so informed LILCO. Because the j l exercise was premised on the false assumption stated in this subpart, the results of the exercise preclude a finding of j
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. -Accordingly, l the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. EX 16.N. [To be liticated as an additional basis of EX 21]. The owners of facilities, purportedly available and ralled upon to serve as congregate care centers, did not participate in the exercise, nor were the facilities themselves used or their adequacy demonstrated, during the exercise. See LILCO Plan, App. B; ggg also FEMA Report at 82. Contention EX 22. The exercise scenario and the activities, reports, and events which occurred during the exercise include or are premised upon certain assumptions, enumerated below, which conflict with established facts, uncontroverted evidence, and ASLB findings. Accordingly, FEMA's findings and conclusions identified in subparts A below, which incorporate or are based ) upon such false assumptions, are without basis and invalid, and cannot support a finding of reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2). Thus, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47 i (a)(1), and, accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. l EX 22.A. [EX 46 to be dealt with under this suboart]. In j the LILCO Plan, the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum is identi-fled as the only " reception center" for evacuees other than those with special needs. Thus, under the Plan, evacuees would be l I r l l I directed to report to the Coliseum for radiological monitoring and decontamination, registration, and direction to facilities for sheltering. Plan at 4.2-1 thru 4 2-2; OPIP 4.2.3. The exercise scenario, and FEMA's conclusions on objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9, 17, 19 and 21, are all based upon an assumption that l l the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum is available for use by l l LTLCO and the American Red Cross as a Reception Center for the registration and radiological monitoring and decontamination of j j evacuees and vehicles pursuant to the LILCO Plan. That assump-l i tion is false. In fact, there is no valid agreement permitting the use of the Coliseum as set forth in the LILCO Plan. Nassau , County has expressly refused to agree to, or permit, the use of Nassau County facilities as part of, or to implement, the LILCO Plan. Egg Nassau County Board of Supervisors Resolution No. 702B-1986, June 16, 1986. Since the basic underlying premisa of FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 16 and FIELD 9, 17, 19 and 21 were met or partly met.(agg FEMA Report at 34, 58, 74 and 80) is factually and legally incorrect, those conclusions are without basis and.are invalid. Because the exercise and FEMA's conclusions were premised on the false assumption that the Nassau Ccliseum would be available as a reception center, the reaults of the exercise preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and uill be taken. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. EX 46. [Not separately admitted but substance to be dealt with under snhoart A of EX 22]. The exercise results demon-strated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the 39 -
implementation of the Plan is deper. dent upon the availability of ; the Nassau Coliseum as the reception center for evacuees, when, in f6ct, that facility cannot be used for that purpose. The exercise was fundamentally premised on the availability and use of the Nassau Coliseum as the focus and endpoint of a supposedly orderly evacuation. It was the facility to which LERO players assumed: evacuees would go for radiological monitoring and decontamination of themselves and their vehicles; hundreds of buses and vans carrying persons out of the EPZ would report, discharge passengers, and be decontaminated; evacuees would be registered, reunited with family members, and provided with assistance in seeking health care, housing, food and other services, and from which evacuees would be provided directions, or transportation to congregate care centers for sheltering. Esgt, objectives EOC 16, FIELD 17, 19, 21; exercise EBS messages. Thus, the evacuation time estimates, traffic control strategies, and other pr) visions of the LILCO Plan purportedly implemented during the exercise, as well as all the directions, decisions, f I and actions of LERO playere during the exercise, were premised on { the assumption ths.t the ultimate goal of the emergency response was to enable evacuees to reach the Nassau Coliseum if necessary l (for monitoring and decontamination) or if desired (for reuniting ) with family members or shelter). All exercise activities relating to evacuation -- that is, everything that took place from shortly after 8:00 (when "prestaging" began) until the exercise ended at 4:30 -- were premised on the basic assumption that the Nassau Coliseum was available to LILCO to be a reception
center.- Indeed, during the exercise the LILCO players in simulated EBS radio announcements advised approximately 100,000
" evacuees" to report to the Nassau Coliseum for monitoring and decontamination because they had potentially been exposed to radiation during their supposed evacuation efforts.
The exercise thus demonstrated that the availability of the 1 Nassau Coliseum (a) is an essential element of the LILCO Plan as exercised, and (b) was an essential premise of the actions of the LERO players in atempting to implement that Plan during the exercise. The Coliseum is not in fact available for LILCO's use as a relocation center, however. Egg Nassau County Board of , l L Supervisors' Resolution, June 16, 1986. Since the exercise demonstrated-that LILCO is not capable of implementing key portions of its Pltn unless the Coliseum is available for LILCO's l use, and since LILC0 has no alternate reception center and failed to demonstrate during *.he exercise that it could implement critical aspects of its Plan, including managing an orderly evacuation, if the Coliseum were not available, the exercise demonstrated.that in fact the Plan cannot be implemented.and hence is fundamentally flawed. Therefore, LILCO failed to satisfy the exercise objectives cited in this contention, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1), (b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.A.3 and J.9, 10, and 12, and the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. EX 22.B. through E. Not admitted.
1 l
.EX 22.F. Dealt with under EX 38 and 39, a f
EX 22.G. & H. Not admitted. EX 22.I. Dealt with under EX 41. EX 22.J. Not Admitted. EY 22.K. Dealt with under EX 21. i l V. CONTENTIONS EX 23-32: MANY ARCAs IDENTIFIED BY FEMA CONSTITUTE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS Contention EX 23. Dealt with under subpart C of EX 50. Contention EX 24. Dealt with under subpart A of EX 15. Contention EX 25. Dealt with under subpart B of EX 41. Contention EX 26. Dealt with under subparts F and G of EX 15. i Contentions EX 27 and 28. Dealt with under subpart H of EX 50. Contention EX 29. Dealt with under subpart B of EX 41. C2ntention EX 30. Dealt with under subpart G of EX 15. Contention EX 31. Dealt with under subpart A of EX 49. 1 Contention EX-32. Dealt with under EX 21. VI. CONTENTIONS EX 33-34: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO NOTIFICATION Contentions EX 33. Not admitted. Contention EX 34. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of providing prompt i notification to the public in the event of a siren failure, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.E. According to the LILCO Plan, in the event of siren failure, Route Alert Drivers will be dispatched to drive through the area around the failed siren and broadcast, through loudspeakers, a notification message. LILCO Plan at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4. During the exercise, LILCO attempted f to demonstrate the capability of implementing this procedure, and to support compliance with the regulatory requirements for prompt notification and alerting of the public, in response to " free play" messages postulating the failure of three sirens (one in each staging area's territory). One Route Alert Driver was l dispatched from each staging area to drive through the simulated siren failure areas identified in the messages. In all three cases, however, the notification process took much too long, and demonstrated LILCO's failure to comply with the regulatory i requirement of prompt public notification. Specifically, as of 9:52, 90 minutes after the siren failure message had been received by the EOC, the Port Jefferson Route Alert Driver had completed only one half of his route. FEMA
Report at 57,-58. Thus, he would not have completed his entire route until about three hours after receipt of the failure message. Similarly, the Riverhead Driver did not complete his assigned route until 78 minutes after the failure message had been received by the Riverhead' Staging Area and one hour and 41 minutes after the EOC received the message of the failed siren. . The Patchogue Driver completed his route.70 minutes after receipt
.of the failure message at the Patchogue Staging Area. FEMA Report at 68, 74. Accordingly, the results of the exercise preclude a finding that LILCO complied with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5),
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.E, and-demonstrated LILCO's inability to implement its Plan. The exercise'also demonstrated LILCO's failure to satisfy objective FIELD 5. The exercise results thus demonstrated a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will'be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 1G CFR S 50.47(a)(1). VII. CONTENTIONS EX 35-37: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Contention EX 35. Not admitted. Contention EX'36. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that subsequent to their adoption of the original recommendations from the onsite staff at the EOF, LERO personnel made protective action recommendations without _ _ O
I apparent basis,' failed to consider alternative protective measures that could have resulted in more dose savings, and made inappropriate recommendation *s, in violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 S II.J.10.m. Thus, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 8 and 12 and the exercise precludes a 3 l finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures j can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Specifically, LERO personnel had no apparent basis for the decision to recommend that people in the original downwind zones -- izgt, zones A-M, Q, and R -- should as late as 3:48 leave their homes and attempt to evacuate if they had not done so earlier. EBS messages simulated every 15 minutes between 12:06 and 3:48 contained such a recommendation. The documents gen-erated at the EOC fail to indicate that any calculations or dose projections were performed to determine if this remained an appropriate recommendation for the entire period during which it was broadcast. There is no indication that the continuing appropriateness of such a recommendation was ever even carefully considered by LERO personnel in the EOC. In fact, while such EBS messages were being simulated (be-ginning at 12:06), the EOF was projecting that a wind shift would direct the plume away from the original downwind zones as early ; as 3:00. LERO personnel were aware of that projection. In light of that projection, however, it may have been more appropriate, and resulted in more dose savings, for individuals who had not yet left their homes by, for example, 2:00 or 3:00, to remain
i I i 1 sheltered in their homes until after the wind had shifted, rather I than getting on the roads with no protection before the wind shift.. After the shift, such persons may have been able to evacuate with a likelihood of less exposure and smaller doses. The failure even to consider such an alternative protective l action for those in the original downwind zones who had not yet evacuated is significant because the LERO players knew that as of 2:40, according to the exercise controller, there were still supposedly 20,550 people who had not yet evacuated. Contention EX 37: Dealt with under subpart I of EX 15. VIII. CONTENTIONS EX 38-39: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO PUBLIC INFORMATION l Contention EX 38. (Substance of basis F of EX 22 and EX 42 to be dealt with under EX 38 or 39: and first sentence of EX 44 consolidated with EX 38 and 39). The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO was unable to provide timely, accurate, consistent and non-confusing information to the news media at the Emergency News Center (" ENC"), thus failing to implement Section 3.8.B and OPIP 3.8.1 I of the LILCO Plan. The Plan provides, in pertinent part, that:
"All Public Information personnel will confer on a regular basis I I
to ensure that accurate and consistent emergency information is ; 1 being shared and discussed" (Plan at 3.8-4); news briefings at l the ENC "shall serve three purposes: ) to provide accurate information on a timely basis
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I 1 i to ensure public and media confidence i
- l to prevent misinformation and rumors"
'(Plan.at 3.8-5); and, press conferences will " provide up-to-date l
information, respond to any rumor received, and answer any ! questions the media may have." Plan at 3.8-6. Similarly, OPIP 3.8.1 provides that the LERO Coordinator of Public Information is i to " confer with the Director of Local Response . . . and the Public Information Staff at the ENC on a regular basis to main-tain consistent information content"; "obtain up-to-date infor-mation regarding offsite emergency response in preparing press releases"; and, " correct misinformation by . . . providing ac-curate information to LILCO Rumor Control personnel and answering questions regarding local response." As the examples in subparts A-Q below reveal, however, duri'ng the exercise LILCO was incapa-ble of complying with these directives. Thus, LILCO failed to ; satisfy objectives ENC 1 and 3-6, and the exercise demonstrated that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it cannot be j implemented by LERO personnel and fails to comply with 10 CFR j $ 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654 S II.G.4. t l Exercise results which individually and collectively evi-dence these LILCO failures and therefore preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident include the following: ; EX 38.A. The ENC was not declared operational until 8:25, and there was apparently no contact with the media by LERO personnel at the ENC until after that time. The first press { l l _-_ __A
briefing was not held until 8:40. Thus, the ENC provided no information at all to the media until almost three hours after the emergency was declared, and long after the 6:52 EBS message announcing the Alert condition and school closings had been broadcast. In a real emergency such a delay would result in substantial confusion, speculation, rumor generation, lack of confidence in LILCO's ability to deal with the emergency, and refusal to believe information, advice or instructions subsequently disseminated by LILCO personnel. EX 38.B. LERO News Release No. 1 announcing an Alert condition and the alleged fact that there had been no release of radiation was not provided to the press by the ENC until 8:21. Although a Site Area Emergency had been declared at 8:19 and the ENC was informed of that declaration at that time (FEMA Report at 25), no mention was made to the media at 8:21 that a Site Area Emergency had been declared, that a minor release of radiation had occurred, and that dairy animals should be placed on stored feed. Thus, the first LERO press release did not contain up-to-date information, and it was inaccurate. EX 38.C. The Site Area Emergency, radiation release, and l dairy animal recommendation was announced by EBS broadcast at l 8:41. Despite the fact that the decision to issue that EBS message was made by the LERO Director by 8:37, LERO News Release No. 2, which included the information in that EBS message, was ) not approved by the Director until 9:00. As of 9:15, it had
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still not been distributed to the press. ' I
EX 38.D. Insufficient copying capabilities at the ENC contributed to delays in the distribution of information, including EBS messages and press releases, to the media. FEMA Report at 53. EX 38.E. Insufficient and inadequate maps and displays in the media briefing room contributed to Lhe confusing and unclear information being disseminated by LERO personnel. FEMA Rep rt at 52, 54. EX 38.F. Copies of EBS messages provided to the media con-tained extraneous infortnation that should have been deleted, and thus were unclear, confusing, and inconsistent with radio broad-casts. Egg FEMA Report at 53, 54. EX 38.G. LERO press releases were distributed much too late, and were inaccurate and in conflict with other data in the public domain by the time they were provided to the media. Although the. ENC received LERO Press Release No. 3 at 10:15, it was not posted at the ENC for the press until 11:10. LERO Release No. 4 was received by the ENC at 10:45, but was not I i L posted.until 11:56. LEKO Release No. 5 covered the 10:24 ) l \ ovacuation recommendation for zones A-M, Q and R. It was ) l cpproved by the LERO Director at 11:02, but did not even arrive at the ENC until 11:36, and was not made available to the press until sometime later. LERO Release No. 6, approved by the Director at 12:25, was not posted at the ENC until 2:10; LERO Release No. 7, approved at 1:11, was received by the ENC at 1:47, j but not po;3ted for the press until 3:07. l I
EX 38.H. The LERO Director decided to recommend evacuation of the entire EPZ at 11:46 and the recommendation was announced to the public in a 12:00 noon EBS message. FEMA Report at 26. However, the ENC did not inform the media of the Director's decision, or the content of the 12:00 EBS message, which was supposedly repeated every 15 minutes thereafter, until 12:47. EX 38.I. Although LERO workers were instructed to ingest KI tablets at 9:45, LERO ENC personnel did not decide to inform the media of that fact until 1:05, and the media was then requested not to print that information. Such a delay and the attempt to conceal pertinent information about the health-threatening effects of the accident would result in further reductions in LILCO's credib!.lity and refusals of the media and the public to obey LILCO's advice during a real emergency. EX 38.J. During press conferences, LERO personnel were unable to respond satisfactorily or accurately to questions about evacuation. In addition, the ENC personnel were unable to provide any information to the media, much less accurate and timely data, concerning traffic conditions, conditions or I evacuation activity on the water portion of the EPZ, or l l protective actions for the correctional facility in the EPZ. !
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They also were unable to respond to questions about manpower at bridges and tunnels on evacuation routes, or the activities of the Nassau County Police. In addition, LERO Public Information personnel were unable to contact Marketing Evaluations, Inc. in a timely manner and therefore had no information concerning siren l activation failure.
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I EX 38.K. Not admitted. ] I EX 38.L. The log kept by ENC personnel recorded that at j 12:01, the gravel truck impediment was being removed. In fact, as of that time, no equipment had yet arrived at the site of the gravel truck impediment, and when it eventually did arrive, it was inadequate to remove the impediment. Egg FEMA Report at 36-
- 37. Thus, ENC personnel had inaccurate information which, if released, would have misled the public into believing the inter-section was clear when in fact it was not.
EX 38.M. At the 1:48 press conference, LERO personnel at the ENC were not able to respond to questions about the fuel truck imped.iment, although that impediment had arisen almost 3 hours earlier. EX,38.N. At press conferences, LERO personnel frequently misstated facts and provided inaccurate information. For exadple, at 9:16, it was incorrectly announced that the Site Area Emergency had been declared at 8:23, and that plant shutdown had occurred at 5:15. The correct times were 8:19 and 5:15. Similarly, at 11:38, LERO incorrectly announced that the winter population of the EPZ is higher than the summer population. EX 3S.0. Although LILCO Press Releases 4 and 5 were , l received by the ENC at 8:45 and 9:05, respectively, they were not given to the Media Monitoring personnel at the ENC until 9:31. EX 38.P. The Rumor Control operation, which is coordinated 1 and controlled by LERO Public Information and ENC personnel, was ineffective as described in Contention EX 39.
I 4 l EX 38.Q. Neither LILCO's proposal to expedite the dissem-1 ination of information by substituting summary information for press releases and transmitting it by computer to the ENC, nor j its proposal to add an extra LERO spokesperson at the ENC, would resolve the deficiencies revealed during the exercise, including those listed in this contention and in Contention EX 38. Nor would replacement of copying machines. Egg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 l at 7; letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1270), Att. I at 2. Contention EX 39. [ Substance of basis F of EX 22 and EX 42 to be dealt with under EX 38 or 39; and first sentence of EX 44 consolidated with EX 38 and 39). The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of dealing with rumors or responding to inquiries from the public during an emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7), and NUREG 0654 S II.G. According to the LILCO Plan, in an emergency the public is expected to call LILCO Customer Relations District Offices and Customer Call Boards to obtain information and ask questions. Plan at 3.8-5; OPIP 3.8.1. And, during the exercise, simulated EBS messages instructed the public to call LILCO 1 District Offices to have questions answered. Thus, the Plan l provides, under the heading " Correcting Misinformation," that "LILCO personnel at these locations will be provided with updated press releases. If they cannot answer the inquiry they will call the ENC.where a coordinated rumor control point will be manned by l
1 l 4 l J representatives from LERO and the Utility." Plan at 3.8-5. ! l During the exercise, LILCO employees from several LILCO District ! Offices and Call Boards responded to simulated inquiries from the j l public. As demonstrated by the examples set forth below, { however, such responses demonstrated LILCO's inability to dispel j i rumors, to correct misinformation, to provide necessary and { accurate information to the public, to provide such information in a timely manner, and to provide consistent, coordinated, and non-conflicting information to the public. Thus, LILCO failed to !
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comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), and NUREG 0654 5 II.G. It also failed to comply with the provisions of its own Plan, or to satisfy objectives ENC 1, 3-6. These examples of repeated errors and failures demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. 1 i EX 39.A, During the exercise, the LILCO District Offices and Call Boards consistently had incorrect or superseded j information concerning the status of the emergency, protective action recommendations, and other basic data. Thus, they were unable to provide accurate and esspntial information to members ] of the public or the press. Instead, if Call Board operators i received calls from the public, as postulaaed in the LILCO Plan tc occur during an actual emergency, they could have provided i l only information that was inaccurate, incomplete, inconsistent j i , and in conflict with that being released by other LILCO personnel at other locations (for example,,in EBS messages or press relesses). Egg FEMA Report at S3. For example: l , 1 l 1 1 1
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(i) The logs kept by all the LILCO Call Board opera-tors, including, for example, those kept by the Port Jefferson, Patchogue, and Brentwood Customer Call Board operators, indicate that the information available to them until approximately 11:00 stated that a Site Area Emergency existed, even though a General Emergency had been declared at 9:39. (ii); The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word that people in zones A-M, Q, and R had been advised to evacuate until approximately 12:35, even though that advisory had first been issued to the public at 10:24. (iii) The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word that LERO had recommended evacuation of the entire EPZ until approximately 2:00, even though that advisory had first been made at approximately 12:00 noon. (iv) The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word of the declaration of an Unusual Event until approximately 8:15, although that declaration was in fact made at 5:40; similarly, the Call Board operators did f not receive word that an Alert had been declared until approximately 8:30, although the declaration was made at 6:17 and an EBS message was aimulated at 6:52.
(v) The Call Board logs' indicate that most call Board operators did not receive word that schools were supposed to be implementing _early dismissals until approximately 8:50, although an EBS message regarding early school closings was simulated at 6:52. EX 39.B. During the exercise, LILCO ..sonnel were unable to provide prompt responses to simulated rumor messages, which were in the scenario purporting to be telephone inquiries from - members of the public to LILCO Call Boards and District Offices. Instead, responses were generally delayed by more than 30 minutes, and frequently longer. For example: (i) A. rumor message inquiring whether the appliances in the caller's home were radioactive was given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 1:45; a response was not relayed to the caller until 2:24. (ii) A rumor message inquiring what to do about ? daughter not yet home from Shoreham-Wading River High School was given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 10:00; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:52. > l (iii) A rumor message inquiring whether the caller, from Bellport, should evacuate was given to the Patchogue Call Board l operator at 12:05; a response was not relayed to the caller until. i 1:00. 1 (iv) A rumor message inquiring about how extensive evacuation will be, and what to do about trucks going into the Shoreham area, was given to the Hicksville Call Board operator at 7:51; a response was not relayed to the caller until 8:20.
(v) A rumor message inquiring whether the cooling towers on the Shoreham plant had blown up was given to the Riverhead Call Board operator at 1:30; a response was not relayed to the caller until 2:48. (vi) A rumor message inquiring if lobsters caught off the Shoreham jetty that morning were safe to eat was received by the Riverhead District Office at 11:30; a response was not relayed to the originating party until 12:28. (vii) A rumor message from a caller whose husband works at the plant and was not home yet, inquiring whether he had been hurt, was given to the Brentwood Call Board operator at 12:43; a i response was not relayed to the caller until 1:30. (viii) A rumor message inquiring whether the plant had been taken over by Arab terrorists was received at 9:54; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:37. l - (ix) A rumor message inquiring what to do with a horse was given to the Port Jefferson Call Board operator at 10:14; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:47. (x) A rumor message inquiring how to get off Shelter Island because the ferry had been cancelled was given to the l Hamptons Call Board operator at 2:52; a response was not relayed { to the caller until 3:24. , 1 (xi) A rumor message from a caller who lived in Medford, but worked in Melville, inquiring what he should do was j l l l given to the Huntington Call. Board operator at 2:32; a response j l was not relayed to the caller until 3:05. l I __------_---_u
(xii) A rumor message inquiring if he could eat the food in his refrigerator was given to the Babylon Call Board operator at 11:59; a response was not relayed to the caller until 12:29. (xiii) A rumor message from a dsiry farmer asking what to do if he is asked to evacuate was received at 9:38; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:12. EX 39.C. During the exercise, rumor control personnel were unable to provide accurate, satisfactory, or reasonable advice or information to simulated public inquiries set forth in rumor messages. Instead, such personnel frequently provided inaccurate or superseded information or demonstrated poor judgment in responding. For example: (i) In response to an inquiry (at 7:51) from a person who "has trucks going to Suffolk," as to how extensive evacuation would be, the Hicksville Call Board operator responded (at 8:20) that the only protective action was the closing of schools, and that there had been no evacuation recommended. As of 8:20, however, LERO was already beginning to " pre-stage" for an evacuation, and a Site Area Emergency had been declared. In light of these facts, it was inappropriate and dangerous to advise the simulated caller to proceed as planned with sending trucks into the EPZ area. (ii) In response to an inquiry at 11:30 (Rumor Control Question No. 11) whether lobsters caught that morning on the Shoreham jetty were safe to eat or touch,'the Riverhead Call Board operator responded (at 12:28) that there was no reason to believe, and no data to indicate, that anything was wrong with l l the lobsters. As of 12:28, hcwever, there had already been a j major release of radiation, and the entire EFl had been advised to evacuate. In light of these facts, it was inappropriate to advise the simulated caller to eat the lobsters, without even inquiring as to when that morning they had been caught, and where the caller was locattd. (iii) In response to a rumor message from The New York Times, simulated at 8:45, and inquiring "what's going on" at the Shoreham plant, the rumor control responder related that at 5:40 an Unusual Event had oeen declared, and at 6:17 an Alert had been declared. By 8:45, however, a Site Area Emergency had been declared, schools had been closed and simulated EBS messages had advised that dairy animals be put on stored feed. Thus, the information provided by LILCO's rumor control personnel was inac-curate, misleading, and inconsistent with information being dis-seminated by other LILCO personnel. (iv) In response to a rumor message simulated at 3:15, inquiring whether there had been a release, the rumor control responder provided data as of 1:00. Thus, the information pro-vided was inaccurate at the time given, and was misleading and inconsistent with information being disseminated by other LILCO personnel. l (v) A rumor message simulated at 11:45 was purportedly from Dan Rather, who wanted "to take a TV crew into the Shoreham plant," and inquired how to get there. In response, the rumor control responder stated "We don't advise going to the plant. I There is a Site Area Emergency. You will be in the way." The !
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l l responder then gave directions to the plant. At 9:39, however, a General Emergency had been declared and as of 11:45, LILCO was q recommending that almost all of the EPZ be evacuated. (At 11:46, the decision was made to evacuate the entire 10-mile EPZ.) The
-suggestion that going to the plant was inadvisable but nonetheless possible was incorrect, and such suggestion, combined '
with the giving of road directions to the plant, indicated ' extremely poor judgment. (vi) In response to a rumor message simulated at 1:17 l inquiring "what areas are to be evacuated," the rumor control i responder at 1:21'related that zones A-M, Q and R should evacu-I { ate. By 12:00, however,.u simulated EBS message had advised that the entire 10-mile EPZ was to evacuate. Thus, the information provided by LILCO's rumor control personnel was inaccurate, misleading, and inconsistent with information being disseminated by other LILCO personnel. (vii) A rumor message was simulated at 1:15 from a caller in Wading River who reported that. people on his street were evacuating, that he could not walk, and did not know what to I do. The response to this call apparently was a recording that ! i the office had been " closed due to conditions at the Shoreham j i plant," and giving the telephone numbers for electrical emer- i i gencies. The failure to properly advise the caller how to l arrange for transportation for the mobility impaired was grossly j improper.
I As the foregoing examples illustrate, the exercise demon-strated that LILCO is incapable of implementing its proposed rumor control procedures, or providing accurate, necessary, and consistent information to the public during an emergency, as 1 required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654, S II.G.3.c. Accordingly, the Plan is fundamentally flawed and the exercise j l precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate j protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). EX 44. [First sentence admitted and consolidated with EX 38 and 39; remainder not admitted). The exercise revealed a funda-mental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that as a result of LILCO's ina-bility to provide accurate, clear, consistent and non-conflicting information to the public (agg Contentions EX 38, EX 39, EX 40.C
& D, EX 42.D, EX 43.A, EX 45), there would be a substantial evac-uation shadow -- or voluntary evacuation of persons not advised to evacuate -- in the event of a Shoreham accident. Egg 21 NRC at 644, 670.
I EX 22.F. [Not separatelv admitted but substance of basis F will be dealt with under EX 38 or 39]. During the exercise, j the exercise players assumed that even in light of the actions taken by them in responding to the accident scenario, members of the public would follow all LILCO protective action recommenda-tions, no one would begin to evacuate until after 10:24 when the first EBS evacuation advisory was simulated, and throughout the entire simulated accident, no one who was not expressly advised to evacuate would attempt to do so. Thus, the actions taken by l l
LERO during the exercise, as well as FEMA's conclusions con-cerning objectives EOC 12, 16, SA 9, and FIELD 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 21, and 22, all assume that given the accident postulated during the exercise, and given the response of LILCO players to that accident during the exercise: (i) there would be no voluntary evacuation at any time by any persons not advised to evacuate, and (ii) there would be no evacuation activity at all prior to the first issuance of an evacuation advisory at 10:24. For example, the actions of LILCO players during the exercise assumed, inter alia: no evacuation or mobilization traffic, accidents, or impediments cn the roads prior to the first evacuation advisory (indeed, no impediments at all, except the two postulated in the " free play" messages, which LILCO was unable to remove); no evacuees ever on the roads, seeking assistance, or needing bus or ambulance transportation, other than those advised to evacuate by LILCO; no bus companies or ambulance companies refusing or being unable to make vehicles immediately available to LILCO because they were in use to j evacuate persons other than those intended by LILCO; and no ) persons reporting to the Reception Center, other than the 100,000 j 1 advised to do so by LILCO. These assumptions are false. In fact, if the accident pos-tulated in the exercise had actually occurred, and the activities of the LILCO players in response had actually been taken, evacua-tion activities by members of the public, both inside and outside the EPZ, would actually have started much earlier, in response to LILCO's actions such as, for example: (a) the first EBS an-1 l nouncement of the emergency, which included the advisory to close all schools (issued at 6:52); (b) the advisory to put dairy ani-mais in zones A-E on stored feed (issued at 8:41); and (c) calls to bus companies to attempt to obtain buses for use in evacuating the public (simulated calls by LERO players began at 8:05). Egg FEMA Report at 26, 35. And, substantial numbers of people, in I addition to just those residing in the zones advised to evacuate in the LILCO EBS messages, would actually attempt to evacuate. Based-upon survey research data, public response to the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, findings of the ASLB (21 NRC at 670), and i for the reasons set forth in Contention EX 44, such voluntary j i evacuation, or evacuation shadow behavior, would in fEct occur in I light of (a) the contents of LILCO's EBS messages, (b) the con-tents and timing of its press advisories (agg Contention EX 38), (c) its rumor control activities during the exercise (agg Contention EX 39), (d) conflicting and inconsistent information and press reports (agg Contentions EX 38-40), (e) pre-existing perceptions and fears of Long Island residents concerning nuclear accidents, (f) and LILCO's lack of credibility. Furthermore, such evacuation would have had a substantial impact on the ability of LILCO players actually to perform the various activities undertaken or simulated by them during the exercise. They would not have been able to perform even the few activities they were able to demonstrate or " simulate" success-fully during the exercise if they had had to deal with the actual public response to the postulated accident and the LERO actions responding to that accident during the exercise. 1 l Since the actions of the LILCO players and the conclusions l drawn by FEMA from such actions were all premised on the false assumptions set forth above, FEMA's conclusions that objectives EOC 12, 16, SA 9, and FIELD 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 21 and 22 were met or oartly met (agg FEMA Report at 32-33, 34, 43, 56, 57, 58, 62, 64, 65, 66, 72, 74, 80 and 82) are without basis and invalid. Because the exercise was premised on the false assumptions stated in this subpart, the results of the exercise preclude c finding 1 of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and 4 will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. EX 42. [Not separately admitted but evidence related to I matters raised in EX 42 will be heard under EX 38, )9, 41, and _ l 10]. During the exercise, the LERO players were required to respond to a limited number of factual situations, events, situations or possibilities -- such as free play messages, questions from evaluators, or situations caused by their own i errors -- that required LERO players to improvise appropriate I actions instead of t-dng ab.e to follow prearranged response patterns -- such as those set forth in OPIPs and LILCO training materials. The response by LERO personnel to euch surprises, unknowns, or tests of their knowledge during the exercise con-cistently resulted in inappropriate actions (and in some in-etances inappropriate corrective actions as well, which com-pounded the error), incorrect responses, and actions or responses inconsistent with the LILCO Plan and/or common sense. Examples of such repeated and consistent failures by LERO perscnnel to respond as;necessary and appropriate te, the minimal number of surprises and unknowns involved in the exercise are set forth in subparts A-G'below. f Collectively and individually, LILCO's incorrect actions.in f response to unexpected situations demonstrate a fundamental flaw
'in the LILCO Plan, in that LILCO pert.onnel are unable to imple-ment _ adequate responses'as called for by the LILCO Plan during even a simulated emergency involving a minimal number of sur-prises and unknowns. In an actual emergency, there would be many
.more unexpected situations than occurred in the limited
< ' February 13 exercise which was largely scripted by LILCO, parti-cularly since, in a real emergency, the full complement of LERO personnel and supporting organizations would be expected to participate and several hundred thousand citizens of Long Island would attempt to take protective actions. LILCO's failure to handle even the limited number of unexpected events which occurred on February 13 is thus a strong demonstration that the LERO players are incapable of implementing the Plan and demonstrates that LILCO failed to satisfy many critical exercise objectives, including EOC 1, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, 20, ENC 3, 5, SA 1,'2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, FIELD 8, 9, 10, 13, 16. Accordingly, the exercise results demonstrated fundamental flaws regarding LILCO's ability to implement the Plan which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an actual Shoreham. emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
EX 42.A. FEMA inserted two free play road impediment mes-sages, requiring LERO players to respond to particular events which had not been specifically planned for in advance. As set forth in the FEMA Report (at 30, 36-38, 57-58, 65) and in Contention EX 41 (particularly subpart B), LERO's responses to i the impediments were untimely, ineffective, and confused, demon-strating LERO's inability to deal with unexpected situations. EX 42.B. LILCO failed to respond adequately, appropriately or in a timely manner to a free play message requesting LERO essistance in evacuating 40 children from the Ridge Elementary School in that: (i) Although the request for a bus to be dispatched to Ridge Elementary School was made at about 10:30, the bus apparently did not arrive at the school until approximately 1:23
-- almost three hours later. FEMA Report at 38, 66. Although LERO personnel were aware of this lengthy delay, no actions were taken to check on the driver's whereabouts or to speed up his arrival.
(ii) As late as 4:23 -- almost six hours after the request for the bus for the Ridge Elementary School had been made q
-- the bus still had not arrived at the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center. LERO personnel took no action in response to this information even though it indicated that 40 simulated children and a bus had apparently never made it out of the EPZ.
EX 42.C. Responding to simulated rumor messages and customer inquiries required LILCO to demonstrate an ability to ( handle unexpected situations since rumors necessarily involve the 1
]
l 1
, .1
i unexpected. As documented by the examples set forth in the FEMA l l Report (at 53) and in Contention EX 39, the LERO rumor control 1 staff demonstrated repeatedly that it is incapable of responding effectively to unexpected situations. 4 EX 42.D. LILCO's Traffic Guides were incapable of responding adequately to the kind of inquiries that must be
)
expected from evacuees during a Shoreham emergency, but which are not expressly discussed with responses set forth in the " Traffic Guide Procedure" in OPIP 3.6.3. For example, only one Traffic i l Guide out of the 14 interviewed by FEMA from the Patchogue Staging Area know the location of the Nassau Coliseum Reception-Center, and one Traffic Guide believed that the general public was to be directed to LILCO's EWDF during an actual emergency. FEMA Report at 64. LILCO's Traffic Guides also were not aware of the chain of command for authorization of exposures in excess of the general public PAGs, or that this would be a voluntary act on their part. In addition, some Traffic Guides indicated to FEMA evaluators that they might question the authorization of other LILCO personnel (specifically, the Lead Traffic Guides) egarding l excess exposure. FEMA Report at 69. The behavior of the Traffic Guides interviewed by FEMA thus evidenced the inability of such personnel to cope with unrehearsed situations, including l inquiries from evacuees, which would in fact be likely to arise in a real emergency. Such inability is significant because, l under the LILCO Plan, Traffic Guides are likely to be the ' primary, if not only, emergency response personnel to whom ovacuees would have personal access.
EX 42.E. LILCO's bus drivers were incapable of carrying out their ansigned responsibilities and duties during the exercise when asked to locate bus yards and drive routes that had not been previously practiced, even though precisely such random and unrehearsed assignments are contemplated in OPIP 3.6.4. For example, of the four bus drivers dispatched from the.Patchogue Staging Area and evaluated by FEMA, one missed part of his assigned evacuation route, one went to the wrong bus transfer point and completed his route only after being prompted by the i Federal evaluator, and one took over two hours to get to his bus transter point from the staging area because he initially went to the wrong bus garage. Egg FEMA Report at 64-65. EX 42.F. LERO was incapable of responding appropriately when, under the exercise scenario, events and situations esca-lated faster than the players had anticipated. For example, when a General Emergency was declared at 9:39, LERO had not fully mobilized its emergency personnel and was unable to dispatch in an adequate and timely manner even those personnel who had re-ported for duty. As a result, Traffic Guides arrived at their assigned TCPs well after evacuation had been advised by LILCO; bus drivers were not dispatched to pick up their buses from bus company yards and, thereafter, to proceed to their assigned bus j transfer points until over two hours after the declaration of a Site Ar'ea Emergency and over one hour after the declaraton of a General Emergency; and Road Crews, Route Spotters and Route Alerting Drivers were also delayed in carrying out the duties and ! responsibilities assigned to them under the LILCO Plan. And, 1 l
-J
although these events during the exercise rendered false the statements in EBS messages that Traffic Guides were in place to assist evacuees and buses were travelling routes to pick up evacuees, LILCO did nothing to correct the messages, or otherwise to modify their activities to deal with the realities created by their own actions, which differed from the scenario exercised and assumed in the LILCO Plan. EX 42.G. During the exercise, ENC personnel were required to respond to media questions and exercise events and actions that had not been scripted by LILCO or set forth in the llan or i OPIps. As set forth in Contention EX 38, they consistently failed tv do so, thus evidencing their inability to perform the precise functions they are required to perform under the Plan. IX. CONTENTIONS EX 40-45: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Contention EX 40. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the Plan fails to provide any traffic assistance or guidance for evacuees until long after they are likely to be on the roads attempting to evacuate. Under the LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise, it is assumed that Traffic Guides will be at their Traffic Control Posts, " guiding" motorists and implementing traffic control strategies to assure that evacuees will follow the evacuation routes prescribed by the Plan, during i the entire evacuation process. Eee, e.o., App. A at IV-5 thru
-72e and V-2; OPIP 3.6.3. Indeed, every LILCO EBS message sup-
I i 1 posedly broadcast every fifteen minutes, beginning with the
]
message simulated at 10:24, stated that LERO Traffic Guides would be in place along evacuation routes to guide evacuees. However, i for the reasons set forth in more detail below, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), NUREG 0654 II.J.9 and J.10, LILCO failed to satisfy objectives EOC 7, 11, 16, SA 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, FIELD 9, 11 and the exercise precludes a finding that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident. Specifically: EX 40.A. During the exercise and pursuant to the LILCO Plan . (Plan, Figs. 3.3.3 and 3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.3; OPIP 3.6.3), the LERO Traffic Guides were not notified of the emergency or required to report to the staging areas until after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. That declaration occurred at approximately 8:19, and the Traffic Guides were presumably notified of the emergency j beginning shortly thereafter. By 9:00, only two Traffic Guides had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area (52 Traffic Guides are required under the Plan); only one had reported to the Port f Jefferson Staging Area (72 are required under the Plan); and one l ! had reported to the Patchogue Staging Area (41 are required under l the Plan). At 9:40, still only 19 had reported to Riverhead, 10 to Port Jefferson, and 37 to Patchogue. Thus, at the time a l I General Emergency was declared -- 9:39 -- only 40 percent of the I f f LERO Traffic Guides essential to the implementation of evacuation l l according to the LILCO Plan were mobilized; none were at their 1 posts in the field to perform their duties under the Plan. I l i
l l EX 40.B. Pursuant to OPIP 3.6.3 and during the exercise, no l Traffic Guides were dispatched from the three staging areas until j after the evacuation recommendation had been made to the public by simulated EBS message. And, subsequent to their being I dispatched, it took substantial amounts of time before Traffic . i Guides' arrived at their posts and were in a position to perform I the functions which the Plan and the evacuation time estimates used during the exercise assume will be performed throughout the ; entire evacuation p'rocess. Specifically: f l (i) During the exercise, the EBS messages recommending i evacuation were simulated at 10:24 (zones A-M, Q, and R) and i I 11:46 (entire EPZ). The dispatch of Traffic Guides began at Riverhead at 10:25 and 12:00, and was not completed until shortly after 11:00 and approximately 12:20, respectively. Traffic Guides at Port Jefferson were dispatched beginning at 10:30; the process was not completed until either 12:20 or 12:49. Dispatch-ing at Patchogue began at 10:30 and was completed at approxi- J mately 10:59. (ii) Traffic Guides from the Patchoque Staging Area did not begin arriving at their posts until 11:00, with the last Guide reporting his arrival at 11:40. From the Port Jefferson Staging Area where dispatching was not completed until either i I i 12:20 or 12:49, Traffic Guides took up to 58 minutes to arrive at their posts. The Riverhead Traffic Guides observed by FEMA did l t J l not arrive at their posts until between 11:50.and 12:10. Egg FEMA Report at 74. And, other Riverhead Traffic Guides were l I
h still~notiat their posts as of.12:50, even though in at least'one case (TCP 26), the Guide had been dispatched at 11:08 -- almost 2
< hours earlier.
Thus, even assuming arque,nda that no one would attempt to evacuate prior to the EBS announcement at 10:24, the LILCO Plan, as demonstrated during the exercise, fails to provide any evacu-ation assistance, or the " guidance" necessary to ensure that evacuees follow the prescribed routes which form the basis of the evacuation time estimates used during the exercise, until'long after evacuces would.be on the road attempting to evacuate.. In-deed, LILCO does not even have the potential capability to' pro-
' vide such. assumed assistance and guidance under the Plan as
~
writt'en, since according to the Plan no Traffic Guides are to be dispatched until after there has been an. evacuation order. EX 40.C. Assuming arcuendo that no members of the public i I would seek to evacuate prior to the simulated EBS evacuation advisory at 10:24, once that radio broadcast had been'made. people would expect LILCO Traffic Guides to be in place to provide assistance and. guidance with respect to evacuation routes. The EDS. message supposedly aired during the exercise at 10:24 so states, and that message was supposedly repeated every 15 minutes. Thus, according to LILCO's own emergency information
. repeatedly disseminated to the public beginning at 10:24, Traffic Guides would be in place. This information was false, and the LILCO personnel who issued'it knew or should have known that it was false. The provision in the LILCO' Plan requiring the issuance of such a false and misleading statement, and the actual
use of such a message during-the exercise, is a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan, and constitutes a violation of 10 CFR S.50.47(b)(7). In addition, by creating public expectations that , such evacuation assistance, including directions and guidance as to evacuation routes, was available, when, in fact, it was not, the likelihood is substantially. increased that none of LILCO's recommendations for other emergency information would be believed or followed by the public. EX 40.D. Not admitted. EX 40.E. Finally, attempting to dispatch Traffic Guides to i those Traffic Control Posts within a 2-mile zone of the plant upon the issuance of an evacuation order, even assuming arauendo that the " dispatch" activities could be accomplished more'expe-ditiously than they were during the exercise, would not correct or even substantially lessen the defect inherent in the LILCO Plan. (Egg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harld R. Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 at 16.) In light of the notification and reporting provisions for Traffic Guides, and the realities that an evacuation order can swiftly follow a Site Area Emergency declaration and evacuation will begin prior to an official evacuation advisory, such an attempted "fix" to the fundamental defect in the LILCO Plan would be ineffective. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in subparts A through 1 E, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it fails to j I comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG.0654 S II.J. The 1 i
exercise thus precludes s a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a-Shoreham emergency. Contention ^EX 41. -(Basis I of EX 22 and EX 42 to be dealt
, 'with under EX 41]. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental. flaw
.in the LILCO Plan and in LILCO's ability to control'and manage an-orderly evacuation of the EPZ pursuant to that Plan in that the Plan fails to provide -- and LILCO failed to demonstrate -- an ability'to remove impediments from the roadways until long after evacuation had begun. There are likely to be accidents and.other
- events ; creating blockages on evacuation routes during a Shoreham-emergency. LILCO's inability to deal with such impediments will cause delay in the implementation of protective actions and
-preclude LILCO from managing an orderly evacuation of the EPZ.
Under the LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates used by 1 the LILCO players during the exercise, it is assumed that evacuees.will be able to, and will, follow the LILCO-prescribed evacuation routes, and that Road Crews will remove impediments efficiently so that the prescribed routes remain open and available for use at full capacity during the entire evacuation process.. Egg, gtgt, App. A at IV-19, -23, V-1 thru -5, Table j i XII, and Fig. 8; OPIP 3.6.3. Not only did the exercise reveal i that LILCO's proposal for the removal of impediments to l 1 evacuation is inherently unworkable, but it also demonstrated that the LERO players were incapable of properly responding to, much less " removing," the " impediments" created by FEMA's free L _ 73 -
play messages. For the reasons set forth in more detail below, the exercise results demonstrated fundamental flaws in LILCO's Plan, noncompliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.10.k, and failure to satisfy exercise objectives, including EOC 5, 7, 8, 11, 16, 17, SA 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and FIELD 9, 10. Thus, the exercise results preclude a finding that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident. EX 41.A. During the exercise and according to the LILCO Plan (Plan, Fig. 3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.2; OPIP 3.3.3; OPIP 3.6.3), the LERO Road Crews were not notified of the emergency or required to report to the staging areas until after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Such declaration was made at approximately 8:19. Even on February 13, when the LERO personnel were on notice that they would be called to report for duty, most Road Crew personnel , did not arrive at the staging areas until well after 10:00. Thus, at 9:00, only one Road Crew member had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area (10 are required under the Plan), none had reported to Port Jefferson (14 are required under the Plan), and none had reported to Patchogue (14 are required under the Plan). At 9:40, after a Gen *xal Emergency had been declared, only two had reported to Riverhead, none to Port Jefferson, and two to I Patchogue. By 10:00, eight had reported to Riverhead, one to j l l Port Jefferson, and five to Patchogue. And at 10:20 -- about the I 1 time of LILCO's EBS announcement advising evacuation -- still only 8 had reported to Riverhead, seven to Port Jefferson, and 10 l
)
to Patchogue. Thus, at the time a General Emergency was declared
-- 9:39 -- only 10.5 percent of the Road Crew personnel essential to the implementation of the LILCO Plan were mobilized, even though the circumstances -- a pre-announced exercise -- were designed to maximize the likelihood of good LILCO performance.
In fact, even at the time of LILCO's evacuation advisory, only about 65 percent of LILCO's Road Crew personnel were mobilized, even though the circumstances -- a pre-announced exercise -- were designed to maximize the likelihood of good LILCO performance. Thus, even assuming that no member: of the public attempted to evacuate prior to the evacuation order, at the time of that order the LERO personnel essential to the implementation of the recommendation according to the LILCO Plan were not even fully mobilized.1 EX 41.B. [EX 25 and 29 to be dealt with under this suboart). LILCO was incapable of responding as required to either of the two free play messages indicating existence of major road impediments, one involving a gravel truck and three cars, and the other involving a fuel truck. See FEMA Report at 1 Pursuant to OPIP 3.6.3, during the exercise the Road Crew l personnel were not dispatched from the three staging areas until l after the evacuation recommendation had been made to the public by simulated EBS message. The dispatch of Road Crew personnel began at Riverhead at about 10:47 and was completed at about 11:00; it began at about 10:46 at Port Jefferson and was ! completed at about 12:40 (with two Road Crews having to travel to l Brentwood to pick up their tow trucks); it began at about 10:45 ! at Patchogue, and was completed at abcut 11:28. Subsequent to l their being dispatched, it took substantial time before crews l were in a position to drive to an identified impediment in the I field and attempt to remove it. Thus, for example, as noted in l subpart B of thic contention, a Road Crew to deal with the j simulated fuel truck impediment did not arrive at the impediment scene until about 2:10, three hours after it had been dispatched, f FEMA Report at 37, 57-58.
30, 36-38, 57-58, 65. For example, although FEMA's free play messages were injected at about 10:40 for the gravel truck accident and 11:00 for the fuel truck accident (FEMA Report at 36): (i) The Evacuation Route Coordinator failed to advise the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route Spotters / Road Crews of pertinent facts, including that the gravel truck impediment was a multiple vehicle accident, that the fuel truck impediment involved the possibility of fire since fuel was leaking, and that both shoulders of the road were blocked by the fuel truck. Such facts were required to be communicated under LILCO's Plan (agg OPIP 3.6.3), and the consequence of not doing so during the exercise was to delay substantially LILCO's response to the im-pediments (by approximately three hours for the fuel truck impediment). Egg FEMA Report at 30, 36-37, 57. (ii) The LERO Evacuation Coordinator, who is to be kept informed of any problems with implementing an evacuation of the EPZ, including impediments or suspected impediments (Egg OPIP 3.6.3), was not informed of either the gravel truck or the fuel I truck impediment until after about 12:13, and even then it was FEMA, not any LERO personnel, which brought information regarding the impediments to the Evacuation Coordinator's attention. FEMA Report at 36. Only thereafter did the Evacuation Coordinator discuss LILCO's response to the impediments with his staff. Notwithstanding that FEMA-prompted discussion, however,
> _ - -_ -_ _ __D
(a) As late as 12:40, the Transportation Support Coordinator had not been informed that a bus evacuation route was potentially blocked by the gravel truck; (b) As late as 1:48, the Road Logistics 1 Coordinator had not been informed that equipment needed to be sent to the site of the fuel truck accident (despite the fact ! Miat the Evacuation Coordinator had discussed the situation with respect to road logistics with members of his staff as early as 12:16). As a result, the Road Crew assigned to the fuel truck
' impediment did not arrive at the scene of the simulated impediment until approximately 2:10 -- over three hours after the impediment had first been made known to LILCO by FEMA. FEMA Report at 36, 57.
(c) There was no EBS broadcast, or other public dissemination of information about the impediments, until 1:45. (iii) LILCO's response, once it had finally begun, was inadequate with respect to both simulated impediments. (a) Only one tow truck was dispatched to the scene of the gravel truck impediment and no scraper was sent to remove spilled gravel from the road. As a result, there was inadequate equipment available to remove the impediment, which would have required 30 minutes or more to clear even with the proper equipment. Egg FEMA Report at 37, 65. (b) Although Road Crews from the Port Jefferson Staging Area were dispatched by 11:50, the Road Crew assigned to respond to the fuel truck impediment (within Port Jefferson's area of responsibility) did not arrive at the impediment scene
until about 2:10, by which time the FEMA evaluator had left. FEMA Report at 57-58. At about 11:15, the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator at the EOC had requested the Port Jefferson Evacuation Support Coordinator to dispatch the Route Spotter on whose route the fuel truck impediment was located. This Route Spotter, however, was not dispatched until about 12:02, a delay of over 45 minutes which interfered with verification of the > impediment. FEMA Report at 37. EX 25. [Not seoarately admitted but to be dealt with under suboart B of EX 41). EOC ARCA 8 refers to a delay of 45 minutes between an attempt to have field workers verify a fuel truck impediment and the dispatch of a Route Spotter from the Port Jefferson Staging Area. FEMA Report at 41. According to the LILCO Plan, all coordination of and decisionmaking concerning evacuation, including the direction of Traffic Guides, rerouting of traffic, and identification and responding to traffic Eeg OPIP I impediments, is performed by personnel at the EOC. 3.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3. In order to be able to make necessary 4 decisions, achieve a coordinated response, and implement an l evacuation, the coordinators and decisionmakers in the EOC must have accurate and timely information from the field. Without such information, an evacuation cannot be accomplished according to the LILCO Plan. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that an evacuation can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), and precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shorehe.m accident. l l I ' 1
)
EX 29. [Not seoarately admitted but will be dealt with under suboart B of EX 41]. Patchogue SA ARCA 2 refers to the fact that appropriate personnel and equipment were not dispatched to remove the simulated multiple vehicle accident road i impediment. FEMA Report at 67. The LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates in the Plcn and used during the exercise assume that prescribed evacuation routes are clear of impediments and available for use by evacuees. App. A at V-2. Under the Plan, Road Crew personnel are assumed to be available, appropriately equipped, and capable of quickly removing any impediments that appear during an evacuation. OPIP 3.6.3. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) as well as a finding that adequate emergency equipment to support the emergency response is available as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8). It also precludes a finding of ! reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. EX 41.C and D. Not admitted. EX 41.E. The proposal to add a Traffic Engineer to the LERO personnel at the EOC (ggg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold R. Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 at 1) would f not. eliminate the flaws in the Plan which were demonstrated by the exercise, since that person's assigned task would be "to essist in evaluating road impediments and developing alternate routing." Even assuming such a person could provide such i
" assistance," it would have no impact on the basic structural flaws in the Plan and demonstrated incapacities of LERO personnel described in this contention.
EX 22.I. [Not seoarately admitted but will be_ dealt with under EX 41]. During the exercise, two impediments to evacuation were postulated in " free play" messages. FEMA's conclusions on j objectives EOC 16, FIELD 9 for the Port Jefferson Staging Area, and FIELD 10 for the Patchogue Staging Area, were all based upon j the exercise assumption that in order to implement its Plan l 1 including the protective action of evacuation, LILCO needs to be 1 capable of removing only two road impediments. That assumption i has no basis. Cven if road impediments were assumed to include only traffic accidents (contrary to the NUREG 0654 provision which clearly includes impediments caused by inclement weather), LILCO itself has estimated that four accidents / breakdowns would occur during an evacuation of the EPZ (agg Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 6685, at 8). In fact, during the two-week period from February 6-20, 1986 (i.e., the weeks immediately before and after the February 13 exercise, and including the day of the exercise), there were a total of 335 reoorted traffic accidents in the Sixth Precinct of the Suffolk County Police Department, which includes the 10-mile EPZ.2 Of these 335 reported accidents, 62 involved personal injuries, 38 required ambulance response, and 65 ' requ; red the assistance of one or more tow trucks. Thus, on 2 Under New York law, an accident is required to be reported j l if the property damage exceeds $400, or if the accident results l in personal injury. Of course, a substantial number of accidents i that fall within these criteria are not reported. I 80 - l
4 ' r -
-y,g --- 7 S a A l tv .eb ,
3 l
\ ,
> ,ij , +$ x
{ l average,"t'$ere were over 22 rep $r'ted accidents per ' day during i; - ( this two-week peyiod, with\r. tor $ than four, on average, involving personal ~ injuries'and thE assistance of one or'more tow trucks, 1I I andapproximat'ely'two-and-one-halb,onaverage, cequiring
., .o ambulance response. >
/ ;
5
,e , t .
p ( 3eca!!5e'she exereire was premised on the false assumption 6 : {, . L A i I that.the capability of removing tw roadway impediments was
~
o suf E.le'ient to assure thahan , evacuation could be implemented, the i
'h resulta of.,the exercise, even, assuming arcuendo that LILCO could j hdvedemonstdatedsuchcapability,precludeafindingof 9 reasonable assurance phad a4 Equate protective measures can and q 3 will'be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Accordingly,
'the'LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.
( i l J Contention EX 42. Dealt with under EX 38, 39, 41, and 50. i Contention EX 43. Not admitted. Contention EX 44. First sentence dealt with under EX 38 and
- 39. Remainder not admitted.
Contention EX 45. Bases consolidated with EX 50. X. CONTENTIONS EX 46-49: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO POST-EVACUATION SERVICES FOR EVACUEES Contention EX 46. Dealt with under subpart A of EX 22. i i
Contention EX 47. .The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw l in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO failed to demonstrate the ability to register, monitor and decontaminate evacuees from special l facilities who are transported to reception centers other than L -the Nassau Coliseum, or that such activities could be accom-plished within 12 hours as required by NUREG 0654 3 II.J.12. Thus, LILCO has not satisfied objectives FIELD 13 and 21, and the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan complies with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10) and NUREG 0654 5 II.J.9, 10, and 12. According to the estimates in the Plan, if there were an evacuation of the entire EPZ, there could be as many as 1600 l residents of nursing and adult homes, health care and other special facilities, all with special needs, requiring that they be sent to special reception facilities (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2), j i plus tens of thousands of school children. This nurnber could be 9 increased by approximate 3y 850 persons if the hospitals in the EPZ and the Suffolk Infirmary also were evacuated. Id. The LILCO Plan, Rev. 6, which was the subject of the exercise, has no provision for the registration, radiological monitoring or de'- contamination of such individuals; nor does it include provisions ) I for reception centers for the vast majority of such individuals, { or agreements indicating that any such reception centers are in fact available or adequate to serve that purpose. Rather, it includes registration, radiological monitoring and decontami-nation procedures to be implemented, and equipment and personnel to be present, only at the Nassau Coliseum and the Emergency i I Worker Decontamination Center. OPIP 4.2.3; OPIP 4.3.1. This is a' deficiency in the Plan which violates NUREG 0654 5 II.A.3, J.10.d and 12, and 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10). It precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan is adequate, or that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures 4 can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as requirod by 10 CFR S 50.47 (a)(1). Furthermore, the proposal in the new Revision 7 version of OPIP 4.3.1, purportedly to address this deficiency (agg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D. Leonard to Harold Denton, ; (SNRC-1270), and Att. I au 4), fails to correct this deficiency i for the following reasons: ! EX 47.A. The proposal to send only one monitor to each special facility reception center -- assuming arcuendo reception centers existed -- is unworkable. Egg OPIP 4.3.1 5 5.1.6 (Rev. 7). For example, one of the few special facility reception centers designated by LILCO is expected to receive up to 465 ovacuees. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2. One person could not adequately j or effectively perform the necessary monitoring, recordkeeping, i and related activities that would be required at such a center, j EX 47.B. The proposal to have monitoring done as evacuees l leave their buses, ambulances or ambulettes (agg OPIP 4.3.1 S 5.4.9.c (Rev. 7)) is unworkable. It could not be done in { inclement weather, there is no assurance that reception centers
-- assuming arcuendo they existed -- would be laid out to permit I l
cuch activities at unloading points, and the evacuees, who by j i I 1
definition have special needs, cannot be subjected to waits in buses or ambulances while lines of others arriving ahead of them
.are monitored by one LERO worker.
EX 47.C. The proposal to have bus drivers keep necessary monitoring records-(agg OPIP 4.3.1 S 5.4.9.c (Rev. 7)) is unworkable. Such personnel have not been trained for such a function, nor have they been properly equipped to fulfill it. It is also impractical to expect a bus driver to be able to perform i such a function. EX 47.D. The proposal to have persons found to be contami-nated "get back on the bus" and eventually driven to the Nassau Coliseum (ggg OPIP 4.3.1. S 5.4.9.d (Rev. 7)) is unworkable, impractical and dangerous. The evacuees at special facility i reception centers are, by definition, in need of special care that cannot be provided at the Nassau Coliseum. To refuse to decontaminate them, and instead to send them to a facility that is not equipped to handle their special needs, and in the process delay their decontamination and also expose them to other contaminated people on the bus, thus potentially increasing their exposure, is without justification. ! EX 47.E. The provision that it is not necessary to provide 1 monitoring personnel at reception centers for schools (agg OPIP 4.3.1. S 5.1.5 (Rev. 7)) is wholly inadequate. Assuming arcuendo l that such reception centers exist -- and they do not -- there is no basis for LILCO's refusal to provide radiological monitoring and decontamination services to the school children evacuees who ! would be taken there. This refusal is a clear violation of NUREG
]
)
I
0654 S II.J.12. Furthermore, the LILCO explanation that such ) J services are not necessary "if the parents are going to be picking up the children," makes no sense, and fails to correct the deficiency. I Finally, during the exercise, messages apparently were i 6 transmitted among certain LILCO players referring to requests that monitoring personnel be sent to certain hospitals and fa-
]
cilities outside the EPZ. The exercise failed to demonstrate, however, that LILCO is capable of providing registration and monitoring at actual reception centers for actual evacuees with special needs during a real emergency, since: (a) such personnel were not actually sent to any special reception center facilities during the exercise (all the referenced facilities were only
" simulated" reception centers in any event since none of them participated in the exercise); and (b) there was no demonstration that the LILCO personnel were capable of (i) performing the necessary registration and monitoring of the number of evacuees with special needs likely to be taken to such facilities, or (ii) otherwise properly implementing necessary procedures for registering, monitoring and decontaminating evacuees at such facilities, even assuming arcuendo that facilities for use as special facility reception centers exist. Accordingly, the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
l l Contention EX 48. Not admitted. Contention EX 49. The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw l in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of performing neces-sary registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees within i 12 hours as required by NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. For the reasons j set forth below, during the exercise LILCO demonstrated that it has insufficient staffing, and insufficient equipment, to perform the necessary registration, monitoring and decontamination of evacuees which is required to effect an evacuation and to comply with 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10). Therefore, LILCO does not satisfy objective FIELD 21 and its Plan is fundamentally flawed since it has no capacity to handle satisfactorily the evacuees that may arrive after a Shoreham emergency. EX 49.A. {EX 31 will be dealt with under this suboart). Although the Plan asserts that LILCO personnel assigned to the reception center to perform radiological monitoring will monitor one evacuee every ninety seconds (OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.4.7), in fact during the exercise this procedure frequently took up to five minutes per evacuee. At that actual monitoring rate, the 78 monitors assigned to the reception center in the Plan could } monitor only 11,232 ovacuees in 12 hcurs (assuming no breaks, and assuming all monitors were constantly available and monitoring). 4 This is far less than the 32,000 evacuees which LILCO used to l 4 believe might be directed to the Coliseum and demonstrates the l 1 fundamental flaw in LILCO's planning for evacuees needing { monitoring and decontamination. In fact, during the exercise, I i l l J
I LILCO in simulated EBS messages advised over 100,000 evacuees (itgt, all those in zones A, B,F, G, X, and Q) to report to the Nassau Coliseum for radiological monitoring because they had been ! i potentially exposed to xadiation during their simulated l evacuation trips. Clearly, under the LILCO Plan, even assuming i that no persons other than those advised to do so by LILCO j actually. report,to the reception center for monitoring.and,. if necessary, decontamination, such a number of anticipated evacuees could not be monitored 'in a tiraely fashion -- i.e. , within 12 hours.
)
EX 31. (Not separately admitted but will be subsumed under suboart A of EX 49]. The Reception Center ARCA refers to the fact that it took LERO personnel four to five minutes to monitor an individual evacuee, as opposed to 90 seconds as presumed in . OPIP 3.9.2 5 5.4.7. FEMA Report at 81. According to the LILCO { 1 Plan, 78 monitors are expected to perform the radiological i l monitoring of all evacuees who report to the Reception Center. OPIP 4.2.3 $ 5.5.1. During the exercise approximately 100,000 persons were advised in simulated EBS messages to report to the Coliseum for monitoring. At the rate of 4 minutes per evacuee the 78 monitors would need approximately 85 hours to perform the monitoring required by NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. Thus, this l- deficiency precludes a finding that LILCO has sufficient staff to i respond as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1). It also preclude a j i i I finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures I 1 I can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_D
L EX'49.B. .Furthermore, the LILCO proposal to telephone INPO,. of her power plants, and other entitles to obtain additional moni-
.toring personnel, and the other features of the purported " alter-nate" monitoring plan in OPIP 4.2.3, S 5.11, were not implemented or demonstrated during the exercise. Such entities did not par-
-ticipate in the exercise nor was there any demonstration of the capability of those entities either to provide the personnel or equipment which LILCO players pretended would be available, or to provide them in a' timely manner. In addition, FEMA did not evaluate the adequacy or implementability of any such proposals 4 during the exercise. Egg FEMA Report at 81. Thus, the exercise provides no basis to find that such proposals could be f implemented, or, even if they could, that tney would result in an ability to perform the necessary monitoring of the number of evacuees anticipated to report to the reception center.
EX 49.C. There is no basis to assume that only those persons expressly advised by LERO to report to the reception center for monitoring because of potential exposure during evacuation activities would actually seek such monitoring. Indeed, upon hearing that all residents of so many zones had potentially been exposed, and in light of the large amount of voluntary evacuation likely to occur for the reasons set forth in Contention EX 44, substant'111y more people than the number expressly advised to report would be likely to seek such i monitoring. Thus, the LILCO response would, in fact, be even more deficient than was demonstrated during the exercise.
i l i i I For the foregoing reasons, the LILCO Plan fails to comply ! l with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.12. The exercise thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). XI. CONTENTION EX 50: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN LILCO'S TRAINING PROGRAM Contention EX 50. [The alleced mistakes related to trainino raised in EX 42 will be dealt with under EX 50; and bases for EX 45 are consolidated with EX 50). The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed in that members of LERO, as well as the personnel of various organizations upon which LILCO relies for implementation of the Plan, are unable to carry out effectively or accurately the LILCO Plan because of inadequate training. Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO is responsible for the training and retraining of both LILCO and non-LILCO personnel in LERO. j Training began in 1983 and, since that time, has consisted of classroom instruction, tabletop sessions, and drills / exercises. i Plan at 5.1-1 thru 5.2-7 and Figs. 5.1.1, 5.2.1; OPIP 5.1.1. l LILCO requires all LILCO members of LERO to participate in its training program on an annual basis. Plan at 5.1-1, 5.1-7 and 5.1-8; OPIP 5.1.1. At a minimum, this requires each LILCO worker in LERO, each year, to attend classroom instruction sessions on seven emergency response training modules and to participate in
l l at least one tabletop session / drill / exercise; on average, how-ever, LILCO personnel are required, each year, to attend class-room instruction sessions on nine modules and to participate in three tabletop sessions / drills / exercises. Plan, Figs. 5.1.1 and i 5.2.1; OPIP 5.1.1. Thus, as of the time of the February 13 exer-cise, the bulk of LILCO's LERO personnel had already undergone almost three years of training by LILCO involving, on average, classroom instruction on a total of 27 training modules and participation in nine tabletop sessions / drills / exercises. The large number of training deficiencies revealed during the exercise collectively demonstrate LILCO's lack of compliance with 10 CFR S 50,47(b)(14) and (15) and NUREG 0654, S II.N and 0, and violations of LILCO's Plan and procedures (chiefly OPIP 5.1.1), as well as LILCO's overall inability to implement the LILCO Plan and procedures as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). In its April 17, 1985 Partial Initial Decision, the ASLB found that the "LILCO Plan training program meets the regulatory standards," but that conclusion was expressly: made subject to confirmation by a finding, to be made by FEMA after a graded exercise, that the Plan can be satisfactorily implemented l with the training program submitted and that i LILCO possesses an adequate number of trained l l LERO workers. j I 21 NRC 644, 756. No such findings have been made by FEMA; in I 1 l fact, as noted below, in its Report FEMA identified a significant j number of training deficiencies. The exercise results thus dis-close fundamental flaws in LILCO's training program which prc-4 l ! l 1 l
clude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emer-gency. Every instance of a LILCO training deficiency revealed during the exercise is not described at length in this contention-because they are so numerous; virtually every error made by a LILCO player during the exercise involved to some degree a fail-ure of the LILCO training program to prepare personnel adequately to perform necessary actions.- Thus, each " deficiency" and each "ARCA" identified.by FEMA, plus each additional error committed during the exercise and identified in other contentions, provides a basis for the Governments' allegation that the exercise results l-h demonstrate a fundamental flaw in LILCO's training program. l Because such errors are all identified elsewhere, in the interest
'of brevity and to. avoid needless repetition, in subparts A-I below, the Governments use cross-references to identify specific examples of the training deficiencies which support this contention.3 EX 50.A. The exercise demonstrated that the LILCO program has not successfully or effectively trained or prepared LERO i
personnel to respond properly, appropriately, or effectively to unanticipated and unrehearsed situations likely to arise in an emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this alle-i 3 References in the subparts to FEMA deficiencies ("D") and 1 ARCAs are to Table 3.1 in the FEMA Report, where the deficiencies and ARCAs are numbered and identified by LILCO facility. Herein the Port Jefferson Staging Area is referred to as "PJSA"; the Riverhead and Patchogue Staging Areas as "RSA" and "PSA"; and the Reception Center as "RC." 4 i .gation are described in Contentions EX 38, EX 39, EX 41, and EX 42, and in the following FEMA Comments: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; PSA-D-1; PSA-D-6; R-D-2; EOC-ARCAs-2, 3, 9; ENC-ARCA-2; PSA-ARCAs-5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. EX 50.B. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training program has been ineffective in instructing LERO personnel to follow and implement the LILCO Plan and LILCO procedures, and in imparting basic knowledge and information essential to the ability to implement such procedures. Exercise actions and l events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 36-39, EX 41, EX 42, EX 45, EX 49, and in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; R-D-2; PSA-D-6; EOC-ARCAs 2, 5, 6, 7, 9; PJSA-ARCA-1; PSA-ARCAs 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, ! 16; R-ARCAs 4, 5, 6; RC ARCA 1. EX 50.C. (The alleced missten described in EX 23 will be ! considered under this suboart]. The exercise demonstrated that the LILCO training program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO personnel to communica'e necessary and sufficient data and information, to inquire and obtain such information, or to recognize the need to do so. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 34, 36, 38, 39, EX 41, EX 42, EX 45, and in the following FEMA con-clusions: EOC-D-1; ENC-D-1; EOC-ARCAs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9; ENC-ARCA '- PSA-ARCA 8, 9, 11 7 12; R-ARCA 1. EX 23. (Not separately admitted but will be considered under suboart C of EX 50). EOC ARCA 5 refers to a 2.5 hour delay by LILCO personnel in correcting the error of reporting
' extrapolated dose data as actual measurements at other distances.
FEMA' Report at 41. This violates OPIP 3.5.2 and, depending upon the particular numbers involved in the error, could result in substantially erroneous dose projections and wholly inappropriate protective action recommendations. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that actual and potential offsite consequences of an accident are accurately assessed, and that l appropriate protective actions can and will be chosen during an accident, as required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(9) and (b)(10). It, therefore, precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in a Shoreham accident. l EX 50.D. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training l l prograia'has not successfully or effectively trained LERO 1 personnel to follow directions given by superiors during an emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 41, EX 42, EX 45 and l in the following FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; PSA-D-6; PJSA-ARCA I 1; PSA-ARCAs 9, 13, 16; R-ARCAs 4, 6; RC-ARCA 1. j EX 50.E. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's training i program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO per-sonnel to exercise independent judgment or good judgment, or to ; use common sense in dealing with situations presented during an emergency or in implementing the LILCO Plan and procedures. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are 4
described in Contentions EX 34, 36, 38-43, EX 45 and in the l following FEMA conclusions: EOC-D-1; PSA-D-1; RD-2; EOC-ARCAs 2, 3, 9; ENC-ARCA 2; PSA-ARCAs 5, 7, 8, 10, 12; R-ARCA 1. 1 EX 50.F. The exercise demormtrated that LILCO's training i program has not successfully or effectively trained LERO per- ! sonnel to deal with the media or otherwise provide timely, ac-curate, consistent and nonconflicting information to the public, . through the media, during an emergency. Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are described in Contentions EX 37, EX 38, EX 40.C, and EX 43.A and in the following FEMA 1 conclusions: ENC-D-1; ENC-ARCAs 2, 3. EX 50.G. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO has failed to , provide training to persons and organizations relied upon for the implementation of its Plan other than those employed by LILCO.
}
Exercise actions and events which support this allegation are ' described in Contentions EX 27, EX 28 and in the following FEMA ) i l conclusions: EOC-ARCAs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. EX 50.H. [The alleced errors described in EX 27 and 28 will be dealt with under this suboart). The exercise demonstrated that LERO training is deficient in the area of dosimetry, l exposure control, KI, understanding of radiation terminology, and 1 related areas. Such training deficiencies are very serious l because members of the public and non-LILCO personnel relied upon to respond to a Shoreham accident (for example, school officials, special facility personnel, and other individuals who are expected by LILCO to respond on an ad hoc basis) would seek information on such subjects from LERO personnel during a real l l l l _ _ - _ __________ =___ _ A
emergency. Since LERO personnel.do not understand and know how to use dosimetry equipment and the related procedures, they would be incapable of responding accurately or effectively concerning those subjects to members of the public, or other workers ex-pected to respond.. The following exercise actions and events are examples of dosimetry-related tt&3ning deficiencies: Contentions EX 42, EX 45, FEMA Conclusions EOC-ARCAs 11, 12, 13, 14, 16; PJSA-ARCA 1; PSA-ARCAs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16; RSA-ARCAs 4, 5, 6. EX 27. (Not separatelv admitted but will be dealt with l l under suboart E of EX 50]. EOC FIELD ARCAS 1, 3 and 5 refer to the fact that school bus drivers have had no training in desime-try, use of potassium iodide or excess exposure authorization procedures and that LILCO has not provided dosimetry or supplies of KI for them. FEMA Report at 45-46. According to the LILCO Plan, school bus drivers are relied upon for implementation of the protective actions of early di'. missal and evacuation of school children in the EPZ. OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, these deficien-cies preclude a finding that protective actions for school chil-dren can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), that means are in place for controlling radio-logical exposure of emergency workers as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(ll), or that radiological emergency response training has been provided to those called upon to assist in an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(15). They also preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. l i l i l ! EX 28. (Not separately admitted but will be dealt with
]
under suboart H of EX 50]. ROC FIELD ARCA 4 refers to the fact that ambulette drivers are not all trained in excessive exposure 3 i authorization and procedures. FEMA Report at 46. According to the LILCO Plan, ambulette drivers are relied upon for implementa-tion of the protective action of evacuation for special facility residents and the homebound. OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, this deficiency precludes a finding that protective actions for special facility residents and the homebound can and will be implemented as re- j quired by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), that means are in place for con-l trolling radiological exposure of emergency workers as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(ll), or that radiological emergency response training has been provided to those called upon to assist in an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(15). The deficiency also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident. I EX 50.I. The exercise demonstrated that LILCO's proposals ! to modify training materials or procedures to " emphasize" such i , things as " accurate use of field data," the need "to relay instructions," "the need to be more precise with information," or 1 other matters already in the procedures and training materials I (agg letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold l Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1) -- training materials and procedures which have been so unsuccessful for three years -- would not correct the flaws revealed by the exercise.
EX 45.A. LILCO's response to the two free play impediment messages involved numerous serious communications failures which played a major role in LILCO's inability to remove the simulated impediments.as provided in the Plan, and as would be necessary to implement an evacuation. In addition, the types of actions which, as described below, LERO personnel failed to take in response to the impediment messages are similar to those that would be required under the LILCO Plan in response to many other situations which would occur in substantial numbers during a real emergency. Therefore, these failures are significant and preclude the reasonable assurance finding required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Specifically: (i) The Evacuation Coordinator, who is responsible for coordinating.all evacuation traffic control, evacuation transportation, and evacuation implementation (OPIP 2.1.1) was never informed by LERO personnel of either of the free play impediment messages, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3 which requires such communication. The Evacuation Route Coordinator was given the fuel truck impediment message at 11:00 and the gravel truck impediment message at 10:40. The Evacuation Coordinator was not informed of either one, however, until after 12:13, when he was informed by the FEMA controller. Egg FEMA Report at 36. The late notification of the Evacuation Coordinator, as well as the lack of statun updates and other necessary communications between and among the Evacuation Route Coordinator, the Traffic Control Coordinator, the Road Logistics Coordinator, the Transportation Support Coordinator, Lead Traffic Guides, Road Crews, Evacuation
L ! I
~
Route Spotters, and. Evacuation Support Communicators, as required by OPIP 3.6.3, led to the substantial delays and ultimate inability to respond adequately to the impediments. In fact, the delays caused by such failures would have been even greater in an actual emergency, since in the exercise LERO never even discovered its errors; rather, it was the FEMA controller who alerted LERO to the problem LERO itself had created. (ii) LERO personnel at the EOC failed to include
, essential information communicated to them via the free play impediment messages on LERO message forms, nor did they otherwise communicate such critical data to the other LERO personnel expected to respond to the impediments, as required by OPIP 3.6.3 and OPIP 4.1.2. Egg FEMA Report at 30. For example, important information was not included on the 10:45 LERO message from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route Spotters / Road Crews regarding the gravel truck impediment, including the fact that three passenger cars were involved in the accident. Similarly, essential information was not included on the 11:06 LERO message from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator
( ' regarding the fuel truck impediment, including that fuel was l leaking, that there was the possibility of fire, and that both shoulders of the road were blocked. See FEMA Report at 30. Because of these fhilures, the equipment eventually sent to respond to the gravel truck impediment was inappropriate and inadequate to remove the simulated obstruction, and the equipment i t
l l l l \ l eventually sent to respond.to the fuel truck impediment was so substantially delayed that LILCO's response was not observed by FEMA. FEMA Report at 37, 39, 57-58. (iii) The Evacuation Coordinator and other LERO personnel were not properly informed concerning a " visual check" of the fuel truck impediment received by the Transportation Support Coordinator from the Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area, and appropriate actions therefore were not taken in l response, contrary to OPIP 3.6.2 and OPIP 4.1.2, until more than three hours after the free play message had been injected. Egg FEMA Report at 30, 57. . (iv) LERO personnel were unable to locate, communicate with, or timely dispatch a Route Spotter to investigate and verify the fuel truck impediment. They were also unable to determine whether one had actually been dispatched. Thus, at abc c 11:15, the Route Spotter / Road Crew Communicator requested the Port Jefferson Evacuation Support Communicator to determine whether a Route Spotter had been dispatched as required under the i Plan, and as apparently assumed by the LERO players. The spotter was not in fact dispatched until about 12:02. Egg FEMA Report at 37. i (v) Although the FEMA controller had informed LERO personnel of their initial errors in dealing with the gravel and fuel truck impediments at about 12:13, and despite the fact that the Evacuation Coordinator had discussed the situation with some of his staff at about 12:16, as of 12:40, the Transportation Support Coordinator still had not been informed that bus
1 J l evacuation route M-1 was potentially blocked by the. gravel. truck, contrary to OPIP 3.6.3. And, as late as 1.48, the Road Logistics l Coordinator had not been informed that there might be a need to i send equipment to the site of the fuel truck impediment. Egg FEMA Reportist 36. Thus, the initial errors, omicsions, and i l failures to follow procedures and accurately transmit information were compounded by additional errors even after the first errors ; had been identified for LERO by FEMA. These later errors further illustrate the significance of LERO's inability to obtain and transmit essential information, since they had demonstrable i impact on other aspects of the overall emergency response. ) (vi) As a result'of the numerous failures and delays in internal LERO communications, information concerning the road impediments and the need to avoid the blocked evacuation routes J was not communicated to the public until 1:46 when EBS message number 8 was simulated. This further demonstrates the impact of LERO's communications failures upon its ability to implement its Plan. W EX 45.B. The response of LERO personnel to the Ridge Elementary School free play message also demonstrates LILCO's inability to communicate essential information to appropriate response perconnel in a timely manner, as required by OPIP 3.6.5. The free play message requesting LERO to provide a bus and driver to assist in transporting'40 children from Ridge Elementary School was given to the Evacuation Coordinator at the LERO EOC at l 1 approximately 10:30. The request was communicated to the Special I J Population Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area within I 1
- 100 - I 1
i about.10 minutes, but in violation of OPIP 3.6.5, the staging I
. area personnel did not respond appropriately or quickly in processing the communication. As a result, the bus driver was not even dispatched to a bus yard to pick up a, bus for-40 '
, minutes. Sgg FEMA Report at 38, 66. Furthermore, there were.no
= apparent efforts by-LERO personnel to follow up on their dispatch orders during the approximately three hour period prior to the i report that the driver had arrived at the school. Finally, LERO's inability to contact, communicate with, or even locate the LERO bus driver, when as of 4:23 he had'still not arrived at the '!
Reception Center, further demonstrates LILCO's inability to obtain or follow y on the absence of information critical to the implementation of a required protective action. I EX 45.C. LERO was unable to notify or communicate emergency information to the FAA or the LIRR, despite the provisions in
.OPIP 3.6.3-requiring notification of the FAA in order to have air traffic diverted from the EPZ, and the obvious need to blave the LIRR divert its trains from the EPZ. The failure of LERO ;
personnel to perform these tasks evidences their inability to appropriately process, act upon, and communicate emergency j information. Sag FEMA Report at 29. 1 EX 45.D. Communications relating to release data and dose i projections were not handled properly or accurately as required . by OPIP 3.6.1. For example, LERO personnel failed to designate clearly on the EOC dose assessment status boards the distinctions between DOE RAP monitoring data and LILCO field monitoring . data. Sgg FEMA Report at 29-30. This failure demonstrates not only an
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I l l l inability to effectively communicate important dose information i I and potentially significant distinctions between the information j from the two sources, but also an inability to recognize the l' significance of that distinction, contrary to the requirements of OPIP 3.6.1. Similarly, downwind distances of sample readings by field monitors were incorrectly reported as 7000 meters instead of 700 meters for a thyroid dose. This error resulted in an initial calculation of thyroid dose as 900 mrem /hr at 4.3 miles downwind, instead of 9000 mrem /hr at about 0.5 miles downwind. Egg FEMA Report at 33. And, at the EOC, several extrapolated doses at various distances were reported as actual measurements rather than as projected data on the dose assessment status board. It took two and one half hours to identify and correct this error. Egg FEMA Report at 33. These failures indicate a significant inattention to detail and accuracy in recording, processing, and communication of data critical to the accident assessment and protective action recommendation processes which are at the core of an em5rgency response. Such failures could lead to dangerous errors in a real emergency. EX 45.E. During the exercise, the LERO Director apparently
=_ ==
left the " command room" on severel, occasions, and therefore was not available to take calls over the RECS telephone or the dedicated telephone. Since, pursuant to OPIP 3.1.1 and OPIP l 3.3.1, data and information critical to command decisions are 1 communicated by these means, his absence and resulting inability l to obtain and act upon such data quickly was significant. Moreover, the searetary who took the calls in the Director's
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l l _ _- -_-_ - _ _ _ _
i absence merely told the callers that the Director would call , l back, and failed to take a message in writing and carry it to the 1 Director immediately upon completion of the transmission. Final- ) ly, LERO failed to have key events or evacuation status boards in the EOC command room. Thus, updated information on the status of the emergency situation was not visible to LERO workers in those areas at all times. Egg FEMA Report at 30. These failures to obtain or communicate vital data, and to have updated information available and visible in the command room substantially impair the ability of command personnel to perform their duties under the Plan. EX 45.F. There were numerous failures to obtain, process, communicate and appropriately act upon important emergency information and data demonstrated by the performance of LERO ENC, Public Information and Rumor Control personnel, in violation of OPIP 3.8.1. These are detailed in Contentions EX 38 and EX 39. The fact that such personnel exhibited such communication inabilities is particularly significant since such individuals were purportedly selected for their LERO positions because of their communications expertise. , EX 45.G. LERO personnel at the staging areas evidanced an inability to accurately, appropriately or in a timely manner obtain, record, transmit, or act upon emergency data, in viola-tion of OPIPs 4.1.2, 3.6.3, 3.6.4, 3.6.5, and OPIP 3.9.1. For example: l { l 1
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L , l L (i) Personnel at the Riverhead Staging Area did not l properly record or appropriately identify event status informa-tion on Emergency Event Status Forms or on status boards. See FEMA Report at 72. l l (ii) Communication between the Port Jefferson Staging ) Area and Traffic Guides was difficult due to poor radio recep-tion, and disrupted other essential communications from that Staging Area. Egg FEMA Report at 56. Such difficulties would be much more serious in an actual emergency when many more traffic guides would be attempting to make radio communications with the staging areas involved. (iii) The Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area repeatedly made inaccurate and misleading announcements to bua I drivers concerning the dose levels at which they were to call in. These incorrect instructions concerning such important informa-tion in fact led to confusion on the part of the bus drivers, and could be very dangerous in a real emergency. See FEMA Report at 68. (iv) The Transfer Point Coordinator at the Brookhaven National Laboratory Transfer Foint was unable to follow instruc-tions and transmit information and directions from the staging i f area to bus drivers during the exercise. For example, he di-rected a bus driver to the EWDF despite the fact that a message from the Bus Dispatcher to all Transfer Point Coordinators had directed that all drivers crriving at transfer points before 4:00 should be directed to the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center. See FEMA Report at 65. i
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l ( _...______________________ _ a
l l
}
l EX 45.E. LERO personr?1 at the EOC and staging areas were unable to transmit consistent or accurate information concerning assistance from the Suffolk County Police Department ("SCPD") during the exercise. For example, at 9:19, the LERO Manager was told by simulators purportedly representing suffolk County officials that no County resources would be available to assist l l LILCO during the exercise. This fact was confirmed by the County i simulators at 10:15, 10:26 and 10:36, according to the logs kept l by the LERO Manager and Director. However, at 9:20 the Evacua- d tion Coordinator recorded in his log that the SCPD had offered to : provide LILCO whatever assistance was required, and the Traffic Control Coordinator was advised of this purported information at l 9:35. At 10:02, the Evacuation Coordinator notified the staging areas that the SCPD had offered assistance on traffic control, route alerting, and route spotting, and that police officers would be dispatched to the staging areas for briefings. And, between 10:02 and 10:15, the Traffic Control Coordinator informed (i) the Riverhead Staging Area to expect 39 SCPD officers to report for assignment to traffic control and route spotting functions; (ii) the Port Jefferson Staging Area to expect 74 SCPD officers and; (iii) the Patchogue Staging Area to expect 37 SCPD I officers. These messages, all of which conflicted with the facts known and recorded by the LERO Manager and Director, were in turn transmitted to Lead Traffic Guides, Dosimetry Recordkeepers, and other staging area personnel. The erroneous information which
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t ._ - _ ____Y
I f had been communicated to the staging areas was not corrected until approximately 10:50. In a real emergency, such a total failure of communication could lead to serious problems.
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l-l l APPENDIX B i
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) f P a f eD ) i a Y C d f e u c rv i e u tS S i e oit c , k u S c .
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O I i l f APPENDIX C l l 1 l l 1 1 1 i i l l l l l i 1 l l l
EXHIBITS BY PARTY AND NUMBER Exhibit Identified it Disposition at 1/ . Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO EXHIBITS Professional Qualifications LILCO Exh. 1 273 273 (274, 1328,
~
of LILCO Witnesses on 1398, 2365, 2366, Exercise Contentions 2686, 3061, 4249, -- 4250, 5969) LILCO 2xh. 2 EPZ Map--Evacuation Routes 681 681 LILCO Exh. 3 Partial Deposition of Kowieski/ 1519 (Not Offered) Baldwin/Keller (1/29/67) LILCO Exh. 4 Letter to Selected LERO 2167 2168 Workers from Kessler re Unavailability for LERO/SNPS Full-Scale Drills on 1/23, 1/30 and/or FEMA Exercise on 2/13 (1/17/86) , LILCO Exh. 5-7 Coles's Focus Groups #1 - 3903 4153
#3 inclusive (1st set of transcripts)
LILCO Exh. 8-10 Cole's Focus Groups #1 - 3903 4153
#3 inclusive (2nd set of transcripts)
LILCO Exh. 11 Letter to D. M. Crocker from 5848 5854 K. Krasner (11/13/86) re: Clarification of Drill Reports for 6/6/86, 9/10/86, 9/17/86 and 10/1/86 LILCO Exh. 12 LILCO's Testimony on Conten- 5962 5968 tions EX 15 and 16 1/ Unless otherwise indicated, the exhibit is admitted into evidence on the tran-script page cited. If the transcript page columns have been left blank, the transcript page nurabers are the same as the last numbers that precede them.
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Exhibit Identified at Disposition'at Number- Description Transcript Page' Transcript Page-LILCO Exh.12a-12z OBSERVER FORMS 9/10/86: 2/ 6476 6796 LILCO Exh. 12a Facility: EOC Assignment - Lead Controller Organization: Impell - LILCO Exh. 12b Facility: EOC l Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell
'LILCO Exh. 12c Facility: EOC Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 12d Facility:- EOC ;
Assignment: Observer / Con-i troller--Dose Assessment ; i Organization: Impell LILOO Exh. 12e Facility: EOC Assignment: Traffic Con-troller Organization: Not Indicated
-LILCO Exh. 12f Facility: EWDF Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 12g Facility: Patchogue Staging Area Assignment: Not Indicated (Emer. Operations Management)
Organization: Not Indicated
.LILOO Exh. 12h Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Facilities & l I
Equipment Organization: LERO LILCO Exh. 12f Facility Patchogue Assignment: Traffic j Organization: Stone & Webster j 1 1 2/ Names were redacted from all observer forms.
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. Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number' Description Transcript Page Transcript Page a LILCO Exh. 12j Facility: Patchogue 6476 6796 Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 12k Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 121 Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Controller--
Route Alerting Organization: Impell _ .. LILCO Exb. 12m Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Controller-- Communication Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 12n Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Dosimetry Organization: LERO/LILCO LILCO Exh. l?o Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Not Indicated LILCO Exh. 12p Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Behr Consulting Group LILCO Exh. 12q Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Traffic Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 12r Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Transportation Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 12s Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Dosimetry Con-troller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 12t Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell
Exhibit Identified at Disposition.at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Exh. 12u Facility: Riverhead 6476 6796
. Assignment: Facilities and Equipment Observer Organization: Impell -LILCO Exh. 12v Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Bus Dispatcher Organization: Impell .LILCO Exh. 12w Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Traffic Controller Organization: Impell 1
LILCO Exh. 12x Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller L Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 72y Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell
-LILCO Exh. 12z Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell i
LILCO Exh. 13 Testimony on survey of 6069 6090 exercises corrected by (Struck) Daverio and Behr (pp. 45-50 of LILCO's Testimony on Contentions EX 15 and EX 16) LILOO Exh. 13a-13z OBSERVER FORMS 9/17/86: 6476 6796 LILCO Exh. 13a Facility: EOC Assignment: Traffic Controller Organization: Not Indicated LILCO Exh. 13b Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell-LILCO Exh. 13c Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Dosimetry Obser- ) vation
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Organization: Impell i LILCO Exh. 13d Facility: Port Jefferson 6476 6796 Assignment: Bus Driver Dis- l patch j Organization: Impell ) i
-5 L, ' Exhibit' Identified at Disposition at Numberi Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Exh. 13e Facilitys Port Jefferson Assignment: Communications v Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Er.h. 13f ' Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: . Lead Controller Organization: TBCG/LERIO LILCO Exh. 13g Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 13h Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell LTLCO Exh. 131 Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Observer--
Facilities and Equipment Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 13j Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Route Alerting Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 13k Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Dosimetry Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 131 Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Observer-- Communications Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 13m Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell LILCO ,'xh. 13n Facility: EOC 6476 6796 Assignment: Public Infor-mation Organization: LILCO LILCO Exh. 13o racility: LERO Relocation Center Assignment: Controller Organization: LILCO
'ExhibitL Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Exh. 13p Facility:- EOC Assignment: Special Evacu-ations Organization: Aidikoff Associ-ates i 'LILCO.Exh. 13q Facility: EOC Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 13r Facility: Patchogue Assignment: -Communication Controller Organization: Impell
_LILCO Exh. 13s Facility: Not Indicated (Field Activity Module) Assignment: Traffic Control Organization: Not Indicated LILCO Exh. 13t Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Field Controller
. Organization: . Impell
'LTLCO Exh. 13u Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 13v Facility: Patchogue
' Assignment: Equipment Organization: LERO LILCO Exh. 13w' Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Dosimetry Organization: LERIO/LILCO LILOO Exh.'13x Facility: Patchogue 6476 6796 Assignment: Traffic Organization: Stone & Webster LILOO Exh. 13y Facility . Patchogue j Assignment: Lead Controller' l Organization: LERO M..ILCO Exh. 13z Facility: Patchogue Assignment:- Lead Control Organizations .LERO LILOO Exh. 14 Attachment Q to LILCO's 6069 6090 Testimony on Contentions (Struck)
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r Exhibiti' . Identified at Disposition at.
. Number- Description Transcript Page Transcript Page i EX 15 and 16 Conten-tion EX 15 Alleged Omissions LILCD Exh. 14a-14y OBSERVER FOkMS 10/1/86: 6476 6796 LILCO'Exh. 14a . Facility: EOC Assignment:" Lead Command and Control Organization: Impell
.LILCO Exh. 14b Facility: .. "OC 1 Assignment: Public I Information l: Organization: LILCO LILCO.Exh. 14c Facility: EOC
. Assignment: Rad'. Health Coord. l Organization:. Not Indicated
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LILCO Exh. led Facility: EOC Assignment: Special-Populations Organization: Not Indicated L2LCO Exh'. 14e Facility: .EOC r- - Assignment: Traffic Con- , troller l Organization: LERIO
,LILCO Exh. 14f Facility: LERO Relocation Center Assignment: Controller Organization: LILCO LILCO Exh. leg Facility: Riverhead 6476 6796 Assignment: Field Controller Organizations- Impell j i'
- LILCO Exh.'14h Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Observer / l Controller Facilities. )
& Equipment j Organization Impell l LILCO Exh. 141 Facility: Riverhead I Assignment: -Bus Dispatcher Impell
' Organization:
- _ ~ . . . . . . - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _--
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Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page . Transcript Page LILCO Exh. 14j Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Bus Dispatcher Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 14k Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Dosimetry Controller Organization: Impell. l LILCO Exh. 141 Facility: Port Jefferson ~ Assignment: Lead Traffic Controller
- Organization: Impell
'LILCO Exh. 14m ' Facility : Patchogue Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell'
, .LILCO Exh. 14n- Facility: Patchogue Assignment: -Field Controller Organization: Impell l LILCO Exh. 14o Facilityt Patchogue
- l. . Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell l
LILCO Exh. lap Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: LERO LILCO Exh. 14q Facility:. Patchogue Assignment: Dosimetry Organization: 'LERIO/LILCO LILCO Exh. ler. Facility: Patchogue 6476 6796 Assignment: Lead Con- , troller ] Organization: LERO LILCO Exh. les Facility: Patchogue j Assignment: Traffic
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Organization: Not Indicated LILCO Exh. let Pacility: Not Indicated Assignment: Family Tracking Controller Organization: Not Indicated LILCO Exh. leu Facility Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell
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l 1 l Exhibit- Identifled at Disposition at i Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page l i LILCO Exh. 14v Facility: Patchogue l Assignment: communication Controller , Organization: Impell j l LILCO Exh. 14w Facility: Patchogue q Assignment: Lead Controller l Organization: LERO l i LILCO Exh. 14x Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Field Controller ' Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 14y Facility: EWDF l Assignment: Decon Leader l L Organization:. Impell- f 8 LILCO Exh. 15 Attcchment R to LILCO's 6069 6090 Testimony on Contentions (Struck) l k' EX 15 and 16 -Alleged Omissions in Shoreham Exer-cise (and those exercised at Perry Nuclear Plant) LILCO Exh. 15a-15y OBSERVER FORMS 12/2/86: 6476 6796 l I l LILCO Exh. 15a Facility: ENC { Assignment: LERO Organization: LILCO LILCO Exh. 15b Facility: Riverhead 6476 6796 { Assignment: Traffic ! Organization: Impell L2LCO Exh. 15c Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Transportation Controller Organization: Impell
..LILCO Exh. 15d Facility: Patchogue j Assignment: Communication 'l Observer l Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 15e Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Traffic Con-troller Organization: Impell 1 l
-Exhibit Identifiea at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Exh. 15f Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Traffic Organization: Stone & Webster LILCO.Exh. 15g . Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Transportation Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 15h Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Transportation Organization: LERIO (Cygna)
LILCO Exh. 151 Facility: Patchogue Assignment Lead Controller Organization: LERO LILCO Exh. 15j Facility: ' Port Jefferson , Assignment: Lead Controller l Organization: TBCG/LERIO LILCO Exh. 15k Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Dosimetry Organization: Cygna Energy Services LZLCO Exh. 151 Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Dosimetry Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 15m Facility: Riverhead 6476 6796 Assignment: Dosimetry Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 15n Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 15o Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell LILCd Exh. 15p Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh.'15q Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Equipment & Facilities Organization: Impell
l Exhibit' Identified at Dispositio? at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Exh. 15r Facility: Patchogue
' Assignment: Lead Controller ..
Organization: LERO LfLCO Exh. 15s Facility: EOC Assignment: Traffic Controller Organization: Aidikoff Associates l LILCO Exh. 15t Facility: EOC Assignment: Traffic Controller .l Organization: Aidikoff Associates LILCO Exh. 15u Facility: EWDF Assignment: Controller--
.Decon Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 15v Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell
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e LILCO Exh. 15w Facility: EOC 6476 6796 l Assignment: Public l Information j Organization: LILCO L3LCO Exh. 15x Facility: EOC Assignment: Dose As s es smen', organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 15y Facility: EOC Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell LILC' Exh.16a-16hh OBSERVER FORMS 12/10/86: 6476 6796 LTL Exh. 16a Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16b' Facility:. Fatchogue Assignment: Traffic Organization: Stone & Webster 4
{ Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Exh. 16c Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Behr Consulting Group LILCO Exh. 16d Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Communications Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16e Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Field 1--Road Crew Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16f Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Traffic Controller ; Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16g Facility: Riverhead l Assignment: Transportation l Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16h Facility: Port Jefferson 6476 6796 Assignment: Transportation Controller Organization: Impell LZLCO Exh. 16i Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Equipment & Facilities Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16j Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Dosimetry ) Organization: Cygna Energy Sercices LILCO Exh. 16k Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Transportation Organization: Cygna/LERIO LILCO Exh. 161 Facility: Patchogue .l Assignment: Observer-- Facilities l and Equipment I Organization: LERO l LILCO Exh. 16m Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Dosimetry Organization: Impell
; Exhibit- Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page
'LILCO Exh. 16n Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: LERO LILCO Exh. 16o Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Communication Controller Organization: Impell )
I' LILCO Exh. 16p Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Transfer Point Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16q Facility: Riverhead , Assignment: Field Controller l Organization: Impell i
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LILCO Exh. 16r Pscility: Riverhead 6476 6796 Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16s Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Traffic Organization: Irmell LfLCO 2xh. 16t Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Controller-- Facilities and Equipment Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16u Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Dosimetry i Controller Organization: Impell . 1 LILCO Exh. 16v Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16w Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16x Pacility: Riverhead Assignment: Controller-- Communications Organization: Impell 41 l _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~
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4 Exhibit- Identified at Disposition'at
. Number . Description Transcript Page Transcript'Page q r
,.LILCO.Exh. 16y Facility:. Brentwood--EWDF; Assignment: Decon Observation Organization .Impell
~ LILCO Exh. 16z Facility:- ENC Assignment Rumor Control .
Organization: LILCO- l l
.. I .LILCO Exh. 16aa . Facility: EOC
, Assignment:
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l Command and j Control- ] Organization: Impell .j LILCO Exh.-16ob Facility:: EOC . 6476 6796 . { l- Assignment:' Special Evac.uations-Organization:- Aidikoff~ Associates LILCO Exh. 16cc Facility:: EOC Assignment: Special' Evacuations i ' Organization: Aidikoff l
-Associates
'LILCO Exh. 16dd Facility: EOC Assignment: Dose Assessment.
Organization 1 -Impell j
.i LILCO Exh. 16ee' Facility:. Port Jefferson.
Assignment: Transfer Point
--Field Organization: Cygna Energy Services LILCO Exh.;16ff Facility: Riverhead Assignment: . Transfer Point Organization: Impell LILCO Exh. 16gg Facility: EOC Assignment: Traffic l Controller Organization: Aidikoff Associates LILCO Exh. 16hh Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell j
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' Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number. Description Transcript Page Transcript Page -LTLCO Exh. 17 LERO Message Form.to EOC 6671 (Not Offered)
Evac. Support Communicator from Road Logistics Coord. re: dispatch road crew #2011 to Route 25A due to over-turned fuel truck (2/13/86, 13:50) 1 LILCO Exh. 17A Final Rule Regarding Frequency 7082 7230 l of Emergency Planning Exercise, 1 49 Fed. Reg. 27733 (July 6, 1984) L3LCO Exh. 18 Final Rule Regarding State 7085 7230 and Local Radiological Ener-gency Plans and Preparedness, 48 Fed. Reg. 44332 (Sept. 28, 1983) j LILCO Exh. 19 30 CFR Part 50, App. E (in 7100 7230 L effect as of Jan. 1, 1984) LILCO Exh. 20 Letter from Papile to Kowieski 7189 7230 ret Schools and Guidance Memorandum EV-2 (2/12/86) LILCO Exh. 21 LILCO's Testimony on Contention 7267 7267 EX 21 (renumbered from Exhibit 7359 19 at Tr. 7359) LILCO Exh. 22 "A Scaling Method for 8886 8916 Priorities in Hierarchical Structures" by Thomas L. Saaty , SUFFOLK COUNTY EXHIBITS SC Exh. 1 Map of Deployment Locations 371 (Not Offered) , of Road Crews and Fuel Tank Trucks SC Exh. 2 Log of Aerial Photographs 581 603 SC Exh. 3 Overview Aerial Photograph of 586 603 Yaphank-Middle Island Road and Main Street SC Exh. 4- Close-up Aerial Photograph of 588 603 Yaphank-Middle Island Road and Main Street q r _ _ o
Exhibit- . Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Exh. 5 LERO Message Form to Lead 641 644 Traffic Guide from TCP l Coord. re direct traffic at TCP's 35, 53, 54 (2/13/86, 12:32) SC Exh. 6 EPZ Map--Evacuation Route 775 778 Spotters SC Exh. 7 LERO Message Form to Lead 780 784 Traffic Guide from Evac. Rte. Coord, re: route spot-ters patrol routes 1001, 1003, 1005, 1006 (2/13/86, 10:20) SC Exh. 8 LERO Message Form to Stg. 780 784 Area Coord. from Comm. re:
- 1. has route spotter 1005 been
}. dispatched? (2/13/86, 11:17) SC Exh. 9 LERO Message Form to EOC 850 860 Evac. Sup. Comm. from Road Log. Coord. rei dispatch road crew 2011 to Route 25A - fuel truck accident (2/13/86, 13:50) SC Exh. 10 LERO Message Form to Evac. 861 864 Coord. from Traffic Control Coord. re: traffic flow L normal except Route 25A (2/13/86, 14:30) SC Exh. 11 Saricks' Deposition Trans-- 870 2031 cript (11/24/86) SC Exh. 12 Impell memo re: Drill Report 881 (Not Offered) for 6/6/86 for LERO Facilities
--EOC, ENC and RVHD (partial)
(10/31/86) SC Exh. 13 Observer Form 2/13/86: 917 924 Facility: Brentwood EOC Assignment: Evac. Controller Organization: Stone & Webster
' Exhibit- Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Exh. 14A Memo to All Shift 1 LERO 937 942 Workers and All Field Workers from Kessler re:
Confirmation of Worker Availability for Jan./Feb. 1986 Drills and Exercise (1/2/86) SC Exh. 14B Memo to All L2RO Workers 937 942 from Weismantle re: FEMA Graded Exercise and Important Points to Remember (2/6/86) SC Exh. 14C Information/ Instructions 937 942 for Players SC Exh. 15 LERO Message Form to Lead 988 1006 Traffic Guide from Road Log. Coord. re: dispatch road crews 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and gasoline tank trucks 3002, 3003, 3004 (2/13/86, 10:45) SC Exh. 16 LERO Message Fore to Lead 989 1006 Traffic Guide from Road Log. Coord, re: dispatch road crews 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and gas tank trucks 3005, 3006, 3007 (2/13/86, 10:45) SC Exh. 17 LERO Message Form to Road 992 1006 Log. Coord. from Lead Traf-fic Guide re: dispatched remainder of road crews and gas tank crews as c? 12:43 (2/13/86, 12:45) SC Exh. 18 Portion of FEMA Guidance 1403 1411 Memorandum AN-1 (Drsft) (Denied) 3/ SC Exh. 19A 4/ FEMA Free Play Message-- 1431 1439 3/ The Board decided to hold SC Exh.18 for admission until the FEMA witnesses testified. At that time the exhibit was admitted in its entirety as FEMA Exh. 2. 4/ SC Exhibits 19A-D have different handwritten notes.
Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page Route Alert, Siren Failure SC Exh. 19B FEMA Free Play Message-- 1431 1439 Route Alert, Siren Failure SC Exh. 19C FEMA Free Play Message-- 1431 1439 Route Alert, Siren Failure SC Exh. 19D FEMA Free Play Message-- 1431 1439 Route Alert, Siren Failure SC Exh. 20 Drill Report for 12/2 and 1464 1471 E-12/10/86 for LERO (3/4/87) SC Exh. 21 OPIP 3.6.3--Road Crews 1588 .1622 Rev. 5 (Denied)) SC Exh. 22 Portion of Appendix A to 1609 1622 LILCO Plan--Time Estimates (. Denied)) Rev. 3 SC Exh. 23A 5/ LERO Message Form to Lead 1656 1681 Traffic Guide from TCP Coord. re: evacuate zones A-M, Q, R and man relevant TCP's (2/13/86, 10:25) SC Exh. 23B LERO Message Form tc Lead 1656 16&l Traffic Guide from TCP Coord. re: evacuate nones A-M, Q, R and man rel evant TCP's (2/13/86, 10:13) SC Exh. 23C LERO Message Form to lead 1656 1681 Traffic Guide from TCP Coord re: evacuate zoaes A-M, Q, R and man relevant TCP's (2/13/86, 10:30) SC Exh. 24 LERO Message Form to Lend 1674 1681 Traffic Guide from TCP Coord. re evacuate zones N, 0, P and S and man relevant TCP's (2/13/86, 12:00) l S/ SC Exhibits 23A-C, 24 and 25 were the only exhibits bound into the record. They were bound in at the end of the March 19, 1987 transcript following Tr. 1807. I ._ . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . _ _ _
Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Enh. 25 Exercise Svaluation Critique 1695 1723 Form (Field 6)--J. Levenson SC Exh. 26 Traffic Control Point 1725 2033 Schematics #1--#130 inclusive SC Exh. 27 Exercise Evaluation Critique 1786 1793 Form (Field 6)--K. Bertram 2034 5/ SC Exh. 28 Partial Initial Decision 1878 2034 (OL-3)--Utility-Sponsored (Not Offered) Offsite Emergency Plan Meeting Requirement of Reasonable Assurance for Adequate Protective Measures, l 21 NRC 644, 723-25 l SC Exh. 29 Evacuation Charts 1 and 2: 1952 2034 X Axis--Time in Hours, (Not Offered) l Y Axis--Percent of People out of EPZ GC Exh. 30 Chart drawn by Shon and 2013 2017 Lieberman 2962 1/ l SC Exh. 31 Portions of Appendix A of 2035 2037 i LILCO Plan--Concurrent l Continuous Flow Treatments l SC Exh. 32 EBS Sample Message #5 (10:23) 2047 2072 SC Exh. 33 Port Jefferson Staging Area 2068 2071 Traffic Control Point Communication List SC Exh. 34 Cordaro memo re: 2073 2078 Preparation for Graded Exercise LERO Training Program (12/9/85) SC Exh. 35 Portions of Drill Report 2117 2132 for 12/2 and 12/10/86 for LERO (3/4/87) f/ SC Exh. 27 was admitted twice. 7/ SC Exh. 30 was admitted twice.
s Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Numbe,r, Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Exh. 36 Thyroid Guidance Cnart 2399 2559-SC Exh. 37 Ead. Health Coord. Log 2412 2559 SC Exh. 38 Map of Average Prevailing 2459 2559 Wind Directions SC Exh. 39 Director of Local Response 2502 2559 Log SC Exh. 40 OPIP 4.2.3--Reception 2703 2703 ,> Center Activation and 2808 Operation (Not Offered) SC Exh. 41A OPIP 3.9.2--Rad. Monitoring / 2706 2808 Decontamination of Emergency (Not Offered) Workers and Evacuees SC Exh. 41B Attachment 3 of OPIP 3.9.2-- 2706 2808 Monitoring / Decontamination (Not Offered) Flow Diagrams SC Exh. 41C Portion of Attachment 5 of 2706 2808 OPIP 3.9.2-- Exposure / Con- (Not Offered) tamination Forms SC Exh. 42 LILCO Transition Plan for 2759 2809 Shoreham--Rev. 8: Key to Consolidated RAC Review dated 12/15/86 SC Exh. 43 Exercise Evaluatier. Critique 2766 2809 Forms (Field 21) -- R. Bernacki and L. Slagle SC Exh. 44 Attachment 2 of OPIP 3.5.5-- 2899 (Not Offered) Health Care Facilities l Evacuation Listing l l SC Exh. 45 "Public Information During 3349 3735 an Emergency at Shoreham"-- 3364 Rev. 5 of LILCO Plan ustd
. during Exercise (renumbered from SC Exh. 44 at Tr. 3364)
SC Exh. 46 "The Media in Disaster" 3403 3735 by Don M. Hartsough and Dennis S. Mileti
Exhibit. Identified at _ Disposition at-Number Description Transcript Page' Transcript Page j
-k SC Exh. (7 EPIP 4-3 Public Informa- 3436 3735 tion' for an Alert / Site Area / General Emergency 1 1
SC Exh. 48' Rumor Control Question #12 3700 3735-(Dan Rather) i SC Exh. 49 Rumor Control Question #1 3700- .3735 SC Exh. 50' "A Research Approach to 4599 (Denied) Improving Our Quality of Life" by John C.-Flanagan SC Exh. 51 "The Employee Performance 4600 4700 Reccrd: A New Appraisal I and Development Tool" by John C. Flanagan and y ' Robert K. Burns SC Exh. 52 Psychological Bulletin 4606 4675 "The Critical Incident Technique" by John C. Flanagan SC Exh. 53 " Training Managers to 4606 4700 Minimize Rating Errors in , the Observation of Behavior" j by Gary P. Latham, Kenneth N. Wexley, Elliott D. Pursell uSC Exh. 54 ." Obtaining Valid Predictors 4606 4700 by Minimizing Rating Errors
.in the Criterion" by Elliott D. Pursell, Dennis L. Dossett, Gary P. Latham SC Exh. 55 Shoreham Critical Incident 4729 4938 Analysis for 2/13/86 Shoreham Exercise (Team 1) - Elliott D.
Pursell SC Exh. 56 Indian Point Critical Incident 4797 4938 Analysis.for 8/24-25/83 Indian Point Freccise (Team 1) - Elliott D. Pursell
l Exhibit identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Exh. 57 " Organizational Interface in 5073 5172 Reactor Emergency Planning and Response", Prepared for
! 'C by Oak Ridge National Laboratory by J. H. Sorensen, E.D. Copenhaver, D. S. Mileti, M. V. Adler SC Exh. 58 Cohesiveness Ratings Analysis 5073 5172 by D.S. Mileti, including:
Portions of the Shoreham Post Exercise Assessment for Exercise Objectives: EOC, EOF, Brookhaven, Field, ENC, Receptien Center, EWDF and Riverhead, Patchogue, Port Jefferson SC Exh. 59 Summary of Objectives 5212 5259 Analysis and Critical Incident Analyses by 2 Elliott D. Pursell SC Exh. 60 K. Bertram's Exercise 5220 5259 Evaluation Critique Form SC Exh. 61 Shoreham Critical Incident 5254 5259 Analysis for 2/13/86 Shoreham Exercise (Team 2) - Elliott D. Pursell SC Exh. 62 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 3/3/82 Indian Point Exercise--5/27/82 SC Exh. 63 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 3/9/83 Ir.dian Point Exercise--4/14/83 SC Exh. 64 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 8/24-25/83 Indian Point Exercise--9/26/83 SC Exh. 65 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 11/28/84 Indian Point Exercise--2/27/85 SC Exh. 66 Post Exercise f.ssessment 5309 6795 for 6/4/86 Indian Point Exercise--9/10/86
Exhib.it Identified at Disposition at-Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page i l SC Exh. 67 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 3/16/82 Oyster Creek l Exercise--6/1/82 ') 1 SC Exh. 68 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 ) for 5/24/83 Oyster Creek l Exercise--9/16/83 .j J SC Exh. 69 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 6/5/85 Oyster Creek ) Exercise--8/22/85 SC'Exh. 70 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 1/21/82 Ginna Exer-cise--2/12/82
'SC Exh. 71 Post Exercir3e Assessment 5309 6795 for 6/22/83 Ginna Exer-cise--10/12/83 SC Exh. 72 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 9/26/85 Ginna E;ter-cise--12/16/85
.SC Exh. 73 .P3st Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 8/11/82 Fitzpatrick Exercise--10/29/82 SC Exh. 74 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795
, for 9/15/81 Nine Mile l- Point Exercise--9/30/81 SC Exh. 75 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 9/28/83 Nine Mile Point Exercise--12/23/83 SC Exh. 76- Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 11/13/85 Nine Mile Point Exercise--2/18/86
.SC Exh. 77 Exercise Evaluation Report 5309 6795 for 10/26/83 Salem Exercisc--
11/25/83 SC Exh. 73 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 10/23/84 Salem Exercise-- 2/19/85 SC Exh. 79 Post Exercise Assessment 5309 6795 for 4/23/85 Salem Exercise-- 6/19/85
Exhibit' . Identified at Disposition at Number Description' T_r_anscript Page Transcript Page SC Exh. 80 Exercise Evaluation Report 5309 6795 for 10/29/85 Artificial Island Exercise--1/15/86 SC Enh. 81 Definition of Area Recommended 5325 (Not Offered) for Improvement from Shoreham 2/13/86 Post Exercise Assessment, I definition of Other Deficiency from Oyster Creek 6/5/85 Post Exercise Assessment and defini-tion of Minor Deficiency from Fitzpatrick 8/11/82 Post Exer-cise Assessment SC Exh. 82 M. Goodkind's computer sheet of 5343 (Not Offered) deficiencies noted during exercise
.SC Exh. 83 M. Goodkind's working document 5343 (Not Offered) noting training problems identified at Shoreham SC Exh. 84 Summary of " Deficiencies", 5349 (Not Offered)
"ARCAs", "ARFIs", " Minor Deficiencies" and "Recom -
mendations" Identified by FEMA in Region II Exercises SC Exh. 85 Modified Attachment B to LILCO's 5381 5722 Training Testimony to Reflect (Denied)) Actual RAC Review and Comments to Revs. 7 and 8 of LILCO's Plan SC Exh. 86 Impell memo re: Drill Report 5737 5829 for 6/6/86 for LERO Facilities - EOC, ENC and Riverhead Staging Area (partial) (10/31/86) SC Exh. 87 Impell reemo rei Drill Report 5737 5829 for 9/10, 9/17 and 10/1/86 for LERO (10/31/86) SC Exh. 88 Drill Report for 12/2/ and 5737 5829 12/10/86 for LERO (3/4/87) l 1 1
Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Exh. 89a-89f OBSERVER FORMS 9/10/86: 8/ 5799 5829 SC Exh. 89a Facility:' Riverhead Assignment: Dosimetry Controller Organization: Impell I SC Exh. 89b Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Communications Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 89c Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Field Controller !' Organization: Impell SC Exh. 89d Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Equipment and Facilities Organization: Impell SC Exh. 89e Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Communications Observer Organization: Impell SC Exh. 89f Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Traffic Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 90a-90g OBSERVER FORMS 9/17/86: 5799 6829 SC Exh. 90a Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Bus Dispatcher Organization: Impell SC Exh. 90b Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 90c Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Communication
. Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 90d Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Traffic Organization: Impell 8/ Names were redacted from all observer forms.
l
I l Exhibit Identified at Disposition at--
. Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Exh. 90e ' Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Traffic Guide /
Field Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 90f Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment:' Facilities and Equipment Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 90g Facility: . Port Jefferson Assignment: Traffic Controller Organization: Imoell lSC Exh. 91a-91k OBSERVL'R FORMS 10/1/86: 5799 5829 SC Exh. 91a Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell
-SC Exh. 91b Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Facilities aid Equipment Observer Organization: Impell fic Exh. 91c Facility: Riverhead 5799 5829 Assignment: Communications Observer /
Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 91d Facility: Riverhead Assignutent: Dosimetry Controller / Rt. Alert Driver Controller Organization: Impell SC Enh. 91e Facility: Riverhead Ast,ignment: Dosimetry Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 91f Facility: Patchogue Assignment: Lead Controller Organization: Impell
I Exhibit Identified at Disposition at , -Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page l SC Exh. 915 Facility: Fatchogue j Assignment: Field Controller ! Organization: Impell l SC Exh. 91h Facility: Port Jefferson Assignments Field Controller Organization: Impell l SC Exh. 911 Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Communications Organization: Impell SC Exh. 91j Facility: Port Jefferson As sigt .nent : Lead Controller Organization: Behr Consulting Group SC Exh. 91k Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Equipment and Facilities Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 92a-92f OBSERVER FORMS 12/2/86: 5799 5229 SC Exh. 92a Facility: EOC Assignment: Communication / Admin./ Security / Special Evac./ Transportation (Evac. Operations) Organization: Behr Consulting Group SC Exh. 92b Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 92c Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Communications Organization: Impell SC Exh. 92d Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Dosimetry Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 92e Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Communications Observer Organization: Impell
Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Exh. 92f Facility: Riverhead Assignment: Facilities and Equipment observer Organization: Impell
^SC Exh. 93a-93f OBSERVER FORMS 12/10/86: 5799 5829 SC Exh. 93a Facility: Port Jefferson Assig:vuent : Communication Organization: Impell SC Exh. 93b Facility: Port Jefferson Assignment: Field Controller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 93c Facility: Patchogue -
Assignment: Field - Road Crew , Organization: Impell SC Exh. 93d Facility: Patchogue 5799 5829 Assignment: Middle Island l Transfer Pt. Organization: Impell SC Exh. 93e Facility: Riverhead , Assignment: Field Contrcller Organization: Impell SC Exh. 93f Facility: EOC Assignment: Public Infor-mation Organization: LILCO SC Exh, 94 Hockert's study-- 6159 (Not Offered) Weighting Calculation for the Shoreham Exercise SC Exh. 95 Direct Testimony of William Lee 6373 6373 Colwell, Deputy Inspector Pater F. Cosgrove, Philip Evans, Charles B. Perrow, Ford Rowan, Lieutenant John W. Streeter, Jr., and Harold Richard Zook on Behalf of Suffolk County Regarding Contention EX 50 I _______._____U
Exhibit - Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Exh. 96 Attachments to SC Testimony 6373 6373 Regarding Contention EX 50 SC Exh. 97 Guidance Memorandum 6884 6954 AN-1 (2 pages) SC Exh. 98 Evaluation Craterion E6 in 6890 6954 Planning Standard E Require-ments and Areas of Review, REP-10, pg. E-3 SC Exh. 99 Testimony of Gary A. Simon 7355 7359 and Stephen Cole on Behalf of Suffolk County Concerning Contention EX 21 SC Exh. 100 M. Jackson's Exercise 7764 7982 Evaluation Critique Form (ENC 1) SC Exh. 101 M. Jackson's Exercise 7799 7982 Evaluation Critique Form (ENC 3) SC Exh. 102 P. Giardina's Exercise 7954 7982 Evaluation Critique Form (EOC 12) SC Exh. 103 G. Connolly's Exercise 7985 7986 Evaluation Critique Form (EOC 8) SC Exh. 104 Memo to R. Kowieski 8009 8322 from R. Wilkerson re: Redundant Route Alerting (4/7/86) SC Exh. 105 Letter to R. Kowieski 8012 8322 from J. H. Keller re: Coments on f.he Draf t Shoreham Report--com-ments attached (3/19/86) SC Exb. 106 C. Saricks' 8096 8322 Exercise Evaluation Critique Form (Field 6) SC Exh. 107 Letter to R. Kowieski 8617 (Not Offered) from T. Harpster re: Shoreham Exercise Objectives (12/3/85)
~
Exhibit Idsntified at Disposition at,
. Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Exh. 108 Deposition of Joseph'H. 8692 8693 Keller, Philip McIntire, (Offer of Proof)
Ihor W. Husar, and Thomas E. Baldwin, 3/6/87 (pp. 64-73)
-SC Exh. 109 Portions of LILCO 8781 8844 Testimony on (Not Offered) l Contentions EX 15 and EX 16 that Suffolk County tried to strike SC Exh. 110 Rebuttal Testimony 8877 8877 of Gary A. Simon on Contentions'EX 15/16 on Behalf of Suffolk County NEW YORK _ STATE EXHIBITS 'NY Exh. 1 Direct Testimony of James C. 6980 7080 ,
I Baranski, William Lee Colwell, Lawrence B. Czech, Gregory C. Minor, James D. Papile, Charles B. Perrow, Frank R. Petrone, and g Harold Richard Zook on Behalf of the State of New York and Suffolk County Regarding Con- 4 l tentions Ex 15 and 16 l NY Exh. 2 Attachments to NYS and SC 6981 7080 Direct Testimony Regarding Contentions EX 15 and 16 NY Exh. 3 Corrections to Government's Pre- 6981 7080 filed Testimony on Contentions EX 15 and 16 NY Exh. 4 FEHA/NRC Memorandum of Under- 8351 (Not Offered) standing, 50 Fed. Reg. 15485
-(April 18, 1985)
NRC EXHIBITS NRC Exh. 1 Direct Testimony of Sheldon 8765 8765 Schwartz and Bernard H. Weiss of the NRC Staff on Contentions E2 15 and 16
i Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page FEMA EXHIBITS FEMA Exh. 1 FEMA Post Exercise Assessment 398 7453 FDn Exh. 2 FEMA Guidance Memorandum 1805 7461 AN-1 (Draft) FEMA Exh. 3 Letter to V. Stello from 7454 7455 D. McLoughlin re: RAC Review of Revisions 6, 7 and 8 and LILCO Responses to FEMA PEA (report and spread sheets attached) FEMA Exh. 4 Memo to Regional Directors 7455 7456 from D. McLoughlin and Guidance Memorandum AN-1 (Final) FEMA Exh. 5- FEMA Testimony 7448 7453 f FEMA Exh. 6 FEMA's Current Guidance 7456 8422 Memoranda of Potential (Denied) Applicability to Shoreham Proceeding (and attached memos) FFNA Exh. 7 Kowieski correspondence re: 8594 8676 Guidance Memoranda GM-PR-1 and GM-EV-2
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