ML20238F190
| ML20238F190 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1987 |
| From: | Barth C, Johnson G, Pirfo O NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238F192 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#387-4386 OL-5, NUDOCS 8709160019 | |
| Download: ML20238F190 (204) | |
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, e 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO gg BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD I
acca . in the Matter of ) 1
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Unit 1) ) , 1 I l l NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE FEBRUARY 13, 1986 EMERGENCY PLANNING EXERCISE George E. Johnson Oreste Russ Pirfo Charles A. Barth Counsel for NRC Staff September 11, 1987 LM' 8709160019 870911 gDR ADOCKOSOOg2
m -- --. _ -. , f - y.o. _g. r ; 1 & t. ... I O- ' TABLE' OF CONTENTS i
, y 5: .N
, .. 1 PAGE(S) 1
' l '. : ! N T R O D U CT I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 f 11.. ? STA N D A R D O F PRO O F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
'111. - ROLE OF FEMA POST-EXERCISE REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 - The Scope of the Exercise and Whether it Constituted a " Full Participation" Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 V. CONTENTION 'EX 21 - Adequacy of Data Used by FEM A for 'Its Exercise Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
.VI. ;CONTEtlTION EX 40 - Mobilization, Dispatch, and Sta ffing of Traffic Control . Post.s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39' 4 Vll. CONTENTION EX 41 - Removal of Roadway i m pe d ime n ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Vill. CONTENTION EX 34 - Route Alert Driver Notification 84
, to the - Fuelic in the Event of Siren Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
' lX . CONTENTION EX 36 - Adequacy of Protective
- Action Recommendations in Light of a Projected 91 W i n d S h i ft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
X. CONTENTIONS EX 38, 39, 22.F, 40.C, 44 AND 49 C - Public Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 A. CO NT E NT I O N E X 3 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 -
- 1. EBS and the Media Generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
- 2. The Contention Subparts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
- a. Contention EX 3 8. A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
- b. Contentions EX 38.B , C, G , D and Q . . . . . 102-
- c. Conten tion EX 38. E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
- d. Contention EX 3 8. F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 l
- e. Contention EX 38. H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
- f. Contention EX 3 8.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
- g. Contention EX 38.), L, M and N . . . . . . . . . . 110 l-J_-_____-_ _
7__. _ _ - . _ - PAGE(S) x , s I ' ' ^j '.
.h. Contention EX 3 8. 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115-
- 1. , Contention EX 3 8. P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
- 3. Co nci u s ion ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 B.- CO N TENT I O N EX 3 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
- 1. Contention EX 39. A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
- 2. Contention EX 3 9. B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120'
- 3. Contention EX 3 9. C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
- 4. C o nc l u s io n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 C. CONTENTION EX 22. F and 44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
- 1. T he Po l l ' D a ta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 ;
i
- 2. Focu s G rou p Inte rviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
- 3. The E B S Mes sag e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128-
- 4. Preexisting Fear of Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 130
- 5. Press Advisories and Rumor Con trol Activi ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
- 6. C o n c l u s io n . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 D. CO N TEN TIO N EX 40. C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 E. CO N TEN TIO N EX 49. C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 XI. CONTENTION EX 47 - Registration, Monitoring and Decontamination of Special Facility Po p u l a t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 XII. CONTENTION EX 22. A - Use of the Nassau Coliseum as the Reception Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Xill. CONTENTION EX 49 - Excessive Monitoring Times . .. . . . . 141 XIV. CONTENTION EX 50 - Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 A. Scope o f Contention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 p B. S ta nd a rd o f P roo f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 l
l \. . C. Evidence Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 4
. - 111 - N) (
%J PAGE(S)
D. Training to React to the Unanticipated /Use of Good Judgment (Contentions 50. A, 50.E and50.F)........................................... 154 .
- 1. Impediment Free-play Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
- 2. ENC and Rumor Control Response to Unexpected Events and inquiries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
- 3. Other Incidents Relating to use of Good Judgment or " Thinking on Your Feet" . . . . . . . . . . 164-
- 4. Conclusions' on Contentions 50. A and 50.E . . . . . . 166 E. Lack of knowledge and Inability to Follow the Plan.as Bases for Finding a Fundamental Flaw in the Training Program (Contentions EX 50.B, 50.G and 50.H) ..................................... 167
- 1. Knowledge of Fleid Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 168
- 2. Basic Knowledge in use of Personal Dosimetry
( Contention 50. C , 5 0. H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '173
- 3. Miscellaneous Examples of Lack of
. B a sic K nowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
- 4. Conclusion in Contentions EX 50.B, 50.G and 50.H ................................. 175 F. Ability to Communicate Necessary information
( Con te n tion E X 5 0. C ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 C. Failure to Follow Directions ( Contention EX 5 0. D ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 H. Providing Information to the Public through the Media - ( Contention - EX 50. F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
- 1. Correction of Training Flaws
( Contention EX 5 0.1 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 J. C o nc l u s io n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 XV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ................................. 186 I. J
/'~ ; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
( ) NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD in the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) Unit 1)
)
NRC STAFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE FEBRUARY 13, 1986 EMERGENCY PLANNING EXERCISE
- 1. INTRODUCTION
- 1. While appeals were pending from the Concluding Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Planning issued by the Licensing Board, LB P-85-31, 22 NRC 410 (1985), a FEMA-graded Exercise of the SNPS (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station) Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan ("LILCO Plan") was conducted on February 13, 1986. This Exercise was conducted pursuant to a request to FEMA to conduct a full-scale exercise of all functions and normal exercise objectives using the current version of the LILCO Plan , with Exercise controllers simulating the roles of key State and local officials. FEMA Ex.1, at ix.
- 2. On June 6, 1986, the Commission provided guidance to the parties to the proceeding on the nature and scope of the issues that might be raised in a proceeding challenging the demonstrations in the Exercise. CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577 (1986). In that decision, the Commission directed appointment of a Licensing Board to conduct a em hearing restricted to whether the Exercise " revealed any deficiencies (v )
N
- 2:-
9 [ . which preclude a ' finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures (2 can and will' be taken, i.e. , fundamental flaws in the plan." Id,. at 581.
- 3. On August 1, 1986, interveners Suffolk County, the State of New York, and the Town- of Southampton filed their contentions. Our order admitting contentions was issued October 3, 1986. Prehearing Conference Order (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Discovery Schedule). Following discovery, the hearing commenced on March 10, 1987. After 40 days of hearings, the record was closed on June 18, 1986. The voluminous record covers over ten thousand pages of testi-mony, not counting exhibits. The contentions, witnesses, and exhibits are set out in Appendices A, B, and C, respectively, of the Applicant's proposed findings.
- 4. Based on the entire record before us, and as set forth in detail in our findings, we have found the Exercise to reveal deficiencies in LERO's ability to implement portions of the Lil CO Plan which preclude tur finding, in the absenct 'of a further more successful FEMA drill or exercise of those portions of the Plan, that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of t.n emergency at Shoreham.1 q 1
I l l
~
1/ Other substantial issues involving emergency planning still remain in this proceeding, which also preclude at this time a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency. See, e.g., CLl-86-13, a 24 NRC 22 (1986); ALAB-847, 24 NRC 412 (19fiiT. L_ __ __
t 11. STANDARD OF PROOF
- 5. . The scope of - this ' proceeding is derived from the Commission's .
. statement accompanying its 1982 amendment of 10 C.F.R. i 50.47 (47' Fed. _
Reg. 30232,. July : 13, 1982), as to how the -results of ' emergency preparedness exercises are factored into the Commission's ~ consideration whether to issue - a . power reactor operating license. In Union of Concerned Scientists v. . N.R.C. , ' 735 F.2d 1437. (D.C. Cir. 1984), the
' Court noted that "in making its ultimate finding on [the adequacy of-emergency preparedness plans, the Commission] relles on emergency exercise evaluations." 3. at 1443. The Court noted, with approva!, the -
Commission's discretion to define and restrict the issues material to licensing. The. Court "In no way- restrict [ed)" adoption of the Commission standard that the exercise is only relevant. to its licensing decision to the extent it indicates that emergency preparedness plans are fundamentally flawed, and is not relevant as lto minor or ad hoc problems occurring on the exercise day. . . . Id. In not - disturbing the substantive standard, the Court did not ; quarrel with the authority of the Commission to view its decision with respect to emergency preparedness planning as essentially predictive in nature, and not a test of the actual state of preparedness on a particular day. 2,/ Whlie the Commission's limitation of hearing rights to motions to
)
2/ ' .. See U.C.S. v. N.R.C. , 735 F.2d, at 1441. The Court rejected the
~
C6mmission's attempt to restrict hearing rights on issues rAed by emergency exercises by requiring interveners to meet the strndards for reopening a closed record, but did not reject the substantive standard for what matters are material to licensing. Similarly, the following observation by the Commission in rejecting a UCS rulemaking petition is pertinent:
.[
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PACE) l l l
L-
-W reopen ' the record, or to 6 2.206 petitions was rejected, the substantive standard of materiality was not.
- 6. In this proceeding, in CLi-86-11, the Commission noted that the Court of . Appeals never questioned the predictive nature of emergency planning findings or the limiting of exercise litigation to matters material to that predictive ' decision. CLi-86-11, 23 NRC 577, 580-81 (1986). In CL1-86-11, the Commission again stated that exercise findings are material to the predictive finding of reasonable assurance only insofar as the exercise results revealed any deficiencies which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken, i.e., fundamental flaws in the plan.
Since only fundamental flaws are material to licensing issues, the. hearing may be restricted to those issues. M.at581.
- 7. The Licensing Board in this proceeding adopted this standard in determining the admissibility of contentions. Prehearing Conference Order, October 3,1986. The Licensing Board also adopted the standards for admissibliity of emergency exercise contentions stated in the UCS decision. Id. at 4. In that connection, the Board also accepted the interpretation of the UCS standard adopted by the Licensing Board in
) (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE)
. [if] . . . some key aspect of the plan turns out to be inadequate or unworkable, or the judgments reflected in the planning process are untenable, or major revisions will be necessary ...[a motion to reopen the record may be granted).
M. at 1444, n.11. 4-u_.__- _ _ _ - _ _ - - _.
4 (~S Carolina Power S Light Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power (s/ Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-55-49, 22 NRC 899, 910 (1985): that contentions alleging minor or readily correctable ; problems should be rejected. . . . ! October 3,1986 Prehearing Conference Order, at 4. -
- 8. None of these decisions deal directly with the standard of proof to be applied to admitted exercise contentions. In NRC practice, the intervenor in a licensing proceeding has the burden of going forward with respect to its contentions, but the applicant retains the burden of persuasion with respect to establishing that it is entitled to a license. E in the case of emergency planning contentions generally, the interveners must raise issues and go forward with evidence material to licensing, and the applicant must establish that the applicable regulatory criteria are '
satisfied and that a finding of " reasonable assurance that protective . measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency" can be made. 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(a)(1).
- 9. The employment of the " fundamental flaw" criterion suggests i
that a contention raising exercise deficiencies must tend to show not only 1 1 that in some manner an area of emergency planning falls short of meeting i i l i 3_/ The Board also noted that, under UCS, the adequacy of the exercise ) itself as a basis for decision-making on the adequacy of emergency ) planning is open to litigation as well, both as to the scope and I implementation of the exerc.ise, ,ld. at 5-6.
~4/ See, _e _. g . , Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear 3Iation, Unit 1), ALAB-772,19 NRC 1193,1245 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985); --id. , ALAB-697, 16 l -3 NRC 1265,1271 (1982). / \
l
7'
'] one or more of the 16 emergency planning standards in ~10 C.F.R. .
" 6 50.47(b), but that the exercise evidence also pre (Dudes ~ the finding' of reasonable assurance called for by 9 50.47(a)(1). In resolving such a a
contention, the applicant must establish that the deficiency either is not factually established, or that if proven, it does not preclude the finding that there is reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken . implicit in this standard is not unh the Shearon_ Harris ! Y standard th at readily correctable defects in the plan cannot be fundamendd flaws, but that plan deficiencies for which effective a'
- compensatory fmeasures may be taken are also not fundamental flaws.
- 10. Thus, while the burden of persuasion resis with the applicant on each contentien, me < ultimatu question is not whether each aspect of regulatory compilance was affirmatively demonstrated by the exercise, J
but, notwithstanding expecteo failures in execution of the plan, whether there is adequate provision in the plan to compensate for or correct such failures 'so that it may be concluded that there' is reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will .be taken to' protect the public in the event.of an emergency. In sum, an applicant fs/ not required to show that the exercise demonstrates compliance with each and every regulatory ' standard. Rather, an applicant must show that the esercise demonstrates j
. no deficiency which precludes the overall finding of reasonable assurance.
- 11. In this respect, the standard is analogous to the burden of an 0 applicant on 'a quality assurance contention to demonstrate that W. withstanding e> pected defects in cons trdction , there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will be protected. See i
V
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r^; Union f(Ectric, Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), A LAB-740, 18 NRC 343
- t-v' ,i (1983).
x j 12. Irj a similar manner, it is not reasonable to hinge the granting of a license on error-free exercises. Inasmuch as only deficiencies in f exercises which revsal fundamental ficws in planning may be the basis for litigation of exercise results, it follows that to find a fundamental flaw, breakdowns such as would preclude an overall showing that adequate protective measures can and will be taken must be shown. In litigating I construction quality assurance it must be established that any breakdown I in QA procedures not be of sufficient dimensions to raise legitimate doubt i . as , to th'e okerall integrity of the facility and its safety-related components. Thus, "Ja] demonstration of a pervasive failure to carry out the quality ;rsssurance program might well stand in the way of the requisite safety ifinding." id. at 346. Simliarly, in emergency exercise litigation, a pervasive failure to carry out an emergency planning program in the exercise might preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken in an emergency. Ill. THE ROLE OF THE FEMA POST-EXERCISE REPORT Much of the testimony presented to the Board was based on the
, 13.
, data contained in the April 17, 1986 FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment
, (FEMA Ex . 1 (hereinafter FEMA Report or Post-Exercise Assessment))
for, as 10 C.F. R. 9 50.47(a)(2) provides, FEMA's findings in regard to an off-site emergency plan " constitute a rebuttable presumption on s questions of adequacy and implementation capability" of the plan. We
,, noted in the Prehearing Conference Order, at 8, that r
y' l L _
. 1 )). [t]he Commission in making,its reasonable assurance \g finding is called upon by regulation to consider- the FEMA emergency exercise evaluation. . ..The FEMA finding constitutes a rebuttal presumption on questions of adequacy and implementation capability. -
l When the FEMA Report was published, it contained numerous findings and recommendations based on observations of activities on the day of the Exercise.. Of principal interest, however, were the findings of Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs). The Report provides the following definitions of those terms.: Deficiencies are demonstrated and- observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite - emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures 'can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear facility in the event of a radiological emergency. Areas' Requiring Corrective Action are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance, and although their correction is required, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety. FEMA Ex. 1, at 8. A third category, areas recommended for improvement, was defined as " problem areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact health and safety. While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness." I d_.
- 14. The FEMA Report found five Deficiencies and 38 ARCAs i (according to LILCO's count there were four Deficiencies and 43 ARCAs).
LILCO Testimony (Behr, Goodkind) ff. 4368, at 29.) in connection with l the review by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) of Revisions 6, 7, and 8 of the Shoreham Plan, however, one Deficiency was changed to an ARCA. FEMA Ex. 3. ( 1 l
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pg ' r b , s '151
. 'doth buffolk County anct .L!t.CO have relled . heavily on the 3
n < t t : y " M. . FEMA Report, t. sing. the facto stated in the Report as "the data base for
', l w I \ $\ C . .i
' :-further1 explcatioT. Tr. 650% (Colwoll);. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 4348,
. )
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i N at 9, Tr. 2 4517-18 (Daverio) / r. 4529-30 (Daveric, Lindell, Pursell) .
' ? Suffolk County, however' accepts and uses the findings 'of Deficiencies e
and ARCAsln the contentions" anci in the inferencM drawn about the presence of fundamentakiflaws, whereas LILCO diiies lssue with the
~
c
~ characterization of the? facts by FEMA. Tr. 4530 (Daverlo, Pursell,
{ E - Lindell). It may also be noted that FEMA agreed with the statement of ' ? facW contehied in the contentions although not necessarily the y ,, t . conclusions. Tr. 8183 (Keller),.
' 10. While all sides appear, as a general matter, to accept the facts E
as reported in the FEMA Report, LlLCO finds itself disagreeing with h FEMA on the concitisions drawn by FEMA, particularly FEMA's findings of Deficiencies. Tr. 4532 (Daverlo); Tr. 4664 (Mileti); Tr. 4519-20 (Behr, { . Pu rsell , Lindell) . As a result, LILCO sought to rebut the. presumptive effect of the findings of the FEMA Report adverse to its po.sition. IV. CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 - The Scope of the Exercise and Whether it Constituted a " Full-Participation" Exercise
- 17. Interveners' Contentions EX 15 and 16 assert that the Exercise failed to test major observable wtlons of the Plan and the emergency response capabilities of many persons and entitles depended upcn by the -
LK - Plan. As such, the Content!ons allege that the Exercise did not l' y constitute the required " full participation" exercise under the regulations. E See 10 C. F. R. Pa:.: t 50, Ap p. E 6 IV. F. E' I
- - - _ _ _ ___,__m___ _
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- 18. ' The other parties -- LILCO and the NRC Staff -- as well as
)
t. FEMA a!! testified that the February 13, 1986 Exercise was a full participation exercise. NRC Staff Ex.1, at 5-7; Tr. 5961-69 (Daverlo, Behr); LILCO Ex. 12; see FEMA Ex. 5, at 105 ("The Shoreham Exercise was equal or greater in scope compared to any other full-scale exercise. evaluated by FEMA Region 11 to date.").
- 19. The question of what constitutes a " full participation" exercise
'Is o'ne of first ' impression for NRC adjudicatory boards. As we have stated previously, if the Exercise is found not to comply with the regulations covering the scope of a full participation exercise, that failure may preclude an ability to ascertain whether there is reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken in an emergency.
Memorandum and Order of December 11,1986, at 13.
- 20. Interveners maintain, inter alla, that the regulations should be read to require the initial exercise for a "near term operating license"
("NTOL") plant (those for which licensing is imminent save the emergency preparedness exercise) to be wider in scope and more detailed than those that are conducted for plants already operating. See N.Y. Ex. 1, at 23-24,
- 21. There are no criteria or guidance published by the NRC with respect to the scope and depth of a " full participation" exercise. NRC Staf'f Ex.1, at 5. FEMA has pub!!shed guidance which includes a number of elements which need to be demonstrated periodically, but net necessarily tested at each exercise. Id.
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l
- 11 :
- 22. In 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E 6 IV.F.1, the general require-
' ments for emergency plan exercises are set out. Footnote 4 to that section states:
" Full participation" when used in conjunction with .
emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel physically and actively take ~ part in testing their integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear
- power plant. " Full participation" includes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of State, local and' licensee personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to. respond to the accident scenario.
- 23. Applicant's witnesses maintained that FEMA guidance and regulations are applicable to a determination of whether the Shoreham Exercise constituted a "fuit participation" exercise. Tr. 6184-85, 6190-93, 6199, 6200, 6222, 6231-38, 6242-44, 6815-23 (Daverlo, Behr). Interveners assert that FEMA guidance is inapposite and that the FEMA standard objectives were not derived with the purpose of ensuring that the full participation requirement of 10 C.F.R. Appendix E is satisfied. See N.Y.
Ex.1, at 28-29 (Baranski, Czech, Papile).
- 24. FEMA's regulation defining " full participation" exercise is at 44 C.F.R. 5 350.2(j):
Full participation refers to an exercise in which: i (1) State and local government emergency personnel are l- engaged in sufficient numbers to verify the capability l l to respond to the actions required by the accident l scenario; (2) the integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant is tested; and (3) the implementa-tion of the observable portions of State and/or local plans is tested, id.
- 25. It is the NRC Staff view that, while all offsite plans are required to meet the sixteen planning standards of 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(b),
\
1
each plan is unique because of different state and locai governmental (M infrastructures.- ' NRC Staff Eic.1, at 6. A determination as to whether an exercise is " full participation" is , therefore, dependent on the partiet.ar details in the plan that is being evaluated. M. 2 6. - In their " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Preparedness in support of Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Rev. 1), the NRC and FEMA set out
- sixteen planning standards corresponding to the standards of 10 C.F.R.
6 50.47(b).
- 27. With regard to the Shoreham Exercise, NRC requested FEMA, on
- ' June 20, 1985, ' to schedule as full an exercise of the LERO plan as was feasible. FEMA Ex. 5, at 90. NRC suggested, however, that FEMA emphasize evaluation of the " functional arevs" of emergency preparedness related to the demonstration of response capabilities within the plume exposure EPZ.- _I d .
- 28. In its October 29, 1985 response to NRC, FEMA recommended two options for exercising the LERO Plan. These were:
Option 1 - proposed that FEMA set aside all functions and exercise objectives related to issues of legal authority and State and local participation. Option 2 - proposed en exercise of all functions and normal exercise objectives. This option would exercise
, the current version of the LERO Plan. Exercise
. controllers would simulate the roles of key State and local officials unable or unwilling to participate.
FEMA Ex. 5, at 91.
- 29. On November 12, 1965, NRC requested that FEMA conduct the
. exercise in accordance with parameters described in Option 2. M. On 9
i r i L November 21, 1985, FEMA sub'mitted the proposed exercise objectives to d the NRC for use by LILCO exercise planners. M. p 30. The FEMA witnesses testified that FEMA made every attempt to l ensure that preparation for, and evaluation of, the February 13, 1986 l Exercise of the LILCO Plan for Shoreham was consistent with the parameters and process established for other fell-scale b Radiological Emergency .' Preparedness (REP) exercises evaluated by FEMA Region !!. FEMA Ex. 5, at 92. The Region designed the exercise objectives to ensure that the Exercise would be of sufficient scope for FEMA to evaluate the following: All functions - i.e., FEMA would be able to evaluate LILCO's and LERO's integrated capability to edequately assess and respond to an accident at Shoreham. Normal exercise objectives - i.e. , FEMA would be ' able to evaluate malcr observable portions of the LERO Plan. t
- 31. At the time of the Shoreham Exercise, FEMA Cuidance q Memorandum CM PR-1 governing the conduct of off-site exercises was in effcet. FEMA Ex. 5, at 89; see LILCO Ex.12, Att.E. CM PR-1 does not j set out any minimum requirement as to how many of the basic planning elements must be tested in an initial or biennial exercise of the 35 standard exercise objectives listed in that Memorandum. M.
- 32. A current FEMA draft guidance memorandum , CM EX-3 (see LILCO Ex.12, at Att. C), is expected to become final by October 1, 5/
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The terms " full-scale" and " full participation" were used inter-changer.bly by the witnesses without distinction between the two. O '
,m , 1987. See Tr. 5901-02 (Cumming). GM EX-3 states that the objectives of i )
V any exercise should be selected from the list of 35 standard objectives "In ! order to test a significant portion of the emergency response capabilities." LILCO Ex.12, J Att. G, at 3. The objectives have been developed to correspond generally to the observable elements of NU REG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1. M. Some objectives, because of their ; i fundamental nature to emergency response, are to be included in each biennial exercise. M. Those objectives are referred to as " core objectives. " Id. These thirteen core objectives are set out as Group A in GM EX-3. M.at8-9. l 33, it is FEMA's position that the exercise objectives (see FEMA Ex. ' 5, at 94-105) tested LERO's personnel and resources in sufficient number l to verify the capability of responding to an accident. FEMA Ex. 5, at 105. The Exercise enabled FEMA to evaluate the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements of the Plan and LERO. M.
- 34. The Shoreham exercise was equal or greater in scope comparea to any other full-scale exercise evaluated by FEMA Region Il to date.
M. The objective of exercises that involve state and local ~ participation is for FEMA to be able to make determinations on the adequacy of offsite preparedness on the basis of reasonable assurance, not absolute certainty. M.
- 35. The testing of all major planning and preparedness elements incorporated in the 35 exercise objectives which FEMA lists as possible areas for testing is not required in every full participation exercise.
FEMA Ex. 5, at 125. 1 1 b
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l l i L-_- - -
l I 3 6. . Interveners specifically allege that the scope of the Exercise E p) 4 (./ was too limited because it did not test the following Plan elements: )
, A. Procedures for pubile notification (EX 15. A) (subsuming EX 24 which alleges failure to activate the sirens, and 16.C and D, which allege lack of participation on the part of WALK Radio and other radio stations);
B. Procedures for public notification in the water portion of the EPZ (EX 15.B) (subsuming EX 16.8, which alleges that the Coast Guard did not fully participate); C. Procedures for implementing protective actions for transients . and people on the water (EX 15.H) (subsuming EX 16.B and
- 18. C (lv) , which allege that the Coast Guard did not fully participate);
D. Procedures for public education (EX 15.C);
.E. Procedures for evacuating the three EPZ Hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (EX 15.D) (subsuming ' EX 16.H, I, and ),
which allege that officials 'from these institutions, from the EPZ nursing homes, and from such facilities outside the EPZ, did not participate); F. Procedures for sheltering school children, for implementing early -dismissal of schools, and for evacuating school children (EY 15.E,F,C) (subsuming EX 16.F,C and EX 26, 30 and 18. C(v), which allege that school officials and school bus drivers, other than from Shoreham-Wading River, did not participate and such participation as did occur was limited and untimely); G. Procedures concerning protective actions for the ingestion pathway EPZ (EX 15.I) (subsuming EX 37 (A-D), which deal with ingestion pathway recommendations, and EX 16. A, ' which alleges that Connecticut did not participate); H. Procedures relating to radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees from special facliltles (EX 15.K):
- 1. Procedures concerning recovery and re-entry (EX 15.M);
J. Participation of Marketing Evaluations, Inc. (EX.16.E); K. Participation of certain ambulance companies (EX 16.K, subsuming 18.C(i)); L. Participation of certain ambulance companies (EX 16.L. subsuming 18.C(li)); and l
M. Participation of Na,ssau County (EX 18.C(vi)) ~ and Nassau [V 's County. Red Cross (EX 18.C(lii)).
. LILCO Ex.12, at 4-5.
37.- According to the LILCO witnesses, there is a three-prong test for determining whether an exercise is a " full participation" one. LILCO
. Ex. 12, at 8 (Daverlo, Behr). This consists of: first, testing "as much of the licensee, state and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation;" next, testing "the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans;" and finally, mobilization of emergency personnel and resources "in sufficient numbers to verify capabliity to respond to the accident scenario." LILCO Ex.12, at 8 (Daverlo, Behr), citing 10 C.F.R Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F(1), at n.4 (emphasis added in testimony).
- 38. Applicants' witnesses would measure the scope and magnitude of an exercise against (1) FEMA guidance and whatever "non-regulatory"
. guidance exists and (2) exercises at other plants that FEMA and NRC have deemed to be full participation. LILCO Ex.12, at 9.
- 39. The Board agrees with the Applicant's position, this issue being one of first impression, that the FEMA regulatory guidance as weil as NUREG-0654 --
while not controlling -- a re instructive and the best authority as 'to what should be the standard for defining " full participation" for purposes of the NRC regulation. However, we are not disposed to give any weight to the report (LILCO Ex.12) prepared and offered by Dr. Hockert for LILCO. We do not believe this "non-regulatory" guidance, as it is described by LILCO, should be considered 3 as affecting our decision on the " full participation" issue in this case.
. Because we find adequate support in the formal regulatory authority, we
\
, j
.' need' not address the possible infirmities with; the Hockert report we will 1
not be relying on it. I
- 40. ' With respect to which of Lthe 35 standard exercise objectives in-
' FEMA' Guidance Memorandum CM PR-1 must be tested, the interveners' I
witnesses took the. position that it is " mandatory" that the ' initial exercise upon : which licensing above five' percent power is. based must include all major, observable , elements of the plan that' are reasonably achievable without mandatory public - participation. N.Y. Ex. 1, at 35. Since the Shoreham Exercise did' not test all of the objectives, the interveners' witnesses maintain that the Exercise was not a " full participation" exercise and, thus, did not' meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E
~
6 IV. F.1. g. : Tr. 7127-7131 (Baranski).
- 41. The FEMA witnesses were of the view that the 35 standard ,
objectives in their Guidance Memorandum need only be tested over a 'six year period, not entirely in the initial exercise. Tr. 7516-7520 (Baldwin, Kowleski) . Those FEMA objectives represent the major observable portions of a plan. .g.
- 42. The NRC Staff witnesses agreed that the number of objectives tested is not the determining factor as to whether an exercise is deemed
" full participation." NRC Staff Ex.1, at 6 (Schwartz, Weiss) . The requirement is simply that the integrated capability to assess adequately and respond to an accident be tested. M. According to the Staff, since i each plant is unique, the specific number of FEMA objectives tested in a full participation exercise will vary. ,1,d .
- 43. The Staff testified that the Exercise attempted to test the integrated capacility of the LERO plan to assess adequately and respond o 5
f
]
. jr to an accident at Shoreham. Id. at 7. The Exercise was designed to test
(' the major observable portions of the - Plan and the mobilization of those resources which were designed to compensate for the nonparticipation of. state and . local authorities, plus accommodating state and local officials- I should they respond to an emergency. g. As such, the Staff witnesses testified that the Exercise was a " full participation" exercise. Id.
- 44. The LILCO witnesses testified that the Exercise tested as much of the Plan as was " reasonably achievable." LILCO Ex. 12, at 16-17 (Daverlo, Behr). 'Where any particular element was not tested, it was due to one of the following reasons: (1) mandatory participation by members of the public or non-LERO organizations would. have been required; (2) FEMA had decided the element' need not be tested; or (3) the " political / legal" situation on Long Island made the demonstration of an item inadvisable. M.
- 45. Procedures for public notification in falling to activate the sirens (Contention EX 15. A; subsuming EX 24), distribution of brochures., and lack of participation by WALK Radio as the EBS (subsumed under EX 15. A) were not demonstrated because, as the LILCO witnesses put it, a " legal cloud" existed over those aspects of any exercise performed by LERO which involved contact with the public. Id.
. A!! hough eventually held to be unconstitutional just prior to the Exercise !
date, local law imposed heavy civil and criminal penalties for participation
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in any activity that could affect the general population. I d_. Without the brochures having been distributed to inform people about the meaning of the sirens, FEMA could not meaningfully sample the population to verify that they heard the sirens and understood that they should tune to an t
_ 19 a NN EBS radio station. Id.; FEMA Ex. 5, at 112. Given these circumstances, . l the Board' finds that the testing of these portions of the Plan was not I reasonably achievable by LERO on the day of the Ex'ercise. i
- 46. LERO personnel demonstrated 'the ability to activate all 4 administrative elements of the EBS and the prompt notification system without actually sounding the sirens and broadcasting an EBS message.
LILCO Ex.12, at 31-32; Tr. 6875-80 (Daverlo, Behr).
- 47. FEMA and interveners' witnesses testified tilat in all recent exercises in New York State strens were sounded. N.Y. Ex.1, at 41; Tr. 7553-56 (Keller, Kowleski), Tr. 7580-81 (Kowleski). FEMA requires, and LILCO has committed, however, to test the sirens at a subsequent FEMA-graded exercise. See FEMA Ex.1, at xi.
- 48. WALK radio .would not participate in the February 13, 1986 Exercise. FEMA Ex. 5, at 107. Based on activities observed during the Exercise, it was determined that all EBS messages were prepared and coordinated in accordance with the Plan. M. The Plan requires that activation of the prompt notification system must take place within fifteen minutes of a decision on the specific protective action recommendations that are to be broadcast to the public via EBS messages. M. In all cases the simulated stren sounding occurred within fifteen minutes of the dM:Islon by the Director of Local Response (as given in FEMA Ex.1, Table 1.2, p. 26). Id.
- 49. Other radio stations relied upon as part of the EBS System did l not participate in the Exercise. FEMA evaluated coordination of EBS I l- messages with WALK Radio as the primary insert station. M. FEMA l
Region il does not as a matter of practice require the participation of,
l l- ,
,q nor does it evaluate .the performance of, the secondary s'ations t in an EBS Jv) '
network for other nuclear power plants in New York and New Jersey. . I' g. This is consistent with the practice of other FEMA Regions l throughout the country. . M. The Board finds that this aspect of the Plan was sufficiently demonstrated and the fact that a simulated message was not actually broadcast over the airwaves was not probative of any flaw in the Plan. Contentions EX 15. A,16.C,16.D and 24 are found to be without merit. p 50. Procedures for public notification in the water portion of the EPZ (EX 15.8, subsuming 16.B regarding U.S. Coast Guard participation) were demonstrated to the extent necessary on the day of the Exercise.- l' Procedures for notification of the public in the water portion of the EPZ were implemented during the exercise by the U.S. Coast Guard. FEMA Ex. 5', at 108. FEMA's evaluation of these activities during the Exercise was ilmited to the observation of LERO's communications w'ith the U.S. Coast Guard from the EOC and telephone inter; views of the Coast Guard officials in New Haven by the Federal evaluator. M.
- 51. FEMA's decision to limit the observation to these communications was based on the recommendation of the Department of Transportation RAC member. M. The important thing to exercise was the communica-tion link to the Coast Guard and to coordinate operations. .id at 109.
FEMA decided .not to evaluate the notification of the public on the water portion of the EPZ. The only action not taken by the Coast Guard was the broadcast of a message over the marine band radio. See LILCO Ex.12, at 33-34 O
e ,
- 52. The Board finds that given the demonstration of integration
}r with ' . the Coast Guard,- means for alerting persons on the water were
. sufficiently demonstrated.
- 53. With regard to the procedures for evacuation of hospitals and nursing homes within the EPZ .not being demonstrated (EX 15.D, subsuming 16.H, i, J), as the FEMA witnesses testified, the Plan does no't intend that evacuation would be recommended for these facilities. ;
FEMA Ex. 5, at 113. The faclittles in question are near the boundary 'of the 10-mlie - EPZ. Id. at 114. FEMA Region li does not require hospitals to participate in exercises, except as responding to medical drills as required by NUREC-0654. M. at 115. This is. consistent with FEMA .w practice in other regions throughout the country. M. Thus, the Board finds that it was not a deficiency in scope of the Shoreham Exercise -- i.e., less than " full participation -- because these facilities did not participate. ,
- 54. The ability of schools to shelter and evacuate school chlidren does not depend on LERO (see Contentions EX 15.E, F, G, subsuming EX' 16.F, G and EX.18.C, 26, 30). See LILCO Ex.12, at 37 (Davario, Behr). As the Board found in the prior litigation: LILCO reed not obtain written agreements with schools since the written emergency plans required by New York State are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented. Shoreham PID, 21 NRC 644, 858; see FEMA Ex. 5, at 116.
- 55. FEMA Region il does not evaluate school participation as part of emergency exercises. FEMA Ex. 5, at 116,123. What was done at the
,v i
f Shoreham Exercise is consistent with other FEMA exercises in New York
\
State. Tr. 7583 (Kowleski).
- 56. LERO did, in fact, demonstrate the physical means to dismiss schools early. See. LILCO Ex.12, at 38. FEMA injected a free play message' and LERO communicated with- the District School Superintendent,
- and the appropriate number of buses were dispatched to the Shoreham-Wading River School. M. In addition, LERO demonstrated the abill'ty to assist an evacuation. FEMA sent a free play message that resources were needed for the evacuation of 40 children. Id. A bus was sent to Ridge Elementary School to assist. Id.
- 57. The Board agrees with 'the LILCO nhuesses that even if the i backup response to the free play message w0s inadequate, .the primary capability to evacuate schools was shown to be adequate. Even assuming i that the 3-hour delay cited by Interveners is accurate, there was still time (2 hours) for the bus to reach the edge of the EPZ within the time
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estimates in the Plan. M.; see' FEMA Ex. 5, at 118; FEMA Ex.1, at 43,
- 66. FEMA did recommend, however, that in the future all schools be i
included in FEMA-evaluated exercises and drills. g. i
- 58. Interveners' witnesses testified that there have been more l extensive demonstrations of school preparedness at other exercises in New York State, and that the notification and participation of only one school district during the Shoreham Exercise was inadequate. N.Y. Ex . 1, i
at 60-63. These witnesses maintain that insufficient numbers of school personnel, school buses and school bus drivers participated. Id. at 79. They also claim there was no demonstration of early dismissal and sheltering. M. at 61. Interveners also argued that to await future
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i
i
s exercises to test LERO capability with respect to schools was insufficient.
\ )
id. at 70-71.
, 59. Given the past practice in FEMA Region 11, and the apparent extent to which schools would have limited their participation in the Exercise as evidenced by the letters from the schools to LILCO, the Board finds that LERO tested its capability with respect to schools to the degree consistent with a reasonably achievable level.
- 60. As to the absence of testing for determining , issuing, and implementing measures for the ingestion pathway, Contention EX 15.1 includes ~the following : Connecticut did not participate (EX 16. A); no .
recommendations were made beyond 10 miles (EX 37. A); no recommenda-tions were made for dairy' animals (EX 37.B); no recommendations were made as to food (EX 37.C); and the Ground Depcsition Calculation Worksheet was not completed (EX 37.D). The LILCO witnesses admit that ingestion pathway activities were not tested to any significant degree. LILCO Ex.12, at 39; Tr. 6919 (Daverio). 61 Intervenor witnesses conceded that such a test has not been done for the other plants in New York State. Tr. 7208 (Papile); see also Tr. 7526 ( Kowleski) . Nevertheless, these witnesses would require one for Shoreham, since Shoreham is an NTOL. Id. at 7207-09; 7231-33 (Baranski).
- 62. In adhering to the NRC suggestion that FEMA scheduie an exercise that emphasized evaluation of the functional areas of emergency preparedness related to the demonstration of response capabilities (see ,
I Finding 28), FEMA and LILCO agreed that ingestion pathway objectives j l ps would not be part of this exercise. FEMA Ex. 5, at 125. This is in l V
f accord with past FEM,A practice. Id. FEMA stated that the State of New ) C York has not. participated in a full-scale exercise of ingestion exposure pathway for any of the three operating sites located .within its borders. The scenario which was developed by LILCO, and approved by FEMA, was one which did not require the implementation of ingestion pathway PA R's . Id. If ingestion pathway objectives had been selected as part of the exercise development, an entirely different scenario would have been necessary. jd. LlLCO witnesses testified that LILCO was willing to include ingestion pathway objectives in the Exercise. LILCO Ex . 12, at 39.
- 63. As the FEMA witnesses testified, and this Board finds, since there' were no ingestion pathway objectives and the scenario was developed and approved on that basis, the participation of- the State of Connecticut (which was limited to simulated communications) was reasonable and appropriate. FEMA Ex. 5, at 126.
- 64. For the reasons stated previously, we do not agree with Interveners that a test of the ingestion pathway was compelled by the fact that this was a near term operating license (NTOL) Exercise.
- 65. Interveners also allege that FEMA failed to test whether adequate procedures exist for monitoring and decontaminating evacuees
. from special facilities who would be sent to special reception / relocation centers. Contention EX 15.K. This issue is also treated under the i
I findings covering Contention EX 47. l
- 66. The demonstration of procedures for monitoring and decontami- l
- l nation of special facility evacuees was not an objective of this Exercise.
l FEMA Ex. 5, at 127. The process of monitoring and decontamination, 'If U i e'
needed, is the same regardless of the location of the monitoring site. Id. As stated in the RAC review of the LILCO plan , the location of the reception centers for many of the special facilities had not yet been designated in the Plan. g.; FEMA Ex. 2, at 2.
- 67. The Exercise objective was to demonstrate adequate procedures for monitoring and decontamination methods used in general, not for evacuees from special facilities. See LILCO Ex.12, at 40. The process used during the Shoreham Exercise is consistent with the one that Region il has been using in all full participation exercises held in the past. ]I FEMA Ex. 5, at 127. The Board finds the omission of this testing on the day of the Exercise to be of no moment in making a reasonable assurance finding as to the Pla n . Monitoring and decontamination need not be ,
demonstrated at multiple facilities in a full participation exercise.
- 68. Recovery and reentry activities were also excluded from the Shoreham Exercise. Contention EX.15.M. Interveners' witnesses con-tend that LERO in no way demonstrated its ability to do this under the Plan. N.Y. Ex. 1, at 154-55. This Board agrees with the FEMA and LILCO witnesses however, that this does not affect the " full participation" nature of Exercise; nor does it indicate a fundamental flaw in the Plan.
- 69. As LILCO testified , recovery and reentry activities are not affected by the time constraints of short-term protective measures.
LILCO Ex.12, at 40-41. Further, as FEMA testified, the Environmental Protection Agency guidance on recovery and reentry activities !s in draft .. form and has not been adopted for implementation. FEMA Ex 5. at 128: Tr. 7673-74 (Keller). The omission of recovery and reentry objectives is consistent with other FEMA full-scale exercises in Region 11. Id. In l l l L .
1 i A addition, recovery and reentry were omitted because of the NRC directive 1 i ! -( . _ ) N to focus on the 10-mile EPZ during the Exercise. Tr. 7675 (Kowleski). i
- 70. We do not find the degree to which recovery and reentry activities were actually conducted at the Exercise to be significant; such a test is not necessary for. a " full participation" exercise. See LILCO l
Ex.12, at 41, Att. J. -
- 71. With respect to the participation of Marketing Evaluations, Inc. '
(EX 16.E) , which is charged with responsibility for conducting a i telephone survey to verify siren operations and evacuation, we agree with the LILCO and FEMA position that there was no rational basis upon which to test its performance on the day of the Exercise. Since the sirens were not actually sounded and no actual evacuation occurred, there would have I been nothing upon which to test Marketing Evaluations. FEMA Ex. 5, at 129; LILCO. Ex.12, at 41. At the future exercise, when the strens are to be actually sounded, Marketing Evaluatic *'s participation would be anticipated and meaningful in that context. See FEMA Ex . 1, at xi.
- 72. The lack of participation by most of the bus companies on the day of the Exercise (EX 16.K, subsuming 18.C(l)) is not illustrative of a flaw in the Plan or a limitation on the full participation nature of the Exercise. See ' LILCO Ex. 12, at 41-42; FEMA Ex. 5, at 130; compare N.Y. ' Ex, 1, at 122. LlLCO has contracts with these various bus companies to supply buses. LILCO Ex.12, at 42 (Daverlo, Behr). The drivers are LERO drivers. M. 'LILCO requires a total of 377 buses to evacuate the ambulatory transit-dependent population in the EPZ. N.Y.
Ex.1, at 132. This includes 333 buses for the general population and 44 buses for the "special population." N.Y. Ex.1, at 132.
-i 1
. -m 73. LILCO witnesses asserted that supplying the buses is.a simple i
function that need not be tested.- LILCO Ex.12, at 42. A sample of bus companies did participate in the Exercise. M.; see FEMA Ex.1, at 35. LILCO mobilized all of its drivers, and those not in buses drove their routes in cars. N.Y. Ex.1, at 133. No passengers were actually picked up or discharged at any point. M. FEMA evaluated el'g ht general population bus runs and one curbside pick up bus run. _Id . : see FEMA Ex.1, at 58; FEMA Ex. 5, at 135.
- 74. FEMA does not require that all transportation resource suppliers l
listed in the plan be involved in any one Federally evaluated exercise. FEMA Ex. 5, at 130. It has been a standard operating procedure of FEMA Region ll to evaluate a sample of bus companies listed in the plan at any full-scale exercise. M. FEMA did state, however, that i subsequent exercises should test a sample of the remaining bus companies in an effort to evaluate all resources identified in the Plan within a six-year cycle. M.
- 75. Two randomly selected bus routes were evaluated for each of i
the Port Jefferson and Riverhead Staging Areas . Both rwtes were implemented according to the Plan. FEMA Ex.1, at 58, 74. Four bus drivers were evaluated for the Patchogue Staging Area. These evalua- ' tions covered briefings , issuance of equipment, and compilance with procedures and route assignments, including travel to bus company l I ybrds, transfer points, pick-up routes, and travel to end destinations.
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Id. at 58, 64-65, 74. ,
- 76. Bus drivers to drive the routes were picked at random by a ;
FEMA evaluator from the large number of bus drivers at each of the l ) L/
l
- 28 .
staging areas. FEMA Ex. 5, at 131. The routes to be demonstrated were 3 selected on the basis of two key criteria: (a) the assumption, based on FEMA's review ~ and analysis of the scenario, that at least emergency - planning zones A - J would be affected by an evacuation reemnmendation, and (b) demonstration of the routes would require the activation of four of the eleven Transfer' Points listed in the plan. ,l d .
- 77. The Board finds that the Exercise with respect to the testing of the participation of bus companies was appropriate and in conformity with FEMA's practice at other plants. Notwithstanding Interveners' witnesses' assertion that at other exercises, unlike Shoreham, FEMA has required that laj bus companies actually be contacted and bua company personnel be interviewed to ensure that the number of required buses would in fact be available (N.Y. Ex . 1, at 138-39), we find no reason to fault the ,
Shoreham Exercise's scope. Participation by all the bus companies relied
- on in the Plan is not necessary.
- 78. Not all . ambulance companies mentioned in the- Plan actually participated in the Exercise (Contention EX 16.L). See M.Y. Ex . 1, at 91. LILCO relies on ambulances and ambulettes to evacuate two segments of the EPZ population: (1) the homebound handicapped who cannot be moved in buses; and (2) residents of special facilities, such as hospitals and nursing homes. ,l d , at 95. LILCO has contracts with eleven ambulance companies to make ambulances and ambulettes availabic in an emergency. OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 6; see N . Y . Ex. 1, at 96. The FEMA Report found that the objective of demonstrating a sample of the resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of the institutionalized mobilityJimpaired individuals within the 10-mile EPZ was met with respect o__ 1 ,
a l w< ~ to the ambulance and embulette demonstrations. FEMA Ex.1, at 43. Six- []' ambulances and six ambulettes were activated and all were dispatched to - pick up mobility-impaired individuals. Id. FEMA does not require that all' transportation suppliers be involved in the exercise. FEMA Ex. 5, at 136. This approach is reasnnable.
- 79. We find the test of ambulance availability during the Exercise-to have been adequate. Moreover, as pointed out by the LILCO witnesses, the mobilization of significantly more ambulances and ambulettes probably would have affected their ability to be available for response to actual emergencies during the Exercise. LILCO Ex.12, at 42.
- 80. Interveners also contend that the Exercise was less than full participation because of the lack of participation by Nassau County- and by the Nassau . County Red Cross. Contentions EX- 18.C (iii) and 18.C (vi).
- 81. LILCO witnesses testified that there is no regulatory requirement for participation of an adjoining county that is outside the ,
10-mile EPZ. LILCO Ex.12, at 42-43. They stated that Nassau County did in fact participate by supplying the Nassau County Coliseum as a Reception Center. Id. Further, the Nassau County Chapter of the Red Cross participated by activating and staffing two congregate care centers in Nassau County and by providing the Red Cross Coordinator at the LERO EOC. ,ld. The Red Cross Coordinator maintained contact with the ! Reception Center and Red Cross Chapter Headquarters in Mineola. FEMA Ex. 5, at 139. The Board finds this contention subpart to be without merit. (
- 82. A key matter disputed with respect to Contentions EX 15 and 16 ~
I_ , revolves around the question of whether the initial exercise for' a NTOL plant should be more comprehensive and test aspects of the plan more completely than the subsequent exercises for the plant once it has its operating . llcense. See N.Y. Ex. 1, at 24-25, 35-36; Tr. 7127 (Baranski); Tr. 7220-23 (Petrone): Tr. 6853-54 (Daverlo); Tr. 7622 (Keller); Tr. 8513-14 (Baldwin, Keller, Kowleski); Tr. 8832-36 (Schwartz); LILCO Ex. 12, at 9. Such a requirement is read into 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E. 5 IV. F.1 by the interveners, while the Applicant, the Staff and FEMA do not view such a requirement as extant.
- 83. There is a certain initial appeal to interveners' position that a more comprehensive first exercise should be required so.as to determine the effectiveness and capability of a plan as well as to establish a " track record" for subsequent exercises (see N.Y. Ex.1, at 25); irrespective of the wisdom of such a policy, however, the only question before this Board is whether such an' initial exercise is actually required by 10 C. F. R. Part 50, App. E, 9 IV.F.1. We find that there is no such requirement. -
- 84. The notion that an initial exercise will lead to major changes in an emergency plan are probably more illusory than real; indeed, there
. seems to be little evidence of this occurring in past practice. See Tr. 7220-22 (Petrone). FEMA has never found such a distinction between NTOLs and operating plants; nor has it developed different objectives for each on that basis. Tr. 8513-15 (Kowleski, Baldwin, Keller). The NRC Staff also saw no difference between the two for exercise requirements.
Tr. 8816-17 (Schwartz), s
l i k l
- 85. This Board rules that such a distinction should not be read into i
(S ;
' v')
the regulations, in responding to public comments on the rule change from one year to two years for full participation exercises before operation for power reactors, the Commission indicated that a " disparity in treatment" of NTOLs and operating plants is unwarranted with respect , to frequency of testing. 52 Fed. Reg.16823, at 16826 (May 6, 1987). The Commission drew no distinction between the two. See ,Id. We also find no basis for doing so. i
- 86. The Board finds that the requirements for a " full participation exercise" are the same for NTOLs and operating plants; thus, while all major portions of a plan must be tested, they need not all be tested in the initial exercise, but may be tested over the applicable six-year period. This Board cannot read a more stringent requirement into Appendix E for the initial exercise of an NTOL.
87, in sum, on . Contentions EX 15 and 16, this Doard finds that the February 13, 1986, Exercise of the Shoreham Plan was a full participation exercise within the meaning of Appendix E in that it tested the major observable portions of the Plan and mobilization of personnel and resources in sufficient numbers to verify capability to respond to en accident to the degree that was reasonably achievable. The admitted portions of Contention EX 15 and 16, including all subsumed portions of other contentions, are, therefore, found to be without merit. Hence, on the basis of those allegations, we find no defect or flaw in the scope of the Exercise that would preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological I emergency at Shoreham. j w
f'~ \(. CONTENTION EX 21 - Adequacy of Data Used ( s]f s. by FEMA for it,s Exercise Evaluations
- 88. Contention EX 21 pleads in essence that the LILCO emergency ;
i plan is fundamentally flawed because FEMA' had " insufficient data to
)
I support its conclusion that (enumerated exercise objectives] were met or partly met. . .". Subparts A through F of Contention EX 21 challenge l 1 FEMA's conclusion on the basis of its limited observation of Route Alert Drivers (21.A); Bus Drivers (21.B); school dismissals and evacuations (21.C); Ambulance /ambulette Drivers (21.D); Traffic Guides (21.E); and traffic obstructions (21.F). I
- 89. The Licensing Board's discussion of Contention EX 21 and its subparts is limited to those matters upon which the County gave i evidence. Other ' matters, pied but upon which Interveners introduced no evidence, have been waived.
- 90. The Licensing Board's review of the FEMA Post-Exercise
]
1 Assessment, and especially the pages cited by the County , does not { disclose any area where FEMA had insufficient data to support its j ( conclusions in regard to whether tested Exercise objectives were met. ] i indeed, in the areas of activity cited by the County in Contention EX 21, -l
)
none of the problems cited by FEMA related to the number of persons or activities observed by FEMA. See FEMA Ex. 1, at 44, 46, 66, 67, 75. The Licensing Board's review of the evidence shows that Suffolk County has not proved that a fundamental flaw exists in regard to tne matters l l alleged by Contention EX 21. j
- 91. Suffolk County's evidence in support of this contention l
l consisted of the testimony of Dr. Gary A. Simon, a well qualified ; l m
\ S. C. Ex. 99. However, (V statistician currently with New York University.
i
.g [] Dr. Simon- had no expertise in emergency planning, had never obterved
.an emergency planning exercise, did not know the content- of the NRC-FEMA regulations and had not reviewed the LILCO plan. Tr.
1
~7359-62. His testimony ~ is a statistical critique of the way in which FEMA Dr. Simon
~
evaluated .the February 13, 1986 Exercise. Tr. 2360 (Simon). summed up his position by stating "...the only method which should be seriously - considered [by FEMA in evaluating an exercise] is simply random sampling ... random sampling enables us to make straightforward
. probability statements about the quantitative results which arise. from the work." S. C. Ex. 99 at - 9. 6,/ Dr. Simon found no fundamental flaw in LILCO's emergency plan. Rather, he found fault with FEMA review and i
analysis procedures.. Indeed, Dr. Simon was . not familiar with LILCO's emergency plan. Not one single time in the entire 69 pages of his preflied written testimony does Dr. Simon even cite to any section of the LILCO emergency. plan. He does not point to any part of that plan as being defective or fundamentally flawed. Having failed to offer testimony on a fundamental flaw in LILCO's emergency plan, the only matter of 1 I
-6/
This is not the first time In this proceeding that Suffolk County has i advocated that statistical random sampling must be utilized. ) Previously the County had argued that compliance with the Quality ! Assurance Program required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B required the use 'of statistical random sampling. The Licensing - , Board found that the QA audit program utilizing professional ] experience was acceptable even though random sampling was not ) used. The Appeal Board stated, in this regard " judgement sampling ) in the conduct of audits is consistent with the requirements of { Criterion XVill." Shoreham, A LA B-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1139, 1140 (1984). This basically is the same issue as presented by the County's Contention EX 22.F which argues that statistical random sampling must be used by FEMA in evaluating an emergency exercise. 1 l
, ,q r
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- i 3y< q
, 1 3 J .J .;
A substance; to be heard in this proceeding, the Licensing Board (bds that - , { Y < y
^U there is no meritto, Suffolk County's Contention EX 21 and its subparts.
- 92. . The e'.nergency planning regulations of the NRC and FE,M.Ajand 4
,e the guidancegnd procedures issued thereunder, do not ' constitute flaws c f ,
in LILCO's. emergency plan, or indeed -in the emergency pian for any , X nuclear power facility. The total thrust of Dr. Simon's testitnony is that !
, - .y the NRC-FEMA regulations are deficient by' not rerjulring statisti::a!
random sampling of all aspects of an emergency exercise. O Thih is i clearly .a challenge to the NRC regulations and requires a 10 C.F.R. 4 5 2.758 demonstration, something which the County did not do. 93.. Further, even if Dr. Simon's testimony weyn not infirm as an attack) on regulations, it still would have to be reijected, o Dr. Simon , analyzed from a statistical perspectlye FEMA's drawing c nclusions based
' on observations of 3 of 60 Route Alert Drivers (21., A); 8 - of 333 Bus Drivers (21.8); and 2 of a total possible 201 Ambulance /ambulette Drivers , '
.g though only twelve were mobi!! zed for the exercise (21.D). Dr. SimorI also comm0nted adversely upon FEMA's lackfof observation of simulated i
early dismissal of schools and evacuating children (21.C). He found little or no fault with FEMA's observing 32 out of 165 Traffic Cuides (21.E). ' l Contention EX 21.F, traffic impediments, was treated by the County under Contention EX 41, which is where it is addressed in this decision.
- 94. Dr. Simon assumed that the Route Alert Drivers , the Bus Drivers, the Ambulance /ambulette Drivers and the Traffic Guides each
.- l c
-7/ Dr. Simon, in concluding his tes timony, stated that the NRC !
g regulations should require random statist.ical sampling. Tr. 7609. l . i 0 L L
m >
- y constituted a finite population. Tr. 7395, 7398, 7401 (Simon) . For q y V '
purposes of his analysis he used a hypergeometric distribution. Tr. 7398 (Simon). He assumed that each driver or guide was a stochastic variant.
'~
Tr. 7395, 73976 (Simon) . Dr. Simon then treated each driver's or gulde's actions as a Bernoull process. Tr. 7394, 7407, 7408 (Simon); S.C. Ex. 99 at 10. Further, Dr. Simon treated ' the 3 Route Alert Drivers , 8 Bus Drivers, 2 Ambulance /ambulette Drivers, and 32 Traffic Guides as random samples. Dr. Simori then constructed power curves using a 95% confidence interval to illustrate the meaningfulness of the range of acceptability with all possible combinations of Bernouli actions of 8I g the drivers (S.C. Ex. 99 at 34, 41 and 57). Putting this in perspective for the layman, it means, for example, that if all three of the
\
Route Alert Drivers observed by FEMA (Contention EX 21. A) performed successfully, the estimated true number of the total of 60 Route Alert Drivers who could be expected to perform successfully would be between 23 and 60 drivers. S.C. Ex. 99 at 34. In layman's terms, Dr. Simon's message is that the number of Route Alert Drivers (3), Bus Drivers (8) and Ambulance /ambulette Drivers (2), observed by FEMA were so small that nothing very meaningful could be said as to how the total number cf l drivers would perform in the event of an emergency. The conclusion to ' S be drawn from Dr. Simon's statistical analysis is that FEMA's conclusions about the exercise, in regard to the Contention EX 21 functions, are n6t 7, . _ . - - E
~
8/ Dr. Simon found no " fundamental flaw" in the number of Traffic Guides and they are not further addressed here. S.C. Ex. 99 at 62
; and 63.
LU 1 L________
. I : ~
I shown to be valid or invalid; but rather that the probab'llity of their
~/ -
q
>b being valid is uncertain. S.C. Ex. 99 at 32, 35, 39, 49, and 56.
- 95. If the Licensing Board were to find that Dr. Simon's testimony is entirely correct, including his assertion that FEMA must use random statistical sampling to support its positions, then we. would still find that
. there is no merit to Contention EX 21 and its subparts. All that L
Dr. Simon's testimony does is to assert that the FEMA Iand NRC) requirements for asses's ing and evaluating an emergency exercise are deficient by not requiring random sampling. On cross-examination, Dr. Simon characterized his testimony as a statistical critique of the way in which FEMA evaluated the February 1986 Exercise (Tr., 7409). If, and l we do not reach this matter, the FEMA-NRC regulations, requirements and guidance are deficient, those Simon-hypothesized deficiencies do not constitute " fundamental flaws in LILCO's [ Emergency] Plan. . . . " CLl-86-11, 23 NRC 577, 581. The Licensing Board's charter is limited by the parameters set by the Commission in CLI-86-11 and it is to permit Interveners the opportunity to prove fundamental flaws in LILCO's emergency plan, not to criticize NRC-FEMA regulations and practices. Even were this not the case, however, there are additional reasons for rejecting Contention EX 21, as set forth below.
. 96. The premises which underly Dr. Simon's testimony do not appertain to the Exercise or to FEMA's evaluation thereof. Dr. Simon's basic premise in that the drivers and guides may be treated as a Bernouli process, that is, as events with only two possible outcomes, here success O
i . ~ - 1 7 M 37 - j
),<Y or failure. Charles A. Daverlo testified for LILCO' EI that a broad range f
F "? of activities was involved regarding_ the drivers and guides. ' Tr. 7268 (Daverio); LILCO Ex.19 at . 7. , Those activities could not be equated _/ with a success er failure', pass or no pass situation, which is the basic 6 framework upon which Dr. Simon bulle hls analysis. See tables in ~ S.C. Ex. 99 at IJ4, 41 and 57. :Dr. Simon testified that FEMA did not randomly l- , select the drivers and guides they observed (Tr. 7390 (Simon)) and thus
.f., they were not stochastic variants, s 97. Mr. Kowleski for F.MA (Tr. 8680 ( K owles ki)) ,' as did Mr. Daver!o (Tr. 7300 (Daverio)), testified that FEMA does not
" statistically ~ sample nor do they need to do so. FEMA determined how many drivers and guides to observe based upon past experience and professional, judgment. Tr. 8480 ( Kowleski) . 'The facts are that the drive.fs and Traffic Guides dc not fit into Dr. Simon's framework of
~'
Tant!om samples of eventi, each of which has only two possible outcomes. Dr. Simon analyzed in his own terms a situation which did not exist. p , The Licensing Board finds the expert testimony of FEMA persuasive and rejects the Suffolk County-Stuon argument that FEMA must employ random statistical ' sampling of all aspects of an Exercise to ' support their evaluations.
- 98. The' Licensing Board finds 'that the weight of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence supports the FEMA position in regard
, to the appropriate number of persons and activities to be observed by
-9/
"LILCO's Tesumony on Contention 21" admitted at.Tr. 7267 as LILCO Exercisa Exhtit 19, hereinafter "Daverio Testimony", or " LI LCO Ex. 19".
F t:MA. Suffolk County has failed to prove its case. While Dr. Simon ( \ ) v' would require that statistical sampling be performed upon isolated narrow aspects of exercise activity, Dr. Simon admits to having no expertise in FEM A'-N RC regulations and procedures; no expertise in emergency planning or exercises; having given minimum consideration to FEMA's exercise objectives and the criteria FEMA evaluators used; having little knowledge of LILCO's emergency plan; and to being unable to cite by section number to any single deficiency in the LILCO emergency plan. Tr. 7359-62 (Simon).
- 99. FEMA is the Federal agency responsible for determining the cdequacy of emeigency plans and the exercise thereof at nuclear power plants. FEMA's historica:l experience and professional judgment has led it to conclude that statistical sampling is not necessary to evaluate exercise performance. Tr. 8280 ( Kowleski) . FEMA also testified that its observations at the Shoreham Exercise were equal to or greater then at other FEMA Region I'l exercises. Tr. 8476 (Kowleski). Mr. Daverlo also testified that FEMA's observations equaled or exceeded those at other exercises. LILCO Ex.19 at 12',15,17,19 and 23, FEMA also testified that FEMA's purpose was to judge organizational response, nct individual q
performances. Tr. 8536 (Baldwin). l 100. In sum, the Board finds that because the Contention neither pleads, nor does Suffolk County prove, there to be a fundamental flaw in the LILCO emergency plan, or that the method of observation by FEMA of J l Exercise events was invalid or unreliable, the Contention must be rejected. Fina!!y, the thrust of the County's testimony is that the NRC
- regulations should be changed to require statistical samplings. Tr. 7409 l
l I j (~N (Simon). As such, it attacks the FEMA-NRC regulations and procedures t "~
' ) for reviewing and analyzing exercises. The Licensing Board finds that i
there is no merit to Contention EX 21. VI. CONTENTION EX 40 - Mobilization, Dispatch and Staffing of Traffic Control Posts 101. Contention EX 40 states, in general, that the mobilization and dispatch of Traffic Guides and the staffing of their Traffic Control Posts (TCPs) during the Exercise were not demonstrated in a timely manner (EX 40. A and 40.8) and that Plan revisions do not alleviate the problems identified on the day of the Exercise (40.E). El 102. LILCO preseiaed the direct testimony of two witnesses on Contention EX 40. These witnesses were Edward B. Lieberman and John A. Weismantle. Mr. Lieberman is Vice President of KLD Associates, Inc. Lieberman and Weismantle, ff. Tr.1548, at 3. KLD Associates is a consulting firm that has performed work for LILCO on evacuation time estimates and mobilization procedures for the Plan. M. Mr. Lieberman is qualified as an expert to testify on Contention EX 40. LILCO Ex.1, at item 6. Mr. Weismantle is V!ce President of Engineering for LILCO, and during the Exercise served as the Manager of Local Response for LILCO. He is also qualified to offer expert testimony on Contention 40. LILCO Ex.1, at item 14. l 103. Suffolk County offered the direct testimony of four Suffolk County Police Department Officers: Assistant Chief inspector Richard C. l l l ! 10/ Subpart C of Contention EX 40 is dealt with under Contentions
~~
EX 38 and 39. Subpart D was not admitted. fb _________m__________..__- . _ _ _ . _ _ _
I L f e' Roberts, inspector Richard . Dormer, inspector Philip McGuire and Deputy I s [' Inspector Edwin J. Michel. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2180. I 104. The FEMA witnesses, Messrs. Kowleski and Keller and D,r. L Baldwin, testified on Contention EX 40 on direct (FEMA Ex. 5, at 9-14) and were cross-examined on this matter. See Tr. 8097-8107. , 105. NUREC-0654, Sec. J.10.J, requires that means exist for controlling access to evacuated areas. Under the Plan. this function is to be performed by the Traffic Culdes. Tr. 8017-19 ( Kowleski, Daidwin). 106. Under the Plan , the Traffic Guides are to " guide" and
" encourage" evacuees to follow the evacuation routes set out in the Plan.
See . Appendix A, at IV-5 to -72e and V-2; OPIP 3.6.3. The Plan pro-vides for' 165 Traffic Guides manning 130 TCPs. Tr.1565 (Weismantie). The Traffic Culdes are expected to provide vehicular traffic control and direction at key intersections to expedite the traffic flow out of an area during evacuation and to relay traffic conditions to the Lead Traffic Guides so as to reflect the effectiveness of the evacuation process. OPIP 2.11, Att. 2 (at 26); see Rcberts et al. , ff. Tr. 2180, at 16. 107. These Traffic Culdes are assigned to report to three staging areas; 52 to the Riverhead staging area, 72 to the Port Jefferson staging area and 42 to the Patchogue staging area. Weismantie and Lieberman, ff. Tr.1548, Atts. B, C, D. The Traffic Culdes from Riverhead man 38 TCPs, those from Port Jefferson 58 TCPs, and those from Patchogue 28 TCPs. M. Of the total, LlLCO labeled 49 TCPs as " critical" (20 from Riverhead, 11 from Patchogue and 18 from Port Jefferson), as first on a priority manning list. Weismantle and Lieberman, ff. Tr.1548, at 10-11. O
'd.
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41.-
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'108. ~ Under- the . Plan, Traffic Guides are not dispatched to their ,
(h posts in the field until after an evacuation order is issued by LERO and, , I" thus/ byl definition these guides are not at their posts at the outset of the- evacuation process. Tr. 8100 (Keller). 109.. On the day of the Exercise, relevant field perennel, including Traffic Guides, were called out at announcement of the . Site Area Emergency. level at 8:19. Weismantle and Lieberman, ff. Tr.1548, at 5. These personnel each- reported to one of the three' staging areas. M. Once at the' staging areas, the field workers were given dosimeters and K1 tablets, and received briefings on radiological procedures. See ' OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 1 ~, and 3.9.1. , Att. 1. The Traffic Culdes then waited for a simulated order for the public to evacuate. Weismantle and Lieberman, ff. Tr.1548, at - 5. Orders to evacuate were given at 10:24 for Emergency Planning Zones . A-M, Q and R, bnd at 11:46 for the remaining zones. 3. at 11. The Traffic Guides for particular TCPs affected by an evacuation order received their - TCP assignments and necessary traffic control equipment after that evacuation order. M. at 11. All field workers, including Traffic Culdes, - also - picked up box lunches at the staging areas. ,ld. at 5. After obtaining their equipment, the designated Traffic Culdes then left the staging areas and traveled to their assigned TCPs.- ,l d, . Once they reached their respective TCPs, the mobilization
. process was completed. Id.
110. The Plan does not provide a specific time frame within which ! l' Traffic Guides must be fully mobilized. M. at 6; FEMA Ex. 5, at 9-14. Traffic Culdes should be at their posts at about the time congestion begins to develop on the roads to achieve a " controlled" evacuation. O. b .-
42 - Weismantle and Lieberman, ff. Tr. 1548, at 6. As held previously, (N
)
t, however, in some fast-breaking accidents this would not be achievable. 21 NRC at 721. 111. The ability to staff the staging areas was evaluated by FEMA under Exercise objective SA 2 (FEMA Ex.1, at 12) for each of the three staging areas. FEMA Ex. 5, at 9. This objective was evaluated as being met at all three staging areas. M. 112. The FEMA witnesses testified that the ' timeliness of the estfolishment of access ' control points by Traffic Guides was evaluated under . exercise objective FIELD 6. FEMA Ex. 5, at 9. They testified that this objective was evaluated as being met for the Port Jefferson Staging - Area and partly met for the Patchogue and Riverhead Staging Areas. M. 113. With the exception of the Traffic Guides dispatched from the Riverhead Staging Area, the FEMA witnesses testified that FEMA had no knowledge as to the specific times that the Traffic Culdes arrived at their assigned posts. FEMA Ex. 5, at 11. FEMA also had no specific knowledge of the times at which the dispatch of the Traffic Guides was completed at the various staging areas. M. 114. At the Port Jefferson and Patchogue Staging Areas, FEMA
. evaluators did not actually observe the dispatch of Traffic Culdes nor did the evaluators actually observe the setting up of the Traffic Control Posts in the field by those guides. Tr. 8080-8085 ( Keller, Kowleski) . The FEMA. evaluators based their assessment on interviews with the Traffic Culdes after the latter had already arrived and staffed their TCPs. M.
q at 8082, 8088-89 (Kowleski); see Tr. 8101-02 (Keller). l
. F I,q 115. In the Riverhead Staging Area, some Traffic Guides were observed by FEMA evaluators arriving at their posts in the field. Tr.
i 8085 (Kowleski). FEMA identified a Defielency in the untimely arrival of these guides. FEMA Ex. 1, at 74-75. The FEMA evaluators, however, i did not take specific note of times at which these guides were dispatched.
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Tr. 8104 (Kowleski). l 116. FEMA Judged the overall performance of the personnel at the staging areas. Tr. 8106 (Kowleski). FEMA testified that the' dispatch was well-organized and proper. Id. The Board finds insufficient evidence to rebut this FEMA conclusion relating to dispatch. 117. The FEMA witnesses indicated that, taking the data set forth . In Attachment 11. of the Suffolk County direct testimony as true (Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2180), FEMA would have identified an additional Deficiency related to the arrival of Traffic Guides at their posts had FEMA actually observed those times in the field. Tr. 8092-93 (Baldwin). 118. Guides from the Patchogue Staging Area were misinformed as to the instructions to give simulated evacuees to reception centers. This , was identified by FEMA as an area requiring corrective action (ARCA). This ARCA had nothing to do with the guides' untimely arrival at their i posts. Tr. 8086-87 (Kowleski). 119. Neither the preflied testimony of the parties nor the cross-examination of their witnesses revealed significant factual ' dispute as to the length of time the mobilization, dispatch, and staffing of Traffic Guides took on the day of the Exercise. The controversy centers on how those times should be interpreted with respect to making a reasonable p assurance finding. 1 %
l . L* , _ 44 _ 120. The Traffic Guide call-out process began at about 8:19 a..m. on the day of the Exercise. Tr.1597 '(Weismantle). Upon arriving .at
' the staging areas, the Traffic Culdes were required. to obtain- dosimetry and field kits and then be briefed regarding the staffing of their posts.
See . OPIP 3.6.3, 8.5.8; Roberts . ,e_t' t al. , ff. Tr. 2180, at 20. At the Riverhead ' Staging Area, the only area at which the actual timing of staffing and dispatch was observed, FEMA found that the time' between
~ deployment from - the . staging area and arrival at the TCPs was
" excessive," taking between fifty and. seventy minutes.. FEMA Ex. 1, . at
-74, 75. A more. expeditious means of getting the Traffic Guides from the
. staging area to the field should be developed, according to FEMA. M. at
- 75. As noted above,. this mobilization problem at Riverhead was found to
- be a Deficiency by FEMA. Id.
121. During the Exercise, there were two dispatches of Traffic Culdes at Riverhead. The first began at 10:25 after the notice of evacuation at 10:24 and 't he second at 12:00 after the notice of evacuation at 11:46. The' first was not completed until shortly after 11:00 and the second at approximately 12:30. Roberts et a_i. , ff. Tr. 2180, at 22; LILCO Admission Mos. 136 and 137. Traffic Culdes at' Port Jefferson were dispatched beginning at about .10:50; the process was not completed until about 12:20.. M.; LILCO Admission Nos.131 and 132. Dis patching ' at Patchogue began at 10:30 and was completed at approximately 10:59. Id.; LILCO Admission Nos.134 and 135. ) q 122. Traffic Culdes from the Patchogue Staging Area began arriving l l at their posts at 11:00, with the last guide reporting his arrival at 11:40. Weismantle and Lieberman, ff. Tr.1548, at 13-14; Roberts et a_I_. , ff. Tr. (s
l 2180,. at 22; LILCO Admission Nos.138 and 139. From the Port Jefferson l U Staging Area, where dispatching was not completed until 12:20, Traffic Guides took up _ to 58 minutes to arrive at their posts. LILCO Admission No. 140. .The Riverhead Traffic Guides observed by FEMA did not arrive - I at their posts until between 11:50 and 12:10. See FEMA Ex.1, at 74. ! Other Riverhead Traffic Guides were still not at their posts as of 12:50. 1 Roberts et al. , ff. Tr. 2180, at 22-23, Att. 6. 123. While the Suffolk County witnesses did not attempt to evaluate what would be a " timely" staffing of posts in an absolute sense, these witnesses were of the general opinion -- given what occurred the day of the Exercise -- that the process for mobilizing, dispatching, and staffing the TCPs is inherently unable to be accomplished in a timely fashion. Tr. 2215-2216 (Michel, Roberts). 124. The previous Shoreham Board found that LERO could substantial.ly complete its mobilization in about 3 hours. 21 NRC at 723. That Board recognized, however, that there are accidents that could progress to the general emergency stage much more rapidly, before the EOC or staging areas could be activated. M . at 724. That would allow inadequate time to go through the planned mobilization process before evacuation began. Id. The Board found no planning defect in that fact, f however, since " complete and timely mobilization under those conditions is 1 simply impossible." M. j 125. The prior PID in this case settled the issue that the arrival of Traffic Guides (and other field personnel) would be distributed over a I i period of time after notification and that all Traffic Culdes need not be i ready to depart the staging area at the time of an evacuation order. 1
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l l .
)
l
3 p 21 NRC 644, 720. As the decision stated, modeling work on traffic hD - assumes' that Traffic Guides will be in place when road congestion begins I l at approximately one hour after an evacuation _ order. M. Indeed, as the prior !!tigation settled, in some rapidly developing accident scenarlos 3 LILCO could not mobilize before an Immediate _ evacuation began. M. at 721. 126. The decisions made during the Shoreham Exercise required the [ staffing of every TCP in the EPZ. Weismantle and Lieberman, ff. Tr. 1548, at 3. _ There were 165 Traffic Guides processed at the three staging areas and dispatched to their field posts. M. 127. As_ stated by _ the LlLCO witnesses, while Contention EX 40 , focuses' on the times necessary to per. form selected "s u btasks" in the Traffic Guide mobilization process, the critical focus for determining ,the underlying merit of the issue before us -- whether there is a fundamental flaw in the Plan as demonstrated by the Exercise -- is on the time needed to complete the mobilization process in a fashion that would provide assistance to the public in the event of evacuation. Weismantle and Lieberman, ff. Tr.1548, at 4. 128. To meet the " controlled" evacuation time estimates for the Shoreham EPZ, Traffic Culdes need not be in place until traffic demand exceeds highway capacity and congestion ensues. Lieberman , ff. Tr. 1548, at 6. Congestion will begin to occur at approximately one hour after the evbcuation order is given. M. at 6-7; See Shoreham PID at 720. Even at that point it is not necessary that every Traffic Guide be in place so long as certain critical TCPs are staffed. M.at7. QG
(N 129. The mobilization of Traffic Guides from the Patchogue Staging (V) Area would have permitted the ' realization of the " controlled" evacuation time estimates. Traffic Guides assigned to the Patchogue Staging Area i began reporting their arrival at TCPs at 11:0'0, just 36 minutes after the evacuation recommendation was first made. Weismantle and Lieberman, ff. Tr.1548, at 13. By 11:25, essentially one hour after the evacuation was first recommended, 28 of 42 Traffic Guides had reported in, staffing 18 of 28 TCPs, including all of the " critical" ones. M.; see Weismantle and Lieberman, ff. Tr. 1548, at 10-11. By 11:30, one hour and six minutes after the recommendation to evacuate was first made, 38 of 42 Traffic Guides had reported in at 26 of 28 TCPs, including the first 22 on the priority manning list. ,id. at 13-14. Another TCP was reported manned at 11:35, and the last TCP was reported staffed at 11:40, just shortly more than an hour and 15 minutes after the recommendation was first made to the public. Jd.'at14. Thus, for the Patchogue Staging Area, all of the critical TCPs were staffed within an hour of the initial evacuation recommendation, and the rest of the TCPs were manned within a few more minutes. M. Accordingly, the Exercise demonstrated that the Traffic Guides assigned to the Patchogue Staging Area can be mobilized in time to assure a " controlled" evacuation. M. 130. With respect to the Port Jefferson Staging Area, Traffic Culdes did not begin to arrive at their posts until 11:25, one hour after the evacuation order. Weismantle and Lieberman, ff. Tr. 1548, at 18 l At 12:00, only 27 of the 72 Port Jefferson Traffic Guides had arrived at their TCPs; at 12:30, 53 had arrived; and at 13:00, 60 bad arrived. Id. m The last Port Jefferson Traffic Guide arrived at his TCP at 13:26. Id. i l
L -
)
By 11:30 only' 4 of the 17 " critical" TCPs had been manned. jd at d Att. C. Twelve of the 17 critical ' Port Jefferson TCPs were staffed by 1 11:45, about 20 minutes after the anticipated onset of congesti,on, and all but two were staffed by 11:55, about 30 minutes' after the anticipated beginning of congestion. Id,. at 15. The last " critical" TCP was staffed at 12:13. M. 131. At the Riverhead Staging Area, the FEMA Report states (FEMA Ex. 1, at 74, 75) that the deployment and arrival at TCPs was
" excessive." Thirty minutes of this time was spent in lines at the staging area ' while guides received field kits and briefings. M.
Documents recording the actual specific times at which individual Riverhead Traffic Guides each reached their posts generally cannot be found. Lieberman and Weismantle, ff. Tr.1540, at 16. Records that do exist for manning " critical" TCPs from the Riverhead staging' area show that _ only two of seven of these posts manned by 11:30. M., Att. D. In general, however, Riverhead- Traffic Guides arrived at their TCPs between 11:50 and 12:10. FEMA Ex.1, at 74. 132. The Board concludes that while Traffic Guides dispatched from the Patchogue staging area arrived in a timely manner, the same cannot be said as to the Traffic Guides dispatched from the Riverhead and Port Jefferson Staging areas. Traffic Guides generally arrived at their TCPs from these two staging areas subsequent to one hour after an evacuation order was given, and thus after LILCO indicated they should be in place. See Finding 128. Similarly, an examination of the manning of " critical" TCPs from the Riverhead and Port Jefferson staging areas again shows 1
h- that most were not manned 'within one hour of an evacuation order. See I Findings 129-130. FEMA .found a Deficiency in the deployment of Traffic
. Guides. - FEMA Ex.1, at 75. In regard to the timely manning of the i
TCPs for a controlled evacuation, the Board concludes that LILCO did not ] l demonstrate reasonable assurance that its Plan can and will be { implemented in the event of an emergency. b i 133. ' .With respect to Contention EX 40.E, which contests the J adequacy of subsequent revisions to the Plan, we cannot be assured that subsequent improvements are an adequate remedy. The changes
-11/ LILCO's proposed findings (at 105-06) seem to argue that it does not matter if Traffic Guides did not arrive at TCPs in a timely manner as the differences in time between a " controlled" and an
" uncontrolled" evacuation are not very substantial. However, this litigation examined the exercise of a plan which provided for a
" controlled", and not an " uncontrolled" evacuation. The Licensing Board in its ~ PID ruled that the traffic control procedures in the LILCO Plan are required by 10 C.F.R. 6 50.47(a)(1) and (b)(10).
21 NRC at 917. The Appeal Board in ALAB.-818, 22 NRC 651, 676-77 (1985), faced LI LCO's arguments that the need for such traffic { control procedures was " immaterial" in the case of Shoreham. It ]j Indicated that provisions for the evacuation of the public, including traffic control, in the event of a radiological emergency are a necessary part of an . emergency plan. The Commission, in CLi-86-13, stated that while there is no specific mention of traffic control procedures in N RC's regulations , traffic controls may nevertheless be necessary for the protection of the health and safety of the public. 24 NRC at 32. It stated that the question of whether these measures are necessary is principally a question of j fact and remanded the question for further hearing in connection with proceedings on " realism". Id. The proceeding here was not conducted under that Commission order to see if provisions of the plan were " Immaterial," but rather under CLl-86-11 wherein the focus was on whether the exercise of the LILCO Plan revealed any 1 deficiencies which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that ' protective measures can and will be taken, indeed, the question of whether a " controlled" evacuation is needed is not before this Licensing Board whose sole charge is to examine the emergency planning exercise, but is before the Licensing Board considering l other Shoreham issues. i V !
p L p discussed under EX 40.E (i.e., Traffic Guides assigned to Traffic Control i. Posts servicing traffic evacuating from areas within two miles of the plant are given the control point assignments and pick up their equipment
' before an evacuation recommendation is made (see Weismantle, ff.
Tr.1548, ' at 19-20)) are improvements which will certainly reduce response time further. Whether these changes, as well as further training of LERO workers, will allow the Traffic Guides to arrive at the . TCPs 'within one hour of an emergency order must be seen in another exercise or drill of this part of the LILCO Plan. FEMA Ex. 5, at 14; Tr. ' 8116-17. (Kowleski, Keller). To the extent interveners continue their argument in this contention subpart that Traffic Guides should be at their TCPs - when the evacuation actually begins -- o r the' evacuation order issues -- as stated previously herein, this issue has already been decided and we are bound . by those prior findings. Shoreham PID at 720-24. Vll. CONTENTION EX 41 - Removal of Roadway impediments 134. Contention EX 41 alleges that LERO failed to demonstrate that it had the capability to identify and remove impediments from roadways in a timely manner and, as a result, the Exercise showed a fundamental flaw in- the Plan. In addition, subpart E to this Contention alleges that LILCO's addition pf a Traffic Engineer at the EOC would not eliminate the flaw' demonstrated by the Exercise. Contention EX 22.1, alleging that FEMA introduced an insufficient number of impediments, has also been subsumed under Contention EX 41. See Prehearing Conference Order (issued October 3,1986) at 14. Oi f
. Suffolk County presented the direct. testimony of four officers
(~} 135. of the Suffolk County Police Department:- Assistant Chief Inspector Richard C. Roberts, inspector Richard Dormer, inspector Philip McGuire, - end Deputy inspector Edwin J. Michel. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 1129-34. They also testified for the County on Contention EX 40. See ff. Tr. ' 2180.- These witnesses are qualifie'd to testify as expert witnesses on these contentions. See ff. Tr. 2180, at 1-6, Atts.1-4. 136. LILCO presented the direct testimony of Edward B. Lieberman-1 of KLD Associates, which is a LILCO consultant on traffic, John A. Weismantle, the Manager'of Local Response for LERO, and Walter F. Wilm, the Evacuation Coordinator of LERO. Lieberman et al., ff. Tr. 272. These witnesses are quallfled as experts. Id_. at 24; LILCO Ex.1. 137. The FEMA witnesses, Keller, Kowieski and Baldwin, offered direct testimony and were cross-examined at Tr. 8145-8267 on this matter. See FEMA Ex. 5, at 15. 138. There may be traffic accidents and other events which block evacuation routes during an actual Shoreham emergency. Roberts e_t, al. , (f. Tr. 1134, at 5. The Plan should provide for, and LILCO should demonstrate, that such impediments to traffic can be dealt with i successfully. See NUREC-0654, ii . J .10.J . Under the Plan, LILCO Road Crews are to remove these impediments so that prescribed evacuation routes remain open and available during evacuation. Roberts et al. , ff. Tr.1134, at 6, citing Appendix A, OPIP 3.6.3. 139. LERO Road Crews are responsible for clearing disabled vehicles or other obstacles from evacuation routes as directed by the Road Logistics Coordinator. OPIP 2.1.1, at 35. The Plan specifies a t t l \ o L-__-__--_______-____-_________________ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
) 3, total of twelve Road Crews for this function. The actual number of Road l
Crews assigned in a real accident depends on the zones to be evacuated. Daverlo et al. , ff. Tr. 272, at 5. 140. Under the Plan, the Evacuation Coordinator directs actions in the areas of traffic control, transportation, and evacuation. From the EOC in Brentwood, . the Evacuation Coordinator is responsible for seeing that sufficient. resources. exist to carry 'out this responsibility.- The Evacuation Coordinator reports to the Manager of Local Response. OPIP - 2.1.1; 3.6.3. 1 41 . The Traffic Control Coordinator, also located at' the EOC, reports to the Evacuation Coordinator. The Traffic Control Coordinator's responsibilities include establishing'and maintaining Traffic Control Posts, coordinating the road logistics aspects of a public evacuation, overseeing evacuation routes, and overseeing traffic flow considerations. It is the
' responsibi!!ty of the Traffic Control Coordinator to ensure -that these activities are rapidiy taking place and that sufficient manpower and i
material exist to perform these functions. The Traffic Control Coordinator is required to make status reports on these matters to the '! Evacuation Coordinator. In order to implement these activitics , the I Traffic Control Coordinator supervises and directs the Traffic Control Point Coordinator, the Road Logistics Coordinator, and the Evacuation l Route Coordinator. See LILCO Plan at 2.1-4; OPIP 2.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3. 142. The Traffic Control Point Coordinator is stationed at the EOC and is responsible for coordinating the field activities of Traffic Guides. He is also responsible for distributing directions to, and receiving information from, the Traffic Culdes through Communicators located at the l I I
I l l *
/ ) EOC. This would include receipt of information about road blockages and ,
V . unexpected traffic flow. The Traffic Control Point Coordinator is to make status reports regarding these data to the Traffic Control Coordinator. See OPIP 2.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3, Att.1 (page 2 of 2). 143. The Road Logistics Coordinator is responsible for coordinating the field activities of LILCO Road Crews, acting as the focal point for distribution and receipt of information, and directions to and from Road i Crews. The Road Logistics Coordinator determines which Road Crew posts to activate based upon which EPZ zones have been ordered to evacuate, and determines the road crews to be deployed. The Road Logistics Coordinator reports to the Traffic Control Coordinator and is required to keep the Traffic Control Coordinator apprised of conditions [ through status reports. See OPIP 2.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3. L 144. The Evacuation Route Coordinator also reports to the Traffic Control Coordinator. The Evacuation Route Coordinator is stationed at the EOC and is responsible for coordinating the field activities of LILCO's Evacuation Route Spotters and is required to relay information on evacuation traffic flow blockage to the Road Logistics Coordinator and the Traffic Control Point Coordinator , as well as keep the Traffic Control Coordinator apprised of such problems through status reports. In turn, the Traffic Control Coordinator should report such problems to the Evacuation Coordinator. See OPIP 2.1.1; OPIP 3.6.3. i 145. The Plan requires that Evacuation Route Spotters report any problems to the Evacuation Route Coordinator immediately. FEMA Ex.1, at 36; see OPIP 3.6.3, Attachment 3, at 9 3. The Plan also requires the ( n Evacuation Route Coordinator to obtain periodic updates from the Route q 1
)
1 l
- _a
l
- 1
( Spotters and to report problems to the Traffic Control Coordinator, as ('v]) well as the Transportation Control Coordinator to update periodically the Evacuation Coordinator on the status of traffic control activities. Id. 146. The specific procedures for responding to roadway impediments are contained in OPIP 3.6.3. Weismantle, ff. Tr. 272, at 5. Revision 6 of the Plan -- the revision exercised on February 13, 1986 -- provides that the Traffic Control Coordinator was initially to instruct the Road Logistics Coordinator to implement road crew operations. OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 4 Weismantle, ff. Tr. 272, at 5. After an evacuation order, the Road Logistics Coordinator identifies the road crew posts to be staffed given the evacuation recommendation and notifies the Lead Traffic Culdes in the three staging areas of the decision'. OPIP 3.6.3. , 5 5.5. The Lead Traffic Guides, in turn, brief and dispatch the appropriate Road Crews. OPIP 3.6.3, 5 5.4.9. Upon arriving at their vehicles, Road Crews were required to check in on their radios with the Evacuation Support Communicator in the EOC and then to maintain periodic contact with that communicator following their arrival at their assigned posts. OPIP 3.6.3. , Att. 2; Weismantle, ff. Tr. 272, at 5-6. 147. The Revision 6 procedures also provided general Instructions with regard to responding to roadway impediments. When an accident report was received in the EOC, response personnel were given two options. I f. the source of the information required verification, the Evacuation Route Coordinator could dispatch a Route Spotter to the accident location to verify the impediment. Once verified, the accident information was to be relayed to the Road Logistics Coordinator who would then dispatch the appropriate equipment. Alternatively, if the source of (G I
L,
. '[ the report was' sufficiently trustworthy, LERO's initial action could have .
I been the dispatch of a Road Crew. Weismantle, ff. Tr. 272, at 6. ; 148. Both the Evacuation Route Coordinator and the Road Logistics Coordinator were instructed by procedure to report problems affecting evacuation to the ' Traffic Control Coordinator who, in turn, was to provide periodic updates to the' Evacuation Coordinator. M. 149, Revision 6 of the LERO Plan did not contain specific instructions about rerouting traffic around impediments or. about broadcasting an EBS' message regarding such rerouting. Weismantle, ff. Tr. 272, at 5-6; see OPIP' 3.6.3 96 5.5.9 and 5.6.7. 150. The Plan provides that Road Crews be notified to begin reporting to the staging areas at the declaration of a Site Arca Emergency._ OPIP 3.3.3, Att. 1. As indicated in the note to Figure 3.3.4 of the Plan, some individuals assigned to Road Crews are placed on standby status at that time. Upon arrival at the staging area, they pick up dosimetry, and are then given the specific assignment and dispatched after issuance of an evacuation order. M.I5.4.1-5.4.6. 151. Contention EX 41. A alleges that the dispatch of LERO Road Crews from the staging areas to the field was not accomplished in a timely manner. 152. On the day of the Exercise, Road Crews were notified to report after the declaration of the Site Area Emergency at 8:19; the evacuation recommendation issued at 10:24; Road Crews were dispatched 1 O I
4 I
. from Riverhead, Patchogue and Port Jefferson at 11:00,11:28, and 11:59, respectively. E Roberts e_t, al. , ff. Tr.1134, at 23-25.
153. To the extent there is a minor factual dispute as to the times ) and numbers of Road Crews mobilized during the Exercise, we credit the testimony of. the LILCO witnesses on these matters since they 'were in the best position to know- these facts. See Lieberman and Weismantle, ff. Tr. 272, at 22. The reporting : Information stated in Subpart A. of Contention EX 41 understates reporting levels. We find that more than enough Rcad Crews were always in place to . respond. See ,ld at 22-23. This finding is limited, of course, to only the mobilization of Road Crews l 1 under Contention EX 41. A; it does not address the issue of Contention EX 41.B regarding actual performance in dealing with impediments (chiefly a problem at the EOC). 154. Contention EX 41. A, and Interveners' witnesses, view this mobilization process as untimely. Roberts et al. , ff. Tr.1134, at 18-24. It is these witnesses' position that Road Crews should be in the field at the time an evacuation order issues. See id.; Tr.1167 (Roberts). The FEMA Report found, however, that no problems were identified during the Exercise regarding LERO's ability to mobilize road crews from the staging areas.. FEMA Ex. 5, at 15-16. Since the Plan calls for dispatch of Road Crews only after an evacuation order, Suffolk County's argument that mobilization of the Road Crews was untimely (see Roberts et al. , ff. Tr.1134, at 18-23), raises a planning issue that has already been 12/ Two of the Port . Jefferson crews went to the LILCO Brentwood
~~
facility to pick up tow trucks; they left Brentwood at 12:40. 5
See Shoreham PID at 720. The prob'lems with [ determined in this case. the actual response are addressed herein under Contention EX 41.B. 155. FEMA's direct . testimony was that no proble;ms were identified by FEMA regarding the specific ability of LERO to mobilize, staff and dispatch road crews from the staging areas. FEMA Ex. 5, at 16. 156. LILCO testified that dispatch shortly after an evacuation recommendation is sufficient because of the " oversupply" of. road crews. Lieberman ,e_t, t al,, ff. Tr. 272, at 22-23; Tr.1060-63 (Lieberman). 157. On the relative weight of the evidence, this Board finds that. the mobilization of the Road Crews was timely in that it was within the prescribed time estimate of the Plan previously litigated. As LILCO points out, not every Road Crew is needed at the moment an evacuation order goes out. Since some (more than probably needed) were readily dispatched, these crews could handle the expected frequency of accidents with the later-ready crews responding to those occurring later in time. 158. We find no basis upon which to agree with Interveners' testimony that the performance of LERO on the day of the Exercise with respect to the mobilization of the Road Crews, as alleged in Contention EX 41. A, was untimely so as to evince a fundamental flaw in the LERO Plan which would preclude the finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an actual emergency. 159. We turn now to Contention EX 41. B . During the Exercise, FEMA attempted to test LERO's ability to remove impediments from the EPZ roadways by inserting two " free play" messages into the Exercise, l FEMA Ex . 1, at 22, 36. These free play messages' assumed 'the
Q occurrence of. two separate traffic accidents, one of which involved a 1 / .
'V' loaded gravel truck and three pas'senger cars, and the other involved an overturned fuel truck. ,I_d.d at 36-39.
i 160. Contention EX 41.8 alleges that LERO was incapable of adequately responding to either of the two free play messages postulating major road impediments that were injected into the Exercise by FEMA. j See FEMA Ex.1, at 30, 36-38, 57-58, 65. 161. The first FEMA free play message, injected at 10:39, read: A loaded gravel truck with a broken drive shaft, which is upright,- but turned sideways In the road is blocking the north ano south bound lanes and both shoulders of Yaphank-Middle Island Road approxi-mately (50) yards north of the caution light at the "Y" Intersection of Yaphank-Middle. Island Road, Main Street and Mill Road (in the vicinity of TCP #124).
.Th'is is a multiple vehicle accident also involving three passenger cars that are blocking both the north and south bound shoulders of the road. There are no ~-
injuries of any individuals. The LERO responder to the site of this impediment should locate the FEMA evaluator who will be wearing a colored armband. l Lieberman, et al., ff. Tr. 272, at Att. B.1 (emphasis in original). 162. - The second FEMA free play message, at 11:04, read: On Route 25A, approximately 75 yards east of the Intersection with Miller Place-Yaphank Road, (in the vicinity of Traffic Control Post #41 ) , a fuel l tank-truck has jackknifed and turned over on its side blocking both eastbound and westbound traffic lanes, as well as both shoulders of the road. In the course of the accident, the fuel tank was ruptured and is leaking fuel. There is a possibility that the fuel could ignite causing fire. There is no fire at present and no injuries to any individuals. - The LERO responder to the site of this impediment should locate the FEMA evaluator who will be wearing a colored arm band.
, Lieberman, et al., ff. Tr. 272, at Att. C.1 (emphasis in original).
N m -m_.-
l-l I
/'~] 163. Each simulated impediment will be looked at separately, s"/
beginning with the gravel truck. The chronology that follows is relatively undisputed. See Tr.1141-42 (Roberts, McGuir'e). The gravel truck free play message was handed to the Evacuation Route Coordinator at 10:39 a.m. by FEMA in the EOC. The Evacuation Route Coordinator i checked the Traffic Control Point and Route Spotter maps and, six minutes later, (at 10:45) gave the EOC Communicator a message that I instructed a Route Spotter to verify that a gravel truck was blocking both lanes of Yaphank-Middle island Road approximately fifty yards north of the intersection with Main Street and Mill Road. Wilm, (f. Tr. 272, at 8, Att. B.3. That message made no mention of the other vehicles . Involved or the blockage of the shoulders. See M. The Route Spotter I went to the indicated location and reported to the EOC Communicator that he found nobody at the location and was returning to his assigned route.
,ld . a t 9. The EOC Communicator in turn reported to the the Evacuation Route Coordinator at 10:56 that the Route Spotter had reported that nobody was at the location and he had returned to his route. ,ld . at 8-9.
164. The Route Spotter did not find the FEMA evaluator on this trip to the location because the evaluator was about fifty yards cast of i l the purported accident location and the evaluator was not readily visible from 50 yards north of the intersection where the accident was reported. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 9; Tr. 557 (Wilm). 165. Since the Route Spotter failed to find any FEMA evaluator in { the field, a FEMA controller in the EOC gave the EOC Communicator a hand-written note at 11:04 Indicating that the FEMA evaluator was located
<w I
[V i
. . ,6% - at- Everett yards Drive ' and Main ' Street, a location 50 east of L
Yaphank-Middle Island Road. Wilm, ff. Tr.-~ 272, at 9, Attachment B.4.
' The same Route Spotter was: again dispatched to , meet the FEMA evaluator.
Wilm, ff. Tr. '.' 272, at 9. 166. . At .11:35, the Transportation Support Coordinator in the EOC
' notified the Bus Dispatcher at the Riverhead Staging Area of the gravel-truck impediment. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at Attachment B.5. Upon receipt of that message, the Bus Dispatcher determined that. Zones L and M could
' be affected ' by. the impediment and- notified the Transfer Point Coordinators at the' Brookhaven Multiplex and at the Shirley Mall' of the-possible impediment. M. at 9, Att. B.6.
l 167. At 11i40, the Route Spotter arrived at the FEMA evaluator's l l location east of the intersection. S.C. Ex.11, at 90. At approximately 11:50, the Route Spotter, having met with the FEMA evaluator east of the intersection, reported to the EOC that he met the FEMA evaluator at that. location, not north of that ! intersection . Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 9, Att. B.7. At about the same time this report was received in the EOC, the Road Logistics - Coordinator instructed the Evacuation Support Communicator to: Dispatch Road' Crew #2006 to Yaphank-Middle island Road east of the caution light. (approximately 50
. . yards) at the "Y" intersection of Yaphank-Middle Island Road, Main Street and Mill Road. Remove gravel truck blocking the north and south bound lanes.
Id. at Att. B.8. Road Crew 2006, in a compressor truck, left its field post to respond to the accident at 12:00. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 9; see Tr. 739-41 ( Wilm) . 7i _--__-_.___m. _ . - _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _
168. Mr. Wiie , the LERO Evacuation Coordinator during the -
/~')N t'
Exercise, testified that at 12:13 or 12:14, a controller in the . EOC informed him that there was a " blocked road" in the EPZ. Wilm , ff. Tr. 272, at 10. Mr. Wilm immediately went to the traffic control area where he met with the Traffic Control Coordinator, Evacuation Route Coordinator, Road Logistics Coordinator and Traffic Control Point
' Coordinator, g,. Mr. Wilm had been informed that the gravel truck accident had occurred east of the intersection of Yaphank-Middle island Road and that a road crew had been dispatched to the scene. After .
I consulting a map of evacuation routes, Mr. Wilm concluded that evacuation l flow would not be affected since the accident was on a route that carried little or no evacuation traffic. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 10. 169. After Mr. Wilm had informed the FEMA controllers of this conclusion , the FEMA controllers " huddled", and then informed him that LERO should treat the gravel truck impediment as though it were north of the intersection rather than east. M. at Attachment B.9. He then met with the Traffic Control Point Coordinator to develop a rerouting scheme around the impediment. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 10. 170. At about this time, Mr. Weismantle, LERO's Manager of Local Response, became aware of the gravel truck impediment after observing "a good deal of activity in the traffic area." Weismantle, ff. Tr. 272, at
- 12. After hearing of the steps being taken to respond to the impediment, Mr. Weismantle was satisfied and returned to other duties. M. ; Att.
B.18. I e l
- m. .
, v
~ ,,y .. c. ' 1 m -s - 8 y Jy :n p' [_ ' 'I g ) [; '" y , e
/ L171.. At 12:20, ' the Traffic Control ' Point Coordinator. sent; the '
2 h ;$' q folic virvj l message to the Lead . Traffic Guide at the Patchogue Stagfng . j y m ,- ; Area:) l
, Contact the . TraffiejGuide,at Post 35, inform him 'to s route . all traffic c %cstbound. ....Do not let traffic proceed south. on Middle' Island ! Road due to a trsffic i problem on south _ bound Middle Island Road. Contact 1 traffic guides at ~ Posts 53 and 54, instruct them to r '
J route 'all traffidato Bartlett Road west bound. Do not y' b
"- let' traffic use srsuth bound ' route Fon Middle island
~
i Road. i v
.Wilm, ff. _Tr. - 272, at 10, . Att. ~ B.10. At 12:31, the Lead Traffic Guide in 7
the Patchogue Staging Area reported to the" Traffic : Control Point L i
.O
~ Coordinator that the appropriate Traffic Guides had been informed of the "f
rerouting . message.- id.
. s 172. By this time LERO was also informed of the separate fuel truck impediment -and began. taking steps to. deal with that (see Findings- ,
180-197, infra); but, continuing with its response to the gravel truck: l
~
. At 12:55, Mr. Wilm -- the Evacuation Coordinator -- asked his staff to inform the ~ Coordinator of - Public Information in the EOC that an EBS message needed to be prepared on both the gravel and fuel truck impediments. ,
Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 11; Att. B.11. 173. Ai 12 :55 . the Bus Coordinator in the EOC asked the Bus l Dispatcher at the Riverhead Staging Area: Are any traffic problems being: encountered on Route ,
#M-1 specifically at the "Y" type inter section of (
Yaphank-Middle Island Rd., Main St. and Mill Rd. 1
.ie to gravel truck blocking north and south bound s unes of Yaphank-Middle island Rd.7 }
At 13:05 the Bus Dispatcher responded that the approprhie transfer, q points had been informed of the gravel truck problem, but that no
1
'"X probler s wen' heing reported on bus routes. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 11.; i
]
Attachment B.13. 174. The Manager of Local Response telephoned Mr. Lieberman, LILCO's trafhe 9ngineer consultant, at approximately 13:20 to ask him, in part, whether he concurred with the rerouting decision for the gravel truck impediment. Id.'; Attachment B.14. Shortly after the Evacuation 4 Coordinator explained the facts , of the gravel truck impediment to
~
Mr. Lieberman, the latter noted his concurrence with the rerouting scheme and estimated that the evacuation time for evacuees using Yaphank-Middle Island Road would be increased by approximately one hour. Id.; Lieberman, ff. Tr. 272, at 13. Mr. Lieberman, however,
"- also noted that the increase would not have a likely impact on the total evacuation times , since Yaphank-Middle Island Road was not a critical evacuation route. ,l d .
175. During this time, the Road Crew was on the way to the scene. After some initial confusion as to the location of the FEMA evaluator such as the Route Spotter had encountered and clarification by FEMA as to the actual location of the FEMA evaluator, and after some direction by the EOC, the Road Crew met at 12:45 with the FEMA evaluator at the location ! east of the intersection. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 11-12. 176. The equipment that LERO ultimately sent to the gravel truck c scene was probably inadequate to be effective in removing the gravel truck. FEMA Ex.1, at 37, 65; see also Roberts g ,al_. , ff. Tr.1134, at
- 37. The free play message clearly states that the gravei truck and three cars were blocking both lanes and the shoulders. See Finding 163, n supra. There was no demonstration that LERO had at its disposal the 1
_ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ __ D
4 (~ appropriate equipment. See FEMA Ex. ' 1, at 37. While FEMA faulted the V] . response for not determining whether gravel hac been spilled, and not sending a road scraper, the free play message stated that ' the gravel truck was upright, and no need to dispatch equipment to remove loose gravel from the roadway appeared. See Lieberman, et al., ff. 272, at Att B.1. 177.. At 13:30, Road Crew 2006 reported to the Road Logistics Coordinator in the EOC that the gravel truck was cleared from the roadway and that traffic had resumed in both directions. M. at 12; Att. B.15. 178.- At 13:45, the first simulated broadcast of the existence of the gravel truck and fuel truck impediments was made. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at
- 12. At this time the gravel truck impediment had been " cleared." M. at 12.
179. At 13:45,. the Evacuation Route Coordinator asked the EOC Communicator to transmit the following message: Have Route Spotters 1002-1004 check the flow of traffic on Yaphank-Middle [lsland] Road. If open, have Route Spotter tell Traffic Cuide at Control Point 53 to open flow of traffic in south direction. Respond by radio when completed. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 12, B.16. At 14:05, Route Spotter 1002 reported that traffic was flowing south bound on Yaphank-Middle Island Road with no delays. Id. ; Att. B.16. 180. Turning now to LERO's response to the fuel truck impediment, the basic factual chronology is apparently undisputed (see Finding 153) and is recounted in the testimony of the LILCO witnesses as follows. L_-_-_-_-_-_..__.--__ _ _ _ . - - _ _ - . . . - . . _
' ~
') -
q 1 N t)
. ri 181. After receiving the fuel truck free play message from FEMA at 11:04 the Evacuation Route Coordinator took action , to have a Route q
-i Spotter confirm the presence of the fuel truck accident. Wilm, ff. I Tr. 272, at 14. At 11:06, he instructed the EOC Communicator to have i
Route Spot ter 1005 proceed to Route 25A, 75 yards east of the t , intersendon with Miller P! ace-Yaphank Road and confirm there was a fuel truck overturned cn its side, blocking both east and west bound lanes. r Jc,. d ; Att. C.7. 182. Falling to alse the Route Spotter ori his radio, the EOC Communicator sent a message to the Port Jefferson Staging Area at 11:15, inquiring whether Route Spotter 1005 'had been dispatched. M. The ' Port Jefferson Staging . Area responc'ed promptly . that the' Route Spotter had not been. Id. 183. At 11:40, the Transportation Support Coordinator in the EOC informed the Port Jefferson Bus Dispatcher that "at 11:06, a fuel truck was reported to be turned over on side blocking the east and west bcund lanes of Route 25A. On 25A, 75 yards east of Miller Place-Yaphank Road, Port Jefferson ," M.; Attachment C.4. At 12:05, the Bus
; Dispatcher at Port Jefferson reported to trie Transportation Support Coordinator !n the EOC that a visual check of fuel truck problem on Route 25A and dilifer Place and Yaphank: Roads indicates no problem for raffic control or evacuation,. completfon. M ., Att. C.5. This message was relayed by a member of *he Transportation Support Group to the Evacuation Route Coordir.ator. Id.
184.- At 11:49, the Port Jeffersor; Staging Area informed the EOC 1 that aN Route Spotters had been dispatched. Wilm', ff. Tr. 272, at 15,
1 1 y% Attachment C 6. At 12:02, Route Spotter 1005 was instructed by the
' b')
EOC Communicator to proceed to the scene of the fuel truck impediment. L id, 185. The Evacuation Coordinator was informed by a controller at 12:13 - about the. existence of roadway problems. See Findirg 168, supra. Discussions with the Traffic Control Coordinator, Evacuation Route Coordina tor, Road Logistics Coordinator and' Traffic Control Point Coordinator initially focused on responding to the gravel truck impediment. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 15. LERO did not begin to discuss the fuel truck impediment until a rerouting scheme had been determined for the gravel truck accident and actions were underway to implement that . decision. . ,l d . - 186. By about this time, Route Spotter 1005 found and met with .the FEMA evaluator just east of the intersection of Miller Place-Yaphank Road.
~~
He was released by the FEMA evaluator at 12:23. Id. , Atts. C.2 and C.7. 187. Discussions about the fuel truck impediment in the EOC quickly concluded that there was no rapid way to remove the impediment from the roadway. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 15. As a result, LERO initiated two different actions. Id.
. 188. First, work on a rerouting strategy for the fuel truck impediment began. ,l d . At 12:47, the Traffic Control Point Coordinator sent the following message to the Lead Traffic Culde at the Port Jefferson Staging Area:
Instruct Traffic Culde at Point 40 to stop all west bound traffic on Route 25A. Reroute all traffic to North Country Road to Echo Avenue proceed west-E r bound. Reason for detour, gas truck spill on 25A.
\
_l d . At 12:57, the Lead Traffic Guide in the Port Jefferson Staging Area V informed the Traffic Control Point Coordinator that Traffic Culdes were rerouting traffic. ,ld_. at Att C.8. 189. Second, efforts were undertaken to contact the Miller Place Fire Department and to request them to rmpond to the fuel truck impediment. I d_. at Att. 9. In addition, it was decided that a LERO worker should be dispatched to the scene of the accident with dosimetry equipment to monitor any exposure to the responding firemen. M. At 12:37, the Evacuation Route Coordinator instructed the Lead Traffic Guide at the Port Jefferson Staging Area to dispatch a Route Alert Driver with dosimetry to the scene of the accident. ,ld,. at Att. C.10. The Route Alert Driver was dispatched at 12:50. ,l d . The driver's response was delayed by the fact that he had initially passed by the evaluator's location without seeing him. M. The Route Alert Driver was released by the' FEMA evaluator at 13:54. Id. at Att. C.16, 190. At <2:55, the Evacuation Coordinator instructed a member of his stsff to ask the Coordinator of Public Information in the EOC to prepare an EBS message on the two impediments. Id. , see Att. C.11. 191. At 12:56, the Bus Coordinator in the EOC again asked the Bus l Dispatcher at the Port Jefferson Staging Area about any traffic problems l l that Bus Drivers may be encountering, especially on Route 25A and Miller Place /Yaphank Road. ,l d_ . The response, received 15 minutes later in the ) EOC, was that " routes associated with V. iller Place transfer point are not ' being affected by fuel truck problem." ,ld. , Att. C.13. ! 192. After receiving the rerouting order, the Traffic Culde at TCP
#40 arsessed the roadway geometry and at 13:10, radioed the Lead Traffic Iv)
Guide at the Port Jefferson Staging Area that sn additional Traffic Culde i%) . V and six additional traffic cones were needed for the rerouting. _id. , Att. ! C.14. An additional ' Traffic Guide with the necessary equipment was dispatched from Port Jefferson. at 13:32. Id,. at 16, C.15. 193. As previously noted,-the Manager of Local Response contacted the Traffic Engineer, Mr. Lieberman, to ask him about the effects of both traffic impediments on evacuation times. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 17, Att. C.9. With respect to the fuel truck impediment, Mr. Lieberman concurred with the rerouting strategy and estimated that the impediment would increase evacuation times by approximately one hour for evacuees affected by the impediment. Id.; Lieberman, ff. Tr. 272, at 17.. 194. At 13:45, EBS message #8 was approved. M. It instructed-the public about both roadway impediments. M. 195. At approximately the same time, the Road Lcgistics Coordi-nator, either at the request of the Evacuation Coordinator er at the recuest of the Lead Traffic Culde at the Port Jefferson Staging Area (Attachment C.18), dispatc'ied a Road Crew to the fuel truck impediment to provide assistance to the responding firemen as needed. Wilm , ff. Tr. 272, at 17. At 13:50, the Evacuation Support Communicator was instructed by the Road Logistics Coordinator to: Dispatch Road Crew #2011 to Route 25A, 75 yards east of Miller Place Road. Fuel truck is overturned and fuel spilling on roadway. Miller Place Fire Department at scene. Truck owned by Hess. Standby at location until further notified. Id. 196. At 14:00, the Traffic Control Coordinator instructed the Logistics Support Coordinator to contact the Hess Oil Company to inform
~-
f] them that one of their gasoline tanker trucks has overturned on , Route i ; k/ 25A; and to have Hess send an empty tanker to the. location for off-loading. Id. at 18. At 14:15, the Logistics Support Coordinator Informed the Traffic Control Coordinator that Hess had made arrangements with a local environmental contractor to transfer the load and that all appropriate agencies were being notified in accordance with Hess' procedures. Id_. , Att. C.21. 197. At 14:45, the Evacuation Support Communicator informed the Road Legistics Coordinator that the Road Crew had reported that the fuel spill had been cleared, that the truck was off the roadway, and that the roadway was clear. Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 18, Att. C.22. The Evacuation Coordinator instructed the Traffic Control Coordinator to reroute traffic back onto the normal evacuation routes at 14:57. M. at 18, Att. C.9. 198. The parties' various witnesses disagreed as to how the foregoing facts regarding LERO's response to the impediments should be interpreted. We now examine those views. 199. Applicant's witnesses were of the opinion that LERO had successfully demonstrated the ability to remove impediments from the roadways of the EPZ and that Contention EX 41.8 was withcut merit. See Welsrr.antle and Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 19. These witnesses testified that this was true even though LERO had never practiced responding to such
" extremely severe" accidents that blocked entire roadways requiring not only actions to remove the impediments but also actions to ensure that evacuating tr affic was not unnecessarily impeded. Id.
t 200. Specifically, these witnesses recounted that: the Evacuation I { n Route Coordinator immediately acted to verify each accident report; once
)
! e s l i l
r 1 f
- 70'-
the gravel truck. accident was verified, a tow . truck was promptly
'D. dispatched to' the Impediment; . In the case of the fuel truck accident, where- removal was not a straightforward proposition,' steps were taken.to have. fire personnel respond to the impediment and to have the truck's owner off-load the vehicle; 'once the Evacuation Coordinator. became involved in- the process, decisions were promptly made to reroute traffic'-
around both impediments; the rerouting schemes that were chosen were - reasonable; these rerouting schemes were. rapidly and effectively . Implemented in the field; and . these schemes were removed once the impediments were cleared. _Id . 201. The LILCO witnesses. also state that the decision was made to inform the public of the- Impediments by . an . EBS message and 'such a message was prepared and broadcast. Id. In addition, the Transporta-tion Support Group . recognized the potential impact of the impediments en bus operations and promptly informed the appropriate field personnel 'of the possible problems. .Id. 202. The LILCO witnesses testified that delays in LERO's response to the traffic impediment free play messages can be directly traced to two primary causes: (1) the Evacuation Route Coordinator did not communi-cate necessary information from the free play messages to field personnel and did not tell of the potential existence of the impediment to his
, superiors in the EOC, and (2) Inherent difficulties in effectively injecting .
severe, readily observable impediments into an exercise and confusion that resulted from FEMA's field evaluation. Lieberman et al . , ff, Tr. 272, at 4.
\
i ( h l C 203.. The LILCO . panel maintained that neither of these causes L'N} p
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Indicates a deficiency in the Plan. M. They state that in an actual emergency the Evacuation Route Coordinator's actions would not have had , a detrimental effect on LERO's response since information about the j l accidents would have reached the EOC in a timely manner by other paths. l Id. Further,' they state, following the Exercise LILCO took steps to improve both the Plan and LILCO's training program as these relate to 1 Sealing with roadway impediments. M. 204. With respect . to the performance of the Evacuation Route Coordinator, according to the LILCO witnesses, his failure to transmit all of the information contained in the original free play messages to the staging area and field personnel resulted in delays and confusion in the field because field personnel were unaware of the need to meet with FEMA - evaluators. Weismantle and Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 20. This led to reports either that no Impediment existed or that the impediment had been cleared. M. In addition, the Evacuation Route Coordinator's failure to inform his coworkers and superiors in the EOC of the roadway impedi-ments also led to delays in LERO's response. M. The LILCO witnesses said, however, that in this respect the Evacuation Route Coordinator is not totally to blame. The FEMA free messages indicated that they were from "C. Connolly, EOC Team Leader." Not knowing Mr. Connolly, the Evacuation Route Coordinator chose to verify the reports of each accident using LERO personnel rather than to inform the Road Logistics Coordinator of the impediments. Id. Until this verification process was completed , the Evacuation Route Coordinator assumed that he need not report the accidents. M. LILCO's witnesses, however, acknowledged
that the Evacuation Route Coordinator showed poor judgment in this regard. Tr. 5599 (Weismantie; Tr. 5628 (Devario). 205. As to any FEMA role in the delay, according to LILCO, the two impediments imposed were of such severity that, had these really occurred, the verification of each would have taken place almost immediately. Weismantle and Wilm, ff. Tr. 272, at 20. These witnesses i maintain that numerous LERO field workers, all capable of communicating i with the EOC, would have driven by, or been within view of, the impediments on the way to their field locations. M. at 20-21; see Att. D .1, 2, 3. For the gravel truck Impediment, two Route Spotters, two Traffic Guides and the Middle Island Transfer Point Coordinator would have passed the scene of the accident. M. For the fuel truck impediment,14 Traffic Guides and as many as 49 Bus Drivers would have f' been in a position to have seen the accident according to the LILCO testimony. ,ld. at 21. 206. LILCO faults the FEMA evaluator for the delays in responding to the gravel truck impediment since the evaluator was not where the free i i play message indicated he would be located. M. Had he been readily i observable, according to i.l LCO , the sequence of events during the Exercise suggests LERO would have been able to demonstrate a timely I l response to that impediment. Id. 207, in sum, with respect to Contention EX 41. B , the LILCO witnesses testified that, while steps can be taken to improve LERO , 1 performance in response to roadway impediments , the facts do not oemenstrate that the LERO Plan failed to provide the necessary personnel 1
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l l l I
j e or resources to respond 'or that the organizational structure present is
' I' incapable of removing roadway impediments. ,ld, at 22.
208. The Intervenor witness panel's conclusion on Contention EX 41.8 was that .the LERO Plan is inherently unworkable in ' dealing 1 with roadway impediments. Roberts eM. , ff. Tr.1134, at 6. 209. Interveners recount that under the Plan, an impediment reported by a Traffic Guide to his staging area results in a vertical line of communications, from Traffic Guide, to Lead Traffic Guide at the staging area, to a communicator at the EOC, and then to the Road Logistics Cocedinator at the EOC (OPIP 3.6.3). Roberts et al. , ff. Tr.1134, 'at 32. Questions' or requests for additional information from the Road Logistics Coordinator, or others at the EOC, would require this communications path to be reversed. M. Responses to such questions or requests woul'd thus be passed up this vertical chain. M. 210. Interveners' witnesses assert that FEMA circumvented this time-consuming and potentially confusing process during the Exercise for LERO by directly informing the EOC of the gravel truck (as well as the fuel truck) impediment. M. This is conjecture. We are required to evaluate what did happen on the day of the Exercise and draw inferences therefrom. The scenario for the Exercise did not include entering " free play" messages at the Traffic Culde level. Just as we cannot assume, as LILCO has claimed, that in an actual emergency with information coming from the field the response would be faster, we cannot, on this record, conclude that gathering information in the manner suggested by Interveners would have resulted in untimely and inappropriate responsive
e l' ' o actions. .See LILCO Test. Cr .c. EX 41, ff. 272, at 21, 24; Tr. 404-05
$L.-) (Weismantle).
211. Interveners also fault the Evacuation Route Coordinator for not advising the Evacuation Support Communicator for Route Spotter / Road Crews that the gravel truck impediment was a multi-vehicle accident and that this information was required to be communicated under the Plan (see OPlP 3.6.3). Roberts et al. , ff. Tr.1134, at 34. The consequence of not doing so was to delay LERO response to the gravel truck impediment. Id. i 212. Interveners similarly fault LERO's Evacuation Rcute Spotter for not informing the LERO Evacuation Coordinator of the roadway impedi-ments as required by the LILCO Plan, so that a coordinated and planned response could be implemented. M. at 35. They also blame LERO for having done nothing to deal with the gravel truck impediment until FEMA 1 clarified the intent of its 10:35 message at about 12:13, which they, perceived as a " prompting" of the LERO response. ,ld. at 36. On this basis the Interveners ascribe all fault in taking action on the rerouting of traffic because of the gravel truck accident to LILCO. M.at37. 213. Interveners recognize that the Evacuation Coordinator, after being informed of the impediments, did discuss the need to reroute traffic and procedures for doing so. FEMA Ex.1, at 36. They further concede that LERO shortly thereafter rerouted traffic around the gravel truck, at about 12:20. Roberts et al. , ff. Tr.1134, at 37. However, Interveners claimed that the rerouting scheme was improper, and ignored the best available alternative -- shifting south-bound traffic off Yaphank-V.iddle A V
i (~3 island Road onto Walters, to Everett Drive, and onto Main Street. M. at { t 'V Si-53. 214. Interveners also maintain that LILCO's response to the fuel truck impediment during the Exercise was also evidence of LERO's failure to deal effectively with roadway impediments. M. at 42. They state that the Evacuation Route Coordinator did not properly communicate matters involving the fuel truck impediment. M. at 43. He did not notify the , Evacuation Coordinator of the problem. Roberts et ai. , id. As a result, interveners' claim a traffic rerouting scheme was not planned or implemented, and potential equipment necds for responding to the impediment were not ascertained or readied. M. They claim the rerouting scheme adopted by LERO improperly diverted traffic into a heavily populated and trafficked area north of P.oute 25A. M.,at46-49, ; 56-57. Interveners recommended a scheme to avoid that asserted problem. ,l d , at 57-61. Although the Interveners recognize that the Evacuation Route Coordinator apparently notified the Evacuation Support Communicate for Route Spotter / Road Crews of the fuel truck impediment, they fault him for falling to advise the Communicator of pertinent facts as required by the LILCO Plan, including that the fuel truck impediment involved the possibility of fire, particularly since fuel was leaking, and that both shoulders of the road were blocked by the fuel truck. M. They maintain that the consequences of not following the Plan in this regard substantially delayed LILCO's response to the impediment. M. at 44, 215. Interveners claim that the fault was not just actions of the LERO Evacuation Route Coordinator , but permeated the whole LERO g) t m
L. C organization. Id. - For an example, they point to the fact that although
' at about 11:15, after having tried unsuccessfully to contact Route Spotter 1005, on whose route the fuel , truck Impediment was located, the Route l Spotter / Road Crew Communicator requested the Port Jefferson Evacuation Support Communicator to determine whether Route Spotter 1005 had been dispatched. M. The spotter was not dispatched. until about 12:02. Id.
On this basis Interveners would have us find that there is no basis to conclude that the LILCO Plan can and will be implemented in an l emergency. M. at 45. 216. Interveners also maintain that the field response to the fuel truck impediment was untimely in that the Road Crew did not arrive until about 14:00 to this impediment reported at 11:00, with equipment inadequate for the task. M. Moreover, they point out that Hess Oli Co. was not called until about 14:15 for the purpose of having the fuel j transferred from the' overturned tanker, i d,. , 217. The 'EMA witnesses testified that FEMA attempted to evaluate the LERO respanse to impediment problems by the EOC as well as the Port Jefferson and Patchogue staging areas. FEMA Ex. 5, at 155-56. Both impediment problems were intentionally situated at the confluence of traffic along major evacuation routes and were designed to entirely block l those routes, including both shoulders of the roads. ,l d . These impediments were designed: (1) to present realistic types of problems to coordinators and decision-makers at the EOC, (2) to require field evaluation by LERO evacuation route spotters, and (3) to observe the actual dispatch of Road Crews with appropriate emergency vehicles to
- f. the scene, as specified in the Plan. d
,l_d,. The impediment problems were
( 4 k
/ ; not designed to entirely cut off traffic flow from all ,of an affected s )
eneergency planning zone. Id. LERO's ability to reroute traffic using secondary roads or other means was to be taken into consideration by the FEMA evaluators on the day of the Exercise. ,l d . 218. The FEMA witnesses testified that they generally agreed with the facts as stated in Contention EX 41. B . Tr. 8178-80 (Kowieski, Keller) . They testified that their conclusions with relation to the Exercise were ' set out in FEMA Post Exercise Assessment of April 17, 1986 (FEMA Ex. 1). FEMA Ex. 5, at 2. This Assessment found that the Exercise objective of demonstrating the organizational ability to deal with impediments to evacuation was not met. FEMA Ex.1, at 36-38; see FEMA Ex. 5, . at 17, 155-56. The FEMA Asses'sment stated that the flow of information on impediments needs to be improved and that there were unnecessary delays in responding to the impediments. FEMA Ex.1, at l
- 36. The FEMA witnesses testified that there was a lack of communication in the LERO EOC. FEMA Ex. 5, at 156; Tr. 8194 (Kowleski); see also FEMA Ex.1, at 37, 219. The FEMA Assessment acknowledged that problems were encountered in regard to the gravel truck impediment because the FEMA evaluator was not at his designated location and was not met until 11:40.
FEMA Ex. 1, at 36; see also Tr. 8220 (Baldwin) . However, it pointed out that, contrary to the LILCO plan, the Evacuation Coordinator was not told of either impediment until a FEMA Controller told him of the two roadway impediments at 12:13. g. FEMA also there concluded that there was also a lack of lateral and downward communications, pointing to a
!p) v failure of the Evacuation Route Coordinator to tell the Transportation U e
m__ \- Support Coordinator that the gravel truck impediment . blocked a bus
'f'.
evacuation route until 12:40, and that the Road Logistics Coordinator had not been informed of the possible need to send equipment to the site of the fuel truck llnpediment until 13:48. Id,. at 36-37, 220. FEMA concluded that the response to the gravel truck impediment was inadequate because the messages from the LERO EOC were ; l incomplete in falling to indicate that three cars were involved in the ' accident, and because no consideration was given to determining whether any gravel had spilled and if additional equipment was needed to remove the gravel. I,d,. at 37. On this basis it recommended more training to focus on equipment needed to clear impediments and better communication to the Evacuation Coordinator and laterally in the EOC. Id. 221. In regard to the fuel truck impediment, FEMA concluded the response was inadequate because: (a) of the delay ,of 45 minutes in dispatching a Road Spotter to verify the accident; (b) of a de. lay of one hour in notifying the Bus Dispatcher in Patchogue of the impediment; and (c) the delay of about three hours in the dispatch of equipment to remove i 1 the impediment. ,l d, . Again, FEMA recommended better and more prompt communication of road impediment information. M.at37-38.
)
222. The FEMA Assessment particularly recommended two actions be )
- taken to correct these deficiencies in the communication of roadway - impediments. Id. at 37. First, that information on impediments be passed up, down and laterally in the chain of command as soon as possible after instituting impediment verification and other related i procedures. ,l d . Second, that additional tre3ning be provided to assure that LERO procedures are implemented. Id.
( i I i
n s 223. For the reasons su'mmarized above, FEMA found a Deficiency in
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LJ the LERO response to roadway impediments: Delays !n responding to the two (2) evacuation impediment free-play messages inserted at the LERO EOC were caused by the failure to inform the Evacuation Coordinator in a timely manner. In addition there was a lack of internal communication in response to these impediment problems. Pertinent information was not included on the 1045 and 1106 LERO Message Forms from the Evacuation Route Coordinator to the Evacuation Support Communicator
- for Route Spotter / Road Crews regarding the simulated impediment involving the gravel truck and fuel truck problems. As a result to this lack of information, the .
Impediment problems were not analyzed in a timely l fashion and incomplete equipment was dispatched to handle the gravel truck impediment in the field (NUREG-0654,11, J.10.k). FEMA Ex.1, at 39. 224. As a result of this Deficiency FEMA recommended: Internal communications procedures should be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure that i information on impediments ,is promptly passed both up the chain of command to the Evacuation Coordinator and downward and laterally to all lead coordinators under the Evacuation Coordinator and their staffs. Addit!onal training is needed to ensure that the procedures, whether new or current, are properly implemented. All coordinators at the EOC, and those who initiate messages, must be trained to include all pertinent information on the LERO messages forms and to analyze the equipment requirements to clear impediments. ,
.I$<
225. An additional problem, according to FEMA, was that the LERO l 1 Road Crew was not properly informed that the impediment was a multiple j vehicle accident and the tow truck dispatched would have been inadequate to clear the route. FEMA Ex. 5, at 156. FEMA identified this issue as an Area Requiring Corrective Action and recommended that personnel at e., t N.]
l 1
. i I
l []/ s
'~'
the Patchogue Staging Area should be trained to request more information from the LERO EOC when impediments to evacuation are indicated. id. 226. The Board draws the following conclusions with regard to the ) i gravel truck road impediment. First, it is obvious that the LERO Evacuation Route Coordinator did not know how to react to the FEMA
" free play" message of 10:39 involving the gravel truck. He treated the message as a report needing verification, rather than the report of an actual occurrence as the message indi.:ated. See Finding 161. Although this confusion would be unlikely in the case of an actual emergency, when the actual location of the accident would be observed (Tr. 404-05 (Weismantie); Lieberman, ff. Tr. 272, at 20-21), it is nevertheless undisputed that the Evacuation Route Coordinator did not exercise good judgment in his response. Tr. 5549 (Weismantie); Tr. 5628 (Daverio);
see LILCO Proposed Finding No. 237. Second, the LERO Evacuation Route Coordinator did not coordinate and report this information to the Traffic Control Coordinator and other LERO managers at the EOC. Findings 161, 168. Nor did tr.* Evacuation Coordinator inform the Manager of Local Response and others in the EOC. Findings 204, 209. These failures were contrary to the Plan. Finding 145. The Evacuation Route Coordinator did, however, quickly dispatch a Route Spotter to verify the information, and the Route Spotte.- promptly and properly reported his observation by 10:56 - that he was unable to verify an accident by meeting with a FEMA evaluator at the location indicated in the FEMA " free play" message. Findings 163-165. At 11:04 FEMA corrected i the location where the LERO Road Spotter was to meet the FEMA Evaluator, and about 11:40 the Road Spotter met him and reported where p' kJ
L 4 they had ' met. Findings 165, 167. 'Upon receiving this message, 'the
. LERO organization promptly dispatched a road crew at 12:00 to remove
- A the obstruction. Finding 167. This crew, however, did not have the proper equipment to do the job. Finding 176. The LERO Evacuation Coordinator then quickly took action, to see whether an accident' at the
. location where the Route Spotter met the FEMA Evaluator would adversely affect the evacuation. Finding 168. He correctly concluded that an accident east of the "Y" intersection would not. I d,. At 12:14, FEMA instructed the Evacuation Coordinator to presume that the accident occurred at the location it had indicated in its original " free play" message involving the gravel truck -- i.e. north of the intersection --
rather . than where the Road Spotter and the FEMA Evaluator met. Finding 169. Shortly thereafter, at 12:20, the LERO rivacuation Coordinator took the action of having traffic rerouted around the 1 accident. Finding 171. In sum, delays were caused by attempting 'to
. verify the FEMA " free play" message and by a failure to coordinate actions in dealing with the roadway impediment as called for in the LERO l plan. El 227. Summarizing with regard to the fuel truck road impediment, the Board draws the following conclusions. As in the case of the gravel )
truck impediment, the LERO Evacuation Route Coordinator did not know 1 i how to react to the FEMA " free play" message. Again he treated it as a ] i report needing verification, rather than a report of an actual occurrence. j 13/ There were also delays in simulating broadcast of information to the
~'- '
l g public in EBS messages. Finding 178. i 1
t i l Finding 181. Although a mistaken judgment, this confusion would be ,
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unlikely 1n an actual emergency when an accident would actually be observed and the messages would be sent through regular chains of command. Tr. 404-05 (Weismantle); Lieberman, ff. Tr. 272, at 20-21; l Tr. 5549 (Weismantle); Tr. 5628 (Daverio). Again, as in the case of the gravel truck impediment, the LERO Evacuation Route Coordinator did not coordinate or report the fuel truck " free play" message to the the Traffic Control Coordinator, and other responsible LERO personnel in the EOC as provided in the LERO plan. Findings 181, 185. Morever, in contrast to actions regarding the gravel truck impediment, actions taken in regard to the fuel truck Impediment were generally untimely. While the FEMA message was received at 11:04, a Road Spotter was not actually sent to the scene of the accident until 12:02. Finding 184. The accident was verified by 12:23, but the message rerouting traffic was not sent until 12:47. Findings 186, 188. The affected Traffic Guides did not ask for help and equipment to reroute traffic until 13:10, and additional personnel and equipment were not dispatched until 13:32. Finding 192. 228. Further, actions in' dealing with the simulated leaking fuel truck were not timely. The message indicating the overturned and leaking fuel truck was received at 11:04 and verified by 12:23. Findings 162, 186. The fire department was not notified until 12:47 and a LERO crew to help the fire department was not sent until 13:45. Findings 188-189. Nor was the owner of the truck contacted to help unload fuel truck until 14:00. Finding 196. In sum, the LERO organization did not properly respond to the fuel truck impediment in the Exercise. O
l l j
/% -229. On the basis of the foregoing,. this ' Board finds that the LERO '
Li i response - during the Exercise to the fuel truck impediment, and to a ] lesser extent the gravel . truck Impediment, 'was generally ineffective and -] 4 i failed.to demonstrate that LERO could deal with Impediments to evacuation on the roadways. However, contrary to the interveners assertions' it
. was not shown ,that the Plan is inherently unworkable. Rather, as FEMA stated, we also find the . deficiencies in regard to the removal of roadway .
Implements to be a function of failure df. communication and training.. FEMA Ex. 1, at 36-39. While the Plan has not been shown to be flawed, Applicant failed .to show that it is ' capable of utilizing that Plan to j
. communicate the information necessary for prompt and effectiv'e response i
to road impediments. Indeed, what' was demonstrated was that if LERO members do not follow the procedures required, and promptly and. accurately communicate evacuation . problems, as they are to do under the Plan, the Plan will n'ot work. FEMA Ex.1, at 39; Roberts, ff. Tr. 2234, . at 33-34; Tr. 407-08 (Weismantle); 402(Wilm). 236. Having reviewed the extensive record detailing the LILCO and Intervenor rerouting schemes, we find both schemes to be reasonable in - terms of the criteria used for these purposes. See LILCO Findings 84-85. As Applicant stated, rerouting schemes are generally not unique (Tr. 2273-74 (Lieberman)) . LERO's, as well as the Interveners', sug-gested rerouting schemes were both viable (Tr.1112, 2274-75, 2280 (Lieberman)) . Given this conclusion with respect to rerouting per se, we do not deal with the specific details as to each scheme here. 231. On the basis of the foregoing it appears that "the exercise revealed... deficiencies which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance b
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.. j f^N that protective measures can and will be taken, i.e. , fundamental flaws in
\') the plan" in regard to the removal of roadway impediments. See CLI .86-11, 23 NRC at 581. We have previously concluded that this aspect i of the Plan as written is adequate, See Shoreham, LBP-85-12, 21 NRC ]4 644, 795-798 (1985). However, before a finding of a reasonable assurance l k
is made that the Plan "can and will be implemented" a FEMA remedial drill j or exercise is necessary, after further training, to demonstrate that the LERO personnel have the skill and ability to implement the Plan. 232. With respect to Contention EX 41.E, wherein the Interveners challenge as ineffective the proposed revision of the LERO Plan to add i the position of Traffic Engineer to the. EOC, we find that such a "fix" is not relevant to the problems caused on the day of the Exercise. Those problems, as stated earlier, were ones of communication throughout the EOC and from there to the field , and in training. The new Traffic road impediments and develop Engineer would assist in evaluating , alternate routing schemes. Such areas were not the principal source of failure on the day of the Exercise; rather, needed and useful information i was not flowing to the persons that required it, with the result being an l inadequate field response. 1 1 Vill. CONTENTION EX 34 - Route Alert Driver Notification I to the Public in the Event of Siren Failure l l 233. Conter, tion EX 34 states generally that the Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO is incapable of l providing prompt notification to the public in the event of a siren failure. 234. Intervenor Suffolk County offered the direct testimony of l Assistant Chief Inspector Richard C. Roberts and Deputy Inspector
)
a ; L__ _ ---__
1 Edwin J. Michel of the Suffolk County Police De,partment in ' support of (] Contention EX 34. Tr.1490-1495; Roberts and Michel, ff. Tr. 1495. Both men were qualified to testify as expert witnesses on Conten-tion EX 34. See M. at Tr. 1495, Tr. ff. 2180, at 2-3 and Attach-ments 1, 4. Applicant LILCO offered the direct testimony of Charles A. Daverlo and John A. Weismantle on Contention EX 34. Tr.1326-1327, i Both men were quallfled to testify as expert witnesses on Conten-- tion EX 34. See Id.; ff. Tr.1327, at 1-2: Tr.1352. The FEMA witnesses, Messrs. Keller and Kowleski and Dr. Baldwin, addressed Contention EX 34 in their direct testimony (FEMA EX. 5, at 8,141-143) and were cross-examined on this matter at Tr. 7992-8079. 235. Under the LERO Plan; primary alert and notification of the public is done by means of the EBS broadcasts, tone alert radios, and i the fixed siren . system. See Daverio, ff. Tr.1327, at 5-6. If a siren falls, LILCO relies upon Route Alert Drivers to provide a backup to the 89 fixed sirens for public notification. In that ' event the Route Alert Drivers are dispatched to drive through the areas around the failed sirens so that a notification message could be broadcast over loudspeakers to the public in those areas. See LILCO Plan at OPIP 3.3.4; Daverlo and Weismantle, ff. Tr.1327, at 6. 236. During the Exercise, in response to a " free play" message from FEMA (ff. Tr.1495, at Att.1) postulating the simulated failure of three sirens, one Route Alert Driver was dispatched from each of the three LERO staging areas. FEMA Ex. 1, at 57, 58, 64, 68, 74-76; t Daverlo and Weismantle, ff. T r . 1327, at 9. All of these drivers took l
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a;
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[ more than 45 minutes to complete each of their assigned routes. FEMA
- EX.1, at 57.
237. On that basis, Suffolk County's witnesses . testified that the Exercise demonstrated that LILCO's " route alerting scheme is inherently flawed." Roberts and Michel, ff. Tr.1495, at 5. In all three instances, Suffolk ' County's witnesses maintain ' the simulated backup notification l process "took much too long" and, therefore, demonstrated LERO's' failure to comply with what interveners view as a regulatory requirement regarding prompt notification. Roberts and Michel, ff. Tr.1495, at 6-7. 238. At the time of the Shoreham Exercise, FEMA Region li's , position was that the 45-minute limit of NUREG-0654, App. 3-3, item 2C applied to backup route alerting. Tr. 8005 (Kowleski); see FEMA Ex. 4: Tr. 8025-26 ( Kowleski, Keller); Tr. 8019 (Kowleski). Based on dis-cussions held after the Exercise, and a memorandum received from FEMA Headquarters, FEMA Region il modified its position on .the existence of a 45-minute time requirement for backup route alerting. Tr. 8005-8006 (Kowleski); Wilkerson to Kowleski Memorandum, ff. T r . 1327, at Attachment B; S.C. Ex. 104; see also FEMA Ex. 4, at 5-7; Tr. 8027-28 (Keller, Kowleski). That memorandum stated that "there is no hard and fast time requirement for the (backup) route alerting system. " Id. Since there are. no minimum time frames, no corrective actions may be required. M. This position has been formally adopted in FEMA Guidance Memorandum AN-1. FEMA Ex. 4, at 5-7; see Tr. 8025-26 (Keller); see also Daverio and Weismantle, ff. Tr.1327, at 3-6. FEMA thus changed i its rating on this matter for Shoreham from an area requiring corrective action to an area recommended for improvement. Tr. 8000 (Kowleski,
\
,f Baldwin); Tr. 8005-06 (Kowleski). b FEMA Guidance Memorandum AN-1 -D sets 45 minutes as a " suggested objective" for route alerting but it is not )
L . a requirement. FEMA Ex. 4, at 1-5; see also S.C. Ex.18. E i; 239. No preclusion of a reasonable assurance finding could be based on the amount of time taken during an exercise to complete backup route alerting. See FEMA Ex.1, at 8; FEMA Ex. 5, at 142-143; Tr. 8004-05 -l (Baldwin, Kowleski) . Such backup alerting, while required to be in place, is essentially discretionary as to the time in which it need be
. completed. See ,ld. A fundamental flaw in the plan, therefore, cannot be based on excessive route alert driver time.
240. Notwithstanding the lack of any particular time requirement for route alerting in FEMA guidance documents, FEMA witnesses said that backup route alerting took "too long" on the day of the Exercise. 14/ While the basis of this policy change is somewhat unclear on th'is
~~
record (see Tr. 8007-08, Kowleski), this Board does not find the
" motivation" of FEMA in making this policy change (an area Interveners attempted to explore at trial) of any . relevance or materiality with respect to determining the issue under consideration in Contention EX. 34, i.e. , whether backup route alerting on the day of the Exercise took so long as to demonstrate a fundamental ..
flaw in the LERO Plan. Tr. 8077-8078 (Frye) . 15/ LILCO maintained that the law of the case in these proceedings is
"~
that no standard time limit need be met for the route alert driver function. Daverlo and Weismantle, ff. Tr.1327, at 3; see Shoreham, LDP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, at 759 (1985), a ff'd , A LA B-BTU 23 NRC 135, at 143 (1986). At the hearing, in the context of. a LILCO motion to strike Suffolk County direct testimony on Contention EX 34, this Board ruled that the prior Licensing Board decision (having become final agency action and therefore binding in this case) did not address the 45-minute backup alerting requirement; rather, the prior decision went only to the point that backup route l alerting could not be performed within 15 minutes and, in fact, was not required to be performed within 15 minutes. Tr.1002; see Tr. 478-500. v I
em Tr. 8003-04 (Baldwin); see also Michel and Roberts, ff. Tr.1495, at 8; IV) FEMA Ex.1, at xiv, xv, xvii. However, the length of time taken by the Route Alert Drivers can, in large part, be attributed to the fact that j
. l each driver attempted to cover an entire failed siren area. We find, as .l 1
the LILCO witnesses testified, that the observed times for the three Route Alert drivers set out in Contention EX 34 (as adopted from the j k FEMA Post Exercise Assessment, FEMA Ex.1) do not accurately reflect { l the time it would really take to notify the public by the backup system in -
)
an actual radiological emergency at Shoreham. 241. During the Exercise, LERO dispatched only one Route Alert Driver per staging area to perform the siren backup fur.ction. Each driver was assigned to cover an entire stren area alone. Daverlo and Weismantle, ff. T r. 1327, at 3, 9-10. The Plan , however, does not restrict LERO to one Route Alert driver per siren area, and in an actual emergency LERO would not need to so limit itself. Id.; Tr. 8029-8030. Under the Plan there are more than enough Route Alert Drivers assigned to the siren backup function to permit LERO to assign multiple drivers to a single siren area. Id. Fewer Route Alert Drivers could be assigned to the less difficult routes and more drivers to the more complex routes during an actual emergency. There is reasonable assurance that this apportionment could be done, even within a supposed 45-minute time
~
frame under many accident scenarios. 242. LERO relies upon maps to ensure that route alert drivers can get to, and drive through, the areas around failed sirens. Tr. 13 69-70 (Daverio). Consequently, any route alert driver might be dispatched tc any of the failed siren routes. _I d . V)
243. The map provided for the Riverhead Route Alert Driver had no mileage or distance scale making it difficult to determine where to begin i and end route alerting in that failed siren area. FEMA Ex.1, at 74, 75. This is readily remediable, thus not a fundamental flaw; but it is one of the reasons for delay of that driver on the day of the Exercise. ] 244. It is unclear why LILCO limited itself to only one driver for each stren area on the day of the Exercise. Tr. 8024-30 (Kowleski, i Baldwin). During pre-Exercise discussions between Mr. Daverio of LILCO and RAC Chairman Kowieski, Mr. Kowleski stated that LERO would be expected to limit itself to one driver per failed siren area. g. This l FEMA position was not communicated to any LERO personnel. M. ; Tr.1373 -74 (Daverlo); Tr. 1450-51 (Weismantle and Daverio); Tr. 1372-73 (Daverlo); see Tr. 1377-78 (Daverio). The Board finds that the precise rationale or reason underlying this LERO action is immaterial to a determination on the merits of Contention EX 34. See Tr. 8042. E 245. While sixteen of the sixty Route Alert Drivers provided for in the Plan are needed for notification to the deaf, 44 Route Alert Drivers are left to cover 89 siren routes. OPIP 3.3.4, Att. 6; Tr. 1362 16/ This Board finds that LERO's approach was entirely reasonable, even if incorrect (see Tr.1002; Tr. 478 ff.), in assuming on the day of the Exercise that, by virtue of rulings in the prior Shoreham litigation, there was no specific time requirement for siren backup route alerting. Tr.1483 (Weismantle); Daverlo and Weismantle, ff. Tr.1327, at 7-8; see 21 NRC 644, at 759. Their decision to send out only one driver per siren route could have been reasonably based on that assumption. This Board concludes, therefore, that LERO was not in fact attempting to perform this route alert function within a limited time frame during the Exercise; hence, the excessive times actually recorded are not , demonstrative of a fundamental flaw in the Plan. O
l t ,g
/ G (Daverlo); Daverlo and Weismantle, ff. Tr.1327, at 9-10. Thus, there is
( ) substantial redundancy even if there were to be a '5-20% siren failure rate. g. ; Tr.1458-59. At a high assumed ;. failure rate of 20%, then l t each available driver would only need to cover approximately 40% of each area. I 246. The LILCO witnesses concede that under some emergency circumstances the 45-minute goal may not be ach!evable. Tr.1387 (Weismantle). In subsequent drills this time still was not met in all cases. See S. C. Ex. 20. The earlier PID recognized that in some fast breaking accidents this would be the . case and said LERO could r.ot be ' i required to do the impossible. See 21 NRC CA4, at 721-724. 247. This Board finds that there is no present regulatory requirement that mandates a 45-minute time within which backup route alerting must be completed in the event of a siren failure. As the testimony illustrated, while 45 minutes may be an , optimal goal or
" suggested objective ," there are many variables that might affect the reasonableness of such a time frame. See Tr.1414-1419 (Daverlo and Weismantle) . The Suffolk County witnesses made no independent assessment as to whether a 45-minute limit was reasonable. Tr. 1528-29 (Roberts and Michel).
248. Given the number of available personnel to LERO who could be used to fulfill this function in the event of an actual radiological emergency at Shoreham, the fact that the route alerting on the day of the Exercise may have taken an excessive length of time does not demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the Plan. There is adequate provision in the Plan n (i.e. , the number of available drivers) to comperbate for the putative (v)
- 91~-
4' I J failure" . during the Exercise in that the end result is reasonable
'C' assurance that backup, notification measures can and will be taken.
L IX. CONTENTION EX 36 - Adequa'cy of Protective Action Recommendations in Light of a Projected Wind Shift
~
249. Contention EX 36 essentially asserts that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed because during the Exercise LERO personnel failed to consider an alternative protective action recommendation of sheltering l'~ for those not yet evacuated after a projected wind shift. This contention .
~
was admitted on the premise that performance errors during the Exercise could, if proven, establish that .the Plan as it relates to protective action decision-making is fundamentally flawed. See October 3,1986 Prehearing Conference Order at 19. As litigated at hearing, the question presented to us was whether the process for the reconsideration of earlier
- protective action recommendations was fundamentally flawed. See Minor Testimony, ff. Tr. 2612, at 20.
250. The appropriateness of the original protective action i recommendation, as such, was not placed in issue by the contention. See , id. at 14, n.1. Further, the expansion of the evacuation zones in anticipation of later wind shift was not challenged as inappropriate or inconsistent with the Plan. Minor Testimony, ff. Tr. 2612, at 15, n.2. As a result, our consideration of Contention EX 36 focuses on whether the process which led LERO to continue to recommend evacuation for residents in the zones for which a wind shift was projected was 4 fundamentally sound. 251. Suffolk County's witness did not claim there to be an M- Inadequacy in LILCO plans and procedures. Minor Testimony, ff. Tr.
2612, at 6-8. Rather, he maintained that, because each of the 15-minute interval EBS evacuation recommendations was in effect a new recommenda-tion , new calculations using updated information should have been performed as conditions changed through the day to determine which protective action would result in the most dose savings. According to Mr. Minor, this was not done. Id. at 18-20. 252. While we . agree with interveners' proposition that a failure to engage in a continuing process of consideration of relative dose savings from alternative protective actions would be a breach of a " fundamental premise and basis of LILCO's protective action recommendation procedure," we find here that LlLCO did in fact engage in that process in a fundamentally sound manner. As a result, there is no basis for inferring that the LILCO Plan for protective action decision-making i.1 fundamentally flawed. 253. First, as noted by LILCO, the principal basis for the original protective action recommendation of evacuation was plant data indicating a long-term release, resulting in projected doses downwind in excess of EPA PAG's for the child thyroid dose. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 2364, at 4, 8; Tr. 2551 (Watts) . The soundness of the procedures used and the decision itself was not challenged; nor was the use of' the chlid thyroid dose as the critical dose consideration. Minor Testimony, ff. Tr. 2612, at 9 - 11; Tr. 2614-5 (Minor); see also, Tr. 2403, 2405, 2409, 2417, 2423-24, 2433, 2491-2 (Watts) . These critical considerations indicating evacuation of downward residents within the EPZ did not change during l the scenario. Tr. 2576, 2570, 2583-4 (Watts).
;g, 'l '
.s
_ 9 3 .. i a
', / 254. Second, after the initial? recommendation., Mr. Watts, the .
' l \
Q ' Radiation . Health Coordinator, performed per! odic calculations based on information be.ing; received at the EOC which showed that plant releases - and resultincl dose hrojedtions would be much higher than first projected. U LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 2364, at 4, 7, Attachments D, E, and F; [, -- a s Tr. 2446, 2fiSI-2, 2508 (Watts) . As a result, Mr. Watts concluded that
# ihere was n6 reason to perform additional calculation.s to see if sheltering
.rather than evacuation"should be recommended. Tr. 2508-09 (Watts).
The EOC protectivc(actiori decision-making team continued to receive and i exchange information oh ! weather conditions (including windi shift e projection) and road ' conditions during the day. Tr. 2566, 2594 '! (Weismantle): Tr. 2604 (Kessler); Tr. 2568-71 (Watts) . Th'e projrcted s wind shift led, in fact, to the recommendation to evacuate additional zones at 11:46 a .m. Tr. 2567 (Kessler). Monitoring of ,the situation continued in order to confirm the vsfidity of earlier evacuation decisions. Tr. 2576 (Watts) . 255. Third, during the mid-afternoon time frame ' focused ^ by Suffolk ' County, the EOC team was aware of several reasons why a proje:: tion of valnd shift did not - warrant reconsideration of a shelter , recommendation for those residents in the downwl.;d evacuation zones ivho had not yet begun to evacuate. By 2:40 p.m. , those residents had a
! 7
; theoretically been emersed in the plume for several hours. ,
E,ince after one hour of emersion in the plume, sheltering no longer provides effective protection frem Inhalation .of radioactive iodine, and thus no thyroid dose savings, there was no benefit with respect to this critical dose pathway c from advising Ttisidents in downwind zones to shelter. LILCO Testimony, r 4
_ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . _ - _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . =_- -___ __ _ _ _ -__ _ . L t
);
l '(/ ff. Tr. 2364, at 8, 9-11; Tr. 2620-21 (Minor); Tr. 2487, 2488, 2507, 2512 2519 - (Watts) . Similarly, shelter at that point offered little g otection from ground contamination. Tr. 2492 (Watts). l; 256. Although Suffolk County sought to suggest that road impediments should have warranted reconsideration of the protective action recommendation, it was shown that residents would have been no worse'off in a car on the road sitting in the plume than they would have ( been if they stayed at home, and better off inasmuch as iodine concen-tration sould lessen as they moved away from the plume. Tr. 2487,
- 2521, 2582 (Watts) . It may also be inferred that to the extent wind shift did in fact occur, the benefit to persons formerly in the downwind zones would accrue whether they were at home or in a car. Mr. Kessler i
testified that, for purposes of protective action recommendation, it did nc,t matter how long it took to evacuate in the circumstances presented, and we agree. Tr. 2593 (Kessler). Finally, it was uncertain when, in fact, the wind shift would occur, until it in fact did occur, at 4:30 p.m. (per the scenario) . Tr. 2516 (Watts); Tr. 2564-5 (Kessler) . As a result, the EOC team saw no compelling reason to change the protective action recommendation back to sheltering. Tr. 2575 (Watts). 257. Finally, witness Watts testified that, as the evacuation proceeded, he had in mind that he wanted to avoid causing confusion by protective action recommendation for people already j changing the i instructed to evacuate. Tr. 2530- 33 (Watts) . See also, LlLCO } TesUi'ony, ff. Tr. 2364, at 5,11-13; Tr. 2534-5 (Mileti). 258. Suffolk County's witness Minor also raised the lack of
/
O instructions to the public to take individual protective actions, such as 4
m ! N "using a molst cloth to cover 'one's nose and mouth, or closing of windows l'f one were still inside the house.. Tr. 2622-3 (Minor). He also noted that there was 'some additional dose savings in whole body dose that could have w derived from such protective actions which should have been but l were not considered for recommendation to the public. Id. Individual protective actions of this sort were not clearly raised by the contention. Moreover, LILCO's response was that such measures were not contained in l its Plan, and, in any event, suggestion of such protective measures may have confused the public and had only a variable benefit. Tr. 2497-98 (Watts, Weismantie). We do not find that the absence of consideration of such instructions in the Plan to be fundamental to the protective action recommendation process. 259. FEMA concluded that appropriate protective- action recommendations were made _ by LERO personnel and that good judgment was shown by the Radiation Health Coordinator and Nuclear Engineer. FEMA Ex.1, at 33; FEMA Ex. 5, at 24. 260. In sum, we have found that the contention that 'the LERO process for making protective action recommendations was fundamentally flawed to be without merit. No evidence was presented to show that the Plan itself was fundamentally defective in this regard, and the evidence of its implementation dem nstrated that the Plan was followed. These conclusions are fully scMrted by evidence presented by FEMA. We therefore find that Contention EX 36 does not show a fundarrental flaw, and must be rejected, i L
^
I' i _ L i / l v' X. CONTENTIONS EX 38, 39, 22.F, 40.C, 44 AND 49.C - Public Information 261. This group of contentions assert collectively that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed with regard to the public information program as implemented Juring the Exercise of February 13, 1986. 'The contentions concern the performance of the public information personnel at the Emergency News Center (ENC) during press briefings and in exer-cising - the rumor control function. Specifically, they assert that this performance was so deficient that it would result in confusing , conflicting, inaccurate and untimely information being disseminated to the public (Contentions EX 38 and EX 39). This in turn would cause a substantial voluntary or shadow evacuation if such information were in fact given to the public during an emergency (Contentions EX 22.F, 40.C, 44 and 49.C). A. Contention EX 38 262. Contention EX 38 asserts that the Exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO was unable to provide timely , accurate, consistent and non-confusing information to the news media at the Emergency News Center (ENC). This assertion is bolstered by the recitation of numerous incidents which occurred on the day of the Exercise set forth as subparts A-J and L-Q.
- 1. The EBS and the Media Generally 263. At the outset, we note what appears to be a disparate l
r philosophical approach to the concept of how to address public information by the Applicant and FEMA on the one hand, and the interveners on the
r
- l
[ T
\,h other. At- the heart of this fundamental difference lies the concept of l
what role the media would play in an emergency. The Applicant and - FEMA see the official nature of the EBS system as the primary means to inform the public of what actions it should take. LILCO Testimony on Contentions EX 38 (ENC Operations) and EX 39 (Rumor Control), ff. Tr. 3206, at 8-9; FEMA Ex. 5, at 32, 35, 39. Interveners place greater l emphasis on the role of the media , that is , broadcast and print journalists, as the primary source of that information. Testimony of Philip Evans, Fe Rowan, Stephen Cole , Susan Saegert and Elizabeth Loftus, ff. Tr. 3786, at 30-31, 38, 64. Consequently, we find resolution of this issue necessary in order to provide an appropriate framework in which to consider the testimony on these contentions. 264 The pertinent regulations are found in 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(5) and Appendix E, 9 IV. Additionally, NUREG-0654 in 9 lI.E and Appendix 3 sets forth guidance for implementing these regulations. It is abun-dantly clear from a regulatory standpoint that reliance on the EBS system is considered the primary means for notification to the public of any nuclear accident. This is consistent with our earlier decision regarding notification to the public where the system was deemed adequate in its reliance on the EBS messages. PID, 21 NRC 644, 757-764. While we also found that with regard to the credibility of LILCO and LERO the public likely will seek information from many sources, PID at 691, we did not suggest the EBS messages would not be primary in instructing the populace as to appropriate protective actions. 265. LILCO's witness, Dr. Mlleti, pointed out that it is clear from an examination of how people actually receive and process information v
I during emergencies that an EBS system' would play a major role in shaping public response. Tr. 3234 (Mileti) . Another LILCO witness testified .that - the only way to malte an initial notification to the public within 15 minutes of the declaration of an emergency, which the regulations require, would be with strens and an EBS for quick, clear, accurate and concise information. Tr. 3235 (Daverio) . Dr. Mileti also testified that the EBS is the way to solve the problem of lots of information floating around; that is, by making all other forms secondary.
. Tr. 3341, 3343 (Mileti). However, he did concede that the other unofficial sources of information could override the official system. Tr.
3344 (Mileti). 266. FEMA also testified that the emphasis is on the EBS notice, not press relcases, but press releases should amplify, broaden and expand the EBS notice, and are helpful. Tr. 7777-78 (Keller) . Furthermore, there is no requirement for distribution of news releases to the media. Tr. 7793-94 (Keller). FEMA interprets the guidance in NUREG-0654 as meaning public notification via the EBS, not a separate media notification. Tr. 7819-20 (Keller). 267. Intervenor witness, Mr. Rowan, testified that the media would be the primary conduit of information, rather than the EBS, because the public is familiar with known journalists on radio and TV stations. Tr. 4070 (Rowan). Mr. Rowan went on to say that interpretation (of the EBS messages) would carry great weight with people who needed to be protected or needed to take or not take some action. Tr. 4072 (Rowan). Mr. Rowan conceded the EBS might be fine for initial warning , but maintains the emphasis should be on the press. Tr. 4087 (Rowan).
i i _ 7m- -{ Dr. Saegert suggested that there was no evidence.to support emphasizing the EBS as the most significant part of information, and interpreted . i multiple channels of Information as referring to sources of information l other than the EBS, rather . than as multiple sources of information cited as part of the message. Tr. 4094 (Saegert). 268. We find. that whlie we may agree with the interveners that ' media relations constitute one important element in the overall scheme of-the public information ' program, we must reject any theory that is in seeming conflict with our regulations, i.e., the notion that broadcast journalists would be the primary conduit of information to the public, rather than the emergency broadcast system (EBS). While recognizing the importance of the media, we agree with FEMA that the Regulations contemplate an official source of information, such as the EBS, to avoid the problems that arose in the context of the TMI experience, and this prompted the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654. It is the EBS that is critical. Tr. 7827 (Keller). 269. Hence, we turn to consider each contention and its relevant subparts in light of a regulatory framework that places primary emphasis on the EBS messages themselves. We must determine whether information gathered at the ENC was confilcting or inaccurate or unreliable and if so, would it reach the public in such a way as to significantly diminish the capacity of the EBS messages to inform the public.
- 2. The Contention Subparts 270. Contention EX 38.A asserts that activation of the ENC and the first briefing for the press were untimely, which would result in
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t% Y. confusion ~, rumor generation, lack of confidence in LILCO's ability to deal with the emergency and refusal to believe subsequent instructions. 271. There was agreement as to the timeline for the events set forth in this subpart. LILCO Admissions 37, 38. The LILCO Plan calls for ' activation of 'the ENC at the declaration of an alert (6:17 a.m. for the exercise) . LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206 at 16. The ENC was declared operational at 8:25 and the first press briefing was held at 8:40. M. The first EBS message noticing an alert was broadcast at 6:52, and the first news releases were issued at 6:25 and 6:39. g. at 17. 272. FEMA found the activation of the ENC was done very well. FEMA Ex. 5, at 32. FEMA also took the position that holding a press
- briefing within 15 minutes of activation of the ENC is adequate. M. at
- 33. FEMA also pointed out that the primary means of giving necessary emergency information to the public, the EBS system, was activated nearly two hours before the first press conference. M.
273. LILCO testified that the ENC could have been activated earlier than 8:25, but since an alert does not indicate a serious plant condition, the Director of Public Information decided to wait for additional staff 1 before declaring the ENC operational. Tr. 3t:23 (McCaffrey). 274. LILCO also testified that in a real emergency, the two press releases would have gone out on the AP and UPI wires, and the press l would also have heard the EBS message, and would have called the i Corporate Communications Department, which is staffed 24 hours a day. LILCO Testimony, (f. Tr. 3206, at 18; Tr. 3426, 3435 (McCaffrey). This i department would know the content of the press releases. Tr. 3436-37 (McCaffrey). The Emergency Communications Liaison (ECL) stays at the l 5 __---___m-- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ , _ _ _
- 101 -
7-(,). control room and would have ready access to control room information. Tr. 3438 (Robinson). Hence, there would be additional channels available for the press to seek supplemental information to the EBS message in advance of any press briefing. 275. Interveners assert that any hint of a serious problem at a nuclear power plant would be considered by the media as a major news event, and the EBS message generated at 6:52 a.m. would result in the immediate mobilization of all available resources by every news organiza-tion. Evans, et al. ff. Tr. 3786, at 41-42. Consequently, a large number of reporters would have arrived at the ENC by 7:30 a.m. seeking additional information. M. at 44. According to intervenor witnesses, this lack of formal establishment of an ENC and press briefing before 8:40 would result in an effective news " blackout" for over two hours, and a hostile and skeptical group of reporters asking questions. d . at 46,
,l_d 276. Further , Interveners assert that the information in the messages themselves is meager, imprecise and is laced with Jargon.
Evans, et g. ff. Tr. 3786, at 56-57. Hence, if the only information available to the media in advance of the news conference was the EBS message, or press releases based on it, then the information is insuf-ficient to adequately or clearly inform the public as to what to do. M. at 57, 60. Interveners' position is that the media (and public) would want to know what is happening at the plant and what to do. M. 277. However, the only protective action advised in EBS #1 was for schools to remain closed , for the public to review its emergency brochure, and for the public to stay tuned to the radio for further information. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, Attachment B. Further, C l
l
- 102 -
5s y t < y/ the News ' Releases gave' information as to conditions at the plant and stated that there are four' classifications for emergencies, of which the l unusual event is the least serious. Evans , et, al. , Attachment 6. 278, ile have carefully reviewed the EBS messages and Press Releases. While we can understand the instinctive approach journalists would take to seek out all possible information as cited. In the intervenor testimony, we cannot find that the information available prior to the activation of the ENC constitutes either a " blackout" or hints of a
" cove r-up. " Rather, given our earlier finding that dissemination of information to the public via the EBS is the primary source for in.structions to the populace, we decline to find activation of the ENC by 8:25 a.m. a flaw. -The Regulations are concerned with prompt instructions to the populace, and this LERO did.
279. Contentions EX 38.B, C, and G allege that the News Releases were not timely provided to the press. Specifically, News Release #1 announcing an alert was not provided to the press timely, though an EBS message concerning the information in this release had been broadcast at 6:52. The Site Area Emergency EBS was broadcast at 8:41, but the news release was not distributed to the press timely, nor in fact, were any of the other releases during the day. Hence, it is asserted that the news releases were inaccurate and in conflict with other data already in the public domain by the time they were distributed to the media. Contention EX 38.D alleges that insufficient copying capabilities at the ENC contributed to delays in the distribution of information to the media. l p Finally, Contention EX 38.0 asserts that LILCO's proposed changes to the
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( ) (./ Plan to address these problems would not resolve these deficiencies. Since the issue of delays in providing hard copies of such ir. formation to the media is necessarily tied to the copier problem and what LILCO proposes to do about it, we consider all of these sub-Issues together. 280. While it is true that hard copies of the EBS messages were not immediately available as press releases at the ENC, the information contained in EBS message #2 regarding the site area emergency (SAE) (declared at 8:19), the minor release, and the recommendation to place dairy animals on stored feed was read over the air at 8:38 and discussed at the press briefing at 8:40. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 20-21, 23, 281. Similarly, as to the other examples of untimely distribution of copies of press releases, none of the inforination contained in these press releases was unavailable, since it was broadcast over the EBS network and discussed with media representatives in live press briefings. M. at 29. 282. The lack of hard copies of EBS messages being provided the press in a timely manner was found as a Deficiency in the FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment Report. FEMA Ex.1, at 52-53. FEMA found that due to the time lag in providing hard copies of EBS messages, the reporters did not have an accurate or timely picture of protective action recommendations to the public. Id. However, FEMA testified that there is no time requirement for the distribution of news releases to the media, and the primary means of providing necessary emergency information to the public is via the EBS system, not by news releases which are [7 Intended to reinforce the EBS message. FEMA Ex. 5, at 36, 39.
\- )
- 104 - ; )
kj 283. LILCO conceded that there were problems with the copying equipment in use the day of the Exercise. which resulted in delays in providing hard copies to the press. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at
- 24. This was due to high temperatures in the copier area and overloaded circuits, g. However, it is LlLCO's position that such press releases are primarily used as background by the media, and are not primary sources. Furthermore, LlLCO has relocated the copier
- 3. at 29-30.
machines, installed separate circuits and has added a number of additional machines. Id. at 25. There are also new procedures to provide summary sheets of the EBS messages by computer for immediate posting , with formal news releases to follow. M.at23. 284. Interveners maintained that while the press may hear or be told about the EBS messages as they were broadcast, nevertheless they would demand immediate transcripts of those broadcasts so the contents of the messages could be relayed immediately and accurately to home offices. Evans, g al. ff. Tr. 3786, at 69. It was interveners' position that the absence of such transcripts or news releases would leave members of the media to speculate on the precise wording and meaning of the EBS message. ,l d . Such speculation was seen as likely to create the impression that the ENC was not the best place to get timely information, which would seriously hamper the ENC's abliity to be a central clearing- j i house to control the flow of information about the emergency. M. at 70-7). j l 285. FEMA pointed out, however, that if information was already in l l the public domain through the EBS message, there should not be any
,l'D, j
l l
_ l g - .105 --
/
D confusion caused by confirmation of that information via hard copy to the
- media, even if distributed after the fact. FEMA Ex. 5, at 39.
286. Once . again the relevant framework is whether untimely distribution of press releases at the ENC would engender conflicting or inaccurate and unreliable information which would reach the public. .We do not believe the only source of information for . reporters is the news releases. As noted supra, sufficient live sources of information would be available whom- responsible journalists would seek out. See, eg ., Tr. 4065 (Evans). We are mindful that FEMA rated the lack of copier capability at the ENC as a Deficiency; however, we decline to find lack of hard copies of news releases a fundamental flaw in the Plan, especially in view of the fact that LILCO has taken action to obviate this problem. Finding 283. 287. Contention EX 38.E asserts insufficient and inadequate maps and displays in the media briefing room contributed to confusing and unclear information being disseminated by LERO personnel. 288. The FEMA Post Exercise Assessment noted that an EPZ map, which tracks protective actions and the plume exposure pathway, and a status board, which provides emergency classification levels (ECLs) and their times of declaration, should be added to the media briefing room. FEMA Ex. 1, at 53-54. FEMA cited this as an area for corrective action (ARCA). However, FEMA testified that this lack did not lead to disseminating confusing and unclear information to the media. FEMA Ex. 5, at 37. v . _ - - . _ _ . - _ . _ . _ - . - _ . . - . _ . _ _ - _ -.-------- -_...--_.-_--_-- _ _ A
p p -y
- 106 -
m n 289.. LERO ' has added the maps and displays suggested . by FEMA, along with an aerial photograph map' of the EPZ which shows in detail the streets:in the- 10-mile EPZ. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, . at. 25-26. 1 This testimony was not disputed.
'290. . Consequently, we. find that LILCO has addressed the FEMA concern cited in the Post Exercise : Assessment and ' Contention EX 38.E j does not indicate a fundamental flaw in the- LILCO plan.
1 I 291. Contention EX 38.F asserts that . copies of. the EBS messages l provided to the media contained extraneous information that should have L . :
' been deleted, rendering 'them unclear, confusing 'and inconsistent with l radio broadcasts.
292. Under the procedures used during the February 13, 1986 Exercise, the EDS messages completed at the EOC were telecopied to the ENC, copied as is, and provided to the media. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 26. Those . messages were pre-scripted forms that are edited or filled in during an emergency to fit actual information needs. As a result, these forms are distributed with some information either crossed out or written in. M. 293. This was another area cited by FEMA as an area requiring corrective action (ARCA). Specifically, the Post Exercise Assessment states: "Some hard copies of EBS messages that were provided to the press contained extraneous information (clearly marked for deletion) that should have been omitted to avoid possible confusion." FEMA Ex.1, at 54. k __ ._.__m_ _._.______m.m._..__ m_.____.__._.-____.____
I L
- 107 - l l
l (-[ 294. LILCO has addressed this concern by changing the procedure so that marked-up EBS messages will not be provided to the media. l Instead, a summary sheet filled out at the EOC with information taken from the EBS messages will be sent by computer to the ENC in final form. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 27. News releases, drafted at the EOC, will also be sent by computer to th6 ENC, and though they contain the. same information as the EBS message, they will be printed and distributed in clean, professional form. M. at 28. 295. Interveners quibble with the new procedures, however, stating that if the new procedure requires some editing of the EBS messages l before they are turned into press releases, they can only assume this would lead to further delays in getting out press releases. Tr. 4102 (Evans). Mr. Evans also felt reporters would not be satisfied with anything less than the full text EBS message, because he would want to answer any questions of his editors about it accurately.
~
Tr. 4103 (Evans). Mr. Rowan, however, did concede that the press briefing is more important than any of the press releases, but timely posting of l written information that was in the briefing "sure helps to prevent confusion. " Tr. 4103-4 (Rowan) . 296. We find LILCO's change to eliminate providing marked-up EBS messages adequately addresses the ARCA identified by FEMA. While it may be that the media cannot be satisfied with written press releases, that is the dynamic of a news center, to provide live people to enable a ; reporter to get sufficient information. Tr. 3507 (Patterson). Hence, we I find this contention subpart has no merit. 1 _ _ __.__m. _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _
- 108 -
(3 I V) 297. Contention EX 38.H alleges that while a decision to recommend evacuation of the entire EPZ was reached at 11:46 and broadcast via the EBS at 12 noon, the EF, did not inform the media of this until the press : briefing' at 12:47 p. .i. 298. The facts were not in dispute. LILCO Admissions 62, 64, 79. Interveners' maintain, however, that this delay in informing the media at the ENC would produce an angry and combative press corps, who would be infuriated when confronted with knowledge that a full-scale evacuation l had - been ordered, but that they were not provided any details for 40 minutes. Evans, et g. Tr. 3788, at 84-85. 299. There was, however, no delay in getting this information to i the public within 15 minutes of the decision , and the press, by monitoring the EBS broadcasts in the ENC, would have had this knowledge. The media would have been informed of this information when the message was broadcast. FEMA Ex. 5, at 40. 300. Moreover, LILCO testified that the new procedure to provide a summary sheet of the EBS message would shorten ~ the time within which the press will receive confirmation of any changes in key information. < LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 32. Furthermore, the LERO spokes- a person is available to answer any questions that may be generated by the press and decides when to make LERO announcements to the press based on consultation with other public information officers and the demands from the press. Tr. 3511 (Robinson). Consequently, there would not be I- a vacuum of information as suggested by Intervenor witnesses. 301. We do not find that this rises to the level claimed by interve-nors, of a deliberate withholding of vital information , since this 4 4
l
- 109 -
(~ information was indeed broadcast the to the public and discussed with the media ' within 40 minutes. We find insufficient basis for finding that this ) l would poison press reL-tions or be perceived as a lack of cooperation by LERO so as to make its credibility suspect. Hence, this subpart does not support the contention's main premise that a fundamental flaw is shown in the Plan as confusing or conflicting information would be disseminated to the public. 302. Contention EX 38.1 alleges that LILCO workers were instructed to ingest potassium lodide (KI) tablets at 9:45, but the ENC personnel did not deide to inform the news reporters until 1:05, at whic.h time they rec,oested they mt print that information. 303. The facts alleged in the contention are very much at doubt. LILCO testified that no L' dRO or LILCO personnel at the ENC requested ~ that information about K1 Ingetion be suppressed, and in fact, the press was never given this information. L!LCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 33; Tr. 3512 (Robinson, McCaffrey). Interveners accept that there is some dispute as to the accuracy of the allegation. Evans, g a_I. I ff. Tr. 3786, at 71, 73-74. The central issue, however, is not whether LILCO requested the press to suppress the information, but whether the decision not to inform the press at all would damage LILCO's credibility and lead to public refusal to follow protective action recommendations. 304. LILCO did not inform the press of the KI ingestion by LERO workers because it does not affect the public, and it is the policy of New York State not to recommend distribution of Kl to the public during a radiological emergency. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 33-34; Tr. D
- 110 - .m).
( V 3519. (Daverio) . Dr. Mileti pointed out . that a brief, unexplained. announcement regarding Kl for LERO workers might lead to 'some unwarranted concern among the public. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 34, A detailed explanation of what Ki is, what it does, and why workers, not members of the public, were being asked to ingest it would be necessary to alleviate such concern. M. However, if asked about Kl LERO would answer any such questions. g. : Tr. 3525 (Robinson) . Information about K1 is not relevant to protective actions for the public. Tr. 3524 (Mileti). 305. FEMA agreed that the LILCO Plan, which does not contemplate the use of K1 for the general public, is in complete accord with the New York State plan for other nuclear power. plants within its borders. FEMA Ex. 5, at 41. FEMA further stated that it is both unnecessary and inappropriate to disseminate via the media information which is of no direct value to the public. ,l d . 306. We agree with FEMA that the information about Kl is not relevant to the 'public at large, and, absent the detailed explanation suggested by Dr. Mileti, such information could create undue anxiety in the public mind. Since it is the policy of New York State not to recom- i mend distribution of Kl to the general public,. we believe that this is just l the sort of irrelevant or extraneous information which would be confusing and conflicting if disseminated indiscriminately. Hence, we do not find this a flaw in the Plan. or in the performance of personnel at the ENC. 1 307. Contentions EX 38.), L, M & N all concern the performance of O ENC personnel at press conferences. Specifically, Contention EX 38.J f L -- - - _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ -
- 111 - .,s asserts generally that LERO personnel were unable to respond satisfactorily or accurately to questions about evacuation, or provide timely accurate data concerning traffic conditions during the press conferences. Contention EX 38.L asserts that the ENC had ' inaccurate information on the gravel truck incident, and Contention EX 38.M concerns inaccurate information regarding the fuel truck traffic Impediment. Contention EX 38.N asserts that ENC personnel misstated !
facts and provided inaccurate information. , 1 308. A transcript of the news conferences was provided at { Attachment P to LI LCO's Testimony. LILCO took the view that the reporters' dissatisfaction with the information available stemmed from the ilmitations of the scenario itself since there ' was no independent field verification of events available in a simulation. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 35-36. It is also LILCO's position that the effectiveness of an entire public information system cannot be judged on isolated questions or bits of information; rather it is the overall performance that is important (For example, was essential information disseminated to public in a timely ! manner? Was a news center activated to deal with the press? was consistent information given out?). Id,. at 37. 309, in reviewing the news conference transcripts, it is clear that information about both plant conditions and the general flow of events was available at the ENC. LlLCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, Attachment P. In fact , the LERO spokesperson did answer questions about the water portion of the EPZ (id,. at 38), what was being done (or not done) for the correctional facility (id. at 39), what was being done by the Nassau O County Police (id. at 40-42), and traffic conditions (Id. at 43-44). I
- 112 -
\
( 310. Interveners do not dispute that such issues were, in fact, addressed in the press conferences; they assert, however, that the information provided in response to press questions was inadequate and non-responsive. Evans, ej al. ff. Tr. 3786, at 97-101. However, we find that what was covered in the press conferences were the protective actions that were recommended for the public, and Interveners' complaint that LILCO cnly answered questions which were asked and only gave the press information that it requested (Tr. 4150-51, (Saegert)) was an artifact the the Exercise itself, interveners' speculation on what might take place during a real emergency (Evans, et al. ff. Tr. 3786, at 102-103) is not supported by the record of the press conferences themselves . 311. Contention EX 38.L asserts that the ENC log recorded that the gravel truck impediment was being removed at 12:01, when no equipment had yet arrived at the site, hence the ENC had inaccurate information > which would have misled the public if it had been released. 312. This information was never released to the public, and ! therefore did not impact the public health and safety. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 44. Similarly, the announceraent at the ENC between 12:47 and 1:07 that the gravel truck had been removed, though 'it was actually removed at 1:30, would not have greatly affected the public, especially as the EBS messages being broadcast advised evacuees to avoid i l the location in any case. M.; Tr. 3545 (Robinson). Nv l [ l I
Y I F n - 113 -
+
( 313'. . Contention EX 38.M asserts that at .the 1:48 press conference, LERO ' personnel were not able to respond to questions about the- fuel truck impediment. In fact, at the outset. of that news conference the
> LERO spokesperson announced a fuel truck blockage of Route 25A, with traffic being - diverted. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 44-45. At
- issue here 'is - the lack of . additional detalis about the' condition of the l-truck, that is, whether it is ' overturned or broken down. Evans, et al.
ff. Tr. 3786, at 97-98. 314 We agree with LlLCO that in terms of information available to evacuees, whether ' the truck was overturned or broken down mattered little, since traffic was being diverted around the blockage and the public was so informed. 315. Contention EX 38.N cites three examples of LERO personnel misstating facts and providing inaccurate information regarding the time the plant was shut down','the time a SAE was declared and the size of the winter versus the summer population of the EPZ. 316. We do not find the three examples given of any consequence. The time of the SAE was at 8:19, and the spokesperson's statement that it was at 8:23 is not relevant to the public's protective action decision-making . LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr.- 3206, at 46. This is also true as to the time of plant shutdown, whether it was' at 5:15 or 5:40.
,l d_. Similarly, the size of the winter versus the summer population is also not an issue, especially since the correct figure for the total number of I expected evacuees was also provided in the statement. M.
1
.O
,s 1 -a l , l
- 114 -
7 i i
\ -317. '. interveners cite two other examples, one of a Dr. Brill stating Inaccuracies 'at - the- press ' conference _(Evans, . et al. ff. Tr. 3786, . at 93), and assert that the LERO spokesperson gave an inaccurate answer with regard to protective actions for the public during the first news conference '(g. at 81-82).
318. There is rio serious dispute about the fact that Dr. Brill did give some inaccurate data to reporters at the ENC regarding the sheltering factor for the EPZ and his calculations of dose projections. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, Attachment P. LILCO's witness pointed out, however, that the purpose of a news center is- not to prevent people from saying contradictory things, but rather to have them in a place so you lknow what- they -are saying and can cope with it. Tr. 3573 ( Robinson) . . Additionally, LILCO's witness, Mr. McCaffrey, testified that the news ' manager subsequently reminded the press of the correct protective action and noted that Dr. Brill's opinion was his independent opinion, not the official position of LERO. Tr. 3572-73, 3576 (McCaffrey) . 319. Intervenor witness, Mr. Evans, was of the view that anything _ said by Dr. ' Brill . would be rendered meaningless if his association with LILCO was known.- Tr. 4062 (Evans). Mr. Evans also testified that the
' correct LERO response to Dr. Brill would be for the LILCO (sic. LERO) spokesperson to reiterate the evacuation recommendation. Tr. 4063 (Evans).
320. Rather than a flaw in the Plan, we find this sort of incident illustrates exactly what a news center is designed to be, that is, a place O i
i i
- 115 -
[ )j'.
' 'V to centrally collect information and ' attempt 'to cope with inaccuracies and i
misstatements. 321.- Similarly, during the first press conference, the LERO j spokesperson stated the only protective action recommended so far was for schools to remain closed and did not mention the directive concerning placing dairy animals on stored feed. Tr. 3468-69 (Robinson). ' We agree l with interveners that this may be an incomplete answer regarding i protective actions, but since the actual recommendation was broadcast on the EBS in a timely manner, we do not find omission of this at the press conference particularly troubling, especially in a geographical area that 'is not heavily populated by dairy farmers in any case. PID, 21 N RC ' 644, 876. 322. None of the testimony presented on these subparts leads us to conclude that the overall performance of personnel at the ENC was so deficient as to provide substantial enough conflicting or inaccurate or unreliable information to the press that the EBS messages would be disregarded by the public. Overall, the press was. given the same information as to what actions the pubile should or should not take as was being broadcast over the EBS, and the ENC functioned in a manner consistent with the concept for such operations contemplated by NRC Regulations. No fundamental flaw was shown.
- 323. Contention EX 38.0 concerns the media monitoring function of .
i l l personnel at the ENC, and alleges that there was a delay in giving 1 up-to-date press releases to them. Media monitoring is a part of the O rumor control organization that monitors how the media are reporting the d 1
- t. - - __________d
l l I
- 116 -
]
t
,, ! {
El accident. They listen to and tape radio and television broadcasts and keep logs which are reviewed by LILCO and LERO personnel to determine if the media is disseminating any information that is inconsistent with LILCO or LERO statements. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 47. Like rumor control, this is an on-site function. g. The media monitors would hear the EBS broadcasts, and could also see and hear the joint news conferences, since a television monitor for that purpose is in the media monitoring area. M.at48. We do not find an instance of a delay in providing press releaf es to the media monitors as evidence to support a finding of a fundamental flaw in the public Information program of the Plan. 324. Contention EX 38.P alleges the rumor control operation was ineffective, which is the subject of Contention EX 39. Consequently, we address this issue in our findings on that contention.
- 3. Conclusion 325. Based on the evidence before us, we conclude that operations at the ENC on the day of the exercise did experience some problems in timely providing the media with written copies of EBS messages and press releases. We decline, however, to find this as a fundamental flaw in the Plan. We are not persuaded by the evidence that the news media was, in fact, provided inaccurate or inconsistent information in such a way as to adversely affect public information or intervene with information contained in the official EBS broadcasts of protective action recommendations.
[' Clearly, there is room for improvement in the operations to ensure the f N
(
- 117 -
p smooth flow of Information.. While thei media may never be satisfied with enough information (Tr. 3526 (Patterson)), we cannot find that an intelligent and sophisticated body of Journalists would behave in the-manner described by' Interveners _(eg. Evans,- tet al. Tr. 3786, at 45-46, 85, 103-104). We do not' find that the evidence of ENC operations during the exercise supports a ' predictive finding that during a real emergency, LERO's implementation of ENC functions would have a detrimental impact on . the public health and sa fety. As a result, Contention EX 38's assertion of a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan is rejected. B. Contention EX 39 326. Contention EX 39 asserts the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that LILCO is incapable of dealing with rumors or responding to public inquiries during an emergency. Specifically, the various subparts allege the rumor control operators had out-dated information on the status
.of the emergency and protective actions recommendations (Contention EX 39. A); there -was a lack of prompt response to inquiries (Contention EX 39.8); and the operators were unable to give accurate or reasonable advice or information in answering inquiries (Contention EX 39.C).
-327. The P'lan provides for the public to call LILCO Customer Relations District Offices and Customer Call Boards to obtain information, and if the operator is unable to answer the question from information immediately available, the operator is to call Rumor Control at the ENC.
The Rumor Control Supervisor then consults with the Emergency News l Manager who refers the inquiry either to the appropriate LERO or LILCO i O
e y b
- h18 - . ,/-
5U) source.- ' LILCO Testimony,' ff. Tr. 3206,' at 5'2-53:' see also Evans , et al. a ff. Tr. 3786, Attachment 13, 328.. It is interveners' position that the Rusor Control function of the Plan!is an integral part of the public information prog /am and would be Jammed. with calls upon broadcast of the first EB5 at 6:52 a.m. j Evans, et _a.l ff. Tr. 3786, at 110-112. This, they maintain, would be at 9 1
'least as important as the!EBS messages. On the other hand, LlLCO M.
considers the; Rumor Control function as primarily one of monitoring potential rumors and dispelling them by sending the correct information ; i out through the media. LILCO Testimony, ff. TrL. 3206, at 51, 329. It is of secondary importance to broadcasting EBS messages to the public in a timely manner and providing press conferences and releases to the raedia. M. 330. While there is no specific regulation regarding rumor control, r. NUREG-0654 6 ll.G.4.c states, as guidance, that "Each organization shall establish coordinated arrangempots for dealing wit,h rurriors." Thus, the issue here is whether such coordinated arrangements eNist and whether they. are adequate to deal with rumors. We do not subscribe to Interveners' theory, however, that this function is as important as the EBS messages themselhu. The only concern that we have is whether information garnered from rumor control operators. would substantially contribute to inaccurate information being disseminated to the public, or whether the rumor control operators were ineffective in dispe!!!ng any ) I perceived rumors. l ( i i l l n i 1 x_
i a- - 119 -
,O )
- 1. __ Contention EX 39. A 331.. ' FEMA cited .
Rumor Control function as a Deficiency, due to i the slow distribution of EBS messages to rumor control from the LERO g public Information ' officer resulting in provision of out-dated protective
)
action information. FEMA Ex.1, at 53. Specifically, during a test call to a rumor control operator, the rumor control operator gave out outdated q Information that only zones A-M, Q and R were to be evacu.ited, when a a general evacuation of the of the entire EPZ had been broadcast via the EBS an hour and a 15 minutes earlier. g. : FEMA Ex. 5, at 47. 332. FEMA' testified that it -was the combination of delays in getting EBS messages and press releases to the media and rumor control person-nel that in combination resulted in a Deficiency. Had rumor control had proper information and given it out promptly and correctly, the hard copy problem wculd not have been, by itself, a Deficiency. Tr. 8578 (Keller, Kowleski). 333. FEMA also testified that many of the asserted inadequacies are in 'part artifacts of _ the Exercise since all of the EBS broadcasts were i 7 1 simulated, whereas in a real emergency the broadcasts would be made and i the district offices and call boards would have access to the information by monitoring the EBS stations. FEMA Ex. 5, at 50. In the Exercise, distribution of the information had to be made by other means (i.e. , written hard copy). M. 334. LILCO conceded that on the day of the Exercise there was a j logistical problem in getting news releases copied and telecopied to all , l l- offices, due to the copier breakdown. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at ) \ m LILCO testified, however, that the revision to the Plan provides 59-60. i i i ________-__L
f Lf" 120 -
. [\ \ '~ - for simultaneous transmission of news releases and summary sheets to the ENC rumor control components, and they are also provided with LlLCO and LERO press kits containing background Information on the Shoreham plant, the EPZ, radiation, and nuclear energy in general. M. at 56.
335. While we agree with Interveners that if the rumor control operators during a real emergency responded to public inquiries with outdated protective action information which conflicted with an EBS message some confusion would result, we find that the result during the Exercise. was more a function of the inadequate state of preparedness on that date, than predictive of the actual result in a real emergency. We find that the actions taken by LILCO to obviate extensive copying requirements and for direct transmission of EBS information to Rumor As a result, we Control Operators to be appropriate corrective ection. find no fundamental flaw.
- 2. Contention EX 39.8 336. Contention EX 39.B asserts that the rumor control persoanel were unable to give prompt responses to inquiries, citing 13 examples where responses took from 29 minutes to over an hour. FEMA testified that the Plan functioned as designed, and a correct response, though delayed is better than either no response or an incorrect response given immediately. FEMA Ex. 5, at 51.
337. Interveners maintained, however, that callers would not wait for responses during a real emergency, but would refuse to listen to or follow the EBS Instructions and act on their own pre-existing fears l Mstead. Evans, ej al,. ff. Tr. 3786, at 129-130.
nry e. , f i 15 . T +
\ ,l .j. '
i g /,fr (3 - - (,
* - 121 -
r ,
' 9 ,0 33.W. LILCO lp61nted out that great care must be taken Os make sure l
j ; that no one is given incorrect info 7mation, and there can be no hard and 1 q fast rule on how much time is needed to' properly respond to inquiries,
- u. j i ' - since most questions are very specific. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 60, , ,
y,
-339. . Given the types of inquiries cited in, the cont.entions, such as t
questions rega/r'ing whot to do with animals or what.about food supp!!as, we agree tliat accurate aaswers are necessarh, and if / the public was concerned enough to call, no doubt it would wait on a response, absent available informatiorp te, answer the slS et!fic inquiry elsswhere. We do
;i ,
think, however, that it is essential that the rumor control personnel have basic information on radiation, the ENZ, the Sitoreham plant, and appropriate ' protective actions readily at their disposal to alleviate fears that inspired the caffehs in the first piece, The remedial actions described by LILCO appear to address these matters and no fundamental flaw is shown. LILCO TeStsnony, ff. Tr. 3206, at (O.
- 3. Contention ,EX 39.C
, 34 Contention EX 19.C asserts that the rumar control personnel ?. provided trNccurate information and demonstrated poor judgment in L responding to questions from the public. The centention. subpart lists e seven examples frc>n which tr#1s conclusion is drawn. 3fil . Three of the exarnples dealing with out-of-date info mation available to rumor control were due to the lack of timely information being i l 3 j' )/ distributed to the operators due to the copier problem. FEMA Ex. 5, at o . 4
- 122 -
, l V 53-54; LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 69. This is partly what led FEMA ~ to assess a Deficiency against rumor control at the ENC. ,l d . 342. Other . examples, however, are not borne out by the facts. For example, the caller who was sending ' trucks into the EPZ wanted to know how extensive the evacuation would be, but that Information was not available to anyone without access to the scenario at the time the call was made. FEMA Ex. 5, at 52. Similarly, the . response to the caller inquiring about lobsters caught in the morning was' correct and accurate. Id. If caught in the morning, the lobsters could not be contaminated by a release that did not begin in-plant until 11:30. ,ld. at 53. 343. Likewise, .the advice given ,in response to the " Dan Rather question" was appropriate, given the operator s interest in being responsive to an inquiry from the press. ,ld at 54. Finally, the actual response to' the caller concerned about transportation was to provide a number where the information could be had, since the office called was closed due to the evacuation. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 67-68. 344. We do not find overall that the responses provided by the rumor control personnel demonstrated poor judgment, although there were Instances of not having timely data as to the actual status of the emergency. However, the EBS system would have answered a number of the inquiries and it is difficult to imagine how the few isolated instances cited here would impact a significant portion of the population as would the broadcast of EBS messages, coupled with live coverage of the press conferences. 345. Hence, we find Contention EX 39.C to be without merit. O i j l
- 123 -
f
- 4. Conclusion 346. Overall, we agree with FEMA that operation of the Rumor Control function in the LILCO Plan was deficient the day of the Exercise, in- that accurate, timely and pertinent information was not . readily available to the operators for responding to public inquiries. However, we do not think this rises to the level of a-fundamental flaw to the extent that the public health and safety would be compromised by the Inaccu-racles cited in the contention.
C. . Contentions EX 22.F and 44 347. Contention EX .22.F and the first sentence of Contention EX 44 were admitted and consolidated with Contentions EX 38 and EX 39 in our Prehearing Conference Order of October 3, 1906. Together these j l contentions assert that as a result of LILCO's inability to provide accurate, clear, consistent and non-conflicting information to the public (as asserted in Contentions EX 38 and EX 39), there would be a substantial evacuation shadow in the event of a .Shoreham accident i (Contention EX 44). This voluntary evacuation of persons would occur in { l light of (a) the contents of the EBS messages, (b) the contents and timing of press advisories, (c) the rumor control activities, (d) con-flicting and inconsistent information and press reports, (e) preexisting fears of the population, and (f) LILCO's lack of credibility (Contention EX 22.F). ) l 348. The issue of an evacuation shadow phenomenon was previously i I l' litigated in the emergency planning proceeding that considered LILCO's i i / Plan, ard our findings regarding this issue are set out in some detail in l l I L_____.____..____
i
- 124 -
,-}
\s' our Partial initial Decision on Emergency Planning. Long Island {
Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 1 21 NRC 644, 655-671 (1985). Therefore, we do not intend to revisit the I substance of that issue here. What is pertinent regarding the Exercise, however, is our conclusion regarding the evacuation shadow phenomenon:
..We therefore expect a diverse spectrum of popula-tion response in a radiological emergency. Some will refuse to evacuate when advised they should. Some will take time to be convinced and will evacuate later than advised. Many will follow instructions, and some will evacuate when not advised to do so. Our finding of rationality, however, compels the conclusion that the public will consider the information it receives and will react predominantly in a manner that is consistent with the advice given....a rational pub!!c will behave predominantly in accordance with public information that is disseminated at the time an emergency happens, it will not react by following some predetermined tendency that urges a shadow 1 1
evacuation . . . .The Board's ultimate finding on this contention strongly depends on there being clear non-conflicting notice and instructions to the public at the time of an accident, if for any reason confused or conflicting information was disseminated i at the time of an accident, the Board accepts that a large excess evacuation on Long Island could materialize. _Id. at 670.
- 1. The Poll Data 349, in support of these contentions, interveners introduced the f results of a poll conducted by Dr. Steven Cole, President of Social Data i
Analysts, Inc., in which the actual EBS messages used in the Exercise were paraphrased and read to a small sample of Long island residents, i Evans, et al. ff. Tr. 3786, Attachment 14. According to Dr. Cole, the g EBS messages were redrafted by him because the actual messages were I (, long, filled with jargon, had parts that were irrelevant and would not l l
L l
- 125 -
y
- a. )
U Influence. the' response of people, and had terms that he thought people L would find confusing. Tr. 3847-48, 4114-15 (Cole) . Thus, the questions u were written leaving out what he considered repetitive, confusing or unnecessary information. g. 350. The results of this poll purport to show that a substantial number of Long Island residents would evacuate their homes upon hearing the first EBS message broadcast at 6:52 a.m. concerning the declaration of an alert at the Shoreham plant. Evans, et al. ff. Tr. 3786, at' 159. Specifically, some 53% of households living outside the EPZ and 62% of households liv!ng inside the EPZ would attempt to evacuate. M. , Attachment 14, at .11. b It was Interveners' position that while the survey itself does not show there are any inconsistencies in the EBS messages', the fact that people responded by saying they would not follow the instructions indicates the messages were confusing. Tr. 3857 (Cole). In fact, Dr. Cole testified that is the primary basis for his conclusion that the messages were unclear. Tr. 3858 (Cole). 351. It appears that Dr. Cole's present survey is not statistically i sound and lacks predictive value. A random sample is one in which every member of the population surveyed has an equal opportunity to be included. Tr. 4164 { Cole), it is only by means of a random sample that one may estimate population parameters from sample statistics. Tr. 4165, 4183 (Cole) . Dr. Cole testified that he conducted a random survey of households by telephone. Tr. 4161, 4165 (Cole) . This survey was 17/ To the extent people evacuate hours before the recommendation to
~
evacuate is given, there would be fewer people evacuating and less q[ congestion after the recommendation is given. j V} I I 1 I
--------------_--__a
- 126 -
\v conducted between 5. and 10 p.m. when persons working- during those hours, such as policemen, hospital workers, and retail store employees, were not at home to answer the phone.- Tr. 4166-68, 4180-83 (Cole).
The survey was also' not random as it excluded 'many completed calls, because the heads of household reached were not of proper gender to give the male-female balance desired. Tr. 4169-71, 4190 (Cole) . The fact that 14 to 20 percent of the households in the areas called had more than one phone also adversely affected the randomness of Dr. Cole's survey as those households would be more likely to be called. Tr. 4164-65, 4176-79, 4183 (Cole) . Although Dr. Cole stated he assigned various weighting factors to account for multiple listings and oversampling in the EPZ, the basis for the assignments of these weight is not readily apparent in his testimony. See Evans, g al. , (f. Tr. 3786, Attachment 14, at 47-48 and Table A-3, in sum, Dr. Cole's testimony has little value. 352. A review of this poli data and the questionnaire used in the survey shows that it does not substantially differ from the previous polis conducted by Dr. Cole in the earlier proceeding. See, e.g . , 2i NRC 644, 663-664. Interveners , however, maintain that by using the information from the actual EBS messages used in the Exercise, although not citing the full text of the messages, the survey is valid because it used the information that would be available at the time of an accident. Intervenor Findings No. 654, at 473. l 353. We do not agree. To begin with, we note that in redrafting the EBS messages for the questionnaire, Dr. Cole left out information O telling people where to look for further information (i.e. , the pubile l [ - - _ - - - _ _ - - - _ - _ _ _ _
- 127 -
O information brochures, telephone book inserts , etc . ) . Tr. 3796-97 (Cole) . - The questions also did not refer to the " emergency broadcast system" and did not mention consulting with others. Tr. 3792-94 (Cole). 354. It it. clear that the questions, while based on the EBS messages, nevertheless do not rise to the level of providing the situational information that would actually be available during an emergency. The public information brochures have not been mailed to residents of the EPZ. Tr. 3814 (McKleskey). Consequently, once again we are faced with a predictive poll which only shows what projected response is likely if no information were disseminated. Thus, as we found earlier with regard to the predictive findings of public opinion polis, the residents of Suffolk and Nassau Counties do not now have the additional information that respondents wou!d need to determine their actions in an emergency, and use of the severely truncated EBS messages In the questionnaire does not cure that defect. See, 21 NRC 644, 666-7.
- 2. Focus Group Interviews 355. This same defect also hampers the " focus group interviews" conducted by Dr. Cole. See, Evans, et al. ff. Tr. 3786, at 172-177, 194-197, 201-213, 216-218, 220-222. Even here, the EBS messages were edited, and not played verbatim. Tr. 4125 (Cole). Further, the focus groups did not take account of the fact that there would be information other than the EBS messages available in a real emergency. Tr. 4074
( Cole) . 356. In addition, two different sets of transcripts of these inter-h views which show substantial differences were provided as LILCO exhibits
l. l s
's
- 128 -
I 5-7 and 8-10. Dr. Cole testified that the tapes' were indeed hard to follow and transcribe because people were talking all at once. Tr. 3905-6 l (Cole), in . order to properly interpret the tapes Dr. Cole pointed out that one' needed to be present at the actual interview, so he did the moderation himself and relied on his memory of what transpired at the sessions . In reviewing the transcript. Tr. 3922-29, 3935-39 (Cole) . Dr. Cole further admitted the accuracy of the survey and focus group results cannot be precisely determined. Tr. 3942 (Cole). 357. As a result of these limitations noted supra, we do not find the information from the focus group interviews provides us with reliable evidence and we decline to give it any weight.
- 3. The EBS Messages 358. Interveners also maintained that the EBS messages themselves were not clear and understandable, and they contained loconsistent and vague information which would confuse the public. Evans, et al. ff. Tr.
3786, at 188-218. This analysis was based largely on the data gathered from the focus group interviews, however, and given our determination regarding these results above, we give it little credence. 359. Dr. Miletl testified that emergency public information character!stics that help most people perceive risk more accurately in an emergency include such factors as specificity, consistency, accuracy, certainty and clarity. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 11. The information should include the location of the risk, what people should do and how much time they have before they should do it. It should be distributed over diverse channels and be repeated frequently, and
la ( i
, 4
- 129 -
p 1 disseminated from a source that enhances officiainess, credibility, and familiarity. Id. 360. A review of the EBS messages themselves confirm that in large measure these . characteristics are appropriately addressed. LILCO < Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, Attachment B. We do not find the examples of I " inconsistency" cited by Interveners to be either significant or confusing. For example, EBS #2 states a minor release of radiation has occurred. It continues with recommended pubile action, including advice that schools should implement their early dismissal plans, but that this does not mean a release of radiation is imminent. Id. We agree with Dr. Mileti that while the message could be improved, the public safety would not be adversely affected simply because precise data regarding a minor release was not provided. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 15. 361. Similarly, EBS #7, which stated the thyroid dose was 40% of the EPA guidelines at 10 miles downwind of Shoreham and recommended evacuation of persons within the 10-mile EPZ, but not for persons outside the EPZ, was cited by Interveners as inherently incredible since the population of Long Island does not accept a 10-mile EPZ as a meaningful concept in terms of radiation risk. (Intervenor Findings at 462, Evans, et al., ff. Tr. 3786, at 280-81: Tr. 3844, 3867 (Cole)). While we agree that his information. could benefit from additional supplementation as to why there was no risk for people outside the EPZ, we do not agree that the message is inherently incredible without this information. 362. We therefore find no significant deficiencies in the EBS i messages. . O I y i 1 1
- 130 -
73 i Nj 4. Preexisting Fear of Radiation 363. We accept that pre-accident fear of radiation exists in the general population. 21 NRC 644, 662. We disagree, however, that this is the overriding determinant of public behavior in response to a radiological emergency, as !ntervenors would have us believe. g. : see also Tr. 3640-42 (Cole). In any case, if the Interveners are correct that 62% of the population in the EPZ would leave their homes at 7:00 after the first EBS broadcast, this would logically seem to efiminate some of the l projected traffic congestion for .the remaining 38% of the population who would not attempt to evacuate prior to a recommendation to do so, which was not broadcast until 10:24, some 3 and a half hours later for zones A-M, Q and R, and 12:00 for the remaining zones. FEMA Ex.1, at 2f Table 1.2. 364. The impetus for our emergency planning regulations is to enhance dose savings. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company, et al,. , (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1), ALAB-727,17 NRC 760, 770 (1983). Since the population at risk would have already removed itself in the scenario postulated here by Interveners, we do not believe this basic goal of emergency planning would be seriously compromised.
- 5. Press Advisories and Rumor Control Activities 365. Finally, we have previously addressed the issues surrounding press related activities at the ENC (Contention EX 38) and rumor control activities (Contention EX 39). While we did find that operations at the ENC could be improved, we did not find that substantial conflicting or l
l /O inconsistent information woula be disseminated to the detriment of the h 1
. . _ _ -- = _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1:
- 131 - ..
-J fy
( ,/ public. We did find -that the rumor control activities could present a l l problem for a small segment .of the population if inquiries did not give out
}
consistent information. Even assuming such problems were to arise, we find such evidence insufficient to support a finding that substantial shadow evacuation would take place upon the first broadcast of an EBS message.
- 6. Conclusion 366. We see no reason to set aside our earlier determinations with-regard to the shadow evacuation phenomenon. Nothing from the Exercise of the LILCO Plan leads us to conclude that the notice to the public would be unclear or conflicting in such a way as to make the public act irrationally, in a real emergency, substantially more information will be -
available to the public than the EBS messages alone; there will be press coverage, and public information would be disseminated in 'the form of brochures and mallings. We do not think consider: tion of the EBS messages in a vacuum as presented here by Interveners is a true indication of what the public response would be. Therefore, the Board finds Contentions EX 22.F and EX 44 have no merit. 1 D. Contention EX 40.C 367. Contention EX 40.C asserts that the EBS evacuation advisory issued at 10:24 (EBS message #5) included information that Traffic Guides would be in place to provide assistance when, in fact, Traffic Guides ; were not in place at the time the message alred. Issuance of a false and ! misleading statement, it is said, would substantially increase the likelihood , m
,_ 1'32 - ;f thatJ none of the other emergency information would be believed by the public.
368. The actual' statement in' the EBS read "You will be directed l along evacuation routes by' trained traffic guldes who know which way, you should go." LILCO . , Testimony , ff. Tr. 3206, Attachment B. interveners maintained' the pub!!c would interpret .this statement as
. meaning that Traffic Guides would be on the roads to give them directions and tell them' where they are supposed to go. Evans, et al. , (f. Tr.
i 3786, at 244. ,1 369. There is- no dispute that Traffic Guides were not in place at 10:24,. but were; being dispatched when the message was read.- The goal of mobilization' is to have the guides at their posts at about the time
~
1 congestion begins to develop on the roads within the EPZ, approximately I one-hour after the evacuation recommendation. LILCO Testimony, (f. Tr. l 3206, at 71. See also Findings 110, 125, 128. 370. In fact, during the Exercise, there were delays in Traffic 2 ! Guides reaching their posts. (See Findings on Cont. EX 40, supra.) However, we do not believe that the public would either be alarmed or confused by the absence of Traffic Guides along the side of the roads at various intersections, especially since these guides would not be directing l J
- traffic. See, 21 NRC 644, 790-795.
371. We agree with FEMA that the message would be better if reworded to indicate Traffic Guides were being dispatched to assist evacuation traffic. FEMA Ex. 5, at 70. However, we do no find that j i this statement, even if interpreted by the public as suggested by j l 4 l
- 133 -
V- Interveners, would lead the public to conclude that the EBS Information was wholly incredible and not'to be trusted. E. Contention EX 49.C 372. Contention EX 49.C alleges that substantially more people than the Plan assumes . would seek monitoring at the relocation centers upon
' hearing the EBS' advisories. which recommended reporting to the Nassau Collseum to be monitored for possible radiactive contamination.
373. We note with regard to the timeline here that the first evacua-tion advisory for zones A-M, Q and R was broadcast at 10:24 a.m., and the general evacuation advisory for the entire EPZ was broadcast at 12:00 noon. The first EBS . advisory regarding monitoring for residents of several zones was not broadcast until after 1:31. See FEMA Ex. 1, at 26,' Table 1.2. 374. Interveners based their conclusions regarding this " monitoring shadow" upon the same data from the. survey and focus groups introduced in connection with Contentions EX 22.F and EX 44. See Evans, et al. ff. Tr. 3786, at 279-81 and Attachment 14. We decline to give this much weight here for the same reasons discussed with regard to those contentions, supra.
> 375. Further, Dr. Mileti testified that the real problem is not getting people who are safe to be monitored, but getting people who are at risk to utilize the service. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 88, and discussion 86-95 infra. We agree with Dr. Mileti that shadow evacuation and. monitor.ing shadow are not the same behavior. g.
i [ 4
q
- 134 D 376.- [Hence, we are not persuaded that 'a large monitoring shadow a
would . naturally flow from a shadow evacuation, even if one did materialize
- on Long Island. We - find ' Contention EX 49.C - wholly lacking In merit. .
XI. CONTENTION EX 47 '- Registration, Monitoring and Decontamination of Special Facility Populations. 377. Contention. EX 47 states in part: The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in : the LILCO Plan in that LILCO failed to demonstrate the. ability . to - register , monitor _ and decontaminate evacuees from~ special. facilities who are transported to reception centers other than the Nassau Coliseum, or
< that such . activities'. could be accomp!!shed within 12 hours .as required by NUREG 0654 9 II.J.12. Thus,-
LILCO has' not satisfied objectives FIELD 13 and ' 21, and the ' exercise precludes a finding, that the LILCO - Plan - complies with 10 CFR 9 50.47(b)(1), (b)(8), (b)(10) and NUREG-0654 9 ll.J.9,10, and 12. 378. Contention EX 47, insofar as it seeks to litigate matters. not within the scope of the Exercise as conducted, including not only registration, monitoring and decontamination of institutionalized- !- mobility-impaired individuals, but also school children who would be
' transferred;to separate facilities, as well as Plan revisions of procedures not tested in the Exercise, goes beyond the appropriate scope of this l proceeding, which is limited to demonstration of fundamental flaws revealed by the Exercise.
379. First,- the FEMA Testimony (FEMA Ex. 5, at 25) clearly states that the February 1986 Exercise objectives did not include any l-
' demonstration of registration, monitoring or decontamination of evacuees from special- facilities. who would have been transported to reception centers other than the Nassau Coliseum. See also the testimony of Mr.
Keller for FEMA, Tr. 8532, to the same effect. Indeed, Suffolk County 1 l
- 135 -
p agrees .that LILCO ' did not attempt to demonstrate monitoring or , decontamination of special facility populations (Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 21). Since the functions alleged by Suffolk to be flawed were in fact never exercised, it follows that the Exercise did not disclose - a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan in regard to those functions. 380. Second, Suffolk County's reliance on the FEMA evaluation criteria and FEMA's field objectives 13 and 21, as relating to Contention EX 47, is misplaced. Contention EX 47 relates to evacuees from special facilities who are transported to the reception centers other than the Nassau Coliseum. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 4. FEMA field objective 21 refers to registering , monitoring and decontaminating evacuees at the Nassau Coliseum (FEMA Ex.1, at 15). FEMA field l l objective 13 pertains to demonstrating resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of institutionalized mobility - impaired individuals. FEMA Ex.1, at 14; FEMA Ex. 5, at 26: Tr. 8532 (Keller). Neither field objective 13 nor 21 requires registration and monitoring of 4 mobility-impaired persons at the Reception Center and not doing so during the Exercise is not a fundamental flaw in any emergency plan. i M. Thus Suffolk County has misunderstood or misstated the purpose and objectives of FEMA field objectives 13 and 21. 381. Similarly, although the LILCO Plan calls for evacuation of school children to pre-designated reception centers, this activity was not within the scope of the Exercise objectives. See, Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 17. The requirement to designate reception centers for special facilities is adequately treated in the PID. See 21 NRC at 840. l
\
1 i A ( v
1-
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C 382. Contention EX 47 was admitted to permit Suffolk County to prove' that a demonstration of registration, monitoring , and decontamination of the Institutionalized mobility-impaired as well'as school children was necessary for the public health and safety apart from any-other demonstration of registration, monitoring , and decontamination. Prehearing Conference Order, October 3,1986, at 28. Suffolk County's testimony argues, essentially, that loved ones must. be able to locate
.special ' facility residents after an accident. Harris and Mayer, ff.
Tr. 2992, at 19. Certainly this is desirable. Suffolk County, however, makes no showing that the registration that LILCO did at the Nassau Coliseum would not be effective if performed elsewhere where the institutionalized mobility-impaired and school ' children would be taken. 383. Suffolk County also urged that records must be kept. I d_. Again, however, Suffolk made no showing that the record-keeping at the Lessau Coliser performed by LILCO and observed by FEMA would not be adequate to protect the public health and safety if performed at facilities specifically designated for the mobility-impaired. 384. Again, to the extent that Suffolk County has pled and attempted to show that FEMA's exercise review procedures are defective, this is a matter beyond the purview of this proceeding. 385. Finally, to the extent Contention EX 47 (Subparts A-E) seeks to litigate Plan revisions not exercised on February 13, 1986, see Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 22-34, the proposed revisions and the contentions which relate to them raise planning issues outside the scope of this proceeding, and need not be further explored here. O I
I e
- 137 '-
o 7 D 386. ;In short, the Licensing Board finds that the absence during the . Exercise of LERO registering , monitoring and decontaminating of special facility populations was not a fundamental flaw in the LlLCO emergency plan. Suffolk . County misconceives the scope of this
- Exercise-related proceeding, and the purposes of FEMA field objectives.13 L and. 21, which do not require simulation of monitoring of mobility-impaired at facilities other than the Nassau Coliseum as alleged by Suffolk County.
And finally, the Licensing Board finds that the evidence does not establish that .the public health. and safety require a demonstration of registration, monitoring, and decontamination, other than that which was performed at the Nassau Coliseum. The Licensing Board concludes that there is no merit to Contention EX 47. Xil. CONTENTION EX 22.A - Use of the Nassau Coliseum as the Reception Center , 387. During the exercise, the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum was used as Reception Center to which general population evacuees from the EPZ would be directed for registration, monitoring and decon- f tamination if necessary in the event of an emergency at the Shoreham ' facility. Since the Exercise on February 13, 1986, the Nassau Coliseum as a Reception Center has become no longer available for such use. See i LILCO Finding No. 301. Contention EX 22.A alleges, in pertinent part:
"The exercise scenario and FEMA's conclusions ... are all based upon an assumption that the ... Coliseum is available for use ... as a reception center..." and goes on to assert that since the Coliseum is no longer an l
available reception center FEMA's conclusions regarding the Exercise and l 1 The Contention raises the issue d LILCO's emergency plans are not valid. l
- 138 - .whether. the present; unavailabliity of. the Nassau Coliseum is a fundamental 1 flaw. In LiLCO's emergency plan. Evidentiary presentations .were made by- Suffolk County, LILCO and FEMA.
388. The Licensing Board observes, as did the previous Licensing.
. Board, that Contention EX 22. A does not plead a fundamental flaw in the LiLCO Plan which was revealed by the Exercise. $ The Contention was admitted to permit Suffolk County to prove, if it could', something uniquely important about the Coliseum qua the Coliseum that made its withdrawal from.- use as a Reception Center a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan.
389. To support its Contention EX 22. A, the County introduced the testimony of medical doctors, David Harris and Martin Mayer (following Tr. 2992). The County's evidence completely ignored the premises and caveats in the Licensing Board's October 3, 1986 Order admitting Contention EX 21. A. ' Doctors Harris 'and Mayer presented no evidence that there ' was anything unique or important about the Coliseum, as verses any other physical structure, that made its absence a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan relating to Reception Center functions. See Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 36-40. On this basis alone, the Licensing Board finds that .there is no merit to Suffolk County's Contention 22. A and dismisses it. The Licensing Board's decision is also supported by weighing the evidence introduced by the parties upon this contention. That evidence is briefly summarized and analyzed below, l 1 ' 18/ Prehearing Conference Order, October 3,1986, at 14. l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9
- 139 - ! ) Doctors Harris and Mayer have no education or experience in N' 390.
evaluating radiological emergency exercises or the activities that were or simulated at the Coliseum during the exercise performed : (Tr. 3013-3017) . They provide no testimony that would make the Coliseum as a Reception Center any different from any other large facility which could be used as a Reception Center. Their prefiled testimony states: it cannot be said that an ' orderly evacuation' can be accomplished or that such a capability has been demonstrated , if there is no facility available to be the end point of the evacuation...in the absence of a facility and the capability of performing those health-related services, there is no basis for a conclusion that an orderly evacuation would or could be implemented. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 39. 391. However, this testimony is little more than the witnesses' Ipsi dixit that without a facility for use as a Reception Center, that function Sa$not be accomplished. It does not address the issue admitted, nor the 3 adequacy of LERO's demonstration of the activities to be performed at the Reception Center. 392. No evidence was introduced to impeach or impugn the FEMA findings as to the adequacy of the demonstration of Reception Center functions. Pertinent parts of FEMA's findings relating to use of the Nassau Coliseum as the Reception Center are set out below: RECEPTION CENTER The Reception Center at the Nassau County Veterans Memorial Coliseum was excellent for control of contaminated , uncontaminated , and unmonitored The Reception Center was evacuees and vehicles. fully mobilized by 1015, approximately one and
;g) one-half (1.5) hours after the staff was Approximately three hundred (300) called.
people were ( ,/ 1 i l l
- l. ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _
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/
/-3 4
(/ # activated initially and a roster was available demonstrating the capabilities for twenty-four (24) hour staffing. Over one ' hundred (100) people were - actually registered and monitored , and were decontaminated (simulated) if necessary. Procedures for monitoring evacuees were generally good, but on several occa-sions personnel- monitoring took considerably longer than the time set forth in the LERO procedures. Proper dosimetry was avaliable and constantly monitored. Personnel were aware 'of does authoriza-tion ' limits. FEMA Ex . 1, at xvill, x1x; see also 79-81. FEMA testified at the hearings that "An orderly evacuation does not depend on the specific location of a reception center (s) to which evacuees are directed" (FEMA Ex. 5, at 21). The LILCO witnesses, John A. Weismantle, Elaine D. 1 Robinson, and Richard J. Watts, all with some considerable expertise in emergency planning , supported the FEMA position (talLCO Test. Contention 21. A following Tr. 2690, at 7 and Tr. 2747 (Robinson)). 1 393. Thus, weighing the evidence, the Licensing Board finds that the present lack of use of Nassau Coliseum as a Reception Center does not vitiate LILCO's demonstrated ability organizationally to staff and maintain a Reception Center. There is no evidence that makes the Nassau , I Coliseum uniquely necessary to LILCO's Plan as verses any other potential Reception Center. The reliable, probative, and substantial evidence is clear that Nassau County's withdrawal of the Coliseum as a Reception Center some four months after the February 1986 Exercise is not a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. The Board finds that there is no j merit to Suffolk Contention EX 22. A and it is dismissed, b
p;L z p< '
.141 -
u. &e p b (, ' Xill. ' CONTENTION' EX 49 - Excessive Monitoring Times-c; 394.- Contention' EX 49, in . essence, maintains that "the Exercise
. revealed a fundamental flaw. In the LILCO Plan as. LiLCO'is incapable of
~
performing; necessary. registration and radiological monitoring of. evacuees within 12 - hours as required by NUREG-0654, 9_li.J.12." Contention 1
' EX 49 was'- admitted on the basis "that the time to' monitor each person-was allegedly. shown by the . exercise to be far longer than - [the 90
~
p
- seconds]' planned for" (Prehearing Conference Order, October 3,1986, at
- 29).
395. Dr. Mayer from. Suffolk County testified that "many times"
. (Tr. 3033) it took 4 .to 5 minutes to monitor a person at the Colls'eum.
The basis. for ' Suffolk's prefiled testimony assertion that radiological l monitoring frequently took up .to five minutes per evacuee was the FEMA . Post-Exercise - Assessment (FEMA Ex.1, at 80). Harris and Mayer, - ff. Tr. 2992, at 44.. However, the Licensing Board's review of the. Assessment shows that FEMA found that "on several occasions" monitoring took approximately _4 to 5 minutes per individual. FEMA Ex.1, at 80-81. 396. LILCO's witnesses on Contention EX 49 testified that three l Federal evaluators were in line and that monitoring - them took between 4 and 5 minutes. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 2690, at 9. At the Reception Center over 100. persons were registered and monitored. M. Thus, while the Contention asserts that monitoring " frequently" took up to five minutes per evacuee, and Dr. Mayer testified this occurred "many times", the evidence offered by FEMA and LILCO establishes this .] 1 occurred only as to three persons, all Federal evaluators. ,ld.; Tr. 2778 I i o.,
1 i
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i L
'V (Watts) . FEMA Ex.1, at 80, 81. All other persons were monitored in L about 90 seconds. Tr. 7932-85, 7729 (Keller).
397. The Licensing Board finds that Suffolk County's contention that monitoring took far longer than'the planned target of 90 seconds per I person was not substantiated. The Licensing Board further finds that-only three of the more than 100 persons monitored took longer than the targeted 90 seconds. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 2690, at 9 Tr. 7729 ( Keller) . I
.398. FEMA'. cited this as an Area Requiring Corrective Action and recommended . additional training of monitoring personnel assigned to the Reception Center. FEMA Ex.1, at 81. However, such a citation does not indicate a fundamental problem, and the Licensing Board finds that the excessive time the LERO personnel took to monitor three Federal evaluators, in contrast to other people, at the Reception Center is not a fundamental flaw in LILCO's emergency plan. As did. FEMA, the Licensing Board recommends that LILCO provide additional training to I
personnel who will engage in radiation monitoring at all planned reception centers. 399. Contentions EX 49. A and 49.B allege, respectively, that LILCO is not capable of monitoring the 100,000 evacuees projected by the Exercise to arrive at the Reception Center and did not demonstrate its procedures for obtaining back-up monitoring resources. Suffolk County, FEMA, and LILCO all addressed these allegations very briefly in their { 1 I i l
l
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prefiled written testimony El and we may simliarly dispose of these l . issues in summary fashion. E l 400. Suffolk County claims, without substantiation, that the alternate monitoring procedures were different from those actually used in the Exercise, and that no INPO personnel participated in the Exercise. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 50. 401. However, LlLCO described how the procedures for expedited monitoring (of the driver, and the car hood and wheelwell) were demonstrated and how obtaining additional monitoring resources was demonstrated by simulation. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 2690, at 10-11. LILCO also noted that the INPO personnel to be relied on had actually been contacted as recently as January 30, 1986. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 2690, at 12. 402. The FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment states the salient facts: The Supervising Decontamination Leader informed his staff of the anticipated increase in numbers and implemented (simulated) an alternate plan which is available to handle evacuees in excess of the thirty-two thousand (32,000) planned. This alternate monitoring plan (OPIP 4.2.3, Section 5.11, Page 16-17) provides for the monitoring of the wheelwells and hoods of vehicles and the hands and thyroid area of drivers of all vehicles arriving at the Reception Center to reduce the time needed to process groups of evacuees. Also, the Supervising Decontamination Leader contacted the LERO EOC to make arrangements for additional monitoring personnel to be provided by other support organizations (i.e. , the institute for
-19/ Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 50; LILCO Testimony, ff.
Tr. 2690, at 10-12; FEMA Ex. 5, at 31.
-20/ The number of people expected to be monitored is before another Licensing Board (OL-3), and it is expected that Board will make a determination of the number of people for whom monitoring is to be provided.
C/
- 144 -
l.
'l Nuclear Power Operations, DOE, etc.) and the estimated arrival times for these additional personnel were provided by the LERO EOC. However, the alternate evacuee monitoring plan for the Reception Center was not evaluated at this exercise.
FEMA Ex.1, at 80-81. 403. Suffolk County states that, because none of the called-upon agencies ' supplied additional personnel, this is a major flaw in LILCO's emergency plan. Harris and Mayer, ff. Tr. 2992, at 50. The Licensing Board finds that the failure of INPO, DOE, Brookhaven and 'others to participate in the Exercise and provide additional live personnel to assist in radiological monitoring was not part of the Exercise and does not constitute a fundamental flaw in the LILCO emergency plan. 404. The Licensing Board finds that there is no merit to Suffolk County's Contention EX 49 or any of its subparts. XIV. CONTENTION EX 50 - Training A. Scope of Contention 405._ Contention EX 50 essentially alleges that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that the emergency planning exercise showed that there was insufficient training to assure the Plan's implementation. As noted in the text of the Contention (see Attachment A to LILCO's Proposed Findings), the PID on the sufficiency of the LILCO Plan found that "the LILCO Plan training program meets the regulatory standards." However, the PID went on to state: { 1 This conclusion is made subject to confirmation by a j finding, to be made by FEMA after a graded exercise, that the Plan can be satisfactorily implemented with the training program submitted and that LILCO
, possesses an adequate number of trained workers.
V , l l
I
- 145 -
O LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644', at 756. In admitting Interveners' training program contention in this proceeding, we acknowledged our earlier reference to this .two-step review process, noting that the "the exercise was to be the vehicle that would confirm the adequacy of LILCO's training program." Prehearing Conference Order, October 3, 1986. In this second ' stage of the process, we focus on the adequacy of the training in light of personnel performance in the Exercise'. M.at30. We also noted that "[t]he only issues of interest in this proceeding will be whether flaws specified in the bases occurred in the exercise and if so whether they collectively point to a fundamentally deficient training program." M. Interveners' contention asserts that " virtually every error", but particularly the " Deficiencies" and " Areas Recommended for Corrective Action" ("ARCA"), cited in the FEMA Report, " disclose fundamental flaws in LILCO's training program which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency." Intervenor Suffolk County has organized its contention into nine subparts (A through il grouping the alleged training program deficiency bases (FEMA-cited Deficiencies and ARCAs and problems otherwise enumerated in cited contentions) according to the following training concepts:
- 50. A - ability to respond to unanticipated and unrehearsed situations l I'
likely to arise in an emergency 1 i t 50.8 - knowledge of and ability to implement the plan and procedures
- 146 -
w ,
.. X ability. to. communicate information: (1.e. , to provide, obtain or .-
50.C 3 4 seek it) { 50.D . ability to follow directions of superiors [{ l 50.E ' ability to, exercise independent ; Judgment and common sense. :
; (, . o . ,
In emergency . situations or in implementing the plan and procedures
;i 50.F - ability ' to provide ' Information to the media ~ in a timely , '
1 accurate and consistent fashion i 1 50.G - failure to train non-LILCO employee personne! who will be .f; i relied upon i O j i
'\
'50.H ' lack of understanding of dosimetry, exposurgicontrol, use of
>g
.,KI, and related matters
,50.1 proposect modification of training "using matarlais and ro'cedures used previous)y, will not correct flaws revealed in the .
l exercise. 1 B. Standard of Proof 406. 'in examining the adequacy of LILCO's training program one must look to the provisions of the regulations dealing with training, l principally 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15), and the criteria employed by the NRC f~ and FEMA to evaluate compliance I with that skandard, contained in .i% i
., )
!i s
~&
- g t
- 147 -
h[7 l< f Paragraph IV.F. of Appendix E to Part 50 also
'( NUREG-0654, Rev. 1.
\. o l T , establishes required elements ' of training, particularly those relating to l L the participation in training and drills, and the testing through exercise
. of the implementation of procedures, equipment, communications _ and l
L notification. i l l 407. As we have noted above, however, at this stage we ne )
- 4. looking not so much at whether the LILCO training program meets each
\
aspect of the regulatory standard , inasmuch as we have previously l subjected the program to extensive scrutiny, and found it adequate, with certain specified reservations. At this juncture the focus is on the 1 Exercise, to see if the Plan can and will be implemented in the event of an emergency, or if th'ere are systemic or pervasive problems which raises legitimate doubt as to whether there is reasonable assurance that in l the event of an emergency, adequate protective measures can and will be taken. In examining the merits of the training contention, we have focused on performance of LERO personnel during the Exercise not to find whether mistakes have been made. We fully would have expected numerous mistakes in an initial FEMA-graded exercise. Rather, we have examined the allegations of widespread failure to implement the Plan to see whether the errors in performance fit a pattern which raises substantial I doubt as to whether the training program as conceived and implemented by LlLCO is adequate to assure that the Plan would be effectively t- implemented in a real emergency. Existence of such doubt would Indicate
.w that the training program was fundamentally flawed.
q.' 408. Suffolk's witnesses stated that a fundamental flaw in the LILCO training program means the existence of " extremely significant problems in 9
l i
- 148 -
the LILCO training program -- problems, indeed, which relate to whether LILCO's personnel are or can be tralned sufficiently to implement the i LILCO Plan." Suffolk Testimony, S. C. Ex. 95, at 35-36. See also, i Interveners' Findings 8-19. However, Suffolk County's witnesses repeatedly emphasized the signiScance of each Individual performance error during the exercise, noting that no such error should be I considered trivial. See, ej. , S. C. Ex. 95, at 39, 40. It placed emphasis on specific acts and the understanding of specific persons of how the individual task fits into the overall workings of the plan. _Id. at 40, n.18. 409. LlLCO defines a fundamental flaw as "a pervasive, systemic, conceptual flaw in a plan . . . substantially affect [Ing] the public health and safety" which is not readily co rectable by equipment or training or straightforward plan changes. LlLCO Proposed Finding 21. According to LILCO, the proper unit of analysis to determine whether a " pervasive, systemic or conceptual flaw" exists in the training program isthe LERO i organization. See Tr. 8917 (McKleskey); Tr. 4980 (Mileti, Lindell) . l Although there was no disagreement between the parties that organiza-tions only function through Individuals, id_. , LILCO continually 1 emphasized that, because of redundant and diverse means of accom-plishing tasks under the Plan, Individual performance errors can be compensated for either by back-up individuals performing the same task, or by detecting the existence of a problem and arranging for alternate means of dealing with it before it has spread or has irreversible consequences. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 13-14 (Lindell, Mileti). LILCO's thesis therefore is that the structure of the organization and
.[
f V
- 149 -
m , , l \ _) Plan " assures tna*1 Importet goals will not be threatened by individuals falliag to report for duty or ptrforming tasks incorrectly." ,l d . tee also Tr. 5044-45 (Lindell, Daverlo!. p 410. Lil CO maintains that the ramification of this distinction in
- @, ' ' approach is that the level of effectiveness of the training program and
,xg the level of performance ' required of individuals may be allowed to be low in certala specific respocts because rpecific performance failures may have insignificant consequences. Tr. 5061 ( Lindell) . Thus, in. assessing
- whether a fundamental flaw in the training program exists, LILCO looks not so much for a pattern of individual flaws tg draw inferences about the
/ training program, as does SuffolM County, but rather looks to whether the organization! objective was performed through back-up means (persolnci, equipment, or otherwise). Sej, Tr. 5524 (Daverio). For individual performance errors to be significant, they must, according to
/
LILCO, lead to severe, irreversible consequences. Tr. 5049 (Lindell).
,411. In the Board's view, it is not only getting the task done right that r!gnals effective training , but the understanding of how the individual act fits into the large picture. S. C. Ex. 95, at 40, n.18.
/ Such individual understanding was, considered significant in the study of
'ihe LERO organization performed by LJLCO's witness, Dr. Mileti. LILCO .
i Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 14 Ydthout such understanding , one l cannnot be sure that the person will get the task right in the future, when circumstances may be somewhat different. Second, patterns of l
, I individual conduct may reveal inadequacies in training, even where an Individual performance error has no or trivial consequences. Therefore, f% >/
\
- _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ ~
i J
- 150 -
$r y j
() we do not' limit our inquiry to individual behaviors which themselves have significant consequences. 412. It may be true, however, that redundancy and diversity of methods for achieving emergency response objectives affect the level of individual performance required. As LILCO itself noted, without back-up mechanisms and redundancies, the training program may not be adequate. Tr. 5065 (Lindell) . As a result, we have looked to see whether such redundancy or diversity for accomplishing functions can in fact be relied upon. 413. The' criteria for whether a " fundamental flaw" exists in the training program cannot alone depend upon whether the flaw was not correctable or rendered the plan unworkable. See, Tr. 5132 (Mileti). As LILCO itself notes, all emergency planning problems are ultimately correctable. Tr. 5192 (Mileti) . Rather, the appropriate question is whether the mechanisms put before us indicate that problems have been identified and can and will be corrected, so as not to interfere with the I adequacy of emergency response. 414 In sum, the question is whether the training problems identified in the contention are pervasive or systemic in nature, indicating a breakdown of the training program which would preclude us from finding there to be reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. L [. ! l L L
~ _ _ _ _ _
- 151 -
.m
'I ~C. ' Evidence Considered -
415. Suffolk County,. LlLCO, and FEMA submitted written direct I testimony on Contention EX 50. See S.C. Ex. 95; Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368; FEMA Ex. 5. Reports of the post-exercise LERO drills were
" contained as Attachments 7-9 of S. C. Ex. 95. Summary a*1d explanatory documents related to analyses performed for LILCO interpreting the FEMA' Post-Exercise Assessment and comparing it to other exercise assessments was contained in Attachments C-F of the LILCO direct testimony. Both Suffolk County and LILCO introduced into evidence numerous volumes of exercise reports from other facilities, as well as observer forms and other documents created during the Exercise and post-exercise drills. Working documents supporting the comparative analyses performed for LILCO were also admitted. We reviewed the qualifications of the witnesses who testified and found them quallfled in their areas of expertise and their ~
testimony credible, except as noted below. 416. LlLCO's testimony presented three different analyses based on the data in the FEMA Report in an attempt to show that, notwithstanding the deficiencies which FEMA cited, the " training program effectively trained persennel to carry out their emergency jobs." LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 8. While the materials supporting the comparative ,
, analyses fill a large part of the record, the Board found these efforts to be of relatively little value in addressing the contention and determining whether a fundamental flaw had been shown to exist. Inasmuch as LILCO Y
- 152 - l
[ ) j
'd does not place substantial weight on these analyses in their proposed l findings, the Board does not further deal with them. b 417. While Suffolk County relles on the factual data provided by .
FEMA's observation of exercise performance, the specific subparts of 21/ These analyses include a study by Ms. Goodkind and Mr. Behr
~
comparing the results of the Shoreham exercise with other exercises in FEMA Region 11 (LILCO Test. Cont. EX. 50, ff. Tr. 4368, at 27-32, Attachments C, D), a " Critical incident Analysis" by Mr. Pursell (Id. at 21-27, (S.C. Ex. 52) Att. E), and a study by Drs. Mileti aiid Lindell of LERO's organizational effectiveness (id. , Attachment F). The Goodkind/Behr analysis compared the incideTce of FEMA-graded deficiencies and ARCAs, and training citations in the Shoreham FEMA Report to their incidence in other FEMA Region 11 exercise reports. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 27-32, Attachments C and D. According to these witnesses, the number of ARCAs and Deficiencies for the Shoreham exercise, 47, compared to an average for 16 other exercises of 42. Id. at 29. More Deficiencies were found in three other exercises, aTd more ARCAs were found at five other exercises. Id. The witnesses' tabulation of training citations by category found' that there were five categories of training where training problems were found, compared to an average of 6.4 areas for the 16 other exercises. -Id. at 30. From this review, LILCO concluded that the Shoreham trElning program was as good or better than at other evaluated plants. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 31. The Board cut short cross-examination on this testimony, but allowed both the testimony and the exhibits offered by both parties concerning other exercises to be admitted into the record for purposes of background. See Tr. 5241, 5248-49, 5359 (Frye). There is simply no basis for treating the number of Deficiencies and ARCAs given at an exercise as fungible items which may then be valldly compared with the number of Deficiencies and ARCAs given by FEMA at another exercise. LILCO acknowledges in its proposed findings that the Goodkind/Behr study can at the most be used for background material and cannot provide a basis for findings on whether there were fundamental flaws in the training prog ram. LILCO Proposed Finding 460; see also Tr. 5359. Similarly, LILCO > acknowledges "that the critical incident analysis is too subjective for us to rely on ir the context of this proceeding." LILCO Proposed Finding 490. The third LILCO study--on the organizational structure of LERO--is only relied upon by LILCO to show whether the problems in training demonstrated during the Exercise were capable of correction. See LILCO Proposed Findings 455-56. The conclusion drawn by LILCD is "that the organizational structure is j (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) V)
- 153 -
/% (V) Contention EX 50 focus directly on what Interveners contend the LILCO training program must be able to accomplish if there is to be reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures will be taken in an emergency. Chief of the functions which interveners contend must be accomplished are: training LERO personnel to "think on their feet" when confronted with unanticipated events and problems (50. A, 50.E), training LERO personnel to know and follow the Plan in a timely and effective manner (50.8, 50.D), and training LERO personnel to be able to communicate effectively within the organization, and with the public (50.C, 50.F). Suffolk County also contends that specific instruction has been ineffective relating to protection of LERO and other personnel from radioactive exposure (50.G, 50.H). Finally, interveners contend that modifications to the Plan fall to address the fundamental problems identified by the Exercise (50.l) b 418. To find that a fundamental flaw in the training program exists, it must be established that one or more of the foregoing functions are i essential to implementation of the Plan, and that the training problems (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) likely to be effective" and "that the LERO training program produced an organization with high potential for effectively l I responding to an emergency, and therefore the training program could not be fundamentally flawed." Id. Again LILCO has not maintained that the study is other thaT indirect evidence of the , j efficacy of its training program and it is not relied on here as a basis for concluding that a fundamental flaw does not exist. 22/ in their proposed findings, interveners characterize a three step
~
hierarchy of tralning -- basic knowledge, fearning by doing, and reacting to the unexpected. Intervenor Proposed Findings 767, 806, 844. s
l l
- 154 -
t
/" '( shown are so pervasive or systemic thist we must find that the LILCO training program "has . failed in its mission." See Prehearing Conference Order, at 30.
D. Training to React to the Unanticipated /Use of Good Judgment (Contentions 50. A, 50.E and 50.F) 419. LILCO has not contested the importance of training LERO personnel to be able to react appropriately to unanticipated situations during an emergency, and to use good judgment when facing problems which are not specifically covered in the plan or procedures. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 34-40. It is LILCO's position that nearly everything that transpired during the exercise "had an element of surprise." M.at34. In LlLCO's view, Exercise participants did not know in advance the time events would occur, the areas to be evacuated, the sequence of the accident, the free play messages, the field locations they would be assigned , and so on. M. LILCO found no " systemic basis" for concluding that LERO workers were unable to respond to unanticipated and unrehearsed events. g. at 36. Focusing its attention mainly on LERO's response to the free play roaa impediment messages, LILCO noted that, given the lack of training on removal of road impediments, LERO
" recognized the need to keep evacuation traffic flowing and, in fact, accomplished that in an appropriate fashion". Id. at 38.
420. Suffolk County focused its presentation somewhat more broadly, directing our attention not only to the adequacy of response to road impediments, but more generally to events or situations which were l. f i not directly covered by previous training, ruch as the free play messages, breakdowns in equipment, in communication, and mistakes made
I-T - 155 - m 3 t, Q by the ' players in ' carrying ' out their roles Las examples of a generic .
' training problem. See ' Contention EX 42; 5.C. Ex. 95, at 56-57, 61 et
, seq., 68 et seq. At the heart of the Suffolk County contention.is that in an ' emergency it can be expected that mistakes will' be- made and things
~
L
. will go wrong in' ways which cannot be anticipated; thus, the training program must prepare LERO personnel to d'eal' with such an eventuality.
Tr. 6389-90, ~ 6429, 6442 (Perrow); Tr. 6572, 6619 ' (Evans); . Tr. 6611 (Rowan). In Suffolk Country's view, such situations require personnel to' rely on . their experience, knowledge. and common sense ' to improvise and adjust their response. S.C.; Ex. 95, at 57. Training can help prepare for the unanticipated by placing the emergency workers in realistic situations during training. ,l d . at " 80-84; . Tr. 6392 (Streeter); Tr. 6393-4, 6400-1 (Perrow); Tr. 6397 (Colwell); Tr. 6766,- 6769-70 (Cosgrove) . 421. Suffolk County maintains the LERO's reactions to these free play messages involving evacuation traffic impediments, its response to unexpected events and inquiries in dispensing public information, 'and several other exercise occurrences showed that the LERO training had not prepared LERO workers to deal with unexpected events. 1 '. Impediment Free-Play Messages - 422. As indicated in Findings 161 and '162, two free-play impediment messages were introduced by FEMA controllers at the LERO EOC on the morning of. the Exercise. FEMA Ex. 1, at 30, 36. One involving a gravel truck was inserted at about 10:40, the other involving a fuel 1 g truck, was inserted at about 11:00. M. The details of what then ) j i
j- --156 - I
^! k occurred and the basis upon which FEMA found a Deficiency .with regard to the LERO response to these impediments are set out in ' connection with Contention EX 41. - See Findings 134-232.
423. Although Suffolk County sought to show that the Exercise was extensively rehearsed, Tr.'6665 (Streeter); Tr. 8292 (Keller), it appears that LERO did not anticipate and did not train for dealing with' major road impediments requiring re-routing of traffic. Testimony, ff. 4368, at 38; Tr. 5493 - (Daverio); Tr. 5483-4 (Weismantie) . While LILCO argues that LERO responded to the impediments effectively, LILCO concedes that "the Evacuation Route Coordinator failed to perform his assignment as effectively as he could have by falling to transmit all' of the information on the originai free play messages and by failing to inform his co-workers l and superiors of the accident. . . " Jd. at 36; Tr. 5490, 5632-33
.(Daverio); see also - LILCO Proposed Finding 222. LILCO witnesses observed that the Evacuation Route Coordinator failed to appreciate the severity of' the accident or its consequences and did not use good 1
Judgment. Tr.'5549 (Weismantle); Tr. 5628 (Daverio); see also LILCO Proposed Finding 237. Of the five possible causes of performance failure identified by Dr. Lindell - sslection, equipment, facilities, materials and training (Tr. 4994-5 (Lindell)) -- we can identify no significant role of any factor except training. 424. However, LILCO argues that in a real emergency other workers, the County police or the media would have seen the impediments and the delay in response caused by the Evacuation Route Coordinator's keeping the message to himself would have " virtually eliminated the delay (
\
experienced in the Exercise." Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 37. LILCO l - _ - - - - - - - -
- 157 -
/%.
(' witnesses point to the availability of others to detect and report the l impediment as an example of diversity and redundancy rendering this i l performance error insignificant. Tr. 5497 (Daverio, Weismantie); cf. Tr. 5634 (Weismantle) . Moreover, LILCO witnesses noted that during the
).
response to the impediments LERO players showed good judgment in their response. Thus, when it was recognized that a traffic impediment existed, LERO players devised a re-routing scheme in consultation with the traffic consultant to keep evacuation traffic flowing. Testimony, ff. j Tr. 4368., at 38. LILCO also noted that ti.e Traffic Guide at Traffic Control Point #40 reacted appropriately to the rerouting order for the fuel truck by requesting an additional traffic guide and six traffic cones. Tr. 5503 (Weismantie): Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 38, 39. Finally, LILCO notes that the problems were correctable by straightforward training. Tr. 5493 (Daverio); See Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 39. 425. Suffolk County disagreed with this assessment of the ramifications of the performance failures. Suffolk County's testimony focused on the lengthy delays in responding to the impediments, and the inadequacy of that response when made. S.C. Ex. 95, at 62-65. The testimony pointed to problems which were not related to the artifice of the simulation and not limited to the Evacuation Route Coordinator: lack of follow-up to ensure instructions were being carried out, lack of use of . 1 redundant communications to ensure that communications got through, and lack of verification that the appropriate responsive measures were taken. M. at 65-66. Tr. 6673-75 (Zook). When a delay in dispatching the Route Spotter to the site of the fuel truck impediment was caused by the need to brief him, alternate means of rapid verification were not ! j l i b
fs L - 158 - p 3: attempted. ' FEMA Ex. 1,. at.37, 38. Well after the 12:13 " prompt" of ' E Evacuation Coordinator, the Transportation Support Coordinator had not been informed (as of 12:40) that one of the bus routes was blocked by l the gravel . truck Impediment; and as late as 13:48 the Road Logistics - Coordinator had not been informed of the need to send equipment to the site of the fuel truck impediment. FEMA Ex.1, at 36. Interveners claim appropriate road clearing equipment was not' provided in the case of the gravel truck impediment because those responsible for ordering the equipment to the impediment did not ' request sufficient ' details on the n'ature of the impediment. FEMA Ex.1, at 37; Tr. 6682-83 (Colwell); but see FEMA Ex. 5,' at 75, n.i . Similarly, as noted by FEMA, the fact that
'the. fuel truck was leaking,. the fact that there was the possibility of fire, as well as the fact that both shoulders were blocked were not included in-the ' initial LERO message to the Route Spotter / Road Coordinator. FEMA Ex.1, at 30.
426. LILCO, in its testimony, and in its follow-up drills, treated the' problems as showing that LERO personnel were not adequately trained in procedures for dealing with road impediments which. require re-routing of traffic. See S.C. Ex. 95, Attachments 7-9. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at' 39 (training for re-routing not included due to improbability of accidents blocking traffic); Tr. 5633 (Daverio). The major training response made by LILCO was to place more emphasis on dealing with major traffic impediments, both by creating the position of Traffic Engineer to give advice on re-routing strategies and by introducing one l l or more major road Impediments in each of the post-Exercise drills.
~
Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 39; S. C. Ex. 95. , Attachments 7 - 9; FEMA j
.5 l 1
- 159 -
(gm) Ex. 3, at 1 of 16. As described in the above cited drill reports and in v both LILCO's and Suffolk County's testimony, many of the same problems experienced during the Exercise plagued the drills. See,. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 68-72; S. C. Ex. 95, at 95-98, Attachments 7-9; S. C. Ex. 87; Tr. 5758-59, 5784-86, 5804, 5847 (Behr). 427. The intense post-Exercise training on major road impediments would seem to make it less likely that LERO would encounter such pervasive difficulties in future exercises or in an emergency. In addition to adding the position of Traffic Engineer to assist in developing alternate routing strategies, procedures have been changed to improve notification, verification, and internal communications. FEMA Ex. 3, Table 3.1, at 1 of 16, 2 of 16. In connection with Contention EX 50.I, LILCO argues that these efforts show a big improvement in response capability and in the training program, while Suffolk County argues, based on the errors encountered in the post-Exercise drills, that the same sorts of difficulties occurred as the day of the Exercise. See Testimony ff. Tr. 4368, at f: M; S. C. Ex. 95, at 93-98. 428. As noted above, FEMA found the response to the road impediment messages to demonstrate a Deficiency in the ability of the LERO organization to effectively communicate internally, and recommended additional trainin,g in this area. FEMA Ex. 1, at 37. The response to the road impediment messages was seen by FEMA as one of several breakdowns in the LERO training program. FEMA Ex. 5. at 73, 75; Tr. 8284_ (Kowleski); Tr. 8285, 8542-3 (Keller). FEMA found the impediment response as evidence that, at the time of the Exercise, the LERO training program was inadequate, Tr. 8298 (Keller), and LERO managers unable to .\
i
-- 16 0 -
adequately handle unexpected situations. Tr. 8300 (Keller). FEMA did not evaluate the post-Exercise drills, and FEMA re-assessment of the current status of the training program must await another exercise. l Tr. 8318-19 (Kowleski). 429. The weight of the evidence on LERO's response to the road impediments during the Exercise supports the Contentions EX 50. A and 50.E that LERO personnel are not sufficiently trained to effectively deal I with unanticipated events which have the potential to disrupt the taking of effective protective actions. See Tr. 8300 (Keller, Kowieski).
- 2. ENC and Rumor Control Response to Unexpected Events and Inquiries _
430. The thrust of Suffolk County's cciatention in regard to training for the distribution of information and for rumor control is that LERO personnel were not capable of responding effectively or of using good Judgment when confronted with unexpected events or inquiries (covering three subparts of Contention EX 50 - 50. A, 50.E, and 50.F) . First, Suffolk County argues that, like the road impediments, the breakdown of the copier is an example of something which will likely go wrong during an emergency, which will require personnel to improvise and find alternate means of accomplishing functions. However, in addition, Suffolk County argues that failure of rumor control operators to promptly respond to inquiries shows that such personnel were not adequately trained to handle unexpected inquiries. S. C. Ex. 95, at 68-69, 74-75 n.41, 173, 179; Tr. 6442 (Perrow); Tr. 6611 (Rowan); Tr. 6572 (Evans). 431. With respect to providing timely information to the media at the ENC, Suffolk County points to the inadequacy of information provided to l
l. 1
- 161 -
l m l \ The () the LERO spokesperson at the ENC. S. C. Ex. 95, at 74-75 n.41. spokesperson, according to Suffolk County witnesses, should have "been on the phone or used other means to obtain all the pertinent and up-to-date facts relating to [the impediments] in order to report them to the media." M. Suffolk County faults LILCO for relying excessively on EBS messages directly to the public and ignoring the role of the media. Id. at 179. Similarly, with respect to the use of out-dated information by rumor control personnel, Suffolk County states LERO "should have come up with a different way of getting the information since the copier machines and the computers were not doing the job." M.at69. 432. LILCO argues that whatever problems may have exhted as a result of the copier breakdown, these were caused by failures in equipment, not in training. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 57. In addition, as argued in connection Contention EX 38 and EX 39, LILCO testified that failure to provide hard copies of EBS messages and press releases had no significant effect on public information because such hard copy information is "at best, a tertiary means of providing information to the pu blic. " Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 58. See also LlLCO Testimony on Contentions EX 38 and EX 39, ff. Tr. 3206, at 20, 22, 29. Similarly, LILCO argues that the copier problem did not prevent rumor control from responding as trained. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 58. Moreover, in its Contention EX 39 testimony, LILCO argued that only one rumor surfaced that needed to be addressed, one regarding whether the plant could blow up. Testimony, ff. Tr. 3206, at 56. The remaining calls LILCO characterized as questions, not rumors significantly affecting public D response. Id. at 51, 69. LILCO's position, therefore, is that even ( ! V)
- 162 - j though there were copier problems, notification of the public concerning the need to take protective actions was not significantly impaired.
Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 57. 433. In the FEMA Report, FEMA found that, as a result of insufficient copying capabilities at the ENC, delays in distribution of information resulted in (1) hard copies of EBS messages not being provided to the media in a timely manner, and (2) rumor control personnel not being able to answer questions received from the public ? because they had not been given accurate up-to-date status reports. FEMA Ex. 1, at 53. This was cited as a Deficiency finding . M. Specifically, FEMA found that due to time delays in posting of EBS messages in written form, reporters did not have an accurate or timely picture of protective action recommendations which had been made to the public. With respect to the impact on rumor control, FEMA noted that some one hour and thirteen minutes after broadcast of an EBS message announcing evacuation of the entire EPZ, a rumor control operator still only had available information indicating a partial evacuation. ,i d,. However, the FEMA Report does not identify this problem as relating to training, FEMA Ex.1, at 53; and on cross-examination, it was treated by FEMA as an equipment problem. Tr. 8285 (Keller). 434. We agree with FEMA's assessment. Even assuming there was a breakdown in public information at the ENC, Suffolk County does not demonstrate the problems created by the lack of printed information at the ENC could have been compensated for by actions taken by ENC 7 personnel. As a result, we do not find that the failure to take alternate steps to provide the media with up-to-date information was attributable to (] V
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(,) a failure to train ENC personnel to "think on their feet." Similiarly, with respect to use of out-dated information by rumor control, no alternative is suggested, and none readily comes to mind. Moreover, modifications to the Plan to provide less cumbersome procedures for getting up-to-date information to rumor control centers should speed up response times. See, LILCO Testimony on Contention EX 38, 39, ff. Tr. 3206, at 21. While we would agree, in general, with Mr. Rowan, that if there is an i inability to deal with unanticipated problems, having a dozen copiers is not a solution, see Tr. 6611 (Rowan), the evidence before us on this subject does not support his premise. As a result, we do not find in connection with problems associated with the breakdown of copying A machines at the ENC that LERO managers demonstrated a lack of training to respond to unexpected events. 435. Finally, we turn to the contention that the training program failed to adequately train rumor control operators to answer inquiries from the public. Suffolk County cites a number of examples which are i asserted to show poor judgment in the answering of inquiries from the public: whether lobsters caught off the Shoreham jetty were safe to eat, , whether a person should send his " trucks going to Suffolk", and whether it was advisable to give directions to a TV crew on how to get to the plant. S. C. Ex. 95, at 70-74,154-155. As noted, supra, in connection j with Contention EX 39, FEMA found that the responses given were accurate, based on the information available. See FEMA Ex. 5, at 52, 53, j
- 54. The responses of rumor control to these inquiries do not demonstrate l poor judgment. Even were it assumed , however, that these particular examples showed poor judgment, they are not of such significance in the V
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f _ ( overall. scheme of public information as to preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that the public information function can be accomplished. b
-3. Other incidents Relating to Use of Good Judgment or " Thinking .
on Your Feet" 436. Suffolk County also raised numerous other ' problems as supportive of its position that LERO personnel were unprepared for unanticipated events and problems, and did not exercise good judgment in such situations. See Contention EX 50. A, 50.E, S. C. Ex. 95, at 87-92, 151-159. We have reviewed each offered basis. Of ~ the numerous incidents cited by Suffolk County in its testimony, we have found only a handful of examples not already discussed above which show either a poor ; reaction to an unanticipated event or problem, or failure to use good judgment. 437. One such incident, in which a radiological field monitoring team stopped within the plume to report its dose assessment data, showed poor judgment. S. C. Ex. 95,'at 89, 153. However, it appears that the unnecessary exposure was minimal. This incident was cited as an area recommended for improvement by FEMA. FEMA Ex.1, at 51, 52. 438. A second problem was the failure of the secretary to the Director of Local Response to take messages from calls received over a l
-23/
In light of the fact that the adequacy of the rumor control function
.was admitted as part of Contention EX 50 and testimony on the matter was fully adduced, we do not view the fact that rumor control J is an onsite training function, a point raised by LILCO (Testimony, 1 ff. Tr. 4308, at 58) as barring findings on training on this .
function. There is adequate authority in the law for reforming the ] q (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PACE) U
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I' ! (v./ ) dedicated phone line directly to the Director when he was out of the command room. S. C. Ex. 95, at 91; FEMA Ex.1, at 31. This also was cited as an area recommended for improvement. FEMA Ex. 1, at 42, t 439. Yet another problem involved failure to decontaminate an evacuee's hand prior to putting on anti-contamination gloves. The evacuee was also instructed to put bootles on his feet while his hand was still contaminated. Id. at 81; 5. C. Ex. 95, at 153. This incident also was cited as an area recommended for improvement. FEMA Ex.1, at 81. a40. The above incidents seem to be isolated mistakes, not particularly consequential, and not indicative of a pattern relating them to a training breakdown. 441. On the other hand, there were several examples during the Exercise of LERO workers reacting to problems experienced in implementing the plan with good judgment. In this category are the use of telephone notification when four LERO workers failed to use the automatic verification system (FEMA Ex. 1, at 28; S. C. Ex. 95, at 90); the use of second floor telephones to make emergency notifications at the Patchogue Staging Area, when use of first floor telephones was insufficient (FEMA Ex.1, at 61 -- cited as an ARCA because procedures precluded use of the second floor; Tr. 5538-9 (Daverio)); and consulta-tion with the Traffic Engineer on re-routing of traffic (Tr. 5503, (Weismantle)). (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) l l l pleadings to conform with the proof; nevertheless, we have treated ! this function as part of the contention, and therefore no reformation of the contention is required. }
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i ) 442. Suffolk cites numerous cases in which LERO workers are said to have failed to use independent judgment to correct inadequacies in the plan. For example, failure to inform the Long Island Railroad to divert trains from the EPZ is cited. S. C. Ex. 95, at 156. The failure to have a procedure for this purpose was cited by FEMA as an ARCA. FEMA Ex . 1, at 39. Confusion regarding how to contact the FAA, another procedure-related problem, . also . cited as an ARCA, was another similar ; example. 443. However, these examples, as well as others, which show either problems with the procedures, or lack of knowledge of procedures, do not show~a failure to use good judgment, or to react to the unexpected. Moreover, they appear to be readily correctable by straightforward plan or procedure changes, or additional training. Suffolk County would have us find that these sorts of examples show insufficient " learn by doing" training. S. C. Ex. 95, at 89. Since the very purpose of the Exercise is to find these sorts of glitches in the plan, we view the uncovering of these problems in the Exercise as the needed " learn by doing" training.
- 4. Conclusions on Contentions EX 50. A and 50.E 444. While we have noted the instances in which LERO personnel showed sound judgment in dealing with certain problems, and where other problems were either not related to training or were readily correctable, the only significant test of LERO's ability to adapt to the unexpected were the road impediments. Here, the LERO organization was unable to respond in a satisfactory manner to a major unexpected problem. FEMA found that the difficulties experienced in responding to the road v
n i
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impediments showed an inability of LERO to effectively respond . to unanticipated situations. Tr. 8300 (Keller, Kowleski). It attributed this failure to lack of proper training. Tr. 8284 (Kowieski), Tr. . 8285 (Keller); FEMA Ex. 5, at 73. LILCO witnesses stressed that LERO as an
- organization has the flexibliity and the redundancy and diversity of function to ' overcome individual performance . errors. See Tr. 5170-1 (Mileti); Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 13-14. However in the case of the road impediments, such redundancy and diversity was not apparent. It is not enough to argue that in such a situation, there is redundancy because people will get out on their own. b Tr. 5640 (Weismantle) .
E. Lack of Knowledge and Inability to Follow the Plan as Bases for Finding a Fundamental Flaw in the Training Program (Contentions EX 50.B, 50.G and 50.H) 445. As in the Quality Assurance area, in any activity as complex as_ implementation of emergency response to a nuclear accident, it is not reasonable to expect perfect performance. See Test. , ff. Tr. 4368, at 8-9; Tr. 4543 (Frye). Errors in performance during an emergency exercise are to be expected, even with an excellent training program. However, if lack of knowledge or ability to follow the plan is sufficiently widespread, one cannot be sure that errors by one individual will be corrected or compensated for by the actions of others, in such a case, there may be a breakdown in the training program sufficient to raise legitimate doubt about whether the emergency response organization can l 24/ As we have indicated, questions involving whether it is " immaterial" whether portions of the Plan can be implemented are before another Q Licensing Board. I { _ -_ - ___ ________ _A
l s L - 168 - l j j- implement the plan. It is with these considerations in mind that uo examine the basis for Contentions EX 50.B, 50.G. and 50.H.
- 1. Knowledge of Field Personnel 446.' Among its citations to failure to follow the plan and procedures, ' raised oy Contention EX 50.B, Suffolk County raises again the communications failures which occurred during response to the road impediment messages, and at the ENC following the breakdown of LILCO's copying machines. S. C. Ex. 95, at 104-114. There is substantial l
overlap between the bases supporting Contention EX 50. A and 50.E and those raised under Contention EX 50.B. For example, in responding to the road impediments and in providing up-to-date information to the media and rumor control operators, failure to communicate the appropriate information violated the plan and procedures. The issue raised in Contention EX 50.8 which is not raised in the other contention subparts i is lack of basic knowledge and lack of routine training. S. C. Ex. 95, at 100-101. Since discussion under subparts 50.A and 50.E of LERO personnel's inability to implement the plan in response to road impediments and in providing timely information to the media and to individuals calling rumor control is not principally a function of lack of knowledge of the plan, we believe these subjects have been appropriately dealt with in other sections of the findings. As a result, we here focus on those matters not adequately treated elsewhere. 447. The most compelling evidence presented tending to demonstrate l a failure of field personnel to follow the plan based on lack of knowledge involves the performance of the general population evacuation Bus Drivers v .
._.._-___.______m
l
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,m dispatched from ' the Patchogue Staging Area. FEMA described what happened as follows:
Four (4)- Bus Drivers dispatched from the Patchogue Staging Area were evaluated. Two (2) of the drivers were able to pick up buses at designated yards, proceed to assigned transfer points, and drive their assigned routes, although one (1) of them missed part of his assigned ' evacuation route. More confusion was evident on the part of the other' drivers.. One (1) driver proceeded to the wrong transfer point, and completed his route only after being prompted by the ! ' Federal evaluator. The other driver took over two (2) ' hours to get to his transfer point from the staging area because he initially went to the wrong bus garage. it is recommended that training be provided to Bus Drivers to assure that they will be able to follow directions given . to them and to drive their routes from the staging area to the bus garages to transfer points, and to complete their entire assigned pickup routes, in addition, it is recom-mended that - [ procedures] be revised to require, respectively, the Bus Driver to present, and the Transfer Point Coordinator to verify , each Bus Driver's copy of the Bus / Van Dispatching Form . . . to assure that the Bus Driver has arrived at the proper transfer point. FEMA Ex.1, at 64-65. FEMA cited these failures as a Deficiency. Id. at 66. 448. As noted above, three of the four Bus Drivers from the Patchogue Staging Area observed by FEMA during the Exercise experienced problems in running their routes. Although LILCO sent approximately 300 Bus Drivers to the field , only eight drivers drove buses. Tr. 4548 (Daverio) . All of these were actually observed by FEMA. Tr. 4551 ( Daverio) . 449. FEMA concluded that the inability of the drivers to properly I l' run their bus routes was a training problem. FEMA Ex. 1, at 65. Tr. J 8285 ( Keller) . Moreover, LILCO noted that a major change in the O training of bus drivers was instituted to familiarize each driver with each 1
)
l L L
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n of the bus garages and transfer points. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at ll 1 (w).
~ 72-73; Tr. 5711-12 (Daverio). LILCO determined that the failures during i
the Exercise were attributable to a prior practice of allowing LERO personnel to volunteer to drive to certain locations. M. 450. This evidence demonstrates that, at least at the time of the 1 Exercise, training of general population Bus Drivers was superficial at best. Whether the - modification to the training program described has 4 1 resulted in better preparedness has not been tested. Testimony, ff. Tr. .
~
4368, at 73. 451. Suffolk County cites a number of examples of delays in j dispatching personnel, including general population Bus - Drivers, from staging areas to the fleid. S. C. Ex. 95, at 103. Several have been i covered in the previous discussion, or in the discussion of response to the road impediment messages. 052. Delays in dispatch of Bus Drivers from the Patchogue Staging Area was originally cited by FEMA as a Deficiency. FEMA Ex.1, at 62. l L However, following the RAC review, this was changed to an ARCA, 1 principally because the lack of a requirement in the Plan to dispatch the bus drivers within two hours. FEMA Ex. 3, at 1 of 19. However, FEMA noted the failure to use resources available to expedite the briefing process, and found that the Evacuation Coordinator did not issue Instructions, in accordance with the Plan, to pre-stage buses until one l hour and twenty minutes after the designated time. M. at 2 of 19,. 3 of f
- 19. Thus, while not a Deficiency according to FEMA, FEMA found a number of instances of failure to follow procedures in connection with the staging of buses at the Patchogue Staging Area.
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453. FEMA also noted a 40-minute delay in the dispatch of a Bus l Driver from the Patchogue Staging Area to evacuate 40 school children. FEMA Ex.1, at 67; S. C. Ex. 95, at 103. 454. Also in connection with Bus Driver evacuation routes, the Transfer Point Coordinator at the Brookhaven National Laboratory Transfer Point gave the wrong destination instructions to a driver for the i non-institutionalized mobility-impaired. FEMA Ex. 1, at 65, 67; S. C. l Ex. 95, at 103, 104. LILCO witnesses viewed this as an isolated, minor mistake, not as evidence of a pervasive flaw in LERO training. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 50. 455. As with the lack of familiarity of Bus Drivers with the garages and transfer points, LILCO recognized that delays in dispatching field personnel from the staging areas is a problem. Tr. 5787 (Behr) (considering staging area-only drills to " find out exactly where the problems are") . 456. To speed up dispatch, LI LCO stated that it has modified procedures to have available transfer point coordinators assist in the dispatch process. Tr. 5637-38 (Daverio). FEMA noted that during the Exercise, the B u.; Dispatchers "apparently did not adequately use uncommitted Transfer Point Coordinators in dispatching Bus Drivers from the Staging Area (as required by Section 5.5.8 of OPIP 3.6.4.)" FEMA Ex. 3, 2 of 19 - 3 of 19. 457. None of the Staging Area problems were considered by LILCO to represent a pervasive flaw. See Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 40-41. LILCO notes that the Exercise involved about 1000 LERO personnel over a
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3/~ . . (- .12-hour period, performing hundreds of tasks in accordance with the plan and procedures. ,l d . l- 458. .For there to be a pervasive failure, according to LILCO, a-major function of the plan must not be performed -- such as not getting ! people out to the field. Tr. 5522-3 (Weismantie), Tr. 5524 (Daverlo). It was noted that 386 Bus . Drivers were briefed and dispatched from the staging areas during the Exercise. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 50. LILCO states that these Bus Drivers were briefed,. dispatched, proceeded to garages and transfer points and then to their destinations. M. However, only eight of these drivers were evaluated, and the inferences we draw must be drawn from those who were observed. 459. LILCO's position is based on redundancy in resources to accomplish the task, notwithstanding individual performance errors. While redundancy apparently exists in numbers, the ability of those redundant resources to accomplish the task in accordance with the Plan and in a timely fashion was not demonstrated.
' 460._ Dr. Mileti and Dr. Lindell testified that in their opinion, buses are not needed, since most people will find their own way out of the EPZ in an emergency; thus, inability of Bus Drivers to drive their routes in a correct and timely manner. does not have an important bearing on the health and safety of the public. Tr. 4664-5, 4989 (Mileti); Tr. 4988
( Lindell) . Whether provision of bus transportation for evacuation is essential to the public hesit! and safety (it appears to be covered by NU REG-0654 [ accord, Yr. 4991 (Behr)]) is less important to us than there was a significant area of activity in which the Exercise , g demonstrated that LERO personnel were not adequately trained. To our
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.m minds, the LILCO definition of pervasive failure -- a major function not being performed . by the organization -- was satisfied when the FEMA i
evaluation found that the ability to provide general population bus evacuation was not shown. FEMA Ex.1, at 66. l
- 2. Basic Knowledge in Use of Persone' Dosimetry (Contention 50.C, 50.H) 461. Another - area in which a large number of instances of procedures not being followed was in the use of personal dosimetry, and knowledge of exposure limits and excess exposure controls. Suffolk l
County Contention EX 50.G and 50.H assert widespread lack of knowledge during the Exercise of LERO personnel as well as ambulance and ambulette personnel concerning use of personal dosimetry, procedures for authorizing excess exposure, and taking of potassium lodide (KI) tablets. Numerous references to these areas are found in the FEMA Report, and cited in the Contention. See S. C. Ex. 95, at '103, citing FEMA Report at 59, 68-70, 76, 77. See also S. C. Ex. 95, at 188-193, and references i cited therein. $ 462. LILCO does not appear to contest the facts alleged by Suffolk q County and as set forth in the FEMA Report related to these personal radiological pretection matters. See Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 59-64. With respect to ambulance and ambulette workers, rapid turnover of personnel was identified as the cause of unfamiliarity with dosimetry and exposure control. Id. at 60. LILCO instituted a monthly training program for new drivers to deal with this problem. g. Failure to provide dosimetry training to personnel within organizations not participating in planning, although potentially a problem, certainly does
i
/
374 - 8 A-not show inadequacies in the LILCO training program. d . a t 61. , With l_d {v)7 . respect to knowledge of LERO workers on these matters, LILCO has modified its .tralhing to emphasize the importance ;of reading dosimetry,
/
,r knowing when to ingest Kl. and knowing' how excess. radiation exposure. is o l
', u authorized. M.at62. However, the principal corrective action appears -
\ g 'j to be issuance of identification badges, to be worn on outer garmems, which ' list personal radiological procedures on the back for ready reference in the field, p.
463. Although we find that the lack of knowledge of procedures concerning. personal radiation exposure was pervasive' in nature, we note that the problems identified do not directly affect the health and safety of the public. M. We also find that the problem appears to be readily correctable through the use of ilD badge information aids and more 3 training. '
, e' s a.
464. While ione may question whether personnel who failed to read < their dosimeters will look at their badges, we agree with Drt. L!ndell and Mileti that the aids will do the job in. a real emergency, during which there will be every inceritive to keep tEact ofScne's own exposure." Tr. 5200 ( Lindell), Tr. 5202 (Mileti) . We find that the train!ng problems ' ident) fled during the Exercise with regard to personal radiation ' exposure 3
~
controls are not fundamental in nature. s
- 3. Miscellaneous Examples of Lack of Basic Knowledge 465. Similarly, in regard to the dispatch of Traffic Culdes, the fact )
that it took 'far longer in most instances than the one hour contemplated i _ for Traffic Guides to be dispatched and arrive at their Traffic Control I
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(G l l l t _ _ _ _ _ _ __A
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Posts shows a failure of training to instill a sense that these actions should be accomplished within a set time. See Findings 101-133. 466. Suffolk County points to numerous other examples of failure of LERO personnel to follow procedures or demonstrate knowledge of the sv-plan: failure to use, or use correctly, LERO message forms; use of wrong security procedures; erroneous announcement.s of information to LERO personnel; exessive time in monitoring personnel; extraneous information included on EBS message forms: Traffic Guides not knowing the location of the Reception Center or where to public was to be directed L for monitoring and decontamination; and failure to update status boards. S. C. Ex. 95, at 103-104. M.ost of these errors, however, appear to be isolated -- as in the case of the erroneous announcements and monitoring times -- or readily correctable -- as in the case of use of message forms, security measures, and update of status boards. 467. The inability of 13 out of 14 Traffic Guides from the Patchogue Staging Area to provide the location of the Nassau Coliseum Reception Center, while perhaps correctable, however, suggests a breakdown in the training of Traffic Guides. See S. C. Ex. 95, at 117. Inasmuch as the Reception Center is the only identifiable destination which all evacuees would have a common interest in knowing, we view the inability to provide such fundamental information as clear evidence of a failure to provide adequate training. 4 Conclusions on Contentions EX 50.B, 50.G and 50.H 3 468. This review of the evidence of the basic knowledge of LERO workers concerning their jobs and the Plan shows that numerous errors
l.
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[ .
'( were made. 'As FEMA noted, most of the ARCAs and Deficiencies can be FEMA Ex. 5, at 73; Tr. 8284 traced to deficiencies in training.
( Kowieski) . Although some errors, such as the erroneous announcements to LERO workers, seem to be isolated or inadvertent mistakes, others ! were made by enough workers to indicate a pattern related to deficiencies in training. Traffic Guides not being dispatched or arriving at Traffic Control Posts in a timely manner, Traffic Guides not knowing the location of a key destination for evacuees, Bus Drivers unable to find parages and transfer points , workers not able to appropriately use radiation protection information, suggest that the LERO training program was not equal to the task, at least on the day of the Exercise. While LILCO has undertaken good-faith efforts to remedy the gaps in knowledge by additional training, until the ability to maintain emergency response skills has been demonstrated, we retain serious doubts about the adequacy of the LILCO training program. F. Ability to Communicate Necessary Information (Contention EX 50.C) 469. Contention EX 50.C references various other contentions and FEMA Deficiency and ARCA citations to support the proposition that the LILCO training program failed in its mission to enable LERO personnel to communicate effectively during an emergency. Suffolk County's witnesses testified that timely, accurate, and common sense communications are "the backbone of a successful response." S. C. Ex. 95, at 136. We agree. 470. In our previous discussion of Contention EX 50. A we found that breakdowns in communication in response to the road impediment free play messages were indicative of an inability of LERO to respond 7 4 1 1
7 .
^
.r.
.} . N ll j >
2 :_ , e T ~
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r f effectively 'ty unanticipated .. events. The evidence adduced under tha l,' contention therefore supports Suffolk County's ' position under Contantion i 1 EX 50.C. Conversely, our finding that media briefing problems and ! rumor control' problems stemming from the breakdown of LILCO's copying I machines were not fundamentally a training problem supports LILCO's position on this contention. in ddition. there were instances of failure to follow the' plan, or demonstrate knowledge of procedures which also l may be characterized as failures in communication. We will not treat this evidence again here. Rather, we will focus on other examples of per sonnel errors in communication to determine . Whether they are i pervasive in nature, or otherwise indicate a breakdown in training for effective communication during in emergency. 0 471. Suffolk County #atec that the delay in dispatching a bus to p '
! evacuate Ridge Elementary' School children, and the failure to follow up r;
on the' dispatch constituted communications nilures. S. C; Ex. 95, at j 128. Any de;ay attendant to the dispatch of the bus, however, was not
~ '
"t attributable to cominunications, but rather to implementation of efispatch
. r procidures. ' Tr. 5E57-5560 (Daverio). In addition, follow-up calls were w ,
made in an appr$pr; ate manner. Tr. 5561-6'1 (Daverio) . As a result, [,j j this allegation is .without merit. Several other communications breakdowns noted by Suffolk
~
472. i County appear to be either isolated events, orfthe product of inadequate procedures, rather than a result of a flaw hi training. Failure to notify the FAA resulted from having the wrong phone number listed in the procedure. Tr. j572 (Daverlo). See S. C. Ex. 95, at 130. Failure to contact the LIRR, was a procedure problem. ,ld. ; Tr. 5573 (Daverio) . v , 1-
')
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V O; ]
~;
r . 1 h 473. Errors .in reporting downwind distances for field monitoring 1 data, in posting extrapolated dose data as actual data, in stating the EPA PAG. for ' thyroid dose (by - the Health Services Coordinator), and in leaving off the units of measurement for exposure limits (by the Patchogue B' u s Dispatcher) appear to us to be minor, Isolated events, not Indicative: of a pattern caused by failure of the training program.. See S. C. Ex. 95, at 130,132; FEMA Ex.1, at 33, 40, 68-69. 474. Other communications problems such as the need to have key events or evacuation status boards in the EOC command room, S. C. Ex. 95, at 131, . to properly update information on the Riverhead Staging Area ' status boards, ,ld . at 132, seem readily correctable. Incorrect communications concerning the availability of Suffolk County Police Department personnel appears to have been caused by incorrect controller input to the simulation. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 50-51. See S. C.
' Ex. 95, at 133-134.
475, in sum, having examined the evidence reisting the Contention EX 50.C not otherwise covered by other subparts of the contention, we find no basis in this additional evidence for finding there to be a fundamental problem in the training program. G. Failure to Follow Directions (Contention EX 50.D) 476. Contention EX 50.D asserts that various actions and events during the Exercise demonstrate that the LlLCO training program failed to effectively train LERO personnel to follow the directions of superiors during an emergency. The testimony submitted on this contention deals with only a handful of incidents, which are, in any event dealt with , ) ' l.- i
l [
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f% k under other contentions as well. See Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 51-53; S. C. Ex. 95, at 149 _ Moreover, Suffolk County witnesses stated that l they found insufficient basis to conclude that the contention was-l supportable. Id. at 149-150. As a result, no further consideration of this portion of the Contention EX 50.D is warranted. H. Providing information to the Public Through the Media (Contention EX 50.F) 477. Elsewhere we have treated the functioning of the LERO organization in response to the breakdown of the copying machines in the i ENC. Ilcre we must examine whether evidence other than that related to that equipment failure supports the contention that there was a funda-mental breakdown in the training program in the public Information area. 478. In Contention EX 50.F, considerably more than in other contention subparts, Suffolk County relles extensively on facts not directly presented in the FEMA Report. See S. C. Ex. 95, at 166 ,et seq. 479. Leaving the copier-related problems aside, FEMA found that, in general, activation of the ENC was accomplished well, and pointed only to the need for an EPZ map tracking protective actions and the plume pathway, as well as a status board with emergency classification levels and times of declaration -- both easily correctable shortcomings. FEMA Ex.1, at 52-54
]
480. Suffolk County's witnesses held LILCO to a very high standard 1 in judging the adequacy of performance by LERO personnel at the ENC. ] Where FEMA found the activation of the ENC "done well," Suffolk County criticized the set-up as showing "almost casual slowness." FEMA Ex.1, 1
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(p) at 52; S. C. Ex. 95, at 173; see also M. at 168. While FEMA found that v the media's lack of accurate and timely picture of protective action recommendations was due to the copier machine breakdown, Suffolk County criticized LERO for falling to " seize the initiative" and to assure that it made " data promptly available to the media." Id. at 173-177. 481. While FEMA found that media briefings "provided requested information and answered questions presented by media representa-tives. . .", Suffolk County found the LERO spokesperson " unprepared,"
" flippan t ," " offensive", lacking in access to detailed information, and unresponsive to the needs of the media. Id. at 182-185.
482. Central to Suffolk County's position is that the spokesperson and the ENC had more information to give, but, because of lack of understanding of the effect of failing to give the media immediate updates of events, would have forced the media to seek other, less authoritative sources, leading in turn to confusion. Icl . We disagree. 483. First, while the ENC did lag behind the EBS messages in the information it was giving out, it seems clear that the media had the same access to the EBS information as the public. Id. at 179. Thus, while there were delays in distribution of information, the media had the same information as the public, and it seems unlikely that this would have engendered confusion. 484. Second, while Suffolk County states that the spokesperson i lacked details on the number of people who had been told to report for { monitoring , details of traffic impediments, and the correct seasonal l population fluctuations in the area, M. at 184, this information seems to I n us to be in the " nice to know" rather than " essential" category. See l l l (o) l L _ _ - - _ - - _ - _ - _ _
f
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,m Testimony on Contentions EX 38, EX 39, .(f. Tr. 3207, at 35-45. Suffolk County has not ' presented information which leads us to conclude that there was a failure to properly train the LERO spokesperson or ENC personnel.
485. We conclude that, overall, no fundamental inadequacy in the LERO training of ENC personnel was shown.
- 1. Correction of Training Flaws (Contention EX 50.l) 486. Contention EX 50.1 asserts that. LILCO proposals to modify training materials or procedures would not correct the flaws in training revealed by the Exercise. While the contention would cover the breadth of Suffolk County's allegations of fundamental flaws, our treatment of the scope of the contention may be limited to those areas where we have found those other allegations to be substantiated. We have therefore reviewed the evidence relating .to the post-Exercise drills to determine whether training since the Exercise shows that training flaws shown by the Exercise have indeed been corrected. Attention has therefore been directed to the performance of LERO in the areas of communication, response to unanticipated events and basic knowledge -- with particular attention to the performance of LERO EOC and field personnel in response
- to road impediments, and to Bus Driver and Traffic Guide performance.
487. Suffolk County questioned whether the free play messages introducing into the drills various types of road impediments constitute a realistic test of ability to deal with the unexpected. S. C. Ex. 95, at 93-94; Tr. 6598-6600 (Streeter). As noted earlier, LILCO treated the problems observed during the Exercise in responding to road impedi-e_=-- _ _ - -
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r i ments, as deficiencies in training for road impediments, not as deficiencies in responding generically to unexpected events. 488. Whlie we would agree with Suffolk County that repeated drills on slight 1y different road impediment scenarios introduces little in the way of surprise, such repetition was in fact a form of " hands on" " learning by doing" training emphasized repeatedly by Suffolk County's witnesses. See S. C. Ex. 95, at 80-89, 93; Tr. 6767-72 (Cosgrove). 489. Such repetition, in fact, appears to have shown some positive results. According to Suffolk County, the post-Exercise drills continued to show delays and improper responses and communications to the road impediments introduced. M. at 97-98. However, review of the LILCO drill reports shows that response to the road impediments improved substantially during the September / October drills, following problems experienced in the June drill. M. , at Attachment 7, 8. LILCO pointed to good responses to impediments during the December drills. Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 71; S. C. EX. 95, at Attachment 9. However, there was delay in response to one of the four impediments, id., and communication problems on another. S. C. Ex. 95, Attachment 9, at 4. j j 490. LILCO's observations of Traffic Guide performance during the June, September and October drills were favorable. Id. , Attachments 7,
- 8. In the December drills, dispatch of Traffic Guides, Bus Drivers and other field workers appeared to be timely. M., Attachment 9, at 17-40.
As noted earlier, special remedial " road rallies" of Bus Drivers continued , during the December drills, and were not evaluated. Testimony, ff. Tr. l 4368, at 72-73; S. C.' Ex. 95, Attachment 9, at 42. ; O i l 1
0 l
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) ( l g) ( 491. Improvements in performance ' in the foregoing areas give credence to the correctability of the deficiencies in knowledge exhibited I during the Exercise, and in the ability to respond to road impediments. The post-Exercise drill evidence. tends to show greater emphasis on the
'"learning by doing" concept suggestcd by Suffolk county. See , eg ,
Tr. 6779 (Cosgrove) . Assuming Suffolk County is correct that earlier training lacked realism, even Suffolk County concedes this is a correctable problem. Tr. 6778 (Cosgrove). However, these drills were observed. only by LILCO, and neither FEMA nor Suffolk County had the opportunity to observe performance. Tr. 8298-99 (Kowleski); Tr. 673!: (Cosgrove). As a result, we cannot accord decisive weight to the evidence represented by the post-Exercise drills. 492. Even by LILCO's own account, however, training problems found in the Exercise have persisted. According to LILCO witness Behr, ; dispatch procedures at stagir.g areas continue to be an area of concern. Tr. 5787 (Behr). 493. More significantly, LILCO acknowledged that response and communications problems continued in the June, September and October drills. Tr. 5758-9, 5769, 5784-86 .Behr); 5772-3 ( Daverio) . A report j prepared for LILCO on the Septerrner and October drills summarized as follows: One of the major areas of concern during this drill series continues to be the communications between the EOC and the Staging Areas. Long delays in getting information to the Staging Areas were experienced throughout the drills. Much more emphasis needs be I placed on communications, both in accuracy and f timeliness. Delays in the response by the Staging Areas can be traced back to delays in transmitting A information or instecction by the EOC. The informa-tion flow from the EOC to the ENC also proved to be l i -
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j~ . It V a major deficiency noted in one particular drill. appears that the common - denominator in communica-tions delays is the EOC, and emphasis must be placed in training that facility. S. C. Ex. 87; 97, at Attachment 8. See also, Tr. 5758-59, 5769, 5775, 5777, 5782-83 ( Behr) . These problems were also discussed in LILCO's testimony. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 4368, at 69-71. While the December drill may have shown improvement, communications problems occurred in dealing with the brush fire and truck impediments. S. C. Ex. 95, Attachment 9, at 4,10; see also id. at 25. J. Conclusion 494. Because of the. far-reaching scope required of a utility-only plan , LERO has attempted to train a very large number of emergency workers from the LILCO organization -- well over 1,000 were mobilized for the Exercise, and this was one of three shifts. LILCO Testimony, (f.
. Tr. 4368. at 10. The LILCO training program conducts quarterly drills, but due to' the size of the organization, this results in individuals receiving drill training only annually. Tr. 5725 (Behr). In addition to the Lurden of training such large number, it is more difficult to train LERO personnel to be emergency response workers for a nuclear accident than it is to train persons who regularly perform emergency response work. See, Tr. 4465 (Behr); Tr. 5137 (Mileti).
l
- l. 495. Suffolk County did not contest that an adequate number of LILCO employees had been provided training. Tr. 6378 (Perrow); Tr.
6382 (Cosgrove). However, unlike police or fire department personnel, who interact as respondents to emergencies on a regular basis, the LERO ! O organization is intermittent in nature, drilling for emergency response
.( i
{ l L_--___--__-__________-.
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(- only periodically. Tr. 6425 (Perrow); S. C. Ex. 95, at 206. Thus the {) task of the training program is indeed a formidable one. See ,Tr. 6539, 6541 (Cosgrove). Our review of the evidence in this proceeding suggests that, overall, the LILCO efforts have paid dividends. Nevertheless, as indicated by the FEMA Deficiency citations, and evidence of continuing problems in effective communication and in dealing with the large span of control at the staging areas, see Tr. 6434-37 (Perrow), particularly in non-routine situations, substantial doubt has been raised in our minds whether the training program instituted by LILCO has been intense enough to overcome the additional burdens which have been placed upon LERO. 496. As we stated in our discussion of the standard of proof (Finding 406 el seq. ), to find that an aspect of the LILCO plan is fundamentally flawed, we must find a pervasive breakdown which raises substantial doubt whether the plan will be implemented in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. We have found above that there is substantial doubt whether, faced with a major unanticipated problem, LERO personnel have sufficient training to communicate and respond effectively to implement the necessary protective actions in a timely manner. Substantial questions also exist in connection with the timely dispatch of LERO Traffic Guides, Bus Drivers and other emergency workers and their prompt performance of their tas ks . Although the problems cited are correctable, we are not satisfied that they have indeed been corrected. This deficiency in the training program requires us to find that there is not at this time reasonable assurance that adequate (
,o protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency v>
! )
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at ' Shoreham. ' A ' further FEMA drill or exercise of those . parts of the LILCO' Plan where fundamental flaws have been INnd is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. XV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The. Board has considered all of the evidence and argument submitted by the parties in this proceeding on the February 13, 1986 Shoreham emergency planning exercise. Based on a review that record-and the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Board concludes that: i
- 1. Deficiencies were found in the following areas:
- a. training for, and execution of internal communications within the command structure of LERO and between that structure and field personnel in response to unexpected events; I
- b. basic knowledge of Bus Drivers and Traffic Guides of their assigned functions) and i
I I
- c. timely response of Traffic Guides, Bus Drivers, Route l Spotters, and Road Crews in the performance of their 1
emergency tasks. O) V , I l I (. _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -
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!D .
D') ' These deficiencies are significant to the overall ability of LERO 2. to implement the LILCO Plan and were not demonstrated to have been compensated for or corrected.
- 3. These deficiencies preclude . a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a ' radiological emergency, i.e. , show a fundamental flaw in the Plan .
- 4. 'A finding of reasonable assurance must await further demonstration in a FEMA-graded exercise or drill of those portions of the Plan where deficiencies were found, in order to show the adequacy of corrective measures. The Board retains Jurisdiction until such corrective measures are completed.
Respectfully submitted, tb r Gqo,rge E. J6hnsort/ Oreste Russ Pirfo - WlcJ k . Ark T Charles A. Barth Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland I th's 11th day of September,1987 O L .- ---- - . - - _ _ . - - _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - - - _}}