ML20238E681

Lilco Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on Suitability of Reception Ctrs.*

ML20238E681
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Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	09/02/1987
From:	HUNTON & WILLIAMS
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CON-#387-4363 OL-3, NUDOCS 8709150137
Download: ML20238E681 (148)

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,;r UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

'* ) (Emergency Planning)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE SUITABILITY OF RECEPTION CENTERS f

HUNTON & WILLIAMS 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 September 2,1987 5 Y

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LILCO, September 2,1987 UNITED STATES OF a c,RIC A NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE SUITABILITY OF RECEPTION CENTERS Here, pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.754 (1987) and the schedule adopted by the Board on July 30,1987 (Tr.19,237), are LILCO's proposed findings of f act and conclusions of law in the form of an initial decision.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page . .

1. Procedu ral H is t o ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 II. Fi ndin gs o f F a c t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 A. The Number of People Arriving at the Reception Centers . . . . . . . . . 10 B. The Location of the Reception Centers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 C. The Adequacy of LILCO's Proposed Monitoring Methods. . . . . . . . . . . 38 D. T raf fic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 E. Zo ni ng La ws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 18 III. Conclusions of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 IV. O rde r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 V. Finality and A appealability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 0 Appendix A: List of Witnesses Appendix B: L!st of Exhibits

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. This decision addresses the question of whether designated reception cen-l ters in the offsite emergency plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station are ade-quate for use by the public in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. In deciding this question we are mindful of NRC regulations governing emergency plan-ning, namely 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, and the guidelines of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Rev.1), and we give great weight to testimony given by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission

'*aff (the Staff) witnesses.

2. The procedural history of the relocation centers issues in the Shoreham proceeding is lengthy and complicated. Although it represents only a small portion of the entire proceeding, this history vividly illustrates the extraordinary degree of detail in which the LILCO Plan has been litigated.

3. Relocation center issues for offsite emergency planning were first ad-dressed in " Phase 11" of the Shoreham emergency planning proceeding, which took place over nine months beginning December 6,1983, and ending August 29,1984. During that hearing sixteen witnesses testified about relocation centers over eight days in May, July, and August. Transcript pages, including prefiled testimony and exhibits, num-bered over 500 on just the relocation center issues.

4. The LILCO Plan originally designated five facilities in Suffolk County to serve as primary and backup relocation centers. These centers were to provide ra-diological monitoring and decontamination services for evacuees, as well as emergency sheltering. During the course of the litigation on the relocation conter contentions, Suffolk County and New York State, Interveners in the proceeding, twice refused to

.i make available public buildings relied upon in the LILCO Plan as relocation centers.

Each time that LILCO identified f acilities in Suffolk County to be used, the specified facilities became unavailable, and LILCO was forced to revise its Plan.M Ultimately, LILCO was forced to revise the Plan to include only f acilities in Nassau County.

5. LILCO withdrew its previously filed testimony and submitted new testi-mony on July 30,1984. Hearings were held in August 1984. LILCO now relied on one or more " reception centers" for registering, monitoring, and decontaminating evacuees and 50 or so smaller f acilities or " congregate care centers" for sheltering evacuees.U --

In light of its past experiences. LILCO declined to identify during the hearings the re-ception center with which it was then negotiating an agreement. LILCO committed to revise the Plan to include the named reception center upon completion of negotiations.

The Board did not require identification of the f acility during the August hearings, but .

noted the lack of an identified reception center as a " void in the record." Thereaf ter, on August 29, 1984, the Licensing Board closed the record on the Phase II offsite emer-gency planning issues.

1/ LILCO first submitted prefiled testimony on the relocation center contentions (24.0, 24.P 74, 75, and 77) on March 2,1984. At that time Suffolk County Community <

College (SCCC), BOCES II Occupation Center (BOCES II), and the State University of New ' York at Stony Brook (SUNY-Stony Brook) were designated as the primary reloca-tion centers. The State University of New York at Farmingdale (SUNY-Farmingdale) and St. Joseph's College were designated backup relocation centers. When SCCC and SUNY-Stony Brook became unavailable to LILCO, LILCO revised its plan and submitted supplemental testimony on June 15, 1984. This revision designated BOCES II, SUNY- )

Farmingdale, and St. Joseph's College as primary relocation centers and Dowling Col-lege as a backup center. Shortly thereaf ter Interveners made BOCES Il and SUNY-Farmingdale unavailable. ,

2/ The final revised testimony was based in part on an agreement with the Nassau '

County Chapter of the American Red Cross to operate the congregate care centers.

Negotiations were in progress with Nassau County officials to use the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum as the Plan's reception center.

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6. In a letter submitted to the Board on October 30,1984, LILCO named the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum as the reception center for evacuees and, at the same time, sought to admit the identity of the reception center into the record as a g.

" confirmatory item."W At a conference of counsel on January 11, 1985, the Board ruled that the reception center's identity could not be admitted without reopening the record. Accordingly, LILCO filed a motion to reopen the record on January 18, 1985.

7. On January 28, 1985, over the objection of the County and State, the ,,

1 l Board granted LILCO's motion and limited the scope of the reopened hearing to the '

l I narrow issue of whether the Coliseum was functionally adequate to serve as a reception center. The Board provided all parties the opportunity to submit evidence on the re-opened Contention 24.0 but declined to permit discovery sought by Suffolk County.

LILCO, FEMA, Suffolk County, and New York State submitted prefiled testimony. The Board accepted testimony filed by LILCO and FEMA, but rejected most of the Interve-nors' testimony, holding that it did not address the functional adequacy of the Coliseum.

Although the Board did admit portions of testimony sponsored by Dr. Radford and Depu-ty Chief Inspector Roberts, Suffolk County chose to withdraw that testimony as well.

In the hearings held June 25 and 26,1985, LILCO and FEMA witnesses presented their testimony, while the Interveners attempted to make their case by cross-examination alone.E# Transcript pages, including prefiled testimony and exhibits, numbered over 3/ LILCO also submitted to the ' Board a letter of agreement executed by LILCO and the General Manager of the Coliseum for use of the Coliseum as a reception center, as well as a letter of approval f rom the Nassau County Executive to the General Manager.

4/ Suffolk County submitted testimony sponsored by Leon Campo, James H. '

Johnson, Jr., Edward P. Radford, and Deputy Chief Inspector Richard C. Roberts. New York State submitted testimony by Charles E. Kilduff, Langdon Marsh, and Sara J. ,

Meyland.

5/ LILCO's written testimony consisted of an af fidavit of Elaine D. Robinson and six l attachments. FEMA's prefiled testimony consisted of a two page affidavit of Thomas E. Baldwin, Joseph H. Keller, Roger B. Howieski, and Philip H. McIntire.

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8. The Licensing Board, in its Concluding Partial Initial Decision, resolved the majority of remaining issues on reception centers in favor of LILCO. The Board found that "overall procedures for processing evacuees at the Coliseum (were] concep-tually adequate," Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

LBP-85-31, 22 NRC 410, 419 (1985) (hereaf ter "CPID"), but determined that the record was unclear as to whether the Coliseum could accommodate the general population evacuees who may seek monitoring and processing but not shelter. The Board further determined that LILCO should provide more detail concerning the Coliseum's size and available facilities in relation to the number of people to be processed and show time estimates for monitoring evacuees that fall within the 12-hour range contemplated in N UREG-0654. Id. at 417-19.

9. Both LILCO and the Interveners appealed portions of the CPID, but the . .

Appeal Board initially took up only Interveners' appeal, granting that appeal in part.

Tr~ Appeal Board held that Interveners had been entitled to discovery upon reopening the record and that the Licensing Board must also address the issue of whether the Col-iseum was accessible to evacuees, as well as any other factors that could affect its util-ity as a reception center. The decision required that the record again be reopened and

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that additional hearings be held. Lonc Island Lightine Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,157-63 (1985). The Appeal Board also held i

that, since the issue of sheltering f acilities had been fully litigated, the Licensing Board had been correct in not hearing additional evidence on congregate care centers. In consideration of appeals pending on other issues, the Appeal Board instructed the Li-censing Board to stay action on the remand unless otherwise instructed by the Commis-sion. Ld. at 163.0

$/ The Commission, by Order of September 19, 1986, declined review of reception center Lssues and directed that the remand of ALAB-832 take effect. Order, Long (footnote continued)

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10. Before LILCO's appeal on reception center issues had been heard, the Nassau County Board of Supervisors passed a resolution on June 16,1986 that attempted to make the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum unavailable as LILCO's reception cen-ter and to prohibit LILCO's use of Nassau County facilities without prior approval of the Board of Supervisors.

11. On September 19, 1986, the Appeal Board addressed LILCO's appeal and directed the Licensing Board to determine whether any new facility selected by LILCO was adequate to serve as a reception center and whether the change in the f acility l itself affected the question of the need to plan for evacuees seeking monitoring but not 1

sheltering. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-847, 24 NRC 412, 424 (1986). The Appeal Board further directed the Licensing Board to determine if the issues of whether the reception center could accommodate the general population evacuees who seek monitoring and processing but not sheltering, and wheth-er the LILCO Plan should contain a planning basis for the number of evacuees arriving at the center to be monitored, had been f airly raised by Contention 24.0 (hereinaf ter

" evacuee monitoring issues") and if so to clarify its previous decision on monitoring evacuees in regard to those issues. I_d. at 419-24. The Board declined, at that time, to determine whether the planning basis constituted a regulatory requirement. Id_. at 420.

12. As a result of the actions taken by Nassau County officials and in light of the Appeal Board's decisions, LILCO on September 30, 1986, filed a motion with the Li-censing Board to eopen the record on Contention 24.0 for the purpose of replacing the Coliseum as a reception center with three LILCO facilities: the Hicksville, Bellmore, (footnote continued)

Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power . tion, Unit 1), Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 (September 19, 1986).

ar.a .40slyn Operations Centers. The Licensing Board, in its October 29,1986 Clarifying Decision on Remand, held that the evacuee monitoring issues had been fairly raised by Contention 24.0. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

LBP-86-36, 24 NRC 561, 572-73 (1986). Based on its holding that the planning basis for general population evacuees seeking monitoring but not sheltering was at issue, the Board further held that LILCO must establish such a planning basis. The Board chose not to act on LILCO's motion to reopen the record prior to the Appeal Board's ruling on specific holdings in the Licensing Board's October 29 decision.I Later the Appeal Board deferred to the Licensing Board's finding that the evacuee monitoring issues had

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been properly raised and affirmed the Licensing Board's determination that LILCO must estimate and plan for the number of evacuees likely to seek only monitoring and decontamination at reception centers. The Appeal Board further determined that the subject planning basis constituted a regulatory requirement. Long Island Lighting Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-855, 24 NRC 792 (1986), review declined, Memorandum from Samuel J. Chilk to the Board and Parties, Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 (June 23,1987).

13. On December 11,1986, the Licensing Board granted LILCO's motion to re-open the record and ruled that the reopened proceeding constituted the hearing called for in ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,157-162 (1986). Memorandum and Order (Rulings on LILCO Motion to Reopen Record and Remand of Coliseum Issue), Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Unit 1), Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 ASLBP No.

I/ In an unpublished order of November 4,1986, the Appeal Board affirmed the Li-censing Board's holding in LBP-86-36 that the issue of the number of evacuees to be monitored was an issue properly raised for litigation. ASLAB Memorandum and Order, Lont Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 (November 4,1986) (unpublished).

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l 86-533-01-OL, slip op, at 2 (December 11, 1986). The Board determined as well that the scope of the hearing, as set out by the Appeal Board on remand, would encompass any factors that might affect a designated facility's adequacy as a reception center and outlined the specific issues to be addressed in the hearing within that scope.

14. Following the reopening of the record, pretrial proceedings continued for six months, during which time 32 individuals were deposed. The public hearing began on June 30, 1987 and continued over eleven days ending on July 30, 1987 when the record was closed. Twenty-six witnesses testified; transcript pages numbered 1.847, not including prefiled testimony and exhibits. The parties filed 1.061 pages of written testimony, including attachments, in addition to presenting 100 exhibits for admission into evidence.

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15. Based on the extensive record of the issues raised in the remanded recep-tion center litigation, the Board concludes that the LILCO Plan demonstrates that the designated reception centers for use by the public in the event of a radiological emer-gency at Shoreham are adequate to support issuance of a full power license for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. In reaching our decision we have considered all of the evidence and all of the proposed findings of f act and conclusions of law submitted by the parties. Those not incorporated directly or inferentially in this Decision are re-jected as unsupported in fact or law or as unnecessary to the rendering of this Decision.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

16. The issues admitted for hearing were defined in the Board's Memorandum and Order of December 11, 1986, cited above. Those issues were the following:

1. How many people are expected to arrive at the re-ception centers within the meaning of NUREG-0654 Criterion J.12.

2. Whether the [ reception centers'] location (s) might create problems in regard to the evacuation shadow phenomenon.

3. Whether the distance of the [ reception centers) from the plume EPZ would increase exposure to radi-ation, causing an additional problem.

4. Whether the proposal to send evacuees to LILCO parking lots could or would ever be implemented in a way to p.~otect the public health and safety.

5. Staff requirements given the new scheme.

6. LILCO's proposal to transport all evacuees travelling on buses to the parking lot next to its Hicksville f acil-ity, when that f acility itself is also proposed by LILCO to be the LERO worker relocation center.

7. Whether transportation and traffic problems might develop as a result of the.[ reception eenters'] loca-tion and [their] distance from the plume EPZ.

8. The adequacy of evacuation routes to the three LILCO facilities proposed as reception centers, including the effects of traffic congestion on the way to and in the vicinity of the f acilities, and LILCO's Revision 8 proposal to employ traffic guides on Nassau County roadways.

See ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,157-63,162 n.105 (1986); Memorandum and Order Rulings on LILCO Motion to Reopen Record and Remand of Coliseum Issue, ASLBP No. 86-533-01-OL (December 11,1986): ALAB-855, 24 NRC 792 (1986), review declined, Memoran-dum of June 23, 1987 by Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.E For the rea-sons given below, we find for LILCO on each of these eight issues.

3/ Two other issues were withdrawn by the Interveners. Memorandum and Order, ASLBP No. 86-529-02-OL (A pril 30, 1987)

6 A. The Number of People Arriving at the Reception Centers

17. In ALAB-855 the Appeal Board affirmed our finding that LILCO is obliged to provide a basis for the number of people expected to arrive at relocation centers, whether for sheltering (congregate care) or for monitoring and possible decontamina-tion. This calls upon us to interpret NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criterion J.12,E which reads as follows:

12. Each organization shall describe the means for registering and monitoring of evacuees at relocation centers in host areas. The personnel and equipment available should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers.

The percentage of people from the EPZ expected to arrive at a relocation

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18.

center is a generic issue. Tr. 18,346-47,18,353,18,465 (Keller). But so f ar as our re-search has revealed, it has not been litigated or addressed before in any reported NRC decision.NI 9/ Criterion J.12 is one of the criteria for 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), which requires that a " range of protective actions" be developed.

M/ To the extent the case decisions discuss the number of people that must be planned for, they use the 20 percent figure, but in the context of people needing shel-ter, not monitoring or decontamination. S_ee e Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. (Wm. H.

Zimmer Nuclear Power Station. Unit 1). LBP-82-48,15 NRC 1549,1589136 (1982),

aff'd with modifications. ALAB-727,17 NRC 760 (1983); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nu-clear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-37, 20 NRC 933, 956, 960-61 (1984), af f'd, ALAB-813,22 NRC 59 (1985). The former case merely says that "[a] approximately 20 percent of [an] evacuating population will proceed to a relocation center." It also notes that if the possibility of contamination exists, individuals would be advised to report to a relo-cation center through the media.

The latter case, Catawba, also cites the 20 percent figure (20 NRC at 956),

though for Catawba apparently there is more than enough shelter available for the en-tire EPZ. The Catawba ASLB concluded that there would be adequate monitoring per-sonnel and equipment at the shelters (20 NRC at 960-61), but it is not clear from the decision how many people the Board believed would have to be monitored.

19. The position of LILCO, the NRC Staff, and FEMA is that an appropriate ,

planning basis is 20 percent of the population of the EPZ -- that is, a plan should pro-vide in advance the resources (people and instruments) to monitor 20 percent of the EPZ population in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker ,e_t al. direct testimony), at 10; FEMA Ex. 2 (Baldwin et al. direct testimony), at 7; Tr.19,221 (Kantor). The position of New York State is that LILCO should be required to plan for 100 percent of the Shoreham EPZ. NYS Ex.1 (Papile et al. direct testimony), at 7. Suffolk County's posi-tion, based on responses to a question in one of the County's opinion polls, appears to be that LILCO should be required to plan for " hundreds of thousands" of people. SC Ex.13 (Cole et al. direct testimony), at 19.

20. The Board's fundamental finding on this issue is that the 20 percent figure used by FEMA, and supported by the NRC Staff, is a reasonable planning basis for re-ception centers.

Agency Interpretation

21. This finding is consistent, as noted above, with the interpretations prof-fered by both FEMA and the NRC Staff. FEMA and the NRC Staff wrote Criterion J.12, Tr.18,351 (Keller),19,208 (Kantor), and FEMA is charged with reviewing plans against it, Tr. 19,219,19,227 (Kantor). FEMA's interpretation is its national policy. Tr.

13,360-61 (Husar). Accordingly, their opinions as to how J.12 should be interpreted are entitled to considerable weight.

11/ NRC Staff regulatory gu'. des are entitled to " considerable prima facie weight."

Vermont Yankee Nucica" Powar Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809, 811, clarified as to other matters, 8 AEC 826 (1974). In particular, NUREG-0654 is entitled to such weight. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nu-clear Station, Unit No.1), ALAB-698,16 NRC 1290,1298-99 (1982). Likewise FEMA findings constitute " rebuttable presumptions." 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2).

(footnote continued) e

" Legislative" History

22. Our finding is also consisteat with the " legislative history" of Criterion J.12. The " considerations [that] led to the development of Criterion J.12" were de-scribed by an NRC Staff witness as follows:

The consideration.s expressed in NUREG-0396, the re-port of a joint NRC-EPA task force on emergency planning issued in 1978, and the lessons learned during and af ter the accident at Three Mile Island led to the development of the planning criteria in NUREG-0654 including J.12. The ra-diological characteristics of potential releases show that materials which could lead to contamination of members of l the public, although less likely to be released than other fis' l sion products, should not be neglected in planning. Consid-ering the experience at TMI which indicated a concern re-garding contamination among some members of the public, l the NRC and FEMA staff developers of NUREG-0654 con-cluded that the planning basis for emergency response at nu-clear power plants should include a capability at relocation centers to monitor evacuees from the EPZ for contamina-tion NRC views evaluation criterion J.12 to be a means of assuring that offsite response organizations have provisions included in their emergency plans and procedures for moni-toring members of the public evacuated from the plume ex-posure EPZ, including evacuees requesting shelter and those requesting monitoring only.

No specific number or percentage of the EPZ popula-tion to be monitored is given in NUREG-0654. Based on planning concepts that included (1) the potential conse-quences, timing and release characteristics of a spectrum of accidents rather than a single worst-case accident, (2)

(footnote continued)

A number of decisions say that the Staff's and FEMA's opinions are not binding on licensing boards in contested proceedings. For instance, on questions such as inter-pretations of statutes the NRC Staff submissions have no more weight than those of any other party. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station Units 1 & 2), CLI-76-17, 4 NRC 451, 462 (1976). But we are not relying on to the Staff and FEMA simply because the are r the Staff and FEMA, but rather because they are privy to, and pres-ented uncontradicted information about, the intent of the authors of NUREG-0654 and because their interpretation of the regulatory requirement makes sense and is consis-tent with the Commission's general approach to emergency planning.

predetermined protective actions based on plant conditions, and (3) protective actions that initially would be taken over part rather than the whole of the EPZ (the keyhole concept),

it was the judgment of the staff that local offsite response organizations need not possess the capability for monitoring the entire or even the majority of the EPZ population for contamination. The intent was for offsite organizations to have sufficient capability to monitor a reasonable number of evacuees to determine the existence and extent of a con-tamination situation and to allay public concerns. The in-tent of the 12-hour period in J.12 was to provide a recom-mended objective for planning purposes and for evaluating monitoring capacity (i.e., personnel and equipment).

Consistent with the planning basis expressed in NUREG-0654 and NUREG-0396 that for the worst possible accidents protective actions would need to be expanded and that detailed planning for the EPZs would provide a substan-tial base for expansion of response efforts in the event this proved necessary, it was recognized that for a serious core damage accident resulting in a large release of radioactive materials offsite, the monitoring capabilities of offsite agen-cies would need to be supplemented by other industry and l

governmental resources including the Federal capability.

The objective in this case would be to expand the monitoring capability to provide monitoring services to all members of the public within and beyond the EPZ who needed or wanted to be monitored. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period in evaluation criterion J.12 is not considered to be applicable in this extraordinary situation as these other industry and governmental resourcas would be expected to respond on a best effort basis.

Staff Ex. 5 (Kantor direct testimony), at 3-5. Mr. Kantor's testimony was based in part on his -discussions with people who participated in the development of NUREG-0654, including a person who was on the NRC-FEM A Steering Committee that produced N U REG-0654. Tr.19,214-15,19,232-33 (Kantor); see also Tr. 19,186-87, 19,204-08 (Kantor).

23. LILCO's witness Dale Donaldson's testimony was consistent with the NRC Staff's. See Tr.17,748 (Donaldson). Mr. Donaldson was part of a three-man team that draf ted a " precursor" document to NUREG-0654. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 8: Tr.19,232-33 (Kantor). With respect to monitoring the public, the

authors of the precursor document did not have a specific number of people in mind, but believed "that only a small percentage of the EPZ would require monitoring." Id.:

see also Tr. 17,453-55 (Donaldson). Mr. Donaldson also testified, based on his NRC ex-perience observing drills and exercises and responding to and investigating the TMI ac-cident, that clear precoordination of the responsibilities for monitoring is more impor-tant than extreme detail; that is, monitoring can be effectively implemented as long as the basic response f ramework is in existence. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testi-many), at 9; Tr.17,457 (Donaldson); see also Tr.17,666 (Linnemann) (problem at TMI was not shortage of people but lack of organization). This is why the intention behind the precursor document was that "some capability" for monitoring the general public be prouded. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 8; see also Tr. 17,747-49 (Donaldson).

Fundamental Concept of Emergency Planning

24. The Board's finding is also consistent with the fundamental concept of emergency planning: that there should be detailed planning for the more probable acci-dents, with the capability to expand the planning basis ad hoc in the event of less likely worst-case accidents. See Tr.19,202-03 (Kantor), 17,482-83 (Crocker), 17,485-86 (Donaldson). "The emphasis is on prudent risk reduction measures. The regulation does not require dedication of resources to handle every possible accident that can be imag-ined. The concept of the regulation is that there should be core planning with suffi-cient planning flexibility to develop a reasonable ad hoc response to those very serious 12/ "[P]lanners must apportion their resources expended in attempting to limit the public consequences potentially associated with such accidents in accordance with pri-orities that are associated with the relative probabilities of Category 5 events com-pared to more probable accident scenarios." Tr. 12,380-81 (Finlayson).

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, " s low probability accidents which could affect the general public." Sputhern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-83-10,17 NRC 528, 533 (1983) (emphasis in original). This concept runs throughout NRC regulations and guidance. For example, NUREG-0396 and -0654 provide that detailed emergency planning should be done for a " spectrum" of accidents, not for the worst-case accident. -

NUREG-0396 at 4-5, 7-8; Tr.18,369 (Keller). NUREG-0396 recommends that "[n]g o '

special local decontamination provisions for the general public (e.g., blankets, changes of clothing, food, special showers)" and no special decontamination equipment for prop-1I erty and equipment need be provided. NUREG-0396 at 14-15 (emphasis in original):

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 4-5. Similarly, the NRC requires de-tailed planning only for a 10-mile plume exposure EPZ, while at the same time ,

recognizing that an ad hoc expansion of response efforts beyond this distance might be required.E Likewise, when the NRC promulgated the regulation that requires no ad-vanced planning offsite for operation up to five percent power. it recognized that some ofIsite response might be required even at this power level but reasoned that an ad hoc response would be adequate.

25. Similarly, when it comes to monitoring, LILCO, FEMA. and the NRC Staff emphasize that what is important is that there be a " planning basis" of detailed plan-a ning for a portion of the EPZ population, with the capability to expand the response if

. t .

necessary. Tr.18,369,18,374-75 (Keller),18,357 (Husar),19,202-03,19,222 (Kantor),

1_3/ The preamble to 10 CFR S 50.47 provides that the distances chosen for the 10-and 50-mile EPZ's "are considered large enough to provide a response base that would support activity outside the planning zone should this ever be needed." 45 Fed. Reg.

55,402, 55,406 col. 2 (Aug.19,1980). ,

1_4 / 47 Fed. Reg. 30,232-33 (July 13.1982) (preamble to low power emergency plan-ning rule): see also 46 Fed. Reg. 61,132, 61,133 col.1 (Dec.15,1981) (notice of proposed rulemaking).

. . g i

l 17,744 (Dreikorn), 17,481-82 (Crocker). Twenty percent of the EPZ population provides such a substantial planning basis. Tr.19,221 (Kantor), 18,357-58 (Husar).

FEMA Policy

26. The Board's finding is consistent with FEMA's policy, as embodied in a memorandum of Richard W. Krimm of FEMA dated December 24, 1985. LILCO Ex.1 '

(Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. L; FEM A Ex.1 This " interpretive guidance" was prepared by FEMA's Policy Development Branch, and is FEMA's national policy. Tr.

18.314 (Keller), Tr.18,440 (Husar),18,346,18,465 (Keller). The Krimm Memorandum is based on FEMA's review of "[p]revious experience gathered on evacuation responses to a variety of natural and technological emergencies." FEM A Ex. 1. Among the emergencies that FEMA took into account was Three Mile Island; a FEMA witness testified that to the extent that the experience at TMI bears on the situation today, it supports the 20 percent standard. Tr.18,471 (Keller); see also SC Ex. 33. Research shows that anywhere from 3 to 20 percent of the evacuees arrived at relocation centers or shelters, FEMA Ex.1, though a FEMA witness thought that 3-15 percent was a more representative range, Tr.18,322 (Keller). Accordingly, FEMA has chosen the upper end of the the 3 to 20 percent range as the planning basis. LILCO Ex.1, Att. L: FEMA Ex.

1; see also Tr. 18,355-59 (Musar). The Krimm Memorandum does not explicitly analyze the number of people who might actually be contaminated in a given accident; howev-er, as LILCO pointed out, ordinarily one would expect protective action recommenda-tions (either sheltering or evacuation) greatly to limit the number of people contami-nated; hence, in most cases one would expect the only people arriving at shelters to be those who needed shelter. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 10-11; see also Tr. 18,404-05 (Keller), Tr. 19,216-17 (Kantor), 19,228 (Hulman), 17,478-79 "

(Crocker).

w.

/

s 1

t

27. It is not disputed that under some circumstances more than 20 percent of the EPZ might need to be monitored. 'Tr.18.325 (Keller), LILCO Ex.1,(Crocker e.t a_1.

direct testimony), at 11-12.E The Krimm Memorandum says so explicitly:

^

For highly improbable radiological releases involving 'high levels of radiation encompassing a relatively large area, it may be necessary to monitor a greater number of evacuees beyond 20 percent of the population. In such a situa' tion, State and local governments would be expected to develop and implement ad hoc response measures, supplemented, if '

needed, by Federal and private sector resources.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e.t al. direct testimony), Att. L, at 2: FEM A Ex.1. But it does not follow that NRC regulations require detailed planning for more than 20 percent, any 1

more than planning for beyond the 10-mile EPZ is necessary because some accidents l

might require action beyond 10 miles. <

Plume " Footprint" Analysis

28. The Board's finding is also consistent with the NRC Staff's analysis of the number of people who might be exposed to a radioactive plume from an accident at Shoreham. This analysis was presented in the written testimony of Lewis G. $ulman.

Staff Ex. 5 (Hulman direct testimony). Mr. Hulman calculated the site of a straight-line Gaussian plume in each of sixteen 22i-degree sectors around the compass and de-termined the number of people that would be in the " footprint" of each such plume, including in every case the people in a circle two miles in radius about the plant. He then calculated the percentage of the time the plume would touch the various peremu-ages of the EPZ population. Id. at 5-8; Tr.19,224-25 (Hulman).

,e .

l' 3 -

l M/ LILCO testified earlier in this proceeding that it is very improbable that all l 160,000 people in the EPZ would be advised to go in for decontamination. Tr. 14.828-30 l (Weismantle, Cordaro).

a- . .

f

' 29. Mr. Hulman used three different scenarios, which he called Cases 1, 2, '

and 3. For Case 1 he limited the plume width to six times the crosswind dispersion parameter, a width that would be expected to contain some 99.73 percent of the con-centration of contaminant. M.at5-6. For Case 2 he assumed that the plume would l

continue t'o grow horizontally or broaden rather than be limited as in Case 1. Ld. at 7.

In Case 3 he assumed that all people from 2 to 10 miles in each of the sixteen 22t de-gree sectors, plus all those within two miles, could be within the plume. Ld. He then L weighted each of the 16 population estimates by the percent of time the wind would be expected to blow in that direction. In effect, this case assumed no difference in plume

[

growth, or differences in plume size, for different atmospheric stability assumptions, and assumed everyone in a 22i degree sector, plus everyone within a two-mile radius. - -

would be influenced by a release. Ld. at 7. Mr. Hulman used projected population esti-mates for the summer of the year 2020 (a total of 230,646 people), because these repre-f sented the greatest population expected within the 10-mile EPZ. Ld. at 2.

30. In each of the three cases in Mr. Hulman's analysis, the percent of people in the EPZ with the potential to be exposed to the calculated plumes would be less than 20 percent most (about 90 percent) of the time. Hence, in the Staff's view this analysis supports the 20 percent figure chosen by FEMA in the Krimm Memorandum. Ld. at 9.

31. Two Suffolk County witnesses testified that the Staff analysis was inade-quate. See SC Ex.14 (Minor and Sholly rebuttal testimony). Their reasoning was that Mr. Hulman's analysis ignored the effect of shif ting winds and precipitation, both of which could increase the number of people contaminated. But Mr. Hulman was aware i of these limitations and acknowledged them in his written testimony. Staff Ex. 5 ._

(Hulman direct testimony), at 8. In his view the conservatism in his analysis (principal-ly ignoring the effect of protective actions) more than offset these limitations. Ld: see 1

also Tr. 19,211,19,223,19,228 (Hulman). As noted above, LILCO testified that ordinari-ly one would expect protective action recommendations greatly to limit the number of people contaminated. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker gt al. direct testimony), at 10-11.

32. Moreover, the record compiled earlier in this proceeding shows that

"{ aletual wind shif ts at the Shoreham site are less frequent than for many other sites."

Partial Initial Decision (hereinaf ter "PID"), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 779 (1985); see Cordare, et al., ff. Tr. 8760, at 43 and Att.19; Tr. 8957 (Cordaro). As Mr. Hulman testified:

When Ilook at the data that has been collected in the region near and at Shoreham specifically, I find that wind shif ts are not unlikely. They do occur, but there are a rela-tively large number of periods in which the wind does not shif t, and it blows pretty much in the same direction for long periods of time. So, while it's true on the one hand that the wind can shif t, it's also true that an accident, if it were to occur at Shoreham, could encounter a situation where the wind did not shif t.

Tr.19,222-23 (Hulman); see also Tr.19,229 (Hulman). All that the County's testimo-ny on this point establishes is that more than 20 percent of the population micht need monitoring, something that is not in dispute.b 16/ Not only is the weather better at Shoreham than at other sites, there is some ev-idence of record that Shoreham has extra safety features as compared to other plants.

Tr.12,420-23 (Finlayson, Minor). Recently, LILCO has stated that it plans to build a supplemental containment system, a feature that no other plant in this country has.

Tr.17,926 (Minor). In light of the evidence showing that Shoreham is better than other plants in these respects and the f act that the issue here is a generic one, the Board cannot reject the Staff's analysis, as the Interveners wish it to do, simply because wind shif ts and precipitation might occur.

11 / The Board is not required to make worst-case assumptions about everything that might happen in a radiological accident. In the Limerick case an intervenor challenged the evacuation time estimates on the ground that an average one-hour mobilization time for school buses used for the estimates was too brief. The ASLB had acknowledged that mobliization could take longer than one hour. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 490 (1986). The Appeal (footnote continued)

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State of New York ArtrumeA%

3/' 33. The Bost finds that the reasons for requiring detailed emergenciplan-

. .t ning for morgthan 10 percentjof the EPZ population are not persuasive. As noted ,'

above, New Tork State argus:that LILCO should be required to be able to monitor 100 percent of .the EPZ populaticn {n about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The State's posithn was presented by diree witncsses from the State's Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group (REPG). t Their advocacy of a 100 percent requirement for Shoreham seems to t,e based on three ,

,> y grounds: '

1. The " plain raeaning" rulejl/ of Statutory construction,

2. guidance allegedly received from FEMA personnel, and

~

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3. the f act, de:11ed by no one, that more than 20 percent. of the EPZ popula- 1 f tion might shJw up at thu reception centers in some circumstances.

t s

3 . *'

(footnote continued) ,

hoatii said that " LEA's claim that the ETE should be based on wocst case assumptions is Unconvincing." In a footnote it explained as follows: ,

l e In ALA&t819,22 NRC at 713, wu pointed out tha[the  ;

low probability that an accident requiing evacuation might occur is not an approprdte consideration when determining the adequacy of an emergency' plan. That does not mean,

, however, that the options crovided t'or under the plan must assume. in adCition, the trasence of the worst conceivable extraneous conditions. 'See generally San Luis Obispo Mothers f or D_esce v. NRC,,780 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir.1986) (er}

banc). ,' ,

i e P,hJlfdelphia Electric Qg (Limerick Generating Station. Units l'& 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 491 n.17 (1986).' >

"jjf "A commori-sense readira of Section J.12 means to us, as emergenby planners, that there must be planning for' monitoring 100% of the EPZ populanon/' NYS Ex.1

&apile e_t al. direct testimony), at 8. "(T]he Krimm memorandum is in confdct with the plain language of ! Ection J.12 . . . ." Id. at 11.

4 t 1 1 j

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. _._ _ __.m m______.______m_ _ ._ .l

I

)

34. First, we do not agree with the State witnesses' application of the " plain meaning" rule. The words of Criterion J.12 are "all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ -iving at relocation centers" (emphasis added). It is undisputed that more than '- percent of the EPZ population might arrive at relocation centers.

However, it is also true that in construing legal language one assumes that the authors l intended the words to have meaning and avoided the use of superfluous language. Ac-l cordingly, the phrase " arriving at reincation centers" should be given some meaning.

t

' Had the authors of Criterion J.12 meant that the personnel and equipment available should be capable of monitoring "all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ," they would have lef t out the phrase " arriving at relocation centers." According-ly,'it is clear that something less than 100 percent of the EPZ was intended.N The only evidence of what the authors intended was presented by Messrs. Donaldson (for LILCO) and Kantor (for the NRC Staff), and that information is consistent with trLe Board's " plain meaning" analysis and not the State's.

35. Second, the State witnesses based their interpretation that J.12 requires a ,

100 percent planning basis in very large part on their interpretation of FEMA's views. Tr.18,148-49 (Papile. Czech),18,251 (Baranski).E But on the witness stand

.l_9/ The " plain meaning" they see in the words is not at all plain, even in REPG itself. At one time a REPG employee was writing school officials describing a 30 per-cent planning basis. Tr. 18.125-27 (Papile).

2_0/ It is just as apparent, from the phrase "in the plume exposure EPZ," that the draf tsmen intended the guidance to address people in the EPZ, not " shadow" people f rom outside the EPZ.

I 21/ The State REPG witnesses testified that they were not aware of the Krimm l Memorandum until recently. Tr.18,153,18,249 (Baranski, Papile). The memorandum was sent to the State, but apparently the State never provided it to REPG. Tr.18,502 (Keller). Indeed, the X;imm Memorandum was attached to, and discussed in. LILCO's Supplemental Memorandum of Law on the Number of People Who Might Be Monitored (footnote continued) l - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

the FEMA witnesses disclaimed that interpretation, leaving little basis for the State's case.E FEMA has not deviated from the Krimm Memorandum, Tr. 18,446-49 (Husar, Keller, Baldwin), and has never given a negative finding for a f ailure to meet a standard

- (footnote continued) in a Radiological Emergency, served November 21, 1986. Fully five separate copies were served, respectively, on Special Counsel to the Governor, an Assistant Attorney l General, a person in the State Energy office, Staff Counsel in the State Department of Public Service, and a Counsel to the Governor.

l U/ It is clear that the State accepts the federal Criterion J.12 as its own standard.

See Tr.18,234,18,237 (Papile).

l M/ Much of the State witnesses' quarrel with the Krimm Memorandum seems to be that it was not published more formally, Tr. 18.156,18,158,18,161,18.229-30 (Papile).

They simply could not say whether they would follow the guidance if it were published more formally. Tr. 18,159-62 (Papile). Indeed, the REPG testimony on this point sug-gests that the State witnesses do not really disagree with FEMA about the meaning of the federal criterion:

l Q. The question is a hypothetical and was, if the Krimm memorandum came out in the same words as it is today af ter this process of comment and publication as a FEMA guid-ance memorandum and concurrence by the NRC, would you follow it? . . .

.. . WITNESS PAPILE: Again, I would have to say that I would have to go to the agencies responsible. In this case, the Health Department and so forth.

But, I would like to add, that's a minimum require-ment. And, I would like to add also, a minimum required is 20 percent. What we are saying is, maybe above 20 percent.

As long as we meet the minimum requirement FEMA has no call-back. We have ben threatened, we have been written letters, we have ' men Tid that they are going to check us for 100 percent. .nd, I xeep telling them 20 per-cent is what you are asking 7. That's all you can check.

That's what the federal agency is asking for. If we say all, that it's more than 20 percent, we have met the minimum requirement.

Tr.18,159-60 (Papile).

higher than 20 percent, Tr. 18,449-50 (Keller). Moreover, the FEMA ' witnesses explained why in one instance they appeared to require planning for 100 percent of the EPZ population. Tr.18,446-48 (Husar, Baldwin). In another instance, in which a dif-ferent FEMA Region had apparently required planning for 100 percent for the Trojan plant, the FEMA witnesses concluded that that Region had subsequently changed its in-terpretation to conform with the national pcuoy embodied in the Krimm Memorandum.

Tr.18,373-74,18,449 (Keller).

Practice at Other New York Plants

36. New York State witnesses testified that they aimed for 100 percent moni-toring capability at other operating nuclear plants in New York State. They do not, however, achieve this goal. Tr.18,381 (Keller Husar). The FEMA witnesses testified that the counties responsible for the Nine Mile Point /FitzPatrick plants have the capa-bility of monitoring 35 to 40 percent (less than the 46.6 percent that LILCO has provid-ed). Tr.18,371,18,379 18,472,18,481-83 (Keller). The REPG witnesses testified that the counties around Indian Point cannot meet the 100 percent standard. Tr. 18,247 (Baranski),18,252 (Czech); see also Tr. 18,381, 8,383-85 (Keller). As for Ginna, FEMA testified that 98 monitoring personnel are necessary just to meet the 20 percent standard; the REPG witnesses testified that they believe 231 personnel are available.

2_{/ if a plan calls for more than is required by federal standards, FEMA nevertheless reviews against the plan's higher standard. Tr.18,370 (Keller).

25/ According to the FEMA witnesses, the New York State policy of having capacity for more than 20 percent has not been put in writing or formally conveyed to FEMA.

The New York counties affected by the State's position were recently " surprised" by it.

Tr.18,45'., -56 (Husar). The State continues to forward plans to FEMA having less than 100 percent monitoring capacity. Tr.18,460 (Keller). A fair inference would be that

( the State's unwritten " policy" was formulated recently and for the purpose of pre-venting a Shoreham operating license.

I

Tr.18,459 (Husar); Tr. 18,073-75 (Czech). Apparently many of the monitors for other .

l New York State plants are volunteers from volunteer fire departments and the State Guard. Tr. 18,105,18,081 (Papile). It appears that a 100 percent standard for detailed, advance planning is met nowhere in New York State. Even if it were, the decision of New York State to have 100 percent monitoring capability at sites where the State and counties are responsible for planning would not be dispositive of the meaning of a federal guideline such as Criterion J.12.

37. Moreover, a REPG witness testified that the 100 percent standard they advocate for Shoreham is " planning guidance only." Tr. 18,238,18,215,18,229 (Papile).

l l The State's witness explained what he meant as follows:

l WITNESS PAPILE: In our statement, we feel as though in order to meet the criteria of J-12, that you may have so many monitors on hand at that time to stop (start) the operation, and then you may have a call-up of other monitors at that time, and your planning guides must then show where you are going to get the other monitors from.

It is the same thing as was stated, I think, by LILCO when they brought up the fact of INPO coming in and other agencies. We do this on a county-to-county basis.

JUDGE KLINE: So, the requirement for monitoring capability on hand on the day of the emergency, may not be --

WITNESS PAPILE: We have to build it up to 100 per-cent, sir.

JUDGE KLINE: The amount of capability on hand, plus the amount that you can call, must be 100 percent?

WITNESS PAPILE: Must be 100 percent, yes, sir. And we say that should be so stated, sir.

Tr.18,238-39 (Papile). It appears, then, that there is little or no difference between the State's position and LILCO's, the NRC Staff's, and FEM A's.

l l

t

Monitoring Shadow Suffolk County appears to disagree with both the 20 percent guidance 38.

adopted by federal agencies and with the 100 percent standard urged by the State.N Suffolk County's witnesses testified that in a Shoreham emergency (apparently in any Shoreham emergency, or at least in any one in which there was a release), " hundreds of thousands" of people would come to the reception centers asking to be monitored. SC Ex.13 (Cole e_t a_1. direct testimony), at 19. Many people would come to be monitored, l

the County argues, whether or not there was any objective reason to believe they had been contaminated and whether or not they had been advised to be monitored. LILCO's witness referred to this behavior as the " monitoring" shadow, as distinguished from the

" evacuation" shadow. LILCO Ex.1 (Crccker et al. direct testimony), at 12-13.

2_6/ Other nuclear plants in New York State do not take into account people outside the EPZ for purposes of planning for monitoring. Tr.18,176 (Czech). FEMA's evalua-tion of other New York plans is based on 20 percent of the EPZ and not 20 percent of

the people between the plant and the reception centers. Tr.18.376 (Keller).

2_7/ LILCO and Suffolk County agree that the root cause of shadow evacuation and of shadow monitoring are the same. Dr. Mileti, testifying for LILCO, said that the " root of both . . . evacuation behavior or seeking out of monitoring would be the same " Tr.

17.766 (Mileti); see also Tr.17,773 (Lindell). Professors Saegert and Johnson say that evacuation and monitoring-seeking "have some similar roots." SC Ex.13 / Cole e_t aj. di-rect testimony), at 27; see also Tr. 17,871,17,882 (Johnson),17,933 (Cole).17.933-34 (Johnson, Saegert). The County witnesses meant that pre-existing fear of radiation is the _" primary factor" causing " hundreds of thousands of people to attempt to be moni-tored in the event of a Shoreham accident." Dr. Mileti, on the other hand, was refer-ring to situational perception of risk, as shaped by emergency information. Tr.17.766 (Mileti). Hence the dispute here is what it was in the earlier litigation over the " shad-ow phenomenon."

i However, evacuation shadow and monitoring shadow are different manifestations l

of the root cause. Dr. Mileti addressed the difference between " monitoring" shadow and " evacuation" shadow in his testimony on Contentions EX 38 and 39 in the 50-322-OL-5 (EP Exercise) hearing. See LILCO's Testimony on Contentions EX 38 (ENC Op-erations) and EX 39 (Rumor Control), Docket No. 50-322-OL-5, at 86-87. As he said I there, if there were a link between shadow evacuation and monitoring shadow, it would ,

likely be an inverse relationship. Ld. at 87. That is, surely some of the shadow evacuees would conclude that their evacuation had been successful, so that they would not need l monitoring. Ld. at 86-87. j l

i 1

1 I l b - _ . . . . _ _ . _ ..._______ _ ___ __ __ _ __ __ _ d

39. The County's estimation of the " monitoring shadow" was based on an opin- I i

ion poll taken by Suffolk County witness Stephen Cole. Several questions on this poll were based on Dr. Cole's adaptation of the scenario used in the emergency planning ex-ercise of the LILCO Plan on February 13,1986, which was recently the subject of a sep-arate hearing. Among several questions asking people whether they thought they would evacuate in response to certain EBS messages was the following question specifically about monitoring:

If at 1:45 pm you heard on the radio a LILCO repre-sentative say that certain people living within ten miles of Shoreham may have been exposed to radiation during their trip out of the evaucation zone and should go to a specific location in Nassau County to be monitored for possible radio-active contamination, would you:

4 1 = go to the specific location in Nassau to see if you had been contaminated with ra-diation, or i 2 = go somewhere else to have your radia-tion level checked, or 3 = would not bother to have your radiation level checked.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 13-14. In response to this question Dr.

Cole received the following answers:

Suffolk Suffolk Nassau Outside EPZ Inside EPZ Total t=Go to the specific location in Nassau County to see if you had been contaminated with radiation 50% 49 % 52% 50%

2=Go somewhere else to have your radiation level checked 31 33 38 32 3=Would not bother to have your I radiation level checked 15 12 5 13 4= Don't know 4 5 4 5 Total 100 99 99 100 Thus, 50 percent of the households queried said that they would go to the reception centers. Dr. Cole extrapolated to the population of Long Island as a whole and testified i

j that 50 percent represents more than 1.3 million people. SC Ex.13 (Cole et al. direct I

i 1

u-_-_-____-______

testimony), at 17. He testified that the survey was useful to estimate the " approximate magnitude" of the public's response to a monitoring advisory. Ld.

4 0. - FEMA does not consider the County's po'Is to be a reliable data base from which to estimate the number of people who might be concerned about contamination.

Tr.18,324 (Keller).

41. We have already concluded in this case that " poll results have no literal predictive validity." LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 667 (1985); see also Ld. at 655-71.E Our reasoning was that the public, in an actual emergency, would have additional informa-

. tion that respondents would need to determine their actions in an emergency.E We therefore gave little weight to the predictive findings of the public opinion polls. Id.

This finding has now passed Appeal Board review and the time for Commission review and is final agency action.

2_8/ The view that polls of behavioral intentions can predict Dehavior is a distinctly minority view, as explained earlier in this proceeding. Cordaro e_t gl., ff. Tr.1470, at 69-76: Tr.1817 (Dynes, Mileti). Dr. Mileti testified that he was co principal investiga-tor of the largest "what would you do if" study he believed the National Scier.ce Founda-tion has ever funded, and the report from that study clearly points out that one cannot predict human behavior from what people told the investigators they would likely do.

Ld. at 81.

D/ As Dr. Mileti testified earlier, many " intervening variables" may prevent or delay evacuation:

(Flor instance, you might ask me what would you do if [you were] in a fire and I might say I probably would evacuate as quickly as I could.

Put me in a fire, let's say if this room were on fire, there may be lots of intervening variables for why I don't l

evacuate first. .

Tr.1835 (MIleti). More recently Dr. Lindell testified that many " barriers" may prevent l or delay evacuation. LILCO Ex. 50 (Lindell rebuttal testimony), at 3-4. The opinion

. poll relied on by the County ignores or downplays these other f actors, LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 16, and gives respondents only one choice --

evacuation -- for an " active" response to the hazard, Ld.

l t

42. There is no good reason to change that conclusion now in the face of yet another similar opinion poll. This is particularly the case where we are asked to rely

. principally on a single question that in no way reflects the situation that the public would face in a real emergency. This question, and the 'other questions in the poll, were edited by Dr. Cole, making them shorter, and giving less information, than the EBS messages used in the Shoreham exercise. Tr. 17,819-22 (Cole), LILCO Ex. 4. The  ;

l entire accident scenario, which took place over several hours in the exercise, was de-j scribed to survey respondents in the space of a few seconds. The survey question gives i-the source of the advisory as "a LILCO representative," when the LILCO EBS messages are explicitly designed to refer to . multiple sources of information.E Ld. The survey repeats each (significantly edited) message only once, whereas the real messages are ,

j designed to be repeated every 15 minutes.U Ld. The particular survey question does l

not even tell the respondent whether he is one of the people who was advised to be monitored N

43. The only data on monitormg-seeking af ter a real emergency were pres-ented by LILCO. LILCO testified that starting about two weeks after the Three Mile Is-land Accident, whole body counts and thyroid counts were offered to the public. Over the next several months approximately 736 whole body counts and about 200 thyroid counts were done. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et _a_1. direct testimony), at 15. Compared to i

30/ Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 27: Tr.10,496-97 (Weismantle).

31/ Cordaro et al.. ff. Tr.1470, at 34: Tr.10.593,10,607 (Mileti).

M/ Dr. Cole testified that, at least those people who live outside the EPZ could not have believed that they were in the group advised to be monitored, because the ques-

' tion said that certain people may have been exposed to radiation "during their trip out of the evacuation zone." See LILCO Ex. 4. at 3866-67. It is not clear, however, that respondents were aware of the location of the evacuation zone.

l

the number of people who lived near TMI (about 35,000 people within live miles, 127,000 people within five to ten miles, and 209,000 people within 10-15 miles, id.), or the number of people who evacuated (144,000 by one estimate, Tr.17,499 (Mileti),

19,195 (Kantor)), only a ver tmall percentage of the public asked to be monitored. If the County's theories were correct. one would expect a great many rme people to have requested monitoring.

44. The sort of reasoning the County uses to argue about the " evacuation" shadow f ails to support its argument about " monitoring" shadow. Whereas in the case of the " evacuation" shadow the County depends heavily on actual behavior iluring the accident at Three Mile Island, in the case of " monitoring" shadow the same sort of evi-dence from Three Mile Island f ails to support the County's position: at TMI very few people came to the reception centers, Tr. 17,876-77 (Johnson), and few people, so f ar as we know, asked to be monitored. And the County's poll results on monitoring also ap-pear to be different from actual behavior; there is no evidence of " distance decay" in the number of residents saying that they would report for monitoring N Focus _G coups

45. Dr. Cole also conducted " focus group interviews" with 49 people on Long Island. SC Ex.13 (Cole et al. direct testimony), at 30-36. Tr.17,822 (Cole). So f ar 3_3/ Generally speaking, both the actual evacuation behavior at TMI and the intended behavior reported in polls show a " distance decay"; that is, people f arther from the nu-clear plant are less likely to say they would evacuate. See Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr.

2789, Figures 1 (ff. p. 8) and 3 (f f. p.18); Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 87. As LILCO's witnesses testified earlier in this proceeding, the " social sciences have recognized for some time that distance from the hazard affects perception of the hazard or risk . . . ."

Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 84-86: Tr.1873 (Mileti).

1 I

3_s/ Earlier in this proceeding Dr. Cole testified about other focus group interviews he had done. Cole, ff. Tr.10,727, at 16; Tr.10,823-24 (Cole).

l

.as the evidence of record shows, these' focus groups show little about monitoring. How-ever, the County witnesses used them in connection with their thesis that Long Is-landers fear radiation.

46. Dr. Cole testified that the focus group participants were not a statisti-cally valid sample and therefore could not be used to generalize statistically to the pop-ulation of Suffolk and Nassau Counties. See LILCO Ex. 4. What value the focus group interviews have in his view, apparently, is to lend support to his thesis that Long Is- l landers fear radiation. But the Board has already accepted the proposition that people fear radiation. Indeed, NUREG-0396 says that " radiation tends to be perceived as more dangerous than other hazards . . . ." NUREG-0396, App. I, at I-1 to 1-2. (LILCO's wit-ness Dr. Mileti testified that people should have a healthy respect for radiation. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker sLt al. direct testimony), at 19. And we have also found that people are not likely to react in a knee-jerk f ashion based on this fear of radiation. We see no rea-son to alter that finding now.E Suffolk Countv Cnallenge to NRC Regulations

47. We also note that Suffolk County's arguments on this issue amount to a challenge to NRC regulations. For example, the County witnesses testified that "peo-  ;

ple on Long Island believe that the EPZ is a fiction." SC Ex.13 (Cole et al. direct testi-many), at 21. The County's witness Dr. Johnson believes that NRC guidelines are based on unrealistic assumptions. Tr.17,896 (Johnson). The County's witnesses also reject the proposition that complying with NUREG-0654 and providing sound emergency infor-mation will minimize inappropriate behavior.

3_5/ That finding has now passed Appeal Board review and the time for Commission

! review and has become final agency action.

LILCO's Compliance with the 20 Percent Guidance

48. Finally, we note that LILCO has done far more than merely comply with the 20 percent guidance endorsed by FEMA and the NRC Staff. First, LILCO has done its analysis based on exactly 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, not the "about" 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of the criterion.E/ As is obvious f rom the word "about," there is some flexibility in the 12-hour criterion, as l FEMA and the NRC Staff witnesses confirmed.E Tr.18,390-91 (Keller), Tr.19,219 i

(Kantor).

49. Second, LILCO's traffic analysis shows that about 46.6 percentE of the EPZ population can be monitored in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, more than twice the 20 percent guidance l value.D Tr.17,728 (Watts),17,744 (Dreikorn). And this does not take credit for the fif ty percent extra monitoring personnel that LILCO calls out as reserves, discussed balow in connection with monitoring procedures. This conservatism is apparently not used for other plants. Tr.18.393 (Keller).

50, Third, LILCO has included in its plan a " driver-only" monitoring method as l a backup that is capable of monitoring considerably more people than the primary 1

l method. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et .a_1. direct testimony), at 53.

36/ In its analyses LILCO took the 12-hour period to begin with the arrival of the first evacuee. This is a reasonable approach. See Tr.17.742-43 (Watts). Tr.18,461 (Husar).

37/ The NRC Staff testified that observing the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is not important from a '

health and safety standpoint. Tr.19,225 (Kantor). It is a " sort of a benchmark to be used in evaluating the resources." Tr. 19,225-26 (Kantor): see also Tr.19.227 (Kantor).

3. 8/ As noted below, LILCO has increased the number of monitoring and decontami- ';

nation personnel over what it planned for the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum f rom 180 to 293. Tr.17,781-82 (Dreikorn).

39/ Also, LILCO is prepared to monitor within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> aJ people arriving on buses, not just 20 percent of them. Tr. 18,417,18,436 (Keller). i i

Ability to Expand

51. LILCO has proved that it has a substantial capacity to expand its response over and above the 20 percent guidance. In the first place,it has provided space and a plan for 140 monitoring stations at its reception centers, not just the 63 required to monitor 46.6 percent of the EPZ population in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. di-rect testimony), at 53. Second, it has agreements with the Department of Energy and with INPO, both of which are prepared to provide substantial additional resources.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 52-53; Tr.17,656-63 (Crocker, Dreikorn, Watts), Tr. 17,724-27 (Linnemann, Crocker). Also, LILCO has agreements with a number of other organizations who could help in an emergency. Tr. 17,724-27 (Crocker, Linnemann).

52. LILCO has included in its plan provisions for advuing people to go to their l

ultimate destinations, take showers, and return for monitoring later on in cases of ex-tremely large numbers of people needing decontamination. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker el al.

direct testimony), at 59; Tr.17,739 (Watts). Support for this approach can be found in a draf t EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Inci-dents. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 59. In this sense, LILCO's plan does provide for the entire EPZ population and more.

53. LILCO is in an unusually favorable position to expand its emergency re-sponse because it has provided all these resources without participation of the State or County. LILCO testified that, in case of need, it would be prepared to call on the State and the Counties in New York State for resources.E LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. di-rect testimony), at 54. As noted above, New York State believes that it has a large M/ For that matter, the State witnesses believed that volunteers could be trained as monitors in 3-4 hours. Tr.18,085 (Czech).

1 l

L-_----_--_----------_----- - - -

j

number of monitors, from volunteer fire departments and the State Guard, available for other nuclear plants in the State. The State itself also has trained monitors, though the witnesses could not say how many. Tr. 18,082-83 (Czech). It is reasonable to believe that these monitors would be made available and wou2d be willing to help in an ex-tremely serious emergency at Shoreham. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t a_1. direct testimony),

at 54; Tr.17,666,17,726 (Linnen. ann); CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 31 (1986).E

54. In summary, the Board finds that arrangements to monitor 20 percent of the EPZ population within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> are a reasonable way to meet Criterion J.12 of l NUREG-0654, and we find that LILCO's plan more than meets this standard.

l 1

B. The Location of the Reception Centers

55. Two of the admitted issues question the adequacy of the location of the I

reception centers and their distance from the Shoreham plant. These issues are the following:

Whether the distance of the reception centers from the plume EPZ would increase exposure to radiation, causing an additional problem.

Whether the reception centers' locations might create problems in regard to the evacuation shadow phenomenon.

Distance of the Reception Centers from the Plume EPZ l

56. The reception centers are approximately 40 miles from the Shoreham sta- i 1

tion, about the same distance as the Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum that they re-placed. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 24. The relevant guidance is NUREG-0654 Evaluation Criterion J.10.h. which states that the emergency plan should include "[rlelocation centers in host areas which are at least 5 miles, and preferably i 1

M/ " Typically if you get the state involved, they can involve the monitors that are in tnose other counties." Tr.18,424 (Baldwin).

1

10 miles beyond'the boundaries of the plume exposure emergency planning zone; . . . ." 1 (emphasis in original). LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et a_1. direct testimony), at 23.

57. The Board finds that the location and distance from the plant of the LILCO reception centers do not make them unsuitable for their intended purpose. Our reasons are the following.  ;

58. First, it is undisputed that some other nuclear power plants have recep-tion centers as far away as the reception centers for Shoreham. This includes at least one site in New York State, for the FitzPatrick and the two Nine Mile Point plants, which has two reception centers 35 and 40 miles away from the plants respectively.

Tr.18,120 (Baranski, Papile); LILCO Ex 1, Att. K. Obviously there is nothing categori-cally wrong with a reception center 40 miles from the power plant. See Tr.18.292, 18,340,18,408-09 (Keller).S

59. Second, LILCO testified that "[als a ger.eral matter, the dose received

' from the contamination on a person's body is small compared to the dose he received from having been in the plume in the first place." LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker ej al. direct testimony), at 38. LILCO supported this with a calculation, using standard health phys-ics tormulas and based on the accident scenario used in the February 13,1986 Exercise.

This calculation shows, even assuming that the contaminated person was delayed E hours before being decontaminated, that he would receive (conservatively) only about five percent of the dose he received before he evacuated. Id:S# see also Tr. 18.414-15 (Keller). FEMA also testified that delay will not typically result in a medically 4_2/ See also Tr. 14,621,14.624 (Keller).

M/ As noted below, LILCC's traffic analysis assumed " Level of F" Service all along the evacuation routes from the EPZ to the vicinity of the reception centers. Using an average speed of 18 miles per hour for these conditions, average travel time from the edge of the EPZ to the general area of the reception centers would be about 1.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />, i

1 l

significant' increase in exposure. Tr.18,293-94,18,295,18,415 (Keller). Good health physics practice would dictate that monitoring be done as soon as possible. Tr.18,285 (Keller), 17,476-77 (Watts). But there is no reliable evidence that delays in getting to the LILCO reception centers would be exc ssive.

60. County witness Dr. Rad'.ord testified that " surf ace contamination could be highl.v significant in comparison to the direct radiation from the plume. Thus,in some circumstances, surf ace contamination can be a significant f actor in an individual's total dose." SC Ex.16 (Radford et al. direct testimony), at 34. But Dr. Radford provided no i

details about what these " circumstances" might be. He simply assumed surface con-l tamination that would produce a five rad dose in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> and pointed out that doubling the amount of time of exposure would double the dose. Ld. at 34. (This is an oversimplification, since the decay of radioisotopes having short half lives would tend to lower the dose.) Dr. Radford made no attempt to relate the amount of dose received from surface contamination to the amount of dose that the individual would have re-ceived in the first place while getting contaminated.

61. Suffolk County's witnesses would not opine either that the reception cen-ters are too far away or too close to the plant. Nor could they suggest any better loca-tion. New York State counsel asked a number of questions on cross-examination appar-ently designed to explore whether other suitable f acilities might exist closer to the plant. He discovered none. Tr.18.341-44 (Baldwin. Kellerh see also Tr. 17.700-03, 17,765,17,783 (Crocker).b Even if he had, it would not automatically prove that 44/ While having a reception center farther from the plant might have some disad-vantages,it might also have some advantages. In particular, the farther from the plant the reception center is, the less likely that it will have to be relocated because the re-ception center itself has been contaminated Tr. 18,296-97,18,411 (Keller) - a concern which the interveners seem to have.

I' LILCO's Plan is inadequate. There is no requirement that the best possible site be cho-sen. j i

62. In short, the Board finds that the distance of the relocation centers from the EPZ does not make them unsultable. j Reception Centers' Locations and the " Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon" 1

63. Suffolk County's witnesses testified that the location of the reception centers might affect the evacuation " shadow phenomenon"in two respects. First, they believe that the location of the reception centers, which would be viewed as " safe ha-vens" by members of the public, would be used by the public to define the zone of risk.

That is, perceiving the reception centers to be " safe," the public might regard every-thing between the plant oM the reception centers as " unsafe" and therefore tend to j evacuate.those areos. This would Mnd to produce an evacuation zone some 40 miles in  !

radius. Second, the County witnesses testified that the reception centers might be viewed as a " local unwanted land use" because of the presence of radioactivity there.

This,' they testified, would cause people who lived around the reception centers to evac-unte, creating a separate " shadow" evacuation around each of the three centers.

Reception Centers as Defining the Zone of Risk

64. The Board rejects the County's *neory that a reception center at 40 miles  !

from the plant would expand the " shadow" zone out to that distance. There appears to be no empirical data to support this theory at all; it is simply theory and speculation.

i

65. It is not supported by the experience at Three Mile Island, on which else- i where the County relies so heavily. The reception center, which was hardly used at all l at TMI, was about 10 miles away, and yet there was evacuation from beyond 10 miles at TMI.

l

66. Dr. Johnson's reasoning on this issue is circular. In his study on TMI he concluded that people avoided the reception center at TMI because it was perceived as being too close to the zone of risk; now he concludes that the location of the reception center itself defines, or helps to define, the zone of risk. Also, in his TMI study Dr.

Johnson concluded that people evacuated to a " zone of perceptual desirability" -- a zone they perceive to be relatively safe, Tr. 17,883,17,885 (Johnson), LILCO Ex. 9 at 59, which happens to begin at about the distance that the LILCO reception centers are from the plant, Tr.17,883 (Johnson). Now he says that the location of the reception center helps determine what distance is perceptually safe. Dr. Johnson himself recom-mended, in his TMI study, locating reception centers (by which he apparently meant shelters) out to 100 miles. Tr. 17,888-89 (Johnson).

67. At bottom, the County's theory of reception centers' defining the zone of risk is simply another theory for expanding the EPZ, in this case to wherever the re-ception centers are located. NUREG-0654 recommends having reception centers 20 miles from the nuclear plant; at the Ginna plant, to take one example, the 10- to 20-mile zone around the plant contains some 701,398 people. Tr. 18.098-99 (Papile). The County's theory is therefore a challenge to NRC regulations and could be rejected for that reason alone.

Reception Centers as " Local Unwanted Land Use"

68. The Board also rejects the County's theory that reception centers will be viewed in essence as hazardous waste sites and cause a mini-evacuation from their vi-cinity. First, onca again there appears to be no empirical data to support this theory; it is pure theory and speculation.

69. Second, this theory, if true, would apply at many other power plants in the country. Reception centers are of ten located at schools or other public buildings that are located in populated areas. Tr.18,365 (Keller),17,762 (Dreikorn).

70. Third, what empirical evidence there is does not suggest that people will automatically flee from a hazardous waste site. Professors Mileti and Lindell testified that " places where plutonium is produced or where a nuclear plant has had an accident (Three Mile Island) have not experienced an outflux of people moving away." LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al direct testimony), at 23. They testified that only af ter the risk has been clearly defined by an authoritative source will you see people leaving as they did at Love Canal and Times Beach, and if this were not true, we would see people migrating from the areas around Three Mile Island, train derailments involving toxic chemicals, etc. Id. This testimony was uncontradicted.

l

71. In short, the Board does not find the County's theory that the reception centers themselves might cause evacuation to make LP.CO's centers unsuitable.

C. Adequacy of LILCO's Monitoring Procedures

72. Given our finding above that the appropriate planning basis for moni-toring evacuees at reception centers is 20 percent, the Board now addresses whether LILCO's monitoring procedures for the general public are adequate. In doing so, the Board resolves the following three issues admitted in this proceeding:

Whether the proposal to send evacuees to LILCO parking lots could or would ever be implemented in a way to protect the public health and satety.5E Staff requirements given the new scheme, and LILCO's proposal to transport all evacuees travelling on buses to the parking lot next to its Hicksville f acility, when that facility itself is also proposed by LILCO to be the LERO worker relocation center.

15 / Although this issue was stated vaguely by the Interveners, the Board admitted the issue because the Interveners " clarified in their response that it refers to LILCO's ability to perform radiological monitoring of the public in its revised plan." ASLB No.

86-533-01-OL at 18.

i

ASLB No. 86-533-01-OL at 18.

73. Having heard all the evidence presented by the parties in this proceeding, the Board finds for the reasons set forth below that LILCO's monitoring and

'dcontamination procedures provide reasonable assurance that adequate measures can and will be taken to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological l emergency at Shoreham.

1 I

LILCO'S Monitoring Procedures

74. As noted above, LILCO has designated three of its operations centers as reception centers to be used in the event of an emergency at Shoreham for the regis-tration, monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees from the plume EPZ. Before the i Board for review are those portions of Revision 8 of the LILCO Plan and the February 20, 1987 Draf t Procedures that concern reception centers. See OPIP 3.9.2 and 4.2.3 (Rev. 8 and 2/20/87 Draf t).W Because of LILCO's commitment to the Draf t Proce-l dures, the Board's decision focuses on the adequacy of the Draf t Procedures and those parts of Revision 8 not changed by the Draf t Procedures.

75. The Plan provides for 63 monitoring stations to be set up at the Roslyn.

Bellmore, and Hicksville reception centers. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimo-ny), at 41 Att. J: Tr.17,490 (Crocker). Evacuees will be directed by traffic guides to a monitoring station where they will be monitored while they remain in their vehicle. ,

I 16/ In addition, the Board will address the adequacy of LILCO's decontamination pro-cedures, even though it is not one of the admitted issues. Also, the Board will address some issues raised by the Interveners even though they call for us to address the details i of implementing procedures, contrary to the Waterford decision. Louisiana Power and L.ight Co. (Waterford Steam Elec. Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732,17 NRC 1076,1107 (1983).

41 / The February 20, 1987 Draf t Procedures are Attachment P to LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), OPIP 4.2.3 (Rev. 8) is Attachment Q, and OPIP 3.9.2 (Rev. 8)is Attachment R.

I 1

Each monitoring station will have two monitors and a traffic guide. A monitor will stand on each side of the car and monitor the head, shoulders, hands, and feet of each passenger. OPIP 3.9.2 5 5.5.8 (2/20/87 Draf t). The traffic guide will take a swipe of one quarter of the front hood and a wheel well and then have one of the monitors scan the swipe for contamination. OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.5.8 (2/20/87 Draf t); OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.5.7 (Rev. 8). The traffic guide will also record for registration purposes the license plate number of the vehicle, the number of passengers, and whether clean tags have been is-sued. OPIP 4.2.3 S 5.4.5 (Rev. 8 and 2/20/87 Draf t); see also OPIP 4.2.3, Att. 6 (Rev. 8).

LILCO estimates that the cycle time for monitoring a vehicle will be 100 seconds.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t aj. direct testimony), at 42. The monitoring cycle time covers the time from which a vehicle pulls into place to be monitored until the next vehicle arrives for monitoring. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 6-7.

76. LILCO calculates that 20 percent of the EPZ population can be monitored in five to six hours using the primary monitoring method described above. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker gt al. direct testimony), at 42. LILCO estimates that 46.6 percent of the EPZ population can be monitored at the three reception centers in about a 12-hour period.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et a_1. direct testimony). Att. T at 26-27; LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 5: Tr.17,728 (Watts),17,744 (Dreikorn).

77. LILCO's procedures provide that if no contamination is found on either the occupants or the vehicle. " clean" tags will be placed on the vehicle and given to each passenger of the vehicle. OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.5.8 (2/20/87 Draf t). If any contamination above an acceptable value is found anywhere on the vehicle or on any of the passen-1 gers, then everyone in the vehicle will be directed to one of LILCO's decontamination l trailers for additional monitoring and decontamination, if necessary. LILCO Ex.1 )

I (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 40; Tr.17.572 (Dreikorn); OPIP 4.2.3 S 5.5 (Rev. 8).

i,

78. Those evacuees from the EPZ who do not have their own transportation will be taken by bus to the Hicksville reception center, where all bus evacuees will be monitored. See OPIP 3.9.2 5 5.4 (Rev. 8). Monitors will board each bus and frisk stand-ing evacuees, paying particular attention to the head, shoulders, hands, and feet and scanning the frmt and back of each evacuee in an "X" pattern. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), Addendum: Tr.17,561 (Dreikorn); see also Tr.17,573 (Dreikorn).

This procedure should take approximately 60 seconds. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. di-rect testimony), Addendum: Tr.17,562 (Dreikorn). If any contamination above accept-able levels is found on a bus evacuee, he will be sent to the decontamination trailer for further monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination. Tr.17,572 (Dreikorn); OPIP 4.2.3 5 5.5 (Rev. 8).

79. If there is any queston about whether the level of contamination is above acceptable values for any evacuee, that person or carload of people will be sent to the decontamination trailer. Tr. 17.586-87 (Dreikorn),17,590 (Donaldson).

80. There will be two decontamination trailers at Hicksville and one each at Bellmore and Roslyn. Each trailer is eqtiipped with 20 showers and nine wash basins.

Each evacuee sent to the decontamination trailer will be remonitored there. Tr.17,572 (Dreikorn),17,591 (Linnemann). If any contamination is found, the person will be in-i structed to remove any contaminated clothing and/or wash the exposed skin surfaces to remove any localized contamination. If necessary, the evacuee will be instructed to take a full shower and then be monitored again. OPIP 3.9.2 5 5.6 (Rev. 8). Paper cloth-ing will be issued to those evacuees who require them. Once a person has been suffi-ciently decontaminated, he will be given a " clean tag." Detailed information will be collected about the location and extent of contamination and the process used to decontaminate him. Tr.17,704 (Dreikorn); OPIP 3.9.2 5 5.6 and Att. 5 (Rev. 8).

1

Alleged Defects in the Reception Center Procedures

81. Suffolk County witnesses claim that LILCO's draf t procedures are inade-quate because LILCO's method of monitoring individuals in their vehicles may cause im-proper scanning, may miss areas of possible contamination, and is not designed to de-tect thyroid contamination. SC Ex.16 (Radford et al. direct testimony), at 12-13. In addition, Suffolk County alleges that the 100-second monitoring cycle time estimate is too low. Ld. at 16. According to Suffolk County, LILCO's time estimate does not ac-count for vehicle breakdown, driver confusion, delays in entering monitoring stations, operator f atigue, evacuee stress and frustration, and evacuees' questions. Id. at 18-19, 20,23. New York State claims that LILCO's monitoring procedures are inadequate be-cause they do not require a "whole body" scan; while the State witnesses do not neces-sarily oppose monitoring evacuees in vehicles, they believe the procedures are at least awkward. NYS Ex.1 (Papile et a_1. direct testimony), at 20,21. Witnesses for New York State estimated that it would take two to three minutes to monitor a person and two to I five minutes to monitor a vehicle.E Ld. at 23.

l l 82. Suffolk County and New York State witnesses both claim that LILCO's l procedure for monitoring vehicles is inadequate because it does not monitor the entire vehicle, NYS Ex.1 (Papile e_t aj. direct testimony), at 21; SC Ex.16 (Radford e_t al. di-rect testimony), at 11-12. In addition. New York State alleges that LILCO's registration

)

method does not collect enough information about where the evacuees came from and  !

where they are going. NYS Ex.1 (Papile e_t al. direct testimony), at 22.

1 l

M/ According to FEMA witness Mr. Keller, the New York State Emergency Worker Handbook gives a range of two to three minutes to monitor an evacuee although some county plans in New York use 90 seconds. Tr.18,420 (Keller).

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LILCO's Position

83. LILCO contends that its monitoring method surveys the key areas where contamination is most likely to be found. Tr.17,555 (Watts). LILCO contends that its procedures are similar to and as thorough as the State's procedures, which call for mon-itoring the " perimeter" of the individual, moving the probe one foot per second l

(LILCO's procedures call for moving the probe eight to ten inches per second) while paying particular attention to the head, shoulders, hands. feet, and any " moist areas".

Tr.17,579-80 (Watts); see also LILC'O EX.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 41; Tr.

18,087-88 (Czech). LILCO argues that its procedures are very conservative in that if contamination is found on any person in a vehicle or on the vehicle itself, then all oc-cupants are sent for more extensive monitoring at the decontamination trailers. Tr.

1 L 17,572 (Dreikorn),17,607 (Watts). LILCO's witnesses based their conclusion that moni-1:

l toring can be effectively done in a vehicle within the 100-second cycle time in part on 1

two time trials and a training session. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 42; LILCO Ex.- 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 6; Tr. 18,583-84. 18,747 (Lieberman). LILCO contends that operator fatigue will not be a problem because LILCO will call out 150 percent of the monitors it needs; evacuees' questions or confu-sion will not be a problem because LILCO .will provide evacuees with an information sheet, because most evacuees will be listening to the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) and because evacuees will be able to comprehend the monitors' simple instruc-tions and will be willing to help and not hinder the monitoring process. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 47-48, 49: Tr.17,759 (Mileti). LILCO also testified that based upon the different means by which a vehicle could get contaminated, its procedures for monitoring a vehicle will detect any significant contamination on the vehicle. Tr. 17,55 7-58, 17,560-61 (Dreikorn, Watts). LILCO says that thyroid i

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l... - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _

monitoring is not routinely done under most other emergency plans and is not likely to be useful at the time evacuees are at the reception centers. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et

- a_1. direct testimony), at 58; Tr.17,564-65 (Watts),17,763 (Linnemann); see also Tr.

18,418 (Keller).

l The Board's Finding l

84. The Board agrees with LILCO that its procedures for monitoring evacuees arriving by private vehicles and by LERO auses are adequate. While LILCO's moni-toring method is different from some other methods used in FEMA Region II and across the country, there is no standard method. Tr. 17,552-53 (Dreikorn), i7,554 (Watts). The issue is whether LILCO's method can detect medically significant levels of contamina-tion on an individual. The Board is persuaded that it can. In addition, the Board finds that LILCO's procedures provide reasonable assurance that minor levels of contamina-tion that might contribute to long-term radiological exposure of an individual can also be detected. The Board also finds, based upon the evidence before it, that LILCO's esti-mated 100-second monitoring cycle time is both reasonably accurate and adequate to monitor vehicles and their occupants. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, the Board finds that LILCO's monitoring procedures provide reasonable assurance that ade-quate measures can and will be taken to protect the public health and safety in the event of an emergency at Shoreham.

Method for Monitoring Evacuees in Vehicles

85. The principle issue with respect to LILCO's monitoring procedure is whether it is capable of detecting significant levels of contamination on an evacuee.

LILCO presented to FEMA's witness Mr. Keller several scenarios in which evacuees could pick up contamination by evacuating from an area immersed in a plume, by

1 4

c 3 .

,e evacuating through a plume, or by evacuating af ter the plume had passed over the area they had come from or the area they had driven through on the way out of the EPZ. Tr.

18,395-400 (Keller); see also Tr. 18,168-69 (Czech). According to Mr. Keller, LILCO's i monitoring method, as described to him by counsel for LILCO,W would most likely de-i tect any contamination picked.up by an, evacuee in any of those scenarios. Tr. I6,400, I

(Keller). The most likely place to pick up contamination, testified Mr. Keller, wod!d be ;

on the soles of the feet. Tr.18,401 (Kelleri. Suffolk County also cross-examined LILCO l witness Mr. Watts about how an individual would pick up contamination. Tr. 17,175-76 (Watts). While there are different ways of becoming contaminated while evacuating, Mr. Watts testified, it is hard to imagine how contamination could be picked up on a j person without getting it on the evacuee's hands or feet.,151. And FEMA testified that

/,

"[i]t is not likely that medically significant contamination would be picked up"My' con-tact with previously contaminated items., FEMA Ex. 2 Maldwin ej a_1. direc't testimony),

3 s l

l at 19. h,

86. The Board is petWaded that it is Mghly improbable that edcuees would be exposed to radioactive mate.tisis from a plume without picking up some contamination on their head, shoulders, hands, or feet or on their vehicles. No witness suggested any scenario in which a person could pick up some contamination on an isolated part of his ,

body and not pick up some contamination on the areas of the person or vehicle surveyed 1 under LILCO's procedures. The prceability of such a situation arising is too low to give W In FEMA's fi refiled testimony and in the RAC review of Revision 8 of the LILCO Plan, FEMA stated that LILCO's monitoring procedures were inadequate partly because they did not monitor all arriving evacuees using the " driver only" method. FEMA Ex. 2 (Baldwin ej g. direct testimony), at 16; FEMA Ex. 3. It was precisely because of this FEMA finding? hat LILCO revised its procedure to what is written in the February 20, 1987 Draf t. JILCO Ex.1 (Crocker ej d. direct testimony), Att. P. FEMA and the R AC have not evaivated LILCO's new monitoring procedures set forth in the February 20th Draf t.

i i

i

it any significant amount of consideration here. Rather, the Board accepts as reason-able LILCO's testimony that the contamination expected to be found on a person would likely be diffused more-or-less uniforti.1 over his body. Tr.17,592 (Linnemann). The Board also agrees with FEMA that if there are higher levels of contamination on an in-dividual, then the probability of finding that contamination is correspondingly greater whereas very low levels of contamination that might more easily be missed are likely to have insignificant consequences.E Tr.18,308,18,309,18,400 (Keller); FEMA Ex. 2 l (Baldwin gLt al. direct testimony), at 19. According to LILCO witness Mr. Watts, the act l of " brushing up" against a contaminated object, which might result in low-level con-l tamination, would present more of a nuisance than a health-threatening situation, espe-l cially given the spectrum of accidents that we are concerned with here. Tr. 17.476-77 (Watts); see also Tr.18,293 (Keller). The Board concludes that LILCO's monitoring method can sufficient;y detect medically significant and more minor levels of contami-nation.

87. Another issue related to the adequacy of LILCO monitoring method is whether it is possible to monitor a person seated in his vehicle. The Board accepts as reasonable LILCO's testimony that the areas surveyed are easily accessible to the moni-tors. LILCO Tx.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony). at 44. The Board believes that the evacuees will assist the monitors by following their instructions and will be able to hold out their hands, lif t up their feet, and lean forward to allow the monitors to reach their head, shoulders, and upper back. The Board also finds reasonable assurance that moni-toring of the back seat occupants of a two-door vehicle can be adequately done for the M/ For contamination to be an immediate health threat, Mr. Keller testified, "the individual would have to be close to the plant, would have to stay there for an extended

. amount of time, and it would have to be a serious--toward the more serious end of the spectrum of accidents." Tr.18,389 (Keller); see also Tr.18,405 (Keller).

s-i

above reasons and because LILCO will use the HP-260 probe, which has an eight-inch extension handle. id; see also Tr.17,583 (Dreikorn). This conclusion is strengthened by the f act that LILCO's procedures provide for a separate monitoring lane to monitor ve-hicles that may be difficult to scan because of their type and/or the number of occu-pants. OPIP 4.2.3 5 5.4.6 (2/20/87 Draf t).

88. In reaching this conclusion, the Board is mindful of the fact that none of the _ Interveners have presented any data demonstrating that monitoring in vehicles cannot be done adequately. As a matter of fact, New York State witnesses testified that they ao not necessarily oppose monitoring of evacuees in vehicles. NYS Ex.1 (Papile eJt al. direct testimony), at 20. In fact, the Interveners' allegations are purely hypothetical. Their complaints about LILCO's procedure appear to center around a fear that LILCO will monitor people too quickly and without enough care. Id. at 20-21. But the Interveners did not conduct any of their own trials or tests of LILCO's procedures.

On the other hand, LILCO conducted two time trials on January 5 and February 10, 1987, and a full-day training session at the Hicksville f acility on June 8,1987. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e, t al. direct testimony), at 42; LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal tes-timony), at 6; see also NYS Ex.1 (Papile et al. direct testimony), at 24. At the training session, one portion of the facility was fully set up, vehicles were cycled through con-tinuously, and LILCO's monitoring procedures were put into practice. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 6. Although the Interveners were given the docu-mentation of the time trials and of the training session and videotapes of the training session, they did not present any reliable evidence that LILCO's monitoring method is defec tive.

t

[-

1 S.

89. The Board finds that New York State's claim that LILCO's procedt'tas are

, . . 1 inadequate because they do not provide a " dhole body" frisk is, also without merit. The State alleged that LILCO's procedures may miss " area $ of possiblE contamination . . .

especially on the back of the sLoulders." NYS Ex.;l (Papile et gl. direct testimony), at

{

21. k stated above, however, the Board believes that any significant areas of contami- q nation would act be missed by LILCO's monitoring method. It is evident from LILCO's testimony that m the process of monitoring an individual's head, choulde s, hands, and

,tst, other areas are surveyed such as the back of the shouldets and the upper bJea por-tion of the body. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et 31. direct testimony), at 44: Tr. I7,570 (Dre!korn). Furthermore, the monitoring procedures used elsewhere in New York State ca'd for monitoring the " perimeter" of the individual while emphasizing the. same. areas L1LCO monitors. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. dirbet testimony) at 41: Tr. 17.579-80 L

l  :.(Wat ts). Thus New York States procedure also migat miss some localized contamina-I

.. t > ,i

, tion on the front or the back of the individual. But this does not maM the State's pro-cedures inadequate. Tr.18,395 IKeller). Based upon the aridence presented on the dif-7 ferent methods of monitoring evacuees the Board is percLaded that LILCO's procedures are adequate, ,

l

90. The Board iVfurther' hebuaded by the conservative nature of LILCO's monitaring procedures. ,1f any conta.Tiination is found on any person or on the vehicle.

then 411 occupants are sent for more detailed monitoring. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al.

. direct testimony), at 40; Tr.17,572 (Dreikornd In addition, LERO monitors are trained that if there is any question about the level of con: amination on an Jr.dividual, then they are to send that person to the decontamination trailer for remonitoring. Tr.

17,586 (Dreikorn); see also Tr.17,3?h91 (Donaldson). Nor does tb? Board believe that LILCO's conservative approagh will Sverburden its decrctamination traile:s' with I

E_______________________

people who have contamination just on the borderline of an acceptable value. Several  !

of LILCO's witnesses testified that it would be rare to find many individuals right on j the borderline. Tr. 17,589-90 (Donaldson),17,592 (Linnemann, Watts). As LILCO wit-ness Dr. Linnemann testified, the contamination would be f airly uniformly deposited over the individual, making it easier to detect. Tr.17,592 (Linnemann), Furthermore, evacuees would be remonitored at the decontamination trailers before they would be decontaminated, so that if there were a false high reading it would be detected before I

i the evacuee would be processed further. Tr.17,591-92 (Linnemann). This procedure increases the odds of catching any isolated spots of contamination and is certainly ade-quate to meet the intent of Criterion J.12 that monitoring be done "to determine the existence and extent of a contamination. . . ." Staff Ex. 5 (Kantor direct testimony), at 4.

Thyroid Monitoring l

l 91. The Board does not find LILCO's procedures deficient because they do not provide for thyroid monitoring at the initial monitoring phase.W Emergency thyroid monitoring is not required by federal regulations. Tr.18,418 (Keller). Nor is it a com-mon practice in the industry: New York State does not require thyroid monitoring, Tr.

18.417 (Keller), and, so f ar as LILCO witness Mr. Watts was aware, only one other loca-tion in the country conducts emergency evacuee thyroid monitoring during the initial 4

monitoring phase, Tr.17,564 (Watts). ]

i 51/ LILCO's procedures do provide for thyroid monitoring for all evacuees who are ]

sent for additional monitoring at the decontamination trailers. OPIP 3.9.2 5 5.G.13 '

(Rev. 8). Even without thyroid monitoring being conducted at the decontamination trailers the Boards would find that LILCO's procedures are adequate for the reasons set forth in the above text.

f In addition, based upon the evidence presented, the Board concludes that there is no real benefit to thyroid monitoring as an immediate post-accident response. A c-cording to Suffolk County witness Dr. Radford, once radioactive iodine is already in the body (and thus detectable in the thyroid) it is essentially too late to take any preventive measures. Tr.18,037-38 (Radford); see also Tr. 18,052-53 (Minor. Radford). On the other hand, if thyroid monitoring is done too early following exposure, then it is likely that no contamination would be detected in the thyroid. Tr. 18,052-53 (Minor, Radford): Tr.17,565 (Watts).

92. Assuming it could be determined very early that a person had been or l would be exposed to radioactive iodine, the medical procedure for preventing the uptake of radioactive iodine by the thyroid would be the administration of potassium iodide. Tr.17,679,17,763 (Linnemann),18,037 (Radford). But there is a great deal of l

I controversy over the use of potassium iodide. Tr. 18,038-39 (Radford). Consistent with FDA guidance, many people consider potassium lodide to be of little or no use for the general public. Tr.18,165 (Baranski). New York State's policy is not to administer it to the public. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 58: Tr.18,163-64 (Papile),

18,418 (Keller). Thus, thyroid monitoring has little value as an immediate emergency l

response action. Therefore, the Board concludes that LILCO's monitoring procedures are adequate without provisions for routinely monitoring the thyroid gland.

100-Second Monitorine Cvele Time

93. The Interveners contend that LILCO's 100-second cycle time estimate for monitoring is too low. SC Ex.16 (Radford et a_1. direct testimony), at 16; NYS Ex.1 (Papile et al. direct testimony), at 23-26. However they presented no evidence about how long it would take to monitor evacuees using LILCO's procedures. Rather, the State provided general time estimates of two to three minutes to monitor a person and I

j

two to five minutes to monitor a vehicle. Ld. at 23. These estimates are not based upon any time trials of the LILCO procedures.

94. As noted above, LILCO's 100-second estimate is ba?ed in part on two time trials conducted on January 5 and February 10, 1987. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker gLt aj. di-rect testimony), at 42; see also NYS Ex.1 (Papile et a_1. direct testimony), at 24. Con-l trary to the State's written testimony, NYS Ex.1 (Papile e_t aj. direct testimony), at 24, the time trials did account for the time to drive up to the monitoring station, be moni-tored, and then drive off, LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 42. The 100-second estimate was later confirmed as accurate during the June 8,1987 Hicksville training session. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 6-7. Based on his observation of this training session and his review of a videotape of the Hicksville training session, Mr. Lieberman calculated that the average service rate per vehicle was under 90 seconds. Ld. at 7. This service rate takes into account the complete cycle time from entry of one group of vehicles to entry of the next group of vehicles. Ld.

The Interveners presented no evidence to contradict this testimony.

95. The remaining hypothetical problems5_F (operator f atigue, vehicle break-down, and behavioral problems and concerns) that the Interveners allege will increase 5 22 / FEMA. on the other hand, testified that it graded the adequacy of county plans in New York based upon a 90-second per person monitoring time. In addition, FEMA l stated that if an individual is highly contaminated. the contamination will be detected much more quickly than in 90 seconds. On the other hand, if the contamination is barely detectable, then the full 90 seconds may be needed. Tr.18,391-92 (Keller). As noted above, however,it is unlikely to find individuals contaminated just on the border-line.

53/ During the hearing, Suffolk County asked several questions of the LILCO panel about procedures to take care of and monitor pets brought to the reception centers.

Tr.17,696-98 (Crocker, Dreikorn). While the Board notes here that this subject was ralsed, the Board believes that it is irrelevant to whether LILCO's procedures provide reasonable assurance that adequate measures will be taken to protect the public health and safety. Thus, it will not be addressed further.

the 100-second time estimate are insufficient to warrant a finding that LILCO's proce-dures are inadequate or its time estimates too low. The effect of most of these hypo-thetical f actors is hard to quantify and the Interveners made no real attempt to do so.

96. The Board agrees with LILCO that operator fatigue will not increase its time estimates, since LILCO intends to call out an additional 50 percent of its monitors to relieve when necessary those individuals originally doing the monitoring. LILCO Ex.

1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 49. The Board finds that LILCO's procedure to call out additional monitors is conservative, especially given the fact that FEMA does not expect a plan to provide for a reserve number of monitors. According to FEMA's testimony, FEMA looks only at the total number of monitors available to work a 12-hour shif t (not an eight-hour shif t, Tr.18,451 (Keller)) and multiplies that number by the time it takes to monitor an individual to determine whether a plan meets its planning basis. Tr.18,305,18,392-93 (Keller). The Board finds that the possibility of fatigue does not make LILCO's 100-second time estimate inaccurate.

97. The Board also does not believe that vehicle breakdown will increase the 100-second time estimate for monitoring. The likelihood that many vehicles will break down is small. In addition, any vehicle that might break down could easily be pushed out of the way.

98. The Board also finds that the behavioral problems and concerns (driver confusion, evacuee stress and frustration, and evacuees' questions, Tr. 18.023-28 (Saegert)) hypothesized by Suffolk County do not show LILCO's monitoring procedures to be inadequate. LILCO has made provisions to deal with evacuees' questions by use of M/ In fact, Mr. Keller commented that FEMA's calculations assume that "every monitor is busy" the entire time: "That individual monitor doesn't stop, doesn't take a coffee break, doesn't have the lunch break." Tr.18,392 (Keller).

1

l an information sheet that will be distributed to evacuees at the reception centers;

]

there will also be people at the decontamination trailers who could answer questions if someone should insist. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 47. The infor-mation sheet, which has not been finalized yet, Tr.17,621 (Crocker), will answer most of the questions that evacuees might have; therefore, the monitors will spend less t;me answering questions, Tr.17,759 (Mileti). In addition, most of the evacuees will be lis-tening to the EBS, which will provide them with additional information. Tr. 17,718 (Mileti),18,029 (Saegert). The Board believes that these plans exceed the requirements of the regulations and should be more than adequate to cope with the public's need for information. ,

99. The Board finds that while evacuees may experience some confusion, stress, and frustration, these factors do not need to be quantified and need not be con-sidered in establishing time estimates for monitoring evacuees. These f actors are not ordinarily considered when FEMA evaluates whether a plan can meet its planning basis:

FEMA's calculations are based strictly on monitoring time. Tr. 18,305, 18,391-92 (Keller). Moreover, these are the same f actors that earlier in this proceeding the Inter-venors argued would prevent a successful evacuation from the EPZ. The Board rejected that argument then, and it rejects that argument now.

100. Furthermore, the Board believes that LILCO's instructions for monitoring and the paths through the monitoring areas are sufficiently simple and well-defined that the evacuees will be able to follow them with little difficulty. Traffic guides will be strategically placed to direct evacuees through the facilities; at the trailers standard magenta / yellow ropes, stanchions, and signs to designate which controlled areas will be used. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t a_1. direct testimony), at 58; OPIP 4.2.3 S 5.8 (Rev. 8). .

1 The diagram of the reception centers' layout gives no reason to believe that evacuees I

1

will not be able maneuver through the monitoring areas. See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker ej al. direct testimony), Att J. The Interveners have provided no detail about which areas they believe will cause driver confusion and will be difficult to maneuver. In fact, when asked to identify such " problem" areas, Suffolk County witness Dr. Saegert was unable to do so. Tr. 18,025-26 (Saegert); see SC Ex.16 (Radford et al. direct testimony),

at 23. Likewise, Dr. Saegert was unable to give any examples of LILCO's instructions that the evacuees would not be able to follow. In f act, she was unsure exactly what in-structions would be given to the evacuees. Tr.18,026 (Saegert).

101. The Board also agrees with LILCO that the evacuees will cooperate with the LERO monitors since they are seeking the help of LERO and, therefore, will not want to hinder that help. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker ej aj, direct testimony), at 47-48.

None of the Interveners' witnesses was able to present any evidence of aggressive be-havior during any evacuation, including Three Mile Island.E See Tr. 18,031-32 (Johnson, Saegert). The Board does not find studies on the honking behavior of drivers or anecdotes about people's behavior in blackouts and gasoline lines persuasive or even relevant to this proceeding. See Tr.18,032-35 (Mayer, Saegert).

102. Thus, the Board finds that LILCO's 100-second monitoring cycle time esti-mate is reasonable. The Board does not believe that the possibility of operator f atigue, vehicle breakdown, driver confusion and stress, or evacuee questions make LILCO's monitoring procedures inadequate. For the reasons set forth above. the Board finds reasonable assurance that LILCO's time estimate is accurate.

55/ As established earlier in this proceeding, there is no evidence to suggest that traffic accidents increased during the evacuation at Three Mile Island, Cordaro et al.,

f f. Tr.1470, at 12-13,131, or in other evacuations, [d. at 132.

5_6/ LILCO witness Dr. Mileti testified earlier in this proceeding that the principles of human behavior in civil disorders are different from those in other emergencies. Tr.

1787-88 (Mileti).

Registration Procedures 103. LILCO's procedures for registering evacuees at the initial monitoring phase require that the traffic guide at each monitoring station record the license plate number and State, the number of occupants in each vehicle, and whether a clean tag had been issued or not. OPIP 4.2.3 SS 5.4.4 and 5.4.5a (Rev. 8); OPIP 4.2.3 S 5.4.5 (2/20/87 Draf t); Tr. 17,617-18,17,704 (Dreikorn). Each bus passenger's name will also be recorded. Tr.17.618 (Dreikorn); OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.6 (2/20/87 Draf t). The Interveners argue that these procedures are inadequate because they do not require recording the name of each occupant, where he came from, and his ultimate destination. NYS Ex.1 (Papile e_t al. direct testimony), at 22-23. But LILCO's witnesses testified that if it became necessary to contact evacuees, it would be possible to do so using the license plate number. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 47; Tr.17,618-19 (Dreikorn). If necessary, evacuees could be contacted by or given information in the newspapers and over the radio. Tr.17,715 (Dreikorn). FEMA testified that detailed in-formation about evacuees who are not contaminated is not needed and that the failure to gather such information does not present a radiological health problem. Rather,it is more important to have complete information on those individuals who are found to be contaminated. Tr. 18,274-76 (Keller). According to FEMA, this information should in-clude "a record of the amount of contamination that was present, the area or location on the body the contamination was present, the decontamination means . . . , the suc-cessfulness of the decontamination process, . . . and what was done with [the] individ-ual [who could not be decontaminated). . . . " I_d. at 18,274 (Keller). LILCO's proce-dures for recordkeeping at the decontamination trailers require this type of detail. Tr.

17.619,17,704 (Dreikorn); OP!P 3,9.2 (Rev. 8). Such recordkeeping will allow LILCO or i

any governmental agency to contact evacuees at a later time to conduct whole-body t

counting or other medical follow-up. Tr.17,619 (Dreikorn). The Board agrees with FEMA that it is more important to gather detailed information about e'tacuees who are contaminated than about evacuees who are not. Therefore, we find that LILCO's regis-tration procedures are adequate.

Monitorinst Eauipment 104. There was discussion in both the oral and written testimony about the suitability of LILCO's monitoring equipment, the Eberline RM-14 and the HP-210, -260, and -270 probes. Suffolk County claimed that even though the Eberline RM-14 is a proven device, it cannot be used in the manner LILCO wants to use it because, ac-cording to Suffolk County, it is difficult to make accurate readings, mental calcula-tions, and determinations of contamination in a matter of seconds. SC Ex.16 (Radford e_t al. direct testimony), at 17-18. Suffolk County also argued that operator f atigue, the monotony of the tasks, and environmental conditions would effect accurate measure-ments. Ld. at 18.

105. LILCO testified that the Eberline RM-14 is relatively simple to use, prov-en in the field, and commonly used in the industry. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 43. FEMA agreed that the combination of the RM-14 and the HP-210

-270 or -260 is a reliable instrument. Tr.18.435 (Keller). LILCO witnesses stated that the RM-14 is usable under a wide range of humidity conditions and temperatures. I_d; Tr.17,599 (Dreikorn), 17,597-98 (Watts). For example, Mr. Watts, who was present dur-ing the Ginna nuclear plant accident, testified that the RM-14 was used without prob-lem during the Ginna accident under extreme weather conditions in the wintertime. l_d.

, in addition, LILCO testified that clear, thin plastic bags will be put over the instru-1 l

ment to protect it in extremely heavy downpours. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker gLt a_1. direct testimony), at 43. During cross-examination LILCO witnesses also testified that the i

w__-_________-_--_ ,

1

' monitors will have no problem hearing the RM-14's alarm because it is quite audible and s j

because the ' volume on the RM-14 is set at its maximum level. Tr.17,575 (Watts). 1 LILCO witness Mrs. Dreikorn stated that she personally was able to hear the alarm dur-ing training sessions where individuals were monitored in cars that were running. Tr.

17,596 (Dreikorn). The RM-14 is used extensively in nuclear power plants, where the noise level can get quite high. Tr.17,761 (Dreikorn). Needle fluctuation in the f ast mode should not be a problem because the procedures call for switching the response time to " slow" if the meter reading is fluctuating widely. Tr.17,588-90 (Donaldson):

1 OPlP 3.9.2 S 5.6.7 (2/20/87 Draf t). Also the monitors are trained to direct people in for further monitoring if there is any question. Tr.17.587 (Dreikorn).

106. The Board is persuaded by LILCO's testimony on the reliability of the Eberline RM-14. As Suffolk County witness Minor said, the RM-14 is a proven device.

l SC Ex.16 (Radford e_t ;;1. direct testimony, at 17-18. The problems in using it hypothe-sized by Suffolk County simply do not show LILCO's Plan to be inadequate, i

Medical Personnel at the Reception Centers 107. Suffolk County alleges that LILCO's reception center procedures are de-fective because they do not provide for trained medical personnel at each reception center. SC Ex.1 (Radford et al. direct testimony), at 36. FEMA testified that it is less likely for there to be medical personnel at a reception center when reception centers and congregate care centers are separate. Tr.18,429 (Keller). The Red Cross, which operates over 90 percent of the congregate care centers in the country, requires and provides some medical personnel at congregate care centers. Ld. According to Suffolk County witness Dr. Mayer, the Health Department or the Red Cross provides at least a nurse in most shelters. Tr.18,046 (Mayer). It is reasonable to expect that the Red Cross will provide similar personnel at the congregate care centers used by Shoreham evacuees.

i l

1 108. The Board finds that NRC regulations do not require LILCO to provide i

medical personnel at its reception centers. Since evacuees will be on LILCO property for only a short period of time (approximately 15 minutes), LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al.

- direct testimony), at 54-55, Att. T at 27, and likely will not get out of their vehicles,  ;

I and since the Red Cross provides medical personnel at congregate care centers, the {;

Board finds LILCO's procedures to be adequate. l i

Staffine Levels  !

l 109. Having found LILCO's monitoring procedures and time estimates to be ac-

, ceptable, the Board now addresses whether LILCO's staffing levels are adequate to 1

meet its planning basis. In doing so, the Board adopts FEMA's approach in evaluating the adequacy of a plan's staffing level: that is, first, determining the number of indi-viduals that must be monitored; second, determining how long it will take to monitor an evacuee: and, third, calculating how many monitors will be needed to monitor those evacuees in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Tr.18,305 (Keller). The Board's calculation is slightly modified because LILCO's monitoring time estimates are based on monitoring individu-als in a vehicle as a unit. See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 42: Tr.

I 17,572 (Dreikorn).

110. The summer population within the ten-mile EPZ around Shoreham is 160,000. Twenty percent of that number is 32,000. To satisfy NUREG-0654 Criterion J.12, then, LILCO must be able to monitor 32,000 evacuees in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> at its three reception centers. In calculating the number of evacuees it needs to process in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, LILCO assumed that 2.8 people per vehicle would evacuate in about 58,000 vehicles. Twenty percent of this number equals 11,600 vehicles. LILCO Ex.1 l

(Crocker e_t aj. direct testimony). at 42.

L___________________

111. LILCO will provide 63 LERO monitoring stations. At a rate of 100 sec-onds per vehicle, each station can monitor 36 vehicles per hour, or 2268 vehicles per hour for all 63 stations. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 42. By dividing the total number of vehicles that can be monitored in an hour (2268) into the total number of vehicles (11,600) that must be monitored, the Board finds that LERO can monitor the full 20 percent planning basis in 5.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. This is consistent with LILCO's testimony. See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 42-43. By multiplying the total number of vehicles that can be monitored in an hour (2268) by 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and then by the number of evacuees per vehicle (2.8) the Board finds that LERO is capable of monitoring approximately 76.205 evacuees in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This equals almost 47.6 percent of the EPZ population. These figures also correspond to LILCO's .

testimony. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. T at 26-27; LILCO Ex.

26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 5: Tr.17,728 (Watts),17,744 (Dreikorn). Based i

upon these calculations, the Board concludes that LILCO is capable of meeting its plan-ning basis for monitoring all evacuees arriving at its reception centers in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Backup Mnnitoring Procedures 112. It is not necessary for the Board to evaluate LILCO's backup monitoring procedures that will be implemented if the limits of its primary monitoring methods are exceeded, because these additional procedures go beyond the regulatory requirements.

The Board recognizes, however, that the Krimm Memo!,andum trates that some type of "ad hoc" measures would need to be implemented in case of " highly improbable ra-diological releases involving high levels of radiation encompassing a relatively large area . . . ." LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. L. at 2: FEMA Ex. I at i 1

2. As the Krimm Memorandum notes, these ad hoc measures would be supplemented by I

{

federal and private sector resources, if needed. Ld.; see also Tr.19,234 (Kantor). A c- l cording to FEMA, a_d hoc procedures are in plemented af ter the resources and efforts in the detailed planning have been exhaustr,d. Tr.18,422 (Keller). LILCO has gone beyond mere "ad hoc" measures and has included in its Plan detailed backup methods that would i be implemented if the unlikely events mentioned in the Krimm Memorandum occurred.

113. In its augmented plan, which is its .first backup method, LILCO has pro- ,

vided enough space for 140 monitoring stations to be set up at its three reception cen-I ters. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 53. Additional monitors would be enlisted '4 rom INPO (the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) and the Department of Energy. Ld. at 52. In addition, the Board agrees with LILCO and FEMA that addi-tional help would be offered by other experts in the industry, other utilities in the Re-gion, and other counties. See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 54: Tr.

17,666 (Linnemann): Tr.18,424 (Baldwin). For example, volunteers in the private sec-tor would be available from General Electric and Stone & Webster, Tr. 17,725-26 (Crocker, Linnemann), and other health physics technicians could be obtained else-where, Tr. 17,726-27 (Linnemann). The " trigger point" for calling in this additional help, LILCO witness Mr. Watts testified, is when it is projected that 30 percent of the EPZ population will be sent to the reception centers. Tr.17,728 (Watts). The Board agrees with LILCO that this procedure is quite conservative, considering LILCO can already process almost 50 percent of the EPZ population in about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> using its ini-tial monitoring method. Ld.

114. LILCO has also developed a second backup monitoring method in its pro-cedures that also goes beyond that required by the regulations. In its second backup method, to be implemented once it is projected that its first backup method may not be sufficient to accomoda e the number of arriving evacuees, monitors would frisk the

head,' shoulders, hands, and feet of the driver only, of anyone who came from a location

'different from the driver's and of any other individual in the vehicle who requested monitoring. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 53; Tr.17,664-65 (Dreikorn); OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.4.7(d) (2/20/87 Draf t); OPIP 4.2.3. The exterior of the vehi-cie would be monitored in the same f ashion as in the primary method. Id.

115. If none of the above available methods can meet the demand at the recep-tion centers, LILCO's procedures provide that all evacuees be advised by radio to pro-ceed to their ultimate destinations to take showers, change into clean clothes, bag the removed clothes, and return for monitoring at some later time if desired. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et aj. direct testimony), at 59. This procedure is consistent with federal guid-ance found in a draf t, dated June 27, 1986, of Chapter 7 of the EPA Manual of Pro-tective Actions Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, prepared by the 1

l Environmental Protection Agency. Ld: see also Tr.17,739 (Watts).

116. The Board reiterates that LILCO's primary monitoring method is suffi-cient to handle over twice the number of evacuees that the planning basis calls for.

The primary method therefore satisfies .NUREG-0654 Criterion J.12. Since LILCO's backup methods would only be implemented once the planning basis had been exceeded.

these procedures are not subject to the 12-hour time set forth in Criterion J.12. Staff Ex. 5 (Kantor direct testimony), at 5.

Monitorint Procedures for Bus Evacuees 117. The Interveners presented no evidence on the adequacy of LILCO's proce-dures for monitoring evacuees arriving by bus. FEMA testified that LILCO's bus moni-toring procedures in Revision 8 were inadequate because LILCO did not have enough monitors to survey all evacuees arriving by bus within about a 12-hour period. FEMA Ex. 2 (Baldwin e_t al. direct testimony), at 16.

1 118. In its testimony LILCO committed itself to add additional monitors and to implement new procedures, see LILCO Ex.1 (Crccker e_t a_1. direct testimony), at Ad-dendumt LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 38. Upon review of the evi- '

dence presented on LILCO's bus monitoring procedures, the Board finds reasonable as-surance that adequate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety

. of those evacuees arriving by bus in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham.

119. All individuals being evacuated by bus will be taken to the Hicksville re-ception center, where all of them will be monitored. OPIP 4.2.3 5 5.6 (2/20/87 Draf t).

That number has been estimated to be eight percent of the EPZ winter population, or 11,080 people. LILCO Plan, App. A, at III-35. Under LILCO's new proposed procedures, a total of 24 monitors will be available to monitor bus evacuees. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman' rebuttal testimony), at 38. ' LILCO estimates that it will take 60 seconds to j frisk one evacuee. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Addendum: Tr.17,562  ;

(Dreikorn). A simple calculation shows that LILCO can monitor 17,280 evacuees in about a 12-hour period. One monitor can monitor 60 evacuees an hour, and 24 monitors can therefore monitor 1440 (24 x 60) evacuees in an hour. Thus 24 monitors can moni-tar 17,280 individuals in a 12-hour period. All of the evacuees arriving by bus can be monitored in about 7.7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (11,080 evacuees divided by 1440 evacuees / hour).5_I/

120. In making this finding the Board notes that LILCO monitors bus evacuees  ;

differently from the way it monitors evacuees arriving in personal vehicles. Bus evacuees will be frisked while standing on the bus. Particular attention will be paid to the same areas monitored on regular evacuees. In addition, the front and back of the 5_I/ FEMA witness Mr. Keller did a similar calculation during the hearing based upon 24 monitors scanning bus evacuees at 90 seconds an evacuee. He concluded that, with-l out thyroid monitoring, LILCO could monitor all bus evacuees within the 12-hour peri-od. Tr.18,416-17 (Keller).

(

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - . l

bus evacuee will be scanned in an "X" pattern. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testi-mony), Addendum. The Board accepts as reasonable LILCO's explanation for this dif-ference. According to LILCO, its procedures address the unique circumstances of bus evacuees: that they come from different places and get bused to several different ,

i transfer points and, therefore, may be exposed to cross-contamination while on the buses. Tr.17,573 (Dreikorn). This factor increases the chance that an evacuee may get l isolated spots of contamination on areas that would not be detected without monitoring the back and front of the individual in the manner described in LILCO's procedures.

SeeLd.

l. 121. The Board finds no f ault with LILCO's decision not to monitor the thyroid glands of bus evacuees during the initial monitoring phase, for the same reasons dis-cussed above. LILCO's reasons for changing this procedure are reasonable. See Tr.

17.562-65 (Dreikorn, Watts).

Bus Monitorinst and the LERO Family Relocation Center l 122. The Board also resolves in LILCO's f avor the issue concerning the location of the LERO Family Relocation Center. The Board finds that the coexistence of the I

bus evacuee monitoring station area and the LERO Family Relocation Center at the Hicksville reception center will not adversely effect the health and safety of those evacuees arriving by bus. The LERO Family Relocation Center provides a common lo-cation for LERO workers and their families who live in the EPZ to meet. There are fewer than a hundred LERO worker f amilies and only a few hundred family members who would be expected at the Relocation Center. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 51; Tr.17,650 (Crocker).

l 123. A review of the Hicksville reception center diagram shows that the two functions are conducted in different areas of the facility. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al.

I I -

\

direct testimony), Att. J. There is no evidence that the function of either activity 4

' would disturb that of the other. FEMA witness Keller testified that, based upon his personal observation of the Hicksville f acility, he could not "see any reason why [the <

LERO Family Relocation Center] should have any negative impact on the operation of the rest of the reception center function." Tr.18,434 (Keller). The Interveners did not present any evidence to the contrary.

Procedures for Monitoring and Decontaminating Vehicles 124. As noted above, LILCO's monitoring procedures provide that a traffic guide at each monitoring bay will take a swipe of one quarter of the vehicle's hood and ,

one wheel well with a cloth that will then be scanned for contamination by a monitor.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker ej al. direct testimony), at 40: OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.5.8 (2/20/87 Draf t);

OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.5.7 (Rev. 8). The Interveners argue that this procedure is inadequate be-cause the outside surf ace of the entire vehicle is not monitored. NYS Ex.1 (Papile et a]. direct testimony), at 19; SC Ex.16 (Radford et al. direct testimony), at 11-12. Ld.

Furthermore, Suffolk County contends that LILCO's monitoring method should also scan items in the vehicle's trunk. Id. at 12. New York State argues that if any contamina-tion is found on other parts of the vehicle, then the items in the trunk should be moni-tored. NYS Ex.1 (Papile et_al. direct testimony), at 20.

125. The Board m persuaded that LILCO's vehicle monitoring procedure will adequately detect contamination because of LILCO's focus on those areas where f_ particulate will most likely be deposited. Tr. 17,557-58 (Dreikorn, Watts). It is reason-able to expect that if contamination is deposited on a vehicle by a radioactive plume or if it is picked up while driving through an area where a plume has already passed, con-tamination would be picked up on the hood and in the wheel wells of the vehicle. See Tr.17,557-58 (Dreikorn). The only other way a vehicle could pick up contamination

without being in a plume or going through a contaminated area would be through con-tact.with a person who is contaminated. Most probably, that person would be an occu-pant of the vehicle who would also be monitored. Tr.17.559 (Watts); see 17,607 (Watts).

Even if the isolated contamination on the vehicle in this situation were not detected, the contamination on the occupant would be. As a result, all of the occupants and the vehicle would be sent for remonitoring and decontamination, if necessary. Tr.17,559 (Watts). It is inconceivable that any major contamination could be missed given LILCO's conservative approach to monitoring during this initial screening process.

l 126. The Board also concludes that the Interveners' concern about items in the vehicle's trunk is without merit. Contrary to New York State's testimony, if any con-tamination is found on an occupant or vehicle, the contents of the trunk would be mon-itored in detail. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 46. The Board also finds no fault with LILCO's plan not to monitor personal items in a vehicle, since the occupants of the vehicle would probably have placed the items in the vehicle and the occupants themselves would be monitored. Tr. 17,605-06 (Watts). On the other hand, if an item were already in the vehicle when the plume passed, the only way for it to be contaminated would be for the windows to be open. In that case, there would be uni-form disposition on the vehicle itself, which would be detected when the vehicle was monitored. Ld. The Board agrees with LILCO that it is unlikely that items anywhere in j the vehicle would be independently contaminated. Ld.

127. The Board also finds that LILCO's vehicle decontamination procedures are adequate. According to LILCO, vehicles will be decontaminated by wiping them with disposable paper wipes and by using a common household cleaner. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 61; OPIP 3.9.2 S 5.8 (Rev. 8). Each reception cen-ter also has access to the truck washing facilities that have underground storage tanks l

[

and could be used to decontaminate vehlcles. Tr.17,731 (Watts). LILCO has no time estimates of how long it will take to decontaminate vehicles because they are depen-dent on the extent of contamination, Tr. 17,753-31 (Watts); however, if there are a large number of contaminated vehicles, LILCO has space at all three reception centers to park them until they can be decontaminated. Tr.17,731-32 (Watts). In total, there are an estimated 10,870 parking spots at all three reception centers. Tr. 17,762-63 (Watts). As additional people arrive to help out, some of them can be assigned to decontaminate vehicles if needed. Tr.17,733 (Crocker).

Decontamination Procedures 128. LILCO's decontamination procedures provide for the remonitoring and decontamination of evacuees in four trailers that have been especially designed for that purpose. Each trailer has a common area where monitoring is conducted and where lo-calized decontamination can be done. Each trailer has nine wash basins in the common area. The trailers are stocked with supplies and monitoring equipment year-round. In addition, each trailer is equipped with 20 showers in two separate areas: one for males and one for females. Separate undressing and dressing areas are also provided.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. O: OPIP 3.9.2 (2/20/87 Draf t). A total of eight to ten LERO workers at each trailer will be responsible for the moni-t toring and decontamination of evacuees. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et a_1. direct testimony),

at 58.

l l

l 5_8/ According to State witness Mr. Czech, the minimum standard requirement in New York State for a decontamination area is a sink and shower. Tr. 18.088-89 (Czech).

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1

129. According to LILCO's procedures, if contamination above acceptable val-ues is found on an evacuee during the initial monitoring phase, the evacuee and the other occupants of the vehicle will be sent to the decontamination trailer and moni-tored again in greater detail. OPIP 3.9.2 (Rev. 8): Tr. 17,572 (Dreikorn). If decontamination is necessary, the first step is to remove outer layers of clothing and wash the exposed skin in one of the sinks. If further decontamination is necessary, the evacuee will be instructed to take a full shower. OPIP 3.9.2 (Rev. 8). LILCO estimates that at most ten percent of those evacuees contaminated would need a full shower and that a full shower, including remonitoring, would take no longer than 15 minutes.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker !Lt al. direct testimony), at 56-57; Tr.17,679,17,682-83 (Watts);

see also Tr. 17,683-88 (Linnemann, Watts).

130. The Interveners claim that LILCO has underestimated the number of peo-pie who will need to be decontaminated and the number of people who will need com-plete showers. SC Ex.16 (Radford e_t aj. direct testimony), at 30; NYS Ex.1 (Papile et a_1. direct testimony), at 28-29. They also allege that in determining the number of evacuees-who will need showers, LILCO did not consider the fact that people will be anxious and may want full showers even though LILCO believes it is not necessary. SC Ex.16 (Radford et aj, direct testimony), at 30-31. Finally, the Interveners argue that LILCO does not have enough space to shelter evacuees who are waiting to be decontaminated. NYS Ex.1 (Papile et al. direct testimony), at 29-30. l 131. The Interveners have presented no empirical data to counter LILCO's esti-mate of ten percent and have provided the Board with no guidance as to what is the correct percentage. Nor did they offer empirical data on the number of people who I l

l might reject LILCO's procedures and demand full showers. See Tr.18,050 (Johnson, l

Saegert). On the other hand, LILCO witnesses discussed actual radiological l

l

emergencies, including the accident at the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, to support its ten percent figure. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t a_1. direct testimony), at 57. According to LILCO witness Mr. Watts, who was present during the Ginna accident, only one out of 11 employees who travelled through the radioactive plume and were contaminated there needed a full shower. g.: Tr.17,683-84 (Watts). FEMA witness Mr. Keller testified that the majority of the radioactive particulate would be removed relatively easily by simple washing techniques; for most people a full shower would not be needed.

Tr.18,403 (Keller). Also, LILCO witness Dr. Linnemann, who trains hospital personnel in decontamination procedures, testified that of the 60 cases of contamination that he has seen, only one required a full bath; in 90-100 percent of the cases the contamina-tion was removed with one washing. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 57; Tr.17,686-88 (Linnemann). It would be extremely rare, Dr. Linnemann testified, to get contamination under a person's clothing. M. at 17,687.

132. There are no regulations or guidance requiring any particular capacity for decontamination of the public. For example. NUREG-0369 recommends no special ,

i local decontamination provisions. NUREG-0369 at 14-15. NRC Staff developers, how- I i

ever, expected that there would be a capability to decontaminate evacuees. Staff Ex. 5 (Kantor direct testimony), at 7.

133. According to testimony provided by the NRC, FEMA, and LILCO's witness i

Mr. Donaldson who was instrumental in the draf ting of a precursor document to NUREG-0654, it was never anticipated that there would be any significant need for i

decontamination facilities since protective action recommendations are made based upon plant conditions. Tr. 18,404-05 (Keller): Tr.19,216 (Kantor); LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 11; see also Tr. 17,479-80 (Crocker). Thus, it is expected that residents of the EPZ would be either sheltered or evacuated before any release of l

' radioactivity. Tr.18,404 (Keller). FEMA witness Mr. Keller commented that the goal is to avoid having contaminated individuals and that with a reasonably well-thought-out plan the major portion of the evacuees would not be contaminated. Tr.18,404 (Keller).

New York State witness Mr. Papile also agreed with a statement that the most likely scenario for an accident release would be a release of noble gases, which would not cause ground contamination. Tr. 18,131-32 (Papile).

134. LILCO's four trailers have a total of 80 showers and 36 wash basins. Using LILCO's estimate that a shower and remonitoring would take no longer than 15 minutes, it is possible to calculate the number of full showers that can be taken over a 12-hour period at LILCO's decontamination trailers. Four showers with subsequent remonitoring can be taken an hour at each shower for a total of 48 showers over a 12-hour period. If this number is multiplied by 80. the number of available showers, a total of 3,840 showers can be taken at all four decontamination trailers over 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. See Tr.17,693 (Watts). Assuming all evacuees arriving at the reception centers (the 20 per-cent planning basis or 32,000 evacuees) are contaminated, approximately 3,200 evacuees would need a full shower (10 percent of 32,000 evacuees). Based upon these calculations, LILCO has the capacity to shower over 100 percent of those individuals who might need a full shower. The Board finds LILCO's arrangements to be adequate.

Indeed, LILCO has gone beyond the guidance of NUREG-0654. See NUREG-0654 at 14-15.

135. The Board also finds that LILCO has demonstrated an adequate capacity to shelter evacuees in the event there is a need to keep evacuees waiting to be decontaminated. OPIP 3.9.2 (2/20/87 Draf t): LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t a_1. direct testi-

l. many), at 55. The Interveners claim that there is not enough space to keep waiting evacuees. They do not say, however, how much more space is needed or how many I

people would need to be sheltered. NYS Ex.1 (Papile et al. direct testimony), at 29.

They also argue that the buildings designated to hold evacuees are unsuitable because they contain heavy equipment and supplies. I_d. LILCO testified, however, that there is adequate space for evacuees to sit or stand in the various buildings. Tr. 17,667 (Crocker). The heavy equipment complained about by Suffolk County can be removed at the time of an emergency or lowered into the floor where appropriate. Tr. 17,667-68 (Crocker). The Board is persuaded that LILCO has provided a reasonable plan for shel-tering evacuees.

136. Suffolk County also argues that LILCO's provisions for sanitary facilities and for obtaining portable toilets are inadequate. SC Ex.16 (Radford et al. direct testi-many), at 37. But there are restrooms in the LILCO buildings at the three reception centers. Furthermore, LILCO can obtain portable toilets as needed pursuant to agree-ments with vendors. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 55; Tr.17,674-75 (Crocker). The Board finds these arrangements satisfactory. In addition, the Board agrees with LILCO that its plan to have a logistics support group obtain blankets or any other supplies as needed during an emergency through the use of pre-established open purchase orders is adequate. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 55: Tr.

17,669-71 (Crocker). FENIA testified that aj;i hoc measures to bring in additional sup-plies or portable toilets would not require letters of agreement. Tr.18,282-83 (Keller).

While LILCO's planning goes beyond "a_d hoc" measures, the arrangements it has made are more than adequate and more than called for by the regulations. Louisiana Power &

Light Co. -(Waterford Steam Elec. Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732,17 NRC 1076,1107 (1983).

Accordingly, the Interveners' suggestion that additional letters of agreement are re-quired is without merit.

1 I

i I

137. Based upon the above considerations, the Board finds that LILCO's j

decontamination procedures provide reasonable assurance that adequate measures can I and will be taken to protect the public in the event of an emergency at Shoreham.

D. Traffic Issues 138. The two litigated issues remaining to be resolved concern the effect of L

traffic congestion on the ability of evacuees to reach the proposed reception centers. l Those issues are:

Transportation and traffic problems that might develop as a

! result of the [ reception centers'] location and [their] dis- l tance from the plume EPZ.

The adequacy of evacuation routes to the three LILCO facil-ities proposed as reception centers, including the effects of traffic congestion on the way to and in the vicinity of the facilities, and LILCO's Revision 8 proposal to employ traffic guides on Nassau County roadways.

Memorandum and Order (Rulings on LILCO Motion to Reopen Record and Remand of Coliseum Issue), ASLBP No. 86-833-01, at 18 (December 11, 1986). As these two issues cover the same topic, the Board will treat them as one. Our concern here is whether the roadway network servicing the reception centers is adequate to permit EPZ evacuees to reach the reception centers.N 59/ The Board finds that the applicant's burden of proof on the accessibility of the reception centers is a light one. First, as a general rule at least, the magnitude of the burden of persuasion should be influenced by the gravity of the matters in controversy.

Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1,2,3 and 4), ALAB- 1 i

256,1 NRC 10,17 n.18 (1975). Here the entire dispute is about what happens af ter evacuees have lef t the plume EPZ. Moreover, the record shows that delay in reaching reception ecnters is unlikely to be immediately health-threatening. See e.g., Tr.

18,293-95,18,415 (Keller).

Second, it would be inappropriate to set a time limit for getting people to the re-ception centers, particularly when the record suggests that for no other nuclear plant in the country has the applicant been required to analyze the roads to the reception (footnote continued) ,

1 l

L_______________ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _

i i

139. This issue is one of first impression for a licensing board. Several witness-es testified that they were not aware of any similar inquiry having been made with re-spect to any other reception center for any other nuclear power plant in the country.

Tr.18,847 (Hartgen); LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 20: Tr.19,136 (Urbanik); Tr. 18,378-79 (Keller, Baldwin). Two witnesses stated that they would know if any such inquiries had been made. Tr.18,848 (Hartgen),19,136 (Urbanik).

140. Both the NRC and LILCO conclude that'the roadway network is sufficient to service anticipated evacuation traffic demand within about twelve hours. For the reasons detailed below, we concur and, accordingly, find for LILCO on the traffic is-sues.

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l (footnote continued) centers. The Appeal Board did not suggest that there should be a time limit. In re-manding the issue of the accessibility of the reception centers the Appeal Board said as follows:

But, manifestly, a reception center that is beyond the reach of the persons it is set up to serve cannot fulfillits intended purpose, no matter how well the f aellity might be designed and equipped.

ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,161-62 (1986). Thus arguably all the proponent of an emergen-cy plan need prove is that the reception centers are not " inaccessible" or "beyond the reach" of evacuees.

Also, it would be inappropriate to set time limits for reaching reception centers in light of the f act that the Commission's regulations do not set any particular time limits for evacuation of the EPZ. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Sta-tion, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836,23 NRC 749,486 (1986).

1 Also, the testimony of the NRC Staff and FEMA in 'his proceeding suggests that the 12-hour figure in Criterion J.12 is not intended to be taken as a deadline. See, e.g.,

Tr.19,225-26 (Kantor).

I

s The Positions of the Parties 141. The tesjimony on this iss'ue concerned the adequacy of capacity analyses for the approaches to the reception centers presented by LILCO and by the State of New York.

142. LILCD presented two capacity ana!yses, which were both prepared under the direction of Edward B. Lieberman. ? resident of KLD Associates, Inc. (KLD). The first of these, KLD TR-192, reports the results of analyses of several intersections along the paths to each of the reception centers. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony) Att. M. Mr. Lieberman testified that this analysis was preliminary in' extent and detail, undertaken solely to support the trip distribution and path assignment analy-4 sis. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 12. Thus. KLD TR l92 does not purport to be an in-depth analysis of the roadway capacity.

143. KLD Associates subsequently prepared KLD, TR-201, a more thorough, in-depth analysis that considered more intersections in greater detail. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. S. KLD also, prepared KLD TR-201A, a revision of KLD TR-201 containing certain refinements as well as some additional data re-

)

garding background traffic and actuated traffic signal controllers. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony). Att. T at 5 It is KLD-201A on which Mr. Lieberman primarily relies in reaching his/ conclusions about the roadway network.

144. In its analyses KLD considered the level of traffic that would be serviced throughout a twelve-hour period at each intersection analyzed.~ T+1e results suggest that during the first few hours of an evacuaRon, when evacuation trafde would be ar-riving along the approach routes.SS the approach roadways would experience q

)

$3/ These results were based on the assumption that evacuation vehicles seeking monitoring at the receptior' centers would arrive along the approach routes over six hours. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. T at 20. This figure repre- {

(footnote continued) l t

congestion as traffic demand exceeded monitoring capacity. As a result, queues would 7

form upstream of the reception centers and extend along the approach roads. Over the remaining hours, during which there would be no new evacuation traffic demand, the queues would dissipate such that all evacuation traffic demand would be serviced.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), Att. T at 12-13, 26.

145.' Mr. Lieberman testified that the KLD analyses reveal that the controlling factor in determining how rapidly vehicles can reach the reception centers is the rate at which those vehicles can be monitored for contamination at the centers. LILCO Ex.

1 (Crocker et al direct testimony), at 32, Att. S at 17-21, Att. T at 21-25; Tr.18,736 1

(Lieberman). That is, each of the intersections could service vehicles faster than the reception centers. This would result in queues forming at the entrance to the reception centers. Tr.18,736 (Lieberman). Given this constant supply of vehicles, all available monitoring capacity for vehicles would be fully utilized. The maximum number of vehi-cles that could reach the reception centers in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, then, would be determined by i

j the monitoring nte, not by the roadway capacity. Ld. Mr. Lieberman testified that with monitoring rates being the controlling factor, the reception centers could service i

approximately 46.6 percent of the EPZ within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et a

al. direct testimony ), Att. T at 26-27t LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at

5. Accordingly, Mr. Lieberman concluded that the expected evacuation traffic demand (footnote continued) l sents the low end of the range of 6 to 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> over which the evacuating vehicles would arrive. See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. T at 13, 29. Mr.

Lieberman explained that the six-hour arrival period leads to the heaviest loading of the intersections. Tr.18,580 (Lieberman). While lengthy queues would form along the l

evacuation paths if all evacuation traffic were to arrive over a six-hour period, there  !

would be virtually no queuing if evacuation traffic were to arrive over a nine-hour peri- l 3

od. Evacuation vehicles could be serviced at the intersections as they arrived. LILCO j

$ Ex.1 (Crocker e_t a_1. direct testimony), Att. T at 28.

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could travel to the reception centers and be monitored well within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. LILCO Ex.

1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 33, Att. T at 30; LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surre-buttal testimony), at 19.

146. The State's analyses were sponsored by Dr. David T. Hartgen, who is the Director of Transportation Statistics and Analysis for the New York State Department l of Transportation, and by Mr. Robert C. Millspaugh, who is Supervisor of the Traffic Engineering Design Section of the New York State Department of Transportation. The State's analyses differed considerably from KLD's. In the first place, the State assumed considerably higher levels of traffic on the roadway network.W 147. Second, rather than determining the level of traffic that could be serviced by a given intersection over time, the State considered the quality of flow, comparing the traffic demand to roadway or intersection capacity. Tr.18,844 (Hartgen). Based l

l upon this approach, the State concluded that the roadway network is inadequate. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 40-46, 50, 52; NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen l-and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at 11-16.

148. The NRC's testimony on this issue was presented by Dr. Thomas Urbanik.

l 11, who has reviewed initial evacuation time estimate submittals of approximately 50 nuclear f acilities. Staff Ex. 3 (Urbanik direct testimony), at 2. Although Dr. Urbanik did not perform a capacity analysis of his own, he did review the analyses prepared by the State and by LILCO as well as all of the written testimony pertaining to traffic is-sues that was filed in this proceeding. Dr. Urbanik also made field observations of the roadway network here at issue. Tr.18,962 (Urbanik).

6, t / The State did consider one scenario involving lower traffic volumes. Under this scenario, congestion is not a problem. The State, however, dismissed this scenario as unrealistically optimistic. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 39, 41.

l l

l I

,, _7 I

4 -

e ,, a, d

j  ;

1, 7 j 149. Dr. Urbanih testified that the KLU analysos use standard traffic eneineer-t i ing procedures and Neet a simple test of reasonabler#N. Staff Ex. 3 (Urbanik direct testimony), at 4.[Ifis only concern with the KLD analyses relates to assumptions about lef t turn movements at two intertsetiens.. H<i testified that this concern would be

!. i cured with the use of police traffic cont,ro! 3t those intersections. In addition, Dr. Ur-banik found the State's analy@s to A:lrrelevant as, in his opinion, it overstates the i

, level of traffic demand that is likely to be on the roadway network and uses the wrong l

' methodology. Tr.19,030 (Urbanik): see Staff Ex. (Urbanik rebuttal testimony), at 3.

f Dr. Urbanik concluded that with the presence of traffic control measures at a lirrited number of critical intersections, the roadway network will adequately service tne ex-pected evacuation traffic demand within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Staff Ex. 3 (Urbanik direct testimo-ny), et 7.

150. In order to determine which. if any, analysis to accept, the doard must first resolve several fundamental disagreements between the parties. We must deter-1 ,- s l mine the appropriate level of traffic' demand to antoppate on the roadway network, the l

proper standard for reviewin tue relevant, data, Tnd the validity of concerns raised with the methodology used to perforr tne various analyses. Finally, we muss consider y '

the need for traffic control at some locations along the evacuation paths.

The Appropriate Level of ,

traffic Deman('. on the Network f) cf51, One of the major disagreemer;ts between the parties concerns the appro-priate levpvDf traffic demand that should be expected on the roadway network in the ever/ cf a radiological emergency as Shoreham. Mr. Lieberman testified that in KLD TR-201 and KLD TR-201 A he assumed an evacuation of the entire EPZ population, of which 30 percent wott d travel to the receptioli centers for monitoring. LILCO Ex.1 f

l p f g

F

( <

(Crocker e_t & direct testimony), at 30, Att. S, Att. T; LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebut-tai testimony), at 9; Tr.18,651 (Lieberman). He indicated that the 30 percent figure was chosen to inject a degree of conservatism into the analysis, representing one-and-one-half times the planning basis of 20 percent. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker M al. direct tes-timony), Att. T at 16,20. In addition, he assumed that the level of background traffic (that is, non-evacuation traffic that would normally be on the roadway system absent an evacuation) would remain unchanged. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony),

at 30, Att. S, Att. T. On cross-examination, Suffolk County sought to elicit from Mr.

Lieberman testimony that background levels might actually increase as people sought to pick up relatives in the area or to perform other evacuation preparation tasks. M r.

Lieberman responded that if anything, background traffic would likely decrease in an actual emergency as non-evacuees would either postpone trips or find alternative routes to avoid congestion. He assumed that background traffic would remain at nor-mal levels, though, in the interest of conducting a conservative analysis. Tr. 18,597 I

(Lieberman); LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker g al. direct testimony), Att. T at 20; LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 14-15.

152. The State criticized the KLD figures as unrealistically low and overly op-timistic. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony). at 21, 28. The State's ,

i witnesses offered several scenarios that they argued were more realistic. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony). at 39-46. In each of these, the State postu-lated that between 50 and 100 percent of the EPZ would travel to the reception cen-ters. It was also assumed that background traffic would remain at normallevels, and in one scenario that it would actually increase by 50 percent. Ld. In arguing that back-ground traffic levels might actually rise, the State? witnesses relied on the testimony of Suffolk County witnesses Drs. Johnson and Saegert that persons living in tne areas e-----__-.--- _ - - - - -

around the reception centers might flee their homes in the event that these centers are used for radiological monitoring and decontamination purposes. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 17 (citing Direct Testimony of James H. Johnson, Jr. and Susan C. Saegert on Behalf of Suffolk County Concerning LILCO's Reception Centers (Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon and Traffic Issues) (April 13, 1987)). The State witnesses also speculated that additional background traffic might appear as workers residing in the vicinities of the reception centers returned to their homes to be with f amily members. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 17. The -

State also argued that background traffic levels should be increased to take into ac-count the effects of projected traffic growth on the adequacy of the roadway network.

The State asserted that traffic is growing at an annual rate of 4.6 percent inside the EPZ and 2.6 percent outside. Id. Finally, Dr. Hartgen stated that in many cases, non-evacuation traffic might not take alternative paths to avoid congestion. Tr.

18,838-39 (Hartgen). In addition, the State's witnesses, relying on the testimony of Suf folk County witnesses Dr. Stephen Cole and Dr. James H. Johnson, Jr., assumed that as many as 50 percent of the Suffolk County residents living outside the EPZ would travel to the reception centers for monitoring, although not instructed to evacuate or to seek monitoring. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 37. 39-40.

153. The Board finds that LILCO has more accurately estimated the level of traffic demand that is likely to exist on the roadway network in the event of a ra-diological emergency at Shoreham. The Board rejects the thesis that the " shadow phe-nomenon" will make the reception centers inaccessible, for the following reasons. ,

First, evacuees from the EPZ are likely to gain access to the main evacuation routes at i

or near their eastern " termini," and " shadow" evacuees f rom outside the EPZ are more 1

likely to have difficulty entering those routes. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct

testimony), at 34; LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 8; LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 5.

154. Second, the County's theory that large numbers of people outside the EPZ will evacuate in any radiological emergency is unsound, for a number of reasons. The.

issue of the evacuation " shadow phenomenon," which the State adopts from the County testimony, has already been litigated. See Staff Ex. 3 (Urbanik direct testimony), at 5.

All parties agree that there could be some " shadow" evacuation. But the Board has al-ready determined that the public will consider the information it receives and will react predominantly in a manner that is consistent with the advice given, PID, LBP 12, 21 NRC 644, and nothing new has been presented to make us change our minds.

Moreover, the " shadow phenomenon" issue has been litigated in other cases, with re-sults similar to the one we reach here.

6. 2/

See Louisiana Power & Licht Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station. Unit 3),

LBP-82-100,16 NRC 1550,1562 (1982); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756,778-80 (1982). Af ter hearing Suffolk County's witnesses Johnson and Erikson, the Diablo Canyon Board was "not convinced that a social survey would offer useful improvement in public information plan-ning . . . ." LBP-82-70,16 N RC at 778, 823-24. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Is-land Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), LBP-81-59,14 NRC 1211,1568-69 (1981).

Citing Dr. Johnson, the Interveners in the Vogtle case alleged that the applicants should be prepared for the displacement of a significant number of people outside the EPZ. The ASLB, having reviewed the Nuclear Safety article by Dr. Johnson, found in it no support for a consideration that any spontaneous evacuation of residents of the Augusta area (about 26 miles from the plant) might be expected to impede the evacua-tion of the Vogtle 10-mile EPZ. The Board denied admission of the contention. Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), August 12,1985, slip op. at 35-36.

! In the Seabrook case the Board rejected a contention that " behavioral variations" I among members of the public should be analyzed. (Apparently this referred to the pos-sibility of panic.) Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2),

slip op. at 87-90 (Apr. 29,1986) (unpublished).

L-_------_---_------

155. The County's " shadow phenomenon" theory is baud on only one real emer-i gency: Three Mile Island. It ignores, for example, the Ginna accident. See Tr.18,175 (Czech); PID, LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 673-74. It ignores other real-world radiological accidents and experiences, some of which were recounted by LILCO's witnesses.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 20-22, 26-27, 29 Tr. 17,500-21 (Crocker, Linnemann, Mileti, Watts). It also !gnores other well-known radiological ac-cidents (for example, Windscaleb ), which no one has suggested support the County's thesis of " shadow phenomenon" or of hostile, confused, or irrational behavior.

156. That the County's entire empirical data base is the experience at Three Mile Island is on its face f atal. The reason is that TMI coming as it did before the pres-ent.NRC regulations, was a case of what happens without good emergency planning, and particularly without good emergency information. One reason the present NRC emergency planning regulations were enacted was precisely to cure the problems re-vealed by TMI. See Tr.19,195-96 (Kantor).W Hence, the County's entire empirical data base of real-world emergencies is a case that is largely irrelevant to what would 1

happen in a present-day emergency under present NRC regulations. As FEMA witness- )

es testified, it is a "different situation" today. Tr.18,469 (Baldwin),18,470 (Keller); see also Tr. 17,757-78 (Mileti) ("Helter-skelter" that occurred at Three Mlle Island has little chance of occurring at Shoreham, where so much attention has been devoted to providing good emergency information). The planning criteria of NUREG-0654 are de-signed to provide orc'erly, safe evacuation and thereby minimize hysterical reactions M/ There is a body of experience with radiological accidents other than TMI, some of which have affected the public. For example, several radiological accidents are dis- ]

cussed in Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1),  ;

A LAB-698,16 NRC 1290,1317 (1982).

6_4 / See also Tr. 1550, 2027 (Sorensen).

i I

- ________.--_---_____m_ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _

and potential chaos.EI

. Thus the County's case is essentially a challenge to the guidance of NUREG-0654. In-deed, the County's witness Dr. Johnson readily admits that he believes the NRC regula-tions are based on unrealistic assumptions. Tr. 17,896-97 (Johnson).

157. In contrast, LILCO's model of how people behave in emergencies takes into account not only TMI E and other radiological emergencies, but natural disasters M/ Louisiana Power & Licht Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), LBP 100,16 NRC 1550,1562 (1982), modifled, LBP-82-112,16 NRC 1901, aff'd, ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076 (1983). "[P]ublic overreaction to a nuclear accident is likely to be mini-mized provided the guidance in NUREG-0654 is followed, and we conclude that no addi-tional measures need be taken to cope with the public's anxiety." 16 NRC at 1562: see also id at 1576; ALAB-732,17 NRC at 1102 n.43.

NUREG-0654 presumes that citizens will act reasonably on the information that is provided to them. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756, 780 (1982). Even if one assumes that overreaction is likely, the remedy is to broadcast accurate, consistent information. See id. at 779.

Similarly, a study done by one of LILCO's consultants analyzed whether social science principles were reflected in a nuclear power plant offsite warning system that complied with post-TMI requirements and concluded that many of the factors necessary were embodied in the planning system and that others could easily be incorporated.

Cordaro ej al., ff. Tr.1470, at 65.

A revised emergency plan for TMI has been approved based upon the improved public information efforts in the plan. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nu-clear Station, Unit 1) LBP-81-59,14 NRC 1211,1569 (1981).

M/ On the question of what implications should be drawn about emergency response from the experience at TMI, any objective judge would have to accept the opinions of LILCO's witnesses over those of Suffolk County. See, e.e. Tr.17,871 (Saegert),17,872 (Cole).

Leaving aside opinion polls, the only data Dr. Johnson appears to have analyzed are his own survey of TMI residents and the data collected by Cynthia Flynn. See Tr.

17,892 gLt s_eg. (Johnson). LILCO's witness Dr. Lindell has worked with Cynthia Flynn, 1.lLCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. D, at 4, 5, as has an earlier LILCO j

witness, John Sorensen, Tr.1532 (Sorensen). Also, the County's witness Dr. Saegert j relies heavily on " stress" af ter the TMI accident. But it was LILCO's witness Dr. Mileti l I

(footnote continued) t

as well.N Other things being equal a model that fits both radiological emergencies and natural disasters is more plausible than one that addresses merely radiological ones.E 158. The County also bases its case on opinion polls of residents in the vicinity of Shoreham. See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 14; LILCO Ex. 50 (footnote continued) who investigated that stress. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 12-13; Tr.1800-01 (Mileti).

Moreover, several of LILCO's witnesses were involved in the TMI accident, as was one of the NRC Staff witnesses. Mr. Kantor was part of the NRC support team at Bethesda during the emergency and was later part of the onsite support staff. Tr.

19,193 (Kantor). Dr. Linnemann was also involved, Tr.17,666 (Linnemann), as was Mr.

Donaldson. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 9. Mr. Watts was present at the Ginna accident. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t a_1. direct testimony), at 21.

61 / The LILCO witnesses have taken pains to place the experience at TMI within the research tradition on all types of emergencies: natural disasters, radiological emergencies, and other technological disasters. For example, the concept of

" overresponse" is not unique to radiological emergencies; it is something that can hap-pen in any disaster. Cordaro et al. ff. Tr.1470, at 8,17-18,119. What TMI shows is what other disasters have shown; that if people are provided with confusing, conflict-ing, and alarming information they may decide to take protective action, even if it is not objectively necessary, based on their own perceptions of the risk. What (anecdotal) evidence there is about Chernobyl suggests that the public response there was consis-tent with the LILCO witnesses' analysis of what happened at TML LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 26-27, 29.

That the TMI evacuation was not some totally " unique" event caused inevitably by people's preexisting, unchanging fear of radiation is demonstrated persuasively by a number of f acts. For one thing, the evacuation took place over several days and re-flected an " orderly process"; there was no evidence of panic or headlong flight. T r.

17,890-91 (Johnson), Cordaro e_1 a_1., ff. Tr.1470, at 13 (quoting Dr. Johnson). For an-other, the Ginna radiological accident did not produce a " shadow." See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker el al. direct testimony), at 21.

sa/ The County's witnesses for the most part rely on their own opinions, not the large body of research on disasters. To the extent they attempt to cite other re-searchers, their testimony is not reliable. The record in this proceeding shows that the County witnesses' interpretations of research literature cannot be relied on. For exam-ple, they have for years been citing Dr. Lindell, but when Dr. Lindell was given the op-portunity to testify he made it clear that his work does not support the Interveners' theories. See, e.g., LILCO Ex. 50 (Lindell rebuttal testimony), at 1-3.

f

l (Lindell rebuttal testimony), at 1-2. The County compares the results from opinion polls at Shoreham (taken in 1982 and thereaf ter) to actual behavior at Three Mile Island (occurring in 1979). Getting similar results in one case, they conclude that the polls must predict real behavior.

159. However, this conclusion is unsound. A close look at the evidence shows that the results of the opinion polls at Shoreham are close to the actual percentages of evacuees at TMI only within the 10 mile zone. On this ground the County argues that the actual behavior at TMI validates its opinion polls. But outside 10 miles, the opinion polls at Shoreham show higher rates of evacuation than the actual behavior at TMI.

Here the County shif ts ground and argues that the different results show that things are worse at Shoreham than at TMI. Thus, the County uses both the similarity between the numbers at TMI and the numbers at Shoreham (inside 10 miles) to show that polls accu-rately predict behavior and the disparity in results (outside 10 miles) to show that things are worse at Shoreham than at TMI.E M/ See Cordaro e_t al., ff. Tr.1470, at 83-86. As Figure 5 to Zeigler and Johnson, ff.

Tr. 2789, between pp.19 and 20. shows, the actual behavior at TMI was close to intend-ed behavior as reported in the April 1982 survey on Long Island for people 0-5 miles and 5-10 miles from the plant, less close for people from 10-15 miles from the plant, and not close at all for people 15-25 and 25-40 miles f rom the plant.

Dr. Cole concludes from these data that the survey should be taken into account in part because "we find a high level of correspondence between what people on Long Island tell us they would do and what people at Three Mile Island actually did do." Cole, f f. Tr. 2792, at 28.

But at the same time Dr. Johnson explained:

Beyond the 10-mile zone, the (survey) results at Shoreham suggest an even larger evacuation shadow than at TMI. Specifically, within 10 to 15 miles of TMI one-third of the population evacuated. At Shoreham, an estimated one-half of the population within the 10 to 15 mile zone is likely to evacuate. If one compares actual evacuation behavior at (footnote continued)

I

160. The County's case relies on a knee-jerk model of human behavior. It theo-rizes that no tratter what the circumstances of a particular emergency, so long as it is a radiological emergency, people will evacuate in large numbers. See Tr.17,870 (Johnson) ("these measures [by opinion polls) are highly stable over time . . . ."). This model of behaviorE is contrary to this Board's finding of " rationality." PID, 21 NRC at 670.

(footnote continued)

TMI and intended evacuation behavior at Shoreham beyond 15 miles of the plant (s_ee Figure 5), one finds that within the 15 to 25 mile distance zone at TMI, only about 12 percent of the population evacuated; at Shoreham, approximately 33 percent of the population in this distance zone said they would evacuate. Outside the 40-mile zone, less than cne percent of the people at TMI evacuated. but one-fourth of the population in this zone on Long Island said they would evacuate.

Zeigier and Johnson, ff. Tr. 27894 at 20.

B/ Indeed, the County's attempt to correlate the behavior at TMIin 1979 with polls l on Long Island in 1982 and thereaf ter suggest that, in the County's view, the fear of ra-diation and the almost inevitable fleeing behavior that allegedly occurs in an emergen-cy are universal and unchanging. Likewise, Dr. Cole now finds similar poll results around the Seabrook plant. Tr.17,872 (Cole). Nothing we know about human behavior suggests that this model is plausible. See Tr.1759,1760 (Mileti). It appears that the opinion polls are measuring something that is relatively constant from place to place and time to time. But they are not measuring future behavior in emergencies.

H/ The model depends on the County's thesis that people are so afraid of radiation that they will evacuate no matter what information they receive. That people fear ra-diation is not disputed. The County attempts to show that this fear is becoming greater because of the recent accident at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union. See Tr.17,889-90 (Johnson). But the effect of the memory of Chernobyl on some future evacuation is speculative. The fact that people are aware of Chernobyl is no different in kind from earlier County testimony on Hiroshima and Nagasaki:

Another factor which further explains the public's heightened fear of nuclear power arises from its controver-sial history. Studies have shown that a large proportion of the public relates the fear of nuclear power to the use of nu-i (footnote continued)

161. In the litigation on the emergency planning brochure, the County's wit-ness testified about the importance of providing good information to help people accu-rately assess the risk. This Board ordered LILCO to include in its brochure informa-tion that radiation can cause injury or deati.. PID, LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 769-70 (1985). It would be anomalous to require an applicant to include this information in a brochure and at the same time find that fear of radiation makes the emergency plan unworkable.

162. Over the years LILCO has brought in a variety of highly qualified experts on disasters to testify about the value of opinion polls. Generally speaking, these wit-nesses had studied both natural disasters and radiological ones. All these witnesses have explained that opinion polls cannot be used to predict actual emergency behavior.

The latest in this line of witnesses was Dr. Lindell. He has himself used opinion polls to measure behavioral intentions, but has neither used nor endorsed their use as a method (footnote continued) j i

clear weapons. Looming large in the social memory of the l public are the deaths and human suffering caused by the J bombing of Japan during World War II.

Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, at 25 (footnote omitted).

)

U/- In urging the Board to require that the brochure provide more information about l

, radiation doses and health effects. Dr. Saegert and Dr. Radford emphasized how impor-tant it is to provide information about the risk. For example, they testified as follows:

Only if the public is informed of the true nature of the risk is it reasonable to expect that people will attempt to take appropriate protective actions, j l

Radford and Saegert, ff. Tr.14,105, at 3-4; see also Tr. 14,111-14 (Saegert), 14.114-14 (Radford), 14,117-18 (Saegert), 14.120 (Saegert), 14.123 (Radford), 14.126 (Saegert), )

14.130-31 (Radford). Dr. Saegert urged this even though she also apparently believes i that many people would not read the brochure or believe it if they did read it. Tr.

14,139-40,10,871-72 (Saegert).

L_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _

l to predict actual emergency behavior. See Tr. 17,770-73 (Lindell). Indeed, Dr. Lindell cited two of his own studies to demonstrate the inappropriateness of using polls to pre-dict evacuation " shadow." LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 18. He had measured intended response to an eruption of Mt. St. Helens and a release of chlorine from a railroad tank car derailment. Id. Dr. Lindell testified that superficial examina- I tion of these data might lead to the conclusion that respondents would, according to Dr.

Cole's theories, be inclined to evacuate because of their fears of hazard exposure. Ld.

But such was not the case during the May 18, 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens or follow-ing the chlorine tank car derailment at Mississaugua Ontario. Ld. Dr. Lindell testified i that both cases indicate that direct extrapolation from risk perception data substantial-ly overstate the amount of evacuation that would occur and that this in turn suggests that attempts to estimate evacuation " shadow"in a radiological emergency from behav-ior intentions would be equally inappropriate. Ld.

163. In summary, we reject Suf folk County's theory of the " evacuation" shadow phenomenon and find that the State's assumption of shadow traffic overloads the net-l l work. Suffolk County asks us to find that in any radiological emergency at Shoreham 1

large numbers of pople from both inside and outside the EPZ would evacuate (regard-less of conditions ht the time) and that the " shadow" evacuees from outside the EPZ would prevent evacuees from inside the EPZ from reaching the reception centers

,i promptly. We find instead that since the evacuees from the EPZ will, as a general mat-ter, enter the major highways near their eastern termini, the later-arriving shadow evacuees from outside the EPZ will experience significant delays in gaining entry and discourage them from entering the main evacuation routes. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 34. To the extent these vehicles do gain entry, they will dis-perse the evacuating vehicles longitudinally and cause a longer arrival period at the N____-____________-_-_-_-____-________-____

reception centers, Id. at 34-35. This longer arrival period would result in less demand per time on the intersections near the reception centers.

164. Even leaving the above consideration aside, the Board still cannot accept Suffolk County's theory of human behavior over LILCO's. In light of the fact (1) that )

1 there are no reliable empirical data showing that polls can predict emergency behavior, (2) that the evacuation at TMI was an " orderly process" with no indications of panic or irrational behavior, (3) that the accident at Ginna did not apparently result in a " shad-ow," (4) that other real-life experience with radioactive materials does not appear to support the " shadow phenomenon" theory, and (5) that LILCO's theory of human behav-ior is in accordance with what is known about natural and radiological disasters, we find for LILCO on :his issue.

165. We also find that it would be inappropriate to increase levels for back-ground traffic. Dr. Urbanik agreed with Mr. Lieberman that background traffic levels are not likely to increase in an emergency. If anything, he testified, they are likely to decrease. Tr.19,111-12 (Urbanik). This is because people will try to avoid congested i

areas when possible. During an evacuation, some people will postpone discretionary trips that require them to travel along congested evacuation paths or else will find less-congested alternative paths to their destinations. % Nonetheless, Dr. Urbanik con-cluded, because it would be difficult to quantity the degree to which background traffic might decrease, it would be appropriate for present purposes to assume normal back-ground traffic figures. Tr.19,111 (Urbanik). We agree with Dr. Urbanik and Mr.

Lieberman that background levels along congested evacuation paths are not likely to in-crease.

166. We have already rejected the argument that large numbers of residents from areas around the reception centers are likely to flee their homes. Thus, we reject I

the State's argument that these persons will add to background levels in the event of an emergency at Shoreham. Even if some residents did evacuate as the Interveners postu-late, however, this would not likely affect traffic headed toward the reception centers.

As Mr. Lieberman pointed out, if these persons fled relatively soon af ter an evacuation of the EPZ was recommended, they would be out of the area by the time any EPZ evacuees arrived at the reception centers. Tr.18,598 (Lieberman). Even if they waited, however, they would not likely interfere with traffic from the EPZ. Evacuees from the EPZ would be headed toward the reception centers; local traffic, hypotheti-cally attempting to flee f rom the reception centers, would likely be moving in the op-posite direction. Tr.18,600 (Lieberman). This traf fic, then, would not add to the back-ground traffic considered in the analyses.

167. We also find that projected traffic growth figures ne not an appropriate matter for consideration here. Dr. Urbanik testified that:

Planning for nuclear power plants is an ongoing process.

The current plan should be developed on the best available current data. If conditions change substantially in the fu-ture, it would then be appropriate to revise the analysis and plans if necessary.

Staf f Ex. 3 (Urbanik direct testimony), at 6; see also LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 9. We agree. Throughout the long history of this proceeding, we have evaluated the LILCO Plan based upon then-existing conditions. As an example that is similar to the present circumstances, we have considered evacuation time estimates for the LILCO Plan based on the current population of the Shoreham EPZ, rather than deriving a figure based upon projected growth rates. See LILCO Plan, App. A.  ;

13/ Dr. Urbanik's considerable experience in dealing with traffic issues for approxi-mately 52 nuclear power plants entitles his testimony to great weight, i

! )

168. Even if we were to consider levels of projected traffic growth, however, I

we find that the State has used figures that are too high. As Mr. Lieberman testified, the analysis for KLD TR-201A addresses traffic flow in Nassau County, where the re-ception centers are. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 18. LILCO addressed the rate of traffic growth in Nassau County. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebut-tal testimony), at 10. These data show that traffic in Nassau County is growing at a rate of only about 2/3 of one percent annually. Ld. at 10, Att. A: Tr. 18,617 l . (Lieberman); Tr.19,131 (Urbanik). At this rate, background traffic in the area would be i

expected to increase by only three percent over the next five years. We also find it in- I appropriate to assume that the State would permit traffic demand to grow precipitously without upgrading the highway system. Accordingly, we find that the State's use of 150 percent of background traffic is inappropriate. The analyses should be conducted using only 100 percent of the normal background figures, though this too is likely an overestimate.

169. We find that the State has overloaded the network as well with evacuation traffic. As we have already concluded, roughly 20 percent of the EPZ is expected to seek monitoring at the reception centers. The State has exceeded this level by as much as fivt times, which we find excessive. Even the lower figure of 30 percent used by KLD exceeds the planning basis; thus, there is a reasonable margin for error even in the KL' ' analyses.

170. Accordingly, the Board concludes that the State has overestimated the level of traffic likely to be on the roadway network in the event of an emergency at Shoreham. Conclusions based on the State's figures, then. are not helpful in resolving the present issue. The Board finds that the KLD analyses have more appropriately esti-l mated the level of traffic demand. We will analyze the network under the assumption I

that the entire EPZ population is evacuated, that 30 percent of that population seeks monitoring at the reception centers, and that the level of background traffic remains unchanged.

Standard For AnalyzinF Traffic Data 171. The parties also disagree on the proper method for analyzing the traffic data. Dr. Hartgen testified that his is a " planning" analysis, considering the quality of I t~ low at the intersections as opposed to the number of vehicles that would be serviced over time. Tr. 18,784-86,18,819 (Hartgen). In reviewing the adequacy of intersections, the State considered the relationship of the traffic demand to intersection capacity, or l

the V/C ratio. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 40-46, 48-50,

52. Dr. Hartgen testified that when the V/C ratio for an intersection exceeds one (that is, when demand exceeds capacity), the intersection will operate at " Level of Service F," which he testified is characterized by the Highway Capacity Manual as stop-and go flow, lack of freedom to maneuver, and low through volumes. I_d. at 40. He also testified that at Level of Service F an intersection will experience severe congestion, and long queues will form upstream, "gridlocking" the system. [d. at 47 n.20: NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at 6 n.1; NYS Ex. 7 (Hartgen and Millspaugh second rebuttal testimony), at 15. Initially Dr. Hartgen considered the V/C ratio for a 12-hour period, using his own figures for traffic demand at three inter-sections he deemed " critical." NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 40-46, 48-50. Subsequently he reevaluated these same intersections and two others over four three-hour time segments, using the traffic levels assumed in the KLD L4/ On cross-examination, however, Dr. Hartgen agreed that the Highway Capacity Manual states that the designation of Level of Service F does not automatically imply I that the intersection approach or lane group is overloaded. Tr.18,794 (Hartgen).

l l

I analyses. NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at 11-16, Exhib-its 4-10. The V/C ratios for these intersections generally exceeded one, which Dr.

Hartgen interpreted to mean that the intersections "would not work." NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at 12; Tr.18,793,18,795 (Hartgen).

172. The State did not, however, seek to determine the level of traffic that could be serviced by a given intersection over the relevant time period. Indeed. Dr.

Hartgen repeatedly testified that the Highway Capacity Manual sof tware, which was used to perform the subsequent analysis of the five " critical" intersections, does not permit one to make such an assessment. Tr. 18,781-8 00, 18,805, 18,820, 18,895 (Hartgen).

173. Mr. Lieberman, on the other hand, used the Highway Capacity Manual sof tware to perform an " operational" analysis. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 16. For each of the intersections analyzed, he measured the evacuation flow rate, that is, the level of evacuation t'raffic that would be serviced by the inter-section in each of four three-hour segments. From this he drew specific conclusions about how much evacuation traffic would be serviced at each intersection over the rel-evant 12-hour period. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. T at 21-25.

Based upon this work, Mr. Lieberman testified that despite the presence of congestion at certain intersections, the network could service more than 30 percent of the EPZ in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; indeed, he stated that the limiting f actor would be the monitoring rate at the reception centers, which could accommodate roughly 46.6 percent of the EPZ in a 12-hour period.

174. Mr. Lieberman criticized the State for considering the V/C ratios only.

The State's approach, Mr. Lieberman testified, provides no insight into the upstream metering effects of the approach routes. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal

. testimony), at 16. 'Mr. Lieberman also criticized the State's conclusion that congestion at the intersections in this roadway network would lead to " gridlock." LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 16-17. He testified that gridlock applies to a net-work configuration in which streets are closely spaced, forming a grid pattern that ser-I vices heavy traffic on all streets in all directions. Ld. at 16. Such a network will" lock" only when:

There is heavy traffic in a_ll directions:

There is no preemptive traffic control, in the form of traffic-control personnel, that would keep the intersections clear of blockage; and The traffic volume and circulation patterns create overflow queues which are permitted to spill back into intersections I and physically block the passage of traffic of the cross street approaches. When a closed loop of overflow queues develops, the system can " lock," since the leading vehicles in each queue are physically blocked by the tail of another queue which has spilled back into the intersection.

Ld. Mr. Lieberman testified that the network under consideration is not of a grid vari-ety, but is instead characterized as a freeway-arterial network. Traffic during an evac- l uation would flow primarily in a radial direction, and queues would not form closed I

loops. Ld. at 16-17. In addition. Mr. Lieberman testified, to eliminate even the possibil-ity of queue spill-back and the physical blocking of intersections, he has recommended that police personnel be assigned at all major intersections along the paths to and from the reception centers. Ld. at 17: LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. T )

at 34-38. This testimony was not subsequently challenged by the Interveners.

175. Dr. Urbanik's testimony on the appropriate type of analysis supports Mr.

Lieberman's approach and contradicts the testimony of Dr. Hartgen in several respects.

First, Dr. Urbanik disagreed with Dr. Hartgen's testimony that when the V/C ratio ex- j i

coeds one an intersection "f ails" or " ceases to work." Tr.19.049 (Urbanik). He testified j

---

___--__.___.-_______m_ _ _ _ _ _ _

instead that vehicles will still be serviced at a rate equal to the intersection capacity.

The remaining vehicles will simply await their turn in queue. g 176. Dr. Urbanik also testified that the level of service, which is the measure relied on by the State, does not address the relevant issue here - the level of evacua-tion traffic that can be serviced within about twelve hours. Tr.19,062 (Urbanik). In-stead, it merely defines the quality of flow and indicates whether queues will be pres-ent. Id. To resolve the issue, Dr. Urbanik testified, he would perform an operational analysis. Tr.19,038 (Urbanik).

177. In addition, Dr. Urbanik testified that, contrary to Dr. Hartgen's under-standing, one can determine from the Highway Capacity Manual sof tware the number of vehicles that will be serviced through an intersection over a given period of time.

Tr. 19,061 (Urbanik). In f act, D r. Urbanik performed this task during cross-examination. Tr. 19,041-61 (U rbanik).

178. Accordingly, Dr. Urbanik was able to show the difference between a plan-ning and an operational analysis. He performed an operational analysis of two of the intersectionsEl analyzed by the State, using the traffic demand levels assumed in the KLD analyses.

15/ Another one of the " critical" locations analyzed by the State is the intersection of Willis Avenue and the eastbound Long Island Expressway Service Road. This is one of the two locations at which the KLD analyses used two lanes for lef t turns. Counsel for LILCO sought to have Dr. Urbanik perform an operational analysis of this intersection using a single lane for lef t turns. Dr. Urbanik, however, testified that this intersection is part of a diamond exchange and, therefore, he could not prepare an analysis of it without information about the intersection of Willis Avenue and the westbound Long IS-land Expressway Service Road, which constitutes the other part of the exchange. Tr.

19.093-96 (Urbanik). He stated, though, that with some traffic control at the intersec-tion of Willis Avenue and the eastbound Long Island Expressway Service Road, it is highly likely that the intersection could adequately service evacuation traffic using a I single lane for lef t turns. Tr.19,098 (Urbanik). With traffic control. "any uncertainty is taken out of the process." Ld. Thus, this intersection would not present a problem for evacuating traffic. I_d.

16/ The State did adjust the input data, however, to account for certain errors al-legedly made by KLD. NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at

octr. ore contir.ceci l

t. ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ __ __ ___O

The Meadowbrook Parkway Ramp 179. The State's planning analysis at this location shows that the ramp will op-erate at Level of Service F throughout the 12-hour period. NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and M111spaugh first rebuttal testimony), at Exhibit 9. Based on this, Dr. Hartgen concluded that evacuees will be significantly delayed in reaching the Bellmore reception center.

Ld. at 15.

180. In performing an operational analysis of the ramp, Dr. Urbanik considered the hourly rate of flow of evacuating traffic. The analysis shows that the f actor lim-iting the rate of flow of evacuees through the ramp is not the ramp capacity, but the monitoring rate for evacuation vehicles arriving at the Bellmore reception center via the Meadowbrook Parkway ramp.E LILCO Ex. 43. That is, the hourly capacity of the ramp available for evacuating traffic exceeds the monitoring rate for that traffic.

181. The analysis also shows that all of the evacuation traffic utilizing the ramp would be serviced within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Ld. During the first six hours, during which evacuation traffic would be arriving at the ramp, background plus evacuation traffic demand would exceed the ramp capacity. Thus, a queue would form upstream of the ramp. The evacuation traffic demand serviced on the ramp would also exceed the mon-itoring rate at the Bellmore reception center, thus forming a queue upstream of the center. During the remainder of the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, however, there would be no new (footnote continued) 11-16, Exhibits 1-10. Primarily the State used the KLD machine counts for background traffic instead of using the data collected by direct observation; the State adjusted sig-nal timing data to match the specifications on file with the State instead of the data collected in the field by KLD; and the State adjusted certain of the roadway geometrics used by KLD. NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at 11.

I H/ This is based on a monitoring rate of 100 seconds per vehicle, which we have al-l ready found to be a reasonable estimate.

I

i evacuation traffic. Tr.19,086 (Urbanik). In addition, Dr. Urbanik testified, because a queue operates on a first-in-first-out basis, newly arriving Mckground traffic would join the tall of the queue, behind the evacuation traffic. Id. at 19,085-86. Thus, the queue of waiting evacuation traffic, which would be serviced at the monitoring rate, would dissipate af ter an additional three-and-one-half hours, for a total service time at the ramp of nine-and-one-half hours. See LILCO Ex. 43; Tr.19,086-87 (Urbanik). Thus, while the planning analysis merely shows the conditions at the intersection, the more detailed operational analysis explains how the intersection will operate, in this case servicing all evacuating traffic within the 12-hour period.

182. Although the State's capacity figures were used for this analysis, Dr. Ur-banik testified that the State had improperly analyzed the ramp, treating it as an inter-l section rather than a ramp junction. This treatment would result in an underrepre-sentation of actual ramp capacity. Indeed, evidence at hearing indicated that the State's analysis did understate the ramp capacity. According to the State's calcula-tions, the hourly capacity for the Meadowbrook Parkway ramp for the time period 1600-1900 is 503 vehicles. LILCO Ex. 44 at 15: Tr.19,089 (Urbanik). Actual data taken on that ramp for that time period indicated hourly flows of 618,596. and 345 ve-hicles respectively, with an average of 520 vehicles per hour. LILCO Ex. 38: Tr.

19.090 (Urbanik). Thus, if actual capacity figures were used, service times would be even shorter than those derived using the State's figures.

IB/ Dr. Urbanik testified that " capacity" is "the maximum number of vehicles that have a reasonable expectation of passing over a given section of roadway, typically ex-pressed as vehicles per lane hour." Staff Ex. 3 (Urbanik direct testimony), at 6; Tr.

19,046 (Urbanik).

_______--_m_ _ _ _ _ _ _____m____

_ _ _ _ = _ . _ ._ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

j:

! I Old Country Road and Route 107 l

183. The southbound approach to the intersection of Old Country Road and Route 107 is one of the locations at which the KLD analyses assigned two lanes for lef t-l turning traffic. The analysis performed by Dr. Urbanik on cross-examination, though, used capacity figures derived from the State's analysis, which assigned a single lane for l lef t turns alcng the southbound approach.

l l

-79/ The capacity figures for the lef t-turn movement along the southbound approach

! to this intersection are not specifically set out in the State's HCM sof tware printouts used by Dr. Urbanik. See LILCO Ex. 28 at 7; LILCO Ex. 29 at 7; LILCO Ex. 48 at 7; LILCO Ex. 49 at 7. The State's witnesses testified that these figures cannot be derived from the HCM sof tware printout. Tr.18.781-800,18,805,18.820 (Hartgen, Millspaugh).

Dr. Urbanik showed on cross-examination, however, that such information can indeed be derived from the documents. Tr. 19,041-61 (U rbanik). ,

To determine the exact capacity figure for the lef t-turn movement here at issue, one must know which of three options was used to load traffic demand figures into the sof tware program. Tr. 19,049-58 (Urbanik). Dr. Urbanik testified that the first option, in which no traffic is assigned to the permissive phase, was not used. Tr.19,052 (Ur-banik). He cou!J not readily tell which of the remaining two options was used. Id. Dr. _

Urbanik did testify that typically Option 3 is used. Tr.19,153 (Urbanik), and that he thought it had been used by the State. Tr.19,060 (Urbanik). The analysis performed by Dr. Urbanik assumed that Option 3 had been used.

Based upon the documents in evidence and utilizing the procedures for deriving capacity explained by Dr. Urbanik, we find that the results of Dr. Urbanik's analysis would not change if, in f act Option 2 had been used. The following table lists the dif-ferences between Option 2 and Option 3:

Option 3 Option 2 Capacity (voh) Monitoring Capacity (veh)

Time Total Evac Rate Total Evac 0700-1000 486 334 274 496 344 1000-1300 527 386 274 506 365 1300-1600 530 366 274 520 353 1600-1900 - - --- - ---

1 In this analysis, total capacity is derived from the State's printouts using the )

methodology explained by Dr. Urbanik, with the assumption that evacuation capacity is '

the capacity available for evacuees and is simply total capacity minus background de-(footnote continued) l l -

184. According to the State's analysis, this intersection will operate at Level of Service F (V/C greater than one) for two of the four three-hour periods. NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at Exhibit 7. Based on this, Dr.

Hartgen concluded that this intersection will not work, even under the KLD traffic vol-umes. I_d. at 12; Tr.18,793-95 (Hartgen).

185. The analysis by Dr. Urbanik shows that, as was the case on the Mead-owbrook Parkway ramp, the limiting factor with respect to evacuation flow would be the monitoring rate for vehicles traveling along that path. LILCO Ex. 47. The analysis also shows that evacuation traffic demand would exceed evacuation monitoring flow

, during the first six hours, resulting in a queue forming upstream of the Hicksville re-l l ception center and extending along the southbound approach to the intersection. Ld.;

l Tr. 19,099-100 (Urbanik). However, in the next three-hour time period, with no new evacuation traffic arriving, all'of the queued evacuation traffic would be serviced.

l LILCO Ex. 47; Tr.19.100 (Urbanik). In f act, Dr. Urbanik testified that the queued evac-uation traffic would be serviced about one-and-one-half hours into the third three-hour time period, for a total service time at the intersection of approximately seven-and-one-half hours. Tr. 19,100-01 (Urbanik). This would be comparable to the service time calculated for this intersection under the KLD analysis. See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et a_1. direct testimony), Att. T at 23. Accordingly, even using the machine count data and the State's signal timing data, and assuming a single lane for lef t turns.

the operational analysis shows that this intersection can service more than the expected number of evacuees within the 12-hour time period.

(footnote continued) 1 1

mand. Tr. 19,070-71 (Urbanik). Under both Option 2 and Option 3, evacuation capacity l would exceed the monitoring rate. Thus, in either case the evacuation flow would be

' limited by the monitoring rate. Consequently, the results of the analysis would be the same under Option 2 and Option 3.

)

l

186. These two analyses were performed using conservative assumptions. Ser-vice times would be quicker under an analysis performed using the planning basis ree-ommended by FEMA of 20 percent. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att.

T at 29; Tr.19,088 (Urbanik). In addition, if background levels decreased, as is likely to be the case, or if the arrival period for evacuation traffic was actually longer than six ,

i hours, the level of congestion at the intersections would decrease. Tr. 19,088-89 (Ur-banik).

187. The evidence establishes that the mere presence of congestion at an in-tersection does not alone indicate how much evacuation traffic can be serviced at that location. Thus, the State's more limited analysis of V/C ratios alone does not address the issue presented here. Because we are concerned with determining the number of vehicles that will reach the reception centers over twelve hours and not merely the quality of flow at the intersections, we find that the appropriate method of analysis is to consider the actual number of vehicles serviced at the intersections throughout the 12-hour period.

Specific Flaws Alleged In The Analyses 188. LILCO's witness had other criticisms of the State's analysis. For example, he asserted that the State had erroneously defined the roadway network, thereby double-counting vehicles and overloading the network with fictitious traffic. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony): LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimo-ny). We have already found that the State's analysis is not helpfulin resolving the pres-ent issue because it assumes too much traffic demand and fails to analyze the network with sufficient detail to resolve the present issue. Thus, we will not discuss the addi-tional concerns about the State's analysis raised by LILCO. We will, however, discuss the most significant of the State's concerns about the LILCO analyses.

1 L____________-__-____-_____________ b

Obtaining Background Volumes 189. The data regarding levels of background traffic used in the initial KLD analysis,' KLD TR-192, were gathered in the field over a 24-hour period using machine co'unts 'at each. intersection analyzed. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony),

Att. M, at 7, 8 App. A. Data,regarding turn movements were augmented in KLD TR-201 and KLD' TR-201A. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 31.

Turning . percentages were gathered through direct observation in the field and multiplied by the machine count data to determine background levels for turn move-ments _ Tr. 18,639-40 (Lieberman).

~1 90. The State asserted that KLD should have used the unaltered machine counts instead of relying on the manual counts. NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and Millspaugh .

first rebuttal testimony), at 3-4; NYS Ex. 7 (Hartgen and Millspaugh second rebuttal tes-timony), at 4-5. ' Dr. Hartgen testified that, in his opinion, machine counts are generally more accurate than manual counts. Tr. 18,942-44 (Hartgen).b In addition, he stated that while the machine- counts provided an adequate database, the manual counts occurred over too short a period of time, lasting between one hour and one hour-and-fif teen minutes, to provide accurate data. Tr.18,904-06,18.943 (Hartgen).

JLO/ Cross-examination by. counsel for the NRC elicited from Dr. Hartgen's testimony 1that machine counts _may be unreliable. A paper co-authored by Dr. Hartgen provides that:

It is well known that various mechanical devises and manual.

counts will not always yield identical results. Differences in clock time, sensitivity of recording devices to vehicle pass-over, multi-axle vehicle proportions, and mechanical equip-ment f ailure or malfunction all combine to introduce error.

Staff Ex.1, at 12; Tr.18,916 (Hartgen). These errors may be as great as twenty percent over the course of an hour and about two percent over the course of a day. Staff Ex. 2; l _ Tr.18,917-18 (Hartgen).

1 l

w - - _ _ _ = - ____ =________-

-100-i Accordingly, the State's witnesses testified, by augmenting the machine counts with manual counts, KLD improperly reduced the background figures for thirteen of twenty-eight turn movements, thereby overestimating capacity available for evat.uees at several intersections. NYS Ex. 7 (Hartgen and Millspaugh second rebuttal testimo-ny), at 5.

191. In response, Mr. Lieberman pointed out that at the remaining fif teen movements, background figures actually increased, reducing the capacity available for I evacuees. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 2. He also explained

.that machine counts are not entirely reliable because the road tubes used to count vehl- )

cles cannot distinguish between turn movements in a lane that services two or more movements. As an example, Mr. Lieberman considered the intersection of Willis Ave-nue and the westbound Long Island Expressway Service Road. The lef t lane of the westbound approach services both lef t-turning and through traffic. Since the road tubes cannot determine which of these movements a passing car makes, it cannot accu-rately determine the turning volume. Tr.18,634-35 (Lieberman). Thus, for the 7-10 a.m. time period, the machine counts showed 683 vehicles per hour in the lef t lane. SC Ex.29. Using machine counts alone, the State assumed that all background traffic in this lane executed lef t turns. But, as Mr. Lieberman testified, field observations re-vealed that most of the vehicles in this lef t lane continued through the intersection rather than turning lef t. Tr.18,635-36 (Lieberman). On average, only 182 vehicles per i

hour turned lef t at this intersection during that time period. SC Ex. 30. Mr. Lieberman stated that with. the exception of one or two approaches, accurate turn movements could not be derived exclusively from the machine counts. Tr.18,741. (Lieberman). )

i Mr. Lieberman also stated that it is possible that the road tubes for a turn lane may  !

have extended into a through lane. In that case, machine counts for the turn t

I

-101-T movement (which are of axles, not vehicles) would have overstated traffic volumes in the turn lane. Tr. 18,621-22 (Lieberman). Thun, in Mr. Lieberman's opinion, it was nec-essary to collect dea through direct observations to obtain accurate information about t \

the turn movements. 5 Tr.18,741-43 (Lieberman).

192. Dr. Urbanik agreed with Mr. Lieberman that machine counts cannot dis-tinguish between various movements from a single lane. Tr.19,117 (Urbanik). He sug-gested that one wduid have to estimate turn movements when data.are collected with machine counts. Id. As a result, Dr. Urbanik concluded, given a choice Detween ma-s p," .

chine counts and' manual counts, "[ t]he best way to do it would be a manual count." I_d.

193. In light of the limitations with data collected with machine counts'ralsed :

by Dr. Urbanik and Mr. Lieberman, we find the State's criticism to be unfounded. I Obtaining Signal Timing Data s

194. Mr. Lieberman testified that while preparing KLD TR-192 and KLD TR-201 he did not have data for the actual maximum and minimum green times for traffic signal controllers. Thus, he used data taken in the field. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 14. KLD did seek permission from the State to record the adtual data from the controllers.' Id. Instead the State sent KLD documen-tation of the signal timing data. These data, dated April 18,1985, arrived too late to be included in KLD's analyshh. Id 2 ; SC Ex. 26. y preparing KLD TR-201A. however, Mr.

Lieberman compared his field data to those provided by the State. LILCO Ex. 26, at 14; Tr.18,744 (Lieberman).N In doing so, Mr. Lieberman testified, he adhered to the 81/ Mr. Lieberman indicated that there was some trouble interpreting the State's

! data because they were ambiguous and incomplete. Tr.18,744 (Lieberman). On cross-l examination, Mr Millspaugh admitted that some of the State's data could not be inter-preted without @rior knowledge or the aid of interpretive manuals prepared by the State. Tr. 18,880-82 (Millspaugh). This information was not provided to LILCO. [d.

} S '

e 1 -102-([

State's data unless field observations indicated that longer effective phases actually ex-1sted. Tr.18,606 (Lieberman). Mr. Lieberman explained that he gave somewhat more weignt to the field observations because changes in the dial setting for traffic control-1ers are not always reflected in the records. Tr.18,607 (Lieberman). Thus, Mr.

e Lieberman chose the data that he perceived most accurately represented the real world. Tr.18,745 (Lieberman).

195. Mr. Lieberman also testified that even if his signal timing data were overstated, this would not likely change his conclusion that the roadway network is ad-equate. To change his conclusion, the actual intersection capacity would have to be lower than the monitoring rates. With one possible exception, he testified, this would not occur even if he altered his signal timing data. Tr.18,745 (Lieberman). Further-more, in the one instance where the resulting capacity might be lower than the moni-i toring rate, service time for evacuating traffic along that path would increase, but not beyond twelve hours. Id.

196. The State witnesses criticized KLD for using the field data, which they characterized as assumed data, instead of adhering to the data provided by the State.

3  ;

NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 22: NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and i i

Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at 10; and NYS Ex. 7 (Hartgen and Millspaugh sec-ond rebuttal testimony), at 9. Mr. Millspaugh testified that while it would be possible to obtain green time data through field observations for some controllers, others are so complex that it would be virtually impossible to obtain accurate measurements in the field. Tr.18,892 (Millspaugh). Dr. Hartgen and Mr. Millspaugh pointed out that, of the five intersections they analyzed, KLD used the State's recorded signal timing setting j data at only one - Old County Road and Route 107 (Broadway). NYS Ex. 7, at 9 n.5.b l

l L2/ Ironically, at this intersection the State used assumed signal timing data rather 4 than existing timing data. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 48.

w__-___________

-103-Specifically, the State witnesses testified that KLD had overestimated maximum green times at two locations - the intersection of Newbridge Road and Route 27 (Sunrise Highway) and the intersection of Willis Avenue and the eastbound Long Island Ex-pressway Service Road. NYS Ex. 6, at 10.E They added that this would artificially in-crease the capacity of these movements. Id. _

197. Dr. Urbanik agreed with Mr. Lieberman that actual signal timing in the field may vary from recorded dial setting data. Tr.19,115 (Urbanik). This is so, he testified, because the settings may be changed in the field without any record made of the new settings. Tr.19,116 (Urbanik). He also testified that the only way to know if a traffic controller is operating in accordance with the recorded settings is to take mea-surements in the field. Id. Dr. Urbanik stated that while ideally it would be nice to record the actual timing data from the controller settings as Mr. Lieberman sought to do, it would be possible to obtain accurate measurements of maximum green times through field observations. T". 19,115-16 (Urbanik).

198. The Board finds that the State's criticism is simply that KLD did not use the recorded data provided by the State. The State assumes that these data are accurate. However, the data are now more than two years old, and the State has not attempted to verify their accuracy. Tr.18,888 (Millspaugh). KLD prudently sought, M/ In their written testimony, the State witnesses testified that though KLD had used a maximum effective green time of twenty-four seconds for the lef t protected phase along the southbound approach to the intersection of Willis Avenue and the eastbound Long Island Expressway Service Road during the 0700-1000 time period, the existing signal timing operation provides a maximum of only twelve seconds. NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and M111spaugh first rebuttal testimony), at 10. However, the State too devi-ated from the recorded data at this intersection. In their analysis of this movement for the 1000-1300 time period, the State used twenty-four seconds for effective green time as well. LILCO Ex. 33, at 4. This was so despite the f act that the State's signal timing

( data sheets indicate an effective green time of only 18 seconds for that time period.

i SC Ex. 26, at 12: Tr.18,886 (Millspaugh).

I

_, 7 6

/* -104-4-

through actual chs'ervations, to derive the best data ava' ible. We find that where i green times actually. observed exceeded the figures providea by the State, KLD acted  ;

i reasonably in using the actual observed times. Accordingly, we find that the signal timing, data utilized by KLD is likely to be more accurate. According y, the State's con-cern is without merit, -

l Failure to Analy;;e Roadway Sections Between Intersections j J 199 c'Dr. Hartgen testified that the KLD analyses arNdefective for considering

1. the capacities of interse"tions only and not the capacitics'of the read Ecgments leading c

?

to those infersec*lons. He stated that KLD simply assumed that the roadway capacities are adequate. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and,Millspaugh direct testimdny), at 14. But Dr.

.r Hartgen was able to identify only one midblock area that, in his opinion. controls the i route capacity. He stated that Route 107 between the Southern State Parkway and Old Country Road, which lies along one of the paths to the Hicksville reception center, nar-rows to twelanes at one point, reducing the overall capacity of the section. Ld. at n.2; Tr.18 7922 (flartgen).

200. In response, Mr. Lieberman testified that intersections have the greatest eff ect on capad'ty on non-access controlled highways. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebut-tai t+1mo.ty), et 6. He added that the State seemed to recognize this as its own analy-sis considereydprsections only, not the roadways themselves. Ld. In addition he testifled that his position is supported by the Highway Capacity Manual, which provides that it is thq intersections that generally dictate the capacity of an arterial. Id.

201. Mr. Lieberman also testified ihat, contrary to the State's assertions, he did conduct field inspections of the entire roadway k/ stem for the purpose of identi-fying midb'ocKfestrictions. He testified that ip found none. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimori ), at 3, 6: LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 10-11.

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-105-He added that the narrow section along' Route 107 referenced by the State has a capael- i ty that far exceeds the monitoring rate of the Hicksville reception center along that path. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 6; see also LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surebuttal testimony), at 11. Thus, this section of roadway would not affect service times at the reception centers. This evidence was not challenged by the State.

202. Dr. Urbanik testified that he too had considered midblock restrictions dur-ing his field survey. He agreed with Mr. Lieberman that there are no locations along the roads that present concerns. Tr.19,118 (Urbanik).

203. We find that the State's position is without merit. The State identified i

only one midblock area of potential concern, and even then it was undisputed that this area would not affect the overall service times because it would service vehicles f aster than they could be monitored.

Failure to Analyze Capacity Along the Major Access-Controlled Highways 204. Dr. Hartgen also criticized KLD for not calculating the capacities along the major east-west routes, such as the Long Island Expressway. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 15.

205. Mr. Lieberman testified that instead of performing capacity analyses on these evacuation routes, he assumed worst-case conditions of Level of Service F throughout their length for. the duration of the 12-hour period. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 7-8. Mr. Lieberman testified that this was a conser-vative assumption, since Level of Service F conditions may not occur at all, and if they do, they may not exist throughout the entire length of the highway or last the duration of the evacuation. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 10. He testified 4

l that under Level of Service F, traffic will experience stop-and go operation, sometimes l

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-106-coming to a complete stop and sometimes moving at a good speed. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 9. Mr. Lieberman estimated that the mean speed along these evacuation routes under Level of Service F conditions would be approxi-mately 17-18 miles per hour. I_d.; LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t a_1. direct testimony), at 7. {

I He stated that this was a conservative estimate. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testim.ony), at 9-10. Mr. Lieberman testified that known data suggest that mean speeds l could actually be higher. For instance, data in the Highway Capacity Manual show that speeds under Level of Service F on the Southern State Parkway range from twenty to almost thirty miles per hour. Highway Capacity Manual at 2-23, Figure 2-17; LILCO J l

Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 10. In addition, data collected by Dr. Ur-banik on speeds during forced-flow conditions on I-35 in Austin, Texas, also show mean l

speeds ranging from 20 to 30 miles per hour. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal tes-timony), at 10.

206. The State did not respond to Mr. Lieberman's assertion that assuming.

Level of Service F throughout the evacuation routes for the duration of an evacuation l eliminated the need to perform specific capacity analyses on those routes. Instead, the Stata challenged Mr. Lieberman's assertion that the mean speed on the access-l controlled highways at level of Service F would be 17-18 miles per hour. NYS Ex. 7 l

(Hartgen and Millspaugh second rebuttal), at 13-14. The State's witnesses testified that l the rate at flow could be much lower, though they did not indicate what mean speeds l

l would be, nor did they introduce any data to support their position. E at 14.

l 207. On cross-examination Dr. Urbanik testified that at Level of Service F on an access-controlled highway, speeds would vary from a standstill to 30 or more miles per hour. Tr.19,122 (Urbanik). He further testified, based on research he has done, including the study of forced-flow conditions along I-35 referenced by Mr. Lieberman, L_----------__-__

j -107-that he would typically expect mean speeds during Level of Service F to f allin the gen-eral range estimated by Mr. Lieberman. Tr. 19,123-24 (Urbanik).

208. The Board finds that the KLD analyses are not flawed for not specifically analyzing the major access-controlled evacuation routes. It is undisputed that Mr.

Lieberman has assumed the worst-case along these routes. Moreover, the only data presented on the mean speeds likely to occur on these routes during the worst-case sce-nario support Mr. Lieberman's position. Therefore, we find that his assumptions are reasonable.

The Use of Shoulders For Right Turns 209. The State's witnesses test.fied that KLD TR-201 A improperly adds an ad-ditional lane to a few intersection approaches by assuming that evacuees will use shoul-ders as right turn lanes. They testified that this practice artificially increases the ca-pacity at those intersections. NYS Ex. 7 (Hartgen and Millspaugh second rebuttal), at 8.

In their opinion, shoulders may not be used for right turn lanes because of the presence of obstacles, such as parked cars, that woul:1 interfere with vehicles attempting to use the shoulders and because of inadequate capacity along the receiving legs of the inter-l sections. Ld. The State identified two locations where KLD assumed evacuating traffic would use shoulders but did not state whether obstacles that would interfere with the movement were present at these locations or whether the receiving legs were inade-quate to handle the traffic flow.

210. Mr. Lieberman testified that in as.suming that traffic would use the shoul-ders for right turns at some intersections, he followed the procedures of the Highway Capacity Manual, which specifies that any lane that is 16 or more feet wide should be classified as two lanes. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 4. He added that this condition exists at each of the locations where his assumption applies.

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-108-Tr.18,602 (Lieberman). Additionally, he testified that his assumption reflects real-world conditions, because field observations revealed that traffic in fact does use the shoulders for right turns at the locations he specified. Tr.18,603 (Lieberman). He added that the State's concerns about the presence of impediments and about inade-quate receiving leg capacity are not an issue at these locations; in fact, the movement was assigned only at locations at which parking is prohibited for at least 120 feet up-stream of a stop light. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimony), at 4: Tr.

18,603 (Lieberman).

211. Dr. Urbanik testified that where a right lane and shoulder together are at

'least 16 feet wide, it would be appropriate to assume in a capacity analysis that traffic would use the shoulder to make right turns. so long as there are no impediments to this movement. Tr.19,120 (Urbanik). He also testified that during his site survey he ob-served vehicles making right turns from the shoulders at the locations at which Mr.

Lieberman assumed that shoulders would be used for right turns. Tr.19.120 (Ur-banik).b 212. Although the State has voiced a concern about Mr. Lieberman's assump-tion about the use of shoulders for right turns, the State's witnesses introduced no con-crete evidence to support their position. The only evidence presented on this matter, including the State's own videotape, suggests that Mr. Lieberman's assumption about the use of shoulders for right turns merely reflects reality. Accordingly, the Board finds that the State's concern here is without merit.

83 The Board notes that Exhibit 25 to State of New York Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), which is a videotape taken from a vehicle traveling along i one approach route to the Hicksville reception center and along one approach to the Roslyn reception center, shows examples of vehicles using a shoulder to make right turns.

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-109-Construction 213. The State criticizes the KLD analyses for failing to take into considera-tion projects approved for the Long Island highway system under the Rebuild New York Program. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh direct testimony), at 26, Exhibits 7 and 8.

Dr.- Hartgen and Mr. Millspaugh testified that these projects, which will take a number of years to complete, will "significantly affect capacity" on the Northern State Park-way, Southern State Parkway, and Long Island Expressway. NYS Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Millspaugh testimony), at 26. As a result of lane closings, reductions in lane widths, de-tours, and other unspecified construction-related restrictions, the State's witnesses testified, evacuees from the Shoreham EPZ are likely to encounter some delay in reaching the reception centers. But the State made no attempt to quantify the level of l

delay that is likely to occur. Nor did the State consider capacity restrictions due to construction in its own analysis.

214. Mr. Lieberman testified that generalizations cannot be made about the ef-fects of construction on delay because it is not a constant presence. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at 19. For instance, he noted that at the time his anal-yses were prepared there were no capacity restrictions due to construction on the rele-vant highways. Ld. In addition, one cannot simply rely on the State's construction plans, because they are not always implemented as scheduled. Plans may be canceled, postponed, or otherwise altered. Ld. Dr. Hartgen corroborated this testimony on cross-examination. Tr. 18,848-51 (Hartgen). Mr. Lieberman also pointed out that while con-struction is underway, care is taken to minimize the effects on traffic. He added that even when a lane is removed from service while construction is underway, it can of ten be returned to service fairly easily. LILCO Ex. 26 (Lieberman rebuttal testimony), at c l

19. Again, Dr. Hartgen corroborated Mr. Lieberman's testimony; he agreed that the l.

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-110-State attempts to maintain as much traffic flow as is possible around construction sites.  !

Tr.18,851 (Hartgen). In addition, he testified that for several construction projects scheduled for the Long Island Expressway, work will be performed at night and the af-fected lanes will be returned to service during the day, indicating that lanes temporari-  !

ly removed from service for construction purposes can, at least in some cases, be re-turned to service in an emergency.

l l 215. The Board finds that KLD did not err by not considering the effects of

. State planned construction on capacity. The evidence establishes that it would be mere speculation to predict the effect of a planned construction on highway capacity. More-over, any effect is likely to be small. As the roadway network is capable of handling considerably more than the anticipated traffic demand over the relevant 12-hour peri-l od, it is not likely that the presence of construction will materially delay the moni-toring process.

Double Lane Lef t Turns 216. In its analyses, KLD assumed that lef t-turners would use the lef t turn bay i

and would share the adjoining through lane, with through-moving vehicles at two loca-tions: the southbound approach of Route 107 to the intersection with Old Country Road and the southbound approach of Willis Avenue to the intersection with the eastbound i Long Island Expressway Service Road. LILCO Ex. 51 (Lieberman surrebuttal testimo-ny), at 3; Tr.18,545-47,18,551 (Lieberman). Mr. Lie' erman testified that the intersec- l l

tion geometrics at these locations along the access routes would permit the use . f two lanes for lef t turns. Tr.18,557 (Lieberman).

217. The State's witnesses testified that KLD erred in assigning two lanes for lef t turns in its analyses. NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), i at 7-8; NYS Ex. 7 (Hartgen and Millspaugh second rebuttal testimony), at 6-7. They I

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-111-testified that there is "no basis to assume that the through lane at these intersections .

will be used for a substantial number of lef t turns." NYS Ex. 7 (Hartgen and Millspaugh econd rebuttal testimony), at 6. The State's witnesses also testified that, in their opin-lon, lef t turns from the through lane would be unsafe; traffic in the opposing lef t turn lane would obstruct the vision of traffic turning lef t from the through lane. NYS Ex. 7 (Hartgen and Millspaugh second rebuttal testimony), at 7. Finally, they offered their opinion that it would be illegal under New York law for vehicles to turn lef t from the through lanes. I_d. Thus, concluded the State's witnesses, it was improper for KLD to assign two lanes for lef t turns at these intersections.

218. By using double-lane lef t turns, argued the State, KLD has artificially in-flated the capacity available for evacuating traffic at two criticallocations. NYS Ex. 6  ;

1' (Hartgen and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at 7; NYS Ex. 7 (Hartgen and Millspaugh second rebuttal testimony), at 6. By way of example, the State witnesses compared their analysis with the KLD analysis for the intersection of Old Country Road 1

and Route 107 during the 0700-1000 time period. The KLD analysis showed a V/C ratio 4

of 0.566 and a Level 01 Service of C for that intersection. NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at 8, Exhibit 4. This indicates no capacity prob-lems. The State's analysis, on the other hand, shows a V/C ratio of 1.019 and a Level of Service of F, which, the State concluded, Indicates extreme congestion and significant l

delbys. NYS Ex. 6 (Hartgen and Millspaugh first rebuttal testimony), at 8 Exhibit 5.

21P. Mr. Lieberman agreed that evacuation traffic might not make lef t turns from the through ' anes in the absence of traffic control. Tr. at 18,535, 18,539. .

I (Lieberman). However, he testified that in both instances he assigned the two lanes (one exclusive, the other shared) for turns under the assumption that there would be po-lice guidance at these intersections. Tr. 18,531,18,537,18,541 (Lieberman). He added l

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I that he feels it reasonable to expect that under heavy traffic conditions, evacuees seeing the lef t turn bay overloaded, and the adjoining lane underused, would move to the stop line in the adjoining lane and that in the interest of expediting traffic flow, police would direct these vehicles to make lef t turns from the center lane. Tr.

l 18,531-32 (Lieberman). I l

220. In addition, Mr. Lieberman testifled that traffic turning lef t from the through lane would not likely conflict or interfere with traffic turning lef t from the northbound lanes at these intersections. Tr.18,533-34 (Lieberman). Finally, Mr.

Lieberman stated that use of a single lane for left turns at these two locations would not change his conclusion about the adequacy of the roadway network. Tr. 18,5 42, f

18,746 (Lieberman). He stated that he had done an analysis assuming a single lane for lef t turns whicit shows that the expected evacuation traffic demand would be serviced 1

at these intersections within twelve hours. I_d.

221. The analysis of the intersection of Old Country Road and Route 107 per-formed on cross-examination by Dr. Urbanik supports this conclusion. As previously described, that analysis shows that, even assuming a single lane for lef t turns along the southbound approach to that intersection, the intersection can service 30 percent of the EPZ population in about seven-and-one-half hours. See above; see also LILCO Ex. 47. The 20 percent planning basis could be serviced in less time still. In addition, as already noted, Dr. Urbanik testified that, while he did not know how the intersection of Willis Avenue and the eastbound Long Island Expressway Service Road would operate with a single lef t turn lane along the southbound approach, the intersection certainly could service the traffic demand with the presence of traffic control. Tr.19,098 (Ur-banik). In fact, he specifically stated that one advantage of traffic control at this in-tersection would be that police could make use of two lanes for lef t turns if necessary.

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222. The Board finds for LILCO on this matter. In the first place, at least with l

l respect to the intersection of Old Country Road and Route 107, Dr. Urbanik's analysis demonstrates that assigning one lane for lef t turns instead of two along the southbound approach would not change the ultimate conclusion. Moreover, the State's criticism does not consider the presence of traffic control at these intersections. We find that l

the presence of traffic control at the two intersections in question would cure the con-cerns raised by the State. j l

Traffic Control 223. Dr. Urbanik testified that those providing traffic control need not be po-

! lice officers or other skilled traffic controllers. Tr.19.137-38 (Urbanik). The impor-1 l tant thing is that the traffic controller is aware of the task to be accomplished. Tr.

19,137 (Urbanik). In addition, Dr. Urbanik testified that there need not be pre-coordination between LILCO and the traffic controllers, so long as there is some plan to inform them of the function they are to perform. Tr.18,982 (Urbanik). This testi-mony was uncontradicted, and we find no reason to disagree with it. We find that the LILCO Plan adequately satisfies this standard.

224. OPIP 4.2.3 S 5.1.3(a) provides that when the Director of Local Response contacts the Nassau County Police, the Health Services Coordinator is to " provide them I with the traffic control assignments" detailed elsewhere in the Plan. He is also to j "(i]nform the police that traffic intersection diagrams and traffic control equipment ars. available at the Reception Centers from the Reception Center Supervisors."

l LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. Q, at p. 2 of 29. In addition, OPIP L

4.2.3 S 5.3.8 provides that Reception Center Supervisors are to "[p]rovide offsite in-I tersection diagrams and traffic control equipment to Nassau County p; lice if they ar-rive." Id. at p. 5 of 29. The Board finds these measures are adequate to obtain police l

-114-r.

assistance if it is needed in an emergency. The two or more hours minimum that would l

likely be available before evacuees started to arrive, see LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al.,

direct testimony), at 7, should be adequate for LILCO to call the police and give them the information needed.

225. We next determine whether the Nassau County police are likely to re- l spond to a request for help from LILCO in the event of an actual radiological emergen-cy at Shoreham. We begin with the Commission's decision in Long Island Light Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22 (1986). In that deci-sion, the Commission reviewed the Appeal Board's decision holding the LILCO Plan in-adequate as a matter of law because of the refusal of New York State and of Suffolk County to participate with LlLCO in emergency planning. In the absence of govern-l l ment participation, it was assumed that LILCO would be prohibited from performing several functions, such as guiding traffic, blocking roadways, erecting barriers in road-l ways, channeling traffic, and posting traffic signs on roadways. 24 NRC at 30.

226. The Commission reversed the Appeal Board and remanded the issue for further consideration, finding that:

[Ilf Shoreham were to go into operation and there were to be a serious accident requiring cons daration of protective l actions for the public, the State anc C 'unty officials would be obligated to assist, both as a matter of law and as a mat-ter of discharging their public trust. See N.Y. Exec. Law art. 2-B, S 25.1. See also H.R. Rep. No. 212, 99th Cong.,1st Sess.(1985).... Thus, in evaluating the LILCO plan we be-lieve that we can reasonably assume some "best effort" State j and County response in the event of an accident. We also l believe that their "best effort" would utilize the LILCO plan

! as the best source for emergency planning information and options.

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Ld. at 31. Accordingly, in remanding the issue, the Commission directed the Board to l

" assume that the State and County would in fact respond to an accident at Shoreham on a best-eff .ct basis that would use the LILCO plan . . . ." Ld. at 33.

-115-227. This Licensing Board, as well, has refused to assume that the police would not function in an emergency. In their Revised Emergency Planning Contentions of July. 26,1983, the Interveners included Contention 24.Q, which said that "[t]he LILCO Plan appears to rely upon local law enforcement agencies to provide security in evacu-ated areas" in that since "LILCO has no agreements with police departments to provide l

such security," there can be no assurance that the LILCO Plan or the protective actions contemplated in the Plan can or will be implemented. Revised Emergency Planning Contentions at 67-68 (July 26,1983). In its Special Prehearing Conference Hearing Order (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Schedule for Discovery, Motions, Briefs, Conference of Counsel, and Hearing), (August 19, 1983), the Laurenson Board denied ad-mission of 24.Q on the grounds that:

This subcontention assumes the Suffolk County police will fail to perform a regular police function. There is no basis l to assume that the Suffolk County police, contrary the their '

normal duties, would refuse to provide reasonable and appro-priate protection in the event of any type of emergency in the County.

Id. at 15.

228. Likewise, the Interveners' Contention 53 contended that LILCO will be

" unable to provide adequate security in evacuated areas or other areas where evacuees may congregate." The contention addressed both security patrols to prevent vandalism or thef t in vacated neighborhoods and security at certain " key areas" within the EPZ,

" including fuel allocation points, staging areas for emergency response personnel and transfer points for evacuees" as well as the Emergency News Center. Revised Emer-gency Planning Contentions at 113-14 (July 26,1983). Again, the Board denied admis-sion of this contention with the following words:

This contention, with its two subparts, is denied. 53.A sug-gests that LILCO's plan should provide for security patrols to prevent vandalism or thef t in vacated neighborhoods. This is the same issue raised by Contention 24.Qt it is disposed of ,

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-116-by our discussion thereunder. 53.B -- security at "certain key areas" within the EPZ -- is without basis.

Special Prehearing Conference Order (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Schedule for Discovery, Motions. Briefs, Conference of Counsel, and Hearing), slip op. at 20 (August 19, 1983).

229. We find no reason to alter the assumption that the police will discharge their obligation to protect the public health and safety by providing traffic guidance in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. Suffolk County sought to establish, through a certified letter from Nassau County officials, that LILCO cannot rely on the Nassau County police. SC Ex. 22. The letter reports a County resolution stating that no County facilities are to be available to LILCO in an emergency without prior ap-proval by resolution. The letter also states that LILCO has not received the requisite i permission to use ny County f acility in its emergency plan.

l 230. The Board finds that this letter does not establish that the Nassau County police would refuse to provide traffic guidance in the event of an actual emergency at Shoreham. The letter simply addresses LILCO's referencing of Nassau County facilities in its Plan. It does not state, or even imply, that Nassau County police would refuse to respond to a call for help from LILCO at the time of an emergency. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the police would refuse to provide assistance.

231. The only testimony on this issue came from Mr. Lieberman and Mr. Ur-banik, both of whom supported the proposition that, if requested to, the Nassau County police would provide ".raffic control in a real emergency. Indeed, Dr. Urbanik testified about an instance in Texas in which police provided traffic control at an event even though they had previously stated that they would not. Tr.19,141 (Urbanik).

232. As for where it is necessary to have traffic control, the State presented no evidence. KLD has set out a number of traffic strategies in Appendix C of KLD l

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-117-T R-192. LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), App. C to Att. M. Mr.

Lieberman testified that he has recommended traffic control at the numerous signal-ized intersections set out in Table 3-10 of KLD TR-201 A. Tr.18,540 (Lieberman) (citing LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), Att. T at 34-38.). Dr. Urbanik testified that a considerably lesser number of intersections would need traffic control, stating that only on "the order of a dozen and at most perhaps 20" traffic controllers would be needed. Tr.19,140 (Urbanik). He did not list each intersection at which he would ree-ommend the presence of traffic control; however, he did indicate that traffic control would be helpfulin the few blocks around the exits to the reception centers. Tr.19,138 l

(Urbanik). He also testified that his major concern with respect to traffic control i

would be at the diamond exchange at the intersections of Willis Avenue and the east-and westbound Long Island Expressway Service Roads. Tr. 19.093-97 (Urbanik). Traffic control would also be necessary at the intersection of Old Country Road and Route 107 (Broadway), if two lanes are to be used for lef t turns. Dr. Urbanik also testified that traffic control would be helpful at the intersection of Newbridge Road and Route 27 (Sunrise Highway) to direct traffic exiting the Bellmore reception center. Finally, both Mr. Lieberman and Dr. Urbanik recommended traffic control at the intersection of Roslyn Road and the westbound Long Island Expressway Service Road, primarily to keep traf fic exiting the Roslyn reception center from rejoining evacuation traffic at the in-tersection of Willis Avenue and the westbound Long Island Expressway Service Road.

See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), Att. M at C-9. We find that traffic control at a limited number of intersections would be adequate. While traffic controlis desirable at a substantial number of intersections, as recommended by Mr. Lieberman, )

it is important, in Dr. Urbanik's view, at a smaller number. As we find above, LILCO's 1

plan for informing the police of its recommended traffic control strategies is adequate to address this concern.

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-118-E. Zoninst Laws l 233. Suffolk County argues that the use of the three sites as reception centers in a radiological emergency would violate local zoning ordinances or construction codes. The County says that the NRC should find the centers inadequate and deny an operating license on this ground. l 234. This issue was not admitted for hearing. It was raised by Interveners in a motion for reconsideration of a scheduling order, and the Board determined to resolve it

'I af ter the hearing:

The alleged violations of local zoning ordinances that the use of the Bellmore and Roslyn f acilities could create are properly matters to be determined by a state court.

Until one or more of the parties obtain such a ruling, this Board will delay making a decision on this issue until it de-cides all other remaining issues before it.

Order (Ruling on Motions for Reconsideration on Scheduling), ASLBP No. 86-529-02-OL, at 2 (February 4,1987).

235. There is no evidence of record to show any inadequacy of the centers on this ground. Nor has any state court ruled that the reception centers would be illegal.

236. The NRC has, however, been sent a number of e__x parte communications f rom local governments alleging that the reception centers violate local laws.

237. The Board declines to rule that the reception centers violate state law.

There is no basis in the record for doing so. Also, it is not the Board's furation to inter-pret or enforce local laws.

238. Even if it were shown that the use of the reception centers would violate some local law, the Board would decline to find the reception centers unsuitable. It is not plausible that local officials would use a zoning ordinance to deny monitoring and decontamination to members of the public who had been exposed to a radiological emergency. As noted above, the Commission has ruled in this proceeding that State

-119-and county officials would be obligated to assist and would make a "best effort" re-sponse. CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 31 (1986). This principle applies just as much in the context of reception centers in Nassau County.

239. LILCO testified as follows:

If some State or local approval were required before decontamination could be done, LILCO would use best ef-forts to secure that approval. If approval could not be hed in advance of an emergency, LILCO would at the time of an accident seek emergency approval from the authorities be-fore decontaminating anyone.

LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker et al. direct testimony), at 62. Particularly in light of CLI-86-13, this commitment is adequate to resolve any claim that locallaws will be an obstacle to ,

helping members of the public in an emergency. If it were necessary to contact local officials, the two hours or more between the beginning of evacuation and the arrival of evacuees at reception centers should be enough time to do so. See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_t al. direct testimony), at 7.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Based upon review of the entire record in the proceeding, the Board con-cludes that, insofar as providing reception centers for the public is concerned, there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as is required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

2. There are no inadequacies in the reception centers that would preclude the issuance of a full power, full-term operating license for Shoreham.

3. Insof ar as the providing of reception centers is concerned, LILCO's of fsite emergency plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station complies with 10 CFR S 50.47.

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-120-IV. ORDER It is hereby ordered that, if the remaining outstanding issues in this proceeding are resolved favorably to the applicant, a full power, full-term operating license shall be issued to LILCO for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1.

V. FIN ALITY AND APPEALABILITY Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.760 this Initial Decision will constitute the final decision of the Commission 30 days from the date of its issuance, unless an appeal is taken in accordance with 10 CFR S 2.762 or the Commission directs otherwise. S_ee e also 10 CFR SS 2.785 and 2.786.

Under 5 2.762 any party may take an appeal from this Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within 10 days af ter service of this initial Decision. Each appellant must file a brief supporting its position on appeal within 30 days af ter filing its Notice of Appeal (40 days if the Staff is the appellant). Within 30 days af ter the period has expired for the filing and service of the briefs of all appellants (40 days in the case of the Staff), a party who is not an appellant may file a brief in support of or in opposition to the ap-peal of any other party. A responding party shall file a single, responsive brief only, re-gardless of the number of appellants' briefs filed.

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-121- -l l

{

THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND l LICENSING BOARD j l

l l Morton B. Margulies, Chairman 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE i i

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Dr. Jerry R. Kline ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Mr. Frederick J. Shon ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE l

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland,

'this _th day of 1987. .

I Respectfully submitted,

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fggV) -

r Ja s / ristmin [/

Ma J eugers l Hunton & Williams I

707 East Main Street P.O. Box 153~,

Richmond, Virginia 23212 I

DATED: September 2,1987 i

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APPENDIX A l

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EXHIBITS BY PARTY AND NUMBER Exhibit' Identified at Disposition at Nimmhar Description Transcript Page Transcript Pagel/

LILCO EXHIBITS LILCO Ex. 1 Written Testimony of 17421 17421, Douglas M. Crocker, Dale 18515 E. Donaldson, Diane P.

Dreikorn, Edward B.

Lieberman, Roger E.

Linnemanr, Michael K.

Lindell, Dennis S.

Mileti, and Richard J.

Watts on the Suitability of Reception Centers (3/30/87)

.LILCO Ex. 2 Map of Average Prevail- 17752 17756

• ing Wind Directions at Shoreham (Wind Rose),

App ndix A of the LILCO Pirn LILCO Ex. 3 Historical Wind Direc- 17756 17756 tion at Shoreham,.Appen-dix A of the LILCO Plan LILCO Ex. 4 Transcript of 4/27/87- 17830 17991 Exercise Hearing (pp.

3773-4057) (OL-5)

LILCO Ex. 5 " Planning Concepts and 17831 (Not Offered)

Decision Criteria for Sheltering and Evacua-tion in a Nuclear Power Plant Emergency", Ex-cerpts from National En-vironmental Studies Project Atomic Industri-al Forum, Inc.

1/ Unless otherwise indicated, the exhibit is admitted into evidence on the tran-script page cited.

i e

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page a

LILCO Ex. 6 " Protective Response to 17844 17850 Technological Emergency: ,

Risk Fercaption and Be-havioral Intentio1" by M. K. Linde.'.1 and V. E.

Barnes

! LILCO Ex. 7 ExcehptsfromBelief, 17855 17898 Attitude, Intention and (Limited To Section -

Behavior: An Cross-Examined On) .

Introduction to Theory and Research by Ajzen and Fishbein

'LILCO Ex. 8 Excerpts from 17865 17898 Understanding Attitudes (Limited To Section and Predicting Social Cross-Examined On)

Behavior by Ajzen and Fishbein P

LILCO Ex. 9 Excerpts from " Final Re- 17873 17898 port on a Social Survey of Three Mile Island Residents" by Stanley D.

Brunn, James H. Johnson, Jr., and Donald J.

Zeigler LILCO Ex. 10 Excerpts from "A Spatial 17894 17898 Analysis of Evacuation Intentions: Implica- ,'

tions for Radiological Emergency Response Plan-ning" by James H.

Johnson, Jr., and Donald J. Zeig) ~

LILCO Ex. 11 "Towards a Regional Ap- 17900 17909 proach to Radiological Emergency Response Plan-ning" by James H. '

Johnson, Jr.

LILCO Ex. 12 Simulated EBS Messages 17913 17916

1. 8, 8.1, 9, and 9.1 from the February 13, m 1986 Shoreham Exercise

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Ex. 13 "A Model of 17917 17922 Evacuation-Decision Mak- (Not Offered) ing in a Nuclear Reactor Emergency" by James H.

Johnson, Jr.

LILCO Ex. 14 "Modeling Evacuation Be- 17918 17922 havior During the Three (Not Offered)

Mile Island Reactor Cri-sis" by James H.

l Johnson, Jr., and D. J.

Zeigler l LILCO Ex. 15 " Predicting Nuclear Re- 17920 17922 actor Emergency Evacua- (Not Offered) tion Behavior" by James H. Johnson, Jr.

LILCO Ex. 16 Excerpts from Monroe 18075 18097

' County Radiological (Limited to Section Emergency Response Plan Cross-Examined On)

LILCO Ex. 17 Excerpts from Wayne 18101 18109 County Radiological (Limited to Section Emergency Response Plan Cross-Examined On)

LILCO Ex. 18 Excerpt from FEMA Re- 18103 18103 port: "Ginna Exercise - (Not Offered)

Verification of Remedial Actions" (p. 19 of 22)

(1/21/82 Exercise)

LILCO Ex. 19 Excerpts from 18110 18119 Westchester County Ra - (Limited to Section diological Emergency Re- Cross-Examined On) sponse Plan LILCO Ex. 20 Excerpt from FEMA Re- 18112 (Not Offered) port: " Indian Point Ex-ercise Remedial Actions" (3/9/84)

LILCO Ex. 21 Excerpt from 18116 (Not Offered)

"Westchester County RAC Consolidation Plan Re-view" (9/86)

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page l

LILCO Cx. 22 NYS Dept. of Health 18121 (Not Offered) interoffice memo to D.

Davidoff from J.

l Dillenback (9/22/83) re:

Onondage EOC Meeting LILCO Ex. 23 NYS Dept. of Health let- 18123 18128 ter to School Officials from J. Dillenback (3/12/82) re: Reception Centers in Rockland County Radiological Emergency Response Plan (attached: Possible participants at recep-tion centers)

LILCO Ex. 24 NYS Dept. of Health 18128 18147 interoffice memo to D. (Not Admitted)

Davidoff from W. Condon (7/3/85) re:

Decontamination at Nassau Coliseum LILCO Ex. 25 NYS Dept. of Health let- 18139 18147 ter to D. Stuber from M.

Silverman (9/16/85) re:

Enclosed letter to Phil Schmer from Silverman concerning disposal of contaminated water re-sulting from decontamination of vehi-cles or equipment LILCO Ex. 26 Rebuttal Testimony of 18513 18515 Edward B. Lieberman on the Suitability of Re-ception Centers (5/27/87)

LILCC Ex. 27 Video Tape of June 8, 18755 18754 1987 Training Session at (Not Admitted) the Hicksville Reception Center

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Ex. 28 State of New York HCM 18780 18890 Software: Intersection Analysis -- Old Country Road and Broadway Route 107 (4/24/87, 07:00 -

10:00)

LILCO Ex. 29 State of New York HCM 18799 18890 Software: Intersection Analysis -- Old Country .

Road and Route 107 (Broadway) (4/24/87, ,A 10:00 - 13:00)

LILCO Ex. 30 ATI Axle Count -- NB 18811 18890 Route 107 (Broadway) at Old Country Road LILCO Ex. 31 ATI Axle Count -- SB 18816 18890 Willis Avenue at EB LIE Service Road (7/17/86)

LILCO Ex. 32 State of New York HCM 18816 18890 Software: Intersection Analysis -- EB LIE Ser-vice Road and Willis AV-enue (4/23/87, 07:00 -

10:00)

LILCO Ex. 33 State of New York HCM 18817 18890 Software: Intersection Analysis -- EB LIE Ser-Vice Road and Willis Av-enue (4/23/87, 10:00 -

13:00)

LILCO Ex. 34 State of New York HCM 18817 18890 Software: Intersection Analysis -- EB LIE Ser-vice Road and Willis AV-enue (4/23/87, 13:00 -

16:00) 4 LILCO Ex. 35 State of New York HCM 18823 18890 Software: Intersection Analysis -- Sunrise Highway and Newbridge Road (4/24/87, 07:00 -

10:00)

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Ex. 36 Excerpts from " Manual 18857 18890 of Traffic Signal De-sign" Institute of Transportation Engi-neers, by James H. Kell and Iris J. Fullerton l

LILCO Ex. 37 Letter to J. Christman 18860 18890 from R. Zahnleuter (Only Admitted With (4/16/87) re: Response Respect to Defini-to E. Lieberman's re- tion) quests and "LILCO's Fourth Request for Pro-duction of Documents Re-garding Reception Cen-ters Directed to New York State" LILCO Ex. 38 ATI Axle Count -- Ramp 18932 18951 from Meadowbrook Parkway to Sunrise Highway (7/11/87)

LILCO Ex. 39 Chapter 9: Signalized 18935 18937 Intersections User Manu- (Page 28 Admitted al for HCM Software Only)

LILCO Ex. 40 State of New York HCM 19059 19107 Software: Intersection (Not Admitted)

Analysis with Designa-tion Option 1 -- EB LIE Service Road and Willis Avenue (4/23/87, 07:00 -

10:00)

LILCO Ex. 41 State of New York HCM 19060 19107 Software: Intersection (Not Admitted)

Analysis with Designa-tion Option 2 -- EB LIE Service Road and Willis Avenue (4/23/87, 07:00 -

10:00)

LILCO Ex. 42 State of New York HCM 19060 19107 Software: Intersection (Not Admitted)

Analysis with Designa-tion Option 3 -- EB LIE Service Road and Willis Avenue (4/23/87, 07:00 -

10:00)

_7 Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Ex. 43 Operational Capacity 19064 19107 Analysis for Meadowbrook Ramp (07:00 - 19:00)

LILCO Ex. 44 State of New York HCM 19064 19107 l Software: Intersection Analysis -- SB Ramp from Meadowbrook Parkway to i

Route 27 (4/21/87, 07:00

- 19:00)

LILCO Ex. 45 Operational Capacity 19077 19107 Analysis for Intersec-tion at Willis Avenue and EB LIE Service Road (07:00 - 19:00)

LILCO Ex. 46 State of New York HCM 19078 19107 Software: Intersection AnElysis -- EB LIE Ser-Vice Road and Willis Av-enue (4/23/87, 16:00 -

19:00)

LILCO Ex. 47 Operational Capacity 19079 19107 Analysis for Intersec-tion of Route 107 (Broadway) and Old Coun-try Road (07:00 - 19:00)

LILCO Ex. 48 State of New York HCM 19080 19107 Software: Intersection Analysis -- Old Country Road and Rcate 107 (Broadway) (4/24/87, 13:00 - 16:00)

LILCO Ex. 49 State of New York HCM 19080 19107 Software: Intersection Analysis -- Old Country Road and Route 107 (Broadway) (4/24/87, 16:00 - 19:00)

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page LILCO Ex. 50 Rebuttal Testimony of 19156 19156 Dr. Michael Lindell (7/24/87)

LILCO Ex. 51 Surrebuttal Testimony of 19171 19171 Edward B. Lieberman (7/20/87)

LILCO Ex. 52 Excerpts from OPIP 3.6.1 19215 19238 l -- Plume Exposure Path-I way Protective Action Recommendations SUFFOLK COUNTY EXHIBITS SC Ex. 1 Map of Evacuation Area 17458 17468 by Zones and Zone Desig-nations around Shoreham, Appendix A of the LILCO Plan 4

SC Ex. 2 Distribution of 17462 17468 Projected 1985 Popula-tion by Zone around Shoreham, Appendix A of the LILCO Plan SC Ex. 3 Population of Sub-zones 17463 17468 in Sectors 1, 2 and 3 of EPZ Chart SC Ex. 4 "Three Mile Island Nu- 17503 17547 clear Accident Community Impact Study on Real Es-tate", Greater Harrisonburg Board of Realtors, Inc.

SC Ex. 5 " Summary of Real Estate 17509 17547 Study Comparing Price Changes in Shoreham Vi-cinity versus the Town of Brookhaven" by Albert Appraisal Co.

- " ^ -

_ _ _ _ . ________.____,___.___,_________m___ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ __

I l

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Ex. 6 Photograph of Hicksville 17529 17547 Area B, taken from Ex. 6 to the Direct Testimony of Hartgen and Millspaugh l SC Ex. 7 Photograph of Hicksville 17531 17547 l

Area A, taken from Ex. 5 to the Direct Testimony l

of Hartgen and Millspaugh SC Ex. 8 Photograph of Roslyn Re- 17537 17547 ception Center, taken from Ex.3 to the Direct Testimony of Hartgen and Millspaugh SC Ex. 9 Photograph of Bellmore 17539 17547 Reception Center, taken from Ex. 4 to the Direct Testimony of Hartgen and Millspaugh 5C Ex. 10 OPIP 3.6.1 (Rev. 8) --

17615 (Not Offered)

Plume Exposure Pathway Protective Action Recom-mendations SC Ex. 11 "Information Sheet (sim- 17623 17626 ulated) on Reception Centers for Shoreham Nu-clear Power Station, Long Island, New York",

used during June 8, 1987 Hicksville Training Ses-sion SC Ex. 12 Map of Bellmore Op- 17673 17675 erations Center District Office Floor Plan from LILCO Engineering Dept.

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Ex. 13 Testimony of Stephen 17815 18769, Cole, Susan C. Saegert, 17815 James H. Johnson, Jr.,

David Harris, Martin Mayer, Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly on Behalf of Suffolk County l

Regarding LILCO's Recep-l tion Centers (Planning Basis) (4/13/87)

SC Ex. 14 Rebuttal Testimony of 17816 17816 Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly on Be-half of Suffolk County Regarding LILCO's Recep-tion Centers (Addressing Testimony of Lewis G.

Hulman) (5/27/87)

SC Ex. 15 Direct Testimony of 17998 17998 James H. Johnson, Jr.

and Susan C. Saegert on Behalf of Suffolk County Concerning LILCO's Re-ception Centers (Evacua-tion Shadow Phenomenon and Traffic Issues)

(4/13/87)

SC Ex. 16 Testimony of Edward P. 18018 18769, Radford, Gregory C. 17815 Minor, Susan C. Saegert, James H. Johnson, David Harris and Martin Mayer on Behalf of Suffolk County Concerning LILCO's Reception Cen-ters (Monitoring and Decontamination Proce-dures) (4/13/87) l

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Ex. 17 Letter to J. Papile from 18179 18185 I. Husar (10/2/86) re:

RAC Comments for REP Plans for Westchester, Rockland, Orange, and Putnam Counties (Enclo-sure: Rockland County Plan Review (pp. 27-28 of 39) (9/86))

SC Ex. 18 FEMA Guidance Memorandum 18191 18198 IT-1 SC Ex. 19 Letter to D. Talmor of 18520 18550 ATI from R. Goldblatt of KLD Associates (6/23/86) re: Enclosure of sever-al itera for review SC Ex. 20 Drawing of KLD placement 18520 18550 of machine count road tubes at intersection of Route 107 (Broadway) and Old Country Road SC Ex. 21 Photograph of SB ap- 18524 18550 proach at the intersec-tion of Route 107 (Broadway) and Old Coun-try Road SC Ex. 22 Letter to Administrative 18542 19179 Law Judges from T. (Paragraphs 2 and Gulotta of Nassau County 3 Only Admitted)

(7/1/87) re: Assump-tions relative to Nassau County facilities SC Ex. 23 KLD HCM Software: In- 18544 18550 tersection Analysis --

Old Country Road and Route 107 (Broadway)

(3/8/87, 07:00 - 10:00)

SC Ex. 24 KLD HCM Software: In- 18551 18573 tersection Analysis --

EB LIE Service Road and Willis Avenue (3/8/87, 07:00 - 10:00)

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page SC Ex. 25 KLD drawing of placement 18553 18573 of machine count road tubes at Long Island Ex-pressway, Exit 37 at Willis Avenue SC Ex. 26 Actuated Traffic Signal 18605 (Not Offered)

Timing Data produced by New York State SC Ex. 27 ATI Axle Count -- SB 18620 18631 Route 107 (Broadway) at Old Country Road (7/17/86)

SC Ex. 28 Chart of traffic volumes 18620 18631 at intersection of Route 107 (Broadway) and Old Country Road used in KLD TR-201 SC Ex. 29 ATI Axle County -- WB 18632 18641 LIE Service Road at Willis Avenue (7/10/86)

SC Ex. 30 Chart of traffic volumes 18632 18641 at Willis Avenue and WB LIE Service Road used in KLD TR-201 (07:00 -

10:00)

SC Ex. 31 KLD HCM Software: In- 18633 18641 tersection Analysis --

WB LIE Service Road and Willis Avenue (3/8/87, 07:00 - 10:00)

SC Ex. 32 Notes of site survey of 18994 19006 Dr. Urbanik (3/5/87)

SC Ex. 33 FEMA " Response to Inter- 19190 19209 rogatory 9" listing nat-ural and technological emergencies considered by Mr. McNutt in Krimm Memorandum

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page NEW YORK STATE EXHIBITS NYS Ex. 1 Direct Testimony of 18065 18065 James D. Papile, James C. Baranski and Lawrence B. Czech on Behalf of the State of New York Regarding LILCO's Recep-tion Centers (4/13/87)

NYS Ex. 2 Excerpt from RAC Review 18494 (Not Offered) of Oswego County Plan (12/31/81)

NYS Ex. 3 KLD Chart of anticipated 18712 (Not Offered) traffic volumes at in-tersection of Newbridge Road and Sunrise Highway used in KLD TR-201 (07:00 - 10:00)

NYS Ex. 4 KLD HCM Software: In- 18712 (Not Offered) tersection Analysis --

Sunrise Highway and Newbridge Road (3/5/87, 07:00 - 10:00)

NYS Ex. 5 Direct Testimony of 18771 18777 David T. Hartgen and Robert C. Millspaugh on Behalf of the State of New York Regarding LILCO's Reception Cen-ters (4/13/87)

NYS Ex. 6 Rebuttal Testimony of 18772 18777 David T. Hartgen and Robert C. Millspaugh on Behalf of the State of New York on KLD's Capac-ity Analysis (KLD TR-201) (5/27/87)

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page NYS Ex. 7 Rebuttal Testimony of 18772 18777 David T. Hartgen and Robert C. Millspaugh on Behalf of the State of New York Concerning KLD TR-201A and LILCO'S Re-buttal Testimony of May 27, 1987 (7/10/87) i

! STAFF EXHIBITS 1

i Staff Ex. 1 Excerpts from 18915 (Not Offered)

" Streamlining the Col-lection and Processing of Traffic Count Statis-l tics" by David T.

Hartgen and John H.

Lemmerman (NYS Transpor-tation Analysis Report

19) (1/83)

Staff Ex. 2 Excerpt from " Accuracy, 18917 (Not Offered)

Cost, and Responsiveness of Continuous Traffic Counting Systems: A Re-port on the Burnt Hills (Glenville) Rt. 50 Telemetry Demonstration Project" by Edward J.

Snow and Gloria Jillson (NYS Transportation Analysis Report 7)

(3/82)

Staff Ex. 3 Testimony of Dr. Thomas 18954 18955 Urbanik II on Behalf of the NRC Staff on Capaci-ty Analysis in the Vi-cinity of Reception Cen-ters (4/13/87)

Staff Ex. 4 Rebuttal Testimony of 18954 18955 I Dr. Thomas Urbanik II on Behalf of the NRC Staff l

on Capacity Analysis in I the Vicinity of Recep-tion Centers (5/27/87)

Exhibit Identified at Disposition at Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page Staff Ex. 5 Testimony of Falk Kantor 19180 19184 on Monitoring of Evacuees and Testimony of Lewis G. Hulman on Monitoring of Evacuees (4/13/87)

FEMA EXHIBITS PEMA Ex. 1 Krimm Memorandum 18203 18263 (12/24/85) re: Guidance on NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 Evaluation Criterion J.12; FEMA memo to M.

Sanders from C. Wingo (10/22/85) re: Policy Determination Concerning NUREG-0654 Element J12; and letter to S. Glass from J. Keller (10/4/85) re: Clarification of NUREG-0654 Element J.12 FEMA Ex. 2 Direct Testimony of 18261 18264 Thomas E. Baldwin, Ihor W. Husar Joseph H.

Keller (4/10/87)

FEMA Ex. 3 FEMA letter to V. 18261 18266 Stello, Jr., from D.

McLoughlin (12/30/86) re: Attached LILCO Transition Plan for Shoreham -- Rev. 8, Key to Consolidated RAC Re-view Dated December 15, 1986

3 LILCO, September 2,1987

i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

. r:

00w In the Matter of LONG 13 LAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 I hereby certify that copies of LILCO'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON THE SUITABILITY OF RECEPTION CENTERS were served this date upon the following by telecopier as indicated by one' asterisk, by Federal Ex-press as indicated by two asterisks, or by first-class mail, postage prepaid.

Morton B. Margulies, Chairman ** Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 East-West Towers, Rm. 407 4350 East-West Hwy. Atomic Safety and Licensing Bethesda, MD 20814 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Jerry R. Kline ** Washington, D.C. 20555 i Atomic Safety and Licensing i Board Richard G. Bachmann, Esq. **

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission George E. Johnson, Esq.

East-West Towers, Rm. 427 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East-West Hwy. 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, MD 20814 (to mallroom)

Bethesda, MD 20814 Mr. Frederick J. Shon **

Atomic Safety and Licensing Herbert H. Brown, Esq. **

Board Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Karla J. Letsche, Esq.

East-West Towers, Rm. 430 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 4350 East-West Hwy. South Lobby - 9th Floor Bethesda, MD 20814 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Secretary of the Commission Altention Docketing and Service Fabian G. Palomino, Esq. **

Section Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Counsel to the Governor 1717 H Street, N.W. Executive Chamber Washington, D.C. 20555 Room 229 l State Capitol i

Albany, New York 12224 l

l

< Mary Gundrum, Esq. Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General New York State Department of 120 Broadway Public Service, Staff Counsel Third Floor, Room 3-116 Three Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10271 Albany, New York 12223 Spence W. Perry, Esq. ** Ms. Nora Bredes William R. Cumming, Esq. Executive Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.

Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Counsel to the Governor New York State Energy Office Executive Chamber Agency Building 2 State Capitol Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 12223 Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq. ** ,

Stephen B. Latham, Esq. ** Eugene R. Kelly, Esq. l Twomey, Latham & Shea Suffolk County Attorney 33 West Second Street H. Lee Dennison Building P.O. Box 298 Veterans Memorial Highway Riverhead, New York 11901 Hauppauge, New York 11787 Mr. Philip McIntire Dr. Monroe Schneider Federal Emergency Management North Shore Committee Agency P.O. Box 231 26 Federal Plaza Wading River, NY 11792 New York, New York 10278 e -"&

James N. Christman Mary Jo Leugers Hunton & Williams 707 Bast Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: September 2,1987

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