ML20094P772
| ML20094P772 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1984 |
| From: | Stokes C BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE FOR THE PUBLIC INTERES |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8408170380 | |
| Download: ML20094P772 (98) | |
Text
~
P
- a" ..o r~
o~"% Business and Professional L- ' " "
People For The Public Id) Interest DCUETED -
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'84 /GD17 mo 38 In the Matter of )
)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Do cke t Nos. 50-454-OL
) 50-455-OL (Byron Nuclear Power Station, )
Units 1 & 2) )
SUMMARY
OF THE TESTIMONY OF CHARLES C. STOKES ON THE REINSPECTION PROGRAM I. Mr. Charles C. Stokes is a nuclear engineering consultant with P/S Associates. He is engaged in technical consulting in utility production facilities from the standpoints of design calculation, code and federal requirements and quality assurance.
II. Mr. Stokes has reviewed the Byron reinspection report and supplement, and documents reflecting many of the en-gineering evaulations performed by Sargent & Lundy. Mr. Stokes also has reviewed the prefiled testimony of Edison witnesses, Branch, McLaughlin and French and listened to portions of the testimony of those and other witnesses.
III. In his review, Mr. Stokes has reworked a number of engineering calculatione and has cross-referenced formulas used by Sargent & Lundy to perform the evaluations of discrepan-cies found in the reinspection program. He has also examined the engineering assumptions used by Sargent & Lundy in disposi-tioning discrepancies found in the reinspection program.
IV. Mr. Stokes suggests that there are enough signs of possible safety problems at Byron, and problems with Sargent & Lundy's engineering calculations and use of engineering judgment to require an independent engineering analysis of the discrepancies found in the Reinspection Program, and of certain other hardware issues, prior to a determination by the NRC that there is reasonable assurance that Byron can be operated safely.
3s63 8408170380 840817 PDR ADOCK 05000454
's '
T PDR
\
(
.. .,.~
_ ll. Mr. Stokes testifies that-he has-found instances
'.in which,Lbased,on his limited review, he istunableito agree with: Sargent & Lundy's calculations or with its evaluation of safety significance. In addition he discusses miscellaneous-hardware issues, which in his engineering judgment, based on the limited documents he reviewed, do not appear to.have been properly.dispositioned. Lastly,-he comments on those areas in which he perceives signs of possible problems, but as to which, due to time. constraints _and/or incomplete documentation, he has not yet reached;any-further conclusion other than his ,
opinion that further review is warranted.
VI. Mr. Stokes-discusses the many. instances of . ;
possible safety-significant problems he has uncovered in his review of the engineering evaluations performed in the reinspec-tion program.
l 1
n"~ on e ct ppgTED CJ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of: ) DXMr{fD uiQ
) Docket No. 50-454 OL COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) 0L (Byron Nuclear Power Station, )
y 50-45g4 nG017 g33g Units 1 and 2) )
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF CHARLES C. STOKES ON BYRON REINSPECTION PROGRAM Q1: Please state your name and present smployment.
A1: My name is Charles Cleveland Stokes. I am a nuclear engineering consultant. My partner and I do consulting work in the nuclear construction industry under the name P/S Associates.
Q2: Please describe P/S Associates.
A2: P/S Associates is a newly formed firm that offers consulting services to those differing entities involved in the nuclear construction industry. Our initial work has been on behalf of intervenors in NRC proceedings relating to the Diablo Canyon and Byron nuclear power plants.
Q3: Please describe your job responsibilities.
A3: I am a technical consultant in utility production facilities from the standpoints of design calculation, code and federal requirements, and quality assurance. I also design and review existing structures and mechanical components.
l Q4: Please describe your education and professional background.
1
(
o* 1' A4: I am a niember of the National Society of Professional Engineers and a registered Professional Engineer in Alabama, Florida and Georgia. I began my career as a co-op student employee with the Civil-Structural Department of Southern Company Services from November 1972 to June 1975. I was assigned various duties, primarily those of a draftsman and detailer for the Fossil-Hydro Concrete, Structural Steel, and Nuclear Concrete Departments. I worked on Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 and 2, miscellaneous outdoor concrete structures and HVAC, and Miller Steam Plant concrete base slabs. I detailed reinforcing and bolted connections.
I graduated in May 1975 with a BCE degree from Auburn University. I took a job as an Assistant Engineer with Southern Company Services Civil-Structural Department. In this position, I designed outdoor structures on the Miller Steam Plant, and designed sub-structure concrete and checked super-structure calculations on Harris Dam. I held this position from June 1975 to July 1978, when I was promoted to an Engineer II. In this position, I was Civil Material Coor-dinator and designed miscellaneous items on Vogtle Nuclear Plant, performed NRC 79-02 and 79-14 analyses on Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1, and redesigned the precipitator structural steel on the Miller Steam Plant. In addition, I designed S
structural steel for coal conveyorgon Schereer Fossil Plant, and wrote two specifications (one for modifications to the Reactor Heat Discharge System on the Hatch Nuclear Plant).
I held this position from July 1078 to May 1980. l l
2
r
.o? ?. '
In May 1980, I graduated from the Birmingham School of Law with a Juris Doctorate degree. At this time, my resume was submitted to Bechtel Power Corporation's Civil Struc-tural group in Gaithersburg, Maryland working on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Plant. I was accepted and worked from June 1980 until October 1980, performing NRC 79-02 and 79-14 calcula-tions. I then worked f rom October 1980 to May 1981 for the Nuclear Services Corporation, a division of Quadrex Corpora-tion, on the Zimmer Nuclear Plant, during which time I was also assigned to the LaSalle Nuclear Plant. In June 1981 I began work for the Mechanical Engineering Department of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory as the stress analyst on the injector of the Advanced Test Accelerator (ATA). I also made some design changes to the Experimental Test Accelerator (ETA). I left the Livermore Laboratory in February 1982 to work for Reactor Controls, Inc., on Grand Gulf Unit 1 Control Rod Drive System.
In November,1982, I was accepted by Bechtel to work on the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant. I worked on Unit 1 until March 1983, when I was assigned to Unit 2. In October 1983, I was laid off two weeks after writing three Discrepancy Reports against both Units 1 and 2. (See my resume, Attach-ment 1.)
QS: Are you familiar with the Byron Reinspection Program? 1 1
A5: Yes. I have spent more than 300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> reading and reviewing Commonwealth Edison documents, NTtC documents, Sargent &
Lundy documents both at their offices and my office, weld l
3 l
r
- c. ,a procedures of Hunter and Hatfield, and miscellaneous other documents on the Byron facility. I have reviewed documents reflecting many of the engineering evaluations performed by Sargent & Lundy. I have also reviewed the prefiled testimony of Edison witnesses Branch, McLaughlin and French, in addition to listening to portions of their testimony and the testimony of other Edison witnesses at the Atomic Safety and Licenning Board hearing on Byron in July of 1984. I have reviewed Edison's February 1984 Reinspection Report and the June 1984 supplement thereto, as well as engineering packages and other proprietary design documents obtained f rom Sargent & Lundy. In my review I have reworked a number of engineering calculations and have cross-referenced formulas used by Sargent & Lundy to perform their evaluations. I have spent some time reviewing parts of the Byron FSAR, various codes and NRC NUREGS, and researching formulas in the design criteria of Sargent & Lundy or which were referenced in Sargent & Lundy calculations on discrepancies found in the Reinspection Program.
Q6: What is the purpose of your testimony?
A6: My testimony addresses the engineering evaluations performed, and the use of engineering judgment, by Sargent & Lundy in its attempt to show that there are no safety-significant construction problems at Byron. The main purpose of my testimony is to suggest the need for an independent engi-neering analysis of the safety significance of the problems found in the Reinspection Program, as well as an independent 4
l
{
analysis and examination of certain hardware at Byron where evidence indicates possible safety problems.
My testimony is not intended to show conclusively that Byron is not safe to operate. A nuclear power plant is a large and complex facility requiring extensive time and resources for a conclusive engineering assessment; even an assessment limited to the Hatfield, Hunter and PTL discre-pancies found in the Byron Reinspection Program, together with certain Systems Control Corporation discrepancies dis-cussed in Edison's pre-filed testimony, would require far more time than I have had, as well as a range of engineering skills and experience including but not limited to those which I possess.
However, even in the limited time I have had to review Sargent & Lundy documents relating to the engineering evaluations, I have seen numerous indications of issues which, in my judgment, collectively require further exploration and resolution before there can be reasonable assurance that Byron is safe to operate.
For this reason, the purpose of my testimony is to suggest that there are enough signs of possible safety problems at Byron, and enough legitimate concern about Sar-gent & Lundy's engineering calculations and use of engineer-ing judgment, to require an independent engineering analysis of the discrepancies found in the Reinspection Program, and of certain other hardware issues, prior to a determination by this Board on whether there is reasonable assurance that Byron can be operated safely.
5
F l
l
,. ,a My testimony also includes instances in which I am unable, based on the limited review I have couducted, to agree with Sargent & Lundy's calculations or with its evaluation of safety significance. In addition, I discuss miscellaneous hardware issues, which in my engineering judg-ment, based on the limited documents I have reviewed, do not appear to have been properly dispositioned. Lastly, I com-ment on those areas in which I perceive signs of possible problems, but as to which, due to time constraints and/or incomplete documentation, I have not yet reached any further conclusion other than my opinion that further review is warranted.
Q7: Why do you believe an " independent" engineering analysis is needed?
A7: A letter from Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the Congress (Attachment D to the proposed prefiled testimony of intervenors' witness Dr.
William H. Bleuel) specifies criteria for an independent design review of Diablo Canyon. In that letter, M r. Palla-dino indicates that an independent design review must be done by an entity not previously involved in the activity under review. In my opinion, whenever the review is signi-ficantly judgmental, independence is needed.
Q8: Do you believe Sargent & Lundy's engineering evaluations were significantly judgmental?
A8: Yes. As illustrated in various instances cited throughout 6
h ,
f the remainder of my. testimony, an analysis of the findings of the reinspection program for safety and design signifi-cance, which is what Sargent & Lundy did, is comparable to a design analysis'in the degree of. judgment required.
Q9: In your1 opinion, why was not Sargent & Lundy's analysis
-" independent"?
A9: For a number of reasons. Sargent & Lundy from the plant's i
inception ~has been and remainsEthe architect-engineer on Byron, in addition to being involved in a number of other 4
=
Edison projects, such as the Braidwood plant. Sargent &
Lundy thus has a direct economic stake in the outcome of the evaluations. .
Moreover, my review of the firm's evaluations reveals
!' repeated instances in which in my opinion, based on the i
! limited documents I reviewed, it appears that Sargent &-
Lundy's judgments and evaluations fell short of the degree of objectivity and impartiality required of an independent review.
Sargent & Lundy has evaluated thousands of discrepant conditions and yet did not find one single item to be safety-significant. 4 As I reviewed a limited portion of Sargent & Lundy's calculations I found instances where the allowable stress-I appeared to exceed code requirements. I also found '
instances in which certain elements, minor individually, appear to have been omitted, non-conservatively, from calculations,. including instances where if these factors had l
7
J.
i
.been added collectively, it appears that actual stress z
would have exceeded allowable-stress.- I also'found instances 'where it : appeared, on the~ basis of the calcula-tion itself, that the. equipment would fail. Yet the Sar-gent & Lundy evaluations, with respect to each of those instances,~ concluded that'there.was no safety significance.
Q10: -What did your review of the- design criteria (Sargent. &
Lundy's Structural Project Design Criteria BYRON AND BRAID-WOOD Nuclear Power Station Units 1 &2 (DC-ST-03-BY/BR) REV.
- 12) for-Byron reveal?'
A10: The design criteria were one of the standards guiding calculations of design significance in the engineering evaluation of Reinspection Program discrepancies. In my review I found instances in which formulas appeared to be incorrect, and instances in which equations appeared to be-missing elements. I also found instances of design assump-tions that in my opinion are faulty and should not have been relied-on in the design of the plant. These were used as references in Sargent & Lundy evaluations of discrepan-cies found'in the Reinspection Program. In sum, I found a number of problems in the design criteria for Byron.
Q11: Can you elaborate on the problems you found in the design
' criteria?
All: Attachment 2 Lo my testimony is a non-exhaustive summary of
- what appear to be erroneous formulas, questionable design assumptions, and apparently faulty equations I found in my 8
9% .
~brief review of the design criteria for Byron. Following that summary in Attachment 2 are copies of .those sections i I
of the design criteria that are. listed in the summary. '
Point 1 in the summary (Attachment 2A) is section 12.2.4. In'this-formula the lambda symbol appears to be missing. This is important because these formulas should be correct. Although some engineers might know the correct formula without having to see it, cthers may not. If the
~
wrong formula is utilized, faulty design may result. In 12.2.4 the formula is P AE = 1/2( )H2gkAE. The section of
-the design criteria where this apparent error is contained is otherwise so thorough that someone relying on it might not check the formula in another book. If the criteria had omitted the formula and simply referenced it, that would have caused to engineer to check the formula and find the correct one. That would have been the better alternative.
By making that section so thorough, then leaving out the lambda symbol, the likely result is that.the formula may be used incorrectly.
This omission bears on the inferences about the plant which may be drawn from the Reinspection Program. This section of the design criteria relates to below-grade structural building outside walls, which were not included.
in the Reinspection Program and could not have been, because they are under the ground and generally inaccessible.
Thus any error due to this omission would not have been detected in the program.
9
3.- j.1 t
-Q12: - What 'are the other problems you find in'the design criteria?'
A12: The second point in my summary -(Attachment 2B) refers to Section 19.5.d. The' equation appears to be missing a summation, symbol before-the b2 (squared). Without the summation symbol it is not obvious that one shoul'd sum up the to'tals..before b2. It would make a significant dir-ference in.the calculation if such' summation were .not done.
This equation relates to the summation of torsional stresses for the- concrete turbine foundation - another example
-where any'resulting error would not have been detected in the Reinspection Program, which did not tear up and rein-spect concrete.
Also in ~Section '19.5.d the equation, I believe,_should be the square root of F prime C .(Attachment 2C). This is important because of the significant difference between the square root of the number and the number itself. Particu-larly, Section 19.5 d talks about allowable stresses. If the calculation is made without the square root, the result would be a higher allowable stress.
Section 32 3 2 (ALLachment 2D) also' has an apparent error. It says :25 fy when it should be .25 fy. This section relates-to buried piping. Again, any resulting error would not have been detected in the Reinspection Program, which treated buried piping as inaccessible.
Q13:- Isn't that.the kind of error an engineer would recognize right~away?
10
v 1 A13: One would think so, but then why did no one correct the design criteria?
Q14: Are there other apparent errors you have found in the design criteria?
A14: Yes. Number 5 in my summary is Section 32.4.2. (Attachment 2E), which also relates to buried piping. Spangler's equa-tion appears to be listed as D.061, whereas it should be 0.061. Also, I believe that R U should be R3 in the denom-inator. I do not know whether anyone took the D to mean diameter and used the diameter in the calculation, but this appears to be a problem. The difference between using R U as a denominator as opposed to R3 is substantial. Although my review has been limited by time, the apparent errors just discussed in addition to others listed on the summary in Attachment 1 suggest the presence of defects in some of the formulas Sargent & Lundy has employed at Byron.
Q15: When you stated that there are design assumptions that appear to be faulty, to what assumptions did you refer?
A15: Section 34.2 of the design criteria states that embed plates arc designed for 10 kips per foot tension load and 12 kips per foot shear load. I have attached Section 34 2 as Attachment 2F.
Q16: What do you think the problem is with this section?
A16: This a major concern that I have from my discussions with Sargent & Lundy people and from what I saw in the field while on the site visit. It appears that Sargent & Lundy 11
_. . - . __ ~ _ - - . . .
g has procedures t'o hang conduit, HVAC pipe supports, both-
- small' and large, off embed plates.. If.they hung everything l .off-embed plates, as I understand.Sargent & Lundy to say, there could be serious safety problems. I believe there are. legitimate doubts as.to whether the embed. plates would ,
survive a seismic event. These would affect, for example, Hatfield conduit supports, and Hunter-pipe supports, which Z
'may be' hung from embed plates; but again, the embed plates j 'themselves were not reinspected-in the Reinspection Pro-gram, and inadequacies in them thus nay have gone undetected.
I Q17: Please explain why e'mbed plates might not survive a seismic event.
1 1
A17: Ten kips is, I believe, too small for the design of.the I
plates. For example, on the July 28 field trip to Byron I
, saw a 12 inch line that had a strut to the embed plate on
- the wall. If there is a large load on the strut, as I ,
observed in the field (the strut appears to-have 15 or 20 j kips based on the size of it), and that load is applied to the plate, the bolt strength can be exceeded and the whole plate can pull off the wall. If that occurred throughout
- i. -the plant, problems could be widespread. If a large number
- of embed plates are questionable, the plant could not undergo a safe shutdown earthquake.
Q18: How do you know that every embed plate is designed to 10
!. . and 12 kips?
,. A18: I do not; however, that is what this document appears to 12
,,,-# m- ,% ,---r~-- - - , - . - . ,,e .-e-n---# -. - , * ~ . , , . + -
---,c ---,-t 2--c-----. e.%, .-
..%-- +,
say. I did not find any calculations for embed plates, but this document appears to state that all embed plates are designed in this manner.
Q19: Do you have other concerns with the design criteria?
A19: Yes. In Section 37.2.1, relating to mechanical component supports such as Hunter pipe supports, there is a listing of design effects that are to be ignored when performing calculations, for example, torsional stresses, axial self weight and assumptions that all masses are lumped at the shear center. The stresses are small, but they are non-conservative. If these stresses were added to the calcula-tions, I believe, some of them would f ail. This same problem occurred at Diablo, namely, ignoring minor but ton-conservative design effects. At Diablo the NRC required that all the minor stresses be included and all calcula-tions where minor stresses were ignored be recalculated. I have included a summary of these procedures and the proce-dures themselves as Attachment 3 to my testimony.
Q20: Do you have other concerns with the decign criteria for Byron?
A20: Yes. I listed the major concerns above, but I have many other concerns that I have not had an opportunity to review in depth. Attachment 4 to my testimony lists these potential problem areas I have encountered with the Byron design criteria and my initial concerns. It may be that there are answers to my concerns with the procedures listed in Attachment 4, but my questions have not been resolved by 13
J. 11;*-
my review of the documents -thus far.
Q21: What other documents have you reviewed that you have con-cerns with?
A21: One of -the documents is entitled Seismic Subsystem and Equipment Response Spectra Design Criteria Byron and Braid-
~
wood Nuclear-Power Stations Units 1 and 2 DC-ST 04 BB REV.2
'i.
Copy 48,Section V.B. This document is attached to my_
testimony as Attachment 5. It-relates to buildings and would affect calculations for each component in the build-ing, including Hatfield, Hunter and PTL inspected compon-ents; Reinspection Program calculations relied on this document.- In Section V.B. the document states, "The hori-4 zontal seismic model of the nuclear power plant complex involves many degrees of dynamic freedom; theoretically a l' response spectra could be generated for cach degree of freedom in addition to the horizontal model, a separate t-vertical model was developed for the vertical direction of
, excitation, so additional degrees of freedom for which response spectra could be generated were introduced into the analysis" (emphasis added). It appears that only one model was done for both t he horizontal EW and NS, even i
f though the building cross sections were different and only one. vertical model was made. For each building, about its respective center of gravity six (6) seismic loadings
. should have been applied: accelerations along three aves and moments -about- those three axes (Fx, Fy, Fz, Mx, My and 4 Mz). . In the spectra, only accelerations for EM, NS, and 14 -
- ._ . . . . , .. _ _ , . - _ .. _ . _ . _ , . ~ _ _ . . _ .- . . . _ _ _ . - _ - _ . . _ . _ . _ - - - _ , _
vertical are shown. At least one other spectra por build-
'ing should have been made, one for the torsional accelera-tion to building components at their radial distances from the center of gravity. For many components, this torsional component is significant on loads, stresses, and ultimately to a conclusion as to safety of the plant.
022: Why is this important at Byron?
A22: At Byron it appears that the torsional component is being ignored. In every plant I've worked in, the torsional component has never been ignored. I might add that neglect of the torsional component is consistent with the PSAR, Section 3 7.2.11, where torsional effect was listed as insignificant. Nowhere else I have worked has the tor-sional effect been considered insignificant. Now this was apparently detected by the NRC in 1982. The NRC apparently did not altogether approve of the practice, but did find it to be in compliance with the FSAR.
Q23: In your opinion, is it reasonable to assume that at Byron the torsional effect is insignificant?
A23: If all of the items in the building are within 10 feet of the center of gravity, then it probably is insignificant.
But many of the buildings have items as f ar away as 50-60 feet from the center of gravity of that building. For example, the turbine building is a long rectangular building, in which the torsional effects are likely to be substantial.
15
v Q24: Are there other areas you are concerned with?
A24: Yes. In an NRC letter dated January 30, 1984 to common-wealth Edison, on page 11 there was a reference to an allegation received by the NRC regarding undersized welds where tube steel was used. That document is attached to my testimony as Attachment 6. I do not believe that allega-tion was substantiated at the time. Also attached to my testimony as Attachment 7 are the Sargent & Lundy calcula-tions for the weld survey project. Page 10 of that Sargent
& Lundy document, titled Flare Bevel Groove Welds, states,
" Typical field measurements indicate that the actual radius is between T and 2.5T, where T is the tube wall thickness.
Therefore, the design assumption of R = 2T and effective throat equal to 5/16 R per AWS is not a ppl i ca bl e." This quote in my opinion appears to substantiate the NRC allega-tion contained in Attachment 6. The document itself (Attachment 7) raises further questions. It was prepared by one D.J. Sheahan. The document contains no apparent indication that it was ever checked or approved. It has no page numbers, no calculation number, and no book number.
The only other thing that helps one trace it is on the fifth page where there appears the name "D. Patel - 2 8." I looked up this name on a list provided to intervenors in discovery and found that he or she is one of the structural leaders at Sargent & Lundy for the Reinspection Program.
. In my opinion what Attachment 4 suggests is that a design assumption of R = 2T is not valid. However, I am 16
not certain what design assumption was in fact used.
Again, this same problem was present at the Diablo plant.
We used the design assumption of R = 2T and found it was wrong.
Attachments 6 and 7 thus potentially bring into ques-tion every weld to tube steel in the pl. ant. It may be the case that large numbers of welds of this type are as much as 50% deficient. This problem would potentially affect, for example, Hatfield conduit and cable tray and Hunter pipe supports.
025: Do you have any concerns relating to welds reinspected in the Reinspection Progam and repaired prior to engineering evaluation?
A25: In my review, I came across a document labeled Reinspection Program entitled Daily Inspection Report Hunter Corporation Inspector Mark. M. Tabbert 8/16/83 This is a list of 118 ASME and AISC deficient welds, mainly on a feedwater system.
This document is attached to my testimony as Attachment 8.
I have compared the list of 118 welds with the listing in the ASME eategory that was reviewed by Sargent & Lundy and it appears from the documentation available to me that none of the 118 were in the group reviewed by Sargent & Lundy.
It thus appears that these 118 welds may have been fixed before any review was done. The list of the 118 welda describes the deficiencies, and in my ooinion, if thare had been an engineering evaluation performed on these weld deficiencies some would likely have been found to be 17
[' '9r j' 35*
Esa ety.-significant .
Q263- What is the next area of your: concern?.
'A26: Calculation 1 book 19.1.2, the Design Procedures ~and Assump-i tions for Evaluation of As Built Welds with AWS Inspection
- Discrepancies,4p. 14' No. 7 is' attached to-my testimony as.
Attachment 9.'t.The document states that " Convexity is only
-considered !a defect on~ welds with fatigue load- application and does nok ef fect welds at Byron /Praidwood stations."
This quote is consistent with-the testimony of John McLaugblin, who testified that pipe supports were not sub-ject to' fatigue ana' lysis.
! In my opinion, pipe supports are subject to fatigue and
- Lhus, convexity should 'have been considered a defect, i
Donald L. Leone, in his testimonh at page A.20 (fourth j- 'line)-(later adopted by Mr. Branchi stated -that, " weld j discrepancies involving ASME Class-I piping were evaluated against the fatigue analysis for the piping system."
i j this may evidence a lack of communication between the f
structural group and the mechanical group. If mechanical ;
designs account for fatigue in the piping system, then the structural group should take that into account when design-
- .in6 those respectiveEpipe supports. Pipe supports are j subject to load reversal many times. In the NRC document i
Review of :U.S. Nuclear P,egulatory Commission 1983 Annual Report (Attachment'10), on page .17, an article entitled
- 2. ,
l Water Hammer speaks of " water hammer", a condition that-
! causes fatigue loaning and states, "The frequency of occur- ,
5 18 s
i
, - ,, - , , _ _ . . . . _ .- .,.4, ,,- --,-.,,~,,%--,. , - - , ,+,_..,--_.,-,----mr--
- ,-,m.-r.-..-+-..,._-ox., --vw.- - ,---
l: ,. fa rence is low and damage has generally been limited to piping supports." As the NRC article points out, pipe supports are thus subject to fatigue loading. I disagree with Sargent & Lundy's apparent position that fatigue load-ing does not affect AWS welds at the Byron plant.
Q27: Do you have other concerns af fecting the Reinspection Program?
A27: Yes. In Sargent & Lundy Calculation book 19.1.2, Design Procedures and Assumptions, page 20, No. 5. (attached as Attachment 11), it lists D1.1-83 as the structural welding code. In my review of the FSAR, the 1983 code was not listed. This would relate to all as built welds with AWS code discrepancies, whether Hatfield or Hunter.
Q28: Why is this a problem?
A28: There are potential problems when one installs or builds under one code and then attempts to pass the weld under a later code. For example, under the 1983 code it may be easier to pass a weld by calculation because the installa-tion criteria in the new code are more demanding. In contrast, welds may be more difficult to justify by calcu-lation under the earlier code because the installation criteria were then less demanding. Therefore, if one builds under an earlier code (with less demanding installa-tion criteria) and attempts to pass the weld under a later code (requiring less demanding calculations) one may end up passing a weld that may have failed under either code.
19
,. t e
As' a standar'd practice if one installs a weld under one e
code, one should qualify t hat weld under the same code.
Since the 1983 code is not referenced in the Byron FSAR, it appears that the weld was not' installed per the 1983 code and therefore should not be qualified under that
- dode.
't Q29: 'Do you have additional concerns about. .the Sargent & Lundy calculations relating to the Byron Reinspection Program?
A29: Yes. I have questions on calculations and assumptions found in Calculation book 19.1.2, Sec.tions 2.1 (p. 5) and 4.1 (pp. 7- 11), Section 19 (pp. 1-5), Sect ion 21 (pp. 77, 78, 78 A), Sec_ tion 21 (p. 97 A), Section 21 (p.109) and i
, Section 21 (p. 113).
Q30: What is your concern with Section 2.1 and Section 4.1?
A30: This relates to a PTL inspected weld in the Reinspection Program. On yeld No. 140, Beam No. 33601-L on page 8, the weld appears to be shown to be overstressed 1.18 to 1.1.
This is true even though Sargent & Lundy used a 10% over-stress factor for as built conditions. On page 11 the engineer writes, "Ry is assumed to be taken by check p l a t, e s ." On the same page actual stress divided by allow-able is shown to equal 996, less than 1.0. It appears that this joint would fail if it were recalculated including Ry. (Reaction R.in the vertical (y) direction.)
031: What is your concern with Section 21 pages,77, 78 and 78A?
A31: This, too, relat.esLo a PTL reinspect,ed weld. These pages l 20'
N. 4 441 g
+ concern a combination ov.it'ed:and welded' connection.- The -
engineer' who performed this. calculatlon. makes -an assumption
- that.the-. bolts'take part.of the load'.and that there is a
. minimum-pretensionJin-the bolts.. My concern is that this assumption _ is, to my knowledge, not consistent.with indus-
.try-. pract ice. _ When one designs'a welded and bolted struc-
.tural plate the weld is ' designed for 100% of the shear load. In the case-of_ pull ~.out or tension load.the anchor bolts are designed fo'.those r loads. One-cannot reasonably-
~
assume that a certain amount of load 'goes to the bolted.
connection. In this case,- looking a't'.the drawing of the weld and ~ bolts, the bolts' would-not catch very much load until the weld-fails. Even if there is bolt pretension initally, the bolts will relax over time. For the engineer to make the assumption that, t,he bolts take the load, he or she would have to show that those bolts.could take the load T
for:the life of the plant. This assumption is not conser-4 va t,1 v e , nor is it, proven in the calculation. However, it appears that this assumption is necessary to pass the weld under t,he code.
Q32: What is.your concern with section 21, page 97A?
A32: The calculation in this section, relating to a_PTL rein-
- s pectd . weld , show s "I.-.: 2.13 grea ter than 1.0 n.q." If i
this means, as it would appear, that the interaction value fis' equal to 2.13, which is greater .than the code allowable
. o f 1.00, then this equipment does not qualify under the
- code. This is .among t.he worst cases of' apparent failure .I-J 1 21 e
1
_.________._______i___._ ____m_._.____m__.____.__......_.__m_____ -
ac ;*
have.come across in my review. The document goes on to -
say, "Therefore, an Rz must be added per Phase III:modifi-cat ions." It-.is._not: apparent what is a Phase III modifica-
~
tion. If this did fail under-the Reinspection Program, why was it not' recorded as-a Reinspection Program failure? A.
-failure;of this apparent dimension would, in my opinion, likely 'b'e~ safety-signiricant.
Q33: _What.is your concern wit,h Section-21, page 1097 JA33: This, again, concerns a PTL reinspected weld. The respon-sible engincar states, "Thisfportion of the load will-be.
taken from' load "D" and it will' be distributed to weld "A" and "B". In my opinion this should not merely be assumed to happen; i t- should be proven. There are reliable ways to distribute loads based on fixity or on the strength of the section. The fact : that the engineer makes .this assumption does not necessarily mean that the load would in fact react in that manner. I do not see any apparent foundation for this assumption. A calculation should have been performed
~
to justify this questionable assumption. The only apparent, way this assumption could be valid is if one assumes "D" failed. That would ensure "A" and "B" would assume the load.
Q34: Do you have concerns relating to Systems Control Corpora-tion (" SCC")?
A34: Yes. . I have a series of questions regarding SCC supplied control boards. Commonwealth Edison's NCR 695 Attachment A 1
22 ,
I s
e
, e. l, ' '
5I '
.(myJAttachment 12) shows that three main control board E . sections (1PM02J, -1PM02J, 'and 1PM05J) have ;been repaired with '"Bondo," an- auto body type repair compound, 'and by tack welds, rather than by the full' penetration weld'speci-1 fled 11n-the-design. An April 28, 1982 SCC letter to Sar-
- gent & Lundy (Attachment 13) revealed that SCC had used such aut'o body filler in:many panel' face repair applica-
-tions. In the third paragraph, SCC. states, "We can only 2 conclude that the area of the board containing the. cracks may have been subjected to abnormal thermal.or. structural.
stresses."
An April'30, 1982'Sargent & Lundy interoffice memoran-dum from J.A. - Schwin to B.G. Treece in response (NCR~ number F-695; my Attachment 14) has a note at the bottom which states, "The use of body filler material- (Bondo, etc.). is a standard practice of control board manufacturers in repair-ing blemishes to their boards."
The. documents I have reviewed do not disclose the final resolution of this problem, but the documents do raise serious questions. The drawing called for full penetration welds, not tack welds and Bondo. The question then arises
-- What is the function of Bondo on these control boards?
Is it for strength?- Or'is it a sealant? These- main con-trol-boards are Class I safety' equipment. Is it possible that the Bondo could'again crack and a particle become I
^!
lodged in the contact switches? I would also question '
whether proce'dures are in place for the design, installa-23
I tion and qualification of Bondo in Class I safety related controls.
Moreo~ver, I would state that if the use of Bondo is as a sealant, high temperature silicon would be better. If the use is for strength, welding would be better, even taking into account the potential for warping the panel.
Q35. Do you have other concerns with SCC control board panels?
A35. Yes. There is another issue related to SCC control boards which arises from my review of Edison's NCR F-544 (Attach-ment 15). NCR F-544 indicates that main control board panels OPM01J, OPM02J, 1PM01J, 2PM01J, 1PM04J, 1PM 11J, and 2PM11J did not meet the AWS D 1.1 code criteria for welds.
As I understand AWS D 1.1, it is not a stringent require-ment, but is among the easier AWS code requirements to meet. In an effort to correct the situation NCR F-544 indicates that SCC was allowed to write its own acceptance criteria. This is an issue which would appear to deserve investigation.
Q36: Were there other Sargent & Lundy calculations for the Reinspection Program that caused concern?
A36: A review of Sargent & Lundy Calculation book no. BRP-1 for Hunter Subjective Welding also raised concern on my part.
This calculation book reviewed 60 AWS type discrepancies and 49 ASME weld discrepancies, of which two were on the feedwater system ard five on main steam. (This con-trasts with the 118 ASME welds referred to earlier in my 24
- , s )^
E testimony which may have been fixed without a Sargent.&
Lundy review.)
Specifically, ASME . welds Nos. 62 (S-CC-100-11 A) ~and 63 J(S-CC-100-33) (Attachment .16) were accepted 'despite the ;
fact that:the. accuracy of the gauges. supplied for measuring
. -the. welds was only 1/64 of. an inch, whereas ASME requires machine shop type accuracy to the thousandths. The infor-mation I have reviewed suggests that this'. is an impermis-sible practice. -
Q37: Do you have -additional concerns over documents you reviewed at.Sargent &.Lundy?
A37: Yes. .I have not had time to discuss them.all in this testimony, but I do have time for one more. I reviewed a drawing in Sargent & Lundy's home office, Review of Cate-gory-I Conduit Supports Typical' Support-Types and Load Tables DWG. 6E-3393B. This document depicted support type CF and
.MCF (floor to ceiling conduit support) and type CC and CP maximum load- table. When I reviewed the tables I was immediately concerned. In the plant visit I. observed can-tilevers coming off the ceiling for 18 feet using unistrut.
I found this alarming. The CF and MCF uses approximately 2' inch to 4 inch tubing. I saw conduit supports in the field that did not meet design requirements. It was floor to ceiling and was welded at the top and at the bottom.
.According to the drawing it should have had a slip or pin connection at the top and no weld. -Beyond that, it appears that the KL/R, a slenderness ratio which comes out of the
]
25
m -
y UBC, AISC;and a number of other documents including the unistrut catalog, states that th'e limit for KL/R is 200 feet. I reviewed many designs that exceeded the 200 foot factor. .One I noted was-300 feet.
. It appears there is a problem 'with the K factor used in the equation. The unistrut catalog uses .8 as a built in factor within that document. A pin connector uses a factor of 1.;2, and a cantilever uses a factor of 2. When one uses any of those other factors instead of the. 8 for unistrut,
- these supports are substantially outside of the length requirement. .The unistrut book says that when one exceeds 200 for KL/R one no longer has a yield stress failure,.but a buckling failure. I.have viewed this problem both in the tables at Sargent &'Lundy and in th9 field at Byron.
26
.?. l AMA A l
RESUME.
CHARLES C. S'IMES P. E. SS4 416-72-9963 ROUTE'l BOX 223 COF1DlWDCD,AL. 36329
' TEL.- (295) 677-5078 PMW(BEL DMR:
Date of Birth - 03/12/51'- SINGLE - U.S. CITIZEN - EXCELLENT HEAL'H1 PRNMEI(BIhL EXPgmmum:
FIEW ENGINEER - (NOV. 8,'1982 % OCT.14,1983)
Accepted assignment to Pacific Gas and Electric Companies DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR PROJECT UNITS 1 & 2. Placed in on-site engineering group. Performed pipe stress and pipe support
~
design calculations. Wrote paper on how to design and represent flare, flare-bevel, skewed welds and other partial and full penetration welds on drawings to comply with AISC Ind AMi prequalified welds for structural and tube steel. Was assigned to Pipe Support
. Design Tolerance Clarification Group to authorize changes required for installation of
, supports and was responsible for snubber substitution on both units.
PIPE STRESS / SUPPORT ENGINEER - (2/82 % 5/82) 4 Field consultant on Mississippi Power & Light's GRAND GULF 1 for RCI Inc. Assigned to
- control Rod Drive System to assist ECHO pipe stress group and RCI hanger group in resolving t
interference problems by suggesting alternate design. Responsible for ECN's of as-builts and alternate designs and supervising drafting. Assisted QC and Construction t.
personal in interpretation of drawings. BWR Plant and class 1 pipe.
4
+
MECHANICAL ENGINEER - (6/81 % 2/82) i Assigned to the Mechanical Engineering Dept. of the Lawerence Livermore National Labor-
!; atory as a stress analyst on the injector of the Advanced Test Accelerator (ATA).
! Parformed calculations on the injector housing, epoxy insulators, accelerator cells, cat-
! -hode, anode, support structure and handling fixtures for fabrication and installation.
i System involved vacuum-oil interfaces and extremely strong magnetic and radiation fields.
- Injector constructed of aluminum and stainless steel with insulators of a special fill-spoxy compound. Also made design changes to epoxy insulators on Experimental Test
, Accelerator (ETA).
1 PIPE STRESS / SUPPORT ENGINEER - (10/80 % 5/81)
Contracted to Nuclear Services Corporation, a division of Quadrex Corp. in San Jose i California. Performed pipe stress calculations and design of safety related small bore
! piping supports. SAGS program was used in analysis of complex supports. Was assigned to j ZIMER NUCLEAR PLANT as a member of special pipe stress and hanger analysis group. Class
!- I, II, III pipe.
l PIPE SUPPORT ENGINEER - (6/80 % 10/80)
Assigned to Bechtel Power Corporation's Civil Structural group in Gaithersburg, Md. I working on the DAVIS-BESSE PROJECT. ' Checked and made base plate and anchor bolt stress
- calculations and modifications for anchors and pipe hangers. ANSYS finite element pro-I gram utilized to account for plate flexibility and bolt elongation. Strudl was used for i cnalysis of complex frames. Other in house programs were also used.
i PRQJECT/ DESIGN ENGINEER - (7/75 % 5/80)
Southern Company Services Inc., Birmingham, Alabama.
Wrote two specifications concerning modifications to Georgia Power's HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT.
i continued:
The main item modified was the Reactor Heat Discharge System in the Torus.
Designed the structural steel truss for Georgia Power's SCHEREER PLANT coal conveyor cystem Unit No. 2, including details and bents.
Redesigned the precipitator structural steel on Alabama Power's MILLER STEAM PLANT to add precipitator roof enclosure. Elastic analysis performed to allow for thermal growth and to resist wind forces. STRUDL analysis, code check and design was used.
Acted as a nuclear pipe support stress analysis, designer and checker on Alabama Power's FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT. Performed stiffness calculations and checks by hand and computer.
STRUDL was used for analysis of complex structures. Also worked in the field supplying support. information to office personal. Work performed in accordance with NRC 79-02 and 79-14. PWR class I, II, III pipe.
Served as civil material coordinator on Georgia Power's VCX3TLE INCLEAR PLANT. Was rtsponsible for civil quantity take-offs for project construction scheduling, financing and material purchases. Computer storage and retrieval of information was used.
Did ANSYS finite element analysis of powerhouse substructure on Alabama Power's HARRIS DAM. Supervised draf ting, checked drawings and checked calculations on superstructure concrete.
Designed outdoor structures on Alabama Power's MILLER STEAM PLANT. These included railroad, truck and ash pipe bridges, ash trench system and off-site make-up water system.
R:.sponsible for checking calculations, supervising drafting and coordinating field and inter-office disciplines.
PROFESSIQiAL LICENSES AE AFFILIATIGIS:
Registered Professional Engineer - State of Alabama - (12786)
Registered Professional Engineer - State of Florida - (29985)
Registered Professional Engineer - State of Georgia - (12340)
EUCATICN:
Birmingham School of Law, Birmingham, A1., Juris Doctorate degree, May 1980.
Auburn University, Auburn, A1., BCE degree, May 1975.
Massey Institute of Technology, Jacksonville Fl., correspondence accounting.
THE FACTS STATED ABOVE ARE TRUE AND ACCURATE Charles C. Stokes P.E.
l l
U Akhment 2.,
.- l S& L DOCUMENTS REVIEWED STRUCTURAL PROJECT DESIGN CRITERIA BYRON AND BRAIDWOOD NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNITS 1 & 2 (DC-ST-03-BY/BR) REV. 12 Sect.l.1, para. .2 No exceptions to the Final Safety Analysis Report and Enviromental Report is permitted.
Sect.7.4.1.b Interior walls 12", conc. slabs 12", on metal deck-category I floors 8", roof 14", control room ceiling 4" and category II slabs 6" (? anchor bolt problems)
Sect.7.4.2.b exterior walls below grade 15" min. thick, at above grade 24" mine thick.(? reversed)
Sect.8.1.a ACI 318-71 (? FSAR REQUIREMENTS) (? USED IN DESIGN)
Sect.8.1.b ACI 322-72 (? FSAR REQUIREMENTS) (? USED IN DESIGN)
Sect.8.1.c AISC-69 (ELASTIC DESIGN) (? PLASTIC DESIGN) (i USED IN DESIGN)
Sect.8.1.d UBC-73(SEISMIC ANALYSIS CATEGORY II STRUC-TURES) (? FSAR REQUIREMENTS) (? USED IN DESIGN)
Sect.8.1.e AISI-68 (DESIGN COLD FORMED STEEL STRUCTURAL MEMBERS) (? FSAR REQUIREMENTS) (? USED IN DESIGN)
Sect.8.1.f 73 ASME Sect. III Div. 2, proposed standard code for concrete reactor vessels and containments. (? FSAR RE-QUIREMENTS) (? USED IN DESIGN)
Sect.9.5 CATEGORY II DEFLECTION WAIVED (? WITHOUT SOME LIMIT IMPOSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHEN CAT. II EFFECTS CAT. I)
TABLE 9.4-1 NOTE 5 1.67 AISC <= .95 Fy (? FSAR REQUIREMENTS)
TABLE 9.4-1 DESIGN STRESSES 1.75 AISC ? Fy (? FSAR RE-QUIREMENTS)
Sect.10.2.1.1.3.4 In all cases, structural members will be checked for the loads obtained from the pipe and cable pan hanger drawings. (? table diff.)
Sect.10.2.2.1.1 33 hz or less or increase acceleration 50 %
Sect.10.2.2.2.1 LEEWARD PRESSURE IS SUCTION NOT APPARENT IN TABLE Sect.10.2.2.2.2 LEEWARD PRESSURE IS SUCTION NOT APPARENT IN TABLE Sect.10.2.2.2.3 LEEWARD PRESSURE IS SUCTION NOT APPARENT IN TABLE
-n b
,, .; L CDKtb Sect.10.2.3.3.1 FOLLOWING-PARA. EXTREME ENVIROMEt!TAL (1.67-
-AISC. allow.- ? .95Fy) -(? FSAR' REQUIREMENTS)
Sect.10.2.3.4 a. 1.6 AISC allow. .95Fy 4? FSAR REQUIRE-MENTS) (? USED IN DESIGN)' see other sections.
Table 10.3-1 DESIGN STRESSES COLUME 1.6 AISC. allow. .95 Fy:(<= left out)
(f). S ec t .12 . 2.~ 4 symbol)
FORMULA Pae=l/2 ? !!Xii Kae (missin'3 lambda Sect.18.1.1 ALL DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS, METHODS,. REFERENCES AND MATERIALS SilALL BE DEFINED FOR EACH. AREA OF DESIGN USING STANDAllD CALCULATIONAL SUMfiARY S!!EETS.
(f)e Sect.19.5.d- EQUATION MISSING SUMMATION SYMBOL BEFORE Tile :
SQUARED (3)e _ Sec t .19. 5. d EQUATION SilOULD BE SQUARE ROOT OF F'c Sect.20.3.1.d MAX. WT. OF CONDUIT & CABLE DIFFERS FROM NEC 71 VALUES IN UNISTRUT CAT.
FIGUfjE 21.8-3 ?NF TO WELD FIGURE 21.8-4 ?Nr' TO WELD FIGURE-21.8-5 ?NF TO WELD Sect.32.3.1 ? EQUATION NOT ABLE TO VERIFY (REF. STEEL PLATE ENG. DATA-VOL.3 WELDED STEEL PIPE AISI)
Sect.32.3.2 WALL Tl!ICKNESS S!!OULD BE CHECKED FOR INTERNAL PRESSURE AND EXTERNAL LOAD BEFORE INTERNAL PRESSURE IS APPLIED, NOR ilAS A MINIMUN TliICKNESS BEEN CHECKED FuH SAFE 11ANDLING de Sect.32.3.2 :25 ty SHOULD be .25 fy Sect.32.4.2 SPANGLER'S EQUATION D.061 StiOULD BE 0.061 AND R TO T!!E FORTil UllOULD DE R TO Tile T!!IRD IN DENOMINATOR e Sect.34.2 ENBED PLATES DESIGNED FOR 10 KIPS PER FOOT TENSION LOAD AND 12 KIPS PER FOOT SliEAR LOAD (? PLATE SAFETY FACTOR WITil CRITERIA TilAT ALMOST EVERY THING LS !!UNG FROM TiiEM)
Sect.35.3.1 STRESS LIMITED TO 1.0Fy FOR LOADING AND Fy/sq
, root of 3 FOR S!!UAft (? .95Fy for tension loading).
Sect.36. *************
Sect.37.1.2 (? NO LIMIT OF DEFLECTION ON NON-SAFETY llANG ERS IN SAFETY RELATED AREAS) WilAT CLEARANCE CRITERIA WILL BE USED TO ENSURE TilAT NON-SAFETY DOESN'T DAMAGE SAFETY?
"d
.i * .2dWM DC-ST-03-BY/BR Rsv 6 compacted granular fill. With the exception of a 20-25 foot surface layer of lacustrine sand, the subsurface soils and bedrock are suitable for the foundation support of the proposed structures in the in-situ condition. The lacustrine sand stratum will be excavated over the entire plant area and replaced with recompacted granular material.
The method of foundation analysis will be as specified in section 12.1.1.
12.2.2 Subsurface Conditions The plant location is generally characterized by 40 to 45 feet of soil overlying the bedrock.
The topsoil consists of 0 to 16 inches of sandy silt with organic debris. The topsoil is under-lain b sand (y 20 to 25 feet lecustrine). of fine Below the sand and silty lacustrine sand fine is a layer of 15 to 20 feet of hard gray-brown claycy silt (glacial till) with occasional layers of silty fine sand. The till is underlain by bedrock consisting of either siltstone or channel sandstone deposits of the Carbondale Formation. The elevation of the rock surface ranges from 549 to 566 feet.
The Cartondale Formation is underlain by No. 2 coal which in turn is underlain by massive shale, siltstone and siity sandstone of the Spoon Formation
-- top elevation ranging from 489 to 500 feet.
The Spoon Formation is underlain by limestone of the Fort Atkinson Formation with top elevation ranging from 453 to 461 feet.
12.2.3 Groundwater Table The groundwater level within the plant location is at elevation 595 feet -- which is 5 feet below the normal grade elevation of 600 feet established for the plant site. For all practical purposes, the design groundwater elevation shall be taken as 600 feet.
12.2.4 Substructure and Subsurface Walls All substructures will be designed to resist full hydrostatic groundwater pressure to elevation 600. Subsurface walls will be designed to resist '
lateral pressures induced by the groundwater
. S00072 n and soil under static and dynamic loading conditions.
The resultant dynamic lateral force on walls will be l6 obtained by the method described below. !
12-5 .
n-M * *DC-ST-03-BY/BR Rev: 6
\
The equation used to obtain the dynamic forces for dry cohesionless material is P g= 1/2 H2 gg g where:
P = dynamic lateral force in pounds y = unit weight of soil in pcf; the submerged unit weight = 84 pcf below the water table H = height of wall in feet 6Kg = dynamic increment in earth pressure coefficient Values of 6 KAE are a function of horizontal acceleration. For practical purposes, Kg will be taken as ( p , _
- 7" a _-
( m r
. AKAE = 3/4Kh e
---4 %
where Kh = horizontal ground 3 i !
acceleration divided by 'g'.
The pressure distribution W
ip jy is assumed to be an inverted
- ,-+
c-triangle. :'1/ ,t ovNw ic so!L 'rtss.< I The increase in the water pressure at any depth y is given as: e sure s t ..
o ~ ~~ g '
P = 0.70CK h (H1 Y) ! .
_-. . f
- ry The assumed pressure distribution .
p' is shown at right. Q :.
where: 2....< - , ,
C = --
51 - 'EIrNEM78' -
I H1 12 1/2
' 0 - o.72 ,000,, j te - earthquake period in seconds
- - 0.1 sec.
g, . . .
12-6 6 a -
r- 1
, AA n=+ 2s 2c bC-ST-03-BY/BR Rev: 1
- d. The members representing the computer model shall be, as near as practicable, coincident with the c. g. of the actual member.
- e. Member eccentricities shall be specified to account for the stiffness of the joint of intersecting members.
19.5 Design
- a. The members of the foundation shall be proportioned such that the foundation as a whole has a minimum mass ratio of 1.5
- b. The allowable stresses to be used in the design of the foundation will be those specified in the ACI Building Code ( ACI 318-71),
with the restriction that the allowable shear stress in the concrete, Vc, as specified in the code, shall not be exceeded within the distance, d, from the face of the support.
- c. For the consideration of axial stress, the worst combination of axial load and biaxial bending moments will be used for the design.
- d. Due to the unsymmetric nature of loads, the members are subjected to torsion.
The following formula is used to calculate :
torsional shear stress:
3Tu where b(t ;1 Vut "
@b2 t t This expression is equation (11-16) in ACI 318-71.
If V ut > 1.5 F'c the member must be designed for combined torsion and shear per sections 11.7 and 11.8 in ACI 318-71.
l l
50tFr734G ,
t
\
64
p 1 S COMtD. DC-ST-03-BY/BR 32C, Rsv: 1
- e. All girders shall be checked for the deep beam criteria per section-10.7 in ACI 318-71.
All girders with overall depth to span ration 1 greater than O.4 qualify as deep beams.
19.6 Minimum steel
- a. The minimum steel at any section of the girders will be 200 bt/fy unless the area of reinforcement provided-at every section is at least one-third greater than that required by analysis,
- b. The minimum reinforcement at any section of the piers will be that required in (a) or
- 110 at 12 in o.c., spaced around the periphery of the pier whichever is greater.
- d. Temperature steel will be provided in the re-entrant corner at the girder and pier junctions. These bars will be placed at a f 45 angle to the pier, will extend through the width of the pier and will terminate with adequate anchorage. Note, these bars shall not be hooked at their ends,
- e. General Considerations
- 1. All faces of concrete members will be reinforced with bars spaced not more than 12 inches o.c.
, S00070 T7 19 *,
&hd ED / 2E oc-sT-o3-sr/sa Rcv: 6 d = pipe diameter (inches )
F.S. - Factor of Safety - 2.0 32.3 Selection of Wall Thickness 3231 Vertical Pressure The vertical pressure at the top of the pipe caused by the external load shall be calculated by W
Po (12)(2)R.
where:
W =
total effective external load in 1b/lin. ft.
R = radius of pipe inches 32 3 2 Wall Thickness Assuming an allowable ring stress, fa of .25fy, calculate the area per inch len6th of wall section, A, by using A = (Po + Pe) R/:25fy where Pe = external fluid pressure Now, use the nearest standard plate thickness to give the area A for smooth walled pipe.
32.4 Additional Design Considerations Minimum hickness To meet practical requirements in fabricatin6, transporting and installing smooth walled steel pipes the wall thickness shall not be less than 1, percent of the pipe radius, t/R h 0.01.
32.4.2 Deflection Criteria W e pipe delfections shall be checked by using Spangler's equation for deflection, W)00*M.' 3 6 X=D, M 3 4
^
EI+D.061e R AX= horizontal deflection of flexible pipe (inches) 32 '
\
hE (cNyg DC-ST-03-BY/BR Rav: 6 1
K = bedding constant - 0.10 for flat-bottom trench with tamped backfill to top of pipe, 11 = vertical load per unit of pipe length (1b/ linear inch Rof pipe.)
r = radius of pipe (inches)
E = modulus of elasticity of pipe metal (30,000,000 for steel) 6 I = moment.of inertia of cross section of pipe wall (inch / linear inch of pipe. )
e = modulus of passive resistance of enveloping earth (psi /in.)
i Di = deflection lag factor (1.25-1.50) l The pipe deflection should not exceed 5 percent of the pipe diameter.
32.4.3 References ,
- 1. "DesiE n and Construction of Sanitary and Storm Sewers" ASCE, Manuals and Reports on Engineering l Practice, No. 37. 1969
- 2. " Buried Pipelines", Clarke p. 96, 99, and 103 f.
3 " Steel Pipe Design and Installation, AWWA, 1964, p.77.
SO90 M30 32-4 FINAL PAC
Ab W kE DC-ST-03-BY/BR R2v: 6 s
3L. 2 Embedded Plate Grid System A one way grid system shall be provided on the underside of all concrete slabs up to and including grade elevation. The direction and spacing of the plates in each bay shall be detemined by the Structural Department based .
on Mechanical and Electrical Department requirements. Mechanical and Electrical Departw ments.shall make provisions for structural {
steel members to frame between embedded plates where their hangers do not hit the grid i s,vstem.
Typical continuous embedded plates to be provided are shown in Figures 34.2-1 and 34.2-2. They have a maximum pull out capacity of 10 kips per foot and a maximum shear capacity 6 of 12 kips per foot. An interaction curve l for combined tension and shear is provided in l Figure 34.2-3 A separate embedded plate design I shall be made where applied loads exceed the !
. capacity of the grid plate. ,
i O
g S0007433 34-2
r- -
- Anochmed h.
Sect.37.2 NO DEFINITIVE STATEMENT THAT TORSIONAL STRESSES SHOULD BE CHECKED Sect.37.2.1.f DEFLECTION AND ROTATION OF PRIMARY STRUCTURAL STEEL' IGNORED IN DEFLECTION CHECK (? MEMBERS WITH PINNED ENDS)
Sect.37.2.1.g.1.B. IGNORE AXIAL SELF WEIGHT (? MAGNITUDE OF LOAD' AFFECTING MEMBERS'AND CONNECTIONS)
Sect.37.2.1.g.1.C. TORSION ANALYSIS NOT REQUIRED (? MAGNITUDE Ol' LOAD AFFECTING MEMBERS AND CONNECTIONS)
Sect.37.2.1 9 2.8. AXIAL SELF WEIGilT MAY BE IGNORED (? MAGNITUDC OF LOAD AFFECTING MEMBERS AND CONNECTIONS)
Sect.37.2.1.g.2.C. TORSION INCLUDED HERE ? LOGIC Sect.37.2.1 9 3.A. ASSUME ALL MASSES LUMPED AT THE SilEAR CENTER Sect.37.2.1 9 3.B. AXIAL SELF WEIGHT MAY BE IGNORED Sect.37.2.1 9 3.C. TORSIONAL ANALYSIS IS NOT REQUIRED Sect.37.2.1.g.4.A. ASSUME ALL MASSES LUMPED AT SHEAR CENTER Sect.37.2.1 9 4.B. AXIAL SELF WEIGliT MAY BE IGNORED Sect.37.2.1.g.4.C. TORSIONAL ANALYSIS NOT REQUIRED Sect.37.2.1 9 5. EXACT ANALYSIS MUST BE PERFORMED FOR LOADS GREATER TilAN 20 KIPS Sect.37.2.1.g.5.A. ASSUME ALL MASSES LUMPED AT SHEAR CENTER Sect.37.2.1.g.5.B. AXI AL SELF WEIGliT MAY BE IGNORED Sect.37.2.1.g.5.C. TORSIONAL ANALYSIS NOT REQUIR3D Sect.37.2.1.g.6.A. ASSUME ALL MASES LUMPED AT SHEAR CENTER Sect.37.2.1.g.6.B. AXIAL SELF WEIGHT MAY BE IGNORED Sect.37.2.1 9 6.C. TORSIONAL ANALYSIS NOT REQUIRED
__ . Sect.37.2.1 9 7.A. ASSUME ALL MASSES LUMPED AT SHEAR CENTER 1
i ..
m DC-ST-03-BY/BR '
Rev.: 8
}
- i. 1/4" location tolerance for the attachment of a lug on W-shaped member-flanges with respect to the center line of the web.
37.1.2 Non-Safety Related Hangers in Safety Related Areas Non-safety related hangers in safety related (Category I) areas shall be designated according to Section 37.1.1, except that the deflection limitation of Section 37.1.1.C does not apply and deflection need not be calculated.
37.1.3 Non-Safety Related Hangers in Non-Safety Related Areas Non-safety related hangers in non-safety related areas (Category II) shall be designed according to Section 37.1.1, except that the deflection limitation of Section 37.1.1.C does not apply and deflection does not need to be calculated. In addition, self-weight OBE and SSE excitation loads for the auxiliary steel and the component hardware do not need to be considered.
37.2 Auxiliary Steel The design of auxiliary steel and associated welding shall meet the requirements of " Specification for 3
I the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings" and its supplements.
In many instances, either the applied piping load, the thermal and expansion loads, the loads associated with seismic excitations, and/or the effects of the tolerances given in Section 37.1.1 do not coincide with the shear center of the structural members.
These eccentricities can cause torsional shear and warping stresses.
37.2.1 Safety Related Hangers The " Mechanical Component Support Steel Design Procedure" which has a limiting horizontal excitation gH = 4.0, accounts for all the effects due to the tolerances given in Section 37.1.1, except the thermal expansion load.
Auxiliary support steel which falls outside the limits of the " Mechanical Component Support Steel Design Procedure" must be designed by hand, and the effects due the tolerances included in Section 37.1.1 must be properly accounted for in the design. In an effort to simplify the calculations, the following t procedure may be used in the design of safety related auxiliary support steel:
- . - . . - . . _ . . . _ , = . , . _ 1
DC-ST-03-BY/BR Rev.: 8 t
- b. The self weight excitation and corresponding stresses along the longitudinal axis of the component support steel (fa) are small, and may be ignored if the horizontal and vertical accelerations do not exceed 2g and 4g, respec-tively. The axial stress due to self weight excitation is included in the # factors for the various support configurations for a bounding 2g horizontal and 49 vertical spectra.
Axial stresses due to applied loading, however, can not be ignored, and must be included in the interaction equation.
- c. The mass of the component hardware and the auxiliary support steel may be assumed to be lumped at the shear center of the corresponding structural members for the self weight excitation calculations. All eccentricity effects due to component hardware self weight excitation are included in the 9 factors for various component support configurations. The exception to this rule is for back-to-back simply supported l channels supporting constant spring hangers and snubbers. (See Section 37. 2.G.2. )
- d. The following simplification may be used in calculating the mass of the component hardware:
d.1) The entire mass of the component hardware (can, rod and clamp) shall be included in the axial direction of the component.
d.2) The entire mass of the component hardware, excluding the weight of the clamp, shall be used in other than the axial direction.
- e. All eccentricities due to the load indicated on the mechanical hanger drawing must be accounted for in the calculation of f a' I bx and f by*
- f. The dcilecti_on and rotation of the crimagy structural steel framing to which the auxiliary steel is attached may be ignored in the comp '
utation or the anflection in the direction
'cr the hanger load at its_pein_t of application.
N r
S0007511 37-4
DC-ST-03-BY/BR Rev.: 8 i
i g. The following # factors shall be used.
g.1) Simply supported back-to-back channels supporting rod assemblies only.
J = 0.75 A. Assume all masses are lumped at the shear center of the back-to-back channel configuration.
B. Analyze the support assembly for applied load and self weight excitation (member and component hardware) in the vertical and horizontal directions only -- ignore axial self weight excitation.
C. Torsion analysis is not required.
D. The 5 factor equal to 0.75 accounts for the tolerances given in Sections 37.1.1.E through H.
g.2 Simply supported back-to-back channels supporting
, constant spring hangers and/or snubbers.
- = 0.75 A. Assume all masses are lumped at the shear center of the back-to-back channel configuration, except the mass of the can or snubber which shall be assumed to be lumped on the top or bottom flange of the snubber.
B. Analyze the support assembly for applied load and self weight excitation (member and component hardware) in the vertical and horizontal directions only. Axial self weight excitation may be ignored.
C. Torsion analysis shall be required to account for the effects of the eccentricity of the can with respect
- to the shear center of the double channels.
D. The 5 factor equal to 0.75 accounts
- s for the tolerances given in Sections 37.1.1.E through H.
50N)&7S1JE .
1 i
_37__5 _ __._ _ _ _ _ _ ,_, _
DC-ST-03-BY/BR Rev.: 8 e
g.3 Simply supported wide flange members, channels angles and structural tube sections:
- = 0.75 A. Assume all masses are lumped at the shear center of the members.
B. Analyze the support assembly for applied load and self weight excitation (member and component hardware) in "the vertical and horizontal directions only. Axial self weight excitation may be ignored.
C. Torsional analysis is not required.
D. The 5 factor equal to 0.75 accounts.
for the tolerances given in Sections 37.1.1.E through I.
g.4 Cantilevered wide flange members, channels,
- angles and structural tube sections:
9 = 0.65
' A. Assume all masses are lumped at the shear center of the members.
B. Analyze the support assembly for applied load and self weight excitation (member and component hardware) in the vertical and horizontal directions only. Axial self weight excitation ,
may be ignored.
C. Torsion analysis is not required.
m D. The 5 factor equal to 0.65 accounts for the tolerances given in Sections 37.1.1.E through I.
g.5 Cantilevered wide llange, channels, angles and structural tube brackets (Knee Draces):
5 = 0.65 for applied SSE loads less than or equal to 10 kips.
5 = 0.40 for applied SSE loads greater than 10 kips, but less than 20 kips.
For loads greater than 20 kips, an exact 7
analysis must be performed.
A. Assume all masses are lumped at the s0007513 shear center of the members.
DC-ST-03-BY/BR Rev.: 8 B. Analyze the support assembly for
( applied load and self weight excitation (member and component hardware) in the vertical and horizontal directions only. Axial self weicht exci+=*(on may be ignored.
C. -
Torsion an=1v=4a . ia nnt required. m D. The # factors equal to either 0.65 or 0.40 account for the tolerances given in Sections 37.1.1.E through I.
g.6 Wide flange, channel, angle, or structural tube frame assemblies:
9 = 0.75 A. Assume all masses are lumped at the shear center of the members.
B. Analyze the support assembly for applied load and self weight exci-tation (member and component hardware) in the vertical and horizontal directions only. Axial self weight f
excitation may be ignored.
C. Torsion analysis is not required.
D. The 5 factor equal to 0.75 accounts for the tolerances given in Sections 37.1.1.E through I.
g.7 Wide flange, cht.nnel, angle or structural tube sections without mechanical component hardware e.g., seismic restraint or clamped pipes (see sketches below) :
5 = 0.9
??
n t O q
Q n --
I t
.%0007514 l Clamped Pipe Seismic Restraint or Guide l l
DC-ST-03-BY/BR Rev.: 8
]
. A. Analyze the support assembly for all stresses caused by the applied loads and member self weight accelerations (no clamp) in the vertical and horiz-ontal directions only. Axial member self weight excitation may be ignored.
B. Torsion analysis shall be required to account for the effects of the applied load.
C. The # factor equal to 0.90 accounts for the tolerances given in Sections 37.1.1.E and F; Sections 37.1.1.G, 37.1.1.I are not applicable.
37.2.2 Non-Safety Related Hangers in Safety Related Areas Non-safety related supports located in safety related areas shall be designed in accordance with Sections 37. 2.1 with the following modif-ications:
- a. Non-safety related mechanical component supports shall be designed for the maximum i
of either the OBE or SSE load, using the following interaction equation:
fa + f bx + fby 4 5 Fg F yg E by where fa = The axial member stress due to the i applied loading, fbx = Thethe flexural member x axis due to thestress about applied loading = M x/Zx where M x is the applied moment about the y axis, and Z x is the plastic section modulus about the x axis.
f Y
= The flexural member stress about I i
the y axis due to the applied loading = My/Zy, where My is the applied momemb about the y axis, and Z y is the plastic section modulus about the y axis.
F = 1.6 times the allowable axial stress i
' per AISC 1969 4 0.9 F y.
S0007515
~
cc r
- J .. A r MM Additional Concerns with Byron Design Procedures NRC LETTER MAY 31, 1983 TO CO.WONWEALTH EDISON CO. DOCKET NO.
' F 454 P9 no. 3 Under cable IRC-363 "inline splice at penetration" (7 are in line splices made with crimp type connectors, if so were they included in the review of butt connectors? !
NRC LETTER SEPT. 30, 1983 TO COMMONWEALTH EDISON' COMPANY
SUBJECT:
INTEGRATED DESIGN INSPECTION 50-454/83-32 P 2-19 2nd para, from bottom In reviewing the method used to establish the environmental conditions for the auxilary feedwater pump motor, the HVAC.was depended upon. ? did the purpuse orders require that the fans etc. (HVAC) egi? ment be seismically rated for the postulated earthquate to which it could be subjected during this dependence to cool the auxiliary feedwater pump area?
This concern extends to all safety dependent HVAC equipment.
NRC LETTER JUNE 6, 1984 TO COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY P 12 para. 3. failure of cables attributed to clongation of cable insulation NRC LETTER MAR. 19, 1984 TO COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY P 4 1st para. S & L formula Ta = 0.6 x N x TCS'vs. Okonite formula Ta = 0.008 x CM x N x 0.7 from IEEE Standard 422-1977 with .7 factor by Okonite REVIEW OF DWG. 6E-0-3393E LOAD TABLE FOR STEEL CONDUIT SEEMS TO DISAGREE WITH THE TABLE IN THE UNISTRUT CATALOG pg. 113 REVIEW OF EPRI GUIDE _ FALL 1983 P 7 EPRI EL-2847 Article on " Increasing Pipe Cable Section Lengths Power Technologies, Inc." "The main focus of the study is on determining the cable's performance under three mechanical
! stress modes to which the cabic is subjected during installation:
(1) tension and elongation, (2) torsion, and (3) sidewall
- (bearing) pressure in bends." This article was ordered, but has not arrived.
1
5-A cowo REVIEW OF SEIS!!ANG PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION Comments from notes - Vertical members assumed pinned at supports (conservative for members ma'ybe but not welded connections). Also rotational degrees of freedom assumed insignificant. (unconservativ Only performs 8 possible stress combinations. Out-of-plane load considered only if hanger braced longitudinally. (unconservative)
Bracing treated as truss element. Require more time to review but have many questions about this program and the results generated.
NDE EXAMINATION REPORTS HUNTER ON PIPE Minimum pipe wall thickness not met repair performed COMPUTER PRINTOUTS BY INSPECTOR FOR HUNTER CORP.
Doc. Id: 00511 Inspector 1284 inaccessible due to a lot of retro-fit on FW System Doc. Id: 010011 Inspector 1354 inaccessible due to CLEANLINESS &
ilYDRO TEST Doc. Id: 004011 Inspector 1313 inaccessible due to HOT FUNCTIONAL Doc. Id: 011311 Inspector 1515 1st half inaccessible due to CLEANLINESS Table 38.2-1 DRILLING IS NOT ALLOWED IN MORTAR JOINTS (SAW 2 R0WS WilERE EVERY OTHER BOLT WAS IN A JOINT IN ELECTRICAL BOX ROOM WITil JUDGES)
OMITTED NO THROUGH BOLT DESIGN CRITERIA OMITTED NO FLARE-BEVEL OR BEVEL WELD RADIUS OF TUBE SPECIFIED (DOC. STATES THAT TUBE EXITS IN FIELD WITH RADIUS OF t AND THAT 2t DOES NOT APPLY)
OMITTED NO AS-BUILDING 107. OVERSTRESS FACTOR (ALSO NOT IN FSAR)
_ STANDARD SPECIFICATION FOR CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR WORK BYROM STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2, BRAIDWOOD STATION - UNITS 1 AND 2 REV. 20 OMITTED NO MAXIMUM DEPTil 0F EMBEDMENT FOR TilIN SLABS AND WALLS OMITTED NO PROCEDURE FOR CllECKING CONE OVER LAP FROM TWO SIDES OF SLAB
I 4 cc> w t>
OMITTED NO INSTALLATION PROCEDURE FOR THROUGH BOLTS INSTRUCTION PI-BB-27 REV.2 Sect. 3.0 THOSE MEASUREMENTS OF THE "AS-INSTALLED" PIPE NECESSARY TO EVALUATE THE INSTALLATION OF THE SYSTEM (? NO LATERAL CLEARANCE CHECKS CAT.I TO CAT.I OR CAT.I TO NON_ SAFETY RELATED)
REVIEW OF EPRI GUIDE FALL 1983 P 7 EPRI EL-2847 Article on " Increasing Pipe Cable Section Lengths Power Technologies, Inc." "The main focus of the study is on determining the cable's performance under three mechanical stress modes to which the cable is subjected during installation:
(1) tension and elongation, (2) torsion, and (3) sidewall (bearing) pressure in bends." This article was ordered, but has not arrived.
REVIEW OF SEISHANG PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION Comments from notes - Vertical members assumed pinned at supports (conservative for members maybe but not welded connections). Also rotational degrees of freedom assumed insignificant. (unconservatio Only performs 8 possible stress combinations. Out-of-plane load considered only if hanger braced longitudinally. (unconservative)
Bracing treated as truss element. Require more time to review but have many questions about this program and the results generated.
NRC LETTER APR. 17, 1984 TO COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY P 45-46 ALLEGATION 2. Erros in SEISHANG Questions 1 thru 6 on pg. 46 were dismissed by statement rather than a look at the program documentation and procedures in place for its development and maintenance and continued verification of performance. This may also apply to all in-house programs used not just this one.
COMMONWEALTH EDISON LETTER OF FEB. 2, 1984 TO HATFIELD ELECTRIC CO.
SUBJECT:
ITLLING CABLE OUT OF CONDUIT P 1 2nd para. cable could not be removed from conduit had to be abandoned P 2 2nd para. from bottom could not be pulled out "due to it being twisted around the remaining cable in the conduit"
e- --_ . , - -
4cmno NRC LETTER JUN. 6, 1984 TO COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY NRC Inspection summary P 10 h. (1) "a critical conduit length was calculated for each conduit size" "if the actual length of conduit run approached the calculated critical length, that conduit run was flagged for further analysis" ? how was this length of conduit run determined
- by looking at drawings showing the pull box locations? Was any check made to determine if a pull box had not been used as.a pull box? (I was told that some pull boxes were not used)
REVIEW OF HATFIELD WELD PROCEDURES (OLD)
Pro. 13F Findings - welder qualification test procedure inadequate
- no detail as to what was required nor how essential variables were met.
Pro. 13 Findings - ASME Procedure used between 7/28/76 and 11/21/77 did not specify backing ring material. Material compatability is essential to meeting weld design requirements.
No travel speed parameters given for heat input calculations REVIEW OF HATFIELD WELD PROCEDURES (NEU) -
AWS PRO. 13AA REV. O THROUGH 12 (2/21/79) TO (12/20/83) Findings.
This is a generic company procedure for all prequalified (Does not require testing) AWS welding. All joint designs shown in AWS D1.1-75 and additional Flare Bevel Groove design (tube steel to tube steel). The " natural" flare bevel groove design is not a prequalified joint. This weld requires a WELD PROCEDURE QUALIFICATIO!
AND WELDER QUALIFICATION. Suggest a macro etch section be made to verify penetration and effective throat. Also no tolerances given .for field inspectors on joint dimensions.
..v 5 oC-ST-oeBB R;vicion'2 Several linear single degree of freedom systems having different frequencies are subjected to.this motion.
For each single degree system the maximum response (acceleration) is plotted against its frequency. Same procedure is carried on for these single degree systems for various damping values. This results in one curve for each equipment damping value, at a point.
Based on the seismic subsystem criteria developed, response spectra were g,enerated for the two horizontal (N-S & E-W) and vertical direction for the Category I structures. The Byron and Braidwood spectra curves were enveloped, as applicable, and were then smoothed. The resulting smooth curves for all Category I structures are presented in this report.
B. INDEXING OF RESPONSE SPECTRA The horizontal seismic model of the nuclear power plant complex involves many degrees of dynamic freedom; theoretically a response spectra could be generated for each degree of freedom. In addition to the hori-zontal model, a separate vertical model was developed for the vertical direction of excitation, so additional degrees of freedom for which response spectra could be generated were introduced into the analysis.
t I
l S0007557 C-9 1
l a- , __ J
AdM ( '
DC-STM04-BB
[Q, Ravision 2 The rational way to index the response spectra would be i
to identify each spectra with the degree-of-freedom it is associated with, but this would involve assigning a separated identification number to each spectra. These numbers would not mean anything to someone not intimately familiar with the models. Therefore the response spectra are identified'by assigning a three digit number followed by two-letter symbols. The significance of the different numbers and lettert are explained below, in s
relation to a typical number,
> 103 -
_0P -
US Indicates component NS = North South EW = East West VS = Vertical at Slab VW = Vertical at Wall Indicates Loading OB = Operating Basis Earthquake SS = Safe Shutdown Earthquake BL = Braidwood Blast l
Location Number Figures C17 thru C38 are presented to locate the spectra which are applicable at a specific location in the power plant complex. The typical crcss section, Figure C18, shows the elevations of main floor slabs at which spectra were generated. The numbers in the figure identify the slabs in the horizontal seismic codel and are used to identify the applicable response spectra. Since the horizontal extent of the slabs to S0007558 c-1:
~-
.e -
M #M ( [brWb)
DC-ST-04-BB Revision 1 which the spectra apply cannot be shown in the Figure C18, Figures C20 thru C32 show the horizonta} extent of the slabs to which the spectra are applicable. The details of the containment building, reactor support system, and the locations at which spectra were generated are shown in Figure C19 along with the spectra identifi-cation numbers. Figure C33 and C34 show the typical plans of the containment building.
Similarly the locations at which spectra were generated for essential services cooling is shown in Figure C38. l Based on the indexing system as described above, a
" Response Spectra Index" has been included before the spectra curver. The index gives the spectra number, location and elevation of spectra and the sheet number for all buildings.
C-11 l S00007553 j
A**
sf C 8ta ,
/ [**.
UMTED STATES % c h m r 4 (o e ( .' j f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
, atcioN in 70s acostytti noao g, v y .f GLE N ELLvH. eLLINotS 60927 Jgn , s.:
Docket No. 50-454 Docket No. 50-455 Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN:
Mr. Cordell Reed Vice President Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:
K. A. Connaughton on various dates between AugustThis 1
. D. V. Hayes and into allegations concerning construction activiti 1983 and January 1984, es at Units.1,,and,2, authorized by NRC Construction Permats Nothe Byron Station, No.
. CPPR-130 and January CPPR-131 18, 1984,and with to Mr.the discussion of our inspect R. Tuetken. 2on findings on The enclosed copy of our inspection report s
been resolved at the close of the Byron Unitinspected Hearings in August had not and docu 1983. 1 Operatang License (OL) inspections as of November The repart also summar22es the hegion 111 22, 1953 relative to the Commonwealth Edison Company item 82-05-19.reinspection program implemented in respense iance to noncompl No_ items.of course noncompliance with NRC requirements ewere of this inspection. , identifi d d uring the will be placed in the NkC Public DocumentIn accordance enclosure (s) with 10 by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submitFoom unles application the date of this to withhold letter, information contained therein within thiwritten t
r y days of quirements of 2.790(b)(1). Such application must be consistent with the re-the specified inspection reportperiofs will be noted above, a copy of this letterIf we do not bear fro placed in the Public Document and the enclosed Room.
F-1 s.
'~
Y f&Qg (y
- r. Allegation An inspection by alleger revealed a weld not to plan. The i welder indicated on the traveler was neither onsite, nor issued weld rod on the date indicated on the traveler. A
{ person asked alleger to change the date on the traveler.
Alleger stated that he would not.
V Finding This allegation is addressed in Inspection Report No. 83-39 on Pages 49 and 50 Item 7.i. The allegation could not be substantiated and was considered closed in the referenced report. However, further review indicates additional information is available and further inspection is needed to fully resolve this item. The item is thus reopened and will be tracked as Item No. 50-454/84-02-01; 50-455/84-02-01.
- s. Allegation
" General sueveillance of this project illustrates that approximately 90% of the 'B' welds on DV-164's are 1/8" undersize where tube steel has been used. In most cases this represents a 40% decrease in size and 55% in strength."
Finding Resclution of this allegation is documented in Inspection Report No. e3-39 on Page 50, Item 7.j.
The report states that the allegation could not be substantiated. Technically this is correct but ?.he fact that 2 of 18 "B" welds were ident2 fied as undersized on DV-162's rather than DV-164's as alleged indicates the allegation has some validity. This item is thus reopened pending further review and verification of corrective action. (454/84-02-02; 455/84-02-02)
- t. Allegation The disposition on a DR was false. The report was written for lack of welding pre-heat. The inspector observed the process throughout, but th7 dispositioning engineer took the word of the welding foramin, who claimed pre-heat had been done. The report claimed the weld was removed, but it wasn't.
Finding This allegation could not be substantiated and is considered closed. Details of the resolution are contained in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-454/83-3s; Z-455/83-29 on Page 50, Item k. At the h7C inspector's request the weld was magnetic particle tested and found acceptable. The inspector determined that the weld met all code requirenents and there was no visible signs of damaEe to the structural member.
, II F-13
., --m~ ,-.
,~ y, -../.i .,7, S /*
/miacrimerif 'T ..
- *:"~; ,. .. g~.-_ ,, .. . . ,
g j. .
- ,.. , /s ,s,a> ; .,, ,.,,. , ) . f. , , ,, '
- e o i ~'t t.
- c. ^. e i 11 's 7 3:monto: r.:4 --
..,.p,,
,. ,.,,, , .: i.g , y ,.. q ,,, ( g p, ,.9 (.', ,
~, , ,
C ** "C "*
V' 5:ltt,*. -lt.htt$
p-s ;r -
_ _._ .l.l_ fin n t_ f. 8., ._- H e f e s *=f / rsss -
~~s" ef 4 - ~
f.l;t est
? resort!tv . .[ 7M 0:r. 8, /l_' .
PI*jttt
,A c <i'./.c d !> y _
D__* f a __
. Prij. Fle. Eftnio, flo. 4 prove 1 by Octs
- i p .
. - i .
- .i ! ;
yaso
,a, oa w.c .&o c.c pr</rr 660 >cx elAcriu c.
l ' .
t
. . Fw = -s d : O's'~"/,. .
9 = , 0 707 X 'g X 2 x 0.3 c> x 6 a x /. C Y c> 7f .
,PeAf . = .3 . 8 L f '
.. , l
, . . . .. !.. .. ,l
, i
- , i -
....l... , ..! . . ,
..l. _.. : . . . . - -
- i
.. .. .. .. . , . . ...._.i
- t. .. . -.,. . . -
3 ........
. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . i . . . ; .. .. .. .. .
_re.,,v.v/ A./
~
l.. i - ; t .
. .i
[.; ..
i ; .
i..
- i -
, . q. . . ,
s e .
- .i i . , .
......l.. : .
l.
... . t .
i I . .
sG4.sf D on .C Q~c 7~ /M7Al C//n n'*/ '
t.cf o e w i l o d.
e f ': .
-_[. . . . . . .
i g'
- p. J./G /C . A o n 6 sfu.untl / odo , i ;
l W /1) E Q )
i * ^' *
.3..C / ) 7~/M^'S b'En.f a /s.< 9
- c.e = .B. 8 l V oiv 7/*r'. s' 404 I tb -
I i
/C.
. . ... .)~
. . . .. i...
e i
- i t .,
3.
. j . i t - -
i-
. s
. 4
.t s.
l .
.. . , . .- . $. . .. . e. .
. . ... e.
e . . . '
- i. :
- .
- . .:.I 4
. i. .
6 ., .
, 8 . .
.h00050%-
... . t . , . . . .,.... 1
' . . g
..,s...
. . ..i . .
s
. , I
_l .
, . .. .- . + ..
- c.ic, r . ""*
~
I SARGENThlUNDY a.v. o. .. j
. . ~ . , ~ . . .
X
""'C^- s.r. ,_a. ...d no s.,,,,- n.,., d v ,
o, cient C E__ C, .O '
Prep. red by bb ., ,,_ , s D.te/b/S9 l b v Q n Nr b i U \i T) W 0 0 D Reviewed by Project Date _
Proj.No. (4Yj ! tQh EasipJto. (t( A3 _
t.4 4 @,4 Approved by lDate h b OM P fAILE T H E. D E F E.C r? TO T H I .L-TO L E.TL Nrs c II.& i tu T i4 E_ D C, .4 E F-r H E_ D E. F F=.c TS Ph5S Do NOT' O E.Lrz_rr=_ T1+TE.f4 P iL0 m TH- E. \nlE L.D .
D:- r H e.- v i tr_t_ t, is u u c.H a er= D F-T1.or9 i T-tt IT._ D fE_ t IN IL. c:=-o ro 4.. 'I_ F- iWE
. . . W T2.L_O 10 STI Lt. D E_ P E.c._tT1 V E. , cs o *r o 6 u .. .
e) C_a Lc u m m T a. , s s_ Tle b w_.re.o w e_ L o sTE.c_Tio m P tto P Encri a s C p. t 6 on m_ b,cs.)
4NO ~T H U._ iL Fw D M C P_- Q S EC.-T I b t% O T:. T- H- E-T6 '% E_. M E T- A-L i-N7-_CS_63AD_y. C.O M P Rus r n- e._ TL r=_.v t s E. O c sac ri o N - P R_o P i=._fLT) e_s i . . . m T H- e._ .s P E C__ l T:- l G. D 6 E -Tl O f4 PROP E-P-T i f E
f C-IN L C V- L FTE. I H-E. Yo R_E_D t.tC_ Ti o r4 ,
M1:- T ti E. 'N TLE D 'A.trt o N L ! O To ,
I L- D d B F\S E_ M IE T AL PFWS i
T H- E_ W E u>ir H-o v.T
~
F: u.TLT H- iE. it c fAL c ctt_.f%.T-t o e4
.L. t N o -t- cm iv -'7
~1) T H E. I A IL M S E_.n E t4 D Fo9_tfES Fo p T H-r=-
' C o N N E c_.T t O N IN Q u GS TI O N1 tvitA.L, T BE O G T f;1 N TE T.; h R.E F f3 T<_ EN c E D i TLO f A T t+ E reosT T2 Ec' a sr v A-L t O co r e,p terEC P~tA t1, T H h_ \ r. / r. L.- O CT IL E.5 S E.5 A D -E_
c fh L.c u L IAT E O j A CV f3. EL ST IL ESS oF I O Yo S000$003 IS A L L.otu E Oj
, , . Fv T M TE_. C_ o t t C,1TL o (4 4 .
TH TE. W G L-O IL Ptc <_. E F T E O o IL '
R_E. O E_ c.T TE D 4 P- IS
, <_ Ar L_CJ.t L f3T T'_'D , S f4F F_b} FfV_
To k
\
SARGENTi LUNDY u
- ~ - ' * ' "W can. no.
memoweems .. .
Rev. Date C'"' ^*'O 1 Safet y- Related Non-Saf ety- Rela ted
. Page of {
cient C._,F._._ Ce Prenared n',
',/.L.- .
/ ,., 4-,- oat.//!'/2 Project by E nrJ (~, Ry. ) D./ / C O 'I'_ Reviewed t,y Date Proj. No. //] '/ / t/7/2 Equip.No. //d fif '14 ,$ // Approved by Date L.) II C.F D_ C. U X l it E.- F oLL.ow i N ( r-, P Poc E.Qu D.E.
. t5 To jS (2_- Lu E.O tN
_ A _. .
E V R L.u A. T I N (s-- u N O f- R C U T-4 L
g
(
t
-l -t p& n TH-tc.ts t/) cN o (:- "T H E.
5 hDI MIrYbL
- fc, 'i e.
- kg -=
t ( - LA ya Q E n c LCT~
~
l p, .% -o 4 :n.T~
1
' k my
,g THE A VI 5 <--9 tT C_t._i/L . f4o C-H P N 4 !E- IN G E.c -f-jO N I.5 N r.I (.--E. 5 C A ref .
[j' T b h *
. b-- T ia t u.C. F N t.s TWEN D C L.E_ r TE 7HNr PO fLTIO M o F-T H- EL '> > C L.- C AND T E C T~ TO1
.. r m l 0 70 [,) r c c. _ ~ , o m ffc fr,.,.p_.r[ C ,
ST a P 3 '. I c-- s s )oL T2. c.otx t r t a re r E. sT F r.1 t. S d $.ouic_ J v o ry e_.tw re N T LE.B D,$
i /,
you ra ec.u, e =_. m - - -s w r:. w . , .m. . o r- m . -= s o n r=
S0005005 e,r ,..;,n.
tt i o . it c.m . v; e L.C
\A/E i' ?-
/- L._.;/fICE.Q ) <~ A. L C_.tA,. ( A T E.
Y tcc i ' P
~i e,, r,,
_ d= ~Ctw - ~CE c, G O L/G A 1J,* TI A :~^. .
0f*15 ) J} 1.":.* 'I"/< C .$)}[EA [L 1 f~ ^ 'i~u. c. f b ar _, 3 r" 1^. -E se _in, q At.ci,!- n yiptu- ,
. m
.--y--
. e..
i
=.
f
. . P -
, rf
. =
\
L / .
. . VA s
[ >
. P/2. 1 P/E 4 Y 1 - . .
~
.re ., ..
L A4 .
, , 4 ,
i, 0
\*. -
I ./ .
! g -
j
< f- -
,~ -
i .
- i. . . . *
- i. . l
. . J .
- e P/2. l t . .
. o .
\
i Q _ l 1
7 1r :.-tq -
.__,.. t_t t a i
. .s0005037 kll-u _ m' '
. e
,r- . - - - -
9
'e' .e.
'e,'
9 e
. s .. ;, ; ,
9
- O g
D e'-
e t .
e
'9 e e- .
s e 4
0 e d
e
.. 9 O
9 ,O b e e e s .
g .s
- n .
i
%
- e t
's.* ,
e e g O e
, e s * * ,
.!. I .
ee e e .
% * , . . e o
1 -
g
. . e 4 . .
e e
~
6 O
s . , , e O ,
e yuse ..
'?
- R.= P, A DiU S 1 .
s .
s__._
, 'R(O N NOF T U E E.
- /, -
-; % ,' e
- w . e d.'. ' . .
v .
\
s,/ .i _
f
- fg .
~F~- "
C. -
. s .
, + +
4 - .
9 e * *
, e 4 .
G 9 8 - .
e f
- e
. I .
- e ,
I' 9 g=
- e e '
.
- s .
1 O O l'7 'i e t n
~
- . U V se s / w,J . e' 6 e e
4 e
- 8 9 5
g e e i
I y
. .l
, . i
_,_...,_.,_.- 1
< , _ , . . . . . . . , ,. ,m -
_.. .- . . . e FLARE BEVEL GROOVE WELDS .
FOR Fl.ARE BEVEL- GROOVE WELDS, Tile FFFECTIVE TilROAT iiUST BE SPECIFIED FOR TUBE WELDS. THE MIf!! MUM RADIUS OF BEllD IS !!0T SPECIFIED If! ASTii A500 CR ASTM A501. Tile L MAXI!iUM RADIUS IS SPECIFIED AS T!!REE TIMES Tlis TUBE .
WALL TIIICK!!ESS. TYPICAL FIELD iiEASUREF.E!!TS liiDICATE .
TilAT Tile ACTUAL RADIUS IS BETWEEli T AiiD 2.5T, WHERE -
~T IS. Tile. TUBE WALL TillCKi'ESS. THEREFORE, Tile DESIGil ASSUMPTI0i! 0F R = 2T Ai!D EFFECTIVE T!iROAT EQUAL TO
~
5/16R PER AWS DI.1 IS ii0T APPLICABLE. .
G j * ,
e l
\
9 ., l e
- 6 ene .
T 500050,3 s
e
m .
- =x
?.'
A k'6 D*:!, NG4DMw'
- cor.D ront. ten st'ncIrfc/.T:cn /} / J.( ).) /,_C - gC.,y>g'
/ J'J!CiW'f7's*O*! }
st ;vrn nget 3. n.3n 4.2.1.2.4 Fl!'ot V/cico In any pooltion, eitherFillet welda covered by this Specitiention apply to the weldin (n) Sheet to thcet, or (b) Sheet to thicker steel member.
L the following: The allowable load for a fillet weld in lap and T. joints shall not exceed For lon:;itudinal loading: . where
~ ~ ' ~
For L/t < 25 If : r.Ilowable load capacity of a fillet weld (Lips) 4.2.113) L Fu = specified minimism ultimate tensi!c sirength
. P == 0.4 (1 - 0.01 g\ ,
tLP, g ,
For L/t 2 25: t 4.2.1-14) --
P a 0.3 tLF, : thickness of b.uc sheet steel, exclusi c of coa sings, in.
F r tran ; verse loading:
1.2.1 15) L = length of fillet vceld, in.
P == 0.4 tLP,
' 'In ehnli r.ddition, not exceed for : t > 0.150 in., the allowab!c load for a 61!ct weld in lap cnd *
? 2.1-10) P .- 0.3 t,,LP,, .
where L -length of 61!ct weld, in,
- t. = eficctive throat ~ 0.707 wi or 0.707 vi , whichever is r>maller. A tr.rger e fcctive thrtmt may Le t?.':en if it can 1,e ,hown by incasurem:nt that a
- 7. , , .,_. . given welding proced.tre will con.si.iten:ly give a larger value providing
. inensured the particular weldmg procedure umt for making the welds that are is fu!! owed.
A. .: . . - W
- nnd w: = leg on weld (See Fi:ure 4.6) -
L -
V
- f" V/2 *~c~
~
, i,
,y.."s tI y l'-
N 1 .
).>/ J I wI '
\..,;
" 'q::.y *; - ~ -. --
9
, ' l 7. .:
,,_c...
"W
,, g i c:a yss,cc.c
.c awf. ., _ ,
s ...
. w a, a..
A .
e,. s e.&,
,2 p.:c y:.s 6
- a. -
n;a , f.
~
, 1. _ p%s. ymg Am::,,. 4. sc.. w .y .,,
,s .
W tep wr.t ion _.wm *
.- W2 n e:c..: x i m i vi e ,
S0005013 i 1
1 I
cm
.. . ... - ~ .
% .,.r a ,
i
\
.."~ ~ ^ 7' r g:. ,. g e r E **' . .% < / .I Y p<g. m. .
cge. nn.
,s..n s .: .e. . T '~ l '
.'.? P* "* ~ , , s.,,r . . ,o . ,,
.. , ,s , q.
- t.: / ~ ;~ ~i C , 'M ..** M. a/.
F-~
. , e . .9 .. ., .. . , .
~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
' - - - ., w ,
. ---- n.Nt:inre r::: } - - - - - - - ----
c .- . .c a u. o g, 'g . ,7. ._.p g, ,, q r j
,;nn.,7,f. tv- R e'ered a'
- . . . . . /l Paer cf -?
C! bat h- :rcri t y (~~~~ /' C , --- .t i t45 /..
heint -
R eviewe1 t < ! Or.te Prof.flo. Er!uip. flo. Apprend t,y Dets
! l 6
- ; I ! ; i j
- e i
. . I l :
l
.! ' .r; - :i ;
l l . ; .
e : l ; i .
' k
. / L. f/h' .vIofA W d o .s .a is< (.
- o ,.a ' 7/ W L o 5 4 9 ,.
l 0-
- dy /
l
/ fGn- / 4 7cc n.e L Z e.s.:.o m G oa s/PE* 74 <-c , ,7YC bu c~E.DS
,4n8 J'uf,/f:C/~CD 70 do/> f / 7u.a s m s d do.4 4,<,vd' M' A 7'
..' huwra sy~s.-nic zono .'_ - ;
. . i . . . . .
z' y g,. f c.o V . 4
= 0, 7.I' m
_: . i
.. . ? .--J. . ._. . )...,_...,. . . ,
e .
. ..O. , , o h. 7 .
I '
I i
i 1 ; 3 -
~
j
. g.. . . . . . .. ..
s .
f :- 0. ty' / -
.D. . O / af /. 0 t o. 0 7. 9.'.7 . . C,X O. 70."VP .
. l ! -
I I ' i l ,
l
,P
~3. / l /C
- l!
gg/g' -
y- . ; ;
l- l t
.2 f~on - /> c >-o b '< o .a n van cd py?,v&k .
't.'io ( &,o I .TN csce- 6g Zo vCSu n .: c .t.)y-v uisc_
Z o .< > c~
7Ne yo.u 77c 9u.e w cup ,m eybo ya _
. 7. ..ss 3.c u.e o sa.
t u. .o w c ..
' f
- i l .
. 1. . -,. .. . : , . ,
i e i
, fc = ' V K o 6 7V7 X 2 < o 75~ A t' 7,)c /. .C a@
y ' -
t i . e.
D W000 hlE LT3 bQPVEV ' c o s s v_ u r D.c s. C c u m.c_. yo. wo) ,y . t . 2_ i - D.C.S. cn~ c u e c rt c- e t> e_ nmy s rn r a to c"T I j M b* D fs- IN 7% 9( b LA i h b ( f%I b- a = 4 L C--U- L A T ' O r4 bw Lt t O G. t_.i N rp.__ , b g -1,=, ,nv D . c_ . s , ? r. .= s o o er i o s nu. o n. r n. n. P E q w ct E o , 7 ,4 Tz r , E.'o rn a W 1b G- CCN T A CT-F:.O T t + LO LA 01-+ rHU O V E Ei'.V t E t f4 b - f :4 b-I N E_TE I< s O tst o """ Es. F . P E. AT "T' 't+ G- H A t% t.r h._ S g, i? Y C M r- n.o m v., e ~ <-; m o - m ~ m ca.c m ra
- n. w G.t acs q .
ro r ,4 a n ern,ms 4 s.e.c.rio m o nt rs n. mme.
- 3 O r '.O
- l_1 U ~ C., E rd E. 4 fa L. I AG G 'J. (A 9 ~r ! O rst E L cy t r u _f u .-t__. 7t r- r_ na. n. r.: c a_ s co u ra e_ o ,~ -- e d D.C.4 . L i [ t -, s. u ,lq u e ro r P E.-. D R.G '6 L E r a .
1 e 3 b ". ", F . A N c_ H Lij - T t t r._ M' st 6 E D---- I t'; r14 E- !+ 4 rst t. C:_t-I S w I'[ ~ O ;~ * E , b ". t_ . , , ' ! ~.: \N 6 ( C cm sc.._: . . , - .t ' \.) D C ' ' , 2 i'l' "_ f s C.'_ L fi ,,, h f - L C
- f d '.; ,
L~ J i-D k f- "-J.~ T IX (L F- 'P P. E' , E e .' " , C-C oN I v %,3 , 3000L0:2 * - - ..- _. .. . ..:. .. . . ---------.-=- . = m m. m . ,,.f ' ' y-- t, -For k ,_[ i '._ C ' . / '. - p 4 - / dic. No. SARGENT%.LUIJDY ,,~,,,~,,,.. . a' - D a ': "c^"o R.., s.reiv nei. red I no .s.rerv. net. red , r.2 of I ci,eo, c. E c o e,en,edov OJmM., B_ o.,eA/S' _ r,ojui h r:-o N IS T2.t.i D VI c) eD neeicwea by # o te P,oi. No. C/7.[f / 43'17 Eco::::tts '/[N C/gS'/ Approved by o te _ R E.i r p_ r=. ru c. C : Sn r=r=r M r=a im Wrmoc . sos-ea. i.9 \ Jar _o Linc Pro Pe rcr s s . '- Btockytt- 7. 9 ~7 orL rr_ c c A r , ( - blet-o Mnxi mu m SrR.:32 ' S R_ss GL s.s E. -[mg = { Es S!+ h h -k a. . R A s tr m ru L< s r: j T/N 6 s is_ rs j 4-I & % E il. hCA Pst r__ hp, N L) P_ us W f C TAL C. , OK.S '. U b F_. TILniN NG- 'P P<_g P.G rE Ns G r u . t C rE__ , S0005031 1 _ _ . - - __ _ a y gg i . i ,..... . :r- /!(:.e. !.:. Unir ::tcu . . 1, . s. . - . ..y s ')' - } U it i e.t;. T;:!>!c C./.1 (r. c n'.im: ;r1) '~ h1IV:a:b?v tt rc'. .: :: tre .:::::ts jype of iter;oined w :1J wc!J Stre. * !d' Allowa.',_'e str ns stren;::1. Ine? I O.50 r.orn.rc! t:osif: c ;rrh ' Cc.c;;revivo haint r:ot of wc!d n:. tit ro;3. ncert ,, tuss t.orr.ulto. dcQnedt. <>n t rc n et.it tidl i .: e sered
- cffectisc area bear ,
O.M pe?1 user.r:h ct i r;: niti!
- i e
Joii. <!oi; ned l Sain; as t:. se cutal to tcar - l , , . Tensinn cr corrpressior pare:let to Sarne as base recta! Ji E .'j ~ tS: a ui of th: v, !a' We!J m:tal wi:S a s'reag:S
- 9.y
,,..i 3 , . In el equal to or few : :n y{> I , 0.".V) riomin it tenst!e :*.c c;m rnatefu.:ig w c!J rr.et.: rt:iy oc s'. ti. k cf wcld r et:1(Luf. n:ept shear used. , . Shear f.aral ct ta nis of weld stress on bs niced sna:1 , riot esce:J U..:9 y ieid strear:h of bav: meal *- 0.30 no:Mcal tensite n en:ta .- > i of we!d t i: tat sku). ve; t sh::r
- Tension norrnal to effectis: r.rea stress en la a: me:al in::: not <g
. "+ .. )/ cacced 0.55 yi:!d st::n;c of bn: taeta!
- I
. 0.3') r:cr::in;.1 tenu : s:rer;5 '. cf wc!d m-;t:16 u).ese:7c snear $1. ear on effectis e area stress on base meat d..!! We:3 metal wi:h a stre:';6 y0 r.ot eseecd 0. t') y;c!.i t ,:: ;.'t Ey !:ve!e.ps!to c:!::.:h. . , of base rn:tal ma:ching wc!d rnmi rnay be used. . .._ , Tcnsion or com;iression p:r:!!al Satue :S tuw me::.. to a.is of ve!J' .o a O.M nerninat tensi!: s: er.;d Welf inera! v.im a st ey:n = sj d She;tr pa:ai?cl to f.'yiag of wc!d rueu! ti si).c'.w;: shear !c'.cl cqual to or !:s! th 2n },2 7. surfaces to es!ectne area) stress on tw :'etu b n; is $, raatclaing u eld met;;!:r.ay te tiot eseced O SJ i. !J ienf6 used. (if I a'.: rnatal I. l'er ifefi;.i: ion er ctree ive are2,5:: 2 3.
- 2. Ist smtchin; w,:!d m;ul, w,: 1.t!c 2.! 1.
- 3. I'dkt vc!A and ;.'t:nl pir i ; m;;:.: nan ;:c.cse wc .'s Hn'n1 th: con o -ct c!ernents oflasi!!
thewstJ3 ' .S 0 0 0m" sa' 5 .- .. . ; ) . . FII.LET WELDS ASSUME A3G R. AllD E70 ELECTRODES Ai!D WELD lei!GTil i' OBE . 555. = . - . . . P .95 Fy , P/2 FACE 11 FYll' h /2 W : .- (.95)( 6) P/ 2 (.4)(36)LL')P/2 LL' J . {T .. .. 14.. 4LL.'.. >,. P/2 ..1.9.7 LL' >,. /2 . .TilROAT C .3Fri.707LL'>, /2 (3,6)(.3)F.l.707LL' '3P /2 P (.b(70)(.707)LL'>f. /2(1.6)(.3)(70)(.707)LL'>,P/2 III .84LL' ,s, P/2 23.76LL' >,P/2 ~ FACE A GOVERiiS THE DESIGN -.. l .s 0 0 0 C C 's ~ ,,- = ~ FLdREBEVELGROOVEWEL:J FOR A SilEAR LOAD V OUT OF Ti!E PLA!'E OF TliE ABOVE SKETCH-AND: WELD LE!!GTil L. . ASSUME: A501 TUBE (FY = 36), A36 PL Af!D E70 ELECTRODES. CilECK BASE HETAL AT R. OBE SSE - .ll FY EL 6 V .95-FY EL 4 V g (.11)(36) EL GV (.95)(36)EL(V- . V3 . lit.Il EL 6V ~ 19.7 6V EL 1 ! . CilECK WELD - DE SSE . (.3)(Fw) EL c V (1.6)Fw .3EL 6 V , (.3)(70) EL 6 V (1.6)(.3)(70) EL 6 V 21.0 EL 6V 33.6 EL f V BASE METAL GOVER.4S s0005c.10 S ,-e , -p-,-n - ,,-,,c-me- - - - - <-- , - - , - - + - - - - - - - - - ,-- - , - - m . - - , . .. e' . e. . - ? .......................2... . . . Cornmentnry on t he S"ptern!Icr .'!.1N'a ILf'itir n of t he Cohl.I'ormed ">[i.cification 4.2.1.2.4 Fillet We!ds 1'or fillet welds on the :pecimens te: ted in the Cornell rest arch, the dimension wi of the leg on the sheet edge generally was equal to the sheet thichnesa; the other lee, .v., often v, as two or three times longer.~1n connections of thin type, the fdlet weid thront cominonly is larger than the throat of a conven-a tional fillet wehl of the sanie 3ie.e t>ce Sec. A. A. Fig. C.t.2.1.2.3-1). U:.ually ulti-mate failure of fillet welded joint.s is foun.i to occur by the tearing of the plate
- a. djucent to the weld. 'i'enrine i4 the result of nnolied .shearine or. t.enniie f.orces.
depending ut,on whetner the went is ionettu.una! ur transverse. 4 nese cono: tion.6 _ - - - are illustrates 1 in r igure LA.,..l.pJ-1. ... _ -I fe WMi&.L *~ p A-A . ,# '. D r S ,O' /' gO /%<f / _ s w &,/*h V , M. 7 y ^*$f'f0 R:/ . .,...s g x~ N MECC d- ?MW - y. .
- a. Trensvorso rarot b. Lor'Cifud; rat rittet
- Shootlear Shout Toar .
\ Flouro C4.2.1.2.11 FILt Wefd reiture Modos Since the higher strength of the wehl material prevents weld shear failure, the provisions of this scetion are haaed on sheet te::rine. d Spi cinn n s u p t o 0.17, in. t hic h rn-s.we. re._t es.ted i_n ,the...C.E 1,he Inst provnaun in t his : ectoin is to cover the possion:ity th.___n.e.l.l. . .. at :vr sections r.e_s_ea..r.c_h. thicker than o.I's in., the thraat din enso,n may be le:,s than the thickness of the cover runterial. plate and, hence, the tear muy occui in the weld rather than in the plate 5000f, ~.'? &...=L. - . . :=- . .,. r.,,.,. 7
- t.' . .
// -7. . I_ _ 7 '~ n ._../w ei . y m_u C,.t.mC'.T 'd.U ,. .M' .~ . 1 n.,. _ . . _ ---_ - _m ,,e .: m o, , .:.~ 2 7 , ic e / .f u.,sii. &,.a ( w_ n,,, r- -- C ' "*' O ; ' . C 1..ty-fleTetect . - 1.!.!.r n . c t.ty - R tr tr3 - . = 7 l -'r e of *R l Clknt ~' . . . .i.t t r .'.'t__ 'l_h_r '!~ , '~~'~ 03t* ** * /A ' l P,c, ject Ilcit.*.cr? by / Date troi.fis. E n,3; Ap. rev:d 1 y Data . ., ,w ,,, - . -.. 3 Gy .; c: ,.... : 6 A- 47'. " ' . .j . . i g .t - -t . t - ,.c n . - r y / ] o a.e ;r u .e . , i yct.'T i g ( p . , .
- i . . . . . . .
j ., ; . ! 5 . .' . - . , .L ,//.w & Ca. /r'o^t2o~74f TC'M \. . t . .-.}~~ , - - & . ,= - - . .-..-~-- J.a
- 4. .
[psiers~.f)o . , g o, g 1 . ,. . . ;. . i i r ._ ,.. ; i : . . .,..;.. ;i .i i ; , i . . . , ._.j....... . ....,.._7 l . 6*B STD. l ,. //7.[ 7 i
- l l l i bdL*/,D /+'&
E do yx CLFcfconC ,; _ _ i .. ,. i.._..., ... i..b . . 77/dt"d .cs of .r.t w r . c. o 7 y y. . . . l . . . . . . l.., .. _ p ., ,, /s,c.,7/14 7 - [ ,o .<L~- t . ( , . 6 , i ..9 ... ... . . .l..g . . . . ..;. ,.a. . i j . . _ . . . . _ . . .. , ; : , i s _,. 7. ......- . ...,. .. ,g_.... .....,. , 1 ; . . . . l . a s f Y 5.c D +l O ' 5/N . .(.f p f M/hl: f -- , j i , / < , . . . ' . .i"/x w <4.X.C. Z
- S/6binc,syic +i
' ~ .R 2. 77'5~ psT/C.e es= co u ,ro i.res.=rcet s v u . e n /o f ,rie s/ m n " .ga p ,? ,,. . 2 .z-sc ,6 t d e::' O . /a <r..l . . . ~: *) , /: ,I 8 /. . .j f I f . ,. ...j .. .. ..., . g 6
- f. ;
. .. L ; hba- ZonCGu .> -a ( Z ou ,, . :- , , o .o 7/'x w f / o - . . i Z -<* xr ; _ . . . . fi'u ! i : w6 l
- f .
. c t '- .. {,, ;- 09' / - D 9 /. L e g ' ddw & XfG t .,. . . l . .l.- , .: i t . . e
- i . .
. . . f. p/f.sb $ d* s*f .,W U lC f.A1'l. . ' g'yo ra.r > u p, o aya,a,,- ~ 8 .t.. / ,0 ,e ;: ' v >. - . .rf . i l: : c<f. = '43 k.u &. ,x/ C .'. i .S 0 0, 0 5 0. 4 4. ...... ... . ; . I i . , , . . . . . . .._.-.' -. , . . . . . -. .. g
- 8 e thenge-
. l l 6 .0, . 9 s != , $g ' !i e $<C k 3 V 4 @ a N, . ~% Y
- s. . ; Y
,a 2 e }2 O . F 01 >g N hw ' y p;'f p g<"N w a n. . 2 i- ~4. -3 m . 9 , !sse 2 D gm 2 $ { $6..u d s gse i 9 4dm .h 4 i
- s 5
t as El e g % a
- EE ec ff h di %
js 2 gg a: $ GG a- g s N._) $ c).' I 2 h 6 o O 7 'C b - N D R W A b h 1
- s. .
.w @s N PL n . O $ ci p% , 2 , i -l e E ( { ' l I ' ___ i k . - . ___._ _ _ _ _ ! l _ , '_ . ,.e RO hitddFECTION DALLY INSPECTION REPORT "y[ " Anspecuargg a .ga a o g_s.2- a % ~ "* Date 8-/b-83 _ Shift M Y MUNTER CORPORATION K0004656 BYRON PROJECT 6Hr. Icm 14 ID.Na TYPE 6.DC.. T, o STMUS OF REwmK/REPAlR se- Dewiws No. !30 /ABIM20X h NF N6 FW Aug. NR 47I fu"n$'"Ne'ar InsamOENr I30 IAS/bO20X NwNF 114 FW Aoy. NR'47I migrangxgar %. No D>sTcsinov. No Woex FrefceMEv. '
- w. insomoent c amx Geneie, sem Tooc sca> awau
,3D M 6 Fig Aug. xat-rome miaravss<eng IGX 10005X 1 g${j4a4 ffgjlllc.l W "" O'"" * "' * ^ * #
- 0 # "*' *
- 13 0 2FP/405bX bNF M6 FW Aoy. 2 grueex comnae,Saxte> ro pe nea> awew -
- w. acasavec n
. ISO 2FPI4056X AhaNF M6FW Aug.2 gnu-m+ tyez,ge g y Khbot" G3*tRkif Rttb1T> pc RB.D NLh/>EW DE' &CEGSiVR f ISO 2FP/4056X Ncw NF A6FW Aox. 2 e-w.nm w. was-scEsstys wax connaia n>wnere> 5 oc Kan mm. ~ 13 0 2FP'l4056,X LNF HGFW Aux. 2 oc-nne exeeeor ~ y%igioa ""**'"""*'"**"~'~"'~ I30 9-NT-HD-I-2A 362 BVR/W Aux. RND3077 D r. confsomnm! Eikve<Gannam Rame> To oa FiEa> avEw. 13 0 2FP/4056X 1 lll6FW Atx. 2 x-2nen-lu er stu can. swoex comaxig nwnera> rs oc sca> K+wsw. Du & nsor^non norrygcev. 13 0 2FP/4056K 1 116FW Ag 2 gym.an GwfisorA-noN 6epterE,bR cwsEi> 7-n-83. ISD 2FPl4D62R Nat NF 1%FW Aux.2 g-w14as por ige ce v. CDN comptETE,' p.2. GnsGb 7-H-83 g-2FP-nes y,R6tRAr>DN ye eg.p. 13 0 2FP14Db2R Nu)NF M4Fnl pog.2 ~"~# 0"W " * &"r"&$ 13 0 2FPl4062 R Aba Nr4 FW Avy.2 g-26tn M 3 " *'"" * * '~"*- 'l30 2fpIgogg e Alwgf jb FW Aux.2 w a n-m3 Wie"cTEi>Y i l U 1 M k 0 Y u s~ h 4 k @ f f i i y $ E 9 s Nvu, g < s. E b. b 8 s e NI 6 .o M ea u b w h i .5 a w: ..> s ,b s g ru , F 66 c %k hN S6 kjl[i Re \~ ,, V~b h , e@ .7' ' 9 , !x = s N8 9- ** h eogCN 0S = ad a a== M 8 " n-2 e 5 th9 W s"' Ng D E #g @ u= a u Ce m b e x CD T D: o tu < C h. D \ e @ E e 2 & 4 T H '2 ~ f 2 y j p 2 5 k ,2 8 c .- - ? I 1 (n a-o ::- (y /=NRC D mb EEnon % IABBERT~ " ~ " " Date O-16)-83 Shift h 4 0004 W HullTER CORPORATIO!I CYRON Pf!0 JECT SHr. S oF I4 'se DeAwws No. ID. Na Tyrs S.rc.. @[is,L$ llL%^(( STATUS OF REwcRK/RYPAIR ~ % wE &w, Amnon WwAm $q- ICSO20072 ' If5 RV Gnr1 NA oripertar R&mcrEb Sv OcWI* N1.C. 9-1-82. ~ Exwc4wC &nerE, Aconocwnt Wetu Awen. 284 ICS02024 R 1 JMFW Gwr1 NA zg,ppgcuy- ggggn=,, g, ne ayy, y g 4_,.gg_ E" 'V' """'^**"' 2B+ /C902032 R 1 $ FW G>w 1 NA (JVDEEYUT' #*""M %%rttygo^ By "'"*'^ GLW'.I'. B.T 10 82. y CG -5 I5 5gFVPr ML RNp3j3) g 'fff'of'g ff" SStg>ToFC@, WAsb^!4 foe M 45 m - g v ~ . v,g..--lAf ,, .\ X. ,. W, I e 61h 7 gpc ggggw untu uoc c.u tun nu vo _g; Shift M V KOOO4659 BYRON PROJECT swr. 4-on IA- ' SR DRAwsn6 No. I.D. No. TYFE Env,. D'S,$ (($'n^[,I" STATUS OF REwcrK/WPAIR 51 5 G-CC-100-II A I38 FW Fv Aux. RNb310e % u "*d' j EkG%WE /4 RbcESS Of hhTNt2 8-2-83* ,,)$ 3 G-CC-IDO-3 3 /26 0 FW Fv' Aux. atDsoss nue '^' ""'" 0" **'" #*~#3-51 6 S-C-100 -37 3s5 FW Fv Aux. Russo66 Rf"lg 516 G-CC-100- 52 I884- FW Fv Aoy. R>ubscea fy M W ^'***Y*"'""""~**~ sis S-SX-ioO -8 563 FW R/ Aux. RND3io+ $7517 '^' "N #"'" #"" 5/5 S-G>'-loo -8 586 FW FV Aox. Rubssos Q^",lML' R T '" " ""#"~#^
- y. K . '
- p. * , . , '
( i pi~p,+ 4 N ~ 9/adet %/Newr 9:iN5m noAl .Lc - _ - FRO. '~'~~'* Date 8-16-83 shirt h y K00046GO HUtiTER CORPORATI0t1 BYR0ti PROJECT err. 5 on 14 prATus CF REww</RETWR se Dawms No. In No. Tyre arc, $djijg jlL"T^3'" y,, N """ 529 5'-SX-lco-24 I9I9 Fw FV A.ox. Rnb3085 'n 'ff"n"l Q'DM"> /NGOFF?O EAfY No K' " **"'@ OMN, Ab j4&PXMRWAIC.3, /NSe~Ev4G S 29 S-6X->co-24 96 FW Fv Aox. RNb 506z mages,, gar $7J%,7 h *'# *#" N " /" * '" 529 S-SX-/co-24 570 FW FV Aux. RNo 3165 ~ "b" **W4 " M* 529 g-sx-100 -24 569 FN FV Aux. R N b a I0 6 ' f a* M [e a rM^' N 1275 Fw Fv Aut. bb 3108 'm^*-fllf'ja",Q7 W "- 529 G-SX-I00-24 i;yg m" R Tgur* ',,R * " " "#* Fw Fv Aux. gnn 3107 S 21 S-sy -acc-2+ 1276 6 : u
- s. . V -
.:;,y .. n %) =+* =% . ~ . - . _ .
- nKc'a ms w .v~ . . .
Shift D V HutiTER CORPORAT10tl "
- Date 0 8 3 h0004GG1 BYR0tl PP.0 JECT
%r G w I4 se D w we No. ID. No. Tyrs Eny,. $j,E $"n*(( Srxrus 05: Rewcx/REPAtR 633 ISXS3a'8R 1 d4FW Aux. NA W g 2 ? ,' " 'f@p%%%** * *> '" "* - NE&lEGEDTs StbN /NSFEi d 7ED }}ND /ktwia>By QCwl*, Se. S-24-83. ,533 lSX53006R 2 H6 Fw Aox. NA m Swgr- g g - ,,se, a C w =i6 u c a n o " 04 Dismsmawacr DR R.e N2, 8-/6-83. 533 JCCot;o45R Won NF ,j g Aux. g.ga,v. mg a,ge eca y ,,,,opga oN 533 ICCob0+5 R AhnNF M6 FN Aey g.fcyy,w fl$jylg$ Oh D'S"'S'ygv'"6 o DR M N2 > 8-6 "' ~ ~ 533 IQ[2D025X f //6 FW Gwr1 7.$Tm-m2 pn ? $$N$ foxfisupAnow @acee comPwis;/&wAEn=b Tice ME&*EN. 533 ISE2Lo25)( 1 N6FW Get1 Osg-m.mz N,r.tte cc2>. ^ '""' 533 IGT2'c25X 2 1% FW (ourJ 7.{ThCD2F $r^'5Sb. * " #"'" W N'* "'" 633 1SE20025)( 2' Ib FW Gar 1 x.f$zoaz $"N"$EDY ne- aemocAnon do,ucuas, N2. G ocen 7-n-83. 53 3 /S1'220/4X NovNF NGFW ,Gnr.1 394 Abr The tZb. $q f,"f'[?[$$. '## '#' N# 0~#5'D 7'N'O ' 653 /GE220/4)( W1AIF Af FW GMt 1 OcES6t VE 'dPEN, Ab hhRXIh2MOHED, .1h/ 662V/46. 653 S-S)(-Gol-B 3/04 M WMT.M/ N 3126 azos,7y w M v/T/ M aewz ,o NE'C blN'STECDON DAILY INSPECTIO?! REPORT 7 7. V.. i , --- . InspectorMARE M. /AhrT Shif tDAV K0004662 HUtlTER CORPORATION 'a Date O-16 -8 3 BYRON PROJECT Sav. ~7 op 14 se DrAwws No. ID. Ma Tyrs Et.xw. >Yj-fd,E cNfn^oY STATUS OF REWCRK/%MIR ~ %2 IMS235C 27 W2FV Tues, Q$'f3q 'M'$" ;,7 k"'" '**M ** '* * ' """ * * ~ nu. a inweiasur uxx ca.1n.em,rowtun 2 oe ses aview. %2 IMGe5sc 37 WRFV Toeg. w.v. Se g,m,,,ca r ~ %2 1MS235C (o2 WRW Tues. RNb3s59 Aec M<exs *** ""E& "***E*CN" &'N %2 iMS255C 26 WW FV Tues. g.$."S39 Yj, ,, ""' "f** W** *'EW. # *' # ^ " " M 0 N O b 5 'E"' %2 /MS23sc 30 wen Toes. RNDSI40 ArcMAD% sr cv f . (*Q .,' x [ < :.;.s s D ~ - #4d'7MG//ha%ewr ., NRO TEIMGTECT)oM DAILY IllSPECTION REP Inspector D R ERT-Date 8-ll>-83 Shif t day K0004663 HUNTER CORPCRATION BYRON PROJECT S H r. B C F 1 4 __ se DeAwwc, No. ID. Na Tyre h ff$$$ ((7y^f[ GTATUS OF REWCRK/ REPAIR "a Wace:S Rococnov Coeec<7en.rm wuse /4as77
- 605 S- AB-loo-128 ll75 FW FV Aox. MA* GTAMP APPuEb VEP/FsEb EV QC.W.I' S. Dt 7 8 3 w ea' & m , W^>n"6 & x M h m .
' 'DS G-CV- I00-98 3645 FWFVPT Aux. asDsaqs jg",u%,'u"[ar ~ N7' RGW &Mrs, WArriN4 Gw NbE. Ets,a.7s. 45 S-CV- 10 0- 98 3t;44 FWFVPT f ox. Ryp3095 YgRFf/ g g,y_ ,os S-cV- 100 -98 50Sb FWFVPT Aox. RnD 3087 Yg*,"",'L'%, **"*'""^***""#"** 45 S-Gx-100-65 2457-1 FWFV Aux. RHp 3098 'gy',k !" % ss O' * * '" B~'* #3-8*~* ' g & "g, '" * * #' * *'" ~ 'oS s-GY-loo-46 2457-2 FwFV Aux. gnu 3oqq ~ /^' "" " **'R 8-/2-83 , '05 S-GX-100 -65 , 3tS7-3 FwFV Aux. RND3Ioo lyn";'yQ fy"a";fll[u,. '" *'" 0" **~*'" B~'=~B - sos s.sx->w-65 24 s7-4 r&Fv Aox. RND3noI 24so swev Am e.fg.,og g=gr = "o *
- e - e./s e s a a w o*.
u s-sx-ioo -66 'os T-4, Umr L 664 FW FV Aux. Run3129 'g ,'"; fj";w 0""? W0"**menJ"*v'a~- -
- INSU"FW OM^l#0 WOEW WMED WArfsN4 fog J.7Jf SOS WIFWR 30 16 WR FV Com- 1 VfD 549 XE/wroKrr+1EN7' r- -
4 - *% eh -e
- t
.s W. gk glhSFECDoM DAILY IllSPECTI0ii REPORT y InspectorMARX MTAhm ' "** Date 8-S-83 shift h Y HUNTER CORPORATI0rt 40004G64 BYR0ft PROJECT 'St4T. 90F I4-SR DRAWWG No. IR No. TYPE Eux,. Ejfu$ ,[c'fn^oY STATUS OF REwcW/REPAR JMSOFFIOGA:Y' ggings.cy,,.ov ~ll2ws1FtETE, 1g4 S-RC-IDO- S Iog nb pg hux. NA _ AcomOVAL WELD Aooeo.es,mren ey gw.r. /NSLFROENT %FtETE, AbotTroNAl WElb ADDED. 9I4 S-RC-100 -3 108 J% Fd hox. h1A gg,gg,,7,,,ggr g,,;qg,g7,o gy g w y., a.c g_;,-g 3 y .n ' InsoW!OGNY C&*1FLese, AccinoNAL WELD Aroen. C 3;4 G-W-IDO - S 99 Hh F+1 hox. p)A re,areceguea r Ra=idsre.ren By oc.wr. J.t_. 2-28-83.C . /NSOF;x;7 CENT C.os*tFLeic, ADDsT70NAl WELO Avveb. Q's 01 4 G-Rc-loo. 3 - I00 nkpg Aux. NA crinmnmear ReasosrEtren sy ocwr a.L. 2-28-83. tusum/OEWr ll4 6-RC-DOO-5 lO9 H6 g 04 NA % w mttmENT CoruPLETE, Avo,rionAL WEtb Avven.RhNsparen ~~ i By G /NStXY/ GENT (nornETg, ArvinovAt_ WElb ADcED. - 714 S-RC-LOO-3 11 o H4 rw Aox. NA gym,,,cNr R,wm sy g* wI, J.L. 2-/W **^.' ~ /NSofriOENT (MFtETE, AnvirDUAL WEa> Avven. 11 4 G-RC-I00-S' l05 Mb FN hux. NA wisuromxr Rringreren By CL WT., J.L. 3-5-B5$.. j; /NSuFF/ CENT Co,*rn.es6, ApairiovAs WEtb Acce1>. f a .=u 714 G- RC-ICD-S 106 H6pg hox. NA g,ungg y gg,yg77,7 ,n g ,m c w 7_ a.t,3.g.g g EDMPt.ETE, ADbmaVAL WEU> ADDED. I t... /NsOFFWJEMr w ,gpgag, gy n_cwy, 3.t.g._g.gg c'- . l4 S-RC-I 00 -5 \ \lo 46 FW hux. uA gy,aceagar JAKOF7;?QEWr C s-Rc-noo-s H6 FW Aux. NA muroregi,surlCosssPLETE, AvnsrioNAL'WEU> AbOEP.ge,,osra.re> il4 NIB ;. /wwrptoENT CDossPterd, ADOsTioNAL WEu> AbnED. II4 S- W-loo -3 10 4 Hb FN Aux. NA muneEncar waste.ra> av ocwr., a.u z-es-es. u - /rzup2:~/uGAlY Coo *sflETE AvoirioNAL WELDAbcED. 114 S-RC-IDO -3 II4 n6 FW hux. NA % amersmEyr EGm6FEcEb Sy DC WT , d. L. 2-17-83
- INsors/DENr contners, AesprAmE WeECM47742.
11 4 S-W- too - S I07 H6 FW hoX. NA REsanxtsmswr Rtmsrursu By ocwr . d.L.3 8-83. Irsoffk!FNY %Ptese, Aa Evinets F1 R E<N 4774 2. S-RC-l OO -3 11 7 H6 FW Aux. NA g ,u m w RE/NsmTe By M.W.r., J.L. 2-17-h 71 4 * /NGUFFJOENT (onenETE," ArtunoNAt. WE2.D Apt:Ep. 1l4 G-RC-IDO-3 II5 Hh F*l hoY. NA QinfuccgpEs!T gg,graygp By Q.cWE, J.L.3-S-85. ~ RND 3089 Yg y 'r " " > " * " * * -- Il4 S-CC-Dol -20 798 Fw FV Cosr 2
- RND5079 R g yE &WW ro QA. B-+-63 51 4 SY-24 493 FNFVMT fuy.
****'"#^"'"""** 114 GY-2b 5I5 ww Aov. xnv31so 'foTo V ~ - %Awt1/Mawr DAILY IllSPECTION RE T:Cy TpecterMARWK - e NRO ThibSPf?TroM ..u "~ ~
- Date 8-15 -8 3 '
Shift h V HuttTER CORPORATIOil K0004665 BYR0ft 99.0 JECT
- 8. IoF3 Sci n locF 14-
- SR ' Daviw6 No. ID. No. Tyre Eos $Td,N [ffdos," STATUS OF REWcRK/%MIR
'"'" A* "*"'"' *" S* * "~# ** *Wl*?$' 782 iM G9201OX dw NF HGFW & i *NA ~ NEGEoly To % /Nspraw Ao AcrePico BfGCWI, S R. S-25-85 782 lE'Cl7030S MNNF H6FW dwr i NA hs swer ' * " ^ "" # " # # " ' " ' 782 IRy06066G lA H(,FW Gwr. I NA "LR$" '^'m M km ByCC% M 92H3. 782 IRV060GLS IA ysyw (inci na "MR,'ll - u t. tesmoeur ia skvcgSS vp ngmig g.is-g 3 18 2 IFPo20$3V % NF H6FA Cmr. I x.sypyt.tyo3 n=innnvemeur D.R. Excsny;;vg /m pgocgss Dp k}: mig 8-16-8 3 78 2 lFPo20SSV Men NF H6 FW %.1. x-1FPsM umorAm ,' Fbwstiy. . ~ D.R. &c,upicieur /s PJpc.Ess Of Rynese 8-16-83 7BZ IFFD2OSSV b NF HG FW Lt. I ?C-JFP.62-oO3 SuR)ECENVC srcescive Lkeercur Ao _ T6a>say. / " M " * * ^'R B-& B 3. 18 2 IFPozo35V MnNP M(, FW Coac 1. pc.,$2.oog W$Way; ~ ExCEGSIVE UNtscetir Ano Tbrosay. '^' '*"#5 6 # #"*'* #-'6-#3 - 782 lFPO2033y %NF %FW Cmr i mib.co3 $$gh ' excessive dawecar Aur> 'Fbrosiry. -, g,hQ /^t Pho&Ess Of @mic 8->&83 182 lFPD205SV %HF %FN Cour f "[' ExcEGs1VE LhrDEnvr Ann WYW&hf14MLZ* tNkL Kt-IN$ H-t 1 ION umu liorsu ivie nsrun & .,,. uiqemantm m im$m i shif t DAV liUNTER CORPORATION " " a Date 8-M-03 K0001666 BYRON PROJECT P foF3 GHr.Ilor14
- SR DeAv/wc No. I D. N a Tyre Eru,. fMS,$ gg^ol'" GTATuS OF REWORK /WPAIR 382 IFPO2033V Alm h)F I% R4 QwrI j_,&7a3 RSof,"gg, IN M OF & 'R 8-16-8 3
~ EXCESSIVG Untstyr Arip 16EtassW . DR. tasac fioEnr ja Hocas 9:p=pnigg46-83. 782 IFPb2035V' AbJNF H6 FW Gwr. I
- QC-IFP-0283 WarontmEur, f Excesswe qV dor m vr A un - M m.
sg. c ...:/ insumaeur in swaas;c,q> romie 8-/6-83 782 iFPO2033v' MwNF If FW Opr1 y.)n e.FP.07to03 mum 1Enr, x.% sie m ,ie .~ . d lk/EEKOJr Arto h_@ .. 7d8E'i7X ' Y*/ 782 IFPO2O3SV MwNF Ib FW Gw.] g.$ga3 y'l"' ' (,M & **" 8~*B3-eke 4SIVE Udr^9E' air Ann Bacr>'- g.,*Nygg 'f9';'Q^'r IN lh%ESS L'Y kkFNi2 B-/6-83. 7B2 /FP02035V MwNF ll6 FW Qwr i , ' EycEssivs uscacar AAo IBEtwrx I" MS Of M'" B~83-792 )FPOTO35V MwNF}k;FW CourI g.g*pirt.ae ' f lv' M [g ,, ~ Excessive Udtt~Ecur Ano SLDSITX W/!u d W f( N 4 b d u.qsavanirm.A ne- muuc. A 1 g fNKC KEINSPt:( j JON un u. i A.eru. .v.. ntrun6 g.m g Shift DV HUNTER CORPORATION Date 8-16-8.3 8.3op 3 g ggg Ejfif,E ' SR ~ D RAvi w G N o. ID. FJo. TYPE Et_rc [j7n^ou STATUS Cr: REwcRKA% PAIR Q.;fpjgag $@"c?y" '"W' #" #~~## 792 IFF02033V 3 Ikh Fni Cout ! jay ME5S On-MPAtR 8-/6-83. ~ M. CoursoRAnoM 78 2 IFRYZo33V 6 H&FY] Gar.1 c c.;F p a r a s nor The ces. ~ DE Exe /m Process Of Wpnig 8-/se-83. 782 ISDo40/6S 1 N6 M Gac1 g. ssp.o4az % gsS,svEs..talup n conneew rewoex saggroomze ro ec e c a>awow. 78 2 /SDI2039X 1 B&M Gar 1 x-nspe nz a n w w e c.c b. . nu. A6y Gar 1 m.sgv4zal cwweRara awaex wnaE,isamn uocnew aview. ' 78 2 /GDI2031X 1 ww ceb. ~ pe coa r,s owanon y comersre; sea <ixx1:e m cu' new auew. 78 2 ISD12039X 2 g&y Cwr1 x-asr>.;2al norikz ccW _ 782 iST2m25X h NP $6 R4 % f y.fT-b@3 7 $ $lh$Art Y ComngE AozwnosuAt EmA 782 IGE 30460F-B 9 lb M %i Na. Jasomogs' ainner sesazr, gn wnewzW. c. n. 10-12-8 nce 2. Couf1E72, AcanoAIAt. Wew AwEr>. . 78 2 /ST301o M B 9 Rg g Cyri NA m,wn ggerr mimmegy ocwr., c. n.10-t2-82 Jrson=k/ .T'., 9 .. .-+ .'_ .z' -G . \P 1 ~ d InspectorMAee MTAerst-x1 g d 12t5 t$GPECnoN DAILY INSPECTION REPORT yT '*' Date R-16-B 3 Shift M tiUNTER CORPORATION K0004668 BYRON PROJECT GHT I3 or14-ise Davms No. ID.No. Tyrs Eaw S"[-(S,E$$ (($"r^ioY GTATUS OF REV1M/WMIR 076 IRVR.39 /9 WR FV 6nrJ ct.f53g.n; 'y %gl'y,,en, '^'"'""~'"~ ne insu ns woex w p m nuanxceo 75 o c sitio Atview '0 76 IFWE 9 il teFV Garj g.geggo w _m oeurg4 ' R 22 IN30pyjogar EkDE'M lo+sRfrs, J1.H Abr71)uss*1/TTED '07b IP/3 15 4 ,0VMT &a1 W.b.s47 egin,o,,7,,ea, - *REs InsuffMIEMr }&hWDCC Ch*1R.ETE, MR Nar 7bNSMir7Eh '076 /EY.3 13 kWlVMT Gar 1 Wb.S46 pympagg ,1Eur '~ R R. * /usumLIENT E6 WORK (2WIFEf7E, J7:R AbrTRAnsMM '076 iM3 8 WRR' 6an1 yy 5p gg,,gagg, 'O 76 IEYS /0 WEPY Gwr1 w?$S h?&{yNai- ~" #" # # ""' # R2k /NSum ciENT '/N INOCES6 &W/K 6Y4-83. '076 IRY5 4 WRFV GnrI wpp2 mpare,arar x /Nsagicienr innuess of15t:we 8as-63. '0 76 /RYS 16 WR7VMT Q>ar1 wo.e e5+3 noincrEs1 Ear K /NSOF7'/c/GN7~ /NRbCE56. ffEa> Rb8LEM Sa'Mrusco 49-/5-83 D76 IEy5 I3 WMVMT.Gwr1 yv.2 #Sg gympge,- ~~ e wp.eegj insumcisNr Lhmeedwnere; 5%.rwcaracas asaas /GI925408 6 WEP/Mr Gwr1 gy,,merg,,, gar ; - '076 10 76 SI~-8 l'% MFVPT Coar1 %gYb-cos n R- $$%er /sySOFR&/ENY d% NY "' ## "' 0 76 GT B ]?5 FWPVPT Gnr1 A6ST-8-LOS R5wntrepsef 3} 'm[tlpW(90NPw72, WAIT)A4 fhe NDE R50L75. v.e lusumddwr'WJhkeeComners,1%mns 52 NDE hhsws. '0 76 6[-8 l'74 FWIVPr Sur 1 lGC-9E-B-lb4 Rmpawg,end / 8 U *y - . _ + w 4 *** e $ kf k10(d m r AI " %ua 3 r R c- A 4 PE t " 4 J 8' I ? 6 / T C/ H R &e 8- G m o * * "" M < e w 4 t a E "' n # D R O r S ~ ~ D N R E, s . u T . T E . . . A Y S T
- s M &
G <+ - * "~ " " ' e r ~' M V R a, # %n ,
- ,,Yw N, f,
Eo " Ev _N d "s"L Oe /e .m O I 7' i &l",T' 2"TnN F n T T O i wOP A R C E J [o 'H e s n, /^ . O R R aO P 7 s r u C R N O E %2 u e c sn I t o E T R Y s, 1 3 5 3 js N B u U D D t n H E N RR u en m u cr vr1 i x E AQ u nr A t t e T M w r ' r y V v F F W W w W T F F aN _ N o o N 80 e 2 36 14su 8 i T D. 9 4 I 2 H 6 N l N o 2/ 8 1 e 6 2 - h T e / /6 0 wm Y w I- r- I- . C A w a F C s- % R D D r A S- s 9- . N t ~ fer, f 4 4 S j se i (f h s \4 M >\ 1 M xistsertoss x;o eaucEDURES I " EUTil.1 NCY ' l " Pao.!ECT NO AMM3p, t nit No. /,f 2. } !$ l,1 ar". O ':.\T E / l-ll- 63 [ 7 P.v:t {t iw c.Rcn..ctoNG :m . l P' ' For undercut that exceeds this allowable in depth f or in length, the section properties of the base metal shall be recalculated based on the net section where the undercut occurred. Note that there is no reduction in weld metal strength due to weld undercut. .
- 6. Overlap O/L Areas of the weld reported to have' overlap shall be deleted from the (See " Revised Section weld. results Properties") If overlap in the failure at the weld, steps should be taken to grind the overlap portion of the weld in the field to determine if there is a fusion problem. Prior to the grinding, the required not effective throat should be calc-ulated so the field personnel will have guidance as to how much weld they can grind away and still retain an acceptable weld throat.
- 7. Convexity (Profile) PROF Convexity ia only considered a defect on welds with fatigue load application and does not effect welds at Byr on/a raidwood S tations . No calculations are required.
- 9. Porosity ? or POR
- For reported pcrocity that exceeds the AWS allowable,
- the portion of the weld having the porosity shall be deleted trom the weld (See " Revised Section Prop-erties") j 9. Slag S Determination must be made if the. slag is surface 5 slag or included slag. Surface slag can be ground 2 away and is not a defect. Areas of weld metal with included slag shall be deleted from the weld. (See " Revised Section Properties")
- 10. Cracks C Any weld cracking is cause for rejection of the entire continuous weld.
- 11. Craters Areas of weld metal with craters sh'all be deleted (See " Revised Section Properties")
gg3r3;;3 from the weld. r - N im w to NEC U.S. NUCLEAF REGULATORY COMMISSION 1983 Annual Repor l i 9 , w ,e , !) C(o#D3 - til Table of Contents Chapter 1 - 1983 liighlights/1984 Planning Changes Within Commission and Senior Staff . . I Noteworthy Events of 1983 ; 1 Ibi;;y and Planning Guidance for 1984 2 l l l Chapter 2 - Reactor Regulation l ' STATUS OF LICENSING . . 7 I 1 Applications fer Operating Licenses for Power Reactors . 7 Applications for Construction Permits or l hianufacturing Licenses .. 7 , Licensir.g Actions for Operating Ibwer Reactors 8 Licensing Actions for Nonpower Reactors 8 Special Cases 9 ihtPROVING lilE LICENSING PROCESS . 11 Temporary Opera:ing Licenses iI Amendments to Operating Licenses . . Il Decentrafiration 13 Standardization 13 Pr:anties of Generic Safety is3ues 13 Coordination of Regulatory Requirements 13 Regulatory Reform 14 flackfitting 14 IlUhlAN FACit)RS 15 Staffing and Qualitications 15 Training 15 Operator Licensing 15 Procedares 16 h!an-htachme Interfaces . 17 hfanagement anJ Organi7ation 17 UNRESOLVLD SAIETY ISSUliS 17 SUNINtARY OF STA1US 17 , PROGRESS REPORIS . 17 Water llammer 17 PWR Steam Generator Tube Integnty . 19 Fracture Toughness of Support N12tenals 19 Systems Intera6tions 20 Seismic Design Cntena 20 Containment Emergency Sump Itrfortrance 20 4 am.22.r ? .. - - - - ~ n .. 10 ccc m en 17 l l l with these procedures were reviewed ihr their insuble generic implications, and unimrtant generic lessons were Unresolved Safety Issues in fact learned. Section 210 of the Ene> gy lleorganization Act of 1974, as amended, requires that the am.ual report of the Com-Alan-Slachine Interfaces mission to the President and the Congress include pm-gress reports on those items previously identified as During fiscal year 19S3, the NitC continued to n alnate Tnresobed Safi ty issues"(USIs). A totalof 27 U5is base the human factors aspects of n.an-machine interfaces to been identified, and a final technical resohition has been minimize design-induced ermrs in imclear power plants. achined ihr 14 of these (see Table 2). Ilesolution of the In December 1982, the basic requirements ihr detaded reinaining 13 USIs invoh es (l) preparation of a regulatory control nana design reviews and the safety parameter an lysis by Nillt and a review by the Committee to lle-display system were issued. A meeting was hehl in each view Generic linpiirements (CHGil), wmose charter was NilC llegion early in 1983 to further discuw thne re. approved by the Commission on June 16,1952;(2) pmvi-quirements with industry and other interested parties. sion of a public comment perimi after CllGil rey ew. j The NitC has received 24 plans for detailed contml nunn 8o llowed by discussion and disposition of the comments design reviews, representing 80 units during fiscal tear receised in a final report:(3) provision for the incorpora-19% 21 plans have been started by various utilities,'aml tion of the technical resolution into NHC Hegulations, NHC staff has amducted five in-pmgress audits. In addi. Standard lleview Plan, Hegulatory Guides, or other of-tion, preliminary design assessments for control nuuns fit i.d guidance; and (4) pros ision for application of the final were conducted Ihr twu applicants for operating licenses. technical resolution to plants in operation or under These efforts will continue ihmugh fiscal year 19%. anntruction. Significant wurk a>ntinued during the report period in the areas of maintenance, amtrol room annunciators, system safety status indication and h>eal amtrol stations. The man-machine interface aspects of the failures of tin, SU5151 Ally OF STATUS automatic shutdown system at Salem were evaluated. Such interface aspects of amtrol romn habitability hase emerged as a new area respiiring study and review. The USIs that are actively being wurked on are listed in Table 3. together with the present schedule for tecimical resolution. A summary of the status of USIs is published Slanagement and Organization Draft guidelines for management and organiiation. and a wurklumL to aid NHC staffin omsistent assessment of PilOGilESS llEPOllTS applicants for operating licenses, base been developed during the report periml. An analysimi how other indus-tries, governmental agencies, and regulatory hmlies eval-uate or audit organi7ation and administration was con- The following are pmgress reports on each of the Unre-solved Safety issues under active consideration. For back-ducted. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations has gm'md on dIese issues, see the 19S2 NRC AnnualReport, developed performance objectives and miteria for man-pp 19 29, , agement and organization evaluations of plant and airpo-rate activities directed toward elliciency and reliabihty as well as safety aspects. The NitC effort cimeentratn on determining those management and organization factors Water llaminer most relevant to safety. ' Slanagement audits for the Shearon Ilarris Nuclear Water hammer events are high pressure pulses experi' Plant, Units I and 2 (N.C.), which is under construction, enced by fluid systems and caused, for example, by coi-and for the Clinch River lireeder I cactor (n*nn.), were lapse of steam voids in water lines, steam-drisen slugs of sunducted during the year by the llegion 11 ollice and water, pump startup into soided lines, or inadvertent , N Hil. In addition, the llegion I ollice and Nltit annpleted valve clmures. The frequency of occurrence is low and a re-evaluation of certain aspects of management of the damage has generally been limited to piping supports. General Public Utilities Nuclear Corimration reganling (See the 1%2 NRC Annual Report, p 19.) Operator the pmposed restart of'lhree Stile Island, Unit 1 (Pa.). training and awureness, ami plant design modifications, and completed an evaluation of posuble management hcIp to reduce tlie frequency of occurrence. Two relevant deficiencies n: lated to failures of the automatic shutdow n documents " Evaluation of Water llammer Occurrence system at Salem. in Nuclear Power Plants ** (NUREG-0927) and 'Value-4 M *,_ Mey* We'? ** e ~
- l'OK.'t SAS 22.7 1;t v . O ,
N - Kl VISION nut!!il:R O!! DATE ON I.1NE INDICATLD USED IR C C N 1N1'u r DOCltitENl' DESIGN OF N / ~< DATE S DATE S DATE S T N DESCRil'flON SO!il:CE I DI:NT . DATE S ~ _ s i y c) i > m o o .2
- 1. BY/BR Design Criteria S&L DC-ST- 1982 " **
03 BB = tb l j r-
- 2. Spectra Structural S&L DC-ST-
, !~zE-o ", E, Design Standards 04 BB - ami
- 3. S&L Structural Design S&L SDS Sb Standards El.0, 1 ,
y 7.0, 1 r 30.0, 0 h 31.0, 1 p G, 33.0 1 5.0 0 g
- 4. Preparation, Review S$L SAS 22 2 ;
& Tipproval of Struc- 3 e E tural Dept. Cesign Calculations L %% c:
- 5. Structural Welding AWS Dl.1-83 1983 -
g[{ Code Fq u., I w
- 6. Calculation Books S&L 12.2.8 Weld Assess- *J 3 '
to ment' S~~ 5 " S' 12.2.62 o-18.1.1 x o m en. to < zcc . m v. r 13.1.50 e Rs. ') . 18.2.1 2 o z 4$1"* ?$ 18.2.1.3 c - C: 4 -. ( . m o. , N i A-I i a< =A. ; M ^^ p g **4 g%0 I I\Ieg & das lie eI b e I e , ,, m=- -.s = w
- r - - . . . - - -
I hachhdih h - . q x y;.[s .y ' , b , TcRM CP 15-1.1 8-25-81 (Rev f .g, NDHCONFORMANCE REPORT FOR CONSTRUCTION ANDma.695 TEST 4 Cassee,sar*2 tdsse L e* 2"- cx*"X ' 'u ;r : . '-*5?.CP, WC.N td i t s ! V !.Wi, TE IH v. Cn 2 Uc ~ .. < . , , , ,_ / , %; g;; & rx ,.7 p _gg. m o.e t ...a..,,.,.r,...~,....... . , - . ~ . . . . . . .. .A' i,0 &u *g]L. ,.s . . . .. m . . u , x ,. u .. .N . ~. _ r S4'M1b S /PH8J'3"h0NO $T - . l ./9Nt.':7~, .. /DN,14'~f~ Yf
- e. oris.n <&
Q : ca ' f 1 / &~ur : w.c= . O m en a .i. = ~a Q oenct O : 2 o.<ca.ca ,<a C xc,.e,.r.r.c. O v un ~ wee .c O e.,u. C .n: .c.<c w%.< a C C :s~ co. ... m n.o s C ::~"m.C'c ~ Q ut c-c:~,c.- ,<i 4 ,gf,3 , g.,gf 3 '. ** * **- "- * " "a'"
- o- -ca n'"
$'4 b~~2 SAAD kW,0W UA'!/$'* . YAAW~$ 2 h)/k hs// A*AM'aYd kcW .'vA lb. -WK .
- w. .ip/
s hA" /h bb$f $dS$ f_fffb ",i.'N.W, ! ' uY N .n.D' ^^ -Py A_ a da,4u sks a p@cA- %.,c, M44. L. ec && na" YS d A. A'"4 .c y rs k cacA9 li.=.w . ._m 2. [. En. = . - ei.L 1 0 'pc b 'v.4 r .h, l 1o . vcu unt;ATICMs %<cu cA:s pace ~ *cu cf tact acm3 X :n u '."*: t ::ss msus tut.nts acu C'elib:ven 3 JAI / ') 21ts' /i;;' fM}' tDl'. $h0 ? oW&' $'Y
- t. , a. u. ,.,.. y c.w en a m+
. ,,- % c t u e : :.-- r m .trr._,:t um s, u. x. e 3. O., h4 4# =;pe.,,,,e % pe,g 3.w. s w.. m' .+ a.m. . . ." . . s .m- - > :- m .: . v. - - . . - --- a .a n .a:,..,u v. . es UAN.' ACCU ... C .. C m.i... urn.n ,o 0-O is a. ri anc . e. ACa(.a. 8t% . 8 J F G ?Ct.ts.f f *4 -= **;", ad ca an. n,,3 0.*ahld' s... _ ts) s '$ k)$/ f.d'.rh* I $=^.) p 6= - . x . t r u .c //g /b // $ c0/5'/5*5~ C.-cvfd # / k ~ "* 'n O*U .s e.gA .s. c .se .i w a s u e.%;.-.w... c.~..w .s2 o ,.<,. =a u. : . z= . m as & MfDs'l . . ...-~. . e. . . . . . ~a . % arverwo sv ~ s o.,o sv y7 , . T - -,.n - 31 .,m . .r . .-, -. -. , .7, . .. . . .e . . o. ; . . rv -4 ~ . -. . a : 3- _.,a_ n,,.a 4__ 7..!.y .;,, g _ m. -_ z.y .wgr., g ., ---=* .- r- - . + - * - - - - - . , m.. .y m
- e. u ve<.f m . -,s. .o
.u. ,as s,%w :en.o t .L 34 ,m y v ?.**?T* ,.,_.___sg..,,, ,- ~. >>.:. a,ss , , , . u ca 9 co. x i. a ei .s. ae x ,v e o .,. .. . .. .i a ; ,,.. %i .%,....,,4 ;e. .w : ..t . * . . ' + s e.o e.> , s.: . a, < ', ......l.., ,, , . CC.s. , . .. . G . . t --==4 . . 7.....,- m .-. .-- -. . . - .. . , .. .L ~-_7_ ,_ . . .e e . . e .a . . ; ., . r . . . _ _ _t t _o .,.,m __ i .. ,. 7 -., - .a C * . *mJ1 etce .e.a C .Cana e * 's s. e* 1 rm , y g . -. . _ .. . _ ._. . ___. , _ _ , - - - ry,-er- - - - - _ m D e l i ' s s A J d e. xce 4 ' D - w A</ m--- / PNd2J' aw/w n m d 5*-/- 4 0 4 5 B @(s) JP' M / C F- % Clacks A/ 2 cmbs AsA4 6~ucls n in L ea> vns rseu 2 mcAs f-risck ato/$ ' -r;AC L Bady /CM6-) /Avoss ce-/-cos/s nA 4 . . . p><=~we rvr-a s ecow (v P1; 456 r -rw-4co nno e D t ) I Cn ,- - , i M;smay l5 + lU i y' , yy3g I SYSTEMS CONTROL amo.m a us mene nc. PilONis 906 7N Oh0 TWL HIO rH 4847 P.O. BOX 7.% j 1RON .\lOUNTAIN, \ . tlCit!GW 49801 _ {V April 28,'1982'[,'_,[~ [,', ~ Sargent & Lundy Engineers - SS East Monroe Street 60603. Chicago, Illinois . Atta: Mr. D Treece
- Cocconuca[th Edison Company ,
Re: Byron /Braidwood Stations-Units 1&2 11ain Control Boards & Arsoc. Instruments - S&L SpecifIcat forG/L-2IPh ~ , 2075347E07535 , - CECO. P.O. Nos. 20275 Systems Control Ref. No. r -4 Centlemen: . ' phone conversations of several recent he-repair of hairline This between IctterJ.has Schwin beenofwritten S5L and asthe a result undersigned regarding t cracks on the main control boards. M board fagm c""g-We were informed that these cracks occurred in an area on thebodyguak-type repai that had been previously repaired with auto _ l f ace repair applicatTcT'.r' until . We have used this type repair compound in cany paneTo the best We can of our know with satisfactory results. ding this type of problem. - he cracks may have beca - now, received any customer ce= cats regarthe area of the board containing - only conclude th,t l stresses. subjected t[o abr orsal thernal orf dstructuraeM~ I + k .h b 44pc.<d ,5 on th nd. Systems Control was requested to ed=redtin lieu of repair by use o welding ccthods ~ he boards will Ve advise'you that the possibility of warping "the faces of t welding process. . alwayr. exist during a . p .e -continued-N SUDOM.m SARGENT & Nt50C W WN1'* LUNDY t g INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM Fm J. A. S chwi n - 22 X6929 Dste April 30, 1982 ) Project No. 4391/2-00 4683/4-00 Dept./Div. ft/CID 3p,c, yo, File No. Pa;e No. 1 Of 1 Client CCCo Sen. Byron /Braidwood Units 1& 2 Subject Response to !!on-Con fo rmance Recor t (NCR) fiumber F-695 To: D. G. Treece -24 CC: R. P. Orkfritz -22 G. L. Sensmeier-22 IPtt02J (Cystems Control) SC cannot determine why these cracks have appeared. They have had no trouble in the past with cracking of body filler. SC s tate-that repairing said cracks with full penetration welding is acect- ., table, but there is a possibility of warping the boards. i They ) recommend repairing cracks with additional body filler; thus our recornendations are:
- 1. If cracks do not interfere with operation of main control boards and pose no safety hazard to personnel, then leave as is.
- 2. If cracks must be repaired, then repair with additional body filler material. Full penetration welding has the potential to warp the boards.
1Pt105J (Mes tinghousc) This is a Westinghouse seismically qualified board. Any procedure for repair should be reviewed by Nestinghouse to insure compatibility with their qualification programs. , ~ NOTE: The use of body filler material (Bondo, e tc . ) is a standard practice of control board manufacturers in repairing blemishes to their boards. JAS:nh ) scoccina e t < 7 . . Ak hmJ'w 15 ' , can.eri FORM OP 15-1.1 7 .. 12-15-78 (Sev.2) .., 84 N0?lC0l'FORlW.'CE REPORT FOR C0!!STRUCT!0N AND"merSW TEST b 3, 5' Ca m e* 1 '.'l [f t:a .,e-ahI14.;N225. M ant N* M mUMA.eGaLL Nesb; - s -.-. ,--, - g r v y- .% - . . -y.-.--- b ' ' ' ' *da h N M,4.L'. b ,*..I . _.c , n. .- ,, / :. /
- 2. su .n.. .. v u t ts ...~e. . -s e c e. .
- r .- .
'.k, hi;,,f.a t .' o' r.';. 4. G 3. 0 -I $ Sr
- t.e a%J L.re.f U-3 N A 10 YD A TT.Ol kORSOf .$$,?$5 .hyh . . .--;.b.: g$ed
" 4
- 6. A4*%sa;;6ef 41;.prUt B
$$l S fCC p] Ei'8 & .. e.. a ., C Oteter a :. .a A1 f $fw .a4=$7%*m6 . .. ,, c 1 $QcWem% .. =~ ~ . o z.a , ,o m. c ,.. w LM C vG *eoMON8CtvaNcf C OOC.'sd a.'a t Cae 11. 8 *. ge s% *t cT c% a ...t . .. a m: ~c~co~,c. ~ci a ec~ m ene~ C C* as tA010s a nr 43 Ot148.pf.C 's C# AC8/.",*.f Co ae.se .l.
- f. 3. f.C. & P. J. * : t w N4 it -C 6 C 8 4 3 NA :3 *C88 ftGutif NQ bless /C*
RLc14u29 a.f Grev u un I e;;' o ?s.31/ s,waJ DJA _fgenkeg af Co n oI A ceRdd" ""' ~~ ~ cuar ar m's .A o o e r- m.c d Ato G DI h. ~?:1,~,. GDS uL_ y Qn 8' s- 9 b A/ Nf1 A / . - / v7f$'.',t ( b W u f. J.' YTL 8'l4' Er O Y g .,,,= ,1 Q
- s.n.
,2c ~ ** C.e * -,.p.,,,,} &,h, 8 lf.[ Q',, . , y b, luu/ .5k: n TlWlP= s ,w._. m - m_ m e s. ca.at 68 m 3P >.ema.;n ,4, m u -3,%. 1 - m - , ; , , . .; --. --m. .m-- - .. =.cm-ms s-v ..m.7-. , --i 10Cret $0. *,5 e R e po rt Aeguare$ Toa No ~ . .. ..N ..; . '. , . s3. &cyre eeavetO f g c;aatct tad e.ccas,che;s nr c4 _~ - 87 %Qestct.vt act.GM etOwsto la retitN alc.estNct Of *.O*.CCr.f c a ssAr.ct tw at? g ee a is e.ct at ;. g e g. 4tv.te aNO apesavag Evitwt0 ef se,sc.#tD fv *y - --ws - v y,. v= v w A,s.,.s: w or a c . ,, .; .. . .. . . . as.:ws. - ~, , , . N .u " u t .m1yw.t-m.,.-
- Un,- -
...-......,~...:-, . .:t so. 6 t e.e *:s a. es magw t ase s ra ;;a c: cwe. s.m _ 2 . _ ,,;. m m._ . .; c -% . . ~
- w. n s. ..>. o, c:...ac..
.c cn .....an a f a en t i u.c .t . a as. :.s,a.r.; c. ,a . ta .i.p-,~eru .v , .,, ., , ,,, ;, ,; ,, . 4 ,, , , , , , , , , , , . 5 ' .. . .c.1 t = m. . _ . z -- m?.. -G i----~{~~ *i 3.'.f.D.'.f. ,',?"-~; ***l**,-" 4 - -~, . , . -" ' " " - - ' ' *" ' Dil ' ' 23i. d A_ J**"*C Q c . or C- J ,.* .. . etx eto C:"2 .e :.....i t . l . I l ..r ' ~~ ,r, L . GENT & LUNDY l$ (cover'o) C N GlN E E OS ' CHICAGO *p, i
- g ,\ W Project Nos. 4391/2-00 ; t 4683/4-00
) - - Commonwealth Edison Company Byron /Braidwood Stations - Units 1 & 2 Notes of Meeting - October 1, 1980 % I39 Hel t Braidwood Station u ion Offices g4 .ain Cont ol Bo jarWe htug&TMM CR-544 ( re giR-235_ (Braidwcod) ) y \ "'h . . THOSE PRESENT: __ 43 f-D. C. Aaes ) / W. R. Blanford ) I D. A. Brown ) *R.'Cosaro ) Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) R. ~ B . Klingler ) C. Mennecke ) T. R. Sommerfield ) T. D. Spry ) , D. Brule ) Systems Control (SC) . J.'Pezzulo ) G . ,L . Sensmeier ) Sargent & Lundy (S&L) ---- - - - - - - ' *Part-Time
- 1. Purpose The purpose of the meeting was to review the subject aonconformance report, describe the problem, and define a possible approach to resolution. ~
- 2. Nonconformance Review NCR 235 and 544 state that structural member welding of main control boards OPM0lJ, OPM02J, ( 2 ) I PM01J , (2)1PM04J, and (2) IPMllJ does not meet liWS D1.1 criteria. (The NCR's did not include main control board 2PM0lJ in the item number listing, CECO will advise whether this board should be included or not. )
- 3. Problem It is a common practice for manuf acturer's of control boards, panels, and electrical equipment enclosures to reference AEIS Dl.1, Structural Welding Code, in their welding procedure.
S000h003 October 24, 1930 r ,J . it, GQ A4Ti Q} -
- f Commonwealth Edison Company October 24, 1980 Cyron/Braidwood Stations - Units 1 & 2 Page 2 Notes of Maeting '
October 1,1980 It was agreed.that the application of AWS Dl.1 to the inspection of such equipment is not appropriate. However, since SC in this particular case referenced AWS Dl.1 in their welding procedures, field inspection was necessarily done in accordance with the standard. The SC main control boards were found to contain numerous AWS Dl.l. welds which did not meet the rigorous requirements of
- 4. Approach to Resolution Since it was agreed, the AWS Dl.1 may not be appropriate for main control board inspection, the approach to resolution of the NCR's will be to develop a revised criteria for inspection of welds.
The revised criteria will consider the following:
- 1. Service of the equipment and intended function.
- 2. Discrimination of which welds are important to the 3,
structural integrity of the control board. 4, Minimum acceptable weld length and cross section. Unacceptable weld characteristics (e.g. spatter, craters, cracks, overlaps, etc.) 4 t, and lack of fusion should The unacceptable defects. consensus was be considered that cracks. the only ~~~ ~~ 4 S SC f d S&L will prepare t.he revised criteria which will be ' ammended to SC's welding procedure and subsequently used for re-inspection of the control board welds, Results of the re-inspection will be reviewed and the disposition of defective welds, if any, will be decided at that time, ' ACTION: SC, S&L) Prepare revised criteria for weld inspection of . main control boards. . the criteria before issue. Schedule meeting to review G. L. Sensmeier - 3LSepmp . Copics:
- 1. W. Kleinrath (1) W. E. Vahle
- 3. Sorensen (1)
(1) J. S. Bitel (1)
- 3. Cosaro (1) All Attendees
- 7. T. McIntire (1)
(1) LEA (1) P. R. Sommerfield (1) WAC ?. A. Palmer (1) (1) RNB - (1)
- 1. E. Quefio (1) WGH J. F. Gudac (5)
(1) DCM (6)
- 2. W' Fruche (1) JMM
-) J. !! . Smith (S) (1) GCK (1) S000~0:3 wa l an +., nuoon a v < , c. e,,e.no. i z i .. c i \ .' SARGENT %LUNDY ..~,,,~.... _ 4 ,,g o ,, 9 ,g t,v , p jg n, o o ,,, - - . c - c -= M sarety-nelated Non-Safety-Related Page /OO of l ~ client d.Ghd Prepared by O/ ,, M'&.D Date78h ,,oi.a <Bv r:2oed vue i,2 ne.ie.ede, ,<t r pg g ~ ,,,, 7_ g eroi.No. 430 t /4667,. ca.i . no. 4,oro d ev / o.i, ! I . . .I [ .. . '. . ..l . . . . . . . . . . . - . .. !, . s . n e , v e, u - P_ -. 6 - G 7.-o 6 cc:, 4s ma - t_ S -t s u.- . h ru rd e sa FAAA 6 Fsa.AAAE i,aro/r%a A su eAB. Wkt t Aa4 o s S.-rena d o~ DAer rttc '. c:rru erp 4., i D e- cx: -rdE 64E74 Wktc A+J. is i e.o AJ M EEc r Co fd Est 9-- PesPecriVG FOtWW l Tse AAA6 ..... . . I T3 LA.s rt:> rus coca t: t&we Un e4 l* C' t ' n , N Amu.e c rt1 A. r- RUG 6tAE A<e- u) AL L d ! . W12 G ~ 'G4 E (2E-Ac c- n o th . .. . . . . 9 [_$ . 'fiiE4-GE'.-o2E EEccru uJet bs oM Tde A&ovE cotJtd&cn o MG, kBG cr \ i - V ,. ... _ . . . . . . _ _ . ! . , - o .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . , . n. . . . . f5 = 1 . . . . . . .. .. . 1 . .. . .._ ... . - . . b . . _ . . . . . . Q(, 8 . . : . - g . i 1 _ . . . . . - . - - - . ~ . . . . . . . - . . . . . . ... .. \ O . .. 50005C79 . . l .. . . . am .e. e l ,,}}