ML20205H890

Public Version of Transcript of 830810 in Camera,Ex Parte Hearing in Rockford,Il.Pp 7,585-7,610

ML20205H890
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	08/10/1983
From:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
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ML20084D328	List: ML20205H884 ML20205H890 ML20205H894
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OL, NUDOCS 8601300005
Download: ML20205H890 (51)

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H. ,* UNITED STATES OF Ahmasc5 p' NUCLEAR REGULATORY C06045530M 0

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In the matter of:

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPMlY Docket No. 50-4 54 OL (Byron Nuclear Power Station, 50-455 OL Units 1 & 2) w.

IN CAMERA EX PARTE HEARING Loestica: Rockford, Illinois ' ~

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Dets: Wednesday. August 10, 1983 40427

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'(h 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 ,

t 3 BEFORE THE ATOPIC SAFETY & LICENSING 30ARD 4

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In the matter of l 8

6 i COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

Docket Nos. 50-454 OL 7

8 50-455 OL (Syron Nuclear Power Station, t 8 Units 1 and 2)  :

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Courtroom 270 '

11 Tederal Building l

211 South Court Street 12 Rockford, Illinois 13 Wednesday. August 10, 1983

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, IS IN CAMERA, EX PARTE HEARIMC i

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1 17 The in camera ex parte hearing convened at 3

5 18 3:15 p.m., pursuant to agreement.

1 S l' BEFORE:

'I g 20 JUDGE IVAN SMITit,

,g Chairman, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board.

ll 21 lt JUDGE A. DIXON CALLIHAN, g 22, Member, Atomic Safety & Licensing.8 card.

I 23 JUDGE RICHARD COLE, 1I Member, Atomic Safety & Licensing Board.

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1 APPEARANCES: >

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{ STEVEN GOLDBERG. ESQ.

MITZI YOUNG. ESQ.

4 Office of the Executive Legal Director

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l l 3 Washington, D.C. 20$55  ;

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1 6 Appearing on behalf of the NRC Staff. . ,

i 7 lt i NRC PARTICIPANTSt '

l David M. Galanti 9

Roger Fortuna 10

! Robert L. Segal  !

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{ D.W. Hayes

12 j j Kevin Connaughton '

13 if' 1

14 William Forney

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' /'N 1 P R0 C E E D I N G S 2 JUDGE SMITH: I don't know, Mr. Fortuna, if .you 3

have had an opportunity to be briefed about the protocol d we used yesterday.

5 I might review it for you.

6 Number one, if you recall, the Appeal Board 7

referred to the desirability of affidavits in determining 8

-- making a preliminary determination concerning the need' 9

for in camera treatment, or the need at all for protection.

10 So, for that reason, we have regarded this 11 closed session as an informati.on deposition, and that is 12 the officials of Region III I&E have given us information 13 under oath, and we would ask, for that reason and only 14 that reason, that you do the same.

15

. I don't know that it's really essential or that 5

j 16 the Appeal Board had that much in sind at all, but that's I 17 the way we approached it, so if you don't mind, we would S

o 18 approach it that way. 's 1

S' 19 And then we don't take any -- we don't discuss I

20 anything off the record.

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Remember, what we were doing

{ 21 yesterday is we would stop the record for opportunity for I

j 22 you people to consult, so that's different, but we don't 8

23 discuss -- we keep a full record of everything that is 24 happening, because we anticipate that when all of the 25 investigations and all the inspections are complaced, if we

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i b' I do nothing more, that this entire transcript will be made 2 available to the public.

3 Also, we pointed out that there was some chance -

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-- and I think it is very, very remote and it chould by no 5 means control our activities --

but there is always some 6

chance that a court may order us to produce this transcript.

7 That is very remote because all the parties have agreed 8

before the United States District Court thrt this procedure 9 is satisfactory. But, nevertheless, the point I am. making 10 is we should limit'our discussion to only that which is Il necessary.

12 l And then, finally, we should not discuss anything 13 which doesn't have to be discussed in the absence of the

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l 14 parties. We had a tendency yesterday because of naturally 1

15 following through on the subject matter, to get into areas o

lo which could be discussed in the presence of the parties. I 3

I 17 Well, that creates obvious due process problems, 3

18 g and so we should limit our discussion to only~what is

a E 19 essential.

i g 20 I think that's about it. I think those are about e

4 l 21 the ground rules that we followed.

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, g 22 Along.that line, we have not identified -- we 3

23 have identified some people, but not -- only those that we s

2d felt were necessary to understand in context what has 25 happened, and other people have not been identified when ic Q>'

ar21-5 7509 f-o 1 I 1 hasn't been necessary. So that is just an example how we

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2 don't ask for any information which we really don't need. i 3 I guess that's about it.

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So, if you're going to make a report, I'll 5 administer the oath to you, if that procedure is satisfactory i 6 to you.

7 MR. FORTUNA: Yes, your Honor. I believe, though, 8

that the Regional staff and their counsel was going to wrap 9 up their presentation prior to mine.

10 JUDGE SMITH: Well, that say very well be, but 1

11 ve have been going on sort of a round-table basis, very

• 12 informally. You can chip in, and whatever, so we ought to 13

, , start from the very outset that you are able to provide k Id information.

, 15 Whereupon, f

8 16 ROGER FORTUNA

• 17 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn, 8

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was examined and testified as follows:

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$ MR. GOLDBERG: Judge, I thought that we would i

} 20 conclude informational presentation from the Region III I

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21 inspectors regarding allegations pending the Region's g 22 inspection, and then I would invite Mr..Fortuna to comment I, 23 on this.

24 The information elicited from the OI investigators 25 perhaps should be transcribed in~a separate bound record in g< .

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s i the event that that office and the Region III office has a 2 different position about any future disclosure, either 3 restricted or otherwise.

4 JUDGE SMITH: That makes sense. I see no 5 problem with that.

3 MR. GOLDBERG: I believe that the witnesses 7 vere nearing the conclusion of their oral presentation, a Mr. Hayes.also has a written summary which, to some extent, 9

is more extensive than the oral information that was to imparted yesterday and may be of added value in enabling 11 the Board to understand the substance of the allegations.

12 and their potential importance.

13 JUDGE. SMITH: Who wrote the summary?

(~/. 14 MR. HAYES: Both of us. t j

, 15 JUDGE SMITH: Maybe we can just bind it into f

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is the transcript and that way that will simplify the safeguardiah

! 17 of it.

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l 18 MR. GOLDBERG: We have an official copy to have i

e 19 bound in for that purpose. Is that correct, Mr. Hayes?

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20 MR.-HAYES: Yes.

l 21 (The Written Summary of Region III follows:)

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O PRESENTATICN TO THE ATCMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD REGARDING ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE BYRON ELECTRICAL CONTRACTOR (BY D. W. HAYES /KEVIN CONNAUGHION)

PURPCSE

he purpose of this presentation is to provide all information Region III has in regard to those allegations concerning the Byron electrical contractor that have not been investigated to date. Cur presentation will not identify the individuals :naking the allegation or an individual that may be the subject of an allegation. If the Board feels however, that they need these names we will provide them, b'** dh 4 us,s-l-a/~t~hakaf *eme f u . < L. .:,,.-

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The first group of allegations discussed will be those within the purview 1

ef of Region III 1sud the second group will be those referred to the Office k?

of Investigation (OI). It should be noted, that during the course of

,1 jse investigating these allegations, Region III :nay identify elements of 7<

- wrong doing which would be referred to CI and conversely CI may identify elements that are solely technical .in nature and these would be referred to Region III. We will first state the allegation as we understand.it, discuss any potential safety significance and planned action and how on-going or completed activities :nay relate to the allegation. It is our present position that investigation into these allegations must be completed prior to fuel load. If an allegation is substantiated we will make a determination based on the natiure and scope of the problem o as to when corrective action must be completed; either prior to fuel load, I

prior to initial criticallity or prior to power operation above 5%.

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A BACKGRCUND When Region III receives allegations we try to be good listeners. We take down the infor: nation with as few of interruptions as possible and without making judgement as to validity, even though :nany of the anegations are emotionally charged, subjective, very broad in nature or are based on hear-say and rumors. We try to isolate them into ecmplete thoughts then go back over the allegation with the individual to get as much specific information as possible (i.e. dates, location, name and number of the ccaponent(s), other individuals involved, documents, etc.) .

At the end of the interview we go over our notes' with the anager to make sure we have fully and accurately documented the concerns. If the an eger has not already requested it, we ask if he/she wants his/her name and the fact he/she came to the NRC kept confidential. We al:so tell the alleger how to contact us if he/she remembers any further infcz: nation, has other concerns and if they want to be advised of the results of our investigation into the concern (s) .

Following cur contact with the alleger our notes are arranged in a logical order and the allegations typed on a'znamo to Region III fiels with copies to appropriate personnel. Meetings are also held to discuss the allegations and. assign responsibility.

Prior to January 1, 1983, allegations were tracked by Region III. Now all allegations and fonowup action are entered in a computer and are tracked by our headquarters staff. Allegations remain open until they have been

" investigated and any required corrective action completed and verified.

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/ ALLEGATICN Unistrut hanger :nembers are being welded to plates with wedge anchors installed.. Wedge anchors are thereby being subjected to excessive heat and stress.

Potential Safety Sienificance, Planned /Related Actions Welding to installed anchor plates, whether held in place by concrete (inch anchor bolts or nelson studs, is cocznon practice throughout the industry and is allowed by design. The support members welded to these plates are usually small angle or channel iron or unistrut. The amount of heat necessary to accomplish the welding is usually small such that the anchor plant is not significantly distorted, unacceptable stress is placed on the anchor bolts or studs or that the concrete behind the plates is damaged.

NRC inspectors as well as the contractor and applicant QA/QC personnel routinely take plant tours. Cne of- the items observed during those tours by those with responsibilities in this area would be anchor plates

.insta led with concrete (inch anchor bolts). Things they would be looking for would be loose or missing bolts, bolts size and installed depth, lack of washers, inadequate nut thread engagement, plate inadequate contact with surface, signs of concrete damage, etc.

Investigation into this matter would include discussions with cognizant personnel, review of DR and NCR logs and a comprehensive plant tour with primary objective to review anchor plate installations.

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], ALLEGATICN "he electrical area at Byron Station is going to be another C h er.

Potential Safety Significance, Planned /Related Actions This " allegation" was oriai nally documented as a "ccmment" . It was subsecuently decided that the censnent would be for:nally addressed as an allegation and discussed in a future NRC inspection report. This "allegatien" lacks substance and is of a highly subjective nature.

It therefore is considered to be of no potential safety significance.

Disposition of this item will be documented in a future inspection report.

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ALLEGATICN 3,

Conduit is being run before inspection of welds on associated hangers.

Potential Safety Significance, Planned /Related Actions i

Running conduit before weld inspections on associated hangers may make the welds more difficult to access and therefore make weld inspections more time consuming. Regardless of how difficult the welds .my be to access, no relief from weld inspection requirements were ever granted.

The allager's concern was not that welds went uninspected but that weld inspection was made more difficult by this practice. No potential safety significance is attached to this allegation.

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A ALLEGATICN Cable pan covers are re:noved and reinstalled without QC inspection as required for initial installation.

Potential Safety Significance. Planned /Related Actions At the ti:ne this allegation was received, per:nanent cable pan covers had not been installed yet. 'A procedure for cable pan cover 1:stallation had not been written yet. Per:nanent cable tray covers are installed per Hatfield Elec*de Capany Procedure 9C. Quality Control inspection is required prior to installation. If for any reason a cover must be subsequently removed,-quality control reinspection is required prior to reinstallation. Hatfield Electric Company Procedure 30 requires periodic surveillance of cable runs to detect and correct situations adverse to quality such as dirt, debris, fire hazards, :nechanical damage to cabling e.nd improper erection of scaffolding on or near cable trays. This allegation does not reflect practices established for cable pan cover i

installation and is therefore of no safety significance.

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f, ALLEGATICN l Alleger told PTL inspectors detailed to Hatfield Electric that they were not to discuss problems with PTL supervisors.

Potential Safety Sicnificance, Planned /Related Actions i Pittsburgh Testing Lab inspectors detailed to Hatfield Electric Compony report administratively (time and attendance, payroll, employee benefits etc.) to supervision at Pittsburgh Testing Lab and report functionally to i

supervisien at Hatfield Electric Company. Any quality problems identified by inspectors are to be documented and processed for correction in i accordance with Hatfield Electric Company procedures. If the inspectors concerns are not resolved to the inspector's satisfaction by Hatfield Electric Capany, the inspector can contact the applicant's quality assurance organiration or Project Construction Depar : ment Quality Control group. If the inspector still does not get satisfaction, he may contact the NRC. This method of escalating inspector concerns is prescribed by.

procedure and all inspectors are given indoctrination training which includes a presentation of these avenues for having inspectors concerns resolved. This policy does not discourage inspectors fr a seeking satisfaction where quality or safety concerns are involved. This allegation has no safety significance.

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[ ALI.EGATIONS (QC Inspector Training and Certification)

A11eger c124M to have reviewed the qualification records of the Hatfield and Pittsburgh Testing electrical inspectors.

Alleger considered only about six of eight Level II inspectors -

to be qualified for the position they hold. As an example, the Lead _ inspectors had background in civil, not electrical, inspections.

Alleger stated that 5 or 6 new welding inspectors have been hired 7 by Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory and detailed to HECo since approximately December 7, 1982. One of the individuals has no QC experience (he worked in a fabrication shop) . Only 1 or 2 individuals have any experience in the nuclear industry.

Hatfield Electric has an extensive training and retraining program 4 which "doesn't accceplish anything." In Deceanber 1981, Hatfield only had four inspectors, but now has 85. 3 e program has not-been able to handle and adequately qualify the number of new inspectors.

Potential Safety Significance, Planned /Related Actions k Ihe first two allegations detail assessments made by the alleger of the qualifications of unnamed Hatfield Electric Cesapmay Level II Quality Contzel Inspectors. The alleger's conclusions that the subject individuals were unqualified appears to be based purely on consideration of the individuals' education and experience. If the specific information contained in these allegations was to be sutstantiated, safety significance would not necessarily be attached to such f:.ndings. In order to assure that the allegers concerns regarding inspector qualification are adequately i

addressed will require that an evaluation be made of all *.evel II inspectors' certification packages against the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6, Cosmoonwealth Edison policy established to assure compliance with ANSI N45.2.6 and Hatfield Electric C T _ny implementing procedures. Any i noncompliances identified as a result of such an evaluation will result v

in subjecting the improperly certified individual (s) work to reinspection 4

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as is currently being done for previously identified improper CC inspector certifications. The safety significance of any such identified noncompliance would thereby be eliminated because reinspection would be performed to the extent necessary to establish the individual (s) capability or othezwise i

re-establish the quality of all work originally inspected by the individual (s) .

The third allegation was addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-454/6.-17.

The inspector determined that in December 1981, Hatfield Electric had approwhately 50 personnel (super risor, inspectors, as-built documentation) in quality control and a total of 70 personnel on August 24, 1982. These figures do not include secretaries / typists assigned to the CC department.

The allegers somewhat subjective statement that the training program i

k " accomplishes nothing" was not evaluated during the subject inspection.

i This allegation is thus considered uninvestigated.

Subsequent review of training documentation as part of the evaluation of certain individuals certification packages in response to other allegations i

indicated that training covered the relevant requirements nf 10 CTR 50, Appendix B, applicable industry standards, design specifications, Hatfield l

Electric ' W ny's Quality Assurance Program and implementing procedures applicable to the areas of certification. A more detailed review of i

Hatfield Electric t'7ey's QC inspector training program will be conducted as part of the NRC's followup of noncompliance 50-454/82-05-19,

50-455/82-04-19 and documented in a subsequent inspection report. The allegations, as stated, have not been substantiated by reviews of QC 6

v inspector training subsequent to receipt of the allegation. Any potential

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safety significance resulting from inadequacies in training identified in the future will be addressed in the same manner as other deficiencies in the QC inspector certification process an'd as described in the preceding discussion of the two allegations concerning QC inspector cer*J.fication.

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O C7 ALLEGATICN

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J Alleger advised he had written a DR for excessive amounts of dirt and debris on top of motor control centers. For the previously cited reasons, the DR was refused, wasn' t voided, I was destroyed and the DR number reissued. Similarly, another I

DR was written for a linear crack in a steel beam. This DR j

cannot be found and the number has bean reissued. (Note:

Alleger provided R. S. Love with copies of both DR's as well as several others with the same problems.)

i l Potential Safety Significance, Planned Actions /Related Actions l

Siis allegation is, in part, a duplicate of another allegation received from this individual on another occasion. Sie portion of the allegation concerning housekeeping was addressed in NBC inspection report 50-454/82-17r 50-455/82-12. Housekeeping is implemented by the Applicant.

If any individual observes ppor housekeeping resulting in conditions adverse to quality, is encouraged to contact the applicant to have r

the conditions corrected. Instructions for reporting housekeeping

problems are posted throughout the plant. The portion of the allegation j concerning a crack in a steel beam has not yet been investigated. Repair of a building structural member would normally be referred to the applicant or the structural steel contractor for corrective action.

Hatfield Electric Ccapany Discrepancy Reports are to be written for nonconformances which can be corrected "in-house". NRC Region III personnel will investigate this allegation to determine whether or not the conditions identified on the copy of the Discrepancy Report provided 1

1 by the alleger have been corrected. Hetfield Electric ev ay can no l

i longer destroy Discrepancy Reports once a Discrepancy Report n e er has i

f been assigned. If after the Discrepancy Report has been assigned a number l

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it is deter:nined that a Discrepancy Report was an inappropriate :nethod for seeking corrective action, the detez2nination is documented and the Discrepancy Report is closed. Hatfield Electric Company now uses a bound and serialized ledger for logging discrepancies. Hatfield Electric Company's earlier practice in controlling Discrepancy Reports was not tamper proof, however, this allegation does not indicate that the items for which Discrepancy Reports were determined inappropriate went uncorrected. The safety significance of this allegation lies with' the current condition of the steel beam referenced by the alleger.

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,A ALLEGATICNS (Welding CA/QC) 1

/6 Weld undercut is a widespread and serious problem.

ff Some hangers do not have weld travelers for the aux steel.

A large number of welds performed in 1979 and 1980 that were 4 accepted as satisfactory in reality do not meet AWS requirements (40%) due to procedural deficiencies (i.e. lack offCC hold ,

points for preheat verification, temperature stick logs, etc.) . I i

/ !I- For certain hangers covered with fireproofing insulation and for which weld travelers were missing, the insulation was removed and welds reinspected. A reject rate of approximately 90% has been established for these welds.

gf A " Unit Surveillance Walkdown" of a system (not specified) performed by Pittsburgh Testing Labs and CECO resulted in a 38% weld rejection rate.

l ff In drawing area 03051 or 13051 (426' level) 64 hangers were to be checked. Of the 36 or 37 hangers with all welds accessible, 14 had bad connections. The inaccessible welds had to be accepted I on the strength of the weld cards. Authorization to remove insulation to inspect walds was denied.

/6 Panels in Unit 1 containment supplied by Systems Controls Corporation have welds that are not to code (AWS) in that they are undersized (3/8" vs 5/8") .

/7 Some welds that have been covered with fireproofing are only tackwelded. When found, a traveler is written without a Discrepancy Report being written.

g An inspection by alleger revealed a weld not to plan. The welder indicated on the traveler was neither onsite, nor issued weld rod on the date indicated on the traveler. A person asked alleger to change the date on the traveler. i Alleger stated that he would not. j l

" General surveillance of this project illustrates that p7 approximately 90% of the "B" welds on DV-164's are 1/8" undersize where tube steel has been used. In most cases this represents a 40% decrease in size and 55% in strength".

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)c) The disposition on a D2 was false. The report was written '

for. lack of welding pre-heat. The inspector observed the process throughout, but the dispositioning engineer took the word of the welding foreman, who claimed pre-heat had y been done. The report claimed the weld was removed, but it wasn't.

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n Potential Safety Significance, Planned Actions /Related Actions me first allegation in the area of weld quality concerns weld undercut.

Se alleger was referring specifically to welding performed by Hatfield Electric Company involving cable trays, hangers and associated structural elements, me potential safety significance ultimately depends upon the severity of the undercut and the design, margins employed in the selection of structural elements. The applicable American Welding Society (AWS) codes specify =mvimum permissable undercut as a function of structural member thickness or 1/32", whichever is less, ne alleger characterized weld undercut as a " serious" problem in the context of AWS Code c mpliance. The reinspection program established in response to NRC findings 50-454/82-05-19 50-455/82-04-19 and which is currently V

underway has identified instances of excessive undercut resulting in weld rejection and requiring rework / repair to achieve AWS Code compliance.

In general, the weld applications involved in electrical installations at Byron Station are such that undercut would have to greatly exceed AWS Code limits to compromise the structural adequacy of the installations and thereby have any real safety significance. In any event, based on a review of the results of the reinspection program, NRC Region III personnel will determine the need for additional reinspections and corrective actions to assure compliance with Applicant comunitments to the AWS Code.

Se second allegation in the area of weld quality concerns lack of documentation (either lost or destroyed) of quality control inspections for certain welds. When required documentation becomes irretrievable regardless of the reason, the quality of the affected item must be O

O re-established by reinspection. Hatfield Electric Company policy and procedures require that the lost documentation be identified as a discrepancy on a Discrepancy Report and that to clear the discrepancy, a reinspection be performed and documented. The allegation, as stated, does not have safety significance. Contractor QA audits ar.d oversight audits by the Applicart's QA organization, are perfor:ned to detsmine whether or not required documentation is established and maintained and that a mechanism for re-establishing'the quality of items for which documentation is lost exists and is effectively implemented. Additionally NRC inspections of Hatfield Electric Ccampany have been perfnM and will continue to be perfoz:ned to assure that required doc.nnentation is established, : maintained and retrievable.

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( The third allegation concerns welding procedure deficiencies regarding weld preheat. NBC Region IU personnel with swJ.se in this area will perform a detailed evaluation of this allegation and an investigation to determine whether or not corrective action is warranted to repair / rework itene affected by this procedural deficiency. Current procedures comply .

with AWS requirements.

Se fourth allegation in this area identifies welds which were subject to corrective action and reinspection. mese welds therefere do not have potential safety significance. Due to the inordinately high reject rate, however, it could be inferred that the acceptabilitf of other welds covered by fireproofing is highly suspect. welds covered by fire retardent insulation are being reinspected as part of the reinspection program V

established in response to NRC findings 50-454/82-05-19s 50-455/82-04-19.

Se results of weld reinspections requiring insulation removal will be r

evaluated as a group to determine whether or not the percentage of I

welds found to be rejectable warrants additional reinspection of, we,1ds l covered with fireproofing. The scope of reinspection of welds covered with fireproofing will be expanded to the extent necessary to demonstrate or establish acceptable weld quality and compliance with applicable requirements. Any potential safety significance of this allegation will thereby be eliminated.

Se fifth allegation merely reports the results of an oversight inspection initiated by the Applicant of his own accord. The applicant's corrective action system is adequate to resolve these welding deficiencies thereby e14=4amting any potential safety significance attached to those inspection findings. .

J The sixth allegation details a reinspection effort conducted by the alleger. nough it is not clear frcus the allegation as it is stated, the alleger apparently felt that the weld rejact rate was high enough that removal of fireproofing to reinspected additional welds was warranted. The alleger states that 14 of 36 or 37 had bad connections (individual welds). The ntuber of welds associated' with each hanger is widely variable depending on the hanger configuration. It is therefore unclear what the percentage of the total number of welds was rejectable.

The alleger identified welds found rejectable were subject to corrective action. Whether or not the removal of fireproofing to reinspect additional welds was warranted in the instance referred to by the I

alleger is' not clear. As stated in the discussion of the fourth

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allegation in this area, welds covered by fireproofing are included

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in the reinspection program established in response to NRC findings 50-454/82-05-19: 50-455/82-04-19. The quality of welds covered by fireproofing will be evaluated to decexmine the need for additional reinspections.

The seventh allegation in this area concerns undersize welds on panels supplied by Systems Controls corporation. The alleger identified the undersize welds presumably by direct observation. The problem of undersize welds and other deficiencies with panels supplied by this

! company were identified by the NRC and the applicant and corrective actions initiated well before the alleger identified the undersize I welds. Any potential safety significance of the identified nonconformances will be eliminated by corrective actions required to be taken and subject to NRC review and approval. Completion of corrective actions is required prior to plant operation.

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! 2e eighth allegation concerns incomplete welds being covered by fire-proofing insulation. Since welding was not completed, a weld traveler indicating weld completion and quality control inspection did not exist. 2 establish the quality of the weld and required documentation, fireproofing was removed. Detection of any such welds would be accomplished when assembling required documentation for the item prior to release to the owner (Applicant) . Ideally, coordination of fireproofing activities with cable tray hanger installation would have precluded such occurrences. We welds referred to by the alleger were completed l I

and subject to inspection. The alleger felt that a Discrepancy Report

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should have been written. Had the . item been previously accepted, a l l

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Discrepancy Report should have been written but this apparently was not the case. Fireproofing an incomplete and/or uninspected item while not a good practice, does not result in the item being accepted because in order to satisfy documentation requirements the item must be ecmplete, inspected, and found acceptable. The likelihood of an inccmplete or unacceptable item going undetected might be increased by premature application of fireproofing and therefore the frequency of this occurrence should be minimited. As part of the NRC evaluation of reinspection program results the frequency of occurrences of this type will be an=4ned to determine if any additional actions are required to assure that such incomplete or uninspected items have not gone undetected.

The safety significance of this allegation is minimal when considering the mechanism in place, particularly the system of quality documentation, V

to assure detection of incomplete or uninspected items.

The ninth allegation in this area concerns an apparent discrepancy between the date on a weld traveler and other documents which indicate that the welder identified on the traveler 'was not on site on that date.

1 When a weld traveler is lost, a new weld traveler is initiated to re-establish and document the quality of an item. The item (weld) must be reinspected. Since the original record is lost, it is ig ossible to determine the date on which the weld was made. The welders identification, however, can be obtained since it is marked or stamped on the itam.

The new weld traveler therefore has the correct welder's identification.

The date on the new weld traveler is the date the quality of the item was re-established by reinspection. The alleger apparently was unaware of

%/

these possible circumstances. Why an individual asked the alleger to l

O change the date on the weld traveler is unknown. h discrepancy report referenced by the alleger will be reviewed by NRC personnel to 4

determine if it was resolved properly. Any indication of impropriety involving the alteration of required records will be referred to the NRC Office of Investigations. As stated, this allegation does not necessarily have any safety significance.

i The tenth allegation in this area concerns potentially undersized welds.

The potential safety significance of this allegation is dependent upon the margins employed in the design of hangers utilizing the "DV 164" connection detail. Welds on these connections are included in the reinspection program. The results of the reinspection program will be l evaluated to detezzine, among other things, whether or not this allegation 1

can be substantiated. NBC Region III weld experts will investigate I

this allegation. Corrective actions will be required to assure thac the i welds referenced by the alleger are reworked / repaired to achieve compliance l

with design specifications.

f a

The eleventh allegation in this area concerns a failure to preheat prior I

to welding. A discrepancy Report was written by the alleger. The weld i was to have been removed and the item rowelded with preheat prescribed by procedure. The Discrepancy Report indicated that the required corrective actions were performed. A review of the subject Discrepancy Report indicated that the alleger signed the report acknowledging corrective action was completed and that the discrepancy was appropriately resolved though the alleger annotated the report indicating that he had not witnessed preheating prior to remaking the weld. The alleger's signature on the Discrepancy Paport is at odds with the substance of his

O allegation which is that no corrective actions were performed. The subject weld will be examined to determine whether or not there is any evidence that the item had been or had not been reworked. The alleger did not indicate how he detexnined the disposition of the Discrepancy Report to be false. Any indication of impropriety involving falso records will be referred to the NBC Office of Investigations.

1 I

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21. Allegation: Corrective action is often untimely. Resolution of discrepancies may take up to four months. This may preclude the Discrepancy Report originator f rom reviewing the resolution for l

! acceptability.

! I 2

Potential Safety Significance In the case of a nuclear power plant under construction, the timeliness of correction action is a concern in several regards. Corrective actions l

might become harder to implement as the project progresses due to ongoing j construction activities which may make one item harder to correct or result.

in more items requiring correction. If corrective action takes a great deal of j

time, tr a likelihood that documentation of the item or condition requiring corrective action will be lost or destroyed increases. The alleger's concern that the originator may not ,have the opportunity to verify corrective ~ actions does not have potencial safety significance. As long as the description of the item.or condition requiring corrective is adequately documented (as required) l and the individual accepting the resolution of the item or condition is 4

properly certified to do so, it does not matter that the originator does not review the resolution for acceptability.

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'!te tenth allegation concerns the overstressing of cables.

A procedure does exist to control cable tension during installation and based on periodic inspections and observations by our inspectors we believe with minor exceptions that this procedure was being followed.

Cn occasion overtansioning of cables has occurred but in each case that we reviewe1 it was properly documented and corrected.

y From the information we have from the alleger we believe that the alleged cable overstre-sing only inve'.ves a few isolated cases and ver/

l likely they were documented and corrected. If the cable broke there would be no safety concern since the cable would not be usable and replacement would have been required. Although remotely possible, if overstressing did occur to the point it caused the conductor and insulation to yield but not to the point of breaking, the cable likely would fail (especially if it was a power cable) during initial cable testing or operation of the associated equipment.

14e feel that the alleger's use of the teza overstressed means that the cable manufacturer's r e nded maxianum pulling tension was exceeded.

The fact that this value was exceeded does not mean the cable was over-y stressed or damaged. In fact, depending on the type and size of the-cable and proper installation of the pulling eye this value can be

1 exceeded up to a factor of 4 or 5 without damaging the cable.

In sununary, it's very unlikely that a cable could be tensioned to the point of damage but not breakage. Even so a high prcbability exist it would. be detected prior to plant operation. Further if a damaged safety cable went undetected until some point in its life it may fail the probability of the redundant cable also being damaged or failing at the same ti:ne is very remote.

The alleger's concern appeared to be that the cables were overstressed to the point of breakage. The NRC's concern from a plant safety stand-point is not thac the cables bzoke since this fact could not be hidden but our concern is that: (1) cable overstressing may have occurred but was not documented thus records would not be factual and no corrective

{

action would have been initiated, and (2) damaged cable due'to overstressing may exist in the plant.

The first NRC cencarn has been referred to CI. Investigation of the second will depend on CI's findings..

If the first ccacern is substantiated very likely information as to dates, cables involved, location, etc. would be obtained, as minimum the cable pulling crew would be identified. If only the cable pulling crew was known all of their work could be reviewed with emphasis on those cable pulls with the greatest of requiring high pulling tension (i.e. long runs, runs through conduit with high percent of fill, etc.) .

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-c r'2 5 N 7591

(*

s 1 MR. GOLDBERG: I'd like to return at the end of .

2 the oral presentation to the question of documents, but I '

3 think they ought to conclude their oral presentation and 4

make whatever additional -- provide whatever additional i

, 5 information they believe is necessary, and any summation I i

6 that you feel'would be necessary. l 7 MR. FORMEY: Can we confer for a second? i j

e JUDGE SMITH: Yes, sure. l 9 (Parties conferring.)

l to JUDGE SMITH: Can you divide your comments into '

i 11 two parts? One is commenting where you think_it is 12 appropriate on what the Region III I&E people have to say; 13 and then commenting in a separate transcript on that

- %}

i 14 aspect of what you want to report that should be separate; 15

- understanding that when you comment on what they have to say, 16 you may lose control.

$ 17 MR. GOLDBERG: Was that ' comment directed to --

!e% 18 JUDGE SMITH: To Mr. Fortuna.

1

$ 19 MR. FORTUNA: Your Honor, a's I understand it, I

j 20 we are working under an arrangement that whenever OI makes

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, l 21 whatever presentation is appropriate to the Board, that we E

5 22 will so notify the court reporter.and that will hegin, if I

I 23 you will, a separate record that is bound separately.

24 If, however, during the Regional I&E presentation 25 I offer some comments, I should be aware of the fact that b

~

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ar25-8 739;

,[. 1 chose comments made by me are under separate cover.

3 f

2 JUDGE SMITH: Yes, you lose control of those.

3 MR. FORTUNA: Fair enough.

4 MR. HAYES: Okay. Last night the hour was 5 getting rather late, and we were kind of skipping over a  ;

6 number of details. So for that reason we thought maybe 7 this briefing paper would be of some value to you.

8 There is a couple of exceptions in.here. -We 9 discussed two items we had originally referred to 01, and to which on the 9th of this month felt that there really wasn't l 11 enough information and that Region III ought to take the 12 lead.

13 One of those' concerned some pressure on the b 14 inspectors to complete inspections by January 31st. That 15 is not in here.

16 f The other one concerned cable pulling and over-3

• 17 tensioning. So that's in here, but there's a'little Q

18

{3 handwritten -- the allegation is written by hand rather

=

19 than typed. We will make that available'to you.

20 I thought maybe we might just briefly summarize u

l 21 in a couple of areas to try to put things in perspective I

g 22 a little better than -wha t we may have left them last night.

3 23 As I understood the Board's interest primarily I

24 centered on the cracked beam and the welding problems.

25 In regard to the. beam, we can go out there and if a

S

ht25-9' 7593 I"' i the b~eam is indeed cracked, then we are going to have to '

1 2

make an extensive search to determine why it cracked; if  ;

3 it is a~ metallurgical problem and we've got other beams i

4 of the same heat or whatever the case might be; are there 5 other beams out there that may be cracked or have surface 3 cracks that could lead us into a long effort to-make sure 7 that the problem doesn't exist in the plant.

g If, on the other hand, we-find that there is no crack in the beam, then with a limited. search we may satisfy

~

10 ourselves that was not a valid allegation and go forward.

gi On the welds --

12 (Pause.)

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/~ 1 MR. HAYES: On the welds we performe. 2n inspectior 2

in June and as of June 4th, and based on the inspection re-3 sults which is documented in our inspection report 50-454/83-26 4

that's for Unit One only but there is a corresponding number 5 for Unit 2 -- we found that approximately 21,000 weld attri-6 butes were scheduled to be reinspected by the program that 7 was to be' implemented by Commonwealth Edison Company. Of 8 that 21,000 vald attributes, about 7753 had been inspected 9 as of June 4th. Of the 7753 that have been inspected, they 10 had identified approximately 880 defects, or approximately 11 10 per cent, which substantially lower than the rate of 12 identified defects that the allegers had put forth.

13 J,UDGE CALLIHAN: Excuse me, Mr. Hayes _, these are 14 the Hatfield welds of the cable trays and that sort of thing, 15 the same subject as yesterday?

G g

16 MR. HAYES: Yes, we're talking only abcut the 8

• 17 Hatfield welds, which are involved with the supports for O

18

{3 conduit or cable trays. That'.s the only welds we're talking

$ 19 about.

I y 20 JUDGE COLE: So, what was the allegation, if they e

{ 21 found slightly more than 10 percent or about 10 percent, you 1

22 say that's considerably,less than what was alleged.

8 23 What was alleged?

I w

24 MR. HAYES: As I. recall, there was in some cases, 25 90 percent. defect.

(.

26tg2- 7595 i

i (Ds I MR. CONNAUGHTON: There'were three allegation. Did 2

they merely report the results of reinspections? One~is the 3

reinspection of welds that had been fireproofed and they d

alleged a 90 per cent reject rate. They reported that from 5

an Applicant-sponsored unit-surveillance walkdown, which is 6

an oversight inspection program, the.y had a weld-reject rate 7

of 38 per cent. There's a third' allegation that stated in f

8 the years 1979 and 1980, that approximately 40 per cent of 9

welding performed did not conform to AWS require =ents due 10 to procedural deficiencies in the area of preheat and preheat l 11 verification.

12 JUDGE COLE: The 21,000 welds --

33 MR. HAYES: These are - attributes, not welds.

(1- 1.

-JUDGE COLE: Weld characteristics or weld factions?

15 What percentage reinspection is that? What percentage re-3 16 3

8 inspection of the total number of walds does that represent. I

• 17 roughly,.do you know? It's an awful lot of welds orwelding attri-3 18 ,

2 3

butes?

o I'

y MR. HAYES: No, I' don't have'that figure at hand.

20 u

As you say, it's a fairly substantial number,

! 21 As I recall.-there was 45,000 weld's total and 1

22 3 - I would say there was probably six or seven attributes per 5

23 g weld, so, as I unders tand , that reinspection program has been 2.

expanded so they have added to that since we made our inspec-25.

tion. But we should know that there may be more than one

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defect per weld. In other words, the 8'18 does not necessarily

.2 represent 818 defective welds, it may be three or four 3

defects identified on one weld. Most have more than one d weld, and a failure of one weld-to meet the requirements 5

would not necessarily indicate that the hanger would not per-6 form its design function.

7 And, further, a failure of one-hanger would not

~8 necessarily indicate that the whole support system would fail.

9 In fact, the design allows for a certain per cent of failures.

10 JUDGE COLE: So, you're telling us something about 11 the significance of this 10 per cent, sir? .

12 MR. HAYES: Yes, we have not evaluated all of these 13 yet and we would have to take into account where they'd con-Id centrated on hangers right in a row and in that case, that 15 would be a little more serious, and if they were randomly 16 spread out throughout the plant and we have a bad weld here 1 17 and a bad weld there, it would-not have-the same significance.

3 18 g We have just not evaluated those nor have we l'

u evaluated the seriousne'ss of the defect itself, so that-all 1

20 g has to be done. But I don't want to make this a bigger

, { 21 problem chan it really is. There's.just a lot of unknown t

[ 22 values in there, but as I said yesterday with the information 8

23 g I have today, it does not indicate this will be a significant 24 safety problem. We still have to reserve the judgment yet 25 i

to reevaluate it.

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/~N 1 JUDGE COLE: All right, sir. Now pursuing your 2 basis for that statement a' littis bit, to satisfy myself, 3 is that in good part because~of your knowledge that these 4 things are being identified and will be corrected, or is it 5 on the basis that'that percentage of weld failures are faulty a welds is not really something to be overly alarmed about,.

7 that this is typical of what you might find in a plant, or ,

8 is it something that we should be alarmed about, but because 9 it's going to be corrected and it's being identified now and 10 will be corrected that it's not going to 'ge a safety-problem?

11 MR. HAYES: I was looking at it fro = the fact that; 12 perhaps the majority of them would not have to be corrected.

I 13 '

They will be corrected since we know they are defective, but

/ 14 they will either be evaluated and shown to me. The design

, 15 requirement although they may not fully meet all of the code l 5 i g 16 requirements, or they'will.be replaced and brought up the 8

=

17 full design requirements, our Code requirements, so there is o

$ 18 that problem in industry.

3 j 19 I cannot tell you what the percentages are. I t

j 20 know that we have identified problems in every plant that c

l 21 I'm familiar with with AWS. welding, where it does not meet I

g 22 all the criteria for one rnason or another and generally, 3

23 that's undercut and overlap. The Code, as I understand it,

.I 24- is being changed so it's more definitive so the inspectors 25 can make a little better call on these.

A. ,

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I

26rg5 7598 *

'[ - i JUDGE COLE: So, do you have any knowledge of the 1

2 nature of the kinds of defects that are being identified.

3 are most of.them of the undercut type or what?

4 MR. HAYES: Yes, most of them are undercut or 5 overlap and there's a sprinkling of other types, lack of 6 fusion or lack of full size, things of that nature, but the 7 majority of them are either overlap or undercut that exceeds ,

I a the 1/32nd allowable, i i

9 JUDGE COLE: You were talking yesterday about the to possibility of changing the specfications as to the amount'of si undercut and a slight change there'would do away with a con-12 siderable part of the discrepancies?

- 13 MR. HAYES: I believe that's true. I haven't loo ked 14 at all of these but that has been true with Zimmer and I t

15 believe that same thing was true --

the undercoat is somewhere to between 1/32nd and 1/16th.

! 17 JUDGE COLE: All right, sir, so that's another I

is reason why your fears are lessened as to the magnitude of the Up problem.

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.- 20 MR. HAYES: Right, that and the knowledge that e

{ 21 the designer ususally has a large amount of safety. factor in t

g 22 most of his welds.

'I 23 JUDGE SMITH: One of the things I think we should I

24 avoid if we can is --

this information that has been learned 25 upon the reinspection is alluded to in your testimony?

2.6 c g 6 7599 QPs 1 MR. HAYES: Yes, it's preliminary information. i i

2 JUDGE SMITH: And it's going to be available with-3 out reservation at any time it's ready?

4 MR. HAYES: Yes, that information is in a report 5 right now, except the -- some'of the -- I'didn't make any .l t

6 judgments as to what its impact on safety might be, I just  !

I put the raw figures in, how many accepted and how many have l 8 been rejected.

JUDGE SMITH: I would like to, as much as possible 10 it's going to be very difficult for us to do but to repeat on.

4 11 the open record the explanations that you give us concerning 12 .t he safety significance, 13 MR. HAYES:

gg Okay, I don't think anything I've Id just told you, other than alluding to allegations, I would 33 not have a_ problem making public.

3 10

$ JUDGE SMITE: I don't know how we can approach 8

37 that. It may he char --

3 l

i 18 g JUDGE COLE: Maybe I can ask some dumb questions?

s e

l' 3 (Laughter.)

20 JUDGE SMITH: Maybe if you have time you can get 21 the transcript, of this in camera procedure, yesterday and j 22 coday, and pick out the parts that you think can be made I 23 g public and add them to your testimony.

24 MR. HAYES: I'm sure I would anticipate that 25 I would get a series of questions tomorrow or whenever we

(.

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7600 l

1 go en the stand along that line. But our purpose here was '

2 just to try to put it in perspective as we see it today.

3 JUDGE SMITH: But as a general objective, let's j 4 l' do what we can do to get permissible information out.

l l

5 MR. HAYES: Okay, Illl try to do that tonight.

6 There's one other item.I'm not sure that we provided you  !

t 7 all of the examples of.why we felt releasing some of this

)

9 information might be harmful to our investigattod effort 9 or inspection effort. t 10 I have a couple more examples that I personally 11 run into that I can maybe show you what can happen ifsomeonel 12 has knowledge ahead of time. I'd be glad to share that with 13 you if you wish.

V 14 JUDGE SMITH: Yes, that's fine. I really think 15 it's not going to take much for you to convince us that e

g to people --

involved people should not learn ahead of time what 8

End 26U your inspection program is going to be.

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• 1 MR. HAYES: '

I learned, and an investigator with 2

me learned -- we~were interviewing a person and we were '

3 after certain reccrds that had a bearing on these allegationsj l

4 on the adequacy of some of the work that was done at a  !

l 5 nuclear power plant site. And the person we were talking i i

o to said, ."Well, yes, I've got those records, they're back i l

7 on my desk. I've got . chose notes on some drawings," he said.

8 So we said, "Can we get them?" "Sure." ,

9 So we were walking back to his office -- this 4

10 was after lunch or the noon whistle had blown and a couple 11 of his buddies said, " Hey, you're holding up the card I 12 game."

13 And the guy said, "Well, can I give them to you 14 after lunch?"

15 And so we said, "Well, I guess, okay."

g to So we went to lunch, he went to lunch, we esme 3

3 17 back, the records had been shredded, and the explanation we

{3 18 got was that, "Well, gee, the guy that was shredding then,

$. 19 he didn't know that I wanted e.o keep them."

t 20

.j So, you know, there we were. In the future if

] 21 somebody is going to give us documents,'we don't let him E

g 22 out of our sight.- So that's one case.

5 23 And I've gone back where documents have disappeared 24 from the file. You look at it and then you look at another 25 file, and when you look at the other file, it has a bearing 4

ar27-2 7602- -

E' i on s omething you saw in this file, and all you've got is ,

2 just some very cryptic notes, but when you go back to pull 3 that important paper out of that file, it's gone.

4 It's very subtle. There's not much~you can do 3 about it, but it happens to you.

o I'd like to think everybody is honest, but that 7 is not always the case.

8 JUDGE COLE: How often does that nappen? '1 9 MR. HAYES: Not too many times. I'd say in the

{

to 13, or going on 14 years that I've been involved in it inspections and investigations, that has happened to me 12 about seven or eight times. It's not a real frequent one, 13 but it has been crucial sometimes.

14 Bill makes a good point. Those two cases I 13 mentioned did not involve Commonwealth Edison Company. It 16 was at another power plant site. I have not run into any I 17 C

problems of this nature with the Commonwealth Edison Company

$ 18 to date.

n -

ig JUDGE CALLIHAN: When you say Commonwealth I

j 20 Edison Company, do you include also the Byron site activities?

e

{ 21 MR. HAYES: Yes, Byron and Braidwood.

t ,

2 22 That's all I have, unless there is more questions.

I 23 MR. GOLDBERG: Judge Smith, let me just see'if I i

24 understand --

25 MR. TORNEY: That's all one, that's just one ~ copy.

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'cr2713 7603 6-$

1 MR. HAYES: We made a copy, but there are two 2 copies in existence that are exactly like that.

3 (Pause.)

4 JUDGE SMITH: Okay. Also, however, we' do want 5 to keep.down the number of copies. It looks like we won't 6 have a chance to digest this while it's going on. It's 7 longer than I thought. so I don't really think.there is 8 much point in it, other than just to give it to her to bind 9 in.

10 (Parties conferring.-)

11 MR. GOLDBERG: Just before we turn to the OI 12 personnel. I just want to make sure I understood a little 13 bit of the status.

i 14 As I understood,.if the Board contemplaces any I

~

15 kind of unrestricted disclosure of this information that 16 the Staff would have an opportunity to present additional

{

3

• 17 in camera information regarding the need for nondisclosure o

$ 18 to supplement Administrator Kepler's public affidavit.

1 19

{ JUDGE SMITH: Did you intend to say unrestricted

) i j 20 disclosure?

e l 21 MR. GOLDBERG: Unrestricted disclosure.

I 22 JUDGE SMITH:

g Well, in the first place, I can't 3

23 imagine we would do any such thing. But my comment yester-I' 24 day, which I think that you were alluding to, was even if 25 there is a decision on our part to make restricted O

or27-4 .760a

'l.

D, i j disclosure --

that is disclosure under protective order 2 and affidavit of nondisclosure -- we would get back to you l,

, 3 before we did such a thing.

4 MR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I understand it to be that 5 we will have a chance to be heard before you make any 6 disclosure decision, whether restricted or unrestricted, 7 and I think we are talking about what you have indicated is 8 an unlikely decision on unrestricted disclosure.

9 JUDGE SMITH: Yes. I haven't seen anything yet to of the information that we have. agreed should be unrestricted..

Il The only thing I have been talking about is the safety 4

12 significance explanation that is usually of an open nature.

33 MR. GOLDBERG: Okay.

f.(

^

14 And the other maccer is documents. I may not 15 have been very clear yesterday. Let me say that the Staff l

3 j 16 does have documents which identify the allegations which 1 17 they have described yesterday to you, and further today.

3 4 18 One document, a March 11, 1983 memorandum i

,S 19 originated by Mr. Torney, is the subject of the OI f

g 20 investigation, and I would like Mr. Fortuna, during that t

1 21 phase of the presentation, to comment on his position I

g 22 regarding provision of that document to the Board.

5 23 But let me say generally, without exception, I 24 feel once'the Region III and OI presentation is completed, 25 you will'have more information, considerably more a

e'

. _. _ _= _ .

a/27-5 7605 YN i information, about the nature and substance of the allegations 2 than are contained in those documents.

l 3 However, I did offer yesterday to make them

, available, if you. felt- they were necessary. I do not feel, a

5 having seen them, that they vill add anything to your 6 understanding and may unnecessarily create additional papers 7 to be preserved along with the record that's been transcribed.

g{ But --

9 JUDGE SMITH: I still don't know what the to significance is.

i MR. COLDBERG: Let me ask then, Mr. Hayes, if l t

12 he would -- I can have Mr. Hayes describe the documents to l I

ir i3 you. They are internal memoranda originated by various >

i 34 inspectors that describe.in iterative form the allegations 7

15 and, in some cases, a summary of those allegations where l

}

r j.

i3 they have been referred to OI, and perhaps Mr. Hayes may be

} the most knowledgeable about i7 --

> a ig JUDGE SMITH: Now we're going into a new phase 1 l, o of your presentation.

p, These documents relate not to the f'

4 i

20 21 or so Office of Inspection & Enforcement allegations.

' e l 21 MR. GOLDBERG: Let me make it clear that.these t

i 22 documents relate to the entiracy of the allegations, both

! 23 those which have been inspected and I think we've got to I*

24 realize that over half have been inspected, and the balance 25 that remain uninspected.

1 a

}

cr27-6 .

606 (M

We provided the parties with copies, expurgated  !

2 4

copies, of those documents to exclude the identification of 3

incomplace aspects of the inspection, allegations as yet uninspected. And we can provide'to the Board 'those documents 5

in their complete form, although we would advocate the s

l 6 excision of confidential informants, because we have '

already --

8 JUDGE SMITH: Didnc we have this identical discussion yesterday? l 10 MR. GOLDBERG: Yes, and I'm just saying I don't believe there is anything in that material that is going to 12 provide any further information than has already been

'3 provided orally.

d 14 JUDGE COLE: And I thought we agreed.

= '3 MR. GOLDBERG: Okay. I just wanted to make sure.

!3

] '*

JUDGE CALLIHAN: Before you go too far, I

'I 3

heard an allusion, Mr. Goldberg, to our. receiving

, j 18

" considerably more information." Now in what form is that i

19 g information and is that information related to these 20 documents that you have just been discussing? Maybe.I mis-21 j heard.

I 22

'8 1 MR. GOLDBERG: The information I as referring to 23 l is the oral information that you received yesterday, 24 complemented by the written summation prepared by the 23 witnesses that descri.es in far greater detail the J

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_ _ . . - , . , _ . - _ . . - . - _ m . . . - . , . - . - -

7 ar2767 497 l Q *,

l 1

' allegations pending inspection, and their importance and 2

6 their inspection plans. The material that we have --

3 JUDGE SMITH: This presentation will include 4

the information that is in the documents. When we get done, 5 we will have more information from this presentation than a the documents will give us. We will have all of the 7 document'information plus more.

8 JUDGE CALLIHAN: And that which is yet to come 9 is primarily OI-oriented?

10 MR. GOLDBERG: Yes. And as I say, with the 11 exception of one document pertaining to an allegation 12 referred to 01, you have already heard the sum and substance 13 of the Staff information regarding allegations under Region -

(. fd III inspection. '

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jl.28-1 , 76G5 l ':?s' j 1 So, unless there's anything further, I guess we

]

2 ought to have OI present their information. ,

3 4 JUDGE SMITH: Wait a minute.

4

.). Weren't they going to us -- oh, I see. I thought j 5 they were going to give us additional information about theiri a vi w og __

i I

JUDGE CALLIHAN: Who's "they"?

8-JUDGE SMITH: Office of Inspectin and Inforcement.

i S i

Do you think that this is going to be neatly lo severable now?

Il <

Mr. Fortuna can pick up everything -- all aspects 4

12 of his purview that relates to -- that the office of 13 i Inspection and Enforcement participated in.

l \_

Id I understand there is to be some overlapping, and

). 15 I thought that they were going to explain the overlap, and

'8-jj I6 Mr. Fortuna was going to comment on the overlap, and then ii 17 i o we would go into the exclusive office of Investigation part.

)l

!l 18 MR. GOLDBERG: As I understand it, the assignment

I l' iI of allegations either by Region III, IE or OI, is agreed. And lg 20

'r we have provided information concerning allegations under l]

4 a 21 Region III IE inspections. And Mr. Fortuna will make his 22

)3 presentation regarding the balance of allegations which are "8 23 ia under exclusive investigation by OI.

1}

'2d i

I'm not sure that.there is any longer an overlapping 2s responsibility, unless I'm mistaken.

j j

k-i f

31.28-2 7609 MR. FORTUNA: The only overlap might be.that there '

2 are certain pieces of paper that I belle n are in possession 3

of the Region, which,although generated bf the Region, discuss in part that which is presently being worked on or about to be 3

worked on by the Office of Investigations.

i

• The overlap may come in the sense that the Office 7

of Investigations may be not particularly anxious to have 8

those pieces of paper provided to this scard or under >

restricted disclosure or under unrestricted disclosure.

'O But the Region-generated documents -- the overlap may be the Region passed this allegation. OI agreed we were

'2 responsible for pursuing it, and we would tave a reluctance i

'3 to share that document with this Board to parties either under' Ird f restricted or unrestricted disclosure. Su: they're not our l 13 t documents. But we could contend that reve11: ions of those  !

2

! '* portions of those documents may have a deleterious impact s

' l '#

G upon our investigative effort.

'8 That's, I think, the overlap issue.

o I'

] g And you alerted Mr. Goldberg :: the memorandum that >

20 f

t Mr. Forney drafted up on March lith of tnis year. There would i 21 l be on such piece of peper.

22 I MR. GOLDBERG: Yes. But as I understand it, then, "1

23 l you will make a disclosure of the nature of that allegation 2'

so that further provision of that document would be additive 25 to the in camera record.

>~

r

ji 29-3 7610 -

' And that was my point, that at the conclusion of 2

both the I&E and OI presentation, you will have information 3

that is contained in all the documentary material in II's d

possession.

5 JUDGE SMITH: Now, I am concerned about the 6

mechanics of handling this. i 7

I suggest what we do -- I think it's probably a

unlikely that we will not, again, hear from office of Inspection and Enforcement this afternoon.  ;

'O l So, what I suggest we do is, if this is possible,  !

l that we go off the record solely to talk about the mechanics 12 of the transcript.

'3 I 4

(

Let's talk about the mechanics of.the transcript '

' l' off the record.

15 (Discussion off the record.)

3

j j '8 JUDGE SMITH

All right. We're on the record.

I '7 off the record we decided to use the Dewey Decimal 3

j 18 System designation o.f the transcript for Mr. Fortuna's E

presentation.

I 20 t And until we go back to the end of that, let's I s l 21 limit it to Mr. Fortuna's presentation.

t 22 3 MR. GOLDBERG: Before we do that, I think

1. 3

, Mr. Hayes wanted an on-the-record comment.

MR. HAYES: I wanted to make sure there was no

1. 8

misunderstanding on the central relaticnship, that there is at s

P

7611 11as-4 l

rm .

I least one allegation. Both of us are pursuing it jointly.

2 We are pursuing it from a technical standpoint, and OI is 3 pursuing it from a wrongdoing standpoint.

1 4 There is always a chance they will run into

(

l 5 technical matters they will have to refer back to'us that we

{

I 6

i will have to investigate. And we would run into a possibility;'

s

! 7 of things that would fall into their purview, and we would i e refer that back to them.

~

So, there is always a possibility that we'll get 10 into these things.

1 I 11 JUDGE SMITH: I think the better approach, then,  !

1 12 would be for you to chip-in to Mr. Fortuna's comments. !t 13 '

MR. MAYES: If it's appropriate, I will.

'"~

id JUDGE SMITH: Now, we will begin with Mr. Fortuna's!

!l

); 15 presentation at this page number, with the Dewey Decimal f 3 8

j Cnd 28 to System.

!I i7 l3 is ,

I.I i i i 19 4

20 g

t l 21 8

g 22 4

s 23 1

2e 2S l

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