ML20093D623

Comments Re Resolution of Restart Proceeding in Response to Commission 840911 Order.Commission Should Examine Complicity Between NRC Staff & Licensee.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20093D623
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	10/04/1984
From:	Aamodt M, Aamodt N AAMODTS
To:
References
CON-#484-392 SP, NUDOCS 8410110317
Download: ML20093D623 (13)

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'84 BCT 10 P1:24 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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NUCLEAR REGULNIORY CDWISSION .. V..

BEFORE THE (D4 MISSION

. In the Matter of

- Metropolitan FAison Company, et al.

Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 . .

Docket 50-289 S h

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AMODr CDMMENTS (DNCERNING RD93HrION OF '1HE RETTARr PROCEEDING IN RESPONSE TO CDWISSION ORDER OF SEPrDRER 11, 1984 ,,

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. 1 INTRODUCITON By order of September 11, 1984, the Comission pmvided an additional opportunity for the parties to present their positions concerning the mechanism for resolution of the Restart Proceeding.

On August 15 of this year, we brought to the Comission's attention the single mtter which the Comission must, in good conscience, resolve before pmceeding with its review or pmviding for a hearing of any other issues. This is the matter presented in our motion of June 21,.1984 which showed that (1) The health of residents in elevated areas northwest of M is a natter of concern. The cancer death rate is six to eightfold that expected.

(2) The flora in the same areas show effects that can be caused by high doses of radiation.

(3) Many individuals in the same areas who were outside during the initial days of the accident at TMI-2 experienced effects that can be caitaad by high doses of radiation. These effects included metallic taste, reddening of the skin,' hair greying and loss, and diarrhea.

-(4) The Licensee was the sole monitor of radiation relaa m during the initial days of the accident.

(5) The Licensee cl' aims to have lost the original radiation purvey records and the foms and calculations of the two engineers who perfomed offsite dose calculations amund 7 a.m. the morning of the a

M -2 accident.

Until the envi mnmental impact of the accident, particularly as it

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relates to adverse health effects among the, neighboring population has 4

been openly an'd fully resolved, the. consideration of other issues is

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10 grossly inappropriata and a wasta of agency and party time and oth:r resources. If, as we suggest, the Licensee concealed evidence of high radiation releases, denial of the license would be mandatory.

We have included our view concerning resolution of the matter of the training of operators simply to provide additional justification for a postponement of the consideration of that issue until the health / radiation issue has been resolved.

PRCF06AL FOR RESIUTION OF ISSUES 1.o Resolution of the Health / radiation Monitoring Issue.

1.1 Introduction.

In a motion of June 21, 1984, we asked the Comission to investigate the human and floral health effects discovered during the course of a citizen survey conducted in three areas of high elevation L northwest of TMI. We contended that the releases of radioactivity on the initial days of the accident were nuch greater than the Licensee admitted, based on the experiences on those days of a number of a residents residing in the area. Since the Licensee alone monitored the radiation relamaaa during the early days of the accident and since original survey records, the worksheets of engineers who read the dome

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monitors and made initial predictions of offsite doses (of the order of l

,10 and 40 R/hr) and 1NI-2 filters are all claimed to have been lost, we t

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. .further contended that these records were more likely intentionally destroyed. For this reason, we motioned the Comission to delay any decision concerning restart until the matters of radiation dose and l GPU's actions are resolved.- . .

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reasonably, described as a radioactive plume from the TMI-2 plant.

(This experience was related in Affidavit 6 of the June 21 motion.)

An NRC Staff member at TMI, David Collins, stated during a telephone conversation about.the Staff memo of September 12 that the Staff is assured that then is no threat to the health and safety of the residents of the home where alpha radiation was measured a.1d, there is therefore, no justification for pursuing the source of this radiation.

Admittedly, the alpha radiation that was detected emanated from the cracks of the railing and the signal at the surface of the railing was weak, but it was constant, except where the railing had been shielded by:

the person's body (when she leaned over the rail to call the cat).

The NRC Staff, as well as EPA and DER staffers, obtained soil samples from three locations, however we understand all agencies expect j totaketwomonthst$completetheirtesting.

As noted above, we requested EPA to provide its analyses of soil sampling in areas identified northwest of 'INI. We have not, as of this date, been provided with this infortnation although we understand it now exists at the Middletown office.

We' continue to receive information from residents in the 'INI area i 3

which suggests the-i%te presence of high levels of radiation.

7 , This includes the observation and pictures of dandelion leaves over 30 inclee long. We described these flora effects to Dr. James Gunckel of -

Bridgewater, N. J., an authority on ionizing radiation effects in plants. (Dr. Gunckel had examined a number of plants from the TMI area earlier this year and provided an affidavit included in the June 21

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motion.) In a telephone conversation on October 2, Dr. G,unckel stated a

thattheeffectsthatarep'rescentlybeingobserved,okwhichthegiant dandelion leaves are an example, are not mutations from prior fallout

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1.3' Action the Cbmaission Must Take.

he th=nission, must, consistent with their charge to assure public safety, give the natter of health effects i number one priority. Soil testing must be exped[t b without compromising the results. (We understand that the delay is ihrpcised by scheduling of equip 5ent.)

The Cormnimaion must provide the scope and schedule of tte review

• of the health data by CDC. (NitC[sent the June 21 motion to CDC on August 31.

bowever CIC1083g5 M: contacted us to view the raw data.)

, The Corrmission must direct the Staff to initiate a program to nonitor pwperties in the 'IMI area, particularly those at high .

t elevations northwest ,of TMI. Many lives may be a risk. . Does the '#

ingestion of food grown in these areas pose a threat to the health of resident who consdme home-grown food? Do food products from farms in y the area pose a threat to consumers? Is there an ever-present hazard to children and aninnla who romp in the vegetation and play on the i .

y< * ,' ground? Are the trees in forested aivas recycling the radionuclideu , s

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(j whcc3the leaves fall? -Wi-11 raking and burning of leaves pose an- [

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, additional health hazarti? (We have made some measurements which lixiicate radioactivity in tree leaves.,) Are we observing the effects s, of neutron bcabardment? / /

.3, he Comnission must determine Licensee's Inowledge of personal experiencies of residents described in affidavits of the June 21 notion. Did the Licensee know that farmerb northwest o5 the plant can

., no longer frow clover ' seed and have had difficulty growing other crops

'and graden vegetables since tha Secident?$DidltheLicenseehave

[ knowledge of the widespread experience of\ metallic taste? Was the

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Ilcensee aware of reporta of reddening of the skin at th'e time of tha accident, blisters on lips, greying and loss of hair er persistent diarrhea?

Following the August 15 meeting, the Comission requested the Staff to provide any infomation in their possession concerning the experiences of residents as well as the Staff's reply (if any) to Rep.

Stephen Reed's letter of August 15r19 describing residents' experiences.

(his letter was attached to the June 21 motion.) On September 5, 1984, we requested the Comission's provision of f infomation to the parties, and we repeat this request.

2.0 A Hearing to Pr=ine the Matters of Leak Rate Falsification at Both Units.

he hearing of the leak rate falsification matters should proceed and be expanded to include environmental impact, particularly as it effects public health, he Office of Investigations (OI) believes that it has sufficiently resolved managenent nsponsibility for the leak rate i

mtters,to pemit restart of, Uni,t 1. ,However, we would call the (Ymnission's attention to the NRC rules of practice and procedure which j

do not pemit the resolution of important safety issues by a single ,

party, even the NRC Staff. D e investigations of OI have.not been entered into the acord of the proceeding and are, therefore, not a

' legal basis for a Comission decision.

L While the Comission could make a decision imediately effective l

on the basis of review of extra-record evidence (the OI investigations), what confidence can the Commission now have in the

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Staff's findings? The Staff kept these issues of leak yate falsification out of the Restart Proceeding, where they should have l

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been the first evidence considered. Cb the Staff's investigations be trusted?

l he Comission cites (in its onier) a conclusion from the OI investigations that we find incredible. This concerns Michael Ross, manager of TMI-1. 01 has found that Ross did not have any knowledge of leak rate falsification ~at Unit 2 because he was only on duty a few hours each month, his is not a reuuarwmble basis for OI's conclusion.

Ross testified in the " Cheating" hearing that few mtters are held in secret in the plant. Ross testified to his frequent intercharges with operators with whm he worked. Ross was in daily contact with the manager of Unit 2. How could Ross not have had knowledge of daily futile attempts to obtain a . good leak rate at Unit 2?

3.0 Provide Unequivocal Proof that Operators and Managers are Competent.

3.1 Background.

he Comission's August 9,1979 Ortier (at Item 1(e)) required that

)* before restart the Licensee provide' definitive proof that the operators could handle the 'IMI-1 plant under all conditions. Following two hearings which considered this matter, there is no reliable evidence of  ;

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i- the operators' and "danageis' capabilities.

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• What exists is evidence that some operators and managers passed j .

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th'e NRC licensing exam in October 1981 after a second retake, that many failed and that the ARC exam is not a reliable, valid measure of the l

capabilities of the operators. h e other evidence supporting the operators' capabilities was an audit and report contracted by the

.s Licensee. This was the work of the OARP comittee.

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The most noticeable detraction from the c.riginal OARP report was the disparity between the content of the report and the conclusions.

The report discussed a number of significant deficiencies in simulator

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Dese and other problems were not reflected in the sunrnary or conclusions of the repcit.

Two comittee .. l.-1. appeared in the main hearing to support the original OARP report. However, both of these members were psychologists by training and experience, and they admitted that they had no knowledge of nuclear subjects. The psychologists were the only connittee members who observed the training p1w1am firsthand,- so there

..was no credible discussion.of the content and effectiveness of the Operator Accelerated itetraining Program, designed in response to the Chr==nia= inn's August '9 order. Another tvmenittee member with nuclear.

wportise was at the plant but simply evaluated a single aspect of the use of a new pam (dubbeo Decision Analysis) to be used by shift supervisors and

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managersTn thetevent of a tr'ansient'.

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'Ibe Licensoe, if it tilangrees with the above assertion concerning the participation of the original OARP committee members, could clear  :

the air by providing swo9n affidavits from each member of the original

,connittee describing with specif'icity his participation in the original

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connittee review and his independent conclusions at that time.

No reliable information supporting the adequacy of the training of f

operators and managers exists on the restart record. Judge Milho111n did, however, produce some reliable evidence. of .the inadequacy of 1

training by questioning operators during the Cheating"4 hearing.

. he extra-record evidence .provided by the Licensee and the NRC Staff is difficult to assess. In the first place, there are serious o.

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l conflicts in this information. Three audits, contracted by GPU during the years 1982-3 found serious deficiencies in the training p @ am. .

These audits were reported in September 1982 by Data Design Lab and In February 1983 by RHR and BETA.

On the other hand, the Rickover and new OARP Corsalttee report, also contracted by GPUN, found traiding to,be adequate.

It should be noted, in attempting to understand the conflicts in the various reports, that with the exception of the RHR and BETA reports, the audits were contracted for use in the Restart Pzoceeding.

Some of the reports were extremely shallow, particularly the Rickover and new OARP corsnittee report. The Design Data Lab mport is an

" anomoly,being contracted, it would appear,to deflect the deficiencies in trainina which surfaced in the " Cheating" hearing and yet not being Understandably, Licenseeg a patent endorsement of the trainina p @ am.

• - bas' not promoted the' Design Data Lab study, however it should be of:

interest to the Commission. (We di m W aspectsofthestudyinour{

cormnents of February 18, 1984.)

3.2 Discussion. #

Further hearing to consioer the matter of operator. training will The same judge is presiding j

probably not produce any reliable results.

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who was satisfied with the shallow testimony from Licensee and Staff witnesses. For instance, the Board under this judge assumed that a license condition of three additional days of training in 'DfI-2 events would cure the numerous deficiencies so readily apparent and identified in both the Owudth and Aamodt f16 din);s. (The fact that the e

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i Cu.walth withdrew its findings and was satisfied with Licensee's promise l of a bit mre training should not have influenced the Board. See Condition 9, August 27, 1981 PID.) .

An arkninistrative hearing cannot assure that training has been effective for every operator or every crew. A hearing can only seek to prove that training is generally ineffective or generally effective.

However, a single inapy w griately-trained' operator or manager called to perform in a time of emergency can undermine the plant's safety systevas.

3.3 Conclusion.

The only viable means.1by which to determine whether or not an \

operator or manager i,s adequately trained is to test him/her on an exact-replica simulator of the 'DdI-1 plant. GPU expects to have.an exact-zwplica simulator in place in mid-1985. The resolution of the training issue should await the availability of that simulator. In

' vieir of' the pras=Iww* of the h~ealth/ radiation mnitoring' issue, delay in resolution of the training issue would be an applopriate conservance

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of. agency and party rescurces. ,

l l The trat ,ing issue'should be explanded to include managers.There

, was testim ny in the main hearing to the effect that managers, nearly t .

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N11newtocommercialnuclearpowerplantoperation,wouldbegina l

course of study. Tflis training has been included as a condition to restart. However, there has been no provision (other than Staff review) to

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determLne whether the train 1ng has taken place or been effective.

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4.0 Investigation of NRC St.ff Perfomance.

'Ihe Comission is now becoming acquainted with the history of deliberate deception of the Staff concerning the falsification of leak rates at. Unit 2. We asked to rebut the IT:wrpasse of Harold Denton to i

hissioner Asselstine's question as to why the Staff had not brought i

this matter into the Restart Proceeding in a- timely manner. As we explairwi at that time, during the Public meeting on August 15, 1984, we, not the NRC Staffj. raised this issue in the Restart ' ~

p W ing on April 18, 1983 (by motion of April 16, 1983). '

We, and the public, deserve a truthful explanation from the Staff concerning their attempt to shield the leak rate atter from the Restart Proceeding and their continued deception when explainina their actions.

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'Ihe public depends on the Staff to regulate nuclear plants in our neighborhoods. The hission should not expect the public in the h vicinity of 'DG to be willing to accept restart of that plant under any licensee unless the enrunission publicly identifies and roots out the '

[. people.within the NRG Staff who were responsible for the lenient and illegal regulation of the 'DG facilities.

..; Ihe Comnission should be aware thati in their first maragement decision,the Licensing Board adopted, almost without exception, the position and firviinant of the Staff. 'Ihis entire decision is thus undemined.

by the lack of credibility of the Staff.

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CONCLUSIONS The Corsnission must assign the highest priority to the resolution of the cause of the severe health effects in elevated areas northwest j

of 'IMI. If the residents in this area have been put at risk, and many l l

have died, because of Licensee's inadequate or deceptive practices in \

j monitoring radiation releases during the initial days of the accident, denial of the license to operate 'IMI-1 would be the only rwponsible i l

rh =ission decision. For this zwason, it would be a waste of agency 4

'Ihe and party resources to pursue any and all other issues at this { time.

exception would be the matters of leak rate falsification at both units because of the relevancy to the health issue.

The matter of the training of the operators should be decided by shm 1ntor e=nination of the operators: on the exact-replica simulator W

of Unit 1, expected to be delivered in mid_1985. This issue should be L extended to include the adequacy of plant-specific knowledge of the wanaFers, most of whom have no operational experience with a <vvenarcial o . . . .

nuclear power plant.

'Ibe Ozunission should thoroughly. investigate the performance of the Staff in.the Restart Pr M ing. When the regulatory staff is  ;

complicit with the licensee in covering the latter's violations and

. ' [ deceptions, the public is at risk.

Respec ully submitted, VN __

Norman O. Aamodt l

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Marj@ le M. Aamodt I

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'84 OCT 10 P1 :24 0FFICE C r SEC?:. ,.- -

00CKEilNG & SEF itC' .

'Ihis is to certify that the document AAKX7T COMNENTS @ CH RE!KLUTIN OF 'IHE RESTART PROCEEDDG were served on the Ocastissioners, the Boards, Imgal Counsel of the Staff, Licensee and O_--- .. -calth, TMIA, and UCS by deposit in U. S. Ma11', First ma= on October 6,1984.

0 Marjorie M. Aamodt t

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