ML20091K686
| ML20091K686 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, Brunswick |
| Issue date: | 12/21/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17139C189 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-84-105 NUDOCS 8406070170 | |
| Download: ML20091K686 (13) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, ENCLOSURE SAIETY EVALUATION QEDORT N-1 LOOP OPERATION ,E R,UJiSJG,CLS,T E A M ELECTRIC PLANT (ESEP) UNIT NOS. 1 E' 2
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The current BSEP Technical Specifications do not allow plant cperation beyond 24 hours if an idle recirculation loop can not be returned to service. The ability to operate at reduced power with a single Loop is highly desirable from a.v a i l a b i l i t y / outage planning standpoint in the event that maintenance,or compenent unavailability rendered one loop inoperable. By Let.ter dated June 3, 1982 Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) (the Licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specification for Single Loop Operation of BSEP. The requested changes would permit BSEP to operate at up to 50% of rated power with one recirculation loop out of service for unlimited time. While analyses indicate that it may be safe to operate BWRs on a single Loop in the range higher than 50% of rated p'owere the experience (reference letter from L. M. MilLsi TVA dated March 17, 1980 to H. Dentone NRC) at Browns Ferry Unit i has caused concern about flow and power oscillations.
- However, because single loop operation at 50% rated power at seve.ral plantsi including Browns Ferry Plant Unit 1, has shown acceptable flow and power characteristicsr we wilL permit CFEL to operate at Dower level's up to 50% of rated with one loop out 8404070170 840319 PDR FOIA s
BELLB4-105 PDR
-E- ~~ of service during Cycles 3 and 5 f or Units 1 and 2 respectively. If requestedi we wiLL reconsider operation at a higher power Level for BSEP with one recirculation loop out of service after staff concerns stemming from Browns Ferry - Unit 1 single loop operation are satisfied. 2 EVALUATIQS 2.1 , Accidents (Other than Loss of Coolant Accident (COCA1 and Transients Affected by One Recirculation Looc Out of Service - 2.1.1 One Pume Seizure Accident The Licensee states that the one pump seizure accident is a relativ Ly mild event during two recirculation punp operation. Similar analyses were performed to determine the impact this accident wculd have on one recirculation pump operation. These analy:es were performed using NRC approved models for a'Large core BWR/4 plant. The analyses were conducted from steady. state operation at the fotLowing initial conditions, with the ad'ded condition of one inactive recirculation loop. Two sets of initial conditions were assumed:. a. Thermal Power = 75% and core flow = 58% of rated b. Thermal Powe:r = 82% and core 1 Low = 56% of rated These conditions were chosen because they represent. reasonable upper limits of sincle-Loop operation within existing Maximum Average Linear Heat Generation P'te (MALHGR) and Minimum Critical a Power Ratio (MCPR) Limits at the same maximum pump speed.
o P u r. p seizure was simulated by setting the single operation pump speed to zero instantanaousty. 4 The anticipated sequence of e v e r.t s following a recirculatien p u r. ; sei:ure which occurs during plant operatien wi,th the alternate recirculation loop out of service is as folLows: a. The recirculation loop flow in the loop in which the pump seizure occurs drops instantaneously to zero. b. Core void increase which results in a nega*ive reactivity insertion and sharp decrease in neutron flux. c. Heat flux drops more slowly because of the fuel time c o r. s t a n t. d. Neutron fluxi heat fluxi reactor water levele steam. flows and feedwater flow alL exhibit transient l behaviors. Howevere it is not anticipated that the increase in water level wilL cause a turbine trip and result in scram. 4 ~ It is expected that the transient wiLL terminate at a' condition ~ i of natural circulation and reactor cperation wilL continue. There wilL also be a smalL decrease in system pressure. l The Licensee concludes that the MCPR for the pump seizure, accident for the L&rge core BWR/4 plant was determined to be greater than the fuel cladding integrity safety Limit; thereforer no fuel failures were postu" Lated to occur as a res0Lt or this L
- e..
\\ analy:ed event. These results are applicable to BSEP. 2.1.2 Abnormal Tran.s_ienfs 2.1.2.1 a. I d l e L o o p, S,t.,a r_t u p The idle loop startup transient was analyzeci in the SSEP FSAR, with an initial pcwer of 65%. The licensee is to' operate at no greater than 50% power with one loop out of service. AdditionalLye the Technical Specifications are being modified to require thate during single loop operations the suction valve *in,the idle Locp be shut and electrically disconnected. These seasures are being taken to preclude startup of an idle loop. a b. Flow I_ncrease For iii g '. e-l o o p operatione the rated condition steady-state' MCPR Limit is increased by 0.01 to account for increased uncertainties in the core total flow and Traversing In-core Probe (TIP) readings. The MCPR wilL vary depending on flow conditions. This Leads to *.he possibility of a large inadvertent flow increase which could cause the MCPR to decrease below the Safe,ty Limit for a low inital MCPR at reduced flow conditions. Thereforer th e required MCPR must be increased at reduced core flow by a flow factor.K The K factors are derived assuming both recirculation f. 9 loop pumps increase speed to the maximum permitted by the scoop tube position set screws. This condition maximizes the 'ower p increase and hence maximum AMCPR f or transients initiated f rom Less than rated conditions. When operating on on,e loop the i flow and power increase wilL be less than associated with two 4 4 pumps increasing speeds therefores the K factors deriyed from 9 two pump cssumption.are conservative for single loop operation. c. Rod Withdrawal Error The rod withdrawat error at rated power is given in the FSAR for the initial core and in cycle dependent reload supplemental submittals. These analyses are performed to demonstate thate even if the operator ignores alL instrument indications and the al~ arm which could occur during the course of the transienti the rod block system wilL stop rod withdrawal at a minimum critical power ratio which is higher than the fuel cladding integrity safety limit. Correction of the rod block equation and Lower initial, power for single-loop aperation assures that the MCPR safety Limit is not violated. I One pump operation results in backflow through 10 of the 20 jet pumps while flow is being supplied to the lower plenum from the active jet pumps. Because of this backflow through the inactive jet pumps the present rod-block equation and APRM settings must be modified. The Licensee has modified the two pump rod block equation and APRM settings that exists in the Technical Specificatien for one pump operation and the staff has found them acceptable. i 1 The staff finds that one loop tra,nsients and accidents other - than LOCA, which is discussed below, are bounded by the two loop operation analysis and are therefore acceptable. t e _m 2.2 Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) The Licensee has contracted General Electric Co. (GE) to perform single Loop operation analysis f or BSEP LOC A. The Licensee states that evaluation of these calculations (that are performed according to the procedure outlined in NEDO-20556-2r Rev. 1) indicates that a multiplier of 0.85 (Unit-1-8x8 fuel, 8x8R Fuele P8x8R Fuel) and 0.84 (Unit-2-7x7, 8x8Ri P8x8R), 0.85 (Unit 8x8 Fuel) (Ref: - NEDE 24344 September 1981) should be applied to the MAPLHGR Limits for single loop operation'of BSEP Units 1 and 2. We find the use of these MAPLHGR multipliers to be acceptable. 3. THEoMAL wvocautics The li ensee has confirmed that analysis uncertainties are* independent of whether flow is provided by two Loops or single Lcop. The only exceptions to this are core total flow and TIP reading. The effect of these uncertainties is an increase in the MCPR by.01, which is more than offset by the K factor f required at low flows. The steady state operating MCPR with single-loop operation wilL be conservatively established by. muLtiptying the K factor to the rated flow MCPR Limit. f 4. STABILITY ANALYSIS As indicated in the applicant's submittal NED0-24344r operating along e minimum forced recirculation Line with one pump running at minimum speed.is more stable than oper.ating with both i pumps operating at minimum speed. l
~. -7 The' Licensee wilL be required to operate in master manual to i l reduce the effects of instabilities due to controller' feedback. The staff has accepted previous stability analyses resulps as evidence that the core can be operated safely while our generic evaluation of BWR stability characteristics and analysis methods continues. The previous stability analysis results include natural circulation conditions and thus bound the single: Loop operation. In additions the decay ratios (0.74, 0.73) predicted 11 for Units 1 and 2 f or cycle 3 and 5 of BSEP Units 1 and 2 rescettively shows margin relative to Browns Ferry #1 (.83) which had the flow noise. oscillations during SLO. We conclude that with appropriate limitations to recognize and avoid operating instabilitiese that the reactor can be operat'ed safely in the single Loop mode. Our evaluation of the flow / power oscillations evidenced in Browns Ferry wilL continue and any pertinent conclusions resulting from this study wilL be applied to BSEP. 4 s 5.
SUMMARY
ON SINGLE LOOP OPERATION i t 1. -..S.teady_. S. t a.t e T. h. e r.m a..l.. P o w e r. L. e v.e L..w.. i l L n o t exceed 50% Operating at 50% power with appropriate TS chaages was approved on'a cycle basis for Pilgrim 1r Cooper Nuclear Station and f fionticelto Nuclear Generating Station (Safety Evalution Reports (SER) dated December 15, 1981, December 10, 1981 and September 10, 1982 respectively). Authorizatioh for single loop operation for extended periods was also given to l e
4 8-Dresden Unit 2 and 3, Quad Cities Units 1 and 2r Peach. Bottom Units 2 and 3 and Duane Arnold (SER July 9e 1981r SER ~ N:vember 19e 1981). It was concluded that for operation at 5 0!;, pcwer_ transient and accident bounds wou'Ld not be exceeded f o r-these pla'nts. t 2. Minimum C r i t i c a l P o.w..e. r.R. a. t i o (MCPR) Safety .~ n. ,i.LL b,e Increased by 0.01 t o 1.08 Limit w The MCPR Safety Limit wiLL be increased by 0.01 to account for increased uncertainties in core flow and Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) readings. The licensee has reported that this increase in the MCPR Safety Limit was addressed in GE reports specificalLy for BS,EP for one loop operation. On the basis of previous staff reviews for Pilgrim 1r Cooperr Duane Arnoldr Monticello and Peach Bottom and our review of plant comparisons we find this analysis acceptable f or BSEP. 3. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR). Limiting C o n d i t i_ o n _ f o r_,0 93.ta t j o n (LCO) sitL be Increased b,y,,p,.,,0,_1 The staff requires that the operating Limit MCPR be increased by 0.01 and multiplied by the apprcpriate two Loop K factors that f are in the BSEP TS. This wiLL preclude an inadvertent f. Low increase from causing the MCPR to drop below the sa'fety limit MCPR. This was also approvea by the staff for Peach Bottom 2 and 3. i
9-s 4 The Maximum Averace Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (MAPLHGR) Limits will be Reduced bv Accrooriate l multiotiers' The licensee proposed reducing the TS MAPLHGR by 0.85 (Uni't 8x8 Fuels 8x8R Fuele Px8x8R Fuel) and 0.8'4 (Unit-2 -7x7, 8x8Ri Px8x8R), 0.85 (Unit-2 8x8 Fuel) for Single Loco Operation. These reductions were based on analyses by General Electric (GE) in reports NEDE 24011-P-A-1 and NEDO 24344. The Peach Bottom units were allowed to cperate with their MAPLHGR values reduc.ed by - factors o f 0.71, 0. 83, a nd 0. 81 for an unlimited period [ftime for the first three types of fuel listed above. 5. The AP7M Scram and Rod Block Setooints will be Reducad The licensee proposed to modiff the two loop APRM Scrame Rod Block and Rod Block Monitor (RBM) setpoints to account f'or back flow through half the jet pumps. The changes were based on plant specific analyses by GE. These setpoints equations will be changed in tne BSEP TS. The above changes are s.imilar to the Peach Bottom TS changes and are acceptable to the staff'. 6. The Suction Valve in the Idle Loco is Closed.nd Electrically Isolated The Licensee wiLL close the recirculation pump suction valve and remove power from the valve. In the event of a loss of coolant accident this would preclude parti,al loss of LPCI flow through the recirculation loop degra~ ding the intended LPCI performance.
10 ~ The removal of power also helps to preclude a start up of an idle loop transient. 7. The Ecualizer line between the locos will be 11_otated The 'icense'e will close appropriate valves in the cross-tie (e qu a li z e r) Line between the Loops. The previously discussed analysis _ assumed the two Loops were isolated. Thereforer it i s required that the cross-tie valve be closed. 8. The Recirculation Control will be in Manual Centret The staff requires that the Licensee operate the recirculation system.i,0 the manual mode to eliminate the need for control system analyses and to reduce the effects of potential flow instabilities. This was also required of Peach Bottom. I 9. Surveittance Recu*rements The staff requires that ths Licensee perform daily.surv'eilLance on the jet pumps to ensure.that.the pr.es.sure drop 1'or.one jet ~ pump in a loop does not vary from the mean of all jet pumps in that Loop by more than 5%. 10. Previt 4 0ns to Allow Operation with One ""R e e 4 r e u l a t i on Loon'but "of Service 1. The steady state thermal power Level wilL not exceed 50% of rated i s a l ~-.e -r-
,g,-- 2. The. Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit will, be increased bf.01 t o 1.08 (T.S. 3.11C) 3. The MCPR Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) wiLL be increased by 0.01 4. The Maximum Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (i1 AP LH G R) l'imits will be reduced. Unit-1 (Ref: TS 3/4.2.1) fuel Tvoe Reduction Factor 8x8 0.85 ~ 8x8R 0.85 ~ P8x8R 0.85 Unit-2 (Ref: TS 3/4.2.1 Fu.t Tve* Reduction Factor i 7x7 0.84 8x8 0.85 8x8R 0.84 P8x8R 0.84 5. The AFRM Scram and Rod Block Setpoints and the RBM Setpoints, shall be reduced to read as follows: T.S. 3/4.2.2 S $(.66W + 54% -0.66 AW) T.S. 3/4.2.2* S 1(.66W + 54% -0.66 iW)TPF(FRP)/MTPF(MFLPD) ~ T.S. 3/4.2.2 s < (.66W + 42% .66 AW) T.S. 3/4.2.2* S < (.65W + 42% -0.65 4W)TPF(FRP)/MTPF(MFLPD) APRM Upscale (.66 + 42% -0.66 AW) 1 RBM Upscale (.66W +41% -0.56 AW)
- In the event that MFLPD exceeds FRP.
4
1-6. The suction valve in the idle loop is closed and electrically isolated until the idle loop is being prepared for return to service. 7. APRM flux noise wilL be measured once per shift and the x recirculation pump speed wilL be reduced if the flux noise exceeds 5% peak to peak. 8. The core plate delta pressure noise be measurec once per shift and the recirculation pump speed wilL be reduced if the noise exceeds 1 psi peak to, peak. Thereferer based upon the above evaluation and a history of successful operation of other BWRs of the same type as BSEP we conclude that single-loop operation of BSEP up to a power level of 50% and in accordance with the proposed TSsr wilL not exceed the accident and transient bounds previously found acceptable by the NRC staff and is therefore acceptable. The approval for single Loop ooeration up to a power level of 50% is authorized during cycle 3 for BSEP Unit #1 and tyct'e 5 BSEP Unit #2. We have'concludede based on the considerations discussed abover that: (1) because the emendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability'or consequences of accidents previounty considered or create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any eva'Luated previously, and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margine the -n
amendment.does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public wilL not be endangered by operation in the proposed manneri and (3) such activities wilL be conducted in compl'iance with the Commission's regulations and the' issuance of this amendment wilL not be inimical to the common defense,and security or to the health and safety of the public. t 6 D '6* e 9 8 G e O 6 6 0 0
400 Chestnut Street Tower II ) April 14, 1983 Mr. Harold R. Centon, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
In the Matter of the ) Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-260 50-296 At the request of your staff, we met with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) on February 11, 1983 to discuss concerns regarding operation with a single recirculation loop at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. During that meeting we answered questions and provided ORNL with considerable data on past Browns Ferry experier.co in single loop. Enclosed is additional infor=ation and clarification regarding our previous submittals on single loop. We are still very much interested in obtaining NRC approval of single loop operation at the highest power level attainable. However, we understanding that single loop operation at power levels up to 50 percent may be the only possible option available to us at this tice. We want to avoid the need for emergency approval and are willing to work closely with NRC and contractors to resolve any remaining questions and concerns on this issue as expeditiously as possible. Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
- d. D1.Mt.,
L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing Subscribe &agsworntobytore odI11VuYP%t 1983 me his l *f' da 04 1 Notary Public l My Commission Expires Enclosure t cc: See page 2 i $b0 9 F PDR 1a..: t-. t
I i r Mr. Harold R. Denton April 14, 1983 cc (Enclosure): U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. R. J. Clark Browns Ferry Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda,1:aryland 20814 I l- ) r i e e I e B
l ENCLOSURE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND CLARIFICATION REGARDING SINGLE RECIRCULATION LOOP OPERATION BR01483 FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT { (
Reference:
TVA letter from L. M. Mills to I l H. R. Denton dated January 6,' 1983) j 1. NRC requested that figure 3 of the referenced letter be clarifica. Test data was recorded at various conditions as listed in the l-attached tables A-1 and A-2. The annimum peak to peak variation I APRM signal was then detemined from each recording and that point l was plotted against the active loop flow for tht condition. The 1 figure also includes an operating map showing the region in which [ j the tests were perfomed. It should be noted that active loop flow i and total core flow are not directly proportional due to inactive j loop backflow character,istics. r 2. During the February 11, 1983 aceting between TVA and ORNL, it was pointed out to us that our response to question 1 of the referenced I; letter was incorrect. Paragraph 2 of that response states that 'the individual jet pump t flow variations show no relationships to the power-void 1 f characteristics signal (i.e., flux) and their signals show no common oscillation driving them from the discharge end... jet pump noise observed... is not driven by power-void feedback." TVA agrees that this is not correct and, in fact, there will always be a i f-component of Jet pump variation though it any be small which is l characteristic of power-void feedback and which is common to all jet i pumps. We contend that because the individual jet pump flow signals i bear no resemblance to the flux and total flow signals, the power-i void effect on the jet pump signals is a ainer component compared to i the othere which add together to oceprise the total signal, and that j the major oceponents are not common to all jet pumps and not related to power-void feedback. i l i I 2 I j. I e [ r g N - ..-1_,- ~ _ _ _ --~- ~-
\\ x M cd. C. e_ C. N. N. e. =. [' C.; e. e C N.C C f% m c c b= C M O C
- t" C
e .: C
- r. !
m N C c 9 le i O N C T d =* M 9 c% t=' N N. C. N. 4 l C. C. C C. C. C 1= P% .~ C C
==t e N C C 0 c N N M M 7%
== == M M e
== c g% ' C 0
- eC R
c C T m M f"i N M
==t C*l "i C 4 l l C.! r% T C. C C. C. f"i. C. e. o. l ~' , c 1 6"5 e ca e d T L's m c c N M r*l c
== M N ,,3 -e g, go; r% T g" C c 8"== T m
== f9 M N r=1
==# e. = = = ' S 1 l ui 1 i
- C',
C. s r% W m c. C. C. O. b'l. ef C.' e_ f"1 i e C C s C C C C C N N N M N M N m C-{ N C: 5 q' < N T C c N n m M M ~ l ele l O M r% C. C' N. N. O. C. N. 4
- c. !
5 =* C C. e C C C
- m. m.m N
m N C e = M C N c %l y c v a:: o o o <-1 e r9 f9 N F. es O \\ U =J e 1 9 as j O r% t%4 C C M c
- t" C.
'4" O C e-C; .= w f"i C C C C W* e
*=
d N' C T 4* T P% m N N
- t*
O O! @ = 4 e =* c T-e < d r% e c M T f"I N N N.
== L = l alf O 4 c C = > "= b e C a C O. J N q 4,3 Tl - C C. C. N. C3 T. J N. C. C. l C. ;. e U y g T T (""t e
== C C T T T C c v N e gr* O C d Mt b .3
- E" h."2 *IC ad
- d C
T m N d C f"5 N N Ni== cj gi l l' - = = w A C g a w w .=..c.s = -= ~ C. C. C. C. C. d C. C.i sa 4 y y C N M a C N O T T c c
- C"
=. m C
- t*
C r% C c N; f. e T T cl eC O T 54" j g N L"5 C f"* N N t% e c.'
== M l l C ( = D W e .'.d 1 w .u. 6 C*. w 6 C
==1 U C N g n. g C T C. C
- '=
=* ?% N L:1 g es .C C C .C .C
- w c,$
== v =* L'l
== == W=== = g --b $a ~* - a W .p .,_ m = a C ;. L k u u a kJ 6 .= .= N N N N o" .= .= 3."..,a a.=. N N N c U1 m we w C. we we wt we y g =. e: =I .= 4 c .= 4.= 4 4 w= W <C"
== ,,,,y we ed w w e
== ve w w w w C
- J
= = c C C = = ed .J a a w. 4" e C C C C a. C C C C e C = = = g. >= w
- =
C
== m
== = = c c G c 4* = = C d
- =
% C.=.,, ="* u =
- = 'C O
=
.= u u u u w. .= c=. 6 C
== == == == == = U b b b b 64 C v1
== 0 = = .= US ui C U a t c ce = 3, A E 4 C E 2 h A C = )- C 3 = L L L h A l 8 we e L L *= cc4= uo M 2 b 3 bb3 3 U C C .%, y n C o
== 6. .s =. W 6 3 3 3.c,. 'W'" . wg V1 3 3 b C C bL C
- a C
C C .&.8 C ,= Q C a== 5"y. O C.
=
c. tw 6. W U Mq u o e = E 6 6
== g c. g3 e CC= b u C = 8 = b 3 .C, =.=. c U C
- C
== c3 C t. g *=,g e C 6 a o c. m e g .C
===, c
== m e-, 1 cm a 4 O C'
- =
0 f"4 m f"i f"i j c., o e u g. u g. c. u o a = g. g.. L i i e e = g n= F = = c e = C = l i u 6 L = a u w a e-s u o = = = a n. = = = T T T T =. g,. ". =
- =
Q U 4 u L G U
== b G G A 4
- = :
U 5' C d C C 9 L C 3 C C E E, m.9 M a a .* a =* a u .d a . = = C = =:
== == 8
=
>= 0 C C: C W C C C C ll=. C. L =. c e M W d C 7 C 7 7 3 =' W 7 7 7' C lW 4 .w e e L
==
- r-O C
"= a 6 3 = 1 I I = C C = C N M v m c P% C
- n c:
= t"i e o c = m Ci C. %J y C l
== =
== == == == Ne i f 4
==- O g F ' ~ * ^ '^ -- hm%Og 8"' .G * * : .
- O W
, ~. t ? - i ~ 1 2 5 5 s 5 3 ~0 '2 4 7 3 1 4 3 a g 8 5 7 6 2 2 2 l n R n 1 i e o 0 5 '0 e l u i 0 5 f. r l t o 5 6 6 3 c 0 0 3 3 1 a i 0 2 V d 0 6 6 1 1 1 1 e 7 t n 1 r lI l ao a c f i o t t 9 5 0 0 5 i s t 0 6 0 7 8 9 8 e 1 n e 0 4 1 5 'l t 5 4 5 s R d 3 n - o n R c I e / n s es 0 4 1 1 3 3 3 3 o p l t 1 i r ai t o cn i f SU dn s o n r c r, h i / r t s o i a f d d h n e h o d s c c r n t n o o n i l c s i d e a E t G l c d d d d d r i 2 R i I l I r i I i i i e t n S l S e S S S S S p i A s U P l' P P P P P P n t I l d i E a i L n s d o g p n A i T S a 6 e R w o l o t a t P l c s t A F d S e n t P e T e n 5 p 0 P d P. P. P. A g c e 3 m 1 A a / r r n : r c 3 u e 0 a 2 e r t ^ P 1 e l 7 a 9 h 1 l P e n 9 t c A P e 8 c p e p p e p ig c 5 r m l m m n m n e e r e i u P u u u u u l l d e l c P 0 P P P P P a b e e w P n t e 'a lh t t t t t S T i c a e o o i R t r p l i T e o P e e e e e S f t B J C A J J J J J r i e e d gn r w n u o o o o 2 3 0 9 0 1 2 3 4 P_ C P C N 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 ~ ~ t i t}}