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- i June 10, 1982 ass. Be1Ha Carde Goverammat h - *=hility Project Institute for Policy Studies 1901 Q street. E.W.
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la a telephoma esevarsation betonen you and Mr. A. Bert navis of sqr etaff en June 7.1982. you requested a latter regarding our policy of protecting samfid==riality of persons alleging problems at tha l
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I It is the EEC's policy act to divulge the identity of persons umMar i
allasettens, eben they request seenymity. ither dering er d nn_t to as savestiaattaa. shia Annledes emittias the aliasere meme from the i
agency's report of the Savestisatian. sees,er, se meet be recesniend that== eeenstaa the matore of the allasations er the limited member of ladividuals meers of the subject Saformatsam ammy provide a hasis for essgesting the allager's ed==rety. Furthermore. At the ellesations result sa highly visible inaeas that are the embject of. for example, eengressimaal oversight seedittee revisar. At may not be possible to assiers the allager's asesymity la that identifying laferestion may have to be relenaed to the committee (s).
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'1901 Ove Street. N.W.. Washincton. D.C. 20000 (202)234 0382
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June 13, 1983 Honorable Chairman Nunzio Palladino Honorable Victor Gilinsky Honorable John Ahearne Honorable James Asseltine Honorable Thomas Roberts United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Commissioners:
On behalf of the Lone" T'ree Council, concerned citizens of central Michigan, and numerous nuclear workers on the Midland Nuclear Power Plant sitej the Government Accountability Project (GAP) through its' Citizens Clinic requests that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) take immediate action to protect the future public health and I
safety of central Michigan residents through the following actions:
(1)
Modify the Construction Permit (Midland Nuclear Power 1
Pl a nt, Units 1 and 2) to include mandatory " hold points" on the balance-of-plant (BOP) work and incorporate the current Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ( ASLB or Board) ordered " hold po.ints" on the soils remedial work into the Midland construction permit.
(2)
Reguire a management audit of Consumers Power Company
,(CPCo) by an independent, competent management auditing firm that will determine the causes of the management failures that have resulted in the soils settlement disaster and the recently dis-covered Quality Assurance breakdown.
(3)
Reject the Constructior's Completion Plan (CCP) as currently proposed, including a rejection of Stone and. Webster to conduct the third party audit of the plant.
Instead a truly independent, competent, and credible thrid party auditor should be selected with public participation in the process.
(4)
Remove theQuality Assuran'ce/ Quality Control function from the l
Midla'nd Project Quality Assurance Department (MPQAD) and replace l
them with an indeper. dent team of QA/QC personnel that reports i
simultaneously to tiit tiHC and CPCo management.
(5 )
Increase the assignment of bhtC personnel to include additional technical and inspection personnel as requested by the j
Midland Section of the Office of Special Cases (OSC); and, (6)
Require a detailed review of the soils settlement resolution as outlined in the Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report, tr.:'; incorporating a technical analysis of the implementaion of the underpinning proj' ct at the current' stage of completion.
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~ ,.J f NRC Commissioners June 13, 1983 I. BACKGROUND The Government Accountability Project is a project of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C. The purpose of GAP's Citizens and Legal clinics are to broaden the understanding of the vital role i of the public employee, corporate employee, and private citizen in preventing waste, corruption or health and safety concerns. l GAP also offers legal and strategic counsel to whistleblowers, provides a unique legal education for law student interns and public policy students, brings meaningful and significant reform to the government workplace, and exposes government actions that are repressive, wasteful or illegal, or that pose a threat to the health and safety of the American public. Presently, GAP provides a program of multi-level assistance for government employees, corporate employees, and private citizens i who report illegal, wasteful or improper actions. G AP also regularly monitors governmental reforms, offers expertise to Executive Branch of fices and agencies, and state and local governmental bodies, and responds to cequests by Congress and state legislatures for analysis of legislation to make government more accountable to the public. In March 1982 GAP's Citizen Clinic became actively involved with the Midland Nuclear Power Plant. The Lone Tree Council had requested GAP to pursue allegations from workers of major problems at the Midland plant. After our preliminary investigation, we compiled six af fidavits which we filed with the NRC on June 29, 1982. Since that time we have filed five additional affidavits. We are . also preparing an expanded affidavit of ou of our original witnesses. Mr. E. Earl Kent, concerning welding construction problems at the Midland site and four additional affidavits from current and l former workers. Other alarming allegations continue to come to our. attention from a large number of current workers who believe that } reprisals and harassment will follow any revelations of construction problems to either their own management or the NRC. As a result of the intense " chilling effect" on the Midland site GAP is re evaluating our normal investigation process in an attempt to determine a possible solution to the problem. Since the fall of 1982 G AP has also been active in the evaluation of C.onsumer Power Company's proposals for a number of audits request'ed or required by the NRC in an attempt to determine and establish the quality of the work, the implementation of the Quality Assurance / Quality Control p1'a'n,.for the soils remedial work, and a'n independent design and construction verification ( IDCV") of three plant systems. GAP has submitted several analysis letters which revealed substantal weaknesses in the programs, inade-quate information to judge program adequacy,' and basic lack of independence of the proposed main independent review contractors. In late November the NRC Region !!! 05C's Midland Section completed an extensive inspection of the hardware and materials in the nuclear plants' diesel generator building.- This inspection subsequently led to a $120,000.00 fine against CPC,o for a quality assurance e 9 1
NRC Commissioners - 3.- 'une 13,1983 The inspection of the DGB building revealed an extensive breakdown. backlog of quality assurance / quality control documentation, inability to provide materials traceability, unqualified and/or uncertified welders, and an In-Process Inspection Notification (IPIN) system that turned non-conforming items back to contruction instead of i documenting) quality failures on the appropriate Non-Conformance Reports (NCR. t In spite of the major revelations of inadequate construction practices + the NRC Staff permitted the critical soils remedial work to begin in mid-December. It is GAP's position, well known to the Staff, that this premature approval violates the June 1982 request of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards ( ACRS) to Chairman Palla dino. GAP also believes.that,the NRC approval to commence the irreversible soils underpinning work makes a mockery out.of. the Atdmic Safety and Licensing. Board (ASLS) hearings currently in progress to determine whether or not the soils work should be allowed to continue. l Since February 1983 GAP has continued its attempt to determine the seriousness of the situation and the adequacy of the proposed solutions i for the Midland plant. Our efforts at working with the administration of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement have been frustrating, For example, although NRC letters and public presentations were i, informative, they f ailed to provide the key methodology necessary to assess the adequacy of the proposed third-party program.. When GAP investigators attempted to pursue the questions' at the public i,
- meeting, they(were told to " allow the NRC time to ask for thoseNRC Pub documents."
Subsequently, GAP repeated the request in its November 11, 1982 letter. Over two-and-one-half months after the original request, GAP finally received the NRC's response: "You may wish to request access to the documents from Consumers Power." (December 14, 1982 letter from,f I James G. Keppler to Billie P., Garde.) Our request to CPCo was, o i course, turned down. I Our February 8,1983 analysis of the proposed Construction Completion Pro ram (CCP) re utsted a number of considerations by the NRC, inc uding the no ification of the construction permit to maintain susupens' on of all safety-rela.ted work until the entire third-party review program--including the third-party selection, scope, and methodology -- was approved and incorporated into the construction pe rmit. Our March 7.1983 letter to the NRC raised further questions about.the CCP generally, and particularly about the " closed-door" meetings that continued between CPCo and NRC Region!!! administration. In both a March 7,1983 meeting with' Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) staff and It staff and a March 10, 1983 letter to Mr. James Keppler we asked for an immediate response to allegations that we had received l about; negotiations over the details and acceptability of the CCP, Mr. Keppler's response confirmed the fears of our internal sources. plan to hold a public meeting to hear He stated that the NRC did _ng,[,ird ' party proposed by CPCo for the CCP comments on the indepenTeTt th or the scope overview, nor did they plan to review the methodology (March 28, 1983 of the third-party review unless it was necessary. and April 5, 1983 letters;from Mr. James 8. Keppler to Billie Garde.) I g t t :. e g y, ,4 =, s,.
~ i NRC Cocaissioners June 13, 1983 Since that time the NRC Staff and Mr. Keopler himself have testified l before the ASLB in Midland. Michigan. His staff has gone on record with a deep distrust of CPCo as well as a lack of confidence in their [ ability to adequately build a nuclear power plant. Construction problems continue to surface. even with the safety-related work remaining halted. As recently as May 24 1983 Mr. Thomas Novack. Assistant Director for Licensine notified the ASLB of a VIOLATION } 0F HOLO TAG DURING REMEDIAL UN0tRP!NNING CONSTRUCTION. (Exh1D1% 1) i i t The alleged solution to problems stemming from a " poor management l attitude" (testimony of Dr. Ross Landsman on April 28, 1983. A5LB) to the unknown extent of hardware problems is the CCP, Yet as late as June 3.1983 CpCo was still submitting eleventh hour editions of this plan that continue to ignore basse programmatic flaws. Further, it 'is 'cledr that the NRC Staf f plans to evade or ignore, i public requests for the minimum necessary information to complete j a responsible review of the proposed audit and completion plans. Our experiences at the William H. Zimmer nuclear power plant in Ohio and at the LaSalle olant in Illinois have led us to be extremely I skeptical of the NAC Staf f's conclusion about the safety of nuclear l power plants under construction. In those cases the Staff either l ignored or missed majer QA/QC violations at plants 975 and 1005 i complete, respectively. To illustrate, after the Staff virtually ignored GAP analysis and granted approval fpr full power operations at LaSalle..the plant was able to operate for less than 24 hours before being shut dow'n due to a hardware breakdown. At Zim me r, the Sta f f-approved Quality Confirmation Plan was so ineffective that on F November it. 1982 the Comeission' suspended all safety-related constructioi As a result there'is no basis,for confidence in an NRC-approved i CCp on faith. The basis for this extraordinary remedy must be fully l disclosed, as well as the methodology for an independent review. The modification of the construction permit will be the first step in the right direction. j II. LIGAL BASIS, A. Local Reevirements b The la.w gives the Commi'ssion broad discretion to revoke, suspend, or modify the construction; permit of ~an NRC licensee. 42 U.S.C. $2236 states that: c A license or centsrdstion permit may be revoked,l false suspended i or modified in whole.or "in part. for any materia l statement. in the application for 1; cense or in the su ple-l !~ mental'or other statement of fact required b the app icantt orbeiause of' conditions revealed by the app ication for l license of statement 1f fact 'o'r any report, record, inspection. or, ether means.wMchtwould warrant the Commission to refuse L to 3 rant,a licensej on an original;,applicatient er for ,D l s., e' , y ~ f s ,g. )
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i \\ NRC Co 31ssioners 3 .5 June 13, 1983. faikure to construct or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit of license for the technical specifications in the application; or for the violation of or failure to observe any of the terms and provisions of this chapter or of any regulation of the Commission. Part 50. 100 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations states j the same criteria for the revocation, suspension or modification of a construction permit. The NRC has a mandatory duty *o excercise this authority when necessary. According to the decision in Natural Resources Defense Council vs. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 528 F. 2d 166(2nd Gir.1978), under the Atomic Energy Act o f 1954, the NRC is required to determine that there will be adequate protection of the health and safety of the i l public. The is' sue of safety must be resolved before the Commission 1ssues a construction permit. (Porter City Ch. of Jzaak Walton Leaque l vs. Atomic Ene rgy Commis sion. 515 F. 2d 513, 524 (7th Cir. 1975).) l l B. Criteria to Excercise Discretion According to 10 C.F.R. l2.202, the NRC "may institute a proceeding to modi fy, suspend or revoke a Itcense or for such other. action as may be pro er by 2,erving of the licensee en order to show cause which will:
- 1) c11oge the violations with which bhe Itcensee is charged, or the potentially haza rdous conditions or other facts deemed to be suf ficient ground for the proposed action."
As interpreted by the Proposed General Statement of Policy and Procedure for Enforcement Action, published ig the Federal Register, 44FedReg. 66754, Oct. 7, 1980 (10 C.F.R. 2.202.2.204), suspending orders can be used to remove a 4 threat to t e public health.and safety, the common defense and security b..- of the enviroment. More specifically, suspension orders can be issued to stop facility construction when further work would preclude or significantly hinder the identification and correction of an improperly const ructed safety-related system or component: or if the licensee's quality assurance program implementation is not adequate and ef fective to provide confidence that construction activities are being properly carried out. Moreover, orders can be issued shen the licensee has not responded adequately to other enforcement action or when the licensee interferes with the conduct of an inspection or investigation or for any reason not mentioned above fer which the license revocation is legally authorized.. In order to hr.1p determine the significance of violati'ons within'this list, the Commission estabs 11shed " severity categories" ranginq from the most serious structural flaws (Severity !), to m' nor technicalities (severity VI). 44 Fed Reo, at 66758-59. C. Specific Bases for Suspension The Commission clearly has both the duty and the discretion to a 4
l ^T 6-June 13, 1983 NRC Commissioners ~ modify the Midland Construction Permit. In November 1982 Mr. Thomas Novack, the Assistant Director for Paul Shewmon, the Chairman of the Licensing issued to Dr. Advisory Committee of Rea'ctor Safeguards the " Report on Midland Design and Construct' ion Problems, Their Dis position, ano Overall Effectiveness of the Effort to Assure Appro priate Quality." This report covered Midland's problems from the start of construction through June 30,;1982. It is attached as Exhibit 2. A review of this report indicates that the " Summary ) and Conclusions of Overall Effectiveness" is charitable in its observations. The report.contains the fol'1owing statement: Consumers Power has on repeated occasions not reviewed problems to the depth required for full and timely resolu-tion. Examples are: (1) rebar ommissions (1976); (2) tendon sheath location errors (1977); (3) Diesel Generator Building Settlement (1978); and (4) Zack Company HVAC deficiencies (1980). In each of these cases the NRC, in its investigation determined that the problem was of greater significance than the first reported or that the problem was more gc.neric than identified by Consumers Power Company. The Region III inspection staf f believes " problems have kept recurr.ing at Midland for the following reasons: (1) Over-reliance on the architect-engineer, (2) failure to recognize and correct root-causes, (3) failure to recognize the signi-ficance of isolated events (4) failure to review isclated events for their generic spplication, and (5) lack of an aggressive quality assurance attitude each of the examp'les given above demonstrates conclusively in fact, that CPCo has.long since' lost control.of the Midland Project. To illustrate,'although the Diesel Generator Building settlement is quietly tucked.into a list of examples of common construction problems at nuclear sites across the country it is far from that. The DGB settlement issue starts with a Material False Statement (see ACRS Interim Report, at 16-17 ) submitted to the NRC in the FSAR. It continues as one of the most massive construction experie.y ments in the history o f construction, Whether or not it.is possible to tunnel underneath a nuclear power plant and build a foundation a f,ter-t he-f a ct remain a subject.of he,t,ed debate. a Another exam'ple is contained in an in-depth look at the problems ~ of the Zack ' Company on the Midland site. Not only did the s $38,0,0.00, fine levied in 1980 for CPCo's failure to control a 0 sUbcontra'ctor not catch the attention of CPCo, it seems to have forced them' to extraordinary bumbling. In April of 1982 the Quality Assurance Super,y_ iso'P of the Zack Company came to Consumers management withs solid evidence of a serious QA/QC ~ Power Company' going in the Zack headquarters.- Not only did CPCo breakdown on-e k'h* .g ~ w ,
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l NRC Commissioners ~1 - 7.- June 13, 1983 l I ignore the serious warnings of the QA/QC supervisor, Mr. Albbrt l Howard, they did not warn two other utilities receiving suspect material, they did not notify the NRC according to the requirements o f 10 C. F. R. Par t 21, and they revealed the confidentiality of Mr. Howard who~ was subsequently dismissed.--with his staf f--from the Zack Company. Since July 1982 'when the Zack employees came to GAP for assistance CPCo has had to lay off unqualified Zack welders, (Exhibit 3), re' ins pect 100% of the HVAC equi pment on the site, and reorganize the Zack QA/QC function again as recently as June 9, 1983 (Exhibit 4). Un fo r t un a t el y, the reorganization reveals that CPCo has still not caught on to the seriousness of the problems,.they have allowed the same supervisor res ponsible for the Zack p oblems for the past two year to be promoted to the General Su.pe,rintendent of Plant Assurance Division of the Midland Project Quality As sur ance De pa rtment., Further, since.the issuance of the November re port the DGB in-i s pection confirms that CPCo continues its tradition of construction misha ps. Af ter 14 years and an estimate of $4.43 billion dollars i the Commission has ample bases to take immediate action to ensure that the public health and safety will be adequately protected. III. SPECIFIC CRITICISMS OF THE CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION PROGRAM 1/ L In t he Fibru ar.y 8, 1983 analysis of the _ CCP su'bmitted to the public, the NRC, and CPCo GAP requested that the multiple audits / third-party reviews be combined into one comprehensive inde pendent review. Specifically, the G AP staff took Exception to the CCP as being inadequate becau:e it: (1) relied heavily on and incor porated an INPO-type aud'it l by the Management Analysis Corporation (MAC) wh'ich had been j rejected by the-NRC staff'a s not, inde pendent; (2) failed to provide any significant details of the methodology by which either third parties or CPCo would identify problems i in the ss-buf1t condition of the plant; (3) was permeated by an in'herent conflict-o f-interest; ~ (4) institutien!!izes a lack of organzational freedom f'or.the i quality assurance /ouality control function; f (5) was not com prehensive; and, (6) failed to s pecify evaluation criteria and construction ~ procedures that would guarantee quality _ of construction .e 1/ The CCP documents incorpor.ated in our analysis include (1) Letters from Mr. J.W. Cook to' Mr. J.G. - Ke ppler, NRC, dated.Jan.10, 1983, A pril 6, 1983, April 22,1983, and Jun'e.3, 1983; _ (2) Letters from Mr. J.G. Ke ppl er to Mr. J.W. Coo k, CPCo, dated Dec 30, 1982, March 28, 1983; and (3) public meetings with the NRC and CPCo on CCP. W--w er-a
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HRC Commissiors Jun e 13,1983 Following the submittal of the original CCP (January 10, 1983) and the February 8, 1983 public meeting in Midland the HRC requeste fur ther s peci fic information in their March 28, 1983 letter. The questions' from 'the Regional Sta f f seek s pecific details about the sco pe of the p oposed CCP and the methodology of its implemen-tation. CPCo's res ponses, April 6, 22, and June 3, 1983, provide more details --in some instances ex plicit details--yet continue i to evade or avoid the key questions about the adequacy of the CCP to restore the NRC and the public's confidence in the safe'ty of the Midland pl a n t. Our analysis of the submittals indicates that CPCo has provided a plan that will meet only the minimum s pecified requirements of the NRC. The plan remains'structu' rally flawed at the outset.
- First, it pr o'po s e s a' ' t hi r'd 'pa r ty f o r t h e a u d i t function that fails a prima facie test for indepen&nce,. Nhos e competence is questionable,!
given the most charitable review of the past ex periences with quality assurance breakdowns, and whose third-party methodology is too su perficial to even evaluate. Finally, the pro posed auditor the Stone and Webster construction firm, i s suggesting a staff of only nine auditors to provide assurance about the work done by a construction force of over 5,000. (Midland site tour, June 5,1983 The NRC administrative staff continues to ignore both the pleadings of the public and the advice of their.own technica.1 and ins pection s ta f f.a bout t,he a ppr o pria te regula to ry a ction' a t the. Midl a'nd pl a n t. The Regional Administrator has blatantly refused to include the public in any serious consideration of the solution to the problems at the Midland site. The continued refusal of the region to asuage the concerns of the public cou pied with the intense scrutiny; that the Midland plant is receiving from Congress, the press, and local and state government officials is inexcusable. a The ASLB hearings, on going at this time in response to a request from CPCo for a hearing, continue.through the-laborious process of a judicial hearing. Although the hearing, in theory, will resolve the issue of safety for the central Micigan residents +- iri fact,it will be the Staff that controls the critical day-to.-day overview of the plant. For this reason GAP is turning directly to the-1 Commission. We have exhausted our ef forts to wo rk with the Regiona. Administration.to insure that the CCP is adequate. At the Site Tour Mr. Warnick and Mr. Davis, Region - III, confirmed that the CCP: would be a pproveo witn- "10 days to two weeks." With the a pproval of the CCP safety-related construction activities can commence - immediate1.y. It is critical that tHE ' Commission review the decision of the Staff and recog'nize the serious step backwards that- [ this action represents for the third party' auditor concept. A) Modify the Construction Permit to include mandatory " hold po i nt o n the balance-o f-pl a nt (BOP) work and incor porate the current Board l ordered " hold points" on the soils remedial work into the co nstruct permit for the Midland Plant, Units il and d2. i e . l - - ~ -.. e
$'RC-Commissioners 9-lune 13, 1,983 ^ ) On April 8, 1981 Region III management over ruled its investigative sta f f's recome,endations to sus pend construction at the William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station near Cincinnati, Ohio. Instead, the l NRC issued an Immediate Action Letter which, inter alia, required the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company to develop a Quality Con-firmation Program (QCP). On November 12, 1982 the utter failure of the QCP for'ced the Commissioners to sus pend all safety-related construction at Zimmer. Unfortunately CPCo's Construction Completion [ Plan (CCP) pro posed for Midland bears a striking resemblance to the key flaws that doomed the QCP. In some cases, the CCP exacerbates the mainful mistakes of Zimmer. Mo re s pecifically, the Construction Completion Plan is doomed to to the r esumption bf construction on the site.3. pot resolved prior f ailure if the following s pecific probl ems are t j 1. Inherent Conf.lict of Interest I-The foundation of the CCP is to complete " integration of Bechtel I QC functions into the Midla nd Project Quality Assura nce De partment l (MPQAD) u nder Consumers Power Compa ny ma na gement..." (CCP Executive Summary, 1-10-83, at 3.) That has been completed according to the 6-3-83 CPCo letter to the NRC, at 17. i If the CCP adequately recognized that it is the MPQAD management that has failed to supervise and. control the Engineer / Contractor throughout the life of the Midland Project perhaps the CCP would have a chance to resolve the quality problems. But the "QA/QC Organization Changes" outlined in part 3.0 of the S 3-83 submittal simply legitimizes the very structure that has failed to implement the past QA/QC reorganization plans. As stated on Page 11 of Part 3.0 of the 6-3-83 CCP it is the MPQAD Executive Manager who holds.the key contact position with Bechtel l QA/QC personnel. This individual, Mr. Roy Wells, confirmed that the burden of change for the Midland Plant was on his shoulders at the February,8,1983 public meeting. He maintained that it was his personal decision to not replace the top Bechtel QC personnel underneath his su pervision, even in the face of direct NRC requests and public skepticism. If there was any doubt that MPQAD intended to bri.ng in new personnel to change the Midland Project around it is dispelled under the "Objec+ 4=?r" of the QA/QC Reorganization: 3. Use qualified personnel from existing QA and QC departments and contractors to staff key positions throughcut the integrated o,rganization. (6-3-83, at 11) 1/ All safety-related work was halted by CPCo on December 3,1982 following the results of;the NRC OSC ins'pection of the DGB. That "stop work" remains in ef fect for sa f ety. rela ted cons truction exce $ the soils wor k, HVAC, NSSS and electrical ca bl es. (CCP lett ers) ~ ^ ~ ~ ' ~ 4-
s 10 - June 13, 1983 NRC Commissioners 2. Failure to Specify Inspectio~n Procedures ~ and Evaluation Criteria The original proposai (1-10-83, at 8-9, 12) prom'ised to develop and revise the procedures that will be used to conduct the reinspections. Heither the procedures nor the 'eyaluation' criteria for' the inspections were specified beyond vaque vrefefence to profes'sional codes. According to the 6-3-83 proposal the QA/QC Reorganization still failes to include or explain the critical Quality Control inspection plans, (6-3-83, at 12). The technical content and requirements of such plans are promised some undisclosed future time, although QC will be responsible atfor implementing.these, unknown,. unexplained methodologies which (6-3-83, at 12) hold the key to future quality 'at the Midland plant. i MPQAD even plans to continue to use Bechtel's Quality Control i Notices Manual (QCNM) and Quality Assurance Manual (BQAM) "as i approved for use on the Midland Plant." (6-3'83, at 12) The solution l may be convenient, but it fails to explain how a QA/QC system that produced the In-Process Inspection Notification (IPIN) and De ficiency Report (DR) system could be adequate for a new Midland commi-tment to quality. As recently as May 27, 1983 the fi rst month.ly report of.the TERA Corporation that is conducting the Independent besign and ^ Construction Verification (IDCV) program discovered yet another Quality Contro.1 process that has failed. Con firmed Item report Number C-031 (Attached as Exhibit 5 ) reports the signifcance of their finding that four hangers field measured by TERA were out of installation tolerence limits. The report states simply: The construction deviation control process is not functional. Other TERA confirmed items' include hangers installed three feet frca its design locatign (C-032 and C-033), spring hangers located the wrong side of a 90 elbow, construction deviaition information not forwarded for approval and processing by engineering as required by procedures (C-034), hangers at elevations which do not match i l design elevations (C-035), offset dimensions, and drawings that hav.e been signed but not checked (C-03 6), serious FS AR errors that "could lead to the utilization of improper input to the design process." (C-037), improper power supply to the AFW pump which coul,d res' ult in "(f)ailure to provide m.inimum flow " and could pump during the stati cause damage to the AFW turbine drivenIn all TERA reported 46 confirmed items. blackout (C-038). 1/ TERA's monthly summaries contain Open, Confirmed and Resolved (OCR) Item reports, Finding Reports and Finding Resolution' Reports. Confirmed items will be further reytewed and' either' dispos ~itioned' or reported ~ closed or tracked. s t i' l H l I f
I NRC Commissionerr June 13,1983 ~ The TERA 10CV plan is not a part of the CCP activities.
- However, the examples stated above clearly indicate that there is a strong need for a comprehensive inspection of the plant according to specified and defined procedures.
In Section 4.0 " Program Planning," the P'rocedure for Control and Release of New Work exemplifies the lack of information given to the NRC and the public to judge the adequacy of the CCP. Although Section 4.5.3 (named above) allegedly provides the basis for ensuring that the requirements of the CCP are met prior to initiation of new work, in reality these procedures are in something called the Construction Work Plans (CWPs)'. The l' CWPs will not be developed until after a list i s prepared o.r t he Phase I.activit,ies are carried out. In other words the CCP will make u p t'he a6swers as' it goes'along--because no one, particular' i CPCo and.Bechtel, know the questions yet. Similar to the CWPs are the Quality Work Plans (QWPs) which will be written to match the CWPs. The CWP/QWP packages obviously will provide the critical guidance to construction and quality control personnel. Any variation on the CCP simply must contain l NRC inspection " hold points" to review the CWP/QWP packages prior to the initiation of any Phase Two work on the site. t The " hold point" requested above between comp,letion of Phase I l and Pha'se II activities is consistent with the commitments'made i-Keppler to the Midland public at the February 8, 1983 by Mr. public meeting during which he commited to taking a "hard look at the Midland Project." (Public Meeting, February 8,1983, Midland, Michigan) 4 3. Program Implementation Weaknesses j je-Historically it has been the implementation of any QA/QC program that i has been CPCo's Achilles heel at the Midland Plant. Similarily it is the implementation of the current edition of the CCP that concerns GAP staf f working on the Midland project. I In Section 5.0 Program Implemen'tation the key solution apparently .I is the management involvement at every stage of implementation activities. As we have previously stated we believe that this management influence will render the CCP ineffective, regardless l of the commitment of construct' ion pers.onnel. Section 5.0 calls for a management review prior to the initiation of team activities.for Phase 1 work. This review will, of. necessity 2 review training and recertification of QA/QC employees. They will-also " cover the process for both (1) the verification of completed inspection activity and (2) the installation and inspection status-activity. GAP believes that these _ reviews-are critical to the credibility of y a e me.
NRC Commissione rs June 13,1983 the safety of the construction on the Midland site. We request that a NRC " hold point" and a third party " hold poin't" be incorporated at the Management Review stage prior to the beginning of any Phase 1 work. Installation of a " hold point" at this juncture would require that the Management Release discussed on page 27 as Section 5.3 would l be a responsibility.trans ferred to the third-party team, with NRC review and approval, i Under Phase 2 Implementation the following statement raises serious concern about the CPCo commitment to following its own professed work plan: Correction o.f identified problems will be. given priority L over initiation of new work, as appropriate, and the completion teams will schedule their work based on these priorities, (emphasis added). There is no discussion of who will decide what is and what is not 4 appropriate to correct before new work is started, nor how that i ~ determination will be made. Those critical decisions simply must be made by someone other than CPCo and their Bechtel Engineer / ' Contractor. t Finally, GAP takes exception to the " catch all" provid~ed for. in the CCP.. Section 10.0, CHANGES TO THE CONSTRUCTION COMPLETION PROGRAM.provides a procedure which. could undermine the entire i CCP. If CPCo follows its historical path of disguising all unauthorized work as a " misunderstanding" or " lack of clear ' communication,"~than this Section provides a legitimate. channel for " obtaining approval to initiate activities that do'not meet the requi rements of the CCP.." i 4. Lack of Organizational Freedom for.the Quality Assurance Department The organizational premise' of the CCP is a " team" concept that integrate construction, engineering and quality assurance personnel. The " team members will be located together-to the extent pra ct i ca bl e... " (1 83,, at 8) The NRC recognized the lack of organizational freedom in the March 28, 1983 letter from Region'III to CPCo. (3-2B-83, at 1), and, asked CPCo to provide a description the measures the' utility intend $ to institute to " assure that QC reinspection will be sufficiently independent of team controls." CPCo's res ponse as documented,in their April' 22, 1983 letter on' Page 7 indicates that QC personnel. ass'igned.to the teams will be under the Administrative controls of MPQAD. :It states that actual QC inspections will be conducted in accordance. with the PCQIs and irs. approved by MPQAD. Further explanation is provided in the _6-3-83 CCP, Section 4.0, PROGRAM PLANNING and 4.2 TEAM ORGANIZATION. These sections detail both team organiz.ation and training /recertificatiGl 4 t j L F l t bL
s NRC Commissioners ' June 13,1983 Many of the details concerning retraining and recertification appear to be not only adequate, but surpass the commitments made by other utilities with similar problem. In particular GAP believes that i f imp'lemented as planned, and reviewed at a Phase I retraining " hold point" the training process will produce construction and quality control personnel with + sufficient skills to perform their jobs. However, even the best trained work force must still have su pervisors who are commited to quality work instead of cost and schedule pressures. To date MPQAD has demonstrated a neither the ability to implement any quality plan, nor the commitment to do so. GAP reserves judgement on the operation o'n the " team concept" as an a ppropriate. construction concept for nuclear powe r plants until such time as a utility can demonstrate that there can be I organizational freedom for QA functions. ,. ) 5. Lack of Comprehensiveness CCP reinspections will cover only " accessible" completed construction, + (1-10-83, at 10;'4-22-83, at 1 ; a n d 6 8 3., a t 21 ). The Regional staff has. indicated that this is acceptable to them. (3-28-83 letter, at 1) Although there is no indication in.any of the i submittals of the percentage of work that is not accessible Section 4.3 Ouality verification (6a3-83, at 21-22) majority of the work performed prior to December 1982. Further the CCP continues to define out from CCP coverage t'he I soils work, the HVAC work, the electrical cable reinspection, [ the NSSS work, and other pr'oblem areas that have required individual programs to resolve deficiencies. 3 This piecemeal a pproach effectively surrenders any pretentions that the CCP will provide a definitive answer to the-Midland QA problems, even if the program were otherwise legitimate. The 1 necessity for reinspection results. from the inaccuracy of current j ' quality records in the first pl a ce. Paperwork reviews are simply 4 not dependable at the Midland Project.- t It is critical
- FI* ei+h?r a third party or NRC " hold point" be contained in the reinspection Phase I activities to determine the adequacy of the "accesible systems" approach.
Clearly if reinspections find items of non-conformance the inspection scope needs to be increased to include both Non-Destructive Examination i techniques as.well as other means available to the utility to- ~ determine the as-built condition of the plant. The-STATISTICAL SAMPLING PLAN, Ap pe n d i x,' C, Rev.1 of the.6-3-83 l CCP is being reviewed by a industrial, statistician at this time. l The initial review of the sampling plan indicates that it is i consistent with ap.propriate sampling techniques.- We also request ~ l .~ w- -k , + - =, ,e wi rer
t NRC Commissioners 14 - June 13, 1983 that Mr. Rubenstein of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations (NRR) review this plan for acceptability prior to NRC approval. i 6. The CCP fails to require the minimum of a credible reinspection o f the as-built condition of the pl a nt. l At the February 8,1983 public meeting Mr. Keppler said that the { NRC " told them that comprehensive programs needed to be developed ) and put into place in order to: (1) Provide assurance that comp-l 1eted construction work was sound, and (2) Provide assurance that future work would be effectively controlled." (0pening Remarks, 1 Mr. Ke p pl e r, attached as Exhibit 6 ) Evidently Regien kII's assurance will come from CPCo's own audit ' ~ of the plant. Since February GAP staff members have tried every reasonable approach to convince Region III that their philosophical view of industry self-examination has failed at Midland. Although Mr. Keppler boldly maintains that his " reasonable assurance" of the Midland plant can only now be maintained with adequate third -party reviews, in fact, the third party review amounts to nine professionals overviewing the work of over 5,000 construction employees. ~ The meat of the reinspection program is the Quality Ye'rific.ation Program. This Program is explained in detail in Appendix I of the 6-3-83 CCP submittal. Our analysis is on going, however, there are a number of obvious flaws. These include, but are not limited to: --Exclusion of 31,890 questionable closed Ins pection Records (irs) for HVAC and soils. work. Cable routing and identi-fication and ASME ha'nger, programs,( App I, at 7), --Incomplete review by the NRC of the PQCI's to be used for reinspection,( App I at8), --Non-compliance with the 100% reinspection request (3-38-83 1etter from RIII to CPCo, at 1), substituting a '100% reins pection ef fort based on a " systems / area-orientatiog," and supplemented by a " random plant-wide ins pection" to provide a valid quality. baseline on an expeditious basis. (In other wo rds manipulate the 100% hardware inspecti,o_the requirement to get beyond n a,s. q ui c kly a s po s s i bl e. ), --Exemptions ' fo r re ba r, components, and other naterials - that are inaccessible but indeterminate because of materials traceability problems. ( App I, at 13) i --Excessive responsiblity for the Executive Manager of MPQAD to have overall responsibility for the QVP, ( App I,* at 16), --Critical PQCIs to be verified by Review of documentation only Ap pendix B. +,
1 \\ ~ NRC Commissioners 15 - ne 13, 1983 Clearly the CCP i s not, adequate to assure public health and safety in central Michigan. Installation of mandatory " hold points" to review the training and recertification of personnel, the adequacy of the PQCIs, and the a ppropriateness to proceed from Phase I to Phase II in this massive project is called for. GAP urges the Commissioners to review the materials which i comprise the CCP and critically consider the extraordinary requirements that will bring the Midland project into conformance with 10 CFR. B. Require a management audit of Consumers Power Company (CPCo) by an inde pendent, competent management auditing firm that will determine the causes of the management failures that have resulted in the soils settlement disaster and the recent Quality Assurance breakdown. Even if the methodology of the reinspection program and the instal-lation of mandatory " hold points" in the balance of plant work and soils work were adequate it i s impossible to have any faith in the current Midland management team. These are the same people responsible for the problems in the first pl a ce ' The evidence on 'the public record is clear -- the corporate management of the Midland project simply cannot build a nuclear power plant according to the laws of the. Atomic Energy Act as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 10. Our conclusion is based on the testimony of NRC staff inspectors, investigators, technica: experts internal sources as well as the attitude and actions of CPCo management of ficials. For 14 year CPCo has bumbled from one extraordinary breakdown to another, and they have continued a pattern "y 1 of blaming their woes on the NRC, the intervenors, the State Attorney General, and hard times. CPCo has lacked the initiative to make adequate modifications to their construction boondoggle, to recognize the most obvious problems, and to resist regulatory incentives to improve. In testimony before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ( ASLB or Board) NRC inspectors testified that they still do not know the cause of the problems at the Midland site. _( Exhibit 7 )
- Recently, however, one inspector testified that he believed the plant would "run a lot easier without them (CPCo offfc'ials) there."
( Ex hi bit 8 ) Similarily memos written to Regional _ Administrator Ke ppler during the summer of 1982 give significant i nsight into the reasons for the prob 1' ems at the. Midland site. (Contai ned as Exhibit 9 ). These i memos include insight into the technical inadequacies, communication breakdowns, and staff recommendations about solution to the problems on the site. Several examples of these types of comments are listed.below: --On April 27,1983'Dr. Ross Landsman, OSC-RIII, testified before y --w r.,s. -wr,- -e y vw-w-rrip pw ve w= = -ti --w w-ep g ery r--
~ NRC Commissioners Jne 13, 1983 the ASLB that he did not trust CPCo because there were i too many examples of them putting " cost and scheduling ahead of quality." ( Exhi bit 10 ), --On May 6,1983 Mr. Wayne Sha f fer, OSC-RIII, former head of the the OSC-Midland Section said that he didn't have any faith 1 { in CPCo ability. (Exhibit 11 ) i --On June 1,1983 Dr. Landsman testified that MPQAD Executive j Manager, Mr. Roy Wells; Superintendent of MPQAD soils work, j Jim Meisenheimer; and the Section Head for the Soils QA work, 1 Dick' Oliver should be replaced because they are unqualified or have attitude problems. (Exhibit 8 ) --In a June 51, l'98I memo from Mr. Charles Norellius and Mr. Spessard stated the following about Mr. James W. Cook, the i CPCo Vice-President in charge of the Midland Project: (He) may actually be contributing to mme of the confusion which seems to exist. The staff views that he is too much involved in details of plant operations and there are times when the working level staff appear to agree and be ready to take action where Mr. Cook may argue details as to the necessity for such action or may argue as to the specific meaning of-de. tailed work pro-cedures,..." --The Norellius/Spessard memo further suggests that the NRC "should question whether or not it is possible to adequately manage a construction progr am which is as complex and diverse as that which currently exists at Midland." --Fir. ally the same memo questio ns whether the NRC should consider that CPCo "have a separate' management group all the way to a possible new Vice-President level; one of which would 4 manage the construction of the reactor to get it operational and the second to look solely after the remedial soils and j underpinning activities. -- An NRC July 23 B3 m emorandum from R.J. Cook to R.F. Warnick , states that CP Co has a history of not responding to NRC concerns, giving misleading statements to the NRC, not having control of their contractor, continuous deficiencies in material storage conditions, a practice 'of.jnspecting -rather than building-quality into the plant, slipshod" workmanship, an attitude which precludes quality workmanship, and an unwillingness of the constructor to share information with the NRC. (Exhibit 9 -). l --The Cook memo - further states that CPCo uses " tunnel vision," in the identification of problems, has a gag order on their employees to prevent them from talking to the NRC, and remains "a rgumentative" ~ toward the NRC when.they must discus s regulatory concerns. s n 1 l A;%
[~ l 1 ] f NRC Commissioners sune 13,1983 l The Cook memo concludes with the following insight: When considering the above listing of questionable licensee performance attributes, the most damning concept is the fact that the NRC inspection effort at Midland has been purely reactive in nature for approximately the last year, and that the indicators are what have been observed in a pproximately the last six months. If these are the types of items that have become an NRC nuisance under a reactive inspection program, one can only wonder at what would be disclosed under a rigorous routine inspection and audit program. Clearly the' prob'lems 'on the site warranted aggressive management attention.,Yet evidence obtained by GAP under the Freedom I l of Information Act demonstrates tha the solutions to Midlands' problems have consistently had to be initiated, developed and structured by the NRC in a series of painful regulatory negotiations. Just as CPCo cannot " inspect quality into the Midland plant','" the NRC cannot regulate integrity into CPCo management. Both i i quality construction and competent, trustworthy management depend on a basic respect for voluntary disclosure of quality control or assurance problems. It is perhdps easier to understand the lack of c'andor on the'part of the CPCo Midland management team after reviewing the statements u. of CPCo President John Selt.y in recent news articles. In particular GAP brings to the attention of the ' Commissioners a recent Detroit News article (April ,833 ) in waich Mr. Selby admits that they "have bet'the compaKy on the Mid1snd plant." His statement; coupled with the actions of his top-level management, is one explanation cf the panic management that permeates the Midland project. It is Mr. Keppler's view, as expressed during his ASLB testimony, that if CPCo can't build Midland he would have to pull their operating license for Big Rock and Palisades.- We disagree with his conclusion--Palisades and Big Rock are plants that are already j i in the rate base, Midland is not. Its' $4.43 billion dollar price tag, and questionable completion date have almost destroyed the Common sense can explain the lack of confidence-that has company. developed as a result 'of the conflicting pressures of _ cost / scheduling, and safety at the Midland site Yet Mr. Kepp1'er maintains that neither he nor his staff have yet discovered the reason for Midland's management pro bl ems. Since May 1982 the Regional Director has been looking for an answer. At this point GAP believes that the answer is clearly evident in the testimony of his own inspectors. The root causes'for the management breakdown can be best discovered at this point by an i ndependent management. audit t' hat' h.as the authority to recommend solutions to-poor judgement and colossa.1 cost overruns asHwell as construction flaws unlike any other nuclear construction project. 9
~ NRC Commissioner s June 13, 1983 C. Reject the CCP a s currently propos ed, including a rejection of Stone a nd Webster to conouct the thiro party aucit of tne plant. Insteac a truly competent, creoicle, a nd i nd e pe nd e nt tniro pa r ty i auditor should be chosen.witn public partic i pa tio n in tne gr o c e s s. To date the NRC has announced that there will be no res ponse to 1 public concer ns about CPCo's selection of S&W as the third party l auditor. Nor will there be an opportuni'ty to review the methodology by which S&W is to pr e f orm i ts fu ncti o n. Instead, according to an April 5, 1983 letter from Mr. Keppler to Billie Garde, the S&W work will be looked at only af ter a pro bl em is fou nd: We have not. revi.ewed S&W methodologies and do 'not pla n to unless we find significant problems which they have missed. ( Ex hi bi t J1, a t 3. ) The letter confirms that there will be no public meeting to consider 4 public comments about either S&W or to review the adequacy of their pl a n. This continues the long history of r egulation by def ault at Midland. Unfortunately for the public this theor etical a pproach to i governmental regulation is both dangerous ~and expensive. At this l l stage Region III is as guilty as CPCo in a serious conceptual i breakdown that prohibits implementaion of any realistic solution to Midland's problems. y i These problems are at least as serious as Diablo Canyon and Zimmer. They touch on every area of design and construction. For almost 5 14, years there has been a total lack of commitment to a QA program which hcs iaf t the plant 85% complete in an indeursninate state. The long trail oi' continuing revelations, potential sa fety problems, hardware problems, design flaws, major construction defects, a.stro-nomical price increases, and broken p omises have to cally eroded the p;blic ' confidence in CPCo and in the NRC to ensure the quality of the pl a nt's co nstructio n. Only a truly i nde pende nt, comprehensive audit will assuage the public's well-fou nded f ears that Midland is nc-t sa fely constructed. 9 1. Evaluat' ion of the Stone a nd Webster Pro yosal The concerns about S&W's independence would be somewhat academic if. S&W had. pr es ented a c.inimally adequate audit pro posal to address the scope of the QA breakdown. But Tt'didg't. Although the plan is too sketchy to evaluate -- a brief 3 page outline --the number of p erso nn el plaan ed for the audit r emov es any doubt about credibility or d e penda bi. ity. S&W proposes nine auditors for the Midland project! At a minimum, the NRC should recogniz e*that any CCP must be based on the r esults of compl ated third-; arty finding's, as well as t commitment for the duration of the project. The third yarty pro g ram must provide a comprehensive view of the as built condition of the i l plant by an independent auditor, as well a s a n independent a ssessment of all future co nstruction"-- the CPCo CCP and S&W plan do not do eithe I I
l ~ I kRC Commissioners 19.- 'ne 13, 1983 ~ The only truly substantive part of the Stone and Webster audit is the Construction Implementation Overview (CIO), described in the 6-3-83 submittal at 30. Like the soils audit the S&W program commits to stay only until CPCo and the NRC have confidence in the adequacy of the implementation of the QA Program for the Midland plant. This is not a third party l audit by any stretch of the imagination. i 2. Lack of Independence Midland needs, and the Region has commited to a verification program by a truly independent company with no stake in the outcome of its audit. This independent third party is not serving a client's requirements, but rather the ensuring the quality of construction at the,lic interest pub in plant. t { Stone and Web' ster fatis under both a literal and realistic reading of the Commission's primary financial criteria, that the third j party not have any direct previous involvement with the Company. S&W directly fails this test. In September 1982 S&W was hired by CPCo to be the overviewer on the soils QA implementation. If the Commissions independence criteria are to be taken seriously they must be applied. j Ironically, it is the independence criteria that. NRR uses'as.a basis to reject the other CPCo nomination, the TERA Corporation (see March 28, 1983 letter from NRC to CPCo. at 3). 3. Lack of Public _ Participation in the Selection Process Even if the independence crittrIa could be met for S&W the-lack of public participation in the selection process destroys its legitimacy. Although the February 8, 1983 meeting attracted several hundred Midland residents there was no ditcussion or input from the public about the third party avaitor, or the methodology by which the audit would be conducted. ,Instead Mr. Keppler and Mr. Eisenhut firmly. informed the public that an independent audit would deterifne the adequacy of the Midland plant. Within days the NRC and CPCo were in " closed door" sessions over the acceptability of the CCP, -the auditor, huo cne various scopes and methodologies. Unless Mr. Keppler and the Commission h&~v~e rewritten the policies .of the agency the Diablo Canyon model set the basis for increased-public choosesparticipation in resolving the issues of how the Commiss~ ion { independent auditors. j At Midland, by contrast, Region III has chosed to ignore the serious-ness of the situation by eliminating many of the most useful means l of public participation employed at Diablo. Canyon. When GAP protested the series of " closed door" meetings pertaining to the independent audit we were told that there would be no public meetings about S&W, but that all written -comments would be considered (Exhibit 12,. Y 1=
1 m l NRC Commissioners ! June 13, 1983 3 ~ at 3). Instead of the NRC acting to allay the fears of the public l Mr. Keppler's position of " resisting shared decision making" ( Ex hi bi t 13) has only served to reinforce the fears of an already skeptical public in central Michigan. Stone and Webster may be capable of addressing the problems at Midland,,but neither S&W nor CPCo have bothered to acknowledge l that importance of public credibility for the third party auditor. S&W's selection would completely undermine the N9C's reform l action for Midland. I D. Remove the Quality Assurance /Ouality Control Function from the Midland Proj e ct Ouali ty. As s ura nce Depa rtment (MPQAD) and replace them with an i ndependent team of QA/0C personnel that report simultaneously to the NRC and CPCo. i A licensee's quality assurance program is its internal structure of checks and balances to ensure safe operations. Every applicant for a construction permit is required by the provisions of 10 C.F.R. 550.34 to include in its preliminary safety analysis report a description of the quality assurance program to be applied to the design, fabrication, construction and testing of the structures, systems and components of the facility. Quality assurance comprises all those planned and systemati:c actions necessary to j provide adequate confidence that a structJre, system or component will perform satisf actorily in service. Each structure, system or component must be documented, inspected and periodically audited to verify compliance with all aspects of the quality assurance program. The cause of the safety de fects described above is an inadequate quality assurance program, which has been in shambles for a decade. In fact, l in 1973 the original Midland licer. sing appeal board members -felt so strongly about QA ' violations that the Director of l Regulations pointed out that even though the Appeals Board l could not take action on the IE findings-- (H)ad the construction permit proceeding still i been before our Board at the time that the re-f sults of the November 6-8-ins'pection were an-nounced, it is a virtual certainty that we f would have ordered forthwith a cessation of all construction activities'...., (November 26, 1973 Letter from L. Manning Muntzing, Director i of Regulations.-re: Quality-Assurance Deficiencies Encountered at Midland Facility.p.2. ) The 1973 warning should have served as notice.to both Bechtel and l P l [
m NRC Commissioners une 13, 1983 and Consumers Power Company to resolve their QA problems. Quite the contrary, however, they ignored the notice. So did the NRC staff. The problems at the Midland plant have continued unabated. Both the 1979 and 1980 Systemic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) reports give notice of futher and expanded problems at Mid-l land. The problems identified then (lack of qualifications of QC inspectors, continuation of work prior to corrective action) are i similar to those cited as causes in the recent stop-work order. 3 The reports also include acknowledgements of excessive QA backlogs i and lack of timeliness. (SALP Report 1980.) Consumers' failure to learn from its mistakes passed the stage of accidental oversight long ago. 1 The lack of quality assurance at Midland has been a continuous i concern to Region III. In the spring of 1982 at the release of the 1981 S ALP rating, 'Mr. Keppler publicly reported that it was neces-t sary to change previous testimony before the ASLB which had provi-j ded a" reasonable assurance" that the plant would be constructed in accordance with nuclear construction regulations. The revised test-imony was not modified substantially, it is clear that QA problems at Midland were resolved. According to testimony by the NRC staff as early as September 1982 the Midland special section was so concerned about the prob-lems of QA implementation that at least one of them recommended stopping work at the Midland facility. Subsequently the Diesel Gen-erator Building inspection confirned that in fact, there had been a quality assurance breakdown on the site. The solution to resolving the QA breakdown is the CCP. Unfortunately the Region III management seems satisfied with the' I. basis upon which -the CCP is develpped: put Consumers in charge of the program. The public already has had ar. opportunity to preview the resuits of Consumers' internal policy with the Zack debacle over the past three years. Its performance has been disappointing, at most. Although the NRC fined CPCo $38,00d for Zack's non-compliance with federal regulations and forced a major QA reorganization, further actions by the utility revealed a determination to hide p'.oblems. Currently an Office of Investigations. probe is being conducted into the most recent Zack problems. The' findings of the probe are already documented in the NRC inspections of the Zack QA breakdown at the LaSalle Plant. A December 22, 1982 NRC IE report about the revelations acknowledges the critical' role that CPCo played in -response to the 1979 citation: On September 2,1981, the services of a Senior Quality Assurance Engineer from' Project Assistance Corporation (consultants) were retained by CPCo for assignment at Zack for the purposes of establishing a formal document d
s 22 - F,e 13, 1983 NRC Commissioners control system and performing an indepth review of the conditions described by Zack in their September letter (Zack notified CPCo of a ~10 CFR 50.55(e) on August 28, 1981). CPCo MPQAD employees and management knew about the new QA breakdown on the Midland site, yet they failed to notify the NRC or take any other action. a LIkewise, the infamous soils settlement problems, began with 4 pre-noti fication to the Midland management team through the i settlement of the Administration building in 1977. That settle-t ment ocurred a year prior to the beginning of construction of the Diesel Gene ra to r. Bu,il ding. That building is now cracked and sinking. The technical debate over the building itself and j and its ultimate safety remains little more than a judgement t L call between experts. l Finally, the a recently released NRC Investigation (83-13) i into the possible "f alse statement" of CPCo management of ficial Mr. Boos concerning the status of work completed on the site during a 1982 NRC meeting shatters any doubts that CPCo is a utility that seeks to be candid and open with the regulators. [ Recent testimony into the 83-13 Investigation re' port led to an "in camera" session af ter an NRC IE Inspector acknowledged that at least one CPCo official at the March 82 meeting l knew that the NRC had been seriously misled. (Exhi bist 13) These examples 'of the utility's resposne to the discovery of any j major problems completely undermine the assumption upon which the CCP is based -- voluntary. disclosure of Q A violations. Clearly a completion and reinspection program that places faith in a management team that has lost the confioence and trust of NRC inspectors, and a QA Department that has notorio'usly and blatantly disregarded 10 CFR Appendix B, is inappropriate. I } Only a new QA/QC team, with no stake in the outcome of their l I work. can ever restore quality work to the Midland facility. } GAP recognizes this is an extraordinary request for relief, but i t is clearly warranted at the Midland Project. After 14 years of bumbling and 54.43 billion dollars of construction cost there'must be a time when the Commissib3e'rs'intervent to protect the public af fected by this out-of-control project. The Region and the utility have stopped short of realistic regulation, and appropriate controls for the remainder of the' construction phase. Hopefully, the Commissioners will intervene. E. Increase the assignment of NRC personnel to include additional technical and inspection personnel. Region III is currently understaf fed and critically overworked. , 2,J. ; <j e v e 4 v. - r -~ y
'NRC Commissioners Jun. c3, 1983 j The new Office of Special Cases is handling two of the most troubled nuclear plants under construction in the ' country. I The intense inspection effort has provided the only acceptable solution to both the Zimmer and Midland crisis. The teams l of NRC Inspectors assigned to the Office of Special Cases has l been, for the most part, of high quality and extreme.ly i co n u:ienti o u s. They have requested, through memorandum and testimony the assignment of additional personnel to assist on the Midland project. We strongly support the assignment of additional technical and inspection personnel to the Region to augment the OSC teams. i F. Require a de.taile.d. review of the soils settlement resolution, i as outlined in the Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report, incor-porating a techn.ical analysis of the implementation of the underpinning at the current stage of completion. I As a further structural check on the independence and performance i of the third-party program at Diablo Canyon, in 1982 the NRC staff f commissioned Brookhaven National Laboratory ("BNL") to study par-ticular aspects of the seismic design of the plant. BNL raised.que-stions about many of the mathematical models used by PG&E to deter-mine the seismic' design response spectra for the plant. The study revealed that the Teledyne audit was not complete and,BNL co mp re-h u hensive "enough* and that broad access te the audit process by outside consultants can significantly enhance the value and cred-ibility of the third-party review process. In light cf the" concerns by a number of the technical disagreements of several NRC staff members, GAP believes it appropriete for the l NRC commissioners to request another study of the design deficiencie's of the Midland nuclear power plant. In particular we request another i l review of.the Diesel Generator Building by a, non-nuclear construction censultant. If these basic questions cannot be answered then no matter what the numerous third party auditors do to restore confidence in the balance of the plant the residents of central Michigan will never know whose technical judgement was correct. IV. CONCLUSIONS In. the fall of 1982 an NRR staff person recorded (in a log recently 4 obtained by GAP through FOIA requests)the following summary of the ACRS requert-formalized through their June 8, 1982 letter to Chairman.Palladino; and NRR management response. ~ The ACRS asked for a report of, design quality and construction adequacy. They are looking for assurance that with all~ the QA problems at Midland in specific areas that we have not over-looked problems in other areas that have not yet reared their head. Is. CPCo addressing this only through the AFW review? + se A e m.. ,r
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.-y.. +
- s
t . 'NRC C ommi s s i on e rs ] - Junt 3, 1983 l But the INPO effort addresses " work in progress" only! l BUT WHEN IHTEGRATED WITH TERA EFFORT, YOU GET (undecipherable) l f Only for the AFW system! SERVES AS A " SAMPLE" (AUDIT) But it doesn't answer Oa krent 's problem with hidden problems. INPO goes'from today and does only address forward fit. They do not investicate what happened previously. TERA LOOKS B ACKWARD TOO. f But only f oi-thE AtFW system' (We've come full circle). Exhibit 14,at5. Dr. Oakrent's problem with hidden problems is the same as GAP's j concern about hidden problems. In the past year both CPCo and the NRC have managed to avoid the key question about the Midland i i Plant -- What is really out there? Until that question _is answered completely, competently, and credibly there can be no assurance about the safety of the Midland plant. We urge the Commissioners torequest a management. audit of CPC.o; to replace ~ MPQ AD with an independent firm; to insta1T " hold points" in the construction permit, and to require all the necessary changes to C the'pr6 posed CohstrQction Completion. Plan which will enable the public to know the facts about the cost sr.d safety cf the Midland plant. Like Zimmer, the traditional approach of licensee control at Midland can be acco:rplished only at the expense of undue risks to public health and safety. We trust that the A$tB will reach a fair and just decision about the - Midland Plant when it reviews the long record ^ that has been established by 1 Citizen Intervenors, the Staff, and the utility. But,.the aporoval of the CCP without substantial modificttion will h3ve the effect of allowing CPCo to continee its long out-of-control nuclear plant virtually independent of the third-party audit that the central Michigan public expects to be established. We look forward to your prompt response. Sincerely, . ' ~ ' h ?'. O_ BILLIE PIRNER GARDE-Citizens Clinic Director cc: Service List BPG/dk l I ^ l I-g ,, > =. g
e T. * *. y t. i. *. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '83 di13 P4 :34 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of: ) Docket Nos. 50-329-0I. ) 50-330-OL CONSUI'ERS POWER COMPANY ) 50-329-OM ) 50-330-OM (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2) ) ) d CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE l I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing June 13, 1983 GAP Tsttts* to NT Cmrnissime*s, re: Ccnstructim CcTeleticn Plan were mailed, proper. postage prepaid, this L ay of m m , 1983, to: d
- Charles Lechhoefer, Esq.
Frank J. Felley A6ainistrative Judge Attorney General Sta'a of Michigan Atcrnic Safety and Licensing Board Steward H. Freeman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ctarission Assistant Attorney General F=5hington, D. C. 20555 Envircrmental Protection Division 525 W. Ottawa Street, 720 law Building
- Dr. Jerry Earhxar Iansing, Michigan 48913 i
Atr.inistrative Judge Atcrnic Safety and Licensing Board Ms. Mary sinclair U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission 5711 Sumerset Street Midland, Michigan 48G40~ "Ashington, D, C. 20555 Dr. Frederick P. Cowan Ms. Barbara Stamiris j Aininistrative Judge 5795 N. River j 6152 N.. Verde Trail, Apt. B-125 Freeland, Michigan 48623- ~ Boca Raton, Florica 3.1433 .k4endell E. Marshall, President 'Ja es E. Brunner, Esq. Mapletm Intervenors Consuiers Power Ccapany RED 10 l 212 West Michigan Avenue Midland, Michigan 48640 l Jackson,' Michigan 49201 l
- Docketing and Service Section i
.j U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccr:rtission l Washington, D. C. 20555 o 1 4 L. l- .. ~. _ ~ h
l \\ G,
- 3 j Fyron M. Cherry, P.C.
Peter Flynn, P.C. L Char:y & Flynn Three First National Plaza Suita 3700 Chicago, Illinois 60602 [
- Atmic Safety a.M Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Pagulatory Comission Washington, D. C.
20555 2
- Atccic Safety and licensing Jgpeal Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulato_T C:r:nlissicn Washington, D. C. 20555 Steve J. Gadler, P.C.
2120 Ca_w Avenue St. Paul, Mi 55108 Frederick C. Wi.llia:ns, Esq. Isha:n, Iincoln & Beale 1120 comecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036
- Wi.llia:n D. PatcE, Esquire Office of E<ecutive Imga.1 Di. rector U.S. Nucisar Regulatory Chr:missicn
.%ashington, L. C. 20555 1 O oca i3
- Deliyered through the NRC internal mails.
e e i r-
o n - 8, t. a ww - p ~ i UNITED STATES L NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r 3 h REGION.lli f Y e d 7se noosavstinoAo e %,*****j ome suv .u .s.s. v MAY I 7 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: William D. Paton, Couusel for NRC Staff c t j FROM: Robert F. Warnick, Director, Office of Special Cases
SUBJECT:
ASLB ORDER FOR INTERVENOR REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY i IN THE MIDLAND QA HEARINGS The investigator's file for RIII Investigation Report No. 50-329/82-13(EIS); 50-330/82-13(EIS) has been reviewed. The file contained the following documents which are publicly available or were previously submitted for review: 1. January 7, 1983, letter from Consumers Power Company to NRC, title: General Quality Plan for Underpinning Activities and i Quality Plans and Q-List Activities for Service Water Pump Structure and Auxiliary Building Underpinning Activities. 2. April 9, 1982, memorandum from Spessard to Eisenhut, title: Recommen-dation for Board Notification (Midland). 3. RIII Inspection Report No. 50-329/82-09; 50-330/82-09. 4. September 4,1982. Motion by Stamiris before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board for Partial Initial Decision on QA Adequacy in Soils Remedial Work Prior to Commencement of Remedial Underpinning Excavations. 5. September 22, 1982, memorandum from Davia to hurns, title: Consumers Power Company, Midland Nuclear Power Plant, Pcssible Material False Statement. 1 6. RIII Investigation Report No. 50-329/82-13(EIS); 50-330/82-13(EIS). 7. October 26, 1982, memorandum from Burns to Davis, title: Consumers' Power Company, Midland Nuclear Plant - Possible Material -False Statement. The documents listed below are not publicly available or were not previously submitted and are attached to this memo: ' s dh 1 d J.P # O '~' Q fb [ 8 v.r y ed.*L.f 4,!2 2 /~
A o' N. D. Paton gg g 7 gg3 1. Investigation Data Input Form. I 2. Bechtel Technical Specification for Monitoring Instrumentation l for Underpinning Construction. 1 3. Bechtel Technical Specification for Underpinning of Auxiliary Building and Feedwater Isolation Valve Pits. 4. Bechtel Technical Specification for Monitoring Instrumentation for Underpinning Construction. 5. Bechtel Procedure for Installation and Rework of Electrical Cables. 6. Bechtel Quality Control Instruction for Installation of Electrical Cables for Underpinning Data Acwuisition System. 8. Wiss, Janney, Elstner and Associates, Inc., Instrument Cable Installation Drawing. (RIII did not have the facilities to copy this document. The only copy is attached.) 9. Consumers Project Inspection Plan and Report for Installation of Electrical Cables for Underpinning Data Acquisition System.
- 10. Consumers Project Inspection Plan and Report for Installation of Conduit and Boxes for Underpinning Data Acquisition System.
- 11. 99 pages of investigator's notes.
Documents No. 2 thru 4 bear proprietary markings by the Bechtel Power Corporation and should be reviewed with that in mind. I The 99 pages of notes should be withheld. These notes were gathered during the investigation and were incorporated into the final report. k "Originsi :6tgns:1 by.R. F. Ucrnicle' R. F. Warnick, Director. Office of-Special Cases Attachments: As stated cc w/o attach: See attached distribution list r I i I 4 i 1 m,
-n m ,q AY 1 7 1983 l W. D. Paton / - cc w/o attach:
- 1. Portuna. OH:BQ E. Pawlik, OI:RIII DNB W t Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Im pactor, RIII The Honorable Charles nachhaefer ASLB The Bonorable Jerry Harbour. ASLB The Honorable Prederick P. Cowan, ASLB The Bonorable Ralph S. Decker ASLB William Paton, ELD Michael Miller Ronald Callen Michigan public Service Commission Myron M. Cherry Barbara Stamiris Mary SInclair Wendell Marshall Colonel Steve J. Gadler (P. E.) Boward Levin (TERA) Billie P. Garde, Government I Accountability Project t } i. i i I t l L l k I/ omer).RII l (.7........... euaname).W. e..i....i..s........ ..L..e. w... s............ .W..a..r.n..i. c..k.......... ons) 5./.16../.8 3........ .,.f..% 1 nec _ room sie oo.eos n=cu caso _.. _,___OFFICI AL R ECOR D COPY 4 n 4
n G f .I ~ h mp p.mbdd.- ~ DISTRIBUTION: Docket Nos. 50-329/330 OM,0L APR 2 21983 NRC PDR Local PDR WDircks RMattson Docket Nos: 50-329 OM, OL PCR System JRoe RVollmer and 50-330 OM, OL LB #4 r/f TRehm HThompson EAdensam VStello Grace @RDeYoung DHood BSnyder IOuncan Ms. Billie Pirner Garde DEisenhut/RPurple GCunningham Citizens Clinic Director JSnfezak:IE HDenton/ECase Government Accountability Project JStone:IE PPAS " n = 0 ; Institute for Policy Studies Attorney, OELD TSpei,, g.e' Z.J. e 1901 Que Street, N.W. TNovak/MStine ct@ s Wasnington, D. C. 20009 MBridgers, EDO (NRR #12983) J t MJambor .J 1
Dear Ms. Garde:
KJohnson (NRR #12983) 8 SECY (3)
- j w(
e i 1 Your letter of March 25, 1983, to !!r. Darl Hood has been referred to me)f5n ( reoly. D n, yMe As you know, the meeting requested by TERA Corporation in their Mart:h 18, 1983, letter (docketed by Mr. Hood on March 21,1983) with respect to tne independent design and construction verification (IDCV) progran for Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2 was held on April 13, 1983. The meeting discussed the Auxiliary Feedwater System with respect to the present TERA Engineering Program Plan, and also the current plans for incorporating the two additional systems (onsite emergency AC power, and HVAC for the Control Room) selected by the NRC on March 22, 1983. I understand you will soon be submitting your coments in response to the April 13, 1993, discussions. Your letter asks Wien TERA's confirmed items should be reoorted to NRC. Staff comments on recorting recuirements as prooosed by TERA at the April 13, 1983, j meeting will be provided in the near future. We also inferred from your letter - a concern that confimen itens may have been reported to Consumers Power Company and not to the NRC. In a telephone discussion on April 7,1983, isummary enclosed) we we;e advised by TERA that this is not the case. l We trust the reeting and this letter have been responsive to your concerns. Sincerely, l l (Signed) T. A, Rehm i l I Thomas Rehn, Assistant for Operati.ons Office of the Executive Director I for Operations l
Enclosure:
Telephone Discussion Summary
- DHood/hmc *MDuncan
- NOTE: SEE PREVIOUS WHITE FOR CONCURRENCE 4/08/83 4/08/83 l
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i S 3 o, UNITED STATES
- [ *l3.. [ i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION was u~ crow.o c.rossa
.w e %,...../ AFR S rM3 I-Docket.Nos. 50-329, OM, OL 50-330 OM, OL 1 t APPLICANT: Consumers Power Company FACILITY: Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2
SUBJECT:
RECORD OF TELEPHONE DISCUSSION REGARDING PROPOSED APRIL 13,1983 MEETING AND OPEN ITEMS REPORTING On April 7,1983 I called H. Levin, TERA Corporation,-regarding the independent design and construction verification (IDCV) program for Midland ~j Plant, Units 1 and 2. 'The purpose was to establish the agenda for the forthcoming meeting o'n April 13, 1983. TERA will describe the present status of their planning for the IDCV Program with respect-to the second (On-site emergency power) and third (HVAC for Control Room) systems. The first.- 4 IDCV system (Auxiliary Feedwater) will ~ be reviewed briefly, followed by questions and coninent,s. I related to Mr. Levin the third oaragraph from.the enclosed letter of March 25, 1983 from Ms. B. Garde. I asked if any reporting of open, confimed or rasolved (OCR) items has, been given to Consumers Power Company and not to f4RC, as implied by Ms. Garde. Mr. Levin replied that no OCR f tem reporting has occurred to date to either party, and that TERA is operating in accordance with the Protocol enclosed with J. Keppler's 3/28/83 letter to Consume.s Power Cumpany, the external service list from Ms. Adensam's letter of March 24, 1983, and Section 5.0 of the TERA IDCV Engineering Program Plan. Mr. Levin would like to discuss reporting further at the April 13 1983^ neeting. j t Jrv-Darl Hood, Project Manager i Licensing Branch #4 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Ltr. from Billie Garde to Darl Hood dtd.3/25/83 L actosen q tf 4 1 C A s sA t 4 ~,, [.
4 3-- -r TVERNMENT ACCOUNT. '!UTY PROJECT institute for Policy Studies (202)234 9382 1901 Que Street. N.W,. Woshington. D.C. 20009 i March 25, 1983 ~ Mr. Darl Hood U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 s
Dear Mr. Hood:
i I am in receipt of your March 21, 1983 letter
SUBJECT:
i TERA CORPORATION'S PRCOECT QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ENGINEERING PROGRAM PLANS FOR THE MIDLAND INDEPENDENT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION VERIFICATION PROGRAM. The attached March 18, 1983 TERA letter includes a request for a public meeting between TERA and the NRC staff. I also understand, through Mr. Darrell Eisenhut's March 23, 1983 letter that TERA has been requested to expand the two initially required systems to include an independent design verification (IDV) of that part of the Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) equipment that directly affects the control room. This decision is extremely significant,' and I am anxious to review any detailed methcdology plant by either the TERA Corporation or the NRC which will determine the adequacy of the HVAC system. Finally, I note that tne TERA letter of March 18, 1983 indicates that "....the Midland IDVC program has progressed to the point where confirmed items have been identified." It appears that the confirmed items have not been reported to. the NRC at this time, add that TERA is asking for guidance about wh2n to raport these confirmed items. We are deeply distressed that ths confirmed items have not been identified as of yet to the NRC. It was our understanding that all communication would be given simultaneously to the NRC and Consumers Power Company, yet obviously that has not occurred. In our March 7, 1983 letter to Mr. Darrell Eisenhut we pointed out that there had been an admission that TERA had provided Consumers with a report that the NRC had not yet received, (Public Meeting, Midland, Michigan, February 8,1983). Now TERA has " confirmed items" which it has not reported to the NRC. Please clarify for TERA, as well as for us, the details of the requirement that information be provided to the NRC and to Consumers at the same time. Your response will be appreciated in the near future. Sincerely, l l APR11 S83 FMN L bcw BILLIE PIRNER GARDE i Citizens Clinic Director c>.. -$3rpVtfr$$tMO ' -}}