ML20090A103
| ML20090A103 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1979 |
| From: | Hood D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17198A223 | List:
|
| References | |
| CON-BOX-13, FOIA-84-96 NUDOCS 7904130235 | |
| Download: ML20090A103 (21) | |
Text
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NUCLE AR REGULAfon ( COMMIS5loN f
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AASHINGTON. O C 20964 u'p
/
rrp y - m' Docket Nos:
30-32.1 5J-33)
APPLICANT:
Consumers Power Company FACILITY:
Midland Plant, Units 1 S 2
SUBJECT:
SUsotARY 0F. TAN'2ARY ! ~, 19 79 MEi T I NG M P i '.R CHANGES AND REGULATORY GU! DES ON t'IMLITY ASSURANCE On January 17 19 79, the NRC s taf f net in Bethe<da, Maryland with Consumers Power Company (CPCO), Bechtel Associates, and the Babcock 5 Wticox (BGW) Company.
Attendees are listed in Enclosure 1.
The purpo3e o f the meeting was to discuss (1) changes to the Midland Plant designs which have occurred since construction permits issuance and (2) conformance to certain regulaterv guile, on quality assurance during the operations phase.
Changes From PSAR The staff stated that the applicants response to reque::
031.11 in FSAR Amendme: t 13 (Enclosure 2 heretoi
- f. led to conply with Section 1.3.2 of Revison 2 to Regulatar..
Guide 1.70 and was unacceptable.
The sta f f furtier stated that, although the request was made b:. the I n s t ru.me..: :: ! :n and Control Systems Branch, the request i< i n t e nde.' :: appi.
to all areas of the design.
The sta f f emphas::e! the administrative and schedular signif te.ince of thi + information to the review process.
CPC0 will revise the response in February 1979.
CPCC stated that reviews were conducted to assurz tha:
commitments in the PSAR were addressed in the FS3R. illustrates results of the review h.
RSX for its scope of supply in FSAR Chapter ~.
Re3uit: t,r balance-of-plant scope in Chapter ~ are 111u3trated by Erclosure 4.
A few o f the items noted al<a r <:f r e s e n
- issign changes since the PSAR.
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uf Consuaers Power Lonspany l
ccs:
Michael I. Miller, Esq.
Mr. S. II. Ilowe ll Isham, Lincoln & Beale Vtee President Suite 4200 Consumers Power Companv One First fiational Plaza 21.'. hest Michigan F.enue Chicago, Illinois 60670 Jackson, Michigan 19201 Judd L. Bacon, Esq.
Consurers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Mr. Paul A. Perry Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 W. Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esq.
One IBM Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60611 Mary Sinclair 5711 Summerset Ortve Midland, Michigan 43640 Frank J. Kelley, Esq.
Attorney General State of Michigan Environmental Protection Division 720 Law Butiding Lansing, Michigan 48913 Mr. Wendall Purshall Route 10 Midland, Michigan 48640 Grant J. Merritt, Esq.
Thompson, Nielsen, Klaverkamp & James 4444 105 Center 80 South Eighth Street Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 l
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ENCLOSURE 1
.\\TTENDEES D. Ilood NRC M. Gerding Bechtel J. Pastor CPC0 B. Belke NRC J. Iloward B6W M. Rothwell Bechtel J. 'ab ritski CPC0 D. Ilo f fman CPCO D. Bixel CPCO K. Marbough CPCO J. Fremeau CPCO T. Buc:winski CPC0
- 0. Chopra NRC
- 11. Daniels NRC S. Eschback BSW R. Reed B6W I
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- i-t.o e x t e e n. t v" "t,t ma' a r..; asa! 1 1. +> 6d.11 '. t e n. ;.: :,:at.-
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.r in the FSAk. cross-tetorene" of changes i s nr. t c on.:. : : e :
apptcpriate and ts thetafote not included." ae do not a g:
this information should he omitted.
The puapo;r of this secttun ts to tdent.11y ai! siin;I: 01 n *.
changet. Itam the 0114:nal deusqn which we approved d:41 inq t n.
constructs.an permit revacw.
We requtre that yous FJAH dosca.e,-
all stqnitteant etiangen tiom the t.onstruction permit des.1n ar.t ident.i fy tne FSAR loca t a r." whe re the revised design la descrited The description should in.ude the basis fot the enpnge.
This section should also provide a ;surance that the Midland :.n2tr have not been constr ucted to any safety criteria that are less conservative than those to wntch you committed and which -e approved during the review for the const.ructicn permi ts.
Amend your FSAR to aeflect these iequirements.
a
Response
i A crorts-r e t erence o f ch.ingen
- t. hat occurro1 from the PSAH to the FSAR t r. not r:onn ader ed apps ope late becauso extenntve s o f ", r ma t * : r g
.and a ungnii < alit amount ot new t n i o r ma t. : on t n pt ov. le i t n * !."
FSAR.
I n i o s ma t. : us t :; p s ov s. led t a t.he FSAi< on t.he t equ i eme:6f.:.
and Iosm.itn oi Hequiatosy t.iside 1.70 Rev.
.! as ns.: L :
e.
t;y *;-
las s es en FSAk totmat and content from H.S.
Scyd to S.H.
He e.
dat.ed June.. 1976.
A compat1. son of the PSAk to the cutrent FSAR would ref.;1e a significant amount of engtocet ing ef fort and has no Overi;;
ef fect on plant safety.
Hence. It is CPCo's position tha*. t.w necessary information in available for stat f review in the F i A.:
and a comp.irlson or cross-refelencing of the PSAR *o the F:: A A ;7 unnecessary and will not be done.
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The CPCo PSA2 has been searched to identif y as' commit.ents.
The CPCo FSAR has been searched for fulft11sent of those eennt: en:s.
This memo reports the findings of the search as well as pc.nc.ng out several areas of possible ?SAR deficiencies.
I.
FSAR Deficiencies Q p e:.' Pc Y W' 1.
Reactor trip switch (RTS) environmental qualificatien is not addressed, however. seismic is addressed.
2.
Section 7.2.2.2.2 references sections 7.1.2.17 shich does not exist. Should reference section 3.11.
3.
Section 7.2.2.2.3 references section 7.1.2.16 which does ne exist.
4.
Section 7.2.1.1 defines the reactor trip switch.ind cable from the NI/RPS to the CRDCS as part of tne N!!RPS.
The cable is in the users scope and the RTS should be treated separately.
5.
Section 7.2.1.1 includes sensors in the NI/RPS scope.
Pump monitors and ECCAS R8 pressure sensors are in the users scope.
6.
IE to 1E electrical isolation is presently in the users sco pe. Section 7 should reflect this. NSS and BOP isolation will be revised in later FSAR amendment.
II.
Commitments Commitments were f ound in sections 7.1.1.2 and 7.1.2. 3.1 of the PSAR. They all related to equipment qualification either by testing or FMEA. They are quoted below for information.
1.
Sect ion 7.1.1. 2 A) Line 3 "prototyne and final equipment will be subjected to qualification tests as required by the subj ect standard.' (IEEE-279)
B) Line 4 "The teses will establish the adequaev of equi;nent performance in both normal and accident environments.'
2.
Sec t ion 7.1. 2. 3. 9 A) Line 6 "A system fault test analysis will be made considering the modes of failure and determining their effects on the system vital functions."
B) Testins Line 5 "The equionent manufacturer is requir.4 to provide qualification test data to verif y the perf-:r ance j
requireecnts of the equipment."
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C) Testing Last PARA
" Instrumentation and control items that must survive part or all of the LOCA enviren=ent are suojt'et to these qualification test verification ptocedures and requirements."
Ill. Fulfillment of Cosemittsents Due to the differences in organization and style between the PSAR and FSAR, it is dif ficult to relate specific sections.
The FSAR was searched for sections relating to qualification.
These sections are listed below.
e 1.
ECCAS A.
FMEA - 7.3.2.3.1 (4.2), 7.3.2.3.14 (SE7) 5.
QUAL - 7.3.2.2.1 (3.8), 7.3.2.3.1 (4.4), 7.3.2.3.14 (SE8),
Appendix 3A page 121, 3.11.2.2. and 3.11.3 C.
Seismic - 7.3.2.2.1 (3.8), 7.3.2.3.5, 7.3.2.3.14 (SE6), and 3.10.2.2 2.
WI/RPS A.
FMEA - 7.2.2.1, 7.2.2.2.1 (4.2) 5.
QUAL - 7.2.2.2.1 (4.1). Appendix 3A page 121, 3.11.2.2, and 3.11.3 C.
Selenie - 7.2.2.2.4, 3.10.2.2 3.
CRDCS A.
FMEA - Appendlx 1A S.
((TA,f. - 3.11.2.2. 3.!!.1 C.
Seismic - 3.10.2.2 4.
RTS A.
FM EA
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Environmental - not addressed l
C.
Selenic - 3.10.4.2 s
Eaa h sene 4 FEE 17 C19 psA3 PSAR FSAg FSAR
~.
Subsection Commitment Commitment Description Me ference 7.1.1.2 The protection systems are designed The protection systems are designed FSAR Subsection to meet the requirements of the IEEE to the issued IEEE Std 279-1971 7.1.2.4.a.
Std proposed Standard for Nuclear which supersedes the proposed
'.2.1.2.1 Power Plant Protection Systems (IEEE standard.
7.2.2.2.1 Std 279. Revision 10). Prototype 7.3.2.2.1 and flaat equipment will be subject 7.3.2.3.1 to qualtlication tests as required 7.1.3.3.1 by the subject stanJard.
'.3.3.4.1
< 7.1.1.2 The reactor protection and engineered The Jewign criteria of PSAR Sub-i MM Subsections
.afeguards systems are designed to section 7.1.1.2 are incorpor.ated
'...l.1 aset the destas criteria specified in the FSAR except for PSAR Sub-7.2.2.2 In Subsection 7.1.1.2 of the PSAR.
Section 7.1.1.2.4b.
All ESFAS
' ).2.1 and the functional requirements.
subsystems comply except RAS and
!.s.2.3 listed in Subsection 7.1.1.3.
RSSAS whose sensor channels are 7.1. 3. 4'.
energize-to-trip. This design 7.3.3.2 reduces the possibility of spur-ious RR spray actuattoo while still complying with IEEE Std 279-1971.
The functtonal requirements of PSAR Subsectton 7.1.1.3 are in-corpor.steJ in t he FSAk.
In aJJit lon, the FSAR st.ates that
5 asolat ion v.alves will be oper.sted upon Jetection ui.a low RCS pressure.
1.1.1..:.1
- Lanu.sl te= ting i.scili t ies sh.sil be The PSAM commitu nt for mann.at f -:-
'.14 ci t s..n.
puilt into the protect ion 3vstems testing 1.scilities is sncorporat.J
....J.1 to provtJe for:
into t he FSAM and as described in
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Jet.stl in t!e Jimcussions ot
'.;.1.4.1 P e r.,per.s t i. a.s i t e - t i n g, to co.pli.ance witti IEEE StJ 2 7 3-18811 enaute t h.st the protc. t ton Sectton 4.10.
av :.t..u.
6..n t u l t i l l t hc a r r e.gu t s c.t t.
. t a o a m Ontant testInr to psose
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.J t.*. lev -ser.t u.at c r e: 3.A:' itv
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FSAR TSAR PSAR FSM Referente Comoitment Deseription Subsecttos Commitoest 7.1.1.4 The operattag environment for equip-1.
The maximum operating RB tem-FSAR Subsection ment will be maintained in accordance perature is 120F as described 3.11 with Subsection 7.1.1.4 of the PSAR.
in the P3R and in FSAR T.able 3.11-2.
2.
The continuous operation environ-ment design for RPS instrumen-tation inside RB will be provided by amendment.
3.
Engineered safety features actu.ation system (ESFAS) equip-ment ins 1Je the R5 inn designed to operate under an accident environment of a steam / air mixture of 1001 relative t unidity, 277.7F anJ 70 psig as described in FSAR Table 3.11-3.
/ 4.
Seireral meimsic Category I redundant ventflation or cooling mystens have been added to the plant de= tan since the PSAR review. The operation of these systems limits auxiliary building ESF equipeent room temperatures to less th.sn 10*.F (see FSAR T.ibles 3.11-2 and 3.11-3 f or og xitle are.as and temperatutcan.
Theretute. in= t r ui.:ent.at ton in i h..e a r e.a s 13 des t e;nsd t o oper.st e con-tsnuousli at a tery.cr.ature of 16MF or reater, r.sther than 12ht
.a 3 indac.sted in the l'S A R.
In. ten-c.ent at i.in in it.e.e.a r e.2. :. aise dess,ened to oper.ste.s t luni rel.it ec h.. i.t d i t y r.it he t t h.s ti 'st)?. re1.etive hiirr.i.t i t.
- . 2ndtrated in the l* S n.
I n s t r 622.e Int J t 1.J84 sallt.:. i d e these 1 dc s I chr.1 1.a oj.c t Jt e
.i t it.
l.46 J:.d It hs. selat1*.'c his' 1.* l t r at ter e i t it I.* b i
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FSAR FSAR Ps4R PSAg Subsection Commiteest Commitment Description Reference 7.1.1.4 (Coattamed)
The temperature in these areas is not espected to exceed 104F as indicated in ISAR Tables 3.11-2 and 3.11-3.
- 5.
The protective equipment in the control room will operate in an ambient tecperat ure of at
!=ast 80F rather than 110F as indicated in the PSAR. The control room INAC systems maintain the ambient temperature less than 80F.
6.
The discussion of the auxiliary building areasd described 8e item 4 above also applies to the cable spreading rooss.
< 7.1.2.2.1 When active and paselva (check When an active valve is used redun-FSAR Subsection valves) engineered safeguards valves dantly with a passive valve (check
- 7. 3. 3. 2.1, i
are used redundantly, the active valve), the active valve will receive Fig. 7.3-8 valve will be equipped with two only one channel of a:tuation.
The OR control elements, each driven check valve provides rc andancy of by one of the engineered safe-the isolatian function.
Inis design guards channels, reduces the potential far a loss of independence between reJur.Jant channels.
'7.1.2.3.9 A system fault anal.>is will be Failure modes and ei cets analvsis BAW-1000).
made considering the nodes of are provided in the 15AR.
Plart FSAR Table f at ture and deter:aning their technical specificattens require 7.1-$
effect on the system's vital periodic testing to ensurs reliability. T/S 3/4.1.1 functions. Acceptance testing FSAR Sections 3.10 and 3.11 indicate FSAR Subse. t too, and periodic testing will be the acceptance (qualification) tests 7.2.2.1, 3.10 i
Jesigned to ensure quality and or analyses for the protection systems. 3.11 reliability of the sas.pleted sy>tems.
3
s PSAR PSAR FSAR FSAR Subsection Casaltaent Comattaent Description Reference 1
i The RB radiation monitors and the Equipment seismic and environmental FSAR Sub.cetion reactor coolant pressure transmitters qua!!fications which ensure ESF 7.1. Table and associated cabling will be operation are discussed in the FSAR.
3.11-1, 3.11-4 destgeed to perfore the required 3.10 function daring the seactor butiding design basis accident.
7.1.2.2.2 An engineered safeguards actuatica The PSAR commitments are incorporated FSAR Sih.ection j
system will be provided to perfore la the FSAR as follows:
7.3.3.2 l
the followleg:
1.
RBIS-I closes BB isolation valves.
1.
On detection of a high reactor RS$AS starts the RR spray pumps buildseg pressure, close RB and opens the RR spray valves.
i 1 solation valves, start AB sad R&CAS starts the RB recir-spray pumps, opes RB spray culate air cooling units. All valves, and start RS recir-actuate at 4 psig except RBSAS culate air cooling units.
at 30 psig.
1' 2.
On detection of high NB rad-2.
ASIS-!! closes R5 penetrations istion close all R5 penetra-open to the RB atawsphere upon i
tions open to the RB ataus-detection of high BB redisttoa.
i phere. (Type II).
3.
RAS shifts the LPI and RB spray 3.
On detection of a lou RWST pumps into the recirculation level shift LPI anJ RR spray mode of operation upos detection pumps suction to the red r-of low DWST level.
l culation mode of operattaa.
7.1. 2. 2. 3 Auto close main steam and adin feed-MSLIS automatically closes the rsin FSA% S.t u -tt m i
water 1 relation valves af ter a mala stema and main fe= Juster isolation 7.3.3.J steam line rupture.
valves after a mata steam or main 4
fesd line rupture.
7.1.2.2.4 Auto start ausiliary feedwater system AFWAS performs the function indic.sted IS.Ut L:m et s m i
af ter a mala steam line rupture or in the PSAR.
- 7. 3. s.1 l
loss of main feeJwater.
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PSAR FsdA Rafareacq Psaa Pfaa Commitammt Dsseription Sebeestles Mg SW-10003, 9,f.1,J j The egelpment nemmiacturer is required Test data for protection system equip-TSAR Subsection meet is summarised in the FSAR la to provide qualificattaa test data to Sections 3.10 and 3.11.
3.10. Table 3.11-4 3.11.3. Sectica verify the performance requirements of the equipment. Adherence to the egetpoemt specifIcattoes and quali-ficatter test data is ensured throngli maatterang and tospection of the manufacturer's work.
i FSAR Tables 7.1.2.4 Trip setpotats or abnormal conditions -
7.2-1, 7.2-3, for the initiattom of reactor pro-7 3-1. 7.3-2, taction end eat neerlag safeguard i
4_2 systees w!!! be as specifled la Subsection 7.1.2.4 of the PSAs.
< 7.1.3. 3 Valid proeperational teettag of the simulated test signals will be util-isAR subsections ised to verify proper setpoint adjust-liA.I.52, eneses sensing element associated amats, correct operation of indicators 1a.1.$1, with the protection systems will be i
i N accomplished through the actual maal-and alares, and proper logic operation 1.A.I.55 S
M pelation of the measured variable la all operating modes.
j and comparison of the results agaimat a standard. Routine preoperattomat tests of analog sensing elements will I
be performed by the substitution of a calibrating signal for the sensor.
7.1. 3. 3 The sensors will be calibrated during Plant technical specific.ations (1. 5. a
.atles 4.3-1 shutdowns. for ref ueling, or whenever 4.1-1 and 4.3-2) indicate ch.aunel asJ 4.1-2 calibration (includes sensor) to tc the true status of any measured variable cannot, he assessed because performed at least every 18 monti.>.
of lack of agreement among the Plant operation nay continue witt. a channel inoper.able within the req ire-redundant measurements.
ments of the technical spe.:1ficat.r.
limiting condit ion. of operat ion.
7.1.3.4 E.ach channel of the protection mysten These design features are incorpor.:s2
- s'.h sub e sions will be supplied from one of the four in the plant design.
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'.J.2.2.1, I
preferred.a-c buses dest.rtbed in 1.I.1, 8.2.2.8.
The oper.ator can initiate a E *.1.1.1, scartor trip Independent of the auto-
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FSA3 FSAR Psaa Psaa h sSea Casaltaset Cammiteent Deseristten seference i
i 7.1. 3. 2 Start 191 at 1,500 peig law BCS pres-ECCAS actuates MP1 and LP1 at FSAR Subsection eure and start 171 at 200 peig new 1,?% psig new RCS pressere. The 7.3.2.1 BCS pressere.
present destga staptifies the actuation system and allous i
starting of the 171 seener than in the PSAR desigs.
i 7.1.3.5-Operettenal testa en RFS and ESFAS A** operatf oman test on the protectica Appendia 3A, RC 1.118 j
.chamaels are performed by substi-system chwaels will be performed FSAR Chapter 16 tuttag an analog test sissal for as.tadicated in the PSAR and are technical the variable. The test sisaal is di r. eased la FSAR Appendia 34, specifications naamally injected into the lastrument BC 1.118, response Secties C.F.
channel at the impet of the first active channel eteneet in the pro-l tacties syntes cahteets.
i V 7.1.3.6 To essere that failures in the control The Arv SC level control system has FSAR Subsections system cannot produce a failure la heen added to the plant design since 7.3.2.3.1 the protection system, sissals which the PSAR. The SC level transmitter 7.2.2.2.1, l
go to control free shared sensors tapets to ESFAS are also used to 7.3.3.3.4.1 t
j and amplifiets are isolated by means control the SC level through the 7.4.2.1, of isolation amplifiers. The resul-safety grade AFU SC level control Table 7.1-2 i
ting systems meet the requirements system. The output to the AFV SG l
for separation of protection and level control system is isolated from j
l
. control and for single fatture the protection systeri. The isolation l
l specified in IEEE Std 279. Rev 10, device, the protection system, and the and the AIF laterpretation of the AFU SC level control systen are all AEC Ceneral Design Criteria 20 safety grade systems. The systen 21 and 22.
meets the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971.
FSAR Subsectton 7.2.1.1 The regulating system will limit 7.7.1.2
(
power t ransients an. Sollous:
l a.
Between 20 and 901 power -
ramp cl.anges of 10t/ min and I
step changes of 101.
b.
Between 15 and 20%, and between i
90 and 2001 ras.p changes of 30/ min.
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FSAR FSAR pSAR PSAR Subsection Commitment Commitment Description Reference 7.2.1.2 The regulatint system is designed to FSAR Subsectton meet the safety considerations listed 7.2.1.1.1 in Subsection 7.2.1.2 of the PSAR.
/
7.2.3.4 14ss of Lead FSAR Subsections The combined actions of the control The combined actions of the control 7.7.1.2, system and the turbine bypass valve system and the turbine bypass to the 15.2.2 permit a 40% load reduction or a condenser permit 25% (rather than turbine trip from 40% load without 402) electrical load rejection without atmospheric Jump or safety valve atmospheric dump or safety valve action.
The controls will limit operation, and without tripping the steam dump to the condenser when reactor. No safety licits are exceeded the - d====r vacuum to inadequate, as discussed in the accident analysis.
s In wlitch case the atmosphere Jump or safety valves may operate.
7.3.1.1 The nuclear instrumentation is FSAR Subsection Jesigned to meet the requirements 7.3.1 specified in Subsection 7.3.1.1 of the PSAR.
7.3.2.1 The quantity and types of process Instrumentation is proviJed to ensure FSAR ' Sects..a 7. 7, instrument.stion provaJed will ensure safe and urJerly operation of all FSAN ispini.u safe and orderly operation of all systems Juring nornal plant ope r.s t ion.
5.1-1 and ).1-2 systems and processes over the tull These systema not required lor satety l
ope r.st ing range of t ht: unit.
are discussed in FSAR Section 7.7.
7.J.J.1A A study is lieing c.stried out by BW Study cos.pleted.
Bt.W kep.ir t iIn.
to Jetermine the suur e strength =
3 / t/s, t as s..v.-
o f t he varsous isotopes to. allow '.sn s e t t i..n 's s.e.
ev.slisat ion of the required sensitivity or this manitor for Jetecting rapid fuel failures.
s.J.1 A xenon osei11.st ause t bre.hol i power
!Et s er s i, t.. i -
versus sore lite curvs wi!! i,e devel-i.a t a. a.
.u;,.l. n i.t og ed I r va. aie.slysem peitor:.ed during
- p....
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th..fe.sgu 0; the reactor.
1
O PSAR PSAR FSAR ISAM Subsection t'oem a t men t Commitnent Description Re f erenc.-
7.3.3.2.2 The incore monitoring detectors will be FSAR Sut..e.ts n continuously compensated for detector 7.8.2.2.1 burnup, contr il roJ posit ion, fuel burnup, etc, r: calculottons derived from emperine.tal programs.
7.3.3.3 The applicatica of this system for NRC S.aterv
- detectson ui A.aon u=(11latton.and uat ton, so; 11.
at 2
. its stalmun sc =1tivity is beint.
Page 2-3 ex.aained thrc;;n the analysis of esperimental cata.
The analysis should be co:pleted by the end of 1968.
7.5.1 The r.aJiatio. anitoring system is
'he demi.r. re;uire ents of FSAR FSAR letas.t designed to meet the requirements Subsection 7.5.1 are met in the 11.5
=pecified in Subsection 7.5.1 of
- esign discussed in the Tr.hR the PSAR.
Sectiot 11.5.
7.5.2.1 The absence 4f heavy partical. ate.ind inis commitin-nt is contained in i sAR Subw. t i..
h.alogen tsat.,;;c> ut iI be Jeonnat rosted the FSAR.
I 1. 5. 2. *..
by laboratnrf analysis or timed inte-Tat.l e 11.
gr.st ing t ilt e r m.
- 7. 5. 2. 2 Sups.lesent a.;.5e c. int ir..
.n>
n.on s tor-This cos=tt unt in repeated in the l's ang, samples re L.sken t rova cool. int FSAR.
I 1. :....
systems for " abor.atury veriticatlon Table 11.
s t.at the gros, mettvity levels. ire us t han perr.:.2 male Iinit3.
- 7. 5. 3. I l'.ac h ( h snnei. the r.s.: a a t t on c.on i t o r-Ihe al.arn. c;=.r1 bed is proviJcJ.
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t! st MJ loam of t !. l a ts.s t u rd i a l.*n a l W a l l..s. ie Juleun 1.t! l un.
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.FSAR Subsectten Commatmeat Comettmeat Deseris> tion Referenee 7.$.5 Periodic calibraties c k cks of the area Commitments for periodic calibration FSAR Subsections radiation rxamitors and table radiatica ekcks are included in the FSM for 12.5.2.2, anitors are made to eaa. ore that these area radiation monitors and portable 12.3.4.1.5 instru:sents remata operational.
radiation monitora.
l 7.6.2 The information aval'.able in the con-Information is available in the main FSAR Tables 7.5-1, trol room will incluJe ti.e parameters control suom for the parameters listed 7.5-2, drawler.s l
l)
Itsted in PSAR Subsection 7.6.2.
in FSAR Subsection 7.6.2.
listed in Table 1.7-9 7.5.2.3
'he selection and number of points for The area radiatica monitoring systen FSAR Subsection area radiation monitors are coordinated is provided to suppleent the person-12.3.4.1,
-ith the plant access control so that met and area radiation survey pro-Sectica 12.5 aparating personnel are not able to visions described in Section 12.5 enter an unmanitored area in which to ensure compliance with the per-they could be exposed to a dose in sonnel radiation protection sluide-2 escess of the limits of 30 CFR 20.
lines of 10 CFR 20, 10 CFR 50, 10 CFR 70, and Regulatory cuides 8.2, 8.8 and 8.12.
3
-7.6.3 visible and audible alarm units will Visible and audible alarms are pro-FSAR Subsections te incorporated into the control wided at the areaa indicated in 11.5.2, 12.3, room to warn the operator if uns.afe PSAR Subsectica 7.6.3.
12.1.4.2.4.5, anJitions are appro. ached by any 7.7.1.5
=ystea.
Audible reactor buildsng i
e. a.:uat ion 41 ares are to be initiated j
from the r.adi st ion monitoring > = ten ar manually by the oper.stor..tsJible alaras will lie sounded in appropriate are.as throughout the plant
- high raJ1.atian cunditians.are prc=ent.
+
- 1. c. 5 Ii.e :ugnituJe of a fire in the control
?l J1.and Itre
- -- 1 limited by the factors listed P r.t e. t i.in i s.s t -
la Sul. sect iun 7.6.5 of the PSAR.
u at ion hep.ir t,
t % K S ub
.c.c t ;..r. 's. T. I 1
i 1
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i
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..o Psaa FSAR FSAE FsAs Subeesales Ceesttmeet Cometteent beseristten tofer=ece IcCb7 Special emphasis will be given to natu-The control roos weetilatten systes FSAR Subsections taining centrol integrity during is designed to protect the contro!
9.4.1. 7.5.1.2 accident canditions. The layout of room operatorm and equipment from 12.3.2.2.5 dr.awings the engineered safeguarde section of basardous cond6tions which may listed in the centrol board will be designed result during accident conditions.
Table 1.7-9 to minimise the time required for the Engineered safetuards centrol boards operater to evaluate the system per-have been designed to mistatse the formance under accident conditions.
the time requir.d for the operator to evaluate synten performance under accident condittons. This bas been done by arrancan3 controls and lastre.
mentation by.y. ten and by flow of control or system operaties.
In addi-tion, a status dimplay is provided to allow the operator to quickly evaluate the performance of equipment which is automatically actuated by the pro-taction system.
I i
e e
d I
amL FSAR FSAR l
tsentlene Ceemitaset Ceemitaset asectietten soference
(
. 7.1 h arS and ESFAS w&11 he designed the protestiam eyeteos ese designed FSAR Sabeections j
to IEEE Std 279 offective S/30/68.
to IEEE Std 279-197 dish aspersedes 7.1.2.4.a.
i the 1968 revielen.
7.2.1.2.1, 7.2.2.2.1, 7.3.2.2.1 7.3.2.3.1 7.3.3.3.1 7.3.3.4.1 7.3 All safety and preteettaa equipeast h quality centret methode end FSAR Secties 17 will be usaitered by quality pre-preecedures listed in the reopense i
grame d ich teclude the quality j
eentrol methode end precedures
~ to DEL geestion 7.3 are tecluded in the Oh program la the FSAR.
)
is the reopease to DEL questian 7.3.
7.4.
h prieery eeeleet leakage detec-h leakage detection system described FSAR Subsection 5.2.5, i
ties system design criteria ta-in the PSAR differs la some respects Appendia 3A. BC 1.45 elude the criterie listed la free that described la the PSAR. How-reopense to asL genstaan 7.4.
ever, the system to destaaed in comp 11-ance with RG 1.45.
Diffarences are 4
discussed beleur i
l 1.
Reactor butiding ateesphere role-tive humidtty detectors are not j
provided. Instead. Et air temp-ersture and pressure moottors i
are used as an alarm to alert
}
operator of potential problems.
l 2.
Es sump level alara described at 3 inches is not provided. A rate of change level alarm is provided to alarm increase of a 0.5-inch within i hour in conformance with RC 1.45.
3.
RB area nooitors at the discharge of the Rt air coolers. are not provided. Houever Rt gaseous and particulate monitors are provided in conformance with RC 1.45.
I -
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~
M PSAR FSAR h iene Smeetteset Commitenet Descriptles Seforence O
7.7 Suvir - at teettag uhish may be The eewarensental teettag perfereed FSAR Section 3.11, required for sentrols and lastre-en safety-selsted eentrole and ta-Table 3.11-4 maatation is fadicated in resposes trumentation is described la FSAR to BEL questian 7.7.
Secties 3.11 Table 3.11-4.
7.8 The protecties system and ensi-The FSAR ee m itment described is FSAR Sobeection meered safety feature equipment tacorporated into the FSAR.
8.3.1.3 and Pts vist be ditforentiated from eiedlar items not related to protection er safety by locatten and grouplag, color codtage, name-
~
plates, Sadivianal egolpuest tage, or special alphabetical letter j
designations.
4 7.9 The dealen criteria for the reacter The reacter caetant deberettag sya-FSAR Subsections costant deberettag systens is as tem is designed as described la 7.7.1.3, described is reopenas to BEL the FSAR response to BEL questian 7.9.
9.-3.4.2.3.4.d questien 7.9.
7.12 The data ave 11able free ein11er NRC Safety Evaluation, core configuratione of comparable Supplement 2, 7/77, l
size will be evaluated to verify FSAR Sectica 7.8 i
or disqualify the stated reliance en est-of-core (instrumentattoo) for safe and reliable spatial power indications from the core.
i y 7.10 The destga bases for the system The process steam transfer systen FSAR Subsection which transfers process steam (PSTS) is not required for safety.
7.7.1.6, Section 10.3 from Unit 1 to Uste 2 include Interlocks prevent the cross-the requirement of separatica connectica of the two NSSS units between NSS systems as well as through the respective secondary single-failure analysis.
systems.
Because the FSTS is not required for safety, no single-failure analysis is provided.
l
FSAs F3A1 3 01.
h tiene Ceemitment Commitment Description Reference
. /
'./ i,;
7J11
' + A11 et ak radiattee eamitostag in-E s radia:i m nomiters used la the F51.2 Subsection-
. str uente(used in protecties sys-ESFAS systes c.re designed to IEEE
,7.1.2.2. Table 7.1-2
.t
. tems will *ee declamed to meet the Std 279-1*71 which supersedes the l
' proteccion *ystems standards 19H stmadard.
a ~ f f-
-requirements (IEEE Szd 279, 10/64).
O. l.;- -
' ~
$7.14 The bases.for criteria used to the' area and procsss radiatica mont-FSAR Subsection
? determine the locations. range.
torieg systems design criteria in-12.3.4. Sectica 11.5 7
}_)f' t'ypes, and sensitivittei of the.
ciudes those. listed la the response i sees and precess radiation asaltor-to DRI. Qu2stion.7.14.
n
. /'y y p' ~ ~
' leg systee: are as str.ted la r2sprose q
to DEL questiaa 7.14.
1 19 If it becomes necessary'to suddenly The capability.to shut down the FSAR Subsectton 4 'j h
evacuate the centrol roos,' the plant from outside the control 7.4.3.1 i
(
,/ 's reacter can be brought tr> sither room is provided. Aa suulliary
'// '
hot or cold shutdown condition by shutdoun panel is not described la operation of valves and equipesar.-
the PSAR aids the operator A.es
?
- from either local,*areabars or local shutdown is.r+4uired from outside the control roo6.
penets as described in response to -
DEL questaan 7.19.
l Both low RCS pressure and high FSAR Subsection 7.20 A diverse backup reactor trip to the low RCS pressure Et!p will be containment pressure trip the reactor.
7.2.1.1.1 provided so that affective-core j
~
coo 11ag is ensured following a LOCA.
7.17' The' instrumentation and controls The RPS, ECCAS ESFAS, and emergency FSAR Table 7.1-2 for engineered safeguards, the emer-diesel generator controls are designed gency electric power system, and the in accordance with IEEE Std 344.
reactor protectica system are designed to meet Clamm I seismic Jemign criteria. Therefore, there will be no loss of function in these mystems during or following the m.astaus earthquake.
T J
I f
BE FSAR FSAR l
b otiems Gegnitaset Ceemdtuset Descriptles sefereece O
anclosure 3 - Identificetten of Probles Areae Q{dfA A f.4) i la la acceedence with the ragstre-. Owspute of protective imetruments FSAR 5ebeectione monts of IEEE Std 279. Sections "lecated 1aside the SS will he 7.2.2.2.1, h
4.9 and 4.11. the RS protective checked during power operettaa per
- 7. 3. 2. 3.1 lastrumentation senser eetputs 11EE Std 279-1971 by crees checking 7.3.3.4.1 will have the capability of helag between chamaet indicaters located Chapter 16 technical checked during power operaties.
en the systes cabinets la the ama-specificat$ ass. Appendia 3&.
l provisiese for testing and cati-111ary be!! ding. Actuation logic (BG 1.113)
(
brattag channels and the devices will he tested dettag peuer opera-used to derive the float systes tien at the system cabinets la the output signal from the verteus suaillary building. It is met h1 signal wty be 1ecated necessary to enter RS 6trias peuer esternal to the SS er within the operattaa to test lastruments. This RS air reon and will be access-testing will be done at refueltag or ible during power operation. The plaat shutdeus.
eensor signals abell have the signal offset from sere la such.
a mammer to permit detection of shorted, or open circuits.
12 A R&B program dischosed in re
.u This itse is currently under dis-Cpco Serial 4154 sponse to Itee 12 will be coa-cussies with the Inc.
ducted to ensure the adequacy i
and feasibility of the mLasure-ment system used to detect radio-activity la the process steam.
Incloeure A - Additional DEL Questions
{ pgA g -f G 7
The high pressuriser level alare shall be designed and tested as per the criteria listed in FSAR Vol. 111. Eaclosure A. p 7.00-1.
-