ML20087D711

Response to ASLB 840224 Order Indicating Concerns on Security Plan & Security Insp Repts Re Sabotage Matters Raised by Contention Xx & Directing Univ & Staff to Respond by 840309.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20087D711
Person / Time
Site:	05000142
Issue date:	03/09/1984
From:	Cormier W CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, LOS ANGELES, CA
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8403140089
Download: ML20087D711 (130)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0lHISSION , _.

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility 0F CALIFORNIA ) License Number R-71)

)

(UCLA Research Reactor) March 9, 1984 UNIVERSITY'S RESPONSE TO BOARD'S ORDER OF FEBRUARY 24, 1984 DONALD L. REIDHAAR GLENN R. WOODS CHRISTINE HELWICK 590 University Hall 2200 University Avenue Berkeley, California 94720 Telephone: (415) 642-2822 Attorneys for Applicant THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 8403140089 840309 Q@

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ADOCK 05000142 PDR

t I. INTRODUCTION On February 17, 1984, the Board's law clerk informed the attorney for UCLA that as a result of the Board's review of the UCLA security plan and the security inspection reports the Board is concerned that substantial misrepresentations may have been made to it by UCLA and the NRC staff regarding sabotage matters raised by Contention XX. By Memorandum and Order, dated February 24, 1984, the Board indicated its concerns and directed University and Staff to respond by March 9,1984. In a related order of the same date the Board requested that University and Staff provide a description of the level of threat of sabotage the UCLA security plan is designed to meet. University hereby responds to the concerns expressed by the Board and provides the declarations of its attorneys and staff respecting their conduct in this matter. University submits that no misrepresentation has occurred but, instead, that there has been a misunderstanding. That misunderstanding is based on an inconsistent use of terms appearing in the Commission's safeguards regulations, more specifically, the unfortunate use of the term " radiological sabotage" in the introduction to the physical security plan for the UCLA reactor. University will explain the source of this misunderstanding by reference to these declarations certain other documents and the record in this proceeding.

University is confident that upon its review of this material the Board will conclude that no misrepresentation has occurred.

II. BACKGROUND  ;

1 CBG's Contention XX, alleging inadequacies in UCLA's security plan, was submitted in substantially its present form on November 6, 1980. UCLA opposed admission of the contention as lacking bases in its response of November 28, 1980. In its response of December 1, 1980, Staff also opposed all allegations made in the contention and argued in detail that the contention sought to apply 10 CFR Part 73 requirements not pertinent to UCLA's research reactor.

At the February 4-5, 1981 prehearing conference the contention was discussed at length in an attempt to clarify the legal bases for the contention. Tr. 359-390. During that discussion CBG's representative described the basis for the contention with reference to Sections 73.60 and 73.67. Tr. 380-81, 391-93. No mention was made of Sec. 73.40. Counsel for 3

Staff stated that the specific safeguards regulations applicable to the UCLA research reactor were contained in Section 73.67 and that the allegations in l the contention were not based on Sec. 73.67, but on the complicated and 4

i stringent safeguard rules for power reactors ". . .especially those in 73.55 requiring searches and detection devices, etc." Tr. 377-78. Counsel for

! Staff provided the further clarification that power reactors are required to l

l prevent theft and sabotage by means of armed guards, detection devices and i

j search requirements, but that non-power reactors with low to moderate l quantities of special nuclear material are not required to protect against sabotage or theft. Such facilities are only required to detect unauthorized acce.;s. Tr. 394-95.

l The Board admitted Contention XX on March 20, 1981, as modified by the

! Board to insert a reference to Sections 73.60 and 73.67 as the bases for the contention. On April 13, 1981 Staff moved for sumary disposition of the contention. The Board deferred acting on Staff's motion pending the' l

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l completion of discovery. In order to pursue discovery of security matters, CBG was directed by the Board on July 1, 1981, to identify its proposed security witnesses, which the Board stated was the first step in the procedures established by the Appeal Board in the Diablo Canyon proceeding for the discovery of security information. On April 23, 1982 CBG moved to defer identification of its proposed security witnesses pending resolution of a disagreement concerning the scope of the protective order that was to govern the Contention XX proceedings. This disagreement has yet to be resolved and discovery of security information relative to Contention XX has not taken place.

By Order of July 26, 1982 the Board directed that CBG respond to certain portions of Staff's motion for summary disposition concerning the applicability of Sec. 73.60 and the need to protect against sabotage as asserted by CBG. In its September 7, 1982 response CBG argued that UCLA possessed greater than a formula quantity SNM and therefore Sec. 73.60 applied and with it, Sec. 50.34 (d), which reqaires a safeguard contingency plan for dealing with sabotage. CBG also argued that even if Sec. 73.60 does not apply, UCLA's security plan must provide protection against sabotage pursuant to Sec. 73.40(a). CBG stated in a footnote (page 5) that an adequate plan must include " sabotage prevention measures." CBG supplemented its response on February 8, 1983. The Board directed further responses of the parties regarding the inventory of the SNM at the UCLA facility to determine the applicability of Sec. 73.60.

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I On May 11, 1983 the Board issued its first ruling on Staff's motion.l_/

With respect to the need to protect against radiological sabotage the Board noted that on its face Sec. 73.40(a) was applicable to all licensees. The Board reviewed the legislative history of this provision and certain of the recent amendments to the Part 73 safeguards regulations, concluding that none of the changes had the effect of limiting the coverage of Sec. 73.40 in any way. As a result, the Board ruled that UCLA must institute some means of providing physical protection against sabotage. Noting that it had

" addressed a complex portion of the regulations . . . charitably described as murky" the Board invited motions to reconsider its holdings. May 11 Order, at 25.

On August 15, 1983 the Staff petitioned #or reconsideration2_/ of the rulings contained in the May 11 Order. Staff noted that Sec. 73.40(a) is only a " general" requirement and that the Board had not addressed the second sentence of Sec. 73.40(a) which states that licensees must maintain security systems approved by the NRC. Staff then explained that the specific requirements for licensees with SNM of moderate and low strategic significance, such as UCLA, are contained in 10 CFR Sec. 73.67. Staff stated:

-1/ Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Staff's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention XX) (hereinafter, the "May 11 Order"). The Board's Order dealt with the SNM inventory question, the Pu-Be sealed neutron source exemption which affected the SNM accounting, and the asserted need to protect against radiological sabotage. The Board denied the motion.

-2/ NRC Staff Petition for Reconsideration of the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order Ruling on Staff's Motion for Sumary Disposition (hereinafter, " Staff Petition").

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4 The implementation of these objectives requires that licensees l provide physical protection systems to detect unauthorized access l or activities within the controlled access area. 10 CFR Sec. 73.67(2)(1)-(iv). Protection against sabotage and theft, as  ;

required by 73.40(a) and for power reactors in Sec. 73.55, is not  !

required by Sec. 73.67.

The Board errs in believing that a general but unspecified requirement for protection against sabotage exists in Sec.

73.40(a) which would provide ad hoc regulating authority to Staff and/or Licensing Boards. . . Kdditionally, Sec. 73.40(a) also requires protection from theft of SNM rather than the lesser standard of detection specified in the performarce objectives of Sec. 73.67. The Board's interpretation of Sec. 73.40(a) would result in either two contradictory regulations (regarding safeguards against theft) or application of only one phrase of Sec. 73.40(a) (regarding sabotage) to 104 licensees and exclusion of the rest of the sentence (regarding theft).

Staff supported its arguments by reference to the Statement of Considerations issued with 10 CFR Sec. 73.67 in July, 1979 (designated as Sec. 73.47 at that time),3_/ the Staff's advisory memorandum to the Commission of January, 1979,4/ the Statement of Considerations accompanying the adoption of the " Upgrade Rule," including Sec. 73.67, published in November,1979,El and NUREG/CP.-0843, Consequences of Sabotage of Nonpower 6

Reactors, dated June, 1979. Finally, Staff noted that the proposed rule _/

addir.g a new Sec. 73.67(h) for non-power reactor licensees with formula quantities of SNM would be held "to the performance standard in 10 CFR 3_/ 44 Fed. Reg. 43280 (July 24, 1979).

4/ SECY-79-38, January 16, 1979.

5/ 44 Fed. R_eg 68184 (November 28,1979).

6_/ Safeguards Requirements for Nonpower Reactor Facilities Authorized to Possess Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material. 46 Fed. Re . 46333 (September 18,1981), republished for coment, 48 Fed.

R_e2 56(July 27,1983).

. Sec. 73.67(a) for detection of intrusion and theft, but not protection."

Staff's Petition, at 14.

On August 25, 1983 University responded in support of Staff's Petition,7/ stating that Sec. 73.67 contains the specific safeguards requirements applicable to the UCLA facility. UCLA's attorney also stated:

University wishes to note that its security plan, which is not designed to provide protection against sabotage, has been approved by the Comission's safeguards branch . . .

l University's August 25 Response, at 2.

On October 24, 1983,8_/ the Board granted Staff's Petition in part, reversing certain of its earlier rulings and holding that the accounting for SNM at the UCLA facility submitted separately by Staff and UCLA were in agreement and correct and that Pu-Be sealed neutron sources were exempt from the SNM accounting. As a result of these holdings the Board ruled that Sec.

73.60 was not applicable to the UCLA facility. However, the Board adhered to the ruling in its May 11 Order concerning the applicability of Sec.

73.40(a) and the need to provide protection against radiological sabotage.

The Board also solicited the positions of its parties concerning what portions of Contention XX remained for hearing in light of the Board's recent rulings.

-7/ University's Response in Support of NRC Staff Petition for Reconsideration of the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order Ruling on Staff's Motion for Sumary Disposition (hereinafter, " University's August 25 Response").

-8/ Memorandum and Order Ruling on Staff's Motion for Reconsideration--

Contention XX (hereinafter, the " October 24 Order").

University responded on December 13,1983,91 pointing out that in its view Contention XX contained the assertion that UCLA should be able to prevent all possible acts of sabotage. University stated:

In response to that specific claim University has asserted that the Comission's regulations do not require that it be able to " protect against sabotage" in the sense of any requirement that University employ measures at its facility that will be effective in thwarting or preventing specific acts of sabotage or theft.

However, the protection against sabotage and theft required by Sec. 73.40(a) can be interpreted in a more general sense.

Certainly, the security measures employed by UCLA in satisfaction of the requirements of Sec. 73.67 provide some measure of protection against sabotage and theft, even though the design objective of that regulation is only to detect theft or diversion of SNM.

University's Position, at 4-5. University requested that the Board clarify whether its ruling concerning the applicability of Sec. 73.40(a) means that UCLA must institute protective measures in addition to those specified in Sec. 73.67. M.,at6.

In its Deccaber 23, 1983 Order, the Board declined to provide the clarification requested by University stating that it is the parties' responsibility to analyze the realistic threat of sabotage faced by the facility and the degree of protection necessary to meet that threat.

In that Order the Board acknowledged allegations made by CBG that certain misrepresentations had been made to the Board by Staff counsel and two staff members who furnished affidavits in support of Staff's motion for summary disposition. One of the allegations concerned the misrepresentation of sabotage protection requirements for non-power reactors. The Board 9] University's Position Concerning Contention XX (hereinafter,

" University'sPosition").

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requested Staff's response to the allegations and also referred the matter to the Office of Inspector and Auditor. Staff submitted its response to these allegations on January 10, 1984. Staff supported the truth of the statements made by its declarant on sabotage protection matters by reference to numerous agency documents.

III. DISCUSSION A. The Board's Concerns In its Order the Board refers to its decision of October 24, 1983 that 10 CFR Sec. 73.40(a) requires that UCLA take some measures to protect against potential sabotage. Regarding that decision the Board states:

Throughout these proceedings until February 15, 1984, we had been lead / iic f to believe by Counsel that, first, Staff saw no requirement in the regulations that UCLA provide such protection and imposed no such requirement, and second, that UCLA's security plan indeed provided no such protection.

Order, at 3. The Board then quotes from statements made by Counsel for University and the NRC Staff in pleadings filed in August and December, 1983, and statements made by the NRC Staff in SECY-83-500, a proposed rulemaking action to clarify the application of Sec. 73.40(a). Respecting those statements the Board further states:

It thus was clear to us, based on the representations of Counsel, that UCLA's physical security plan was not designed to provide protection against sabotage and that Staff did not require that such protection be provided. However, the security plan and security inspection reports furnished by UCLA indicate that the opposite is true.

Order, at 6.

The Board gives four reasons as the basis of its conclusions that the UCLA Physical Security Plan is designed to provide protection against radiological sabotage and that the Staff has required that the UCLA plan provide such protection. First. the Introduction to the plan contains a statement that one of the purp. of the plan is to provide protection against radiological sabotage. S_ . the Board's perusal of the plan suggests that the plan does include provisions aimed at providing such protection. Third, the security inspection reports indicate to the Board that the Staff did examine UCLA's activities related to physical protection against sabotage. Fourth, the Board interprets a statement in Staff's ,

formal approval of the plan on November 9, 1983, that UCLA ". . . maintain and fully implement all provisions . . ." of the plan (Board's emphasis), to require UCLA to provide protection against radiological sabotage. (Order, at 6-7.)

B. University's Response University's statements regarding the issue of the requirement to provide " protection against radiological sabotage" have resulted in a misundertanding which is explained in the Declaration of William H. Cormier (attached hereto). Here, the University wishes to address the Board's stated reasons for its conclusion that the UCLA security plan is designed to l protect against radiological sabotage.

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. 1. UCLA's Security Plan was Desicned to Comply with the Applicable Requirements of 10 CFR Sec. 71.67.

UCLA's Physical Security Plan was submitted on March 10, 1980 to comply with the provisions of the new Sec. 73.67, made applicable to non-power reactorspossessingSNMoflowandmoderatestrategicsignificance.NI Concurrent with the publication of the amendments in July, 1979, the NRC 11

/ ". . . as an aid to uniformity and published a regulatory guide, completeness in the preparation and review of the physical security plan for special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance." 44 Fed. Reg.e 43280.

As expressly stated on its cover page, the Draft Guide was issued to involve the public in the early stages of the development of a regulatory position in this area. See: Draft Guide (attached). In Januarv, 1980, Regulatory Guide 5.59 was issued. In all respects relevant here, including its title, Regulatory Guide 5.59 is the same as the Draft Guide. Regulatory Guide 5.59 was revised once and reissued in February 1983.

As Mr. Ashbaugh explains in his Declaration, as security officer for the facility he was responsible for the preparation of the UCLA security

-10/ Physical Protection Upgrade Rule, 44 Fed. R_eg. 68184 (November 28, 1979). Sec. 73.67, designated Sec. 7T.T7, was published for comment on '

July 24, 1979. Safeguards Requirements for Special Nuclear Material of Modarate and Low Strategic Significance, 44 Fed. Reg 43280.

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-11/ " Standard Format and Content for the Licer,see Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance," dated July, 1979 and published in draft form (hereinafter, " Draft Guide"). The Draft Guide together with the Federal Register Notice were sent to "NRC Licensees" by letter of l Robert B. Minogue, Director, Office of Standards Development I (attached).

l plan. Mr. Ashbaugh relied on the Draft Regulatory Guide and a sample l i security plan which had been obtained from the NRC.12/

The " Introduction" to the Draft Guide (as well as Regulatory Guide 5.59) notes the relevant regulatory framework and then explains the requirements of physical security plans and the purpose of the guidance document:

Para 70.22(h) andgraph 50.34(c) 70.22 (k) of of1010 CFR CFR Part Part 70 50 and paragraphs identify the physical70.22(g),

protection information that must be provided in a Physical Security Plan as part of a license application. This plan is required in order for the applicant to denGnstrate compliance with the specific physical protection requirements of 10 CFR Part

?3 This regulatory guide describes the information required in the phyical security plan submitted as part of an application for a license to possess, use, or transport SNM of moderate strategic significance . . .

This guide has been prepared to minimize lost time attributable to incomplete physical security plans and to standardize the review process . . . Although conformance with

the guide is not required, the format and content presented are i

acceptable to the NRC staff.

Purpose and Applicability

This standard format has been prepared as an aid tct uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical protection section of license applications and to clarify l

12/ The document bears the title, " Sample Physical Security Plan for Non-Power Nuclear Reactor Facilities Possessing Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significance," is dated June 14, 1979 (" Revision 1")

and it is indicated that the' document comes from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. (Hereinafter, " Sample Plan"; attached.) The document contains no print markings nor descriptive designations.

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l the intent of the regulations. The information this guide I contains will help the licensee plan a physical protection system designed to detect the theft of SNM of moderate to low strategic significance. The physical protection subsystems identified are intended to provide a reference physical protection system that would normally be capable of meeting the performance requirements of paragraph 73.47(a) of 10 CFR Part 73 . . .

Use of the Standard Format The applicant should follow the numbering system of the Standard Format down to the level of section (e.g., 3.4). . . .

Style and Composition The applicant should strive for clear, concise presentation of information. Confusing or ambiguous statements and general statements of intent should be avoided. . . .

Draft Guide, pp. 1-6 (emphasis supplied).

As Mr. Ashbaugh states, he followed the format and specific requirements described in the Draft Guide in the development of the UCLA security plan. The Table of Contents of the Draft Guide was used as the Table of Contents for the UCLA plan. The Draft Guide relates each chapter and section to the specific requirement in Sec. 73.67 (identified as Sec. 73.47 in the Draft Guide). A perusal of the plan shows that the guidance document was followed closely and supports the conclusion that the plan was basically designed to comply with requirements of Sec. 73.67, as explicated in the guidance document.

Mr. Ashbaugh also explains that the introductory statement to the UCLA plan (page 111) was taken from the similar statement that appeared on pages )

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1 and 2 of the Sample Plan (attached) which UCLA received from the NRC at l about the time it received the Draft Guide. (The stamp at the top of each l

page, "Contains 10 CFR 2.79C(d) Information . . ." was supplied by Mr. Ashbaugh.) The Sample Plan was obtained from the NRC and it was understood as a tool to be used. The Sample Plan had an advantage over the

! guidance document in that it constituted a concrete example of how a licensee's security plan should actually read. Although no specific introductory statement was called for in the Draft Guide, the presence of one in the sample plan suggested that such a statement would be appropriate.

I Accordingly, Mr. Ashbaugh prepared an introductory statem;nt for the UCL'A 4 plan working from the Sample Plan. Mr. Ashbaugh was aware of the changes that were being made in the regulatory requirements for non-power reactors.E/ eH did use the newer term " radiological sabotage" in place of

" industrial sabotage" which appears in the Sample Plan. However, he meant 2

i 1_3/ The changing regulatory structure applicable to research reactor facilities is a matter of record in this proceeding. See: NRC Staff Petition for Reconsideration of the Licensing Board's Memorandum and Order Ruling on Staff's Motion for Sumary Disposition, dated August 15, 1983; especially the Comission memorandum, Physical Protection of Category II and III Material, SECY-79-38, attached thereto. See, also: NRC Staff Response to Board Orders to Respond to CBG's Allegations of Material False Statements, dated January 10, 1984; especially, the Affidavit of Donald M. Carlson. In particular, note in

the Comission memorandum that entry search requirements at facilities possessing SNM of moderate significance were deleted from the proposed amendments with the following comment

"The primary purpose of entry searches is to detect materials which could be useful in sabotage.

Since protection against sabotage was not within the scope of the proposed amendments, an entry search requirement would not be necessary." SECY-79-38, p. 2.

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that term in a more general sense and did not have in mind the specific definition of the term that appears in Part 73 of the regulations. E University submits that the text of its security plan, apart from the introductory statement, is clear and it closely follows Regulatory Guide 5.59 in satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR Sec. 73.67. In hindsight, University should have used more care in its choice of words in the introductory statement. However, the purpose and content of the plan is best understood by reference to its actual provisions.

2. The Provisions of the Security Plan are not Specifically Aimed at Protection Against Radiological Sabotage.

The second stated reason for the Board's concern is the Board's belief that several provisions in the plan are aimed at protection against radiological sabotage. University does not know what provisions the Board has in mind nor what the Board understands to constitute " protection against radiological sabotage."

Under the Part 73 definition " radiological sabotage" is limited to deliberate acts endangering the public by exposure to radiation. 10 CFR Sec. 73.2(p). Mr. Ashbaugh states that he is aware of no assessment of a

--14/ The term " radiological sabotage" as defined in Part 73 of the regulations is limited to deliberate acts which could endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. 10 CFR Sec. 73.2(p). As used in UCLA's security plan radiological sabotage includes acts risking damage to the reactor or posing the threat of harm to students, staff, or members of the public.

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I specific threat of radiological sabotage, as defined in Part 73, for which a specific provision of the security plan is directed. Basically, the plan I provides a system of controlled access by means of keys and locks, and alarms to detect unauthorized access by external adversaries. University believes the plan goes beyond what is strictly required under Sec. 73.67.

Certain areas, not otherwise required to be controlled, are controlled for health physics reasons or to protect the contents of the areas from theft or damage. There are additional controls on the reactor and certain other equipment to restrict unauthorized uses which could damage equipment or violate license conditions. But these additional controls have not been taken in response to specific threats of radiological sabotage.

In its December 23, 1983 Memorandum and Order (Regarding Contention XX) the Board acknowledged Staff's position that compliance with Sec. 73.67 provides adequate protection for purposes of Sec. 73.40(a). The Board stated that it could not rule out the possibility that, after hearing, it might so conclude. Memorandum and Order (Regarding Contention XX), at 8.

If the Board is inclined to that opinion then it is possible that it would view the provisions of the plan as providing some measure of protection against radiological sabotage. But, as explained in UCLA's December 13 response and in the Declaration of Mr. Cormier, University meant something entirely different when stating that the UCLA security plan was not designed to protect against radiological sabotage. University was distinguishing Sec. 73.67 requirements from those applicable to nuclear power plants.

3. The Security Inspection Reports do not Indicate that the Staff was Enforcing a Specific Requirement Under Sec. 73.40(a)

In the case of non-power reactors possessing less than formula quantities of SNM, the standard clause that appears in all NRC security inspection reports does not impose requirements beyond those of Sec. 73.67 and instead should reasonably be understood to refer to the specific requirements of Sec. 73.67 (which, according to Staff's position, could be deemed to satisfy the protections required under Sec. 73.40).

4. The November 9, 1983 NRC Approval of the UCLA Security Plan Requires No More than the Implementation of the Specific Provisions of the Plan.

The Board's Order of February 24, 1984, suggests that additional security requirements might flow from the November 9, 1983 NRC approval of theUCLAsecurityplan.1El The approval does require UCLA to ". . . maintain and fully implement all provisions of the Commission's approved physical security plan . . ." However, the reference to "all provisions" need not be regarded as including the introductory statement. The term "all provisions" refers to the provisions of the plan itself, not the introduction. The matter is clarified by the transmitting letter which states:

--15/ Amendment No. 12, approval of the UCLA Physical Security Plan submitted March 10, 1980, was transmitted by letter from Cecil 0. Thomas, Chief, Standardization and Special Projects Branch to Dr. Walter F. Wegst, dated November 9, 1983. The amendment was also signed by Mr. Thomas.

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I We have reviewed the submittal, as amended, and have concluded that it meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67 for the protection of special nuclear material of moderate strategE significance. (Emphasis supplied.)

Both the amendment and the transmitting letter were signed by the same NRC official. University understands "all provisions" to refer to provisions of the plan which satisfy the requirements of Sec. 73.67.

IV. CONCLUSION University submits that neither the University nor the NRC has engaged in any misrepresentation. What is here involved is a misunderstanding.

University regrets any confusion which may have resulted from the reference to radiological sabotage in the introduction to the physical security plan for the UCLA reactor. That reference was unfortunate but we submit of no

'real significance. The text of the plan is clear as to security measures it contains.

Dated: March 9, 1984.

DONALD L. REIDHAAR -

GLENN R. WOODS CHRISTINE HELWICK By e WILLIAM Y CORMIER Representing UCLA i

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-142

) (Proposed Renewal of Faculty THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) License Number R-71 OF CALIFORNIA ) sg 4

) .

(UCLA Research Reactor) ) SE t-

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DECLARATION OF DONALD L. REIDHAAR EE ' .h CP Z

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Cn I, Donald L. Reidhaar, say: ui .

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1. I am the General Counsel of The Regents of the University of California. The Office of the General Counsel is responsible for representing The Regents of the University of California (University) in legal proceedings in which the University is a party.

Associate Counsel Glenn R. Woods and Assistant Counsel Christine Helwick are the attorneys in this office assigned to this proceeding before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. William H. Cormier is on the staff of the Administrative Vice Chancellor at UCLA and is an attorney in good standing. Mr. Cormier, in consultation with the Office of the General Counsel and working under the supervision of Mr. Woods and Ms. Helwick, has been assigned principal operating responsibility for

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J making appearances on behalf of the University in these proceedings.

2. I have read the Licensing Board's Order of February 24,

1984, and the concerns there expressed by the Board I

over a possible misrepresentation. Although I have not been personally involved in the relicensing proceedings, I have carefully reviewed the facts giving

) rise to the Board's concern. Bcsed on that review I am convinced that no misrepresentation has occurred and that the University's attorneys and staff have acted in good faith and in a professional manner.

i j 3. The use of the term protection against " radiological sabotage" in the Introduction to the University's

, Security Plan is unfortunate; nevertheless the specific provisions of the Plan itself are clear and precise.

They do not entail the kind of precautions required of nuclear power plants. Rather, they are the. type of' 1

requirements made applicable to research reactors under 10 Code of Federal Regulations-section'73.67.

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4. . The Board's expression'of surprise in-this_ matter is understandable given the use of the words " radiological

. sabotage" in the Introduction. Still, I am satisfied:

i that a reading of-the Plan itself eliminates any l

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ambiguity. The content of the plan is consistent with !

earlier statements made by Mr. Cormier concerning the UCLA Physical Security Plan.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

J Executed at Berkeley, California this 8th day of March 1984.

NA Donald L. Reidhaar i

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND. LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility 0F CALIFORNIA ) License Number R-71)

)

(UCLA Research Reactor) )

)

DECLARATION OF CHARLES E. ASHBAUGH III I, Charles E. Ashbaugh, say:

1. I am a lecturer and Associate Development Engineer for the Nuclear Energy Laboratory (NEL) at UCLA. I have a Master's Degree in Nuclear Engineering from UCLA and I am licensed by the NRC as a Senior Reactor Operator. Since 1974 I have been the Security Officer at the NEL, with the responsibilities of writing the security plan and its amendments, coordinating with UCLA and NRC staff on security matters, controlling personnel access and procuring and maintaining the security equipment.

2. I wrote the UCLA Physical Security Plan which was submitted to the NRC on March 11, 1980. The security plan was UCLA's response to the new safeguards requirements for non-power reactor facilities possessing SNM of moderate strategic significance adopted by the NRC in November, 1979. The security plan was developed with the assistance of the Federal Register notice of July 24,1979 (Vol . 44, No.143) which explained the proposed rule, the draft regulatory guide, " Standard

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, 2 Format and Content for a Licensee Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance", dated July,1979, which was sent to licensees along with the Federal Register notice, and a document titled " Sample Physical Security Plan for Non-Power Nuclear Reactor Facilities Possessing Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significance",

dated June 14, 1979, which UCLA received at about the same time.

3. The UCLA security plan was written to satisfy the specific require-ments of 10 CFR Sec. 73.67 of the regulations, as explained in the draft regulatory guide finally adopted as Regulatory uuide 5.59 in January 1980. I used the basic format recommended in the draft guide and relied on its explanations of the requirements. My copy of the draft guide and Federal Register notice are attached. The markings and marginal notes that appear on those documents were made by me at the time I was drafting the plan to note significant items.

4. The statements on page iii of the UCLA security plan ("

Introduction:

Purpose and General Performance Objectives") were based on the state-ments appearing on pages 1 and 2 of the sample security plan. The sample security plan referred both to radiological sabotage and industrial sabotage. I c:ed the former term as the better description, though I did not have in mind the specific definition of radiological sabotage that appears now in Part 73 of the regulations. I took the

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i more general view that radiological sabotage included any sabotage that involved the reactor or its associated equipment and any sabotage which could lead to radioactive contamination or radiological i release that coulf pose a danger to students, staff or members of the public.

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5. I believe that UCLA facility is well protected against theft of the fuel or other valusble items and against any deliberate attempts to damage the reactor. its equipment, or other parts of the facility.

The basic means of providing such protection is to control access to the facility and to have a means of detecting unauthorized access should it occur. In addition the security system at UCLA includes a number of enhancements that are not strictly required. All the controls in the UCLA security system provide some degree of protection against an intruder whatever his purpose may be. But the security plan does not provide for armed guard presence at the facility at all

, times, nor mandatory personnel searches and explosives detection devices, nor other such special measures, which the intervenor claims are necessary to protect against radiological sabotage. The plan

! was not developed with any specific design basis radiological sabotage threat in mind. Because theft of the fuel would require considerable time to carry out, a good detection system represents a significant protection, particularly with the UCLA Argonaut reactor where it is very difficult to get to the fuel. The major protection.at the UCLA facility'against acts of sabotage that could result in fission product releases endangering the public is l

, the feactor itself. The reactor is a dense graphite and concrete structure and its operating characteristics are such that the controls cannot be manipulated to cause the fuel to melt. Also, any credible incident that resulted in the crushing of the fuel will not release fission products endangering the public.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Los Angeles, California this 9th day of March,1984.

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-Charles E. Ashbaugh III*'

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility ,

OF CALIFORNIA ) License Number R-71)

)

(UCLA Research Reactor) )

)

DECLARATION OF WILLIAM H. CORMIER r

I, William H. Cormier, say:

1. I am an attorney in good standing and licensed to practice law in the State of California. I am on the staff of the Administrative Vice Chancellor of the Los Angeles campus of the University of California (UCLA). In that capacity I have been delegated, by the Office of the General Counsel of The Regents of the University of California, and under the supervision of Glenn R. Woods and Christine Helwick of that office, the authority to represent UCLA in the proceedings to renew the license of the UCLA research reactor.

2. In its Memorandum and Order of February 24, 1984, the Board expressed concern that counsel for UCLA might have misrepresented certain facts in statements made in pleadings dated August 25, 1983 and December 13, 1

1983. The statements in question, quoted on pages 3 and 4 of the Bc:rd's Order, were drafted and submitted by me. Although I consult with the Office of General Counsel, those particular statements were not reviewed

J with Mr. Reidhaar. Mr. Woods nor Ms. Helwick prior to their submission.

The statements were not reviewed by any other representative of The Regents. In making these statements, however, I was acting within my I

authority to represent VM in this proceeding on behalf of the University.

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3. I reviewed the UCLA security plan in November 1980 in the office of Mr. Ashbaugh, security officer for the UCLA facility. Mr. Ashbaugh informed me that access to the plan was restricted on the basis of an

" established need to know." Consistent with that restriction my review of the plan was brief, perhaps 10 minutes, and was limited to basically 4

flipping the pages to get an idea of what the plan was like. I do not recall that I saw the introduction to the plan. I reviewed the plan again in Mr. Ashbaugh's office in June 1982 in preparation for the discussion that was to occur at the June 29-30, 1982 prehearing conference on the protective order for the release of security information. My l

review was directed to particular portions of the plan that contained potentially sensitive information. My review and discussion with Mr.

Ashbaugh lasted less than one-half hour. I do not recall that I saw the introduction to the plan at that time.

4. I did not review the plan again until January 1984 when Mr. Ashbaugh and I spent several days preparing expurgations of the plan and the inspection reports prior to sending the material to the Board for its review on January 31, 1984. At that time I did note the introduction to t the plan and discussed it briefly with Mr. Ashbaugh. I understood that i

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Mr. Ashbaugh's references there to protection against radiological sabotage were not meant in the same sense in which I used that term in my pleadings. I also understood that Mr. Ashbaugh did not mean to imply by the statements that the security plan incorporated specific provisions designed to protect against radiological sabotage as that term had been used by the intervenor.

5. The statement made by me in University's August 25, 1983 response, that the UCLA se;urity plan is not designed to provide protection against radiological sabotage, was intended to inform the Board that the UCLA plan did not employ measures, such as armed guards, mandatory personnel searches, explosive detection devices, etc., designed to prevent access to its reactcc facility by potential saboteurs. In the context of this proceeding to resolve Contention XX that is what I understood the expression, " protection against radiological sabotage," had meant.

That is how the intervenor had described the level of protection it claimed was required under Sec. 73.40(a). For example, in its September 7,1982 pleading, intervenor declared that an adequate plan must include

" sabotage prevention measures" and that "no prevention is no protection" (page 5). My statement meant that the UCLA security plan did not in-corporate the specific measures (guards, searches, etc.) to provide

• the degree of protection (prevention of access by saboteurs) which CBG claimed was necessary. I attempted to further clarify the meaning I intended in University's December 13, 1983 response (pages 3-6).

4

. 6. As I intended my statement to be interpreted I do not believe it mis-represents the facts nor are the facts inconsistent with University's legal position on the question of the safeguards requirements that apply to University's facility.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Los Angeles, California this 9th day of March,1984.

Ik~ll0" William H. Cormier l

- . . . -. = - .. . - .

t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD D

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility OF CALIFORNIA ) License Number R-71)

)

(UCLA Research Reactor) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I RESPONSE hereby certify that copies of the attached: UNIVERSITY'S TO BOARD S ORDER OF FEBRUARY 24, 1984 in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed as indicated, on this date: March 9,1984 .

John H. Frye, III, Chairman Mr. Daniel Hirsch Administrative Judge Cte to Bridge the Gap ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 1637 Butler Avenue, #203 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Los Angeles, CA 90025 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. John H. Bay, Esq.

Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Chickering & Gregory Administrative Judge Three Embarcadero Center ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Suite 2300 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission San Francisco, CA 94111 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Daniel Hirsch Mr. Glenn O. Bright Box 1186 Administrative Judge Ben Lomond, CA 95005 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Law Center Washington, D.C. 20555 c/o Dorothy Thompson

' 6300 Wilshire Blvd., #1200 Counsel for the NRC Staff Los Angeles, CA 90048 OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. Lynn G. Naliboff Washington, D.C. 20555 Deputy City Attorney Attn: Ms. Colleen P. Woodhead City Hall 1685 Main Street 1

Chief, Docketing and Service Section (3) Santa Monica, CA 90401 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 p

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WILLIAM H. CORMIER Representing UCLA THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA i

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- C0?)TAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION l

• WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Sample Physical Security Plan for Non-Power Nuclear Reactor Facilities Possessing Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significance

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Reactor Safeguards Development Branch Division of Operating Reactors Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Revision 1 June 14, 1979

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CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION

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• WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Table of Contents l

l Page Purpose General Performance Objectives Identification of Special Nuclear Material on Site Implementation General Site Layout Security Areas Controlled Access Areas (Use)

Controlled Access Areas (Storage)

Vital Areas Detection Devices or Procedures Surveillance of Vital Areas Preauthorization Screening Badging System Lock System Accass Control Description Escort System Search Description Administrative and Security Organization Communication Response Procedures l

Material Transportation Requirements Receiver Requirements l Export and Import Requirements Revision 1 June 14, 1979

• CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION

. . WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Table of Contents (Cont'd) 1 Testing Security Records Table 1 Attaciiment 1 Attachment 2 Attachment 3 Figures Revision 1 June 14, 1979

, l CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

. Purpose -

This security plan describes the physical protection system and security organization which will provide protection against radiological sabotage and detect the theft of special nuclear material at the Sample Facility.

It demonstrates compliance with 10 CFR 50.34(c), 10 CFR 73.40 and 10 CFR 73.47.

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l Revision 1 June 14, 1979

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• CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE General Performance Objectives .

The " General Performance Objectives" of the physical protection system and security organization described in this plan are:

To provide protection against acts of industrial sabotage.

To minimize the possibilities of unauthorized removal of special nuclear material consistent with the potential consequences of such actions.

l To facilitate the location and recovery of missing special nuclear material.

To achieve these objectives, the physical protection system shall provide:

Early detection and assessment of unauthorized access or activities by an external adversary within the vital areas and controlled access areas containing special nuclear material.

Early detection of removal of special nuclear material by an external adversary from controlled access areas.

Assures proper placement and transfer of custody of special nuclear material.

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• .CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION

- WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Responds to indications of an unauthorized removal of special nuclear material and then notifies the appropriate response forces of its removal in order to facilitate its recovery.

Revision 1 June 14, 1979 1

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,CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION

- WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

, Identification of Special Nuclear Material on Site The Sample Licensee possesses the following special nuclear material on site:

Form Enrichment Material Amount Non Exempt MTR fuel elements 235 93.0% U 3300 gms TRIGA fuel elements 235 19.4% U 544 gms Fission chambers (4) 90.0% 235 U 10 ams TOTAL (Nonexempt) 3854 gms Exempt 73.47(b)(1)(i)

MTR fuel elements 93.0% 235 U 210 gas Exempt 73.47(b)(1)(ii)

Plutonium Beryllium sealed sources (3) Pu 48 ams TOTAL (Exempt) 258 gms l

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• dONTAINS10CFR2.790(d)INFORMATION

- WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Implementation

• This security plan shall be fully implemented by [ ] or 30 days after approval by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, whichever is later.

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• - CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.750(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

. General Site layout The site is 650 acres of the Sample Licensee Site. The majority of the site is on the alleuvial flood plain of the Sample River. The area adjacent to the site is farm land and is sparsely populated. Figure 1 provides a large scale drawing of the area. Figure 2 provides a drawing of the site layout.

O Revision 1 June 14, 1979

' - CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Security Areas The Security Areas (SA) are permanently established areas which are clearly demarcated, access to which is controlled and which affords isolation of the '

material, equipment and persons within it.

The only SA is the Nuclear Reactor Building (with the exception of the Office Area). The SA is shown in Figures 3a, 3b. The SA is used for training and research. -The SA encompasses the Controlled Access Areas (CAA) and the Vital Areas (VA).

The Reactor Building is a permanent two story structure fabricated with pre-i formed and pre-stressed concrete slabs. The slab walls are held in place by poured concrete columns. The roof is a corrugated steel decking covered with light-weight concrete. A gravel and tar roofing material covers the concrete.

The walls have steel and glass windows. All windows are sealed shut. All access doors to the SA are full-length solid core wooden doors, or full-length hollow core steel doors, or solid wood or hollow core steel doors with steel mesh screen in or over the glass.

The SA is composed of five major areas shown in Figures 3a, 3b. These areas are: (1) Reactor Room, (2) Cor. trol Room, (3') Fuel Storage Room, (4) Laboratory, and (5) Equipment Room.

1 Access to the SA is possible at only four locations. The normal access point i

is the main entrance door that separates the SA from the Office Area. The Revision 1 June 14, 1979 D

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• CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE other access points include a first floor emerdency exit door, the basement emergency exit door, and the freight door. All access doors to the SA are locked and alarmed or the door is under the surveillance of an authorized individual.

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CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Controlled Access Areas (Use) ,

All special nuclear material

• is used only within a Controlled Access Area (CAA) which is illuminated sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized penetration or activities.

The Nuclear Reactor Building (with the exception of the Office Area) is the CAA. The CAA is shown in Figures 4a, 4b l

The illumination throughout the CAA is at least [ ] foot candle measured horizontally at floor level as shown in Figures Sa, Sb. The illumina-tion may be reduced when necessary to conduct experiments requiring less illumination. All special nuclear material in use during such experiments shall be accounted for at the end of the experiment. .

d "Special nuclear material listed in Table 1 may be used and stored outside the CAA.

1 Revision 1 June 14, 1979

- CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION

- WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Controlled Access Areas (Storage) '

All special nuclear material

• is stored only within a Controlled Access Area such as a vault-type room or approved security cabinet or their equivalent which is illuminated sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized penetration or activities.

All special nuclear material at the facility is stored in designated areas within the CAA. The designated areas are: (1) reactor core, (2) spent fuel pool, (3) fuel storage room, and (4) security cabinet. The designated areas are shown in Figures 6a, 6b.

The reactor core is covered by [ ] feet of water and the irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool is covered by [ ] feet of water. The reactor core and spent fuel pool are protected by a tamper-resistant motion detection system.

Therefore, these two designated areas provide protection equivalent to that of a vault-type room. ,

The fuel storage room is a vault-type room constructed of concrete block with only one access door. The access door is a full length solid core steel door.

The fuel storage room is (1) locked and alarmed and the room is protected by a tamper-resistant motion detection system wh'ich sounds an alarm upon the

• Special nuclear material listed in Table 1 may be used and stored outside the CAA.

Revision 1 June 14, 1979

• CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE entry of a person anywhere in i.t and upon exist from the room or upon movement of an individual within the room, or (2) the fuel storage room is attended by an authorized individual.

The security cabinet is a standard commercial security cabinet approved by the General Services Administration as class 6 or equivalent. The security cabinet is locked or attended by an authorized individual.

All the storage areas are illuminated to at least [ ] foot candle throughout the CAA as shown in Figures Sa, Sb. The fuel storage room is illuminated only when the access door is open.

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CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Vital Areas -

All vital equipment is located within a Vital Area (VA),

i The VA is a permanently established area which is clearly damarcated, access to which is controlled and which affords isolation of the material, equipment and persons within it. The vital areas are (1) the control room, and (2) the reactor room. These vital areas are shown in Figures 7a, 7b.

The vital equipments are: (1) the reactor, (2) reactor coolant system, (3) reactor controls, (4) primary biolo0i cal shielding, and (5) irradiated nuclear fuel.

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". CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Detection Devices or Procedu'res The SA is monitored by an intrusion detection system or other device or proce-dures to detect unauthorized penetration or activities. All special nuclear material is attended by an authorized individual or protected by the intrusion detection system as described below.

The intrusion detection system consists of three subsystems, the window intru-sion detection system, the door intrusion detection system and the motion detection system. The location of the detection devices and area of coverage of the motion detection system are shown in Figures 8a, 8b.

The window intrusion detection system employs conductive foil detectors; the door 1ntrusion detection system employs balanced magnetic switches; and, the motion detection systems employs microwave-radio frequency motion detectors.

The intrusion detection system is tamper resistant, line supervised and has an emergency power source. The functional and operational criteria for the intrusion detection system and subsystems are described in Attachment 1.

The intrusion detection System initiates an audio-visual intrusion alarm for any alarm condition in three locations: the Office Area, Control Room and

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Site Security Office.

The intrusion detection system is in service twenty-four hours a day. The door alarm for any door may be placed in the access mode if the SA is occupied by an authorized individual. The alarm for the main entrance door will normally be in access mode during work hours when the Office Area is occupied by an Revision 1 i June 14, 1979 w

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l- authorized individual. The intrusion detection system will (1) be in service, j or (2) the SA will be occupied by an authorized individual, or (3) the SA will i

j be inspected by an authorized individual at least once each four hours on a random basis.

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, WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Surveillance of Security Areas '

Surveillance of the security areas during a normal work day is by routine observation by the facility staff. All areas containing special nuclear materials and vital equipment are checked at the end of each normal work day.

The checks are for proper locking of doors, storage of special nuclear material, unauthorized material, fire hazards and other abnormal conditions.

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CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION

. - WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Preauthorization Screening All personnel granted unescorted access to the SA shall be screened.

The Facility Director may grant an individual unescorted access to the SA based on (1) need for access, and (2) favorable review of information obtained on the individual for trustworthiness and reliability.

The following information shall be obtained for each individual screened:

(a) Facility Staff / Students (U.S. Citizens)

(1) Employment records for last or,e year, and J (2) Academic records for last one year, and (3) Personal reference letters from two nonrelated individuals.

' (b) Foreign Students Q) Admissions file, and (2) Academic records for last one year, if available, and (3) Personal reference letters from two nonrelated individuals, if l possible.

l The Facility Director may authorize the following individuals unescorted access to the SA without review of the above information:  !

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CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE (a) Facility Staff / Students granted unescorted access to the facility for at least the previous one year prior to the implementation of this security plan.

(b) Facility Staff / Students holding or having held a government sanctioned clearance within the last one year.

The Facility Director may grant on a case-by-case basis an interim authoriza-tion for unescorted access to the SA prior to obtaining all the required information if sufficient information is available for the Facility Director to make a preliminary judgment concerning the reliability and trustworthiness of the individual.

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CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION

. - WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Badging System All authorized individuals granted unescorted access to the SA will wear a special badge while in the SA. Escorted individuals . sill not be badged.

The badge will be a destinctive color, approximately A inches x 8 inches and constructed of heavy paper. The badge will have a unique number, the indivi-dual's name, and the individual's photograph. The badge will be laminated in plastic to inhibit tampering.

All badges will be issued from the Office Area and returned to the Office Area at the end of the daily period of use. Badges will not be taken from the Reactor Building. All badges will be accounted for at the end of each work day.

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CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION

, WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Lock System '

Access to the SA is possible through only four doors. Access to the fuel storage room is possible through only one door. All security doors are shown in Figures 3a, 3b. All security doors except the main entrance door are normally locked. Security doors may be unlocked if attended by an authorized individual. The main entrance door is not locked during regular working hours when the Office Area is occupied by an authorized individual who will maintain access control.

Keys (combinations) to the locks are issued to only a limited number of authorized individuals designated in writting by the Facility Director. A physical inventory of locks, cores, keys and key cards is conducted at least once every 90 days. Unused locks, cores, keys, and key cards are stored in a secure location. Locks and keys (combinations) are changed whenever the system is compromised or a key is lost.

All doors are either full-length solid core heavy wooden doors, full-length hollow core steel doors, or solid wood or hollow core steel doors with steel mesh screen in or over the glass. All security locks (doors and cabinet) meet the specifications of Attachment 2.

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CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Access Control Description All individuals permitted unescorted access to the SA are screened. All unescorted personnel entering the SA are badged. A list signed by the Facility Director of individuals authorized unescorted access to the SA is maintained at the facility and Site Security Office.

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- CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Escort System All individuals not authorized unescorted access (visitors) shall be escorted by an authorized escort. All individuals authorized unescorted access are authorized escorts. The following personnel may grant visitors escorted access to the SA: (1) all faculty / staff members authorized unescorted access and (2) students designated in writing by the Facility Director.

The visitor-to-escort ratio shall not exceed 20-to-1 unless authorized in writing by the Facility Director on a case-by-case basis. Escorts shall be capable of maintaining visual contact of all indidivuals under escort and shall remain in the general area with the visitors.

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CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Search Description All vehicles and packages leaving the SA are searched on a random basis. The search shall be conducted by a member of the Security Organization or Operating j Organization. The search shall be by the following:

A. All vehicles leaving the SA shall be searched. The search of the vehicle will include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage and cargo area.

B. Packages leaving the SA which are larger than a [ ] shall be searched in a rar. dom basis but not less than 1 in 10. All special nuclear material in a configuration smaller than a [ ] shall be inventoried at least once each 7 days.

Revision 1 June 14, 1979

.- CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Administrative and Security Organization The Sample Facility security organization is made of up the following components:

Site Security Organization i

1. Director of Site Security

2. Site Security Watchmen Operating Organization

1. Facility Director

2. Facility Assistant Director

3. Reactor Supervisor

4. Reactor Health Physicist

5. Reactor Operators

6. Reactor Radiation Specialist l

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7. Facility heceptionists l

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The Facility Director or his designated representative has overall responsi-bility for the initiation and implementation of the security program at the Sample Facility.

The principal local law enforcement agency is the City Police Department.

Secondary local law enforement agencies are the County Sheriff and the State Police. The Site Security Department maintains liaison with the City Police Department which has committed to provide a response force witen requested.

The response time will normally be less than five minutes. The Site Security Department maintains at least one watchman per shift capable of providing response to the SA. The watchman is trained and qualified for his duties.

The Site Security Department will (1) conduct periodic security checks of the SA when requested, (2) maintain liaison with the local law enforcement agency (3) notify the local law enforcement agency of any unauthorized penetrations or activities in the CAA requiring their attention and, (4) notify the facility management of any unauthorized penetrations or activities in the SA.

At least once each twelve months, the Facility Director and designated members of the operating organization will conduct a security program review .

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l CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION i WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC OISCLOSURE Communication The facility has a comercial telephone service with the Site Security Department.

The Site Security Department maintains 2-way radio communications capability with its security officers on patrol and headquarters with fixed radio units in the patrol cars and portable radio unics carried by the security officers.

The Site Security Department has direct telephone and radio communications with the City Police Department. All the communications systems are available 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> each day. The communications systems are commercial grade.

Revision 1 June 14, 1979

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kh, j WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE R7sponse Procedures R*.:..A Tha facility has established and maintains response procedures for dealing j; b

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with threats or actual thefts of special nuclear material and industrial stbotage. Response procedures for the following security incidents are C31ntained at the facility and the Site Security Department:

1) Bomb Threat

2) Threat of Theft of Special Nuclear Material w.c;:=s

3) Theft of Special Nuclear Material pyM;g t

4) Unauthorized Intrusion

5) Security Violation by Authorized Personnel

6) Civil Disorder

7) Fire or Explosion Gi;!Miii9.ii

8) Loss / Degradation of Security System (s) 3i,;I ~

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9) Industrial Sabotage Th2 response procedures describe the type of response to be accomplished, the duties and responsibilities of ti., security organization and management involved ",@7 gP a.;;;;i in the response, law enforcement assistance available, law enforcement assistance  :, .@(

raspanse capabilities, and law enforcement response agreements.

Tha Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be notified in the event of theft or attzpted theft of special nuclear material. J..

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, WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

. Material Transportation Requirements Whenever the facility transports, exports, or delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of low or moderate strategic significance, the facility will:

1. Provide advance notification to the receiver of any planned shipment specifying the mode of transport, estimated time of arrival, location of the nuclear material transfer point, name of carrier and transport identification.

2. Receive confirmation from the receiver prior to the commencement of the planned shipment that the receiver will be ready to accept the shipment at the planned time location and that he acknowledges the specified mode of transport.

3. Transport the material in a tamper-indicating sealed container. The seals used will meet the requirements of Attachment 3.

4. Check the integrity of the containers and seals prior to shipment.

5. Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accord-ance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.47, unless the receiver is a licensee and has agreed by written contract to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

Revision 1 June 14, 1979

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I The facility does not expect to arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the special nuclear material. However, if the facility does arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the special nuclear material, the facility shall submit a change to this plan at least 120 days prior to the shipment date describing the physical protection system that will meet the applicable regulations.

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. WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Receiver Requirements When the facility receives special nuclear material of low or moderate strategic significance, the facility will:

1. Check the integrity of the containers and seals upon receipt of the shipment.

2. Notify the shipper of receipt of the material as required by 10 CFR 70.54,

3. Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.47, unless the shipper is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

The facility does not expect to arrange for the in-transit protection of the special nuclear material. However, if the facility does arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the special nuclear material, the facility shall submit a change to this plan at least 120 days prior to the shipment date describing the physical protection system that will meet the applicable regulations.

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, , WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC OISCLOSURE O

Export and Import Requirements The facility does not plan to export or import special nuclear material of low or moderate strategic significance. However, if the facility does export or import special nuclear material of low or moderate strategic significance, the facility will submit a change to this plan 120 days prior to the shipment date describing the physical protection system that will meet the applicable regulations.

I Revision 1 June 14, 1979

O CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Test 1

The intrusion alare detection system shall be functionally tested for proper operation at least once each 7 days.

Revision 1 June 14, 1979

)

CONTAINS 10 CFR 2.790(d) INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Security Records The following security records shall be maintained at the facility for at least 24 months:

(1) List of individuals authorized unescorted access to the SA.

(2) Test results for intrusion detection system.

(3) List of individuals authorized to possess security keys (combinations).

(4) Results of physical inventory of locks, cores, keys and key cards.

(5) Results of response to security incidents.

(6) Seal records.

(7) Results of badge inventories.

Revision 1 June 14, 1979 1

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON CSA

• ly g wAsnmoToN, p. c. zossa o e

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T0: NRC LICENSEES The NRC has just approved, in final form, amendments to 10 CFR Part 70,

" Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclecr Material;" Part 73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials;" and Part 150, " Exemptions and Continued Regulatory Authority in Agreement States under Section 274."

These amendments affect licensees who possess, use, or transport special nuclear material of moderate or low strategic significance. The amend-ments become effective 120 days after publication in the Federal Register.

The 120-day delay is to allow sufficient time for review and public coment of a draft standard fonnat and content guide and to prepare and implement security plans to meet the intent of the amendments.

Since these amendments may have some effect on your operations, we have enclosed a copy of them for your information. Also enclosed is a copy of the draft standard format and content guide for your review and comment.

Connents on the guide should be sent by September 24, 1979, to:

Mr. James A. Prell Safeguards Standards Branch Office of Standards Development U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555 Sincerely, M Mf Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Development

Enclosures:

As stated f% g O m

% Federal Register / Vol. 44. No.143 / Tuesday. July 24.1979Rules / and Regulations 9

4 that statute ellows for Comptroller General l rev6ew (44 UAC. 3812(c15ll.

Post pusmeta mePonasanose Co887ACT:

Mr. J. A. Prell. Safegu,ards Standards Branch. Office of Standards RJCt. EAR REGUCATUFIY Development. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

oguissioes Commission. Washington. D.C. 20555 (301) 443-8004 or Mr. C. K. Nulsen.

10 CFR Parts 70,73, and 130 Requirements Analysis Branch. Division of Safeguards. Office of Nuclear Safeguard Requirements for Special Material Safety and Safeguards. U.S.

Nuclear Material of Moderate and 1.ow Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ,

Strategic Significarwa >

Washington. D.C. 20555. (301) 427-4043.

Aossecv:U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. supptsastsevany toeronesanosc On May 24.1978 the Nuclear Rrgulatory Acncee Final rule. Commission published in the Federal

- Register (43 FR 22216) propcsed i sunsasany:ne Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations amendments to 10 CFR Parts 70. 73, and s

for physical protection of plants and 150 of its regulations. Interested persons I materials. Including nonpower t'esctors, were invited to submit written to require physical protection measures comments and suggestions on the to detect theft of special nuclear proposed amendments within thirty 4

material of moderato and low strategic days after publication in the Federal Seificance. %e amendments are being Register. Based on the public comments made in the interest of common defense and other conside.ations. the

! and security. ne measures are designed Commission has adopted the proposed l to provide a level of protection amendments, with modifications as set equivalent to that recommended in forth below.

Information Circular /225/Rev.1 ne effective physicalprotection (INFCIRC/225) published by the amendments are designed to have International Atomic Energy AgencF overall equivalency to the (IAEA).ne amendments specify recommendations ofINFGRC/225 Rev.

protection requirements for special 1. but there are differences in the nuclear material at fixed sites, including detailed requirements. INFCIRC/225 nonpower reactors, and for special Rev.1 recommendations are designed to nuclear materialin transit. minimize the possibilities of theft or Physical protection requirements for sabotage of SNM of moderste orlow independent spent fuel storage strategic significance. Le effective

\ installations and nuclear power reactors amendmentthsye besugimarily

/ are presently covered under to CFR W@h require eatindeteof

- 5 73.40.173.50, and i 73.55 and theft of SNM of moderate or low therefore are not included in these ,trategic significadellowever. In amedments. kquiring early detcetion capabilities, Concurrent with the publication of the these amendments deter the possibilities amendments. the NRCis publishing a of theft or diversion. In the judgment of regulatory guide entitled. " Standard the Comnission, the degra of Format and Content for the Licensee protection afforded by the containment.

Physical Security Plan for the Protection monitoring and detection procedures of SpecialNuclearMaterialof required by these amendments provide or Low Strategic Significance.,Moderste This equivalency to the INFCIRC/225 Re document has been prepared as an aid recommendations for protection of theft

! to uniformity and completeness in the or diversion of SNM.

preparatica and review of the physic'd Significant differences from the security plan for special nuclear proPoud rule published for comment on material of moderate and low strategic May 24,1978 are:(1) Plutonium-significance. In addition, a value/ impact Beryllium (PuBe) sealed sarces w assessment of these amendments has be exempted from the physical ,, ,ould been prepared and placed in the Protection requirements: (2] Plutonium Commission's Public Document Room with atisotopic concentration exceeding 80 1717 H Street.NW., Washington, D.C. Percent in plutonium.238 would be EPFacTtyt OAft: November 21.1979. / exempted from the physical protection 3 Note.-N Nuclear Regulatory requirements: (3) package and vehicle Commission has submitted this rule to the search requirements at facilities where \

Comptroller General for review ofits special nuclear material of moderate l

/

reporting requirement under the Feders! strategic significance is used or stored Reports Act. as amended. 44 USC. 3512. N have been changed:(4)The period of date on which the reporting requirement of the rule becomes effective, unless advised to time allotted for submittal of a licensee Pl an to implement these requirements the c.>ntrary. incl 6 des a 45-day period which has been changed from 60 days to120

[

Fed:r:1 Redst:r / Vol. 44. N2.143 / Tuzadzy. July 24.1979 / Rules and Regul:tirns 13281 days alter the effective date of the an entry search _requiremenps not

~

ofimplementation they perceived to be ,

amendment. In addition. editorial and n'r ces'sary, incommensurate with only margmal clarifying changes were made and some (4) Submission and Implementation of improvements in physical protection:

definitions added to clanfy the intent of Plans-Several comtnenters stated that and ths impacts on the licensees' the regulations. more time would be needed than the ongoing educational and research The following discussion pertains to sixty days aDowed for submission of programs. Particular attention was items (1) through (4) above. physical security plana, or amendments focuses by some commenters on the (1) PuBe sealed sources--Commenters to them, following the date the proposed physical protection requirements for low f the amendmenta become effective. enriched uranium.

quire phys cal rotec i n o PuBe ne Commission agrees that more The technical justification for the U.S.

sealed sources would be prohibitive time may be required. especiauy in the adop*fon of the proposed amendments is from the point of view of the limited case of licensees who have limited contingent on both domestic and budgets available at universities where managenal and finacial resources, and international factors, which are closely most of the sources are now located. has changed the submission date to be interrelated. Current NRC physical imposition of the proposed 120 days following the effective date of protection regulations apply pnmarily to requirements,it was said. would result the amendment. in addstion, the Lcensee strategic special~nuclest material in the curtailment of the use of PuDe is now required to implement the (uramum enriched in the isotope U-235 sources at some sites with a significant approved secunty plan within 240 days to 20% or greater. U-233. and plutonium) impact on the educational and research following the effective date of the in quantitles of fis e formula kilograms or programs at those institutions. In view amendment or within 30 days after the greater. There are no specific physical.

of the very small quantities of plutonium plan is approved, whichever la later. rotection requirements for quantities in found in PuBe sealed sources (generally' Concurrent with the publication of the fesser amounts. Yet. it can be properly from 16 to 181 grams) and the fact that amendments. the NRC is publishing a argued that a 4.9 formula kilogram guide entitled " Standard Format and quantity of SNM is about as important a potential adversaries wishing to obtain Content for the IRMiesPhydcaf. quantity as 5.0 kilograms. Multiple thefts a 5 kg formula quantity of plutonium Security Plan for the Protection o' would have to commit separate acts of of such materials in close to formula theft at a large number of widely Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or quantities could result in the 1.ow Strategic Significance." He gu'de accumulation of more than a formula separated sites without being detected.

is being published for a sixty. day quantity. The proposed detection the Commission bas decided that the comment period and will be reise wd threat to the common defense and requirements are considered to provide with comments taken into consihrstion. sufficient protection with minunum secunty of this country was sufficiently ne amendments to 10 CFR Parts 70. 73 low that physical security measures added cost so as not to affect and 150 would become effecti' e at t..is educational and research programs.

should not be required for PuBe sealed time (120 days after publication) sources.There is an upperlimit of 500 Since the requirements are of a (November 21,1979). Licensees would detection nature rather than preventice grams of plutonium to which this exemption can be applied because therefore have 240 days after publication characterization of the adversary in the of the amendments to submit their plans. regulations was deemed not to be greater than a 500 gram accumulation of The plan would have to be implemented necessary.

plutonium in this form invalidates the JO daye after approval by the basis for this exemption. IAEA In regard to low enriched uranium guidelines allow for such exceptionspublication in / Commission or 360 days after (LEU)of (date (enrichments less than 20".),

in the Federal Register) clandestine enrichment to higher levels the case of *esearch type facilities. (July 24.1979) may go beyond the capability of (2) More than 80 percrat Pu-238-%e Another area of comment dealt with proposed rule has been amended to subnational terrorists, but it does not go employee screening. Some of the beyond the capability of other reflect that plutonium with isotopic licensees interpreted the screening governments. Unless properly concentration exceeding 80 percent in requirement to call for a full field safeguarded. lovr enriched uranium plutonium.238 would be exempted from backgmund investigation of all could be stolen on behalf of foreign the physcial protection requirements. personnel entering the controlled access governments and enriched to explosive This change comets an oversight in the areas where the materialis used or useable levels after it is smuggled out of initially proposed amendments in which stored. The wording of the rule has been the U.S.

It was intended that such material revised to more clearly indicate that the would be exempted to be consistent The Nuclear Non. Proliferation Act of requirement is merely one requiring a 1978 specifies that NRC shall promulgate with the definittons of Category II and screening based on knowledge of regulations which assure that physical III materialin the IAEA document persons permitted access rather than a security measures are provided to INFCIRC/225/Rev.1. formel security investigation.The special nuclear materials exported from (3) Search requirements-Package and guidance package bemg issued with the the United States without specifying vehicle'iEr~h c requirements at facilities rule explains more fully the intent of this whether the materials are low enriched at which special nuclear material of t'9uir'm'nt- uranium or high enriched uranium.

moderate strategic significance is used There was one other area of comment Pursuant to this legislation the t

or stored have been changed. As for which no specific changes were Commission has promulgated to CFR I

revised random searches are only made to the amendments but which is of significance.These comments dealt Part 110.43 which provides among other required regarding items leaving things that:

controlled access areas, and not of those generally with the technical jutification % .

r the proposed amendments.

entering.h primary objective of entry dequacy of physical secunty programs in Many of the commenters questioned

~

sear'ches is to detect materials which recipient countnes for Ca tegory II and III the technical justification for the quantities of material will be based on

[could be usefulin protection sabotage. Since against sa1 proposed amendments on the basis of avadable relevant information and written

- ' the xope c'f the'pr6p,o?otage fe not thewithinsed aseidments.

a lack of detailed information regarding the threat; the additional costs assurances from the reciple-t country or

l 1

432R2 Federal Register / Vol. 44. No.143 / Tuesday. July 24,1979 / Rules and Regulations l I ' sroup of countries that physical seartry information. Procedures, does not have conducted. and (111] the physical i meeewee as a miairum protection to be submitted for approval) l compareb to that set farth la INFGtClass protection of special nuclear material by will be maintained." 2. Paragraph 7E22(h) of to CFR Part 70 any person who, pursuant to the t

is revised to reed as foHowe. regulations la Part 70 of this chapter, While the propoed amendmenu * * * *

• possesses or uses at any site or would provide a needed extension of cudgum sita suWwt m me contml by (h) Each application for a license to i domestic physical protection to spedal possess or use at any site or contiguous *"******"""'"9'**""

nuclear materials for which the level of sites subject to control by the Deensee *'*8I* **I*I ***I'*' "*"d'I "

physical protecdon required was not **'* * ** " *"

previously speciRed. the full value of uraaluni.238 (contained in uranians

' enriched to 20 percent ormore la the stm% signiBeance w pcial nuclw such protection could not be realised maMnal dlow seeksic signiBr.ance. 1 wanium-235 isotope). nranium-233. or until similar protection is afforded au mcrees mquimments plutonium alone or in any ambination such material among the notices in a quantity of 5.000 grams or more IW(2Ws panfpmMctim Mspwial e ph#ca j utilizing such materials. Physical computed by the formula, auc!w matedalin vansponahn W 1

prt,tection measures similar to thoes any peon who is Ucened pumuant to l Proposed, wh!ch are based on the hass =(grams contained U-235+2.3 me mguladasin Pan m and Pan 110 d U-233+ yams plutonium), other '

recommendations of the IAEA than : !! cense for possession or use of this chapter who irnports, exports.

Information C!rcular INFCIRC/225/Rev. such materialin the operation of a Wan8 Pons, dehvm 2 a canier fw ,

1. have already been adopted by several nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part tran8 port in a single shipment. or takes I countries. delivery of a single shipment free on 30 of this chapter, shau include a ,

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of physical securi plan, consisting of two boani $@ whom it is deHmed to a , j 1954, as amended, the Energy parts. Part I sh address vital **' M #*I" "*I* 9"**dd** N *"* "8I* /

Reorganization Act of1974, as amended, equipment, vital areas, and isolation pcial nuclear mahrial er special end sections 552 and 553 of title 5 of the sones, and shall demonstrate how the nuclw metafal dmderam seawgic United States Code, the following appucant plans to meet the signincance w spedalnuc!wmaterial amendments to Title 10, Chapter 1. Code requirements of Il 73.40. 73.50. 73.30.

cf Federal Regulations. Parts 70,73, and

1. 8" * * *i 8'IE*****-

n.70, and 73.n of this chapter in the S. Section 22 d10 3 Pan 73 la 150 are published as a document subject conduct of the activity to be Heensd. amended by revising paragraph (b) and to codiacation. Part II shall list tests, inspections, and adding new pars 99phs (x). (y). (s). (aa)

PART 7th DOMESTIC LICENSING Ogr other means to demo'astrate compliance and @M 2 med as foHows SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATER 8AL with such requirements. 3712 Dennmens, I M Pan 70 new 3. eao. ma am.ndd to add a . . . . .

g,f,Paresmph

,,g g paragraph (k) to read as follows:

• * * * * (b)" Authorized Individual" means l7E23 Centene of Appeaseene any individual, including an employee, a

• +

(k) Each application fora license to student, a consultant. or e9 agent of a

• * + <

possess or use at any site or contiguous licensee who has been designated in '

(s) Ea'ch application for a license that sites subject to control by the licensee writing by a licensee to have would authorize the eensport or special nuclear material of moderse responsibility for surveillance of or delivery to a carrier for transport of stategic si ' canceirJOkgormoreof control over special nuclear material or special nuclear materialin an amount agecial at material oflow strategic to have unescorted access to areas speci5ed la l 73.1(b)(2) of this chapter e gnificance as denned under where spedal nudear materialis used

' shall include (1) a description of the plan paragraphs n.2 (x) and (y) of this or stored.

for physical protection of special chapter. other than a license for * + +

= /*

nuclear material in transit in accordance posemion or use of such materialin the %{x)"spedal nuc! ear material of with ll 73.30 through 73.36. 73.47 (a) and operation of a nuclear power reactor moderate strategic significance" means:

(e), n.47(3) for to kg or more of special licensed pursuant to Pelt 3D of this (1)less than a formula quantity of nuclear material oflow strategic chapter shallinclude a physical security

strategic spedaljiuclear material but signi$cance. and 73.70(g) of this chapter plan which shall demonstrate how the more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 including as appropriate, a plan for the 8ppucant plans to meet the mquimments of paragraphJ3.47(d).{ak (contained in uranium enriched to 23 selection, quali8 cation and tralmag of percent or more in the U-235 Isotopal or armed escorts, or the speciscation and

design of a spedaDy designed truck or this cha(pter. Rand sh as.appropriale. more than of 500 Partgrams 73 ofof uranium-233 or plutonium or in a combined quantity of trailer, and (2) a licensee safeguards PART 7lb PHYSICAL PROTECTXH8 OF more than 2000 grarns when computed contingency plan or response by the equadon. grains = (grants PLANTS AND MATERIALS procedures, as appropriate. for deaung contained U-235) + 2 (grams U-with thr-ets. thefts, and industrial 4. Paragraph 73.1(b) of10 CHL Part 73 233 + grams plutontuml.or sabotage relating to the spedal nuclear is revised to reed as follows

(2)10.000 grams or more of uranium.

materialin transit. Each application for such a !! cense involving formula g 73,3 gmg 235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10

, , , , , Percent or more but less than 20 percent quantities of strategic special nuclear in the U-235 isotope).

material shallinclude the Hrst four @MPe- (y)"special nuclear material oflaw cctegories ofinformation contained in (1) This part prescribes mquirements strategic significance means: '

the applicant's safeguards contingency for (i) the physical protection of (1)less than an amount of strategic j,

plan. (The Erst four categories of production and utilization facilities special nuclear material of moderate '

informetion. as set forth in Appendix C licensed is to CFR Part 73. are Background, chapan 11) (pursuant to Part the physical 50 ofofthis strategic significance, as defined in protection I 73.2(x)(1). but more than 15 grams of C<neric Planning Base. Licensee plants in which activities licensed uranium.235 (contained in uranium Planning Base and Responsibility pursuant to Part 70 of this chapter are enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-Matrix.The Afth category of 235 isotope) or is grarns of uranium-233 m

l Federal Register / Vol. 44. No.143 / Tuesday. July 24.1979 / Rules and Regulations 43283 or 15 grams of plutonium or the (iv) Respond to indications of an '(2) ktore the material only within a combmetion of 15 grams when unauthorized removal of special nuclear controlled access area such as a vault-computed by the equation. material and then notify the appropriate type room or approved secunty cabinet grams = grams contained U- response forces ofits removalin order or thett equivalent which is illuminated 235 + grams plutonium + grams U-233. to facilitate its recovery, sufficiently to allow detection and or (b)(1) A !!censee is exempt from the surveillance of unauthorized penetration (2) kes than 10.000 grams but more f requinments of this section to the or activities, than 1000 grams of uranium.23s extent that he possesses, uses, or (3) monitor with an Intrusion alarm or

/; (contained in uranium enriched to 10 transports (l) special nuclear material otMr device or procedures the percent or more but less than 20 percent which is not readily separable from controlled access areas to detect in the U-235 isotope), or other radioactive material and which unauthonzed penetration or activities.

(3) 10.000 grams or more of uranium. has a total extemal radiation dose rate {(4) don <fuct scruning prior to granting 231 contained in uranium enriched in excess of100 rems per hour at a an tndividual unescorted access to the above natural but less than 10 percent in. distance of 3 feet from any accessible contro3ed access area where the the U-235 isotope, surface without intervening shielding or materialla used or stored,in order to (z)" Controlled access ana" means (11] sealed plutonium beryllium neutron obtain information on which to base a any temporarily or permanently sources totaling 500 pams orless decision to permit such acceoss, established ana which is clearly contained plutonium at any one site or (5) develop and maintain a controlled demarcated. access to which is contiguous sites or (till plutonium with aging and lock system to identify and controlled and which affords isolation of an isotopic concentration exceeding 80 limit access to the controlled access the material or persons within it. Percent in plutonium-238. areas to authorized individuals.

(aa)" Strategic spedal nuclear (2) A license who has quantities of f(6) Emit access to the controlled metenal" means uranium 235 (contained spedal nuclear material equivalent to access anos to authorized or morted in uranium enriched to 20 percent or special nuclear material of moderate individuals who require such access la more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, strategic significant distnbuted over order to perform their duties, or plutonium. several buildings may, for each building 17}' assure that all visitors to the (bb)" Formula quantity" means which contains a quantity of spedal controlled access areas are under the strategic special nuclear material in any nuclear traterielless than or equal to a constant escort of an individual who has combmation in a quantity.of 5.000 grams level of spedal nuclear material of low been authorized access to the area, or more computed by the formnula. strategic significance. protect the . [81e'stablish a security organization or grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.3 matertal in that building under the lower modify the current security orpamzation (grams U-233 4. grams plutonium). classification physical security to consist of at least one watcaman per v requirementa- shift able to asse.se and respond to any

6. A new I 73.47 la added to 10 CFR Part 73 to read as follows: (c) Each licensee who possesses. uses, unauthorized penetrations or activities transports or who d'elivers to a carrier in the controlled accesa areas, f 73.47 I.leensee Fixed site and in.Tranes for transport specialnuclear mate ial of (9) provide a communication R*quirmnents For Tfm Physical Prokeeen modwate strategic significance of10 kg capability between the security of Special Noctear Matettal of Moderate and or more of spedal nuclear material of organization and appropriate response t.ow stratogee signmeanee' low strategic signiRenace shall: force.

(a) Cenwal performance Objectives (1) Each licensee who possesses. usesdate

/ (1) (talsearch from on a random basis effective of Submit by a(date amend;nent) 120 days security venicles and packages leaving the or transports special nuclear material of plan or an amended security plan controlled access areas, and moderate or low strategic sigmficance descnbing how the licensee will comply (11) establish and maintain response sha.ll establish and maintain a physical with all the requirements of Sections procedurn for dealing with thresta of promction system that will achieve the /73.47 (d). (e). (f), and (3). as appropriate. thefts or thefts of such materials.

f s including schedules of tmplementation: (e)In-Transit Requirements for

/ ollowmg objectives:

(i) Minimize the possibilities for and Spedal Nuclear Matwial of Modwate unauthorized removal of special nuclear (2) Within 240 days after the effective Strategic Significapce--

material consistent with the potential date of these amendments or 30 days consequences of such actions: and after the lan(s) sumitted pursuant to (1) Each exports licensee or delivers to a carnerwho for transports, //[

(11) Facilitate the location and paragrep (c)(1)of this sectionis transport special nuclear material of

• recovery of missing special nuclear approved. whichever is later, implement moderate strategic significance shalh 'j material the approved secunty plan .

(2)To achieve these objectives, b (d) Flxed Site Reguirements for / rec (l) eiver provide of any advance notification to the planned shipments physical protection system shall SpecialNuclear Meterial of Modwate specifying the made of transport.

provide: Strategic Significance 4ch licensee estimated time of arrival. location Ne

.j (i) Early detection and assessment of who possesses, stores. or uses quantitles nuclear material transfer point. nar af unauthorized access or activities by an and types of special nuclear material of cprr:er and transport idenafication, extern:1 adverary within the controlled moderate strategic significance at fixed / (ii) receive confirmation from the access area contaming special nuclear sites, excgpt those who are licensed to receiver prior to the commencement of

/ matenal: Operate a nuclear power reactor the planned shipment that the receiver (11) Early detection of removal of p uant to Part 50, shall: will be ready to accept the shipment at special nuclear matsrial by an external 1 use the material only within a the planned time and location and adversary from a controlled access area: controlled access area which is acknowledges the specified mode of (iii) Assure proper placement and illuminated sufficiently to allow transport, transfer of custody of special nuclear detection and surveillance of y (lii) transport h material!n a tamper-material: and unauthorized penetration or activities, indicating sealed container.

I

43264 Feder:1 Register / Vol 44. No.143 i Tuesday. Julv 24.1979 / Rules and Regulationa i

/(iv) check the integnty of the i Appendix A of the action being taken to containers and seals pnot to shipment. trace the shipment. anansthr the 'n*="Hphysical y p; l and protection.

J (v) anange for the in-transit physical (4) Each licensee how exports spedal T2) Tact licenne who receives protection of the materialin accordance nucleat material of moderate stratesc quantities and types of special nuclear ( !

-\ / with the requirements of I 73.47(e)(3) of sigmficance shall comply with the f&,I,' S and this part unless the receiver is a licensee and (e)(3).

reqirements speciSed in 173.47(c), (e)(1)shalk material oflow strategic significance

' has agreed in wnting to anange for (I) check the lategrity of the containers s the in-transit physical protection. (5) Each licensee who imports special and seals upon receipt of the shipment.

(2) Each licensee who receives specialsignificance nuclearmatenalsha!!' of moderate strategic (UWufy the sbpper of receipt of b nuclear material of moderate strategic material as required in i 70.54 of Part 70 sigmficanca shalb (I) comply with the requirements speciaed in i 73.47(c) (e)(2) and (e)(3) of this chapter. and (1) check the integrity of the contalars and ~

and seals upon receipt of the shipment. IM "#""I' # Ih' l"***" EhI*f""

(ii) notify the shipper of receipt of the (ubotify the exportarwho delivered protection of the rasterialin accordance material as required in Sectinn 70.54 of the material to a canier for transport of wie de aquinments d i 73.47(gX3) of part 70 of this chspter, and the anival of such ruatorial. this part, unless the shipper is a lic-nsee (111) arrange for the in-transit physical (f) Fixed Site R ufrements for Spedal and has agreed in wHting to anange for protection of the materialin accordance Nuclear Matarial Low Straksic the in-transu physical pmtecton.

with the requirements of 173.47(el(3) of Stimme=*a-Esch licensee who (3) Each Ecensa, either abpper w this part unless the shipper is a licensee po'neues or usa encial miel. e receiver, who ananges for the physical and has agreed in writing to arrange fu material of low strategic significance at protection of special nuclear material of the in-transit physical protection. fixed sites. except those who are low strategic signiEcance while in (3) Each licensee, either shipper or licensed taoperate a nuclear power transit or who takes delivery of such reactor pursuant to part 50. shalb receiver, who anangen for the physical material fres on board (f.o.b.) thepoint (1) store or use the material onl protection of special nuclear while material at whichit is delivered to a carner for moderate strategic sigmficance in of within a controUed access area, y transport shalh transit or who takes deliven of such (2) monitor with an htrusion alarm or (I) establish and maintain response material free on board (f.o.b.) the point other device or procedune the procedcres for dealing with threats of e t which it is delivered to a carrier for controUed access areas to detect unauthorized penetrations or activities

• thefts or thafu of such material, transport shalh (1) arrange fora telephona arradio (3) assure that a watchman ornffsit" (u) make anangements to be notifled co cadon msponn force wulsespond to au immediatdy of the arrrval of the g

buitF muthorized penetrations or actutties, .gpgmggg such sidpment that is lost or

.cheduled shipment, betwun the currier *"

and the shipper orreceiver, H)esubHab and es p ,

(II) mWmin the time that thematerial procedures for desEng with thanas of ha[ted r after the estimated time i is in trantit by reducing the numberand thdu or hfu dsuch matand. IIIII"'"d"et immediately a trace duration of nuclearmaterial transfers (g) bJnns t Reqmnments fm. Investigatinn of uy shipment that la lost and by routing the meterialin the most Special Nuc!orMaterral af1mw or unaccounted for after the estimated safe and dinct manner. Stn kgic Skrim"< = - arrival time and report to the Nuclear (iii) conduct scnening dad Ucensa\/ l(1) Each heensee who transports or Regulatwy Commission as speciaed in employees involved in the r o deliven to a canier for transport I 7331 and 2 6e shipper w receiver as transportation of the materialin order to s ecial nuclear material oflow ~'

atrawgic appropriate. The licensee who made the sigMScance shdh r.btain information on which to bese a physical protection anangements shall decision to permit them control over the -[1] provide advance nottf! cation to the also inmediately notify the Director of material. receiver of any planned shWm the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory (iv) establish and maintain response specifymg the mode of transport. Commission Inspection and  ;

procedures for dealing with threats of estimated time of arrivd.!ocation of the Enforcement Regional OfBee listed in nuclear matenattranafar point.aame of  !

thefts or thefts of such matartal Appendix A of the action being taken to

" ' " be 'd carrier and transport identification, trace the shyment.

E IY dh (ii) receive confirmation from the (4) Each licenses who exports special shipment at its destination, or of any nccivar prior to mmmencement of the lanned shipment that the receiverwill nuclear matenal oflow strategic I Ne eNor the estimated time e nady m accept the shipment at the significance shall comply with the I d a planned time and location and appropriate requnements specified in

{al , , acknowledgu the spec fled mode of i 73.47(c). (g)(1) and (g][3). s investigetion of any shipment that is lost transport. (5) Each licensee who imports special cr unaccounted for after the estimated M transport the materiallns tamper nuclear material oflow strategic time and report to the Nnelaar indicadng naled catainer. significance shalb l

Regulatory Commission as specified in )che e ni ty (I) comply with the requirements l I 73J1 and to the shipper arteceiver as  ;, ar o shipment. spe i' led in i 73.47(c). (g)(2) and (g)(3), l appropriate. The Econsee who made the and and physical protection arrangements sha!! (v) anange tw & in.trandt physicd (ii) notzfy the person who delivered also immediately notify the Director of "al rd the matenal to a carrier f6r transport nf h ths appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Qef, n of 6e u di 73

,q g,,m this part. unless the receiver is a 31d the arrival of such material

7. Section 7331(a) of to CFR part 73 is Enf rce ent ona O ce listed in licensee and has agreedin writing to revised to read as fo!!ows:

1

Federal Register / Vol 44. No.143 / Tuesday. July 24.1979 / Rul:s cnd Reguhti:ns 43285 I7171 Reporta et unaccounted for nuclear material oflow stretogic sNements. suspected thWt.unaewM sigmficance in quantities poster than 15

• mvero6en. or industrial sanotage- grams of plutonium or uranium 233 or (a) Each licensee who conducts a uranium 235 (enriched to 20 percent or trace investigation of a lost or more la the U-235 Isotope) or any unaccounted for sh;pment pursuant to combination greater than 15 grams when

) 73.36(f). I 73.47{e)(3)(vi), or computed by the equation grams = grams t 73.47[g)(3)(111) snall Immediately report aranluni 235+ grams plutonium + grams to the appropriate NRC Regional Office uranium.233 shall meet the physical listed in Appendix A the details and protection requirements of I 73.47 of 10 results of his trace Investigation and CFR Part 73.

Aall file within a period of fifteen (15) aryscTive DAtm November 21.1979.

days a written report to the appropriate NRC Regional Office setting forth the ,,g, g t,,g ,g ,ga g g, Peh, hw es-U7. as Sut, art Sec. 201. Pub.

details and resulta of the trece t.aw es.aae, es Stat.12as-12aa. Pub. law so-investigation. A copy of such writtes t a, as Stat. 413 (u U.ic, aars. 2 apt. sas1H report shall be sent to the Director.

Office ofInspection and Enforcement. Deted at Washington. DA ibis isth day of July, two.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Washington. D.C. 3655. For the Nuclear Aegulatory rwantos.

? * *

• w g, a gw s.Section 73.72 of to CFR Part 73 is p we rire,s m e,e :

revised to read as follows: eause cena nosee.e 173.72 Requirement for advance neues et empment of species nucceer metertes.

Each !!censee who plans to import.

export transport, deliver to a carrier for transport in a single shipment. or take delivery at the point where it is delivered to a carrier, formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material or special nuclear material of moderate strategic signifftence shall notify the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Off!ce listed in Appendix A by U.S. Mail, postmarked at least 7 days in advance of the shipping date. The following information shall be furnished in the advance notice: shipper, receiver, carrier (s), estimated date and time of departure and arrival, transfer point (s), and mode (s) of shipment. The Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Comm:ssiori Inspection and Enforcement Regions! Office shall also be notified by telephone 7 days in advance of the shipping date that an advance shipping notice has been sent by mail, and of any changes to the shipment itinery prior to the shipment date. Road shipments or transfers with one.wey transit times of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or less la duration between installations of a licensee are exempt from tha requirements of this section.

PART 150.-.EXEMPTIOfJS AND CONTINUED REQUI.ATORY AUTHORITYIN AGREEMENTSTATES UNDER SECTION 214 9.10 CFR Part 150 is amended to add a new Section 150.14 to read as follows:

I t56,14 Commisalon Regulatory Authortry for *hysical Protection.

Persons in Agreement Statcs possessing using or transporting special

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1. • s U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP 911SSION

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OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT 3,)y 1979 DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE AND VALUE/ IMPACT STATEMENT Division 5

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STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT.

FOR A LICENSEE PHYSICAL SECURITY" PLAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF MODERATE OR LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE x,

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This regulatory guida and the associated value/ impact statement are being issued in draft forin to involve the public in the early stages of the development of a regulatory position in this area. They have not received complete staff review and do not represent an official NRC staff position.

Public coments are being solicited on both drafts, the guide (including any implementation schedule) and the velue/ impact staterrent. Connents on the value/ impact statement should be accompanied by supporting data. Coments on both drafts should be sent to the Secretary of the Conunission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coninission Washington. 0.C. 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, by SEP 211979 Requests for single copies of issued guides and draft guides (which may be reproduced) or for placement on an automatic distribution list for single copies of future guides and draft guides in specific divisions should be made in writing to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:

Of rector. Olvision of Technical Information and Document Control.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTR 000CTION........................................................... 1 PART I SNM OF MODERATE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE......................... 10 Chapter 1 U s e o f S to ra ge A rea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.1 Area Where Material Is Used............................. 10 1.2 Area Where Material Is Stored........................... 12 Chapter 2 Detection Devices or Procedures............................. 13 2.1 Detection Devices....................................... 13 2.2 Detection Procedures...,................................ 14 Chapter 3 Access Contro1............................................. 15 3.1 Preauthorization Screening............................. 16 3.2 Badging System........................................ 17 3.3 Lock System........................................... 18 3.4 Access Contro1......................................... 19 3.5 Escort System.................................. ....... 20 3.6 Search......................................... ....... 21 Chapter 4 Security Organization...................................... 22 Chapter 5 Communications............................................. 23 Chapter 6 Response Procedures........................................ 24 Chapter 7 Material Transportation Requirements....................... 25 7.1 Advance Notification................................... 26 7.2 Receiver Confirmation..................... 27 7.3 7.4 Container..............................................

Inspection.............................................

.. 27

........... 28 7.5 In-Transit Physical Protection......................... 28 Chapter 8 Receiver Requirements...................................... 29 8.1 Inspection............................................. 29 8.2 Notification........................................... 30 8.3 In-Transit Physical Protection......................... 30 ,

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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Chapter 9 In-Transit Physical Protection Requirements................ 31 9.1 Communications......................................... 32 9.2 Minimum Transit Times.................................. 32 9.3 Preauthorization Screening............................. 33 9.4 Response Procedures.................................... 34 9.5 Notification........................................... 34 9.6 Lost Material Notification............................. 35 Chapter 10 Export Requirements....................................... 36 Chapter 11 Import Requirements....................................... 36 11.1 Security Requirements............................... 36 11.2 Notification........................................ 37 PART II SNM OF LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE............................ 38 Chapter 1 Use and Storage Area....................................... 38 1.1 Area Where Material Is Used............................ 38 1.2 Area Where Material Is Stored.......................... 39 Chapter 2 Detection Devices or Procedures... ........................ 40 2.1 Detection Devices...................................... 41 2.2 Detection Procedures................................... 42 Chapter 3 Security Response.......................................... 43 Chapter 4 Response Procedures........................................ 43 Chapter 5 Material Transportation Requirements....................... 44 5.1 Advance Notification................................... 45 5.2 Receiver Confirmatior................................... 46 5.3 Container.............................................. 46 5.4 Inspection............................................. 47 5.5 In-Transit Physical Protection......................... 47 Chapter 6 Receiver Requirements...................................... 48

> 6.1 Inspection......................................... .. .. 48 6.2 Notification........................................... 48 6.3 In-Transit Physical Protection......................... 49 iii

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

.Pa21 Chapter 7 In-Transit Physical Protection Requirements................ 49 7.1 Response Procedure................................. 50 -

' 7.2 Notification........................................... .... 51  !

7.3 Lost Material Notification............................. 51 Chapter 8 Export Requirements..........

............................. 52 Chapter 9 Import Requirements.............. ...........,............. 52 9.1 Security Requirements............................. 53 9.2 Notification........................................... ..... 53

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STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT FOR A LICENSEE PHYSICAL SECURITY

[ PLAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF MODERATE OR LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE i

INTRODUCTION The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, directed the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to regulate the receipt, manufacture, production, transfer, possession, use, import, and export of special nuclear material (SNM) in order to protect the public health and safety and to provide for the common defense and security. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred all the licensing and related regulatory functions of the AEC to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

The principal requirements with respect to the physical protection of licensed activities against industrial sabotage and with respect to the physical protection of special nuclear material in transit are, found in 10 CFR Part 50,

" Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," Part 70, " Domestic Licensing of Special' Nuclear Material," Part 73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," and Part 110. " Export and Import of Nuclear Facilities and Materials."

Paragraph 50.34(c) of 10 CF Part 50 and paragraphs 70.22(g), 70.22(h), and 70.22(k) of 10 CFR Part 70 identify the physical protection information that must L

be provided in a Physical Security Plan as part of a license application. This plan is required in order for the applicant to demonstrate compliance with the 4

specific physical protection requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 and must be submitted with each application for a license to possess or use SNM (or for a license authorizing transport or delivery of SNM), except for a license to possess, use, t

or transport less than 10 kg of SNM of low strategic significance, in which case a physical security plan is not required. However, the licensee is required to 1

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meet the requirements of $ 73.47 for the protection of SNM of low strategic  !

significance.  !

This regulatory guide describes the information required in the physical security plan submitted as part of an application for a license to possess, use, or transport SNM of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of SNM of low strategic significance and recommends a standard format for presenting the information in an orderly arrangement. This standard format will thus serve as ,

an aid to uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical protection plan of the license application. This document can also be used as guidance by licensees possessing or transporting less than 10 kg of SNM of low strategic significance in understanding the intent and implementing the requirements of paragraphs 73.47(a), 73.47(f), and 73.47(g) of 10 CFR Part 73.

i ~Aside from providing guidance for the standard format and content of physical security plans, this regulatory guide explains the intent of the various provisions of the regulation. The intent of each requirement is found in the discussion of l each subsection and is implicitly provided by outlining alternative systems that

, could be used to fulfill the requirements. The discussion section and list of alternatives should provide the licensee wit'h the sense of the NRC regulations.

This guide is divided into two parts. Part I, "SNM of Moderate Strategic Significance," provides a standard format for preparing the licensee's security v' plans and provides guidance to licensees who possess, use, or transport SNM of moderate st'ategic significance. Chapters 1 through 6 of Part I apply to appli-cations far a license to possess or use at any fixed site, or at contiguous sites i subject to control by the licensee,'SNM of moderate strategic significance.

l Chapters 7 through 11 of Part I apply to applications for authorization to trans-port or deliver to a carrier for transport SNM of moderate strategic significance.

l Part II, "SNM of Low Strategic Significance," provides a standard format for preparing the licensee's security plan for licensees who possess, use, or transport more than 10 kg of SNM of low strategic significance. It also provides guidance to all licensees whc possess, use, or transport SNM of low strategic significance. Chapters 1 through 4 of Part II apply to applications for a l

2

, , . . . _ _ _ . - 1 license to possess or use at any fixed site, or at contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee, more than 10 kg of SNM of low strategic significance.

Chapters 5 through 9 of Part II apply to appitcations for authorizat' .1 to transport or deliver to a carrier for transport more than 10 kg of SNM of low i

strategic significance.

Table 1 shows the type and amount of SNM covered in 10 CFR $ 73.47. It should be noted, as stated in the footnote to Table 1, that (1) plutonium with an isotopic concentration exceeding 80% or more in Pu-238, (2) special nuclear material that is not readily separable from other radioactive material and that has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding, and (3) sealed plutonium-beryllium neutron sources totaling 500 grams or less of contained plutonium at any one site or contiguous sites are exempt from the requirements of 10 CFR S 73.47.

This guide has been prepared to minimize lost time attributable to incomplete physical security plans and to standardize the review process. The applicant is encouraged to prepare his physical security plan in accordance with this guide and to provide information in each section to support the conclusion that he will be 3

at to opurate in accordance with the pertinent regulations. Although conform-ance with this guide is not required, the format and content presented are accept-abic to the NRC staff.

As developments and changes in the nuclear industry occur, the Commission's requirements for information may need modification; revisions to this guide will be made as necessary to accommodate these changes.

Purpose and Applicanility This standard format has been prepared as an aid to uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical protection section of license appli-cations and to clarify the intent of the regulations. The information this guide contains will help the licensee plan a physical protection system designed to detect the theft of SNM of moderate or low strategic significance. The physical 3

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l TABLE 1 CATEGORIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL MODERATE STRATEGIC LOW STRATEGIC MATERIAL

• ENRICHMENT SIGNIFICANCE SIGNIFICANCE

1. Plutonium --

Less than 2,000 g but more 500 g or lerss but more than 500 g than 15 g i

l 2. Uranium-235 20% or more in Less than 5,000 g but more 1,000 g or less but U-235 isotope than 1,000 g more than 15 g i

10% or more but 10,000 g or more Less than 10,000 g but less than 20%

in U-235 isotope more than 1,000 g Above natural --

10,000 g or more but less than 10%

3. Uranium-233 --

Less than 2,000 g but more 500 g or less but_more than 500 g than 15 g

4. Uranium-235, U-235 portion Less than 5,000 g according 1,000 g or less according i

uranium-233, enriched to 20% to the formula: grams =

! and pluton- or more. to the formula: grams =

(grams contained U-235) + (grams contained U-235) +  !

ium in com- 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams t bination 2.0 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium) but more than plutonium) but more 1,000 g according to the than 15 g according to formula: grams = (grams the formula: grams = '

U-235) + 2.0 (grams U-233 grams contained U-235 +

+ grams plutonium) grams U-233 + grams plutonium.

• The following materials are exempt:

1.

Special nuclear material that is not readily separable from the radioactive material and that has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance

2. of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding,

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3.

Plutonium with an isotopTc7oncentration of 80% or more in Pu-238, and Sealed at plutonium-beryllium any one site or contiguous neutron sites.sources totaling 500 grams or less of contained plutonium

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protection subsystems identified are intended to provide a reference physical protectior, system that would normally be capable of meeting the performance requirements of paragraph 73.47(a) of 10 CFR Part 73. Houver, it is recognized that at any particular site there may be some subsystems and components not needed or additional ones needed to meet these performance requirements. In these cases, the applic7nt is e9ccuraged to address in the license application specific dcpar-tures of subsystems or components from this guide.

The information requested in this guide is the minimum needed for the review of a physical security plan. Additional information may be required for completing the staff review of a particular plan and should be included as appropriate. It is also the applicant's responsibility to be aware of new and revised NRC regu-latior,s.

The information provided should be up to date with respect to the state of technology for the physical protection techniques and systems that the applicant proposes to use.

Information and procedures delineated in the regulatory guides in Divisiort 5,

Materials and Plant Protection," that are appropriate to certain sections of the physical security plan may be incorporated by reference.

The applicant should discuss his plans and progrrms with the NRC staff before preparing the application. This discussion should give particular emphasis to the depth of information required for the plan.

Upon receipt of an application, the NRC staff will perform a preliminary review to determine whether the application provides a reasonably complete presenta-tion of the information needed to form a basis for the findings required before issuance of a license. The standard format will be used by the staff as a guide-line for identifying the type of information needed. If an application does not provide a reasonably complete presentr. tion of the necessary information, further review of an application will be suspended until this needed information is provided.

5 i

,Use of the Standard Format The applicant should follow the numbering system of the Standard Format down to the level of section (e.g., 3.4). Under some circumstances certain sections may not be applicable to a specific application. If so, this should be clearly stated and sufficient information should be provided to support that conclusion.

The applicant may wish to submit in support of his application information that is not required by regulations and is not essential to the description of the appitcant's physical protection program. Such information could include, for example, historical data submitted in demonstration of certain criteria, discussion of alternatives considered by the applicant, or supplementary data regarding assumed models, data, or calculations. This information should be provided as an appendix to the application.

Upon completion of the application, the applicant should use the Table of Contents of the Standard Format as a checklist to ensure that each subject has been addressed.

Style and Composition A table of contents should be included in each submittal.

The applicant should strive for clear, concise presentation of information.

Confusing or ambiguous statements and general statements of intent should be s[ avoided. Definitions and abbreviations should be consistent throughout the sub-mittal and consistent with generally sccepted usage.

Wherever possible, duplication of information should be avoided. Thus, infor-mation already included in other sections of the applications may be covered by specific reference to those sections.

Where numerical values are stated, the number of significant figures should reflect the accuracy or precision to which the number is known. The use of relative values should be clearly indicated.

6

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Drawings, diagrams, and tables should be used when information may be presented more adequately or conveniently by such means. These illustrations should be f located in the section where they are first referenced. Care should be taken to

, ensura that all information presented in drawings is legible, that symbols are f defined, and that drawings are not reduced to the extent that they cannot be read f by unaided normal eyes.

Physical Specifications of Submittals All material submitted in an application should conform to the following physical dimensions of page size, quality of paper and inks, numbering of pages, etc.:

1. Paper Size Text pages: 8-1/2 x 11 inches.

Drawings and graphics: 8-1/2 x 11 inches preferred; however, a larger size is acceptable provided the finished copy when folded does not exceed 8-1/2 x 11 inches.

2. Paper Stock and Ink Suitable quality in substance, paper color, and ink density for handling and for reproduction by microfilming.

)

3. Page Margins A margin of no less than one inch is to be maintained on the top, bottom, ,

and binding side of all pages submitted.

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4. Printing

> Composition: text pages should be single spaced.

Type face and style: must be suitable for microfilming.

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Reproduction: may be mechanically or photographically reproduced. All pages of the text may be printed on both sides, and images should be priated head to head.

5. Binding Pages should be punched for looseleaf ring binding.

6. Page Numbering Pages should be numbered by section and sequentially within the section. Do not number the entire report sequentially. (This entire Standard Format has been numbered sequentially because the individual chapters were too short for sequential numbering within each section to be meaningful.)

7. Format References In the application, references to this Standard Format should be by chapter and section numbers.

Procedures for Updating or Revising Pages The updating or revising of data and text should be on a replacement page basis.

The changed or revised portion of each page should bc highlighted by a vertical line in the margin opposite the binding margin for each line changed or added. All pages submitted to update, revise, or add pages to the report should show the date of the change. The transmittal letter should include an index page listing the pages to be inserted and the pages to be removed. When major changes or additions are made, pages for a revised table of contents should be provided.

Number of Copies The applicant should submit the appropriate number of copies of each required submittal pursuant to 10 CFR $ 70.21.

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4 Public Disclosure I

l h The MRC has determined that the public disclosure of the details of physical protection programs is not in the public interest, and such details are with. held pursuant to paragraph 2.790(d) of 10 CFR Part 2. Thus the physical protection

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section of each application should be submitted as a separate enclosure. Other proprietary and classified information should be clearly identified and submitted in separate enclosures. Each such submission of proprietary information should be accompanied by the applicant's detailed reasons and justifications for requesting exemption from public disclosure as required in paragraph 2.790(b) of 10 CFR Part 2.

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l PART I SNM OF MODERATE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE CHAPTER 1 USE AND STORAGE AREA This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraphs 73.47(d)(1) and (d)(2), which are as follows:

(d)(1) Use the material only within a controlled access area which is illuminated sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized penetra-tion or activities.

(d)(2) Store the material only within a controlled access area such as a vault-type room or approved security cabinet or their equivalent which is illuminated sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthor-ized penetration or activities.

A controlled access area (CAA) is defined in paragraph 73.2(z) as "any temporarily or permanently established area which is clearly demarcated, access to whict) is controlled and which affords isolation of the material or persons within it." Thus a CAA can be an approved security csbinet with a lock to which only authorized individuals have the combination or key, a vault or vault-type room that uses some type of access control system to limit access to authorized individuals, a locked laboratory for which only authorized individuals such as professors or lab instructors have the combination or key, or any open area whose .

boundaries are clearly defined and into which access of personnel is controlled.

The regulations as written are designed to allow the licensee a great deal of flexibility in meeting the requirements in a cost effective manner.

1.1 AREA WHERE MATERIAL IS USED (73.47(d)(1))

Intent Temporarily established CAAs for the use of SNM need not have permanent physical barriers at their boundaries. Office partitions, cordons, or other devices can be used to warn passersby of the restricted nature of the area, l

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! while access control can be effected through surveillance or supervision of the

! area by those using the SNM at the time. However, if the material is to be left unattended in such an area, additional protection must be provided to control access and ensure a detection capability in the st;unce of authorized personnel.

This could be accomplished, for example, through the posting of signs and the use of motion detection equipment covering the immediate area in which the SNM is located. Although the material may be considered in "use," protection requirements would be the same as though the material were in storage, since authorized personnel would not be present.

Permanently designated areas for the use of SNM would more closely approxi-mate CAAs intended for the storage of SNM. In this case, a more likely choice would be permanent physical barriers such as those that would be provided in the case of a laboratory or reactor containment structure in which it was desired to have SNM continuously present and in use. Such an area may also serve as a storage area. Although access control and detection capabilities may be provided through the use of appropriate hardware during the period when SNM is stored in this area, y

other means of providing these capabilities may be required to complement such hardware if alarms are deactivated or doors are unlocked. In such cases, licensees

.nay rely on authorized personnel to effect the required protection.

Illumination sufficient to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized penetration or activities within the CAA where the material is used need not require the use of high-intensity lighting throughout the CAA. What is intended is the use of normal lighting sufficiently uniform throughout the CAA to ensure that material or unauthorized personnel cannot be secreted in a darkened area 4

until a time rnere convenient for the unauthorized removal of the material. For those facilities where experiments must be conducted in a darkened room, the lighting requirement is exempted for as long as is needed provided access control is ensure.1 and the naterial is accounted for at the end of the experiment.

_Cortent Describe tbt Cat wnere the materia. w1;l t,e used. Include in this aescrip-tion inf'.rt.W ;ca on the type of b3rriers :;urroun3ing the material, the portals 11 l l

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t that allow access to the material, the size of the area, the permanence of the i CAA, the use of the CAA (e.g. , laboratory, process area, reactor room), the light- I ing level and uniformity provided to allow detection and surveillance of unautho-rized penetration or activities; state whether the material will also be stored there.

1. 2 AREA WHERE MATERIAL IS STORED (73.47(d)(2))

Intent CAAs used for the storage of SNM should provide protection against theft equivalent to a vault-type room or an approved security cabinet. ALvault-type roomisdefinedin10CFR$73.2as"aroomwithoneormoredoors,allcapab5 of being. .locked, - . . ~ .

protected by an intrusion alarm which. creates an alare upon the

~

entry of a person anywhere into the room and upon, exit from the room or upon move-

ment , . -

of,an individual,within the room." An approved security cabinet is one that is designed to afford protection against surreptitious entry and lock manipulation and has been approved by the General Services Administration or other standards organization (e.g., ANSI) as being equivalent to a class 6 GSA rating or better.

A vault-type room, by definition, must be protected by motion detection equipment. This is considered a valid tradeoff for the physical barrier protec-tion of fered by the security cabinet. The vault-t.ype room .- - - can

. .. b._e a locked labo-

ratory, a supply room,,,or a. closet _ equipped with, a tamper-resistant motion

,de_tect9 r. The motion detector generally would also satisfy the monitoring require-ment addressed in Chapter 2 of this guide, deoending on site-specific considera-tions. By " equivalent to a vault-type room" is meant that a piece of equipment (such as a fission chamber, reactor core, or storage rack), even though it does not resemble a " room," may meet the storage requirement if there is a means of controlling access to it (e.g., a locked grill, inaccessibility beneath water as in a storage pool) and it is protected with a tamper-resistant motion detection system.

l The illumination level required for the CAA should be sufficiently uniform l and bright to detect penetration of or tampering with the CAA (i.e., an approved 12

I security cabinet) or unauthorized penetration of or activities within the CAA (i.e., a vault-type room).

Content i

! Describe in detail the CAA in which the material will be stored. Include l in this description information on the type of barriers surrounding the material, the portals that allow access to the material, the size of the area, the type of l

, CAA (e.g., vault-type room, vault, security cabinet), and the location and level

of lighting provided to allow detection of unauthorized penetration or activities.

If a vault-type room is used to store the material, describe in Section 2.1 the type of intrusion alarm system used there. If a security cabinet is used, describe in Section 3.3 the type of locking system used.

CHAPTER 2 DETECTION DEVICES OR PROCEDURES This chapter provides guidance for meeting the requirement of paragraph 73.47(d)(3):

(d)(3) Monitor with an intrusion alarm or other device or procedures the controlled access areas to detect unauthorized penetration or activities.

In order to help detect unauthorized activities or penetrations of CAAs where

! the material is used or stored, either (1) intrusion alarms or other devices or (2) security procedures are needed. Section 2.1 provides guidance for a licensee who chooses to use intrusion alarms or devices, and Section 2.2 provides guidance for a licensee who chooses to use security procedures.

t y 2.1 DETECTION DEVICES (73.47(d)(3))

Intent i

For CAAs where the material is used, the licensee will probably wish to rely I

on personnel-oriented procedures for ensuring that the CAA is not penetrated l

inadvertently or purposefully by unauthorized personnel while the material is in l 1

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use. However, material left temporarily unattended should be protected by a motion detector (e.g. , suspended from above) that incorporates adequate tamper-resistant features. Licensees should design their systems to minimize the rate of spurious or false alarms through proper installation and procedures.

For CAAs where the material is stored, the detection capability will be satisfied through the use of motion detection equipment. However, the detection capability requirement may also be satisfied by different types of safety detec-tion devices or security procedures. Information regarding intrusion alarm devices that could be used is available in NUREG-0320.* However, any choice of detection d.svice, intrusion or safety, must include tamper-resistant features.

Content Describe the ta..mper-resistant intrusion alarm devices or tamper-resis+. ant

~

sifety devices that are used to mo'niE6r'tFe~f%A where the material is used and stored. This description should include:

1. Type of device used with brief theory of operation,

2. Location of detection device,

3. Type and location of annunciation,

4. Area of coverage,

5. Tamper-rasistant features,

6. Signal line protection features,

7. Emergency power features for devices, and

8. Conditions under which the detection device will be used. .

b/ 2. 2 DETECTION PROCEDURES (73.47(d)(3))

Intent Licensees may choose to provide the required cetection capacility during certain periods through reliance on personnel-Griented procedure! rather ther. by a

NUREG-0320. " Interior Intrusion Alarm Systems." Copies may be obtainea frem the National Technical Information Se"vice, Springfield. Virginia 22161.

14

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_ _ _ a

I l'

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' the use of detection devices. This may be desirable during periods of heavy usage of material when frequent traffic into and out of a CAA may make the use of an intrusion alarm system inconvenient. Authorized personnel engaged in the use of the material or otherwise present within the CAA or its immediate vicinity may satisfy the detection capability requirement provided they can reasonably maintain

! surveillance over the material and control access to the CAA or its immediate vicinity while carrying on whatever other activities they may be engaged in. In the absence of detection devices, at least one authorized person should be present at all times that the material is in use.

If the material is in storage in an approved security cabinet or its equivalent, the material may be left unattended without an intrusion alarm system provided

] some other detection procedure is employed. This may include remote surveillance using a closed circuit television system or r g gmized period 1c, patrols by,a ,

f watchman or campus police.

y Content Describe the procedures that are used or may be used to monitor che controlled access areas where the material is used or stored. These descriptions should include the conditions under which the prncedures would be used; the CAAs for which the procedures would be used; the individuals, categories of individuals, or personnel positions assigned to carry out procedures; the devices used in con-f junction with the procedures; other assignments or activities to be performed by personnel concurrently with their execution of detection procedures; the provisions for documentation of inspection procedures being executed (e.g., a log); a descrip-tion of the procedures themselves; and any techniques employed for randomization of patrols.

CHAPTER 3 ACCESS CONTROL This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraphs 73.47(d)(4), (d)(5), (d)(6), (d)(7), and (d)(10), which are as follows:

l 15 l

l (d)(4) Conduct screening prior to granting an individual unescorted access to e

the controlled access area where the material is used or stored, in order to obtain information on which to base a decision to permit such access, ,

t i

(d)(5) Develop and maintain a controlled badging and lock system to identify and limit access to the controlled access areas to authorized individuals, (d)(6) Limit access to the controlled access areas to authorized or escorted

, individuals who require such access in order to perform their duties, o (d)(7) Assure that all visitors to the controlled access ar'eas are under the constant escort of an individual who has been authorized access to the area, (d)(10) Search on a random basis vehicles and packages leaving the controlled access areas.

N 3.1 PREAUTHORIZATION SCREENING (73.47(d)(4))

I p,.,i,. . i ,.. u . ; . n.. ,

Intent The intent of the requirement for preauthorization screening is to ensure that the licensee will have sufficient knowledge of an individual to determine I his reliability and need for access prior to granting him authorized access to i, the CAA where the material is used or stored. The selection of procedures for l conducting this examination and the criteria he employs to make his judgments f l

i are the responsibility of the licensee and, of course, should be consistent with all local, State, and Federal laws and regulations regarding the protection of the privacy and other rights of the individual. The screening process may be conducted in the same manner as other investigations c tomarily conducted by l

potential employers for similarly sensitive positions. There is no requirement for the licensee to arrange for an NRC clear'ance or similar clearance from any other governsw t organization. Examples of procedures and criteria that may be employed in the screening process include holding or having recently held a 16 s

!! l 1.

i i

'. government-sanctioned clearance; examination of past employment or educational records (to determine any unsatisfactory employment or school actions or incidents

, that would indicate any unreliability or previous breaches of trust betwean the individual and his employer); endorsements or references from previous employers, teachers, or colleagues that would support a decision for granting access er that

i would attest to the trustworthiness and reliability of the individual; and con-sideration of the irdividual's present employment record indicating' demonstrated trustworthiness and reliability over an extended period of employment with the licensee. This may be considered in the nature of "grandfathering.")

Content Describe the procedures and criteria that will be used for obtaining suffi-cient information prior to making a decision on granting unescorted access authorization to an individual to CAAs where the material is used or stored.

Identify the types of individuals who will be screened (e.g., process engineers, supervisory personnel, professors, instructors, graduate students) and who will perform the screening process.

3.2 8ADGING SYSTEM (73.47(d)(S)) "

pg n t -

a s Intent k The purpose of the badging system is to facilitate the identification of

, authorized individuals and the control of access to or within the CAA where the .

., material is used or stored. Information on the badge should be such that it is possible to clearly distinguish personnel authorized for access to the CAAs from l

.; those requiring an escort. Information on the badge should also uniquely identify l the individual possessing the badge. This personalized information can be obtained i i

through the use of photographs, personal vital statistics, signatures, or any  !

i means the licensee may wish to use that will uniquely identify the individual.

1 1

17 l r _-_ _

Content Describe the badging system used to facilitate control of access to the CAAs This description should include:

1. The size, shape, color, material, and construction of badges.

2. The distinguishing features of the badge that identify authorized indi-viduals from escorted individuals.

3. How the badges will be used for controlling access. (For example, will t

all individuals be checked prior to entering the CAAs, will periodic checks be '

made of individuals within a CAA to determine if they are authorized or under ,

escort, or will the badge itself permit authorized entrance, e.g., a card key.)

4. The system used for issuing, controlling, and accounting for the badges,

(

3.3 LOCK SYSTEM (73.47(d)(5))

Intent Locks used to control access to CAAs should be resistant to manipulation or picking and should not be mastered. Examples of typical lock systems that fit this description are three position dial-type combination locks, six pin key locks and card-key lock systems. The procedures for assigning keys and combinations to individuals is an integral part of the lock system and should be designed to g ensure that only authorized personnel have access to such items. Locks and com- "

binations should be changed when information is obtained that the lock system may have been compromised. Further information may be obtained in Regulatory ,

Guide 5.12, " General Use of Locks in the Protection and Control of Facilities '

I and Special Nuclear Material."

Content i Describe the locking system used to control access to the CAAs where mate-rial is used and stored. This description should include locations of all locks 18 A=

l

• i i i l

i included in the system by type of lock, the pick-resistant and manipulation- l resistant characteristics of each lock type used, personnel responsible for issu-ing keys or combinations and changing combinations or locks, criteria for chang-ing combinations or locks, personnel authorized to be given keys or combinaticns,

. and descriptions of types of locks used (references may be made to Regulatory Guide 5.12 for this purpose).

, 3.4 ACCESS CONTROL (73.47(d)(6))

!I Intent The success of other access control system components, such as preautho-rization screening, badging, and lock control, is dependent upon effective control of personnel access into the CAA. Physical access may be controlled in a number of different ways depending upon the actual configuration of the CAA and other site specific factors. Some examples of these alternatives are:

1. Control by Authorized Person. ]f the area to be controlled is suffi-ciently small and free of obstructions, an authorized person performing other activities in a CAA may effect physical access control by monitoring entry of unauthorized persons into the area. A sign posted at the entrance would help deter casual passeraby. A typical application of this approach would be the case

! of a laboratory instructor conducting a class in which he is familiar with each

] of his students and could easily recognize unauthorized persons not in the class.

2. Card-Key, Combination', or Key-Lock Control System. A more sophisticated

^

hardware-oriented system involves the use of a card-key, combination, or key-lock system. Physical access control in this case consists of the use of physical ce barriers to c'eter unauthorized persons. A limited number of entrances that are

.; controlled by authorized personnel using a card key, combination, or key are provided. This system may be more useful when larger numbers of authorized personnel who would not necessarily be familiar with one another need to share '

the use of the CAA.

l' i 1 l 19 I

n l

I _ . _ . _.,. _ , ._ . . , . _ . _ .

3. Control by Security Organization. If security organization personnel are available, physical access control may be accomplished by stationing a person [

at the entrance to the CAA to check identification and allow only authorized persons into the CAA. This alternative may be unjustifiably expensive unless ,

the security organization member's salary can be justified on other grounds as  !

well.. A variation of this system requires persons seeking entrance to the CAA ,I to obtain a key from a properly designated person or security organization for i each use.

Content Describe the system for limiting physical access to each CAA identified in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 to authorized personnel or those escorted oy authorized personnel. Include in this description the names or titles of individuals granting access authorizations, the criteria to be used in granting authorizations, and the procedures used to ensure that only authorized or properly escorted persons are allowed access to the CAA. Reference can be made to Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, and 3.6 of this chapter as they apply to this section for the description of locks, barriers, or other hardware that are used to control access.

3. 5 ESCORT SYSTEM (73.47(d)(7))

Intent e

t The requirement that an escort system be established is in recognition of the fact that the licensee may wish to allow access to certain persons or classes I of persons on a temporary or infrequent basis or on short notice, thus making

.the routine process for granting access authorizations impractical or inexpedient. o Typical arrangements for escorted access may include escorts for aaintenance or

~

l f l repatir personnel, laboratory classes, public tours, guests, and visitors as 3 required. b f J

l 1

20

Content Describe the system that will be used to escort individuals in the CAAs.

In his security plan, the licensee should ensure that only properly authorized a

individuals will be allowed to escort individuals. This description should include:

3 1. Criteria to be used for granting escorted access,

2. Criteria to be used for escorting others,

3. Procedures for escorting individuals into CAAs (e.g., students under supervision of lab instructor, public tours),

4. The number of escorted individuals per escort, and

5. The responsibilities of the escort (e.g., periodic surveillance of all individuals under escort, accounting for all material prior to leaving the CAA, remaining in general area during the time unauthorized individuals are present).

3.6 SEARCH (73.47(d)(10))

Intent The primary intent of the search requirement is to deter and possibly detect attempted thefts of SNM. The search procedures developed by the_J.icensee.should take into_ consideration the environs where.the material is used or stored, the physical _ characteristics-of the material -itself, and the frequency of accounting for the material. In some cases, this will require that all vehicles and pack-ages leaving the CAAs be searched in a random manner. Tne frequency of random searches should be determined by the case with which the materini can be stolen

_, and the length of time it would take to detect a theft. In other cases, only packages that equal or exceed the size of the material being used or stored would 3

5 have to be searched, taking into consideration the difficulty with which the material could be broken into smaller more easily concealed parts.

I 21 I

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Content Describe the system to be used for randomly searching vehicles or packages that leave the CAA. Include in the description information as to: ,a

1. The scope of the search. This should identify the criteria that will j be used for searching vehicles and packages (e.g., whether all p'ackages and vehicles are subject to search or just those packages or vehicles that are larger than the smallest configuration of material being used or stored).

2. The randomness of the search. The scheme for selecting the packages or vehicles to be searched should be identified (e.g., subjecting each package {

or vehicle to a search, using a random number generator for determining whether a candidate package or vehicle is to be searched, searching a minimum percentage of all packages or vehicles leaving the CAA each day).

CHAPTER 4 SECURITY ORGANIZATION This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(d)(8), which states:

(d)(8) Establish a security organization or modify the current security organiza-tion to consist of at least one watchman

• per shift able to assess and l respond to any unauthorized penetrations or activities in the controlled

! access areas.

(

Intent The intent of this requirement is to ensure that, in the event of a security incident, someone will be available to assess alarms or other unauthorized penetra-tions or activities and, if warranted, notify the NRC, the local law enforcement authorities, and the responsible person in licensee management. Early detection and notification of any missing material will help facilitate its prompt recovery.

A A " watchman" is defined in 10 CFR 5 73.2 as "an individual, not necessarily uniformed or armed with a firearm, who provides protection for a plant and the special nuclear material therein in the course of performing other duties."

22

l In some cases, the licensee may assign additional duties to members of the security organization where procedure-oriented options are chosen to satisfy physical pro-tection requirements (e.g., periodic patrols and inspections of CAAs for storage of SNM). Security organization members are not required to be fully dedicated t full-time employees of the licensee. They may include unarmed campus security I personnel (watchmen), contract guards, members of the local law enforcement agency (if sufficiently close to the site), etc. No formal or comprehensive training program is required for security organization personnel. However, under Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73, the licensee should be prepared to demonstrate that each security person understands the particular duties assigned to him and is fully qualified and trained to perform them.

Content Describe the security organization that will be responsible for assessing and responding to security incidents. Indicate the other responsibilities of the security organization such as:

1. Conducting periodic physical security checks of CAAs,

2. Maintaining liaison with the local law enforcement agency,

3. Notifying the local law enforcement agency of any unauthorized penetrations or activities in the CAAs, and

4. Notifying Ifcensee management of any unauthorized penetrations or activities in the CAAs.

CHAPTER 5 COMMUNICATIONS f \o

( This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(d)(9), which states:

(d)(9) Provide a communication capability between the security organization and appropriate response force.

23

l Intent '

The intent of this regulation is to ensure that a communication capability exists between the ifcensee and the designated response force. It is implied that, prior to setting up a comunication capability, procedures and responsibil-l Itfes will have been established between the response force and the licensee.

(See Chapter 6 " Response Procedures.") The type of communication system chosen by a licensee should:

l

1. Provide for full duplex voice communication capability,

2. Be easily accessible to the licensee's security organization, and

3. Be reliable and available for immediate use at any time.

l Some communication systems that would provide these capabilities are a dedicated telephone system, a non-dedicated public telephone system, radio, or any combination thereof.

Content Describe the communication systere that is used between the security organiza-tion and the appropriate response force. This description should include informa-tion on:

1. Type of communication system,

2. Location of voice terminals in relationship to CAAs,

3. Availability of communication system on a 24-hour basis, and

4. Reliability of communication system.

• CHAPTER 6 RESPONSE PROCEDURES This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 70.47(d)(11), which states:

l l

24

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(d)(11) Establish and maintain retponse procedures for dealing with threats of ,

thefts or thefts of such materials.

l Intent The intent of this regulation is to help the licensee to identify those security incidents that could result in the loss of SNM of moderate strategic significance and to develop response procedures to prevent or reduce the likeli-hood of such a loss. Some types of incidents that should be considered and for which response procedures should be developed are:

1. Civil strife such as student demonstrations or employee strikes,

2. Fire,

3. Discovery that some SNH is missing, and

4. Bomb threats.

Content Identify these events for which response procedures will be developed. Also, describe the type of response to be accomplished for each event identified and the duties and responsibilities of the security organization and management involved in the response. Ensure that the NRC will be notified immediately in the event of theft or attempted theft of the material. Describe what local law enforcement assistance is available, their response capabilities, and any agree-ments made with them to respond in the case of theft of the material.

CHAPTER 7 MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS I

r t' This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(e)(1), which are as follows:

(e)(1) Each licensee who transports, exports, or delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall:

25 0

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(1) Provide aavance notification to the receiver of any planned ship- i ments specifying the mode of transport, estimated time of arrival, location of the nuclear material transfer point, name of carrier and transport identification, (ii) Receive confirmation from the receiver prior to the commencement of the planned shipment that the receiver will be ready to accept the shipment at the planned time and location and acknowledges the specified mode of transport, (iii) Transport the material in a tamper-indicating sealed container, (iv) Check the integrity of the containers and seals prior to shipment, and (v) Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 73.47(e)(3) of this part unless the receiver is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

7.1 ADVANCE NOTIFICATION (73.47(e)(1)(1)

Intent The intent of this paragraph is to require the shipper to preplan the trans-portation of material and inform the receiver of his plans prior to shipment.

This is the first of the several transportation requirements that will allow the .

receiver to take delivery of the material as planned or to help ensure trace-l t

ability of any missing material.

i Content The licensee should ensure in his security plan that, prior to each shipment of material, the receiver will be notified of the impending shipment and provided the following types of information:

26 l

l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ - _ _ . - - - - _ .

I I

i  !

j 1. Mode of transport (e.g. , truck, plane, train, or ship),

2. Estimated time of arrival,

3. Location where material is to be transferred to receiver,

4. Name of carrier, and

5. Transport identification (e.g., truck, train, or flight number; ship name).

7.2 RECEIVER CONFIRMATION (73.47(e)(1)(ii)

Intent The intent of this requirement is that, prior to shipment, the shipper will be assured that the receiver is ready to accept the shipment at the planned time and location and has acknowledged the mode of transport.

Content Describe what procedures will be used to ensure that shipment of material does not take place until the receiver acknowledges the planned shipment and mode of transport and states that he will be ready to accept the shipment at the planned time and location.

7. 3 CONTAINER (73.47(e)(1)(iii))

'I j Intent l

The intent of this requirement is to provide a mechanism or system that will j help the receiver detect any tampering with the material's container that may l l have occurred during shipment. Regulatory Guide 5.15. " Security Seals for the i; Protection and Control of Special Nuclear Material," provides guidance in this l area. Requirements for containers are contained in 10 CFR Part 71 and a summary i report on approved containers is contained in NUREG-0383.* l l *NUREG-0383, " Directory of Certificates of Compliance fo. Radioactive Materials Packages.," Copies may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service Springfield, Virginia 22161.

27 i

l -

. . . _ _ - . . - - . . . . - -- -- - a --...---- -

:- -- =:-- -

• 1 Content Describe the types of seals that will be used to monitor the material's con-tainer during transport.

7.4 INSPECTION (73.47)(e)(iv))

Intent The intent of this paragraph is to require the shipper to check the integrity of the material container's seals just prior to shipment so that he can be assured '

that they have not been compromised. Then, upon receipt of the shipment, if the receiver discovers that the container's integrity has been :ompromised and the material is missing, the scope of the recovery operation can focus on the transportation route.

t Content Describe the procedures to be used to ensure that the integrity of the con-tainers or seals is checked just prior to shipment.

7.5 IN-TRANSIT FHYSICAL PROTECTION (73.47(e)(1)(v))

Intent The intent of this paragraph is to require that either the shipper or receiver

~

be made responsible for the physical protection of the material while it is in transit and that the responsible licensee has ackowledged this responsibility by written agreement.

1 Content l In his security plan, the shipper should either acknowledge responsibility I for the in-transit physical protection of SNM of moderate strategic significance 28

l l'

l or ensure that a written agreement from the receiver licensee has been received in which the receiver accepts either full responsibility or shared responsibility l for the in-transit physical protection of this material in accordance with para-graph 73.47(e)(3) of 10 CFR Part 73.

CHAPTER 8 RECEIVER REQUIREMENTS This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(e)(2), which are as follows:

(e)(2) Each licensee who receives special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall:

(i) Check the integrity of the containers and seals upon receipt of the shipment, (ii) Notify the shipper of receipt of the material as required in Sec-tion 70.54 of Part 70 of this chapter, and 4

(iii) Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in

~

accordance with the requirements of 6 73.47(e)(3) of this 9 art

! unless the shipper is a licensee and has agreed in writing to j arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

8.1 INSPECTION (73.47(e)(2)(i))

Intent This requirement is intended to determine whethbr the material's container has been compromised enroute and whether any material has been removed so that immediate recovery procedures can be initiated if required. ,

29

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_ __ . _ ~ . . .. ___ ..

i l

Content Describe the procedures to be used to ensure that the integrity of the con-tainers and seals will be checked upon receipt of the shipment of material.

8.2 NOTIFICATION (73.47(e)(2)(ifll Intent This requirement is intended to:

1. Ensure that knowledge of the current location of all SNM is available, and

2. Formally inform the shipper that the material has been received.

Content I i

Ensure that a completed copy of standard Form NRC-741, " Nuclear Material Transaction Report," will be sent to the shi)per within 10 days of receiving a shipment of material as required in S 70.54 of 10 CFR Part 70.

8.3 IN-TRANSIT PHYSICAL PROTECTION (73.47(3)(2)(111))

Intent ,

I The intent of this paragraph is to require that either the licensee receiver or shipper be made responsible for the physical protection of the material while it is in transit and that the responsible licensee has acknowledget this respon-sibility by written agreement.

l content In his security plan, the receiver should either acknowledge responsibility for the in-transit physical protection of SNM of moderate strategic significance or ensure that a written agreement from the shipper has been received in which the 30

l 4

?

j shipper accepts either full responsibility or shared responsibility for the in-

{ transit physical protection of this material in accordance with paragraph l* 73.47(e)(3) of 10 CFR Part 73.

CHAPTER 9 IN-TRANSIT PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(e)(3), which are as follows:

(e)(3) Each licer.see, either shipper or receiver, who arranges for the physi-cal protection of special nuclear material of moderate strategic signif-I icance while in transit or wh? takes delivery of such material free on

<l

<; board (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for

'{ transport shall:

(1) Ariange for a telephone or radio communications capability, for notification of any delays in the scheduled shipment, between the carrier and the shipper or receiver, (ii) Minimize the time that the material is in transit by reducing the number and duration of nuclear material transfers and by routing the material in the most safe and direct manner, h

'i (iii) Conduct screening of all licensee employees involved in the trans-portation of the material in order to obtain information on which to base a decision to permit them control over the material, 1

(iv) Establish and maintain response procedures for~ dealing with threats

( of thefts or thefts of such material, l (v) Make arrangements to be notified immediately.- of the arrival of 5

the shipr. lent at its destination, or of any such shipment that is l

a

/ lost or unaccounted for after the astimated time of arrival at i

1 f ts destination,' ar.d ' ,

s t- ,

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31 '

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k i

.. a. , . . , - - , ,. . - - - - ., - - - - - -

N (vi) Conduct immediately a trace investigation of any shipment that is v .

lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as specified in S 73.71 and to the shipper or receiver as appropriate. The licensee who made the physical protection arrangements shall also immediately notify the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of the action being taken to trace the shipment.

9.1 COMMUNICATIONS (73.47(e)(3)(1))

Intent The primary intent of this requirement is to ensure that the carrier will notify the shipper or receiver of any changes in plans or delays in the scheduled j arrival of a shipment to its destination due to mechanical breakdown, adverse environmental conditions, public disorders, etc. The shipper or receiver can then decide whether or not to initiate response procedures. It is not the intent of this regulation to require periodic check-in. Public telephone or full duplex >

voice radio are acceptable methods for meeting the intent of this requirement.

Content Describe the type of communication system and procedures to be used by the carrier or SNM of moderate strategic significance for notifying the shipper or i

l receiver of any change in plans or delays in arrival.

i l

( 9.2 MINIMUM TRANSIT TIMES (73.47(e)(3)(ii))

l l Intent This requirement is intended to have the shipper or receiver make a reason-able effort to ship the material by the fastest and most direct method possible.

32 6 - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

i . .

l, It is not intended to require exclusive-use carriers or expensive modes of l travel.  !

]

Content Describe the procedures and considerations that apply in the transportation planning process to ensure that a determined effort will be made to minimize j transit times.

l I

l 9.3 PREAUTHORIZATION SCREENING (73.47(e)(3)(iii))

q Intent The intent of the requirement for preauthorization screening is to ensure that the licensee will have sufficient knowledge of an individual to determine

, his reliability and need for access prior to granting him authorized access to

the material in transit. The selection of procedures for conducting this examina-tion a'nd the criteria he employs to make his judgements are the responsibility 2

of the licensee and, of course, should be consistent with all local, State, and Federal laws and regulations regarding the protection of the privacy and other rights of the individual. The screening process may be conducted in the same manner as are other investigations customarily conducted by potential employers for similarly sensitive positions. There is no requirement for the licensee to arrange for an NRC clearance or similar clearance from any other government organ-ization. Examples of procedures and criteria that may be employed in the screening process include bolding or having recently held a gevernment-sanctioned clearance; examination of past employment records (to determine any unsatisfactory employment or incidents that would indicate any unrelisbility or previous breaches of trust between the individual and his employer); endorsements or references from previous employers or colleagues that would support a decision for granting access or that would attest to the trustworthiness and reliability of the individual; and con-sideration of the individual's present esployment record indicating demonstrated trustworthiness and reliability over an extended period of employment with the licensee. (This may be considered in the nature of "grandfathering.")

33 m

N Content Describe the procedures that will be used for obtaining sufficient information prior to making a decision on granting unescorted access authorization to those licensee employees who will be involved in the transportation of the material.

Identify by title or name those employees who will be screened and those who will perform the screening process.

9.4 RESPONSE PROCEDURES (73.47(e)(3)(iv))

Intent #

'4 The intent of this regulation is to help the licensee to identify those trans-portation incidents for which he might expect to be notified and that might affect the security of the SNM in transit and to plan response procedures for such situa-tions. For example, if the shipper is informed by the carrier that adverse weather conditions have temporarily prevented further progress of the shipment, the licensee ,

should inform the receiver of a new estimated time of arrival.  !

i content Identify those events for which response procedures will be developed. Also, describe types of response to be accomplished for each event identified and the  :

duties and responsibilities of members of the security organization and management g for dealing with the response. Ensure that the NRC will be notified immediately 5 in the event of theft or attempted theft of the material. ,

9.5 NOTIFICATION (73.47(e)(3)(v))

Intent The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the licensee responsible for the physical protection of SNM in transit will have a firm basis for deciding l

34 t

y - _ ____ _ _ _ - - -

i l

whether or not to initiate response procedures in the event a shipment becomes overdue or is lost.

Content  !

Describe the arrangements and procedures that will be used for notifying l the licensee who arranges for the physical protection of material in transit of the arrival of the shipment at its destination, or of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination.

9.6 LOST MATERIAL NOTIFICATION (73.47(e)(3)(vi))

Intent The intent of this requirement is to ensure that, in the event a shipment becomes overdue and no reasonable explanaticn has been received from the carrier regarding its status, a trace investigation will be conducted to locate the missing SNM. At this time, the NRC must be notified that the r;aterial is missing and informed as to what steps are being taken to recover the missing material. Although the licensee is responsible for notifying the NRC of any missing material and to initiate and assist in the subsequent investigation, the law enforcement agencies bear the responsibility for physically recovering the material.

Content Describe what procedures will be used to trace any shipment that il lost or has not arrived by the estimated arrival time. Ensure that all lost or missing material will be immediately reported to the appropriate NRC Regional Office along t with what actions are being taken to trace the shipment, that the NRC will be notified as specified in 6 73.71, and that the shipper or receiver, as appropriate, will also be notified.

r

{

f l

35

. - -- -- - ~ -

l CHAPTER 10 EXPORT REQUIREMENTS This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(e)(4), which reads as follows:

(e)(4) Each licensee who exports special nuclear material of moderata strategic significance shall comply with the requirements specified in S 73.47(c), (e)(1) and (e)(3).

Use Chapters 7 and 9 of this guide to describe the security procedures that ,

will be used to protect the material up to the point where the receiver accepts {

physical protection responsibility for the shipmeat.

CHAPTER 11 IMPORT REQUIREMENTS 1

This chapter prevides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(e)(5), which reads as follows:

i (e)(5) Each licensee who imports special nuclear material of moderate i strategic significance shall: i

. s (1) Comply with the requirements specified in 5 73.47(c), (e)(2) and j (e)(3),and i

i i

(ii) Notify the exporter who delivered the material to a carrier for transport of the arrival of such material. '

4

~

11.1 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (73.47(e)(5)(1))

Use Chapters 8 and 9 of this Standard Format to describe the security proca-dures that will be used to protect the material from the first point where the shipment is picked up inside the United States.

36

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A

11.2 NOTIFICATION (73.47(e)(S)(ii))

Intent The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the exporter is notified that the material has arrived safely.

Content Describe the procedures to be used for notifying the exporter of the material that the shipment has beten received.

l

)

i i

l 37

l PART II SNM OF LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE 1

CHAPTER 1 USE AND STORAGE AREA l

This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirement of paragraph 73.47(f)(1), shich is as follows:

1 (f)(1) Store or use such material only within a controlled access area.

A controlled access area (CAA) is defined in paragraph 73.2(z) as "any temporarily or permanently established clearly demarcated area, access to which h is controlled and which affords isolation of the material or persons within it."

Thus a CAA can be an approved security cabinet with a lock to which only autho-l rized individuals have the combination or key, a vault or vault-type room that j uses some type of access control system to limit access to authorized individuals,  ;

or a locked laboratory for which only authorized individuals such as professors 4 or lab instructors have the combination or key.

1.1 AREA WHERE MATERIAL IS USED (73.47(f)(1))

l Intent l 1 f

Temporarily established CAAs for the use of SNM need not have permanent f l physical barriers at their boundaries. Office partitions, cordons, or other devices can be used to warn passersby of the restricted nature of the area, while ,

access control can be effected through surveillance or supervision of the area  !

by those using the SNM at the time. However, if the material is to be left unattended in such an area, additional protection must be provided to control access and ensure a detection capability in the absence of authorized personnel.  ;

This could be accomplished, for example, through the posting of signs and the j use of motion detection equipment covering the immediate area in which the SNM  !

is located. Although the material may be considered in "use," protection require- +

ments would be the same as though the material were in storage, since authorized personnel would not be present.

t 7

M  !

I

il Permanently designated areas for the use 9f SNM would more closely approximate CAAs intended for the storage of SNM. In this case, a more likely choice would be permanent physical barriers such as those that would be provided in the case of a laboratory or reactor containment structure in which it was desired to have

' SNH continuously present and in use. Such an area may also serve as a storage

, area. Although access control and detection capabilities may be provided through the use of appropriate hardware during the period when SNM is stored in this area, other means of providing these capabilities may be required to complement such hardware in the event that alarms are deactivated or doors unlocked. In such cases, li;ensees may rely on authorized personnel to effect the required protection.

Content Describe the CAA where the material will be used. Include in this description

! information on the type of barriers surrounding the CAA. the portals that allow access to the CAA, and the size of the area. Some typical CAAs where the material may be used are laboratories, process areas, reactor rooms, spent fuel pools, or l fenced-in areas, i

i

1. 2 AREA WHERE MATERIAL IS STORED (73.47(f)(1))

i Intent i

This area may be similar to t required for the storage of special nuclear t

material of moderate strategic significance (see Section 1.2 in Part I of this guide) but dcas not necessarily have to be equivalent to a vault, vault-type room, or approved security cabinet. Examples of typical CAAs where special nuclear material of low strategic significance may be stored are:

1. Vault. A vault is required to h.:./e barriers sufficiently strong to

, prevent or deter penetration and a lockirt. mechanism on the door.

i

2. Apprnved Security Cabinets. Th( cabinets should be approved by GSA as class 6 or higher or by other testi'e9 groops for protection against surreptitious entry and lock manipulatica.

!i 39 i

I . . .

3. Reactor. The reactor is so designed that it does not allow for easy removal of material.

4. Vault-Type Room. Some typical vault-type rooms where materials are .

stored and protected with a motion detector are storage pools, rooms containing in process storage racks, and laboratories where material is left unattended.

In all cases, movement in the near vicinity of the material should generate an ,

alarm signal. '

5. Locked Laboratories or Supply Rooms. These areas must be sufficiently ,

penetration resistant to afford a means of access control and permit the proper  !

functioning of the system for monitoring the storage area as required by para- h graph 73.47(f)(2) of the rule as described in Part II, Chapter 2.

Content j t

Describe in detail the CAA in which the material will be stored. Include  !

in this description information on the type of barriers surrounding the material,  !

t the portals that allow access to the material, the size of the area, and the lock- i ing mechanism used to secure the material (see Chapter 3 in Part I of this guide ,!

for guidance on locking mechanisms). t i

CHAPTER 2 DETECTION DEVICES OR PROCEDURES i

This chapter provides guidance for meeting the requirement of paragraph 73.47(f)(2), which is as follows:

(f)(2) Monitor with an intrusion alarm or other device or procedures the con- t~

trolled access areas to detect unauthorized penetrations or activities. i i

t In order to help detect unauthorized activities or penetrations of CAAs where 4

the material is used or stored, either (1) intrusion alarms or other devices or  !

(2) security procedures are needed. Section 2.1 provides guidance for a licensee '

who chooses to use intrusion alarms or devices, and Section 2.2 provides guidance for a licensee who chooses to use security procedures.

7 48

. I s

T

l 2.1 DETECTION DEVICES (73.47(f)(2))

Intent For CAAs where the material is used the licensee will probably wish to rely t

on personnel-oriented procedures for ensuring that the CAA is not penetrated inadvertently or purposefully by unauthorized personnel. However, material left temporarily unattended should be protected by a motion detector (e.g. , suspended from above) that incorporates adequate tamper-resistant features. Licensees should design their system to minimize the rate of spurious or false alarms through proper installation and procedures.  !

For CAAs where the material is stored, the detection capability will be satisfied through the use of motion detection equipment. However, the detection capability requirement may also be satisfied by different types of safety detection devices or security procedures. Information regarding intrusion alarm devices that could be used is available in NUREG 0320.* However, any choice of detection device, intrusion or safety, must include tamper-resistant features.

h Content t

Describe the tamper-resistant intrusion alarm devices or tamper-resistant safety devices that are used to monitor the CAAs where the material is used and stored. This description should include:

1. Type of device used with Drief theory of operation,

2. Location of detection device,

3. Type and location of annunciation,

4. Area of coverage,

5. Tamper-resistant features, G. Signal-line protection features, A

NUREG-0320, " Interior Intrusion Alarm Systems." Copies may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

! 41 l,

u d

7. Emergency power features for devices, and '

8. Conditions under which detection devices will be used.

2.2 DETECTION PROCEDURES (73.47(f)(2))

Intent Licensees may choose to provide the required detection canability during certain periods through reliance on personnel-oriented procedures rather than by the use of detection devices. This may be desirable during periods of heavy usage of material when frequent traffic into and out of a CAA may make the use of an intrusion alarm system inconvenient. Authorized personnel engaged in the use of 4

~

the material or otherwise present within the CAA or its immediate vicinity may '

satisfy the detection capability requirement provided they can reasonably maintain surveillance over the material and control access to the CAA or its immediate vicinity while carrying on the other activities they may be engaged in. In the absence of detection devices, at least one author.ized person should be present I at all times that the material is in use.

i If the material is in storage in an approved security cabinet or its equivalent, {

the material may be left unattended without an intrusion alarm system provided j some other detection procedure is employed. This may include remote surveillance  !

using a closed-circuit television system or randomized periodic patrols by a f watchman. l t

4 Content i

Describe the procedures that are used or may be used to monitor-the controlled access areas where the material is used or stored. These descriptions should include the conditions under which the procedures would b used; the CAAs for -

which the procedures would be used; the individuals, categories of individuals, ,

or personnel positions assigned to carry out procedures; the devices used in con-junction with the procedures; other' assignments or activities to.be performed by personnel concurrently with their execution of detection procedures; the provisions 42 a .-

-: m_--- --

m

l for documentation of inspection procedures being executed (e.g. , a log); and a description of the procedures themselves. 1 CHAPTER 3 SECURITY RESPONSE This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirement of paragraph 73.47(f)(3), which is as follows:

(f)(3) Assure that a watchman or offsite response force will respond to all unauthorized penetrations or activities.

Intent The intent of this requirement is to ensure that, in the event of a security incident, someone will be available to assess alarms or any unauthorized penetra-tions or activities and, if warranted, notify the NRC, the local law enforcement authorities, and the responsible person in licensee management. Early detection and notification of any missing material will help facilitate its prompt recovery.

For the purpose of this regulation, an offsite response force can be a local law enforcement agency or a contract guard service.

Content Describe the security organization that will be responsible for assessing and responding to any unauthorized penetrations or activities. Ensu,re that at least one guard, watchman, or member of an offsite response force will respond i to all unauthorized penetrations or security incidents at the CAAs.

l CHAPTER 4 RESPONSE PROCEDURES l This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph l

, 70.47(f)(4), which states:

l 1

(f)(4) Establish and maintain response procedures for dealing with threats of j thefts or thefts of such material.

43 i c- . _ _ _ _ _

m Intent The intent of this regulation is to help the licensee to identify those security incidents. that could result in the loss of SNM of low strategic signifi-cance and to develop response procedures to prevent or reduce the likelihood of such a loss. Some types of incidents that should be considered and for which response procedures should be developed are:

1. Civil strife such as student demonstrations or employee strikes,

2. Fire,,

3. Discovery that some SNM is missing, and .

4. Bomb threats.

Content Identify those events for which response procedures will be developed. Also describe the type of response to be accomplished for each event identified and the duties and responsibilities of the security organization and management involved in the response. Ensure that the NRC will be notified immediately in the event of theft or attempted theft of the material. Describe what local law enforcement assistance is available, their response capabilities, and any agree-ments made with them to respond in the case of theft of the material.

CHAPTER S MATERIAL TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(g)(1), which are as follows:

l '

g)(1) Each licensee who transports or who delivers to a carrier for transport l

l '

special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:

(1) Provide advance notification to the receiver of any planned shipments specifying the mode of transport, estimated time of arrival, location of the nuclear material transfer point, name of carrier and transport identification, 44

i l

l l

l (ii) Receive confirmation from the receiver prior to commencement of the planned shipment that the receiver will be ready to accept the shipment at the planned time and location and acknowledges

the specified mode of transport, (iii) Transport the material in a tamper-indicating sealed container, l

(iv) Check the integrity of the containers and seals prior to shipment, l

and l l

(v) Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in l l

accordance with the requirements of $ 73.47(g)(3) of this part,  ;

unless the receiver is a licensee and has agreed in writing to '

arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

5.1 ADVANCE NOTIFICATION (73.47(a)(1(1))

Intent The intent of this paragraph is to require the shipper to preplan the trans-portation of the material and inform the receiver of his plans prior to shipment.

This is the first of the several transportation requirements that will allow the receiver to take delivery of the material as planned or to help ensure traceability of any missing material.

Content i

The licensee should ensure that, prior to each shipment of material, the receiver will be notified of the impending shipment and provided the following types of information: '

l

1. Mode of transport (e.g., truck, plane, train, or ship),

2. Estimated time of arrival,

3. Location where material is to be transferred to receiver, I

45 u

, _ _ _ _ . _ _ . - . ~ - _ __ _ . _ . _ - . _

- .~.-- - . - ...... .. - . ---

4. Name of carrier, and l

S. Transport identification (e.g., truck, train, or flight number; ship l name).  !

5.2 RECEIVER CONFIRMATION (73.47(g)(1)(fi))

Intent The intent of this requirement is that, prior to shipment, the transporter will be assured that the receiver is ready to accept the shipment at the planned time and location and has acknowledged the mode of transport. }

Content Describe what procedures will be used to e,nsure that shipment of material does not take place until the receiver acknowledges the planned shipment and mode of transport and states that he will be ready to accept the shipment at the planned time and location.

5.3 CONTAINER (73.47(g)(1)(iii))

Intent The intent of this requirement is to provide a mechanism or system that will

• help the receiver detect any tampering with the material's container that may ,

have occurred during shipment. Regulatory Guide 5.15, " Security Seals for the Protection and Control of Special Nuclear Material," provides guidance in this area.

Content Describe the types of seals that will be used to secure the material's container during transport.

46

_ _ _ _ . - - __ n-- ~__ - .- --------A

5.4 INSPECTION (73.47(g)(1)(iv))

Intent 1

)

The intent of this paragraph is to require the shipper to check the integrity of the material container's seals just prior to shipment so that he can be assured that they have not been compromised. Then, upon receipt of the shipment, if the receiver discovers the container's integrity has been compromised and the material is missing, the scope of the recovery operation can focus on the transportation route.

Content Describe the procedures to be used to ensure that the integrity of the con-tainers or seals is checked just prior to shipment.

5. 5 IN-TRANSIT PHYSICAL PROTECTION (73.47(g)(1)(v))

Intent The intent of this paragraph is to require that either the shipper or receiver be made responsible for the physical protection of the material while it is in transit and that the responsible person has acknowledged this responsibility by written agreement.

Content In his security plan, the shipper should either acknowledge responsibility for the in-transit physical protection of St#i of low strategic significance or ensure that a written agreement from the receiver has been received in which the receiver accepts either full responsibilit.y or shared responsibility for the in-transit physical protection of this mat 2ria l in accordance with paragraph 73.47(g)(3) of 10 CFR Part 73.

47

CHAPTER 6 RECEIVER REQUIREMENTS '

This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(g)(2), which are as follows:

(g)(2) Each licensee who receives quantities and types of special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:

4 (i) Check the integrity of the containers and seals upon receipt of the shipment, (ii) Notify the shipper of receint of thi Material as required in S 70.54 of Part 70 of this chapter, and (iii) Arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 73.47(g)(3) of this part, unless the shipper is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.

6.1 INSPECTION (73.47(g)(2)(i))

i Intent This requirement is intended to determine whether the material's container has been compromised enroute and whethe'r any material has been removed so that immediate recovery procedures can be initiated if required.

)

l Content Describe the procedures to be used to ensure that the integrity of the con-tainers and seals will be checked upon receipt of the material shipment.

6.2 NOTIFICATION (73.47(g)(2)(ii))

This requirement is intended to:

48 l

[ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ -_ _ _ _m e-- - - - - '

l .

1. Ensure that knowledge of the current location of all SNM is available, and j

2. Formally inform the shipper that the material has been received. I Content Ensure that a completed copf of Form NRC-741, " Nuclear Material Transaction Report," will be sent to the shipper within 10 days after a material shipment has been received as required in S 70.54 of 10 CFR Part 70.

6.3 IN-TRANSIT PHYSICAL PROTECTION (73.47(g)(2)(iii))

Intent The intent of this paragraph is to require that either the receiver or shipper licensee be made responsible for the physical protection of the material while it is in transit and that the responsible licensee has acknowledged this respon-sibility by written agreement.

Content In his security plan, the receiver should either acknowledge responsibility for the in-transit physical protection of SNM of low strategic significance or ensure that a written agreement from the shipper has been received in which the shipper accepts either full responsibility or shared responsibility for the in-transit physical protection of this material in accordance with paragraph 73.47(g)(3) of 10 CFR Part 73. i I

l l CHAPTER 7 IN-TRANSIT PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(g)(3), which are as follows:

(g)(3) .Each licensee, either shipper or receiver, who arranges for the physical .

protection of special nuclear material of low strategic significance while in transit or who takes delivery of such material free on board l 49 l

l 5

1 (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transport '

shall:

(i) Establish and maintain response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of such material, (ii) Make arrangements to be notified immediately of the arrival of the shipment at its destination, or of any such shipment that is' lost or unaccounted for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination, and (iii) Conduct immediately a trace investigation of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as specified in 973.71 and to the shipper or receiver as appropriate. The licensee who made the physical protection arrangements shall also immediately notify the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of the action being taken to trace the shipment.

7.1 RESPONSE PROCEDURE (73.47(g)(3)(i))

Intent The intent of this regulation is to help the licensee identify those transpor-tation incidents that could affect the security of the SNM in transit for which he might empect to be notified and for which response procedures should be planned.

I

, Content Identify those events for which response procedures will be developed. Also describe the type of response to be accomplished for each event identified and the duties and responsibilities of the security organization and management involved 50 3 _ _ _ . __ ~

~l i

i l

l in the response. Ensure that the NRC will be notified immediately in the event i of theft or attempted theft of the material.

7.2 NOTIFICATION (73.47(g)(3)(ii))

Intent The intent of this requirement is to ensure that the licensee responsible for the physical protection of SNM in transit will have a firm basis for 4 deciding whether or not to initiate response procedures in the event a shipment becomes overdue or is lost.

L,ntent Describe the arrangements and procedures that will be used for notifying the licensee who arranges for the physical protection of material in transit (1) of the arrival of the shipment at its destination or (2) of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination.

7.3 LOST MATERIAL NOTIFICATION (73.47 (g)(3)(iii))

The intent of this requirement is to ensure that, in the event a shipment becomes overdue and no reasonable explanation has been received from the carrier regarding its status, a trace investigation will be conducted to locate the missing l SNM. At this time, the NRC should be notified that the material is missing and informed as to what steps are being taken to recover it. Although the licensee

'l is responsible for notifying the NRC of ar.y missing naterial and for initiating and assisting in the subsequent investigation, the law enforcement agencies bear the responsibility for physically recovering the material.

Content

.?

Oescribe what procedures will be used to trace any shipment that is lost or has not arrived by the estimated arrival time. Ensure that all lost or missing 51

. I material will be immediately reported to the appropriate NRC Regional Office along with what actions are being taken to trace the shipment, that the NRC will be notified as specified in 5 73.71, and that the shipper or receiver, as appropriate, will also be notified.

CHAPTER 8 EXPORT REQUIREMENTS This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(g)(4), which reads as follows:

(g)(4)

Each licensee who exports special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall comply with the appropriate requirements specified in S 73.47(c), (g)(1) and (g)(3)- .

Use Chapters 5 and 7 of this Standard Format to describe the security procedures that will be used to protect the material up to the point where the receiver accepts physical protection responsibility for the shipment.

CHAPTER 9 IMPORT REQUIREMENTS This chapter provides guidance on meeting the requirements of paragraph 73.47(g)(5), which reads as follows:

(g)(5)

Each licensee who imports special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:

(i) Comply with the requirements specified in 5 73.47(c), (g)(2) and (g)(3), and 1

(ii) Notify the person who delivered the material to a carrier for l transport of the arrival of such material.

l 52

,r .

I 9.1 SECURITY REQUIREM2NTS (73.47(g)(5)(1))

i Use Chapters 6 and 7 of this Standard Format to describe the security proce-1 dures that will be used to protect the material from the first point where the l J

shipment is picked up.

J 9.2 NOTIFICATION (73.47(g)(5)(ii))

Intent The intent of this regulation is to ensure that the exporter is notified that the material has arrived safely. l Content Describe the procedures to be used for notifying the exporter of the material that the shipment was received.

53

f VALUE/ IMPACT ASSESSMENT A separate value/ impact analysis has not been prepared for this draft regu-latory guide. The guide is being developed to provide a standard format and content for the physical protection plans that licensees authorized to possess or transport special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or 10 kilograms or more of material of low strategic significance will be required to submit by amendments to the Commission's regulations adopted June 21, 1979.

A value/ impact analysis prepared for the amendments was made available in the Commission's Public Document Room at the time the amendments were published.

This analysis is also appropriate to this draft regulatory guide.

/

54 f - Jl

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. Oprice AL suSiNESS Couusstoon l FEN ALTY EOR PRIV ATE uSE, $300 L J l 190024031571 1 1R UhlVERSITY OF CAL IFORNI A EhVI RON HEALTH f. SAFETY OFF IC-HAROLD B BROWN LOS ANGELES CA 9002-