ML20084F706

Estimate of Level of Threat Facing UCLA Reactor in Response to ASLB 840420 pre-hearing Conference Order.Facility Attractive Theft & Sabotage Target.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20084F706
Person / Time
Site:	05000142
Issue date:	05/01/1984
From:	Bay J COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP, NUCLEAR LAW CENTER
To:
References
OL, NUDOCS 8405040287
Download: ML20084F706 (8)

Text

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l 1 JOHN H. BAY '

DOROPHY THOMPSON 2 NUCLEAR LAW CElffER DOCKETED 6300 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1200 1

3 Los Angeles, CA 90048 (415) 393-9234 Telephone:

4 (213) 653-3973 *84 MAY -4 A10 :28 5 Attorneys for Intervenor CFF 'T CF 3ECi'ETIJ '

(Contention XX) I @ ' ,"f l ,'-[

6 COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP 7

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 1

9

! In the Matter of j

10 )

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY )

11 OF CALIFORNIA ) Doc. No. 50-142 OL

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12 (UCLA Research Reactor) ) Proposed Renewal of Facil-l

) ity License No. R-71 j 13 )

14 15 COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP'S ESTIMATE OF THE LEVEL OF THREAT FACING THE 16 UCLA REACTOR FACILITY SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO THE APRIL 20, 1984 PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE ORDER

, 17 18 A. INTRODUCTION 19 In response to the Licensing Board's-April 20, 1984 Pre-20 Hearing Conference Order, Committee to Bridge the Gap (CBG) submits the 21 following summary of the estimated levels of sabotage, theft and 22 diversion threats facing the UCLA reactor facility. The level of 23 threat to the UCLA reactor facility .is dependent upon the value of the 24 facility as a terrorist tcrget or source of nuclear material. This 25 differs when analyzing sabotage and theft, and thus will be treated

! 26 separately below; however, a common conclusion is possible: The UCLA l 27 reactor facility is an attractive target for both potential thieves and l

l 29 saboteurs.

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1 B. THEFT OR DIVERSION THREAT l 2 The level of threat of thef t or diversion occurring at the 3 UCLA facility is directly related to the value of the SNM on site either 4 for use in the manufacture of weapons, as a means of making threats for 5 blackmail purposes, or for sale on the black market.

6 UCLA possesses at least 4.92 kilograms of 93% enriched 7 uranium. Any group capable of making weapons with 93% enriched fuel 8 would be capable of separating the uranium from the UAL eutectic in the 9 MTR-type fuel at UCLA. This is true for both the irradiated and 10 unirradiated fuel. Furthermore, the irradiation levels that exist in 11 the UCLA reactor core are not sufficient to provide a significant 12 deterent to dedicated thieves.

13 The value of the 4.92 kilograms of 93% enriched uranium at 14 the facility can be described in three basic ways: its dollar value, 15 its weapons potential, and its blackmail or threat potential. Although 16 it is difficult to state the precise dollar value of the 4.92 kilos, 17 it is reasonable to assume a value on the black market of at least one 18 hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) per kilogram, or nearly one 19 half million dollars worth of nuclear material at the UCLA facility.

20 4.92 kilograms of U-235 is an extremely significant quantity 21, in terms of weapons manufacture. The critical mass of uncompressed i 22 U-235 with a thick reflector made of beryllium is approximately 11 23 kilograms. However, if both the core and the reflector are compressed, 24 the critical mass may be reduced by the square of the compression. John 25 S. Foster, weapons specialist and former director of the Lawrence 26 Berkeley Labs, has stated in the public literature that compression of 27 ' several times normal density is achievable by use of conventional 20 ! eXPl osives. Indeed, if the compression is merely two times, the l

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critical mass would drop from 11 kilograms to less than 4 kilo-2 grams. Furthermore, the potential consequences of theft of 4.92 3 kilograms of U-235 is very nearly that of the thef t of 5.0 kilograms, 4 the leve[J at which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has explicitly 5 required greater theft protection.

6 4.92 kilograms of bomb grade uranium is also significant for 7 its blackmail or threat value. A group possessing such a significant 8

quantity of SNM could make an extremely effective blackmail threat by 9 sending threatened authorities kilogram quantities of U-235. Having 10 the capability to make such a grandiose demonstration would give a 11 blackmailer tremendous leverag'e and credibility.

12 The PuBe sources possessed by UCLA also add to the value of 13 the UCLA facility as a theft target. The 32 grams Pu-239 contained 14 therein, if released, could potentially result in lethal doses 15 throughout 15,000 square meters of building and significant contamin-16 ation in 1,600,000 square meters of building. As a direct act or as 17 a threat, the theft of the Pu-239 at the facility could create 18 significant terrorist or blackmail potential. Thus, the PuBe source 19 adds directly to the value of the UCLA facility as a theft or diversion 20 target.

21, In sum, whether one considers the monetary value of the 22 U-235, the fact that it is a significant quantity in terms of manu .

23 facturing weapons, or its blackmail value, the value of the 4.92 24 kilograms of U-235 on site at the UCLA facility and the potent'.al 25 consequences of its thef t or diversion are such -that one must assume 26 the possibility of a thef t attempt being undertaken by a dedicated 27 group of persons acting in concert and willing to use violent means.

28 One must also assume that they will be well-armed and equipped and 4

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1 versed in defeating detection systems.

C. SABOFAGE THREAT 3

Like theft or diversion, the level of threat of sabotage 4

facing the UCLA facility is related to its value as a terrorist target.

5 Much more than theft or diversion, however, postulating a level of 0

threat from terrorists is at best uncertain and speculative due to the 7 irrationality or fanaticism which characterizes terrorist actions 8

such as nuclear sabotage, a fact which demands utilization of conserv-9 ative assumptions.

10 Terrorist activity is on the rise. The numbers of people 11 killed by terrorist activity is also rising along with the apparently 12 increasing willingness of terrorists to engage in actions which result 13 in large numbers of deaths. Nuclear terrorism, i.e., incidents 14 involving nuclear facilities, is also on the rise: Thus, there are 15 terrorist groups which consider nuclear facilities, such as UCLA's, i

16 potential targets.

17 In assessing the potential sabotage threat at a nuclear 18 facility, one must account for the qualitative difference between 19 nuclear targets and most other industrial type targets. Nuc' lear 20 facilities, the nuclear power industry and nuclear weapons are the 21 object of intense public fascination in this country. They are the 22 subject of considerable public and media attention. This public 23 visability and media attention makesnuclear facilities prime terrorist 25 targets by providing the element of theater which is the center of the 25 terrorist act.

26 The UCLA facility is itself a potential sabotage target.

27 During the upcoming Olympic Games, the attention of the entire world 23 will be focused on Los Angeles. As was brutally demonstrated at Munich

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s' 1 in 1972, the Olympic Games offer the perfect stage for terrorist 2 activity. Furthermore, the UCLA reactor has already gained national 3 and international attention as a potential terrorist target. Thus, 4 during the Olympics one must assume a maximal threat from all types of 5 national and international terroists who will be capable of staging an 6 extremely well-equipped, well-armed and sophisticated violent attack.

7 After the Olympics, the value of the UCLA facility as a 8 terrorist target will cbviously diminish. It will, however, remain a 9 significant potential target. The UCLA facility has already, and will 10 continue to, received publicigty and notoriety as a potential target.

33 Los Angeles is a major urban center and one of the most active points 12 f immigrati n in the United States. All manner of national, sub-13 national, political and social groups are represented in the Los 14 Angeles area. It is also one of the world's major media centers. The 15 UCLA facility may be even more attractive than other nuclear targets 16 in the Los Angeles area because of its inherently weaker security due 17 to its location on a university campus. All of these factors make UCLA ig an attractive terrorist target.

19 In sum, terrorism is on the rise as is nuclear terrorism.

20 Even af ter the Olympics, given the notoriety of the UCLA facility and 21 Its location in Los Angeles, one must assume a significant level of 22 threat to the facility from sabotage. One must assume significant 23 resources and sophistication will be brought to bear in a violent 24 terrorist attack by a group of persons acting in concert. It must'be I

25 assumed that the participants will be well-armed, well-equipped, 26 Versed in detection systems and the use'of explosives.

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. 1 l 2 D. CONCLUSION 3

As both a theft target and a sabotage target, the UCLA 4

facility has significant value to perpetrators of such action. There-5 fore, one must postulate and protect against a well-equipped, sophis-6 ticated attack, assault or diversion effort.

7 DATED: May 1, 1984 8

Respectfully submitted, 9

! JOHN H. BAY

.: 10 DOROTHY H. THOMPSON NUCLEAR LAW DENTER l

33 h' I

12 By M. //

Lead Attorney f~o yCommittee to 13 Bridge the Gap on Contention XX 14 15 16 17 18 19 1

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United States of America NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket No. 50-142 OL THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY )

OF CALIFORNIA ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility (UCLA Research Reactor) ) License)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the attached COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP'S ESTIMATE OF THE LEVEL OF THREAT FACING THE UCLA REACTOR FACILITY SUBMITTED IN RESPONSE TO THE APRIL 20, 1984 PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE ORDER in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or express mail, postage prepaid, addressed as indicated, on this date: May 1, 1984 John H. Frye, III, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Administrative Judge i

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Glen O. Bright Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Chief, Docketing & Service Section (3)

Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Ms. Colleen P. Woodhead

s William H. Cormier Office of Administrative Vice Chancellor University of California 405 Hilgard Avenue Los Angeles, California 90024 Christine Helwick Glenn R. Woods Office of General Counsel 590 University Hall 2200 University Avenue Berkeley, CA 94720 Lin Naliboff Deputy City Attorney Office of the city Attorney City Hall 1685 Main Street Santa Monica, CA 90401 Committee to Bridge the Gap 1637 Butler Avenue, Suite 203 Los Angeles, California 90025 Daniel Hirsch P.O. Box 1186 Ben Lomond, CA 95005 Dorothy Thompson /

Nuclear Law Center /

6300 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1200 />

Los Angeles, CA 90048 j, /

f JOHN BAY F 7 '

/

O r/

Counsel for Intervenor COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP i

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