ML20077Q311
| ML20077Q311 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000142 |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1983 |
| From: | Bay J GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, NUCLEAR LAW CENTER |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8309160061 | |
| Download: ML20077Q311 (27) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _.
i, ush6 1
JOHN H.
BAY DOROTHY THOMPSON 2
13 9915 NI!II NUCLEAR LAW CENTER 6300 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1200 3
Los Angeles, CA 90048 Telephone:
(415) 393-9234
{'~~~"~~
4 (213) 653-3373 5
Attorneys for Intervenor COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP 6
7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8
9 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
10
)
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
)
Doc. No. 50-14 2 OL g
OF CALIFORNIA
)
)
Proposed Renewal of Facility 12 (UCLA Research Reactor)
)
License No. R-71 I
13 COMMITTE TO BRIDGE THE GAP'S CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO APPLICANT AND STAFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND OBJECTIONS TO CBG TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS 15 I*
16 INTRODUCTION 77 On August 29, 1983 the University of California 18
( "Ap plican t" ) and the NRC staff
(" Staff") filed a series of 19 bjections to the pre-filed testimony of Committee to Bridge the 20 Gap's ("CBG's") witnesses.
In ruling on CBG's objections to Staff and Applicant witnesses' testimony in the first phase of these hearings the Licensing Board
(" Board") has already addressed many of these Staff and Applicant objections.
As will "98' eviden iarY princi-25 pl s and common sense virtually all of the objections raised lack 26 merit and should be overruled.
27
///
28 8309160061 830913
]
PDR ADOCK 05000142 G
PDR N
I CBG's specific responses are set forth below seriatum.
However, several general comments are in order at the outset.
There are four major areas in which Staf f and Applicant 5
have raised objections.
They are objections CBG testimony 0
relating or referring to LEU and TRIGA; SPERT, BORAX and SL-1; the 1960 Hazards Analysis Reports ("HAR") and; operational 8
history and administrative controls at the facility.
Prior to responding to the specife objections CBG will briefly discuss 10 these four areas.
11 Consideration of LEU fuel and possible conversion of 12 the UCLA Argonaut thereto as part of the current safety hearings 13
~ has been the subject of several Board orders.
In its February 8, 14 1983 (p. 36), March 23, 1983 (p. 12) and, May 2, 1983 (p. 3& 4) 15 orders the Board ruled that the issue of conversion of this 16 facility to LEU TRIGA fuel would be the subject of these hearings 17 insofar as. it concerned the safety features of the fuel, only 18 proliteration and availability issues were to be deferred.
19 CBG's references to LEU are limited to those having to 20 do with its inherent sa fety features.
Fur the rmore, in the first 21 phase of the hearings the Board allowed considerable discussion 22 of TRIGA in the context of safety and by way of comparison -of the 23 safety characteristics of the Argonaut and the TRIGA reactors.
24 Specifically, Dr. Olander testified regarding TRIGA fuel studies 25 and applied the results of those studies to the UCLA Argonaut.
26 Mr. Hawley likewise, testified explicity about his opinion as to 27 the comparative safety of the TRIGA and Argonaut reactors.
- Thus, 28 it is clear that testimony regarding the safety features of LEU 2
4 1
TRIGA as compared to the Argonaut is within the scope of these 2
hearings.
3 Staff and Applicant raise objections to CBG testimony 4
- which relates or refers to the data and experience derived from 5
No destructive testing or accidents have 6
occurred at an Argonaut reactor.
Therefore, the application of 7
the data and experience from the SPERT, BORAX and SL-1 reactors 8
4 is a critical subject for expert testimony regarding power 9
+
excursion problems at the UCLA Argonaut.
In fact, this is 10 precisely the type of testimony of fered by Staf f and Applicant.
For then to now object to CBG's witnesses engaging in the same 12 pattern of analysis, appears to be a substantive argument with 13 CBG's conclusions not an evidenciary objection.
14 Staf f raises objections to CBG testimony which refers 15 or relates to the 1960 HAR.
Official notice was taken of the 10 1960 HAR in the first phase of these hearings (Tr. 1281).
17 Furthermore, for twenty years the HAR was the basis of Staf f and 16 Applicant's conclusion that the reactor was inherently safe.
To 19 argue that it is not relevant is absurd.
Finally, the HAR forms 20 one of the bases of CBG's experts' conclusions regarding the 21 vulnerability of the UCLA reactor to a destructive power excur-22 sion.
P 23 Staff and Applicant raise repeated objections to CBG 24 testimony which refers or relates to historical events at the 25 facility.
They have characterized all such testimony as an 26 attempt by CBG to litigate the issue of the facilities checkered 27 history of poor administrative controls and f ailed engineered 28 safety systems.
However, a close reading of CBG's testimony 3.
I reveals that no attempt is being made to litigate those issues at 2
all.
CBG's testimony is an examination of the safety of Appli-3 cants facility.
In many instances this examination based on 4
actual events rather than being purely theoretical, because 5
certain significant conditions, events and accidents have occur-red at the f acility in the past.
There can be no better evidence 7
that a particular situation is possible than the fact that it has 8
happened.
For this reason CBG has submitted evidence of certain 9
significant historical events.
Finally, the transcript is 10 replete with testimony by Staff and Applicant's witnesses con-11 cerning administrative practices, operating procedures and I2 engineered systems at the reactor.
The Board has through its 13 evidentiary rulings, implicity set a standard in this area and 14 that standard must be applied to all party's witnesses equally.
15 CBG's specific responses are set forth seriatum below.
16 y 7, 17 RESPONSE TO PANEL i OBJECTIONS 18 19 Paragraphs 2-7:
Applicant objects to these paragraphs 20 as being legal argument.
These paragraphs constitute a discus-21 sion by CBG's experts of the concept of inherent safety, their 22 understanding of the concept and its importance in the reactor 23 safety field.
This testimony is precisely the type the Board 24 requested from witnesses in the first phase of these hearings, 25 i.e.
the understanding and use of the term inherent safety of 26 each experts that uses this concept as part of their approach to 27 analyzing the safety of this reactor.
These paragraphs are 28 4.
1 illustrative and explanatory of these witnesses' entire testi-2 mony, is relevant to these proceedings and should be admitted.
3 4
Paragraph 5-9,12:
Staf f objects to these paragraphs as 5
comparing the TRIGA and Argonaut reactors.
As set forth above 6
and in CBG's response to paragraph 6 3 of Panel I below, the Board 7
has ruled that such safety comparison is within the scope of 8
these hearings and several witnesses have already testified 9
accordingly.
10 11 Paragraph 13-15:
These parag raphs discuss terms and 12 concepts in the reactor safety-field pursuant to the Board's 13 request that such explanations be provided.
They are also quite 14
-relevant to the examination of accident consequences at UCLA and 15 the fact that such consequencen are exacerbated by the particular 16 site characteristics of the facility.
17 Paragraph 22:
This testimony sets forth CBG's expert 19 witnesses' conclusion that due to the site characteristics at 20 Applicant's facility any accident that releases more than a very 21 small fraction of one percent of the core inventory would en-22 danger the public health and safety and thus is clearly relevant 23 and admissable.
24 25 Parag raph 26:
The Application states that there is no 26 maximum credible accident including core melting which could 27 occur at Applicant's facility.
CBG in this paragraph challenges 20 that assertion.
Such a challenge is clearly admissible.
5
I 2
Parag raph 27:
Fuel damaging accidents at non power 3
reactors are quite relevant to these proceedings.
Not only are 4
such accidents a source of data and experience useful in the 5
safety analysis of Applicant's facility, but they also demon-6 strate that despite the relative lack of regulatory requirements 7
placed on non power reactors, the question of their safety is a 8
serious one.
Applicant's assertion that the damage to SPERT and 9
BORAX is not at issue is correct.
However, such damage is not 10 only relevant, but is a central element of each party's analysis II of the Argonaut's safety.
Finally, the balance of the paragraph 12 gives an overview of the features and changes in Applicant's 13 facility which make close scrutiny of its safety imperative in I#
order to protect the public health and safety.
15 16
- 111, 17 RESPONSE TO PANEL I. OBJECTION S 10 Paragraphs 4-9:
Staf f and applicant object on the I'
basis that the data and experience from SL-1 is not relevant to 20 determining the safety of the UCLA reac tor.
The primary issue 21 addressed by Panel I is whether or not the UCLA Argonaut reactor 22 can experience a power excursion, the results of which would 23 endanger the public health and safety.
The Argonaut is a plate 24 type water moderated reactor.
SL-1 was also a plate type water 25 moderated reactor, which actually experienced a power excur-26 sion.
On that basis alone SL-1 is highly relevant to these 27 proceedings.
28 6.
[
I Both Staf f and Applicant witnesses have commented on SL-1, particularly Neill Ostrander and Millard Wohl.
No destruct 3
tests have been conducted on Argonaut reactors, and no Argonaut 4
has to date experienced a destructive power excursion.
There-5 fore, the expert analysis on this issue largely consists of a 6
debate over the manner and method of the application of data 7
derived f rom SPERT, BORAX, SL-1 and other similar reactors to the 8
UCLA Argonaut.
In fact, Staff and Applicant both base their 9
argument that the UCLA Argonaut is safe on the experience with 10 the SPERT tests.
Based in part on SL-1 CBG witnesses asserts that the Argonaut is unsafe.
Thus, the data and experience I2 derived from SL-1 is likewise germane to the issues of the inherent safety of the UCLA Argonaut, constitutes part of the 14 basis for the conclusions reached by CBG's experts and is there-15 fore clearly admissible.
16 17 Pa rag raph 9 :
Applicant objects specifically to para-18 graph 9 as an argument for a particular standard of review.
This 19 testimony is the testimony of experts in the field of destructive 20 power excursions and reactor safety in general.
Their opinion 21 that large margins of safety at UCLA are necessary in order to 22 provide reasonable assurance that the UCLA reactor is inherently 23 safe f rom destructive power excursions is an expert opinion, not 24 a legal argument.
Fur the rmore, to the extent that the testimony 25 comments on or reflects upon CBG's experts use of and understand-26 ing of the concept of inherent safety, such testimony has been 27 allowed, in fact asked for by the Board in the July hearings.
28 Finally, the Board has already ruled that the issue to be 7
t
)
I addressed at this hearing is whether or not the UCLA reactor is 2
inherently safe and safe by a wide margin.
Therefore, CBG's 3
expert opinion on the magnitude of safety margins necessary to 4
insure that the UCLA reactor is inherently safe from destructive 5
power excursions is directly within the scope of these hearings.
6 7
Paragraph 10:
Staff and Applicant object to this 8
paragraph on the grounds that it is a discussion of the inherent 9
shutdown mechanisms of TRIGA type fuel.
On March 23, 1983, the 10 Board ruled that conversion to TRIGA fuel was within the scope of 11 the current hearings to the extent that it had some bearing on 12 the issue of power excursions.
Only those portions of the 13 conversion issue which dealt with proliferation were deferred.
14 Furthermore, the testimony of several Staff and Applicant 15 witnesses dealt directly or indirectly with TRIGA fuel.
Dr.
10 Olander testified about studies that have been conducted on TRIGA II fuel and applied the results of those studies to Applicant's 10 reactor as the basis of his conclusion that UCLA fuel is as safe or safer than TRIGA.
Mr. Hawley testified as to the relative 20 safety of the Argonaut and the TRIGA reactors.
Mr. Ostrander was 21 permitted to testify that the UCLA reactor had relatively large 22 reactivity void coefficients, CBG asserts that relative to TRIGA 23 fuel the void coef ficients at UCLA are relatively small.
Since 24 Staff and Applicant have presented evidence that the Argonaut is 25 safe compared to the TRIGA CBG must be given the opportunity to 26 make the contrary assertion.
Finally, the only research reactor 27 which has ever been the subject of litigation regarding safety 20 was the Columbia reactor, a TRIGA reactor.
Therefore, it should 8
i
1 be useful to this Board to have some sense of whether the UCLA 2
facility is more or less safe than the Columbia f acility.
3 4
Parag raphs 12-18:
Staf f objects to these paragraphs on 5
the grounds that they discuss BORAX and SPERT reactors.
- Frankly, 6
it is difficult for CBG to understand how Staff can raise this 7
objection when major portions of its case and Applicant's case 8
rest on applying and distinguishing data derived from the SPERT 9
and BORAX reactors to the UCLA argonaut.
Furthe rmore, in light 10 of the fact that all parties rely heavily on the data derived 11 from SPERT, BORAX, SL-1 and other s imilar reactors, CBG's expert 12 panel has, -in these paragraphs, directly addressed the issue of 13 the problems, pitfalls, and appropriate margins of error which 14 must be taken into account when data derived from other facili-15 ties is applied to the UCLA f acility.
Without such testimony, it 16 will be impossible for the Board to determine whether this 17 facility is safe and indeed safe by a wide margin.
18 19 Photographs on pages 7 and 8:
Applicant objects to 20 these photographs as being irrelevant.
As set forth above, the 21 experience at SPERT is extremely relevant to these proceedings.
22 The damage sustained by the SPERT-1 core in the destructive power 23 excursion is quite relevant to the central issue of what would 24 happen to an Argonaut core in such an accident.
25 20 Paragraphs 42 and 4 3:
See paragraph 10 above.
Fur-27 the rmore, the Board's order expressly provides that the LEU 20 issues discussed in the declaration of Dr. Kaku submitted in 9.
1 CBG's response to Staff and Applicant summary disposition motions 2
was to be considered in the current hearings.
3 4
Paragraphs 50-54:
See paragraph 10 above.
5 6
Paragraphs 55 and 56:
Staff objects to the first 7
sentence of each of these paragraphs on the basis that they 8
discuss TRIGA fuel.
See paragraph 10 above.
9 10 Paragraph 6 2:
See paragraphs 10 and 12-18 above.
11 12 Paragraph 63:
Staf f objects to this paragraph and 13 numerous other paragraphs on the basis that they discuss the 1960 14 Hazards Analysis Report (HAR).
The Board has already taken 15 judicial notice of the HAR in these proceedings.
The 1960 HAR 16 was a comprehensive analysis of the safety of Argonaut 17 reactors.
I*
ias the basis for the license at this facility for 18 twenty years and Applicant has sworn to its accuracy in both 1960 19 and 1980.
However as CBG's experts testify, upon close scrutiny 20
-the HAR demonstrates that the facility is not inherently safe.
21 Thus, the HAR forms one of the bases for CBG's experts' 22 conclusions that Applicant's reactor is vulnerable to a 23 destructive power excursion.
Finally, contrary to Staf f's 24 assertion in its objection, the fact that the reactor was 20 licensed at 10 kilowatts in 1960 and is now licensed at 100 kW 20 has very little bearing on'the issue of destructive power 27
'e xcur sions.
The only real difference it makes is in the fission 20 product inventory.
In sum, the HAR has already been admitted 10.
~ _ _.
I into evidence in this proceeding, it is extremely relevant and is 2
properly relied upon by CBG's experts.
Therefore Staff's 3
objection is groundless and must be overruled.
4 5
Paragraph 6 3, second sentence:
Applicant objects to 6
the second sentence of this paragraph on the basis that it 7
considers the lack of certain safety features at UC LA.
This 8
p a rag ra ph, including the second sentence, is testimony regarding 9
the physical characteristics of the reactor and its site.
These 10 characteristics also formed part of the basis for determining 11 what amount of installed excess reactivity would be appropriate 12 at UC LA provide an adequate margin of safety.
This is important 13 background information on the inherent safety.
Fur the rmore, this sentence is the type of testimony that the Board permitted from 15 applicant's witness Mr. Ostrander, over CBG's objection.
16 17 Paragraph 66 Second From Final Sentence:
Applicant 18 objects to this sentence because it deals with engineered safety 19 features.
This testimony is of the same type which the Board 20 l
permitted from Mr. Ostrander over CBG's objection.
Having so 21 ruled the Board must likewise overrule Applicant's objection 22 herein.
23 24 Paragraphs 66-68:
Staff objects to these paragraphs on 25 the basis that they allegedly discuss UCLA adminis trative his tory 20 and the 1960 HAR.
As to the 1960 HAR see paragraph 63 above.
In 27 fact, these paragraphs contain a discussion of changes that have 20 occurred or been discovered at the UCLA f acility subsequent to 11.
L
t the preparation of the 1960 HAR.
These changes are extremely 2
relevant to the issues in the current hearings, and in fact, 3
during the September 1, 1983 conference call the Board requested 4
the assistance of all parties in gathering information on the 5
licensing amendments and changes at the facility over the last 6
ten years so that it might evaluate the rationale for the changes 7
and their effects on the safety of the reactor.
8 9
Paragraphs 69-70:
These paragraphs are expansions of 10 the issues raised in the introductory paragraphs of this panel's 11 testimony.
One would expect some overlap between the introduc-12 tion and the more detailed discussion.
These paragraphs are not 13 repetitive or cumulative and certainly do not violate the stan-14 dards set f orth in 10 C.F.R.
Section 2.743(c).
15 10 Paragraphs 84-88:
See paragraph 63 above.
17 18 Parag raphs 8 9-100 :
See paragraph 6 3 above.
Again, the 19 only effect in terms of power excursions cf the increase in power 20 from 10 kW to 100 kW is in the increase in fission product 21 inventory.
The standard methodology for examining power excur-22 sions is to assume that they ot aur at shutdown or f rom a zero 23 power level.
24 25 Paragraphs 109 and 110:
These paragraphs are CBG's 26 expert witnesses' comparisons between and comments on the Batelle 27 study and several other studies that have been conducted relating 28 to various elements of power excursions at reactors of this 12.
type.
Each of the studies were cited specifically in the Batelle 1
- study.
Again, for Staff to object to comparing characteristics 2
of UCLA's reactor, which has not undergone any power excursion 3
testing with characteristics and data derived from actual power 4
excursion tests and experience at other reactors is specious and 5
demonstrates a lack of understanding of the central issues being 0
considered in these current hearings.
7 0
Paragraph 118:
See paragraph 63 above.
9 10 Paragraph 119:
See parag raphs 4-9 and 12-19 above.
11 12 Paragraph 128 Last Sentence:
CBG is not at this time 13 litigating the operating history of the UCLA reactor.
Submission 14 of evidence relating to some incident or event from the past 15 operation of this facility is not the same as litigating the 16 operational history of the facility.
In many instances, there is 17 no better evidence of the fact that some particular incident or 18 type of incident can happen at Applicant's f acility than the f act 19 that it has already happened.
The objected to sentence and 20 Exhibits C-I-4 and C-I-5 demonstrate an actual mechanism for a 7
21 large negative worth sample and thus are well within the scope of 22 these hearings and are admissible in evidence.
23 24 Pa rag raphs 130-135:
These paragraphs deal with numer-25 ous mechanisms for accidentally initiating a power excursion.
26 Testimony regarding such initiating mechanisms is quite relevant 27 to these proceedings.
It demonstrates types of accidents which 28 13.
i I
I l
1 can happen at this f acility including many which have not been 2
the subject of Staff.r Applicant safety analysis.
In addition, o
3 multiple f ailure modes are specifically the subject of CBG's 4
Contention XIX which is at issue in these hearings.
- Finally, 5
Staf f and Applicant's witnesses have, already in many instances, 6
testified about various accident initiating mechanisms.
7 8
Pa rag raph 144 :
This paragraph pertains to the argument 9
made by CBG's expert witnesses that it is physically possible to 10 have excess reactivity considerably in excess of S3.54 in the 11 UCLA reactor.
The fact that the technical specifications set 12 forth a particular lhnit on excess reactivity does not insure 13 that that limitation will never be exceeded.
Given these facts, 14 in determining an appropriate margin of safety for this reactor, 15 it is necessary to have some indication of the accuracy of 16 measurements at the f acility and likelihood that operations will 17 conform to the technical specifications.
In this vein, Mr.
18 Ostrander has already testified about how carefully the operators 19 allegedly are with excess reactivity loading and measurements.
20 Thus, this testimony should be by CBG's witness should be admit-21 ted and Staff's objections overruled.
22 23 Pa rag raphs 145 and 146:
Multiple failure modes are a 24 proper part of any competent accident analysis and are a specific 25 subpart of CBG's Contention XIX.
26 27 Parag raph 147:
This paragraph states the conclusion of 28 CBG's expert witnesses that, not only is the f acility is not 14
1 inherently safe with the large amount of excess reactivity 2
currently installed, but that because of this fact, reliability 3
of Applicant's engineered features is absolutely critical to the 4
facility's safety.
CBG is not attempting to litigate Applicant's 5
engineered safety features or adminict ative controls and Staff's 6
objection should be overruled.
7 8
Panel I Exhibits:
Staf f objects to all of CBG's 9
exhibits except C-I-14.
Applicant objects to all C-I-3, C-I-5, O
C-I-II a nd C-I-14.
Neither Staff nor Applicant specify the I
grounds for their objections.
Notwithstanding this failure to 12 specify the nature of the objection, CBG offers the Board the 13 following summary of said exhibits:
14 C-I-l a nd C-I-2 document the positive reactivity f dr PP ng the water in the core, as well i
effe t 15 as the positive coefficient of graphite.
10 C-I-3 documents the fact that a large worth sample can be and was removed without insertion of the 77 control blades.
18 C-I-4 documents an actual accident involving Partial opening of the dump valve with consequent 19 water loss lead ing to significant reactivity anges.
20 C-I-5 same as C-I-4.
C-I-6 documents 066 as the positive temperature t
22 coef ficient of graphite at UCLA.
23 C-I-7 through 11 demonstrate the history and duplication of the HAR.
C-I-ll has already been admitted into evidence.
25 C-I-12 and C-I-13 illustrate CBG's Panel I testi-20 safe excursions and destructive excursions
- mony, in luding the tremendous force of the water expul-27 sion and the magnitude of damage to the reactor and the core.
28 15
1 Each exhibit is directly relevant to and within the scope of these hearings.
2 IV*
3 RESPONSE TO PANEL II OBJECTIONS 4
Paragraph 6:
CBG is not at this time, litigating the
-5 6
adequacy of the emergency response plan.
That issue has been deferred.
Paragraph 6 sets forth CBG's expert witnesses' opinion 7
that if water is used in the suppression of a reactor fire, it 8
9 could, in and of itself, result in a serious accident.
This scenario is one additional initiating mechanism for a metal water 10 reaction accident which could result in adverse consequences to public health and safety.
If CBG is correct in its assertion, g
then the reactor is not inherently safe and a subsequent phase of g
the hearings will ascertain the actual adequacy of the emergency 14 r sponse plan in this and other areas.
15 16 Parag raph 9:
See paragraph 6 3 of Panel I.
77 18 Paragraph 11:
The UCLA reactor is graphite 39 moderated.
Titis paragraph is evidence that graphite can burn and g
that at leasr one graphite moderated reactor, Windscale, did burn.
This paragraph is particularly germane in light of Dr.
Wegst's testimony that graphite ca n' t burn.
24 Parag raph 19:
This license application includes a 1
license for two PuBe start up sources.
The possibility and 3
consequences of the PuBe source being involved in a fire is thus y
well.within the scope of these hearings.
Applicant assertion 28 16.
i
g:
I that the specific health consequences of any of the hypothetical 2
accidents being considered is beyond the scope of the current hearing is ludicrous.
The whole purpose of these hearings is to 4
determine the health consequences, i.e.,
the public health and 5
safety. implications, of the licensing and operation of this 6
facility.
7 8
Paragraphs 20-27:
See paragraph 6 above.
9 10 Paragraph 39:
See paragraph 11 above.
Applicant 11 witness Dr. Pearlman and Staff witness Dr. Cort both dealt' with 12 Windscale in their testimony.
In fact, this paragraph is primar-13 ily for the purpose of demonstrating that Wigner energy, an area 14 upon which the Board has heard several hours of testimony from 15 Staf f - and Applicant witnesses is an important safety considera-16 tion in a graphite moderated reactor.
17 la
~
Paragraphs 60 and 61:
CBG is not attempting to liti-19 gate UCLA's administrative controls with this testimony.
- Rather, O
the testimony demonstrates that this reactor has no inherent 21
. protection against corrosion and that indeed that corrosion is an 22 actual problem at-this facility.
23 24 25 Paragraphs 62-66:
These paragraphs consider chemical 26
- reactions of uranium and aluminum with various other sub-27 stances.
Uranium and aluminum are the principal components of 28 17
I the Argonaut and thus this testimony is extremely relevant to the 2
issue of inherent safety.
3 4
Paragraph 67:
See paragraph 63 Panel I above.
5 6
Paragraph 7 4:
See paragraph 6 above.
7 8
Panel II Exhibits:
Staff and applicant object to each 9
exhibit except C-II-2 and C-II-6 although they f ail to specify 10 any grounds for their objection to C-II-3.
11 12 C -I I-1 :
This document is relevant to the cons ider-f Wigner energy and the combustion of ati n 13 graphite.
These issues have been the subject of testimony from Drs. Pearlman, Cort and Wegst.
14 C -I I-3 :
This document is an actual measurement of 15 the flux at the f acility.
These measurements directly contradict those used by Mr. Hawley and g
t re relevant to the consideration of Wigner energy and other issues in these hearings, 17 i
C-II-4:
See parag raph 6 above.
18 C -I I-5 :
This document illustrates the fact that 19 f
violent aluminum water reactions can occur as a result of corrosion without the presence of fire.
20 i
21 RESPONSE TO PANEL III OBJECTIONS 22 r
Paragraph 3:
This paragraph considers the ef fect of tie bolt f ailures and other potential accident scenarios induced 24 I
by seismic activity.
Tie bolts are a physical feature of this reactor as is their inherent tendency to fail.
Staff's objection 3
is completely without basis.
7 i
28 i
1A.
~ - -.
I Pa rag raph' 6 :
Appiicant objects to the inclusion of 2
incidents from the operational history of this facility.
This 3
objection makes no sense whatsoever.
There can be no better 4
evidence that particular events can happen at this facility than 5
the f act that such events have happened.in the past.
These 6
hearings go to the issue of inherent safety.
If an event has 7
happened at the facility one cannot ' maintain that the facility 'is 8
-inherently protected against such an event.
Fur the rmore, the 9
Board has already permitted the testimony of, Mr. Ostrander 10 regarding heavy water tanks and leak inc~idents' and the Batelle I
study comments on the importance of determining whether it is 12 possible to have the addition of a moderator in tertain types of accident scenarios.
14 15 Paragraph 7 The' Board has previously pe'rmitted Mr.
16 Ostrander to testify regarding the location, housing, mechanical operation and general functioning of the control blades.
- Ihus, i
17 18 CBG's expert witnesses must be permitted to advance similar 1
19 testimony.
20 21 Parag raph 11:
Applicant objects to CBG's citation to 22 several occasions in the early 1960's when fuel was removed from 23 the core only a few days after shut down as being beyond the 24 scope of these hearings.
UCLA's postulated maximum accident 25 assumes a fuel handling accident which af ter at least three weeks 26 of shut down.
Although the Board has allowed Applicant's 27 witnesses to give testimony based on this assumption, it is well 28 within the scope of this hearing for CBG to demonstrate that the 19.
1 alleged maximum accident is not a" maximum" accident at all.
In 2
this instance CBG is accomplishing this by informing the Board 3
about the actual past practices.at the facility.
Furthermore, 4
most of the incidents cited occurred af ter the reactor power was 5
increased to 100 kW not prior to the increase in power level as 6
Applicant implies.
7 8
Parag raph 14:
Appl icant is mistaken as to the import 9
of the Board's March 20, 1981 prehearing conference order.
The 10 Board in that ruling denied CBG's contention regarding the 11 security surrounding the fuel shipment.
That ruling has no 12 bearing on the admissibility of testimony and documents regarding 13 that incident as they relate to radiation exposure and related 14 accident scenarios.
This paragraph demonstrates another unana-15 lyzed accident scenario, the occurrence of which could endanger 16 the public health and safety.
To this extent, it is well within 17 the scope of these hearings.
In fact, the Board and parties 18 should recall that discovery was allowed on the contamination 19 aspects of the shipping incident.
20
'21 Paragraph 11-19:
Staff raises a blanket objection to 22 these paragraphs as dealing with -dministrative history.
In 23 fact, these paragraphs examine a series of scenarios related to 24 fuel handling accidents which have not been analyzed and which 25 could result in significant public radiation exposure.
The 26 events and documents discussed in these paragraphs do not raise 27 the issue of the adequacy of Applicant's administrative controls, 28 20.
i I
but rather point out the reality of certain accident scenarios 2
and also provide the Board with certain radiation exposure data.
3 4
Panel III Exhibits:
Staff objects to all eight exhi-5 bits but does not set forth any grounds for said objections.
6 Applicant objects to exhibits 4 through 8.
7 8
C -I I I-1, 2,
3:
These exhibits document certain 9
relevant physical phenomena observed at Argonaut reactors.
10 C -I I I-4, 7:
These exhibits document sources of 33 make up water for the moderator and the possibility and heavy water tanks leaking into the reactor.
C -I I I-5 :
This exhibit documents leaky fuel and dem nstrates that the fuel is not inherently 13 protected from radiation leakage.
14 C-III-6:
This exhibit documents occasions where fuel was handled less than three weeks after shut 15 down.
0 C-III-8:
This exhibit describes the fuel shipping inc iden t.
It is of fered only to illustrate a fuel 37 handling scenario which has not been analyzed and 18 which could endanger the public health and safety.
VI 19
^
U 20 Paragraph 1:
Staff objects to paragraph 1 on the basis that ANSI /ANS standards are not relevant to these proceedings.
g The testimony of Panel IV relates to the dispersion of fission 23 products subsequent to an accidental release f rom the UCLA 24 rea t r.
The ANSI /ANS standards are well respected industry 25 standards which have been relied upon by CBG's experts as a basis 26 f r their conclusions, and as such are admissible into evi-27 dence.
Furtheremore, there are no existing regulations or 28-21.
I regulatory guides which are 9pecifically earmarked for research 2
reactor.
Thus, reliance on ANSI /ANS standards is even more 3
appropriate, Indeed, the Staff's own SER uses ANSI standards in 4
other areas (SER pps. 12-1, 15-1).
The fact that a dispersion 5
'model or any other type of model, calculation or data source is 6
not a regulation or a regulatory guide does not dictate whether 7
it is admissible evidence in this proceeding.
8 9
Paragraph 3:
Staff objects to the discussion of a 10 regulatory guide for power reactors in the context of dispersion 11 at a research reactor.
This is the only dispersion model that 12 has been adopted by the Commission.
This is understandable 13 because when considering dispersion, the source i.e. power 14 reactor or research reactor, is absolutely irrelevant to the 15 dispersion.
It is interesting to note, that the Staf f itself rejects the regulatory guide in question in f avor of measurements i
17 taken at Rancho Seco, a power reactor.
CBG submits that Staff's 18 objection is specious.
19 O
Parag raphs 4-5:
See paragraphs 1 and 3 above.
21 22 Paragraph 10:
See paragraph 3 above.
Also, the 23 dispersion modelling used at a similar facility is clearly 24 relevant to these proceedings.
25 20 Pa rag raphs 13 and 14:
See parag raph 3 above.
27 28 1
22.
1 Paragraph 21:
See paragraph 63 in Panel I and para-2 grpah 3 above.
1 3
4 Paragraphs 23-26, 31:
See paragraphs 1, 3 and 10 5
above.
Paragraph 32:
This is absurd.
Staff objects to the 8
discussion of meteorology in Los Angeles as not having any nexus i
to the issues in this proceeding.
Nothing could have a closer 10 nexus to the dispersion at UCLA than meteorological conditions.
11 I
Paragraphs 37-40:
This is also absurd.
The physical 13 configuration of buildings surrounding the reactor facility bears directly upon the shape and pathway of the dispersion plume in 15 the event of an accidental release.
In fact, at the July hear-16 ings the Board questioned Mr. Hawley closely on exactly this 17 matter.
18 19 Parag raphs 41-43:
The issue of dispersion within the 20 buildings surrounding the reactor and the ef fect of the HVAC 21 system thereon is clearly relevant to these proceedings.
22 23 Paragraphs 44-4 8:
Applicant has requested a license 24 for two PuBe sources.
If it chooses to withdraw said license 25 request, then indeed the dispersion of plutonium in the case of 26 an accident will not be relevant.
The dispersion problems 27 related to the PuBe sources are important and the mere the fact 28 that Staff and Applicant have failed to analyze or take into 23.
l l
I account the possible consequences of an accident involving the 2
Pube source does not render such consequences outside the scope 3
of these hearings.
4 5
Paragraph 50:
At various times during these proceed-6 ings the Board has characterized the central issue in terms of 7
wanting to know what is in the bottle and what could get out if 8
the bottle is broken.
CBG's experts conclude that there is a 9
inventory in the bottle and that a very large fission product 10 great deal of it would get out in the event of an accident.
The 11 testimony and citations in this paragraph support their conclu-12 sions regarding the release implications of having such a "por-13 ous" bottle at UC LA.
14 15 Panel IV Exhibits:
Again, staff objects to all but one 16 exhibit and specifies no particular grounds therefor.
Applicant 17 objects to C-IV-4, 7,
8 and 9 18 19 C -IV-1, 3:
See paragraph 1 above.
20 C -I V-4 :
The dispersion factor at a similar fa ility is relevant to this reactor.
21 C -I V-5 :
This is an official ACRS document which 2
demonstrates that the use of nonconservative mete r logy for the UCLA reactor is inappropriate.
23 C-IV-6:
These pictures illustrate the surrounding 24 buildings.
25 C-I V-7 :
The excerpts from Willrich and Taylor deals with dispersal consequences not thef t and are 26 well within the scope of these hearings.
27 28 1
24.
4 1
C -I V-8, 9:
These exhibits document unanalyzed 2
accident scenarios that have produced doses in excess of 10 CFR 20 lbnits.
3 DATED:
September 12, 1983 4
JOHN H.
BAY 5
DOROTHY H. THOMPSON NUCLEAR LAW CE TER 6
i!!
[
7 By
~ forIgp6rvenor Attogneys g
Committee To Bridge The Gap 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 l
20 1
21 l
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 25.
~
i JOHN H. BAY DOROTHY THOMPSON NUCLEAR LAW CENTER
[
6300 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1200 Los Angeles, CA 90048 Telephone:
(415) 393-9234 (213) 653-3973 United States of America NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket No. 50-142 OL THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
)
OF CALIFORNIA
)
(Proposed Renewal of Facility (UCLA Research Reactor)
)
License No. R-71)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the attached COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP'S CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO APPLICANT AND STAFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND OBJECTIONS TO CBG TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed as indicated, on this date:
September 41, 1983 John H. Frye, III, Chairman Christine Helwick Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Glenn R. Woods U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C.
20555 590 University Hall 2200 University Avenue Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Berkeley, CA 94720 Administrative Judge Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Lin Naliboff U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Deputy City Attorney Washington, D.C.
20555 Office of the City Attorney City Hall Dr. Glen O. Bright 1685 Main Street Administrative Judge Santa Monica, CA 90401 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Committee to Bridge the Gap washington, D.C.
20555 1637 Butler Avenue, Suite 203 Los Angeles, California 90025 Chief, Docketing & Service Section (3)
Office of the Secretary U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Daniel Hirsch Washington, D.C.
20555 P.O. Box 1186 Ben Lomond, CA 95005 Counsel for NRC Staff U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
Ms. Colleen P. Woodhead
\\
=
l William H. Cormier Dorothy Thompson Office of Administrative Nuclear Law Center Vice Chancellor 6300 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1200 University of California Los Angeles, CA 90048 405 Hilgard Avenue Los Agenels, CA 90024 Carale F. Kagan, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,
.C.
20555
_ JOHN BAY /
[/
Counsel for Intervenor COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP l
l
-_ _ _. _ - _ _ _. _ _.. _ _ _.. _