ML20085C605
| ML20085C605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saxton File:GPU Nuclear icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1961 |
| From: | Trowbridge G SAXTON NUCLEAR EXPERIMENTAL CORP., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20083L048 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-91-17 NUDOCS 9110040044 | |
| Download: ML20085C605 (46) | |
Text
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3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3
ATO.4IC ENERGY COI.h1SSION In the Matte.r of . )
Saxton Muclear Experimental Corporation)
Docket No. 50-146 Application for a Provisional Operating))
License Applicant's Propose,d, Findings and Conclusions This proceeding concerns an application by Saxton Nuclear Experimental Corporation (Saxton), pursuant to Section 50.57 of the Commission's regulations, for a provisional operating license for the operation of a light wah8b moderated and cooled pressurized reactor with a nonlihal power rating of 20 thermal megawatts, located at the Sar. ton Station of the Pennsylvania Electric Company, situated approximately twenty miles southeast of Altoona, Pennsylvania. Notice of public hearing was served on the applicant and was published in the Federal Register for August 5, 1961. The issues to be considered at the hearing as specified in the notice of hearing, were as follows:
"1. Whether the technical inform 1 tion omitted from and required to complete the application filed by the applicant has been submitted;
- 2. Whether the construction of the facility has proceeded, and there is reasonable assurance that too facility will be completed, in conformity with the construction permit and the application, as 911o040044 910424 PDR FOIA DEVOK91-17 PDR
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-2 amended, tne provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; 3 Wnether there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the provisional operating license can be conducted without endangering tne health and safety of the public, and that such activities will be ;nnducted in compliance with the Atomin Energy Act of 1954, as amended and the Commission; rules and regulations of the
- 4. \lhether the applicant-is. technically and financially qualified to engage in _the activities authorized by the provisional operating license in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission; 5
Whether the applicant has furnished to the l
Commission proof of financial protection in accordanco with 10 CFR Part 140 ' Financial ~ Protection Require-Agreements';
1 i ments and Indemnity
- 6. Whether there is reasonable assurance that the loading with facility will be ready for initial f nuclear fuel within ninety days _ from the date of-issuance of .a provisional license;. and 7
Whether issuance of a provisional license to-j I
operate the facility under the terms and conditions proposed will be inini;al to the common defense and security - or to the health and safety of the public . "
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Pursuant to tc.e notice of cearing, a public hearlag was convened at tne Auditorium of the Commission in German-town, iiaryland on September 6,1961. Testimony was presented both by ohe applicant and by the AEC staff in support of the issuance of a provisional operating 11. sense.
There were no intervenors in the proceedings and there was no one wao desired to make any other appearance or state-ment at the 0 hearing.
Saxton has requested tl.at a provisional operating license be issued sufficient in scope to cover the Startup Pro 6 ram described in Saxton': Final Safeguards Report filed with Amendment No. 5 to the license application, dated April 19, 1961, and further described in applicant's testimony at the hearing. Saxton has not requested a license permitting conduct of the experimental work which will follow tne Startup Program. The details of the experimental program and related hazards analysis are to be covered in further' amendments to Saxton's license ,
application for appropriate review and autnorization-by the Commission. [Tr. 5]. The Startup Program which precedes the-experimental work consists'of conventional startup activities for a power reactor, including initial core loading cad installation of in-core instrumentation, l
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-4 measurement of a variety of core parameters, and operation ,
at successive power levels up to the reactor's nominal i rated power of 20 thermal megawatts. ( Tr . 29-31 ) .
Background
Saxton Nuclear Experimental Corporation, which was formedinJune1959byfourgeneralPublicUtilities '
Corporation (OPU) domestic operating' utilities, will own and opei4he the reactor. Steam produced in the reactor will be piped to a turbine generator located in the existing Saxton $ team gen $ rating station of the Pennsylvania ,
Electric Company, one of the four GPU subsidiariis.* [Tr.'20). P Saxt6n, which is a nQn-profit corporation chartered under the laws of the_ Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,-has four shareholder and _ two participatin6 members.. The share-holder members are the four OPU operating utilities,. which are Pennsylvania Electric Company, Johnstown,' Pennsylvania; Metropolitan Edison company, Reading, Pennsylvania; New Jersey. Power &' Light Company and Jersey Central Power Pennsylvania-
& Light Company, Morristown, New Jersey. _
State University and Rutgers -University are : participating 9
members. -[Tt. 20-21).
InJuly,1959,5axtonandWestinghouse-Electric- 1
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Corporation signed a contract providing for the construction. 1
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of the entire nuclear facility, furnishing of fuel and associated services, and carrying out of a research and Gilbert Associates, development program by Westinghouse.
Inc., a Heading, Pennsy1'vania engineering firm, was selected by Westinghouse to supervise construction and to perform all the non-nuclear engineering and certain phases of the nuclear engineering. (Tr . 21 ]
Construction Permit No. 'CPPR-6 was 6asued by the Commission to Saxton on February 11, 1960, authorizing nonstruction of the Saxton facility. (AEC Staff Exhibit No. 1, Item 1]. Saxton's initial license application,.
dated July 23,' 1959, and Amendments No. 1 and 2 to the l
license application were f$ led prior to, and considered in connection with,-issuance of Saxton's construction
! permit.
t Since issuance of the construction permit,-Saxton has filed a series of amendments (Amendments No. 3 and 9) i to its license application. Amendments No. 4, 8, and 9 relate to Saxton's* financial qualifications, which are hereafter considered. The remaining amendments furnished technical data about the Saxton facility. Amendment No. 3 l
and Supplement No.1 to Amendment No. 3 provided infctma-tion about the reactor pressure vessel, discussed in greater detail below; Amendment No. 5 submitted Saxton's Final 1
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l Safeguards Report; Amendment No. 6 submitted proposed 4 tecc.nical specifications for inclusion la the license';
and Amendment No. 7 supplied supplemental technical information requested by the AEC staff. The AEC staff testified that, in its opinion, this technical informa-tion was sufficient in scope and detail to complete Saxton's application for a provision't1 operating license, i
(Tr. 189].
Saxbeff's application for a provisional operating 31 cense vas considered by the Advisory Committee on Safeguards Reactor /at its meetin6 on July 6-8, 1961, following a visit by an ACRS subcommittee to the reactor site on Jure 23, 1961. H0n July 8,1961, the ACRS reported to tb3 Commission _its conclusion that the Saxton facility I cran be operated, through its startup program, includin6 operation up to its rated power level of 20 thermal me6a-watts, without undue hazard to che health and safety of the public. [ AEC Sta f f Exhibit No . 1, Item 10 ] .
Description of Facility General. The Saxton reactor is of the pressurized water, thermal neutron, hetrogeneous type, utiliting 5.7%
enriched uranium dioxide.as the nuclear fuel, moderated
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and cooled by light water. In the main coolant system, cool.n6 nater is circulated by one primary coolant pump ,
to the reactor pressure vessel and through the "eactor ,
core. The coolant'then flows from the reactor pressure ;
vessel to a steam generator,-where heat is removed; it then flows back to the primary coolant pump completing:
the cycle. At its normal 1 operating temperature. and 1
pressure, the reactor will develop 20 thermal. megawatts ,,
. of-power! [Tr.-190].
The Shiton reactor facility is substantially similar- ,
to the Yankee reactor (485: thermal megawatts)-operating in Rowe, Massachusetts and the Belgian reactore Br-3 (40'thermalmegawatts),boyhofwhichweredesigned-by the Westinghouse'-Electric Corporation,'and utilizes 1many ,
compdnents and systems whose reliability'has been established .
in the Naval Reactors Program.- - Much of the detailed design; and experimental investigations undertakenEforithe Yankee and-Belgian'reactorsfwhich-served as guides inltherdesign of the'Saxton reactor are now part:of1 established reactor-technology. Accordingly, iticanche-gtnerally: concluded -
that1the Saxton-reactor.is:a' conservatively designed reactor-Lfacility of a-well; proven. type with no?novellfeaturesLof safety significance.- [Tr. 92-3; 97-9;"190-1].- .
The 1following; isc a more detailedu description of.- the -
E . principal _ systems and components of tne Saxton-facility:
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e Core. Tne core of the reactor consists of 21 fuel ,
assemblies arranged in a sym.netrical grid pattern to form I
escentially a right circular cylinder 27 incnes in diameter and 50 inches in height. Each fuel assembly is composed of a 5.386 inch square, with space for 81 individual stainless steel fuel tubes; however, 9 fuel tubes on an outside corner of each assembly are removed in order to from an L-shaped recessed corner allowing space for an offset cruciform h)he control blada. L-shaped fuel assemblies, consistingofninefuelrods,ahe provided to fill the spaces that are not occupied by control rods. The main fuel assemblies are of a spring clip design requiring no bracing or welding. Each fubl tube is filled with 5.7%
enrichen uranium dioxide fuel.in the form of cylindrical ceramic pellets except for a.small gap at the top which provides for fuel pellet expansion and fission gas release space. [Tr. 60-61; 191].
The fuel assemblies are held in proper alignment by an upper and louer core suppcrt plate each of which is perforated to permit the light water coolant to flow through the core to remove heat. Although the initial core .will contain only l
21 fuel assemblies, the support plates are designed to allow for a total of 32 fuel assemblies. The eleven extra l
I spaces will be filled with dummy assemblies approximating a regular fuel assembly in order to maintain proper coolant flow patterns. There are no significant features of the 1
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-9 core or fuel elecent cechanical design whica aave not been previvusly proved suitable for use in a reactor of this general type. [Tr. 60-61, 191-2).
Tne physics calculations for the Saxton reactor core were based on the same techniques used in physics calcula-tions for tne Yankee reactor, and results of these latter calculations compared favorably with experimental results obtained during the initial operation of Yankee. (Tr. 192; 233-4). .
The core has been designed to provide a ratio (Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio) of 2.4 between burnout heat flux and the computed heat flux at the point of maximum heat flux in the reactor under steady state conditions at full power. Estimated burnout conditions are conservatively based on a correlation of a multitude of experimental points collected by the Bettis group of Westinghouse. In addition, calculations indicate _that under any credible accident condition (except the loss of coolant accident described by the applicant as the l
" maximum hypothetical accident" and by the AEC staff as the " maximum credible accident") this burnout ratio.would never be less than 1.85. This' indicates that_there would-be no melting of the fuel element cladding during any credible accident to the Saxton reactor, with the exception l
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of a complete loss of coolant.
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Itsm 16 (ACRS Report)). ABC Staff Exhibit All of tacee calculated nuclear psrameter verified by opecific te ' to be - s will be formed during the
- nitial startup and operati..
,f the reactor an described in the Fina,' SafeBuardo Report and in the t 1 specifications. echnical (Tr . 193 ) .
Pressure Ve_ssel and ain'Coolqntjyotem. t Tne core componente for the Saxton reactor ire contain e d
within a 5-inch thick vertical, cylin'drical, multi-layer , carbon i
steel preanure vessel 58 inchen in diameter n ad over-all height of 18 feet, with a hemispherica3 !
attom head,and a flanged gasketed removabic top head (Tr. 65; 193].
Malti-layer prosaure vessela are different rom f
conventional reactor vessels only in theo meth d of fabrica-tion of the main cylindrical shell course .
One of the advantages of multi-layer constructionniny the that o l inner, stainless steel clad barrel which s ervea as the fluid containing pqrtion of the vessel need b e leak-tight.
The multiple layers of carbon steel which s urround the stainless steel inner shell are used to prnvid a t.ventitn, e vessel A simple vent hole extending from the s e out id of the inner barrel through the outer layers of the vessel is provided in order to monitor for any leaka stainleg1 steel shell. ge fro,m the In this fashion, a leak in the
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inner barrel e.ay be detected unile t.:e vessel itself ic
' still ctructually sound. Solid wall pressure vessela cannot be provided w* th tais metnod of lea 4 octection.
(Tr. 65-6; 194).
T..e Saxton multi-layer pressure vessel was the subject of a detailed review by the AEC staff and tne ACRS during 1961.
On Marca 11, 1960, Saxton submitted Amendment No. 3
- to its licedte application [AEC Staff Exhibit No.1, Item 2] .
pertaining tb a modification in reactor design whien involved chan61 ng the reactor pressure vessel from a solid
' wall construction to a multi-layer type construction.
Information submitted by Sexton with its amendment was i later supplemented by furtner infcrmation contained in i
I Supplement No. 1 to Amendment No. 3 to the license applica-I tion (AEC Staff Exhibit No. 1, Item 4]. The information so submitted by Saxton was reviewed by the AEC staff and by the ACRS . In a letter to the Commission dated September 26, 1960, the ACRS reported that in its opinion a enange to a multi-layer pressure vessel designed and constructed specifically for the Saxton reactor would not introduce any-additional hazard to the.nealth_and safety of the public {AEC Staff Exhibit No. 1, Item 5).
The AEC staff concurt?O in this opinion, subject to any operating experience to be gained from operation
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e of SPdRT III, a reactor also utilizing a multi-layer preocure vessel located in the National Reactor Teat Station at Idac.o Falls, Idano. [Tr. 169; 194-5).
AltnouSn SPERT III has not been operated at power for any cignificant amount of time since tnis early revieN, it has operated tnrou6h 190 transients at pressures varying from zero to 2500 psi and there have been no k indicatiops of unusual effects. Tnerefore,-the AEC staff has now concluded on the basis of the available information that the Sexton multi-layer pressure vessel would not introduce any additional hazard to the health and safety of the public. (Tr. 195; 227; 230-233).
The other components 6f the primary cooling system, includin6 the steam generator, main coolant pump, piping and fixtures are of conventional design, and have been sized for operation at power levels up to 28 thermal megawatts during the future experimental program. All surfaces in contact with the' main coolant we.ter are con-structed of either stainless steel or Inconel, both of which have a suithbly high corrosion resistance. The steam generator has been mounted on a higher elevation than the reactor vessel in order to provide for natural circulation of the main coolant in ocae of pump failure or power supply failure. -The system has been adequately
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instrumented to measure teaperature, pressure, an with indicators, alarms, and control signala provided i on necessary to operate tne main coolant ayatem safely and efficiently. (Tr. 66-8; 195-6).
The Saxton reactor Control and Instrumentation.
uses a combination of metnods to control the reactivity of the core similar to'those a,uccessfully used in the
.ho primary method utilizen six offset Yankee reactor. ;
cruciform chaped control blades containing a silver-indium-cadr..ium alloy which is nickel-plated to increase the 4
A stainlena ateel corrosion resistance of the material.
rubbing strap in incorporated- on both sidea of each of To the blades to further reduce the wear on the blades.
increase the effectiveneen of<the control blades and assist in maintaining an even flux distribution throughot:t the core, each control blade has a follower section compas of fuel roda (similar to thoan used in the atandard f assemblien) attached to the bottom portion for a total
[Tr. 02; 196].
control blade length of_99-inchen.
The motive power for moving the control blades within the core as required to regulate tne power of the reactor
'io provided by Westinghouse friction grip magnetic Jack type l
This type drive mechanism is used in drive mechanisma.
I the Yankee reactor and operates by meana of the magnetio-forces established when electrical current is applied ~to g g 4.eg--,mtv-9 g y qT4-et-yvy--re---- 3-.ver*- - -
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The stroke lengtn of tne mecannium is a coil of ulre. :
(Tr . 64 ; 196-7 ) .
1/32 of an inen. .
r A friction grip ratner toan a laton type grip la In this respect, used in the Saxton drivo mechanism.
Saxton is cimilar to the Belgian reactor (BR-3) rather than to Yankee. The' drive mechanism is of " fail-safe" design, since loss of electrical power or any scram signal removen the ma6netic forces and allows the control to fallt fi* eely into the core and shut the reactor down.
Although the control blades of the Saxton reactor are the bottom entry type, they are lifted above the core during operation and fall into the core under the force The control drive of gravity during reactor ;acram.
mechanisms have no parts made of 17-4 PH stair.less steel.
[Tr. 64-5; 93-4: 97-8; 100-1; 197]. -
1 When the reactor is at operating temperature.and pressu're the six control blades possess reactivity-(poisoning capability) values sufficient to shut the reactor down with an adeqbate safety margin even though the rod ,
A manually set of highest worth sticks out of the core.
limit switch is provided for each control rod drive ,
mechanism so that rod withdrawal can be limited as required L to give sufficient shutdown margin in case of a stuck rod.
However, when the reactor is in a cold condition, the
control blades do not provide a sufficient poisoning effect to nold the reactor in a sub-critical condition.
As in tne cane of the Yankee reactor, a cocondary corKrol cycten in utilized for cold reactor chutdown in which a ,
in added to the primary soluble nuclear poison, boric acid, coolant system in sufficient quantities to maintain the During reactor startup, reactor in a eautdown condition.
as the temperature of the system increasca, the dissolved poison 10-gradually removed from the primary coolant by a bleed atiW feed process until at full power operation less Tne feasibility than 10 ppm of boron remain in the system.
and safety of this method of contro11ing a reactor under snutdown conditions has been successfurly demonstrated in (Tr. 62-3; 197-8).
the operation of the Yankee reactor'.-
A standard system of instrume66ation is provided to temperatuto, continuously monitor and measuer the flow, pressure, flux and power level of the reactor in order to inaure safe operation from atartup to full power conditions.
The meters, recorders, indicators, alarms and control switchec of the system are conveniently located on a central room control console and vertical panel in the main control The startup and for efficient operator surveillance.
intermediate power ranges of the reactor are covered by dual equipment channels while the power range has three identical channels connected in a two out of three
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l coincidence arrangement to avoid unnecessary reactor acrams.
A ocram circuit is provided to actuate the rapid inscetion ,
I of all rods under the following conditio.1s t
- 1. Fast s'tartup rate.
- 2. High power level.
3 Low main cuolant pressure.
- 4. Low main coolant flow.
5
-Low water level in pressurizer.
- 6. Less of main coolant pump. l 7
nigh main coolant temperature,
- 8. Manual scram.
j circuit is provided fpr use I In addition, a rod stop
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during plant startup which will block the removal of control
, The system rods in the event a fast startup rato exists.
includes an automatic control circuit which can be us during steady state operation to move a single rod or a selected Enoup of rods to maintain a constant power level.
The Saxton control system also contains interlocks and alarm points in addition to those previously described for the purpose of warning the operator of abnormal but .
(Tr. 68-70; 198-9).
not necessarily unsafe conditions.
The main A high pressure scram is not provided.
coolant system is protected by relief valves against over-pressure. If the pressure rises because of hign power level or because the temperature in the primary
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4 system riseo excebsively, tnere are nigh power and high ;
temperature scrams. [Tr. 109).
N A safety injection system Safety Injection Syster3 is provided to supp'ly adequate amounts of borated water to tne main coolant system to cool the core in the event The system consists of normal reactor coolant is lost.
an 80,000 gallon storage tank containing borated water, two safety injection pumps, and all necessary piping, fitting &/ valving and instrumentation required for opera-The system can be actuated manually tion of'dhe system.
or automatically by an indication of low pressure in the l Both cafety injection pumps start '
main coolant cystem.
- automatically when initiated by the . safety system and they continue to run until a-predetermined volume of water has been injected into the reactor vessel which is sufficient In addition, to insure tuat the core is completely covered.
the system to aggigned to intermittently pump borated water to the reactor vessel after the initial fill cycle to replenish water that may have evaporated due to decay heat of the core. {Tr. 71-2; 199-200).
Auxi11ery Systems. The systems described heretofore .
are those considered to have a primary effect'on the safety However, of the reactor and hence are of primary interest.
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is also dependent upon a large any power Generating plant number of auxiliary systems and componeiits for bnte and efficient operation.
The systems hcluded in this cate60Py' aret (1) Charging system - consisting of two charging pumps wnich are adjustable between 3 and 15 spm and the necescary pipin6, valving, and instrumentation required to charge degassified and demineralized water from the secondary The system also charges plant into the main coolant s'ystem.
borated waddb into the main coolant system when it is required to keep the reactor 'suboritical under cold shut-down conditions. (Tr. 63; 200-1).
(2)
Purification system - consisting of a regenerative heat exchanger, let-down flow control valve, nonregenerative heat exchanger, purification demineralizer, boric acid demineralizer, filter, surge tank, accumulators, gas supply Tnis and the necessary piping, valves and instrumentation.
system establishes and maintains water purity in the main coolant system, provides control of hydrogen concet.tration, i
removes boric acid by a bleed and feed operation, provides l
a source of main coolant water for sampling and~ fission product detection and provides a source of make-up water to the main coolant system.
The system is also utilized-to remove decay heat until the main' coolant system temperature i
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and pressure have been reduced sufficiently to permit
[Tr. 63-4; 201].
operation of the shutdown cooling system.
(3)
Onemical addition system - consisting of a steam heated boric acid tank, a contrifugal pump for mixing and circulating the boric acid and decontaminant solutions, a chemical addition tan'k and associated piping, valves and Tae system is designed to prepare and instrumentation.
supply boric acid for the main coolant system and the storage well system, to add hydrazine and lithium hydroxide or potassium hydroxide as required to maintain the oxySon content and pH of the main coolant water, and to add, if necessary, decontaminant solutions to remove radioactive (Tr.
corrosion products from the various plant systems.
63; 201-2].
(4) Components coolin6 system - consisting of two centrifugal circulating pumps, two heat exchangers, a surge l
( tank and necessary piping, valving and instrumentation.
l The function of this system.is to remove heat from the l shutdown cooling heat exchanger, main coolant pump, and l
nonre6enerative heat exchanger and to transfer it to the river water. (Tr . 67 ; 202 ] .
(5) shutdown cooling system - consisting of a heat exchanger, two circulating pumps, and necessary piping, The system is ' designed to remove valves and instrumentation.
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s sys ton decay ;. eat fr0n tr.e reactor core after the usin coolant pressure nos been reduced to 150 psi or 1cas, and to provide (Tr. 74-5; spare cooling capacity for the purification system.
202).
(6) Storage well system - consisting of two circulating pumps, a neat excr. anger, demineralizer, filters, storage tank, and necessary piping valves and instrumentation.
The purpose of this system in to transfer storage well water to, or from the refueling water storage tank an-requiredi fer refueling operations, to purify and cool-the etorage well water, to provide a reservoir of water for safety injection, and to provide water for flushing refueling equipment. (Tr. 74; 202]. 1 p
(7) Cooling, heating, and ventilation systems -
consisting of intake and exhaust fans, filters, ducts, monitors, and exhaust stack and necessary instrumentation and controls. Tnree systems are provided- to coc1 and/or heat and ventilate the various potentially radioactive areas of the plant, In addi' tion, entirely separate systems are provided to cool and/or heat and ventilate non-radioactive areas. .(TT 202-3].
(8)
Station service electrical system - consisting of transformers, switch gear, breakers, busses and necessary controls and'instrumenution. The function of tais system is to supply the power requirements for the
asin coolant pucp motor, tne various auxiliary motor drives, pressurizer heaters, lighting, ventilating, control and com.aunication systc=s, [Tr. 71; 203),
(9) Secondary steam system consisting primarily of the Unit No. 2 turbine generator, Unit No. 2 surface condenser and auxiliaries, steam generator blowdown tank, steam headers, miscellaneous tanks, valves and pumpb The and tne necessary controle and instrumentation.
purpose of'the l system is to ut111:e the steam produced into i n the nudlear steam generator by converting it electrical energy which is to be fed into the Pennsylvania '
Electric Company power distribution system. (Tr . 203 ] .
Only the Unit No. 2 turbine generator and oondenser have any significant bearing on the safety of reactor opera-I tion. (Tr. 267; 269-9).
l (10) A pressure control and relief system pressurizes the main coolant loop and maintains the operating pressure l
at approximately 2000 psia during steady-state operation. ,
This system includes a 100 cubic foot pressurizer containing stainless steel sheathed electric heaters, a discharge tank and drain pumps and the necessary instrument and controls, two self-actuated safety valves, and one power relief valve. This system has been designed to accommodate step load changes of flO% and a ramp load change of-l MWe per minute without pressuriser heater or spray operation.
_(IT. 70-1; 108),
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f (11) A radiatie.1 monitoring system is provided to detect, compute, and indicate tne radiation level at This selected locations in and around the plant.
cyatem concists of six onelf-mounted, count-rate meters located in selected areas and in addition, ten radiation monitoring channels, wnich are connected to a common alarm indicating and recording panel located in the reactor plant control room. [Tr. 75].
Radioactive Waste Disposal Systems. In the Saxton faellity, radioactive waste disposal systems are provided consisting of a solid waste system, a liquid waste system, .
' and a ' gaseous waste system. ~
Tne solid waste syste;.1 will handle both combust 1ble and non-combustible radioactive materials by placing them in 55-gallon drums. A hydraulic baling machine will compress the materials for more efficient storage in the drums.
it will be When sufficient material has been accumulated, c'ollected by an AEC licensee for ultimate disposal in Commission approved areas. Rec tut.
- nom the various purifica-tion systems will be aluiced to one of three 800 gallon underground storage tanks for retention until ultimate disposal can be effected . No solid wastes will be buried at the Saxton site. (Tr. 72; 204).
Tne liquid waste. disposal system-includes two 10,000 sch-tank being of gallon tanks and one 5,000 gallon tank, s
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dual, or tan % within a tanit, construction for the storage of radioactive liquid effluents. Equipment is provided to add alkali to the acid waste liquida in order to minimize All the corrosion of the pipes and storage vessels.
piping is enclosed in concrete troughs or double pipes wnich will be monitored for leakage, as will the space The liquids in the between the double storage tanks.
storage tanks will be degassed, decontaminated and reduced to a sludW8 by means of a gas-stripper and evaporator equipment. The sludge is collected in concrete lined 55-gallon steel drums, mixed with dry concrete, sealed and placed in a shicided storage area for ultimate disposal dispose vi radioactive by an AEC licensee qualified to materials. Low level liquid waste will be diluted with the condenser cooling water and discharged, after monitoring, to the river at or below those levels permitted by 10 CFR Part 20 of the Commission's regulations for unrestricted areas. (Tr. 72-3; 204-5].
Thegasesfromthe51guidtnatedisposalsystemand other sources are vented to a common gas disposal system which is maintained under a slight negative pressure by The gases-are compressed one of two gas compressors.
into one-of three-133 cubic foot tanks where-they are held l for optimum radioactivity decay before being gradually l released, under controlled conditions, to the plant stack I
i i
, . .........~........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . ~
e
- for at.no:pc.eric dispersion. Sensitive instrumentation it provided to incure tnat effluents discharged from the ',
gaseous uaute disposal stac'.: will meet the requ$rements of Com:nission regulations. An independent calculation by tne AEC staff han shown that with the release of the maximum concentrations of radioactive gases specified in the technical specificationo under the meteorological conditions e
expected, it in unlikely that any person will be exposed to concentrations of radioactive material in exceso of that pelWLbted by 10 CFR Part 20. (Tr. 73-4; 205).
Containment. Tne Saxton reactor is noused in a steel containment vessel fabricated in accordance with tr.e ASME Code and applicabic code coaea.. The containment is a vertical cylindrical stecil vessel 50 f t. in diameter and 109 f t. 6 in in overall height, with a nemiapnerical need at tne top and an elliptical head at tne bottom. Tne bottom of the vessel is 50 ft. below grade wita the bottom nead embedded in concrete. The portion of tne containment
~
vessel that is below grade has a 1-1/2 ft. thic); inner wall of reinforced concrete which serves as shielding and providen reinforcement against external pressure due to ground water and backfill, and in addition provides missile protection. (Tr . 59-60; 205-6) .
Vacn tue reactor is operating at power, tne contain.aent vessel will be closed and pressure ticat wita all access j
s j
l cpenin;c, p;pelinec, and connections not required for operation cualed by lead-tigat o .utoff volves or gasketed doorn. Pipellt.co required for normal operation are valved as necescary to rcainta'in toe integrity of t..e vessel.
Personnel will not be allowed to enter tue containment vecoc1 w..en the reactor is hot critical or operating at power. (Tr. 206), '
The containment vessel has been sized to enable it to wituatarte a peak internal pressure of 30 paid, Tnis value was b6aed on the peak pressure tnat would be reached in the container if tne entire contenta of tne main coolant system (~2,500 gallons of water) flashed to steam. A leakage rate test of toe vessel, at tne design preasure, was rnede prior to the placement of intersal structures with the piping and electrical penetrativ..a capped, whion resulted in a laakage rate value of 0.04% in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Taking into consideration instrument and measurement error, possible leakage of c1cotrical penetrations, and i a reduced free volume when internal structurea are in I
place, toe estimated leakage rate value was found to be
! O,197% in 24 houra, which is considered to be an acceptable ,
l 1eakage rate for this containment vessel. A final low i
pressure soap bubble or vacuum box test will be performed on the containment vessel after the internal structures I
. ave been erected, tue equipment installed and t..e teaporary construction opening in tne s;; ell rewelded and radiograpaed.
(Tr. 59-60; 205-7; 275-6;,
Tc timony by t..e AZC staff and on benalf of toe ,
applicant regarding too safety of the individual systeuo and components as well as too facility as a waolo supporto One conclucion tnat tac Saxton facility iias been safely desicned. [Tr. 75; 195-6; 197; 1991 2001 207; 223; 226].
Descriotion of Site Tne site for this project is tne Pennsylvania Elcotric Company Sdkbon Steam Generating Station consisting of approxicatbly 150 acres. A small plot adjacent to the existing go6erating plant, on which the reactor is located, has been deeded to Saxton. The cite is locaced about three-fourtos of a mile from the Borougn of Saxton in Liberty Township, Bedford County, Pennsylvania, approximately 95 air miles east of Pitt'aburgh and 72 air miles west of Harrisburg. [Tr . 21; 210 ) .
Tae Saxton Steam Generating Station is located on the f
Raystown Branen of t..e Juniata River, which flows northeast and joins the Frankstown Branen'of tne Juniata River to form the main' branch of t.te Juniata River, wnich emptica into the LJaquer. anna River - above Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
The Raystown Branch river valley lies between Tussey Mountain to ti.e ucot and- Terrace Mountain to tne cast.
There is a ridge rising to approximately 1300 feet imaediately to trie northwest of t.ac cite and a gently to toe sloping ridge rising to approximately 1500 feet
)
I f
noutneoct of tae cite (Tr. 21-2; 210). ;
Tne Saxton site una, of course, considered by the Comuission in tne tosuance of a construction permit to Saxton and wao found at tnat time to be acceptable from a aufety standpoint for a reactor of the general type proposed. [ Intermediate Decision dated January 21, 1960, on Saxton's Application for Conutruction Permit, Docket No. 50-146.) Inforraation concerning certain important aspecto 8h tne site has been supplemented by further investigab[bbs and brought up to dete in connection with Saxton's application for a proviaional operating license. The following is a summary of the supplemental .
data of principal significance to the public health and ,
safety.
Meteorology. A micrometeorological network was set
(
up at the site and han been operated since February,1960.
j Data from this network have been used to establish '
estimates of dispersion and diffusion characteristica-of the site. The following conclunions have been' drawn as a result of analysis of the data collected during the period February 6,1960, through January 19, 1961: (1)
With moderate lapse rates and unstable atmospherio conditions which exist 51 per cent of tne time, effluent from the reactor will diffuse vertically and transport out of the site valley and into toe main valley at
s
- 2b -
elevations ocove ground level and noot of ten in a norto-casterly d.rection down tne valley away from tac Borougr)
With inversion and moderately stable of Saxton. (2) atmospneric conditions waion exist 49 per cent of toe time, effluent will be restricted to the site valley with a predominatly low wind velocity, but turbulent air motion; toe transport of effluent at thin time will also be pre- '
domittntly down the valley away from the Borougn of Saxton. Q2@
Tne inversion and moderately stable conditions whicn generally exist at night onange to moderate lapse and/or unstable conditions during the day, and tnus prevent lon6 periods of contamination buildup within the valley. (4) Deposition of radioactive particulate matter will be predominant 1/ in a northeasterly direction down the valley in an- area which in very sparsely populated and which is almost completely covered by foresta. (5)
Washout of radioactive particulate matter will take plac3 predominantly in a, direction soutn-soutnwest to south-west of the reactor. In this direction, the controlled property '
consequently, the line extends for more than 3,000 feet. '
main portion of any washout should occur on controlled property. {Te, 22-4; P.10-2].
Population:Donsity.. 'tT$egeneralareaaroundtoe Saxton sites is aparsely populated, witn a population density based on 1960 census figures of about 64 persons
. ~ . - - - - - -
l t
' s 29 -
per egt.are alle witoin a 5 ..ile radius and about S3 1 1
l perconc per equare raile uitain a 10-mile radius. [AEC ,
3taff Exnibit Wo.1, Iteca 6 (Final Safecuardo Report) l pp . 105 1 -2 ) . Tne residential population witain one mile of tue site to approximately 1790 personc and consisto priraarily of the Borougn of Saxton and the omall adjacent coraraunitien of East Saxton and Stoneratown. [Tr. 25-6; 212). .
Sinoeotne incuance of a construction permit to Saxton, a nigh sonool with an enrollment of one thousand pupils has been completed at a dintance of approximately 2500 i feet from the Saxton reactor. Special consideration was given at the public hearin6 to this acnool from the atandpoint of the healto and safety of toe studente.
(Tr. 129; 136-8; 1403 149-50; 151-41 243-4). r The school in behind a nill and out of the line of 016ht of the reactor containment vessel, and the pre-dominant winds blow from the alte away from tne school i for all but a very small percentage of tue time. (Tr.
- 137-8) 140; 150; 151-2]. Thus, in the event of a reactor-incident, the school is unielded by tne aill from direct radiation and protected by favorable meteorological--
conditions from radioactive materials in ti.e air.
/spplicant presented at the .iearing a tabic of l
l calculations snowing ti.e amount of .tice w.iich would be l
l
-rat-9.-.wyi.y.g9w*.. g,w>m 9.-i g y ,.9q+-wy gy a -aS.9gy-weg..i9--v vy.gy-1-,gy..,asew 9e :qe- .e- --yg yg,pu. n-1'uv-g-W y 'y+%r e tys *.g wpqr w r.-we a. yp-w y9py.e-ha.t'*f*W1'9F*t W-- *F' **' 'v-
e i
availaole, i n tt.e event of t..e .1axi,au:a oypotactical accident for t..e evacuation of peroonnel i postula ted by toe applicant ,
at varyin7 distances un to 2,000 feet from the reactor, prior to tacir receiving a direct radiatio" @ac of 25 r or a dose of 300 rem to t.ie thyroid from idre,.lall?n of racioactive iodine. { Applicant 's Exaibit m* , 0; Tr.121-2]. .
These calculations were based on the accumption that the person recttiving the direct radiation dose remains in direct liW of night from the reactor and that toe iodine doec resulto from standing tnroughout the period of the expos 9re on the axis of a very narrow radioactive leakage '
plume in the path of the wind from the site. [AEC Staff Exhibit No.1, Item 6 (Final Safeguarda Report), pp. 606.1 et seq.; Tr. 121-2]. The time ova 11able for evacuation of persons located at 2,000 feet is calculated under these conditions to be five weeks for the direct radiation dose Extrapolating and four weeks for the done to the thyroid, from these calculations to a distance of 2500 feet--and utill making no allowence for the shielding effect of the hill between the scnool and the reactor or for the prevailing weather conditions--applicant estimates tnat these periods 1
would be increased to six weeks and five weeks respectively.
[Tr. 149-150]..
also Consideration wad given at the hearing to the posalble <
contamination of the school area as a result of tne release
y-,- * ~ --p -w e + g- += - **+ a
. - w w ee-e- e4-
31 -
of goccous effluents from the plant. Such effluenta are released through a stock which rises 125 feet in the air. (Tr. 73-4; '.32; 205). Since the containment is closed during reactor operation, there would be no release of radioactive effluent from the containment to (Tr. 206; the stack in the event of a reactor incident.
243-4). Therefore,theeff1qentsofprimaryinterest are those generated in the operation of the liquid waste disposal BBN other systems and effluents released during periods of reactor shutdown from the containment vessel.
Particulate matter will be collected on high-efficiency filters located at the inlet of the exhaust fans in' the ventilating systems. [Tr . 74 ) .
As previously stated, Baseous effluente are released to thi stack under controlled conditions, and acnaitive instrumentation is provided to insure that effluents wil]
r meet the requirements of Commisalon regulations. The l
latter prescribe both the maximum concentration of gaseous l
effluents which may be discharged from the site and the i
maximum permissible off-site radiation levela. [10 CPR 20, .
Testimony of the applicant Sections 20.105 and 20.106).
I and of the AEC staff confirms the conclusion that there is little likelihood that permissible concentrations (Tr. 73-4; 152-4; and radiation levels will be exceeded.
205; 244).
i c -. --+- -. - , ,m_
- .__- - - .__ _ _ _ - -- _ _ . _ - . - - - - - - = _ . .. . - _ _ - - _ - - - - _ ~_
i e
Radiological Survey. In order to establiah tne normal racioactive background of toe area, Saxton hao catablished a program for monitoring air, carth, rain water, river water, well water, spring water, silt, vegetation, fish, rabbits, and milk. The samples collected are ar.alyzed by the Pittsburgh Laboratories of Nuclear Science and Engineering Corporation. These programs Wkil enable Saxton to recognize any gradual buildup of 8Hdioactivity in the surrounding area long before it could become an ingestion problem. (Tr. 28; 213-4).
Hazards Analysis Saxton has analyzed accidents that could possibly occur during operation of the reactor due to operator errors and mechanical failure of equipment or controls, or combinations of these two occurrences. These accf. dents can be divided in two. general categoriest accidents involving an uncont' rolled insertion of reactivity, such as rod witadrawal at startup, rod withdrawal at power,. heat extraction by steam plant valve failure or ateam pipe rupture, introduction of cold water, and loss of chemical neutron absorber; and accidents involving mechanical failure of equipment auch as a primary system rupture, control rod drive system failure, turbine governor failure, eccondary system failure, and primary pump failure. (Tr. 113-6; 214].
Saxton's analyces of the reactivity type of accident indicate that tne uncontrolled transient benavior of tne reactor is suon that t.,e neCst,1ve temperature coefficiento of reactivity, tue rod stop interlock, or the scram l
circuits would terminate the resulting power excuraion I The AEC staff agreed before damage to the core occurs.
with the results of these analyses, and believes that suitable design and procedural features have been provided
[Tr. 113-6J r to minimize She occurrence of these accidento.
214-5).
b f the mechanical accidents analyzed, the losa of coolant resulting from a pipe rupture in tne primary oystem, '
coupled with a failure of the safety injection system, is d the most severe and is considered by both the applicant an
[Tr. 1171 the AEC staff to be the " maximum credible accident." '
215].
~
Applicant concluddd.that rupture cf a 3-inch pipe
[Tr. 117-8).
constitutes the larBest credible pipe rupture.
However, in order to give an upper boundary for nazards beyond which no credible hazard could be expected to fall, Saxton analyzed a more severe loss of coolant accident (which it calla the " maximum hypothetical accident") domplete whien assumed, among other' events, an instantaneous and discharge of all water from the primary system to the
[Tr . 118-20 ) .
containment vessel and a complete core meltdown.
- ~ . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . - . . .
- 3h -
Tne AEC staff was not prepared on t.ie bacia er information s -hmitted by Saxton and ilestingnouse to accept trae 3-inca pipe rupture as the largest credible pipo However, tne AEC staff felt no need rupture. (Tr. 217).
to pursue tne matter further since it did agree coat the "hypotnetical maximum accident" postulated by the applicant representstheupperlimitofhublichazardthatcould credibly. Scour during operation of the Saxton reactor, and tnat, itn view cf the remote poasibility of occurrence of en accident of such severity, operation of the Saxton, reactor is an acceptable risk. [Tr. 217; 219).
Applicant's analysis of the " maximum hypothetical accident" considera the amount of radioact$ve materials wnich would be released to the containment vesael, the quantitie's of radioactive material which mignt leak from the containment vessel, and the direct radiation and ingcation l
dosages to which persons in t.he vicinity of the plant might l
- The analysis snows that, be exposed. (Tr. 120-31 217-9).
l- based on a limit for emergency exposure of 25 r from direct f
! radiation and 300 rem to tne thyroid from inhalation of ~
radioactive iodine, not more than 44 persons in the vic1nity of the plant would have to be evacuated and that there would-be ample time for evacuation. [Tr. 122-3; 218-9 as corrected at 224].
s e
e Tec..nical Cualification:
Tne Saxton reactor la being desit:ned anc constructed by tue Westingoouce Electric Corporation who have nad more tnan 20 years experience in the field of nuclear physica.
Personnel of the Westinghouse Atomic Powar Department nave i
many years of experience in tne design, tenting and operat on of nuclear reactora at various nitco throughout the country, in additicn to their vast submarine reactor experience.
(Tr. 219):
The Saxton General Manager, Ascistant General Manager and the three top ot.pervisors at the site were selected .
on the basis of their academic training and experience Tucae men, with the received on other nuclear projects.
exception of the Assistant General Manager, have been participating in the design and construction phases of
- he Saxton project. The Asnistant General Manager, who he3 been recently added to the Saxton staff, in a former NJ sy engineering officer, who han had broad experience in Other Saxton personnel have the submarine react *or field.
been participating in a training program which includes (1) a general orientation courac (2) opecialty cohools, (3) resident training at nuclear facilities, and.(4) on-the-Resident training job training at the reactor site.
for the reactor ahlft supervisors and reactor tecnnic$ans
- - ~ - _ .,__ _ _ _ ,
- -..- + - . . . . . . l s
e Tec.'.n'. col qualifica t ions
.1 Tne Saxton reactor is being designed ano constructed by toe Westing..ouse Electric Corporation who have 4;ad more l tnan 20 yearc experience in the field of nuclear physico.
Personnel of the Westinghouse Atomic Powar Department nave tion l many years of experience in tne design, tecting and opera l
of nuclear reactors at various cites throughout the country, !
in addition to their vast submarine reactor experience.
[Tr. 219):
The Saxton General Manager, Assistant General Manager and the three top oupervisors at the site were selected on the basis of their academic training and experience Tacce men, with the received on other nuclear projects.
exception of the Assistant General Manager, have been participating in the design and construction phases of the Saxton project. The Assistant General Manager, who ,
has been recently added to the Saxton staff, is a former Navy engineering officer, who has had 'eroad experience in Other Saxton personnel have the submarine react'or field.
been participating in a training program which includes (1) a general orientation course (2) specialty schools, (3) resident training at nuclear-facilities, and (4) on-the-Resident training job training at the reactor site.
for the reactor shift supervisors and reactor tecnnicians l
i
. , - . ~ . . , . . . _ , #.. . - . . . . . . , . , _ _ . , _ - , , . _ #
nas included training at Penn State University and at the Westingnouse reactor lacilities at Walt Mill.
(Tr.'31-6; 219-20; Applicant 's Exnibit lio. 2 (Personnel Training and Experience)).
to Qualified Westinghouse personnel under contract Saxton will supervise and tra'n tne Saxton personnel during tne period of initial fuel loading, initial criticality, and core parameter measurements, and will remain at' ebxton for at .ieast two months af ter a sufficient number of Saxton oupervisory personnel and operators have been licensed to permit round-the-clock operation at a substantial power level. (Tr. 36-7; 220). .
Westinghou:e will also provide other supporting techniosi personnel during the startup program. A Westing-house specialist in reactor physion will be made ava'ilable on site as a regular assignment to follow the preparation for reactor startup, fuel loading, initial criticality and physics tests to determine core parameters and reactor behavior. A Westin'ghouse mechanical design engineer will be available during initial fuel loading and control rod installation, and other nuclear power service and design engineers W131 be available on call whenever needed. (Tr.
37-8).
Special inquiry was made at the hearin6 by the Presiding Officer as to the qualifications of Saxton's Radiation Prote.ction Engineer, who has had limited formal education
l .o I
l l !
and experience in .ealtn pnysics work. Tne individual in question coc.ipleted a two-year general engineering
! course at tne Wyomissing Polytechnic Institute in Reading, Pennsylvania. As an employee of one of tae GPU operating subsidiaries, he attended the first general orientation l
l course given by tne Saxton manLgement and was selected i
for work on tne Saxton project on the basis of his previous performance and course work. 'He subsequently attended ,
a four-wock course in basic radiological health and reactor environmental health problems at the Robert A. Taft Sanitary Engineering Center. He was assigned for approximately ,
one year to the Health Physica Sections of tne Westinghouse i
Atomic Power Department and, Westinghouse Test Reactor for l on-the-job training. Both tlie applicant and the AEC sta f f testified tnat they were satisfied with his qualifications for the work to be performed during the startup program.
He has parttipated in Saxton's environmental radiation survey program and in this connection has had a; working contact with Nuclear Science and Engineering Corporation in Pittsburga, Pennsylvania, who assisted- Saxton in tne conduct of the survey, Saxton plans to continue to use the services of Nuclear Science Engineering Corporation on health physics problems and ^7alytical work. Saxton has I
also made arrangsments with a medical consultant,.Who will be available to the Ridiation Protection Engineer for-l consultation on medical problems. [ Applicant's Exhibit No. 2_ (Personnel Training and Experience); Tr. 103-7; 146; ,
270-4; 261-6).
. - . --.. -. . .-. - - - . -- ~ . . . . - - - - ~ -- -
i
)
l Financfal Qualifications Saxton and Meatinghouse have entered into a contract i under whicn Westinghouse P.as agreed to: (1) design, construct and furnish'to Saxton the complete nuclear steam generating plant, together with certain nuclear and non-nuclear aupporting facilities; (2) furnish all fuel requirements for the first five years of operation after initial criticality; and (3) conduct a substantial preoperational and post-construction researen and development program over a period of approximately 7-1/2 years, incluaing the furnishing of certain equipment and personnel. Saxton has agreed to pay Westinghouse the fixed sum of $6,250,000 as the full contract price for the reactor, plant equip-ment, fuel costs, materials and services to be supplied by n'estinghouse pursuant to this contract. [Tr. 38-9; 160-1]. .
Westinghouse also agreed to assume financial responsi-bility for all special nuclear material needed for the five-year period of operation as required by AEC regulations, and to pay directly to AEC all AEC charges in connection with such material. [Tr. 39;-160-1].
Inadditiontothe'paymenttohestingnouseof$6,250,000,'
Saxton has agreed to bear the-cost of certain modifications and additions to existing conventional facilities at the Saxton Steam Generating Station and to furnish certain i
4
)
ot.~.er iteus and services during tne design and construction paases of t..e pro jec t . Saxton has also agreed to bear the cost of operating ti.e plant, except fuel costs watch are to be borne by Westinganuse. {Tr. 39; 160-1).
4 Tne estimated financial requirements of ti.e project through December 31, 1962, i.e. through the period to be covered by the provisional operating license, are $7,367,056, consisting bf actual expenditures through June 30, 1961, of
$4,677,056! snd estimated costs for toe period July 1, 1961, to December 31, 1962, of $2,690,000. This estimate covers payment of the total contract price of $6,250,000 to Westinghouse, the cost of modifications and additions to the existin8 Fr 3 rating station, the cost of operating the facility, . . ', : 2u g the cost of training operating
>ersonnel, and ..lscallaneous other expenses. {Tr. 39-40; 161].
Saxton's ability to meet the financial requirements-of the project depende on contract arrangements which Saxton has made with the four GPU operating subsidiaries-to contribute predetermined shares of the expenses of the project. Testimony at the hearing establishes that the estimated amounts required by Saxton for the period of the provisional operating license are amply covered by contact commitments from the four GPU subsidiaries and by necessary approvals from the SEC and State regulatory agencies.
[Tr. 40-1; 159-60; 161). Tne 'four GPU cubsidiaries are eacn financially capable of undertaking their respective shares of tne project expense. [Tr . 40-1; 161-2 ] .
Proof of Financial Protection Saxton has made arrangements witn NELIA for oublic liability insurance and has filed the necessary proof of financial protection in the form of a standard NELIA liability p#Etoy, providing coverage up to $1,000,000, and a letter from r NELIA dated May 19, 1961, stating that NELIA is prepared to increase tne limit of liability up*
to $3,600,000 as soon as the higher licit is needed. The amount of $3,600,000 is theiamount of financial protection, computed in accordance with Part 140 of xEC's re6ulations, which will be required before the reactor begins operation.
i
[Tr. 11; 41-2; 162).
Completion of Facility Section 50.57 'of the Commission's regulations permits the issuance of a provisional operating license prior to completion of the licensed facility upon a finding that 1 there is reasonable assurance that the facility will be ready for initial fuel loading within ninety (90) days l
from the date of issuance of the prodstnal operating-license. The Westinghouse Project Manager testified on l
t
- 41 - ,
I l
~oenalf of the applicant, and a memoer of toe Division of Compliance testified on behalf of the AEC staff, as to tne current status of construction of the Saxton facility i and toe sened.le for its completion. (Tr. 75-69; 90-1; 167-79; 160-1). Tnis schedule contemplates that the Saxton reactor will be ready for initial fuel loading on or about November 15, 1961. on the basis of the testimony,'there is reasonable assuranco that the Saxton reactor will'be coupleted in accordance witn the license application and will be ready for initial fuel loading within ninety days from tne date of issuance of a provisional operating license. Good cauae has also been shown that this intermediate decision should become immediately effective in accordance with and subject to the provisions of Section 50.57(e).
Section 50.57 of the commission's regulations also requires taat each provisional operating license include
" appropriate provisions with' respect-to any uncompleted items of construction". Accordingly, the provisional operating license to be issued to Saxton includes a condition prohibiting operation of the Saxton facility until the Director, . Division of Licensing. and Regulation, has found that construction of the facility has been completed' in conformity with Saxton's Final _ Safeguards Report, and requiring that a . copy of such finding be
7 . . . . . ., _ . _
promptly placed in the record of tue licensinc; proceedings.
(Applicant's Exnibit No. 3 (Proposed Licensu), Section 4).
A proviso to tain condition, however, would allow loadinh of t..e first core and operation of tne reactor witn the reactor head off and at a power level not exceeding 200 tr ' mal kilowatts prior to a finding of completion of certain enumerated systems. None of the enumerated systems are necessary to the safety of the plant prior to operation at power with the reactor head in place. (Tr. 46; 224-6].
Pfops, sed License and Technical Specifications Applicant presented at the hearing a proposed form of provisional operatin6 license which had been worked out in consultation with the AEC staff. [ Applicant's Exhibit No. 3 (Proposed License) and Applicant's Exhibit No'. 4 (Changes and Additions to Proposed Technical the Specifications);
outset of Tr. 6-7] Counsel for the AEC staff stated at/the-hearinga that in the absence of good cause shown to the contrary, the staff proposed.to recommend issuance of the. license in substantially the form-presented by the applicant.
[Tr. 11-12).
Secti5n 3 of the proposed license contains certain reporting and record keeping requirements, particularly with respect to the " change procedure" contained in subsection 3 B. This " change procedure" has:been modeled l
l
. . - . - -- . - . - - -.- .- _- . . . - _ - . - - - - . - . -. ~
- w3 -
af ter tr.e provisions of t.'.e current VEW,1 operatind llcCuSe and tr,e propoced ar.:endc..ents to Part 50 of t.:e Com..iission's regulations puolished in toe Federal Register for April y, 1961, howe er, there t.as been added to these prov!
a definition of the term " facility" as used in L of Saxton's proposed license. Applicant testified that the definition includes all of the plant systems and 1
components wnich have any significant bearing on tne safety f
The AEC staff expressed the of the reactor. [Tr. 45).
I
\ belief t6st there is no credible possibility that changes i
in plant systems outside the definition would significantly The principal affect the safety of the reector. [Tr. 267].
effect of tne definition will be to eliminate reporting requirements for changes in those portions of the plant which are unrelated to nuclear safety. [Tr. 13; 46; 267). .
In addition to all of the foregoing constituting findings and conclusions, and based upon the entire record of this proceeding
- including the contentions and statements of participants and the proposed findings and conclusions-which have been adopted, modified or rejected, as- shown-herein, the Presiding Officer hereby further finde .
- 1. Saxton Nuclear Experimental Corpora 1on, a duly organized, non-profit corporation existin6 under
4
- 44 and pursuant to tc.e laws of toe Coumonwealto of Penocylvania, Permit No. CPPR-6, dated is tr.e r. older of Construction February 11, 1960, authorizing construction of a light water moderated and cooled pressurized reactor at the Saxton Station of the Pennsylvania Electric Company situated approximately 20 miles southeast of Altoona, Pennsylvania.
- 2. Saxton has submitted the technical information omitted from and required to complete its application for a provisio#a'l operating license.
3 06hstruction of the saxton facility has proceeded, and them is reasonable assurance that the facility will be completed, in conformity with the construction permit and the application, as amended, the pro"1sions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the rules and regulations-of the Commission.
- 4. There is ree.sonable assurance that the activities authorized by the provisional operating license hereinafter ordered can be-conducted without endangering _the health and safety of the publ.ic, and that such activities-will be conducted in compliance with the Atomic Energy:Act of 1954, as amended, and the rules and regulations 1of.the Commission.
- 5. saxton is technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities specified by the provisional operating license hereinafter ordered in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission.
l
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- o. Saxton c.as furnis.ied to tue Comaission proof of financial protection in accordance with 10 CFR, Part140
" Financial Protection acquirements and Inde:.mity Agreements" 7 Tnere is reasonable assurance that the saxton facility will be ready for initial loading with nuclear fuel witc.in ninety (90) days from the date of issuance of the provisional operating license.
- 8. Issuance of a provisional operating license to operate the'Saxton facility under the terms and conditions hereinaf ter' authorized will not be inimical to ele common defense and security or to the health and safety of tne public.
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:
- 1. The Division of Licensing and Regulation shall issue to Saxton Nuclear Experimental Corporation a provisional operating license pursuant to 10 CFR, Part 50.57 authorizing operation of the Saxton facility,-said license, including technical specifications, to be in substance and -form as set forth in Applicant 's Exhibit No. 3 as modified by Applicant's Exhibit-No. 4.
- 2. In accordance with 10 CFR, Part 50.57(e) this Intermediate Decision and Order shall become effective immediately upon issuance,. subject to: (1) tne review tnereof and further decision by the Commission i
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upon excepticns tnereto filed by any party witain twenty (20) days af ter the date hereof, pursuant to the Com-mission's rules of practice, and (2) such further order as the Commissioncny enter upon such except' ions or upon its own motion within forty-five (45) days after the date hereof; provided., nowe#7r, that in tne absence of any further Commission order pursuant to the foregoing, tnis Interbediate Decision shell become the final decision of the Commission at the end of such 45-day period.
Respectfully submitted, i
sMY m &% /
' "V / George F. Trowbridge Counsel for
' Saxton Nuclear Experimental Corporation l
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