ML20083J608

Response to Ucs & NRC 831205 Proposals Describing Means by Which Open Issues Re Mgt Competency/Integrity (Hartman Issue) Could Be Resolved to Allow Restart.Commission Not Responsible for Finding Path to Restart

ML20083J608
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	01/07/1984
From:	Aamodt M, Aamodt N AAMODTS
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 8401100209
Download: ML20083J608 (12)

Text

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. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [y[cED BEFORE THE COMMISSIONEFS .

'84 J!-9 Fi2:12 Nunzio J. .Palladino. Chairman Victor Gilinsky ,

Thomas Roberts James Asselstine .

Frederick Bernthal In the Matter of Metropolitan Edison Comnany Docket 50-289 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 ,

AAMODT COMMENTS TO PROPOSAIS OF DECEMBER 5, 1983 CONCERNING RESTART OF ~TMI-UNIT 1 -

Abstract .

'This document deals with two proposals presented to the Commission at its meeting on December 5.- 1983.

ihese proposals forwarded by the Union of Concerned .

. Scientists and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff

. described means by which open issues concerning ..

management" pompetency/ integrity (principally the

'_ . Hartman matter) 'could be ' resolved' by the Commission :t'o- .

allow' restart of the Unit 1 plant at Three Mile Island. ..

.; The Commission had stayed a hearing of the Hartman ,

matter in order to consider alternativb proposals for . .

resolving th~is matter. -

We discuss the merits of the UCS and NRC Staff proposals and then discuss, in our conclusions, the inaupronriateness of the Commission's consideration of these.cor similar trouosals 3 in the framework of the troceeding initiated by the Commission's Aucust 9, 1979 4 8401100209 840107 /1J J order. PDR ADOCK 05000289 G

proposal.-

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.v--- -

.-The parties were invited informally by both the Chairman

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,. and Commissioner Asselstine to present their opinions

_ , concerning i principle by' which the Commission could draw the line between management (whoeordered, had knowledge of, or were responsible for leak rate falsification at Unit 2) and the " working people".

6.

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On December 9,1983, UCS requested th'e Commission for the opportunity to respond to the Staffis proposal of December 5.

The NRC Staff, the only tarty to reuly (by service of December 29. 1983), did not oupose UCS's request. In the event that the Commission should act to grant UCS's request and extend it to all parties. we have included our cotLments concerning the Staff's proposal at this time.

1. UCS/Gilinsky Proposal for Pre-emptive Commission Decision to Remove GPU Management in order to Restart Unit 1 Reactor.

Our viewpoint remains, as expressed by Judge Milhollin in his renort of April 27, 1982, that' the entire operations staff was compromised by the cheating on tests. The matters of the falsification of leak rates at both units are -furth er evidence of wide-spread compromise among the- operations staff.

All except Harold Hartman have withheld their- information concerning the leak rate falsification despite numerous

^

opportunities to provide information relevant 1to the TMI-2 accident and to' the cheating at Unit 1. ',,_____..._..._

While we have been concerned that management's _ >

responsibility for the cheating on tests not be absolved3 (sincemanahrementallowed"openbook"testsdespitethe Commission's directive in 1980 to Henry Hukill (from Collins)),

we never excused the cheating and lying of the operaEr's7 -

We felt that in making the operators " scapegoats", the

, Commonwealth and others were allowing the culpabilitp. of GPU-and plant management to go unaddressed.

Several illustrative ri - -

sentences from our response to the Commonwealth and Staff's positions concerning Operator G; who lied about his chehting on company tests, are provided:

We do not condone the false testimony of Operator G, nor do we understand why the Commonwealth or the Staff twould find G's elective termination a suitable resolution of this serious crime.

We find, however, the roots of Operator G's false testimony of more concern. These roots were Licensee's lack of responsibility in administering tests according to t u traditional and Commission standards..c.n!

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Aamodt Reply, January.18, 1983 We believe 'that the TMI-1 organization, as a whoia, ' ,

has been involved in wide-spread cheating. The evidence -

is clear concerning cheating on tests; operation of the plants in viclation of technical specifications,efalsified reports provided to the NRC, and in withholding and distorting information during the Restart Proceeding. New management personnel -- those who have joined since the TMI-2 accident --

have been enjoined into the compromised organism, which until -

.this day seeks to cover its knowledge and responsibility for

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the Hartman matter. _ _ _ . . - - -

-Other new individuals in positions of lesser respons,1bility

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-- and knowledge can only be expected to follow the example of the organization. In fact, compromise of new employees may proceed their hiring. According to a candidate engineer, Thomas Quinn, GPU management supplied information through an employment agency which enable him to pass.a psychological screening which he had previously failed. NRC Staff's recent

[]~ attempt to dismiss the Quinn allegations as an isolated incident ~

--- is simply not credible nor responsive. (See Board Notification -

5 83-08, February 1, 1983; Faegre & Benson Recort September. 1983; NRC Investigation Report. Case Number 1-83-003. October 12. 1983 and December 23. 1983 letter Starostecki to Hukill)s

2. The NRC Staff's Proposal .for Restart at 25% of Full Power with Round-the-Clock NRC Insnectors.

Even if the Staff could obtain ', capable , instectors who were knowledreable of B&W Dlants. as promised by kr. Eurley of Region I, we have little confidence 3 based on Dast Staff uerformance, in the canability of these individuals to rerulate. NRC resident inspectors did not prevent falsification of leak rate data at ThI 3 Unit 1 or 2. They did not prevent the overation of these ulants in violation of technical sDecifications. Daey were cither unaware of the true oDerating conditions of these plants or they withheld information. The:

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inspectors either never observed the adminis_tration .of tests with "open books" and cooperation among examinees or never-

) reported what they observed. ,'

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Mr. Murley made the point that the inspectors: are  :-

"to watch the operators because they have not operated the c-

, ,; plant" . (Tr. 127) In view of the point NRC dad ~e throughou't" --

the hearine concernine the site-specific des ~ign of the TMI-T '

plant, we are at a loss ~to unders,tand how NRC inspectors can have_ intimate knowledge of Unit 1 which exceeds that- of licensed

_ operators who have particitated in the TMI-1 training program.

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• e NRC Staff's proposal is extfemely weak. A policing action by NRC is not an acceptable alternative to a competent and trustworthy management or experienced and~;

trained operators. In addition, the issue of who would serve as emergency director is left open'. The single management person with experience on an'd knowledge of the unique TEI-1 reactor is Michael Ross, the Supervisor of Operations, who is under investigation concerning falsification of leak rates at Unit 1, who was involved with the operation of Unit 2 and who was considered by ,

Judge Milhollin and us to have been involved in the cheating on the NRC licensing exams.- According to the record evidence,.

Messrs. Hukill, Clark and Elntner would not have site-specific _ _

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knowledge of the design and operation of Unit 1 as needed.by an emergency director.' . .

Conclusion

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Neither the UCS/Gilinsky nor the NRC Staff proposal . ,_

l l for restart of Unit 1 is accentable. These oronosals._are,3 in addition, inanprouriate considirations for the Commissf on, in the context'of the uroceedine initiated bv. the Commission's _ .

August 9 1979. order. The Commission's task, under that order; was to decide whether Idcensee had met its burden of

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Licensee management pehsonnel

[ 1/ See Tr. 11,520-21 (Arnold).

j. who. make on-the-spot safety decisions during emergency conditiona

' n eed d e tp i_l ad personal knowled ga of the design and operation of TMI-1.

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. - - - .. m -

~7-uroof concerning the issues of the nroceedine.

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We believe that the Commission has strayed from the course set by the August 9 and subsequent Mmrch 3. 1980 orders.

These orders, structured by commissioners with the events of the TMI-2 accident freshly in mind, precisely stated short and long- term items which Licensee was required to address if it was to obtain a favorable Commission decision for restart. The NRC Staff fleshed out the uarticular requirements for meetina those items. Now, the Staff, in the persons of Harold Denton and Thomas Murlev 3 have informed the Commission that their respective organizations, RRR and Region I f have inderendently concluded (what. was Dainfully auparent to us as early as February. 1981 2) -- that licensee has failed to

. comply with identified requirements in a timely fashion! .

2/ Concerning the tra$nine urogram in response to .the -

. Commission's August 9 order.. .

g/

. liy judgment is that the organization has not been - -

effective at bottom line. They have not cleaned . -

up Uhit 2. . They have not moved aggressively to .

put this plant at the top of the list with regard' . ~~

to things like simulators and post-THI fixes and -

those sorts of things. They have -- in that sense ,- -

.;r they've not been an effective ' organization if you- '

i_- - -

look at them from the big picfure. They've done :-' - -

.- what we've ordered, but I thihk if you look back -

over all the years, there's been plenty of P opportunity so that-we wouldn't still be debating .

today whether we~ can certify that all the post-ThI fixes are in. .

, Denton. Tr. 123-4. Commission Meetina. December 5. 1983 Well, you know, prior to my going to Region I in ,

June, I had very little involvement in TMI; in fact, almost none. do last. week in preparation

,. for this meeting I got my senior staff together and residents, everyone from the region who's pretty closely in touch with U I, and we asked ourselves some basic questions. How do we really feel about this clant, about the operators and about the

. mana gemen t, and we hammered it out all last week. -

And we came dow,n bacically where Harold did. -

independently, I might add. Murley. Tr. 126-7. Id.

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We believed in 1981 that Ilcensee had had sufficient time to exercise its opportunity for a second chance to operate a nuclear reactor at TMI. We could not excuse .

11censee's inability to administer a model training program to teach the THI-2 events.4 Can the Commission be as

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permissive,as the licensing Board was in 1981 and trust the Idcensee to undertake and adequately implement commitments in training that have not already taken place 7 5 In the matter of augmentation of operator training, the licensee has only now defined criteria for qualifications of instructors of licensed operctors, and in June 1983 an order for an exact replica simulator was placed which will not be available for training use until 1986. The necessity

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for the immediate address of these two training matters was

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made imminently clear to Idcensee soon after the accident.

-!bie quality of instruction was the subject of a meeting with

-I, the Staff on June 14, 1979 and the Commission referenced the

- - -memorandum.of the meeting in its August 9,1979 order.

The value of an exact replica simulator, on site, was explained

-in?the Eytchinson report of October 1979[ which was_ highly

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critical of the B&W simulator program presently used by Idcensee.- _.

-GFU has had the opportunity to meet all burdens of proof, -

including disproof of the evidence of criminal management i/ licensee's own experts reported misgivings about the credentials of the instructors and the limitations of training on the B&W simulator. Idcensee Ex. 27, Review of OART.

5/ See recommended conditions, August 27, 1981 and July 27, 1982

- Partial Initial Decisions. -

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and employee actions in falsifying leak rates at both units.

Not only has Licensee reluctantiv and inadequate 1v met its burden on ident.ified issues, the licensee has brought about the uresent situation, where numerous matters which_ challenge management comuetency/integri.ty have recently surfaced. These matters were deliberately concealed by licensee -- some for over four years. Investigation of these matters, which Ilcensee had the choice to onenly air and address in the Restar' Proceeding in 1980 - 1981, could mostrone the Commission's decision until 1985 accordint to the NRC Staff's estimates. .

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We find the delay unacceptable in view of Idcensee's

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deliberate withholding of critical information and the Commission's order for an expeditious hearing. We_believe

[ that the Commission is compelled to act, without further _ delay,

~~ '- on'the , basis of the preponderance of extra-record and_ _ record __ _.

evidence which challenges any prior Licensing Board decisions which approve management competency and integrity. . __

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~ We remind the Commission of our motion of October ;27,1983._

(amended on November 11, 1983) that moved the commission to

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- - '-- -deny:Yhe license'of GPU' to operate TMI-1 on -the basis _ _of

I' - "the evidence that alre~ady exists, some of which ewas . presented .

in ten attachments to these documents. ,

No party, except the licensee, has disputed the evidence provided in the ittachments to our motion. Except for the Ilcensee, all parties have recently made statements which support the merits of our motion. UCS emphatically stated to the Commission during the December 5,1983 meeting that

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m' GPU management is unfit to run the TEI-1 plant. Although UCS has been a veteran intervenor in licensing proceedings, rarely has it become involved with management issues. UCS s' now considers plant design and procedure matters which it has litigated in the restart proceeding as jeopardized by the gravity of the incompetency of GPU management.

The very position of the NRC Staff, presented to the Commission on December 5, 1983, demonstrates little, if any, confidence in GPU management.

The Staff must believe that

. management of the plant needs 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> policing to make such -

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a recommendation. In addition, the Region I staff considered .

the operators too inexperienced to do unwatched.

It is not the responsibility of the Commission.to find

.__some way to get Unit 1 restarted. The Commiesion does not

• have the responsibility to protect the investments of GPU _

stockholders nor should it concern itself with.. demand or cost of electricity. The Commission's sole responsibility is to

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regulate, to license or to deny license to those who seek.

permission, for whatever reason, to use nuclear materials.

The' Commission must act now to fulfill that responsibility -

-by denying the GPU license to operate nuclear facilities. __

The characteristics of the GPU nuclear operations at TEI and Oyster Creek (both, incidently, ranked in the bottom-half of operating reactors by recent INPO evaluation) should

.- . convince any reasonable mind that the Commission's continued fcrbearance with GIU as a licensee would be a reckless and i

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4 willful act which would continue to endanger the lives of the people living in the vicinity of these plants.

Respectfully submitted, f h' ddt#MA--

Norman 0. Aamodt At K ~<n.

1 -

m eh Earjo h M. Aamodt

. January 7, 1984 cc: Docketing & Service Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Bos.rd Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Jack Goldberg, Esq.

Geroge F. Trowbridge, Esq.

Union of Concerned Scientists TMIA ECNP' Steven C, Sholly ~

Jane Ice _.

• Representative Bob Edgar .-

Representative Edward J. Marke) -  :

~~

- Senator John Heinz . .

. --- Senator Arlen bpecter -

Eldon Dixon 1

~~ ~ ~ ~

City Council", Hariisburg, PA

--~~~ ~ ~

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Representative Frank Harrison > .-- 'T

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.~ . .

Ms. Virginia Southard

" Bruce Molholt - -

Dauphin County Commissioners Representative Geoyge Gekas .] . _ ., _ { . _ [..; } ~

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January 7, 1984 4,7L:....a,..~.

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. Senator Arlen Specter W '. h United States Senate Washington, D. C.

I Lear Senator Specters

. ihe Aamodts appreciated your interest in the TMI-Unit 1 proceeding. However, we are troubled concerning what appears .

to be acce confusion concerning the purpose of the proceeding and the Commission's role. (We refer to your. interest in

, the bias - for or against nuclear power - of those who participated in the hearing, and in a Ihiladelphia television

- AM4u.

interview,4you stated your intent to introduce a bill to -

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f expedite licensing decisions since the delay in restarting w  ;

i TMI-Ibit t was having adverse impact on the development of e

~ nuclear power.)

drbike the Congress, the NRC canno1f be in the business

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of promoting nuclear power. We trust the enclosed document

• l [ .- will be helpful to you in its attempt to define the purpose l ~ ~

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of the restart proceeding and our role as intervenors. _

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-(See the Conclusions, in particular.) In addition, excerpts from a Senate Subcommittee meeting (Udall, February 24, 1981)

• ~

! and a letter and related document of the Appeal Board are attached because of their relevance to the matter of what i - you view as unreasonable delay.

I We would disappointed if the Senate would seek to under=ine t

a legal process which it has established, simply because the desired results are not forthcoming.

e pectfully your*

. NMb /m)

L'irjorIe M. Aamodt

• ec: same as for Comments, January 7, 1964 e#

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UNITED STATES

1. e n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .'

g jE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL PANEL 0 TfD

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, wAsw tNGTON. D.C. 20$55 E M '9 Pl2:n August 8, 1983

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Mr. Donald E. Eossler 501 Vine Street '

Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 RE: ' METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, ET AL. *

(Three Mile Island Nuclear StEi E ,

Unit No. 1)

Docket' No. 50-289 ,, _

Dear Mr. Hon.dler:

Mr. Edles has aske'd me to respond to your August 3,"

1983, letter commenting on the use of the term " .estart." .

, in the title of the Three Mile Island case. - .

The use of the term is simply a means of describing

1. - -

the type of proceeding involved (the terms " operating -

,: .: r .. license," " construction permit," and " license: amen'dment" - .

._ are used to describe other types of proceedings) . The -

.. ... term is not intended to suggest the eventual outcome of

_ .the case one way or the other. Indeed, in-its:first .

major appellate opinion in the case, ALAB-697, involving -

Jt. . . issues of emergency planning, the Board observed thatcthe~

a. s  :. Commission ordered the hearings "to determine whether : - . ., -

.. _.- if so, ic

' un7.erTwhat Unit .1.should be permitted conditions." to resume (emphasis operation added) and, EoEd

_I.have'en

. s n . ;r _ - the =first few pages of ALAB-697; the reference is . at page -, - . _.

1268. ,

, . .Mr. Edles has asked me to send 'your letter and a. copy of this response to the Public Doctment Room so..that the

' public will be aware of the exchange of correspondence. A-copy of your letter and this response will' also be served .

, on all parties to the case.

Very truly yours, Q,. Au C. an Shoemaker '

Secretary to the

. Appeal Board Enclosure cc: Docketing and Service Branch- h hh

• repeat it here. In essence. after me accident that occurred at Unit 2 ef de Three Stile Islana nu:! 2 fa:i!.ty on Starch 23.1979. de Commission ordered Un;t ! of '

that facility to rema:n in a cold shutdow n :endition. iUnit I w as, by coin:idence.

coming up to full pow er after a refueling outage ind was immedhtely > hut dow n by

. the licensee follow ing the T511 2 accident.1 The Commission :t that time indica:ed that, based on its preliminary review of the Unit 2 accident ehtonoiogy it lacked the necessan reasonable assurance that the Unit I facility could be operated

, without endangering the health and safety of the public. Thereafter the Commis-l sion ordered that a hearing be held to determine whether Unit I should lie permitted q to resume operation and. if so. under w hat conditions.: At issue re de licensee's management:apability and technica! resources, the adequacy of Unit I design and proceduas. separation of Units I and 2. and emergency preparedness.' iies:ings on these matters lasted nearly two years and produced a transcript of over 27.000 pagest as we!! ss hundreds of exhibits. Tne Licensing Board has issued three separate partial initial decisions. plus companion orders dealing with environmen- ,

tal concems and the monitoring of improvements found to be requirei together.

they comprise over 1.300 typewritten pages. .Now before several Appeal Beards are various appeals from those decisions.

The Licensing Board issued its decision in parts to allow me maximum time' tor Commission review.' On August 27.1981. the Board issued its first partial initial decision on licensee's management competence but retained jurisdiction oser managemer;t issues to inquire into allegations of cheating on examinations given to .

i licensee's reactor operators.8 Then, on December 14.1981, the Board issued its j- second partial initial decision conceming plant design and procedures, separation

,. .. ,; .I of units, and emergency planning.' A separate decision dealing with environmen- -

-  ! tal matters was issued a day later.'The final partial initial decision on management cariability. addressing the cheating inquiry, was issued on July 27. 1982.*

8 See Merropoluan E.fison Company (Three Stile Island Nucl car Station. Unit li. LBP 3132. la NRe 381. 336-99 t 194i e sproced4ral ba:k;roend and mansgement issues. "1555. 2t "l N.

See CL1-79-8.10 NRC 141 a 1979). -

8 The operating license for Unit I (now suspendeds lists CPL' Nuclear Cor;cration. Nietropolitsa Edison Company. Jersey Central Power and Light Company, and Pennsylvania Electne Compa::y as 4 licensees. For convenience, me refer to them collectively as the ticensee" throughout this decision.

D; ' See LBP-8132 note 1. supro.14 NRC at 399 iPID 6). The Commission originally intended to f renew the Licensing Board's decision itself but later directed that an Appeal Board tv designated to hetr init al appeals. See CLI sI;19.14 NRC 304 (19811 Whether. or when. T>ti.I is permined to

. .resart.1

~ b4 NRC)oseser,is before the Commission as part ofits immediste effectiver:ess redem. CLI-31.'4 1097 !! 93I1. In an oreer served on October 6.1932. the Commission 2.nounced its intent to rule by December 10 on *he er to lift the immed ate effectis eness of its order that TNII t re-. sin in a .co;d scutdowr..

l ~ 8 LBP 8132. note 1. supra. i4 NRC a 402 403 8 P!D "/ t-45).

• LBP-8159.14 NRC l! piant design. procedures. cnd separst:on. P!D "f t913:9. e nergency pla .ning. P!D "1330-20 $i.

• LBP 61-60. la NRC 17:4 1981).

' LPS-E2 56.16 NRC :sl iPID "20 9-2425s.

1268 t

e- - - - -Cet)yp).!k*C hNL'f )$

NAME: HIIO55010

' PAGE 138

, 3274 That is just an emotion, a reaction.

( 3275 Dr. plasset. It is clear our Chairman is more, charitable 3276 than the past-Chairman.

3277 Dr. Mark. I am not sure. But there are differences in 3278 plant and you meet this face to face at the ACRS uhen they 3279 come and bring their own people to discuss a construction 3230 permit or operating permit or a problem and some of them are 3281 just very much in touch with what is needed to be in touch 328.2 with and in command of it; and others are calling in their 3283 vendors and saying, Well, hey, I don't really knou, but 3284 Mr.

so-and-so is here from Babcock C 1411cox, perhaps he 3285 does.

3286 The Chairman. Let me touch on one~other thing then I ~

3137 rally have to close the hearing. I raised a question this

( 323'8 morning of whether there is a valid reason why TMI-1 which

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3289 uas an operating reactor, apparently had some histor'y of 3290 operating safely.in any event. why it should still'he clo' sed -

3291 doun af ter 2 years ?

Is there s oine thing special about that .

3292 relationship or- uou'Id ue always close i~t d oun', ~ tha t 1s , if 3293 you got a pair of them should you always close down one i~f 3294 you have a LOCA or severe event in the other?

3295 Dr. plesset?

3296 Dr. plesset.

I think.this relates to the point just 3297 discussed.

I think that both Ihree Mile Island-1 and- _-- TMI-2 3293 epresent a management that was incredibly incompetent and N

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- - _ - - -- - - I

HAME: HIIOS5010 PAGE 139 3299 maybe even dishonest. I I

3300 think that means that you have a different attitude towards that license or re-license than i 330 1 you would towards continued 3302 operation of. for example, Rancho Seco or Davis-Bessie.

3303 I think it's quite different.

1 g

3304 Dr. Mark.

I" think the 3305 technical features of that plant. '

-if in trusted hands,

_ _ _ . - and in.a politicallyJo.sAibJe_ clima ta, $

3306 H are y .... such . .that. - there . i 3307

. s no reason uhy that plant could not q

have been turned on in the summer of 1979, except for these 3308 very real reasons. But they .are not mechanical'.

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f 3309 - ~

The Chairman. Gentleman. _

l 3310 you do good work, and I think the country is glad. as I am, that you ar~e [

m 3311 on the job and p g

giving of your time at the ACRS and I thank you for giving 3312 of your time here today.

3313

,tJe will no doubt.have you back here again.

J.'3 314 Thank you very much. .

3315

. The subcommittee is. adjourned.

3316 -

Whereupon, at 2:36 p.m.. -

3317 the subcommittee ' adjournad to thi call of the chair.

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