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Category:REPORTS-TOPICAL (BY MANUFACTURERS-VENDORS ETC)
MONTHYEARML20217L8931999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 1 to BAW-10235, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs ML20210K8831999-07-29029 July 1999 Non-proprietary Addendum B to BAW-2346P,Rev 0 Re ANO-1 Specific MSLB Leak Rates ML20196A6251999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to TR BAW-10235, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs ML20248F7441998-05-31031 May 1998 Reactor Vessel Working Group,Response to RAI Regarding Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity ML20248D6011998-03-31031 March 1998 Suppl 9 to CENPD-279, Annual Rept on Abb CE ECCS Performance Evaluation Models ML20203H6701998-01-31031 January 1998 Rev 0 to non-proprietary Version of BAW-10232, OTSG Repair Roll Qualification Rept (Including Hydraulic Expansion Evaluation) ML20199G9531998-01-31031 January 1998 Non-proprietary Alternate Repair Criteria for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once- Through Sgs ML20211N4921997-09-30030 September 1997 Rev 1 to SIR-94-080-A, Relaxation of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Insp Requirements ML20135F3681996-11-30030 November 1996 Non-proprietary Final Rept Repair of 3/4 O.D. SG Tubes Using Leak Tight Sleeves ML20112E8491996-02-28028 February 1996 Suppl 7 to Annual Rept of Abb C-E ECCS Performance Evaluation Models ML17353A4341995-10-31031 October 1995 Rev 1 to BAW-2245, Initial Rt of Linde 80 Welds Based on Fracture Toughness in Transition Range. ML17264A1181995-07-31031 July 1995 Response to Part (1) of GL 92-01,Rev 1,Suppl 1. ML20083Q9261995-05-30030 May 1995 Joint Applications Rept for Safety Injection Tank Aot/Sti Extension ML20083Q9861995-05-30030 May 1995 Joint Applications Rept for Emergency Diesel Generators AOT Extension ML20085H3221995-02-28028 February 1995 Suppl 6 to Topical Rept CENPD-279, Annual Rept on Abb CE ECCS Performance Evaluation Models,Final Rept,Ceog Task 865, Dtd Feb 1995 ML20073D4561994-09-30030 September 1994 Verification of Cecor Coefficient Methodology for Application to PWRs of Entergy Sys ML20069D4261994-02-28028 February 1994 Annual Rept on C-E ECCS Codes & Methods for 10CFR50.46 ML20063C7571993-12-31031 December 1993 Qualification of Reactor Methods for Pressurized Water Reactors of Entergy Sys ML20081K9821991-05-31031 May 1991 Final Rept on Reactor Vessel App G Pressure-Temp Limits for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 for 21 Efpys ML20067A5241990-12-31031 December 1990 Final Submittal in Response to NRC Bulletin 88-011, 'Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification.' ML20042F3391990-04-30030 April 1990 Suppl 1 to Responses to Questions on C-E Rept CEN-386-P, 'Verification of Acceptability of 1-Pin Burnup Limit of 60 Mwd/Kg for C-E 16X16 PWR Fuel.' ML20059M4481990-03-31031 March 1990 Unit 1 Pressure-Temp Limits for 15 Efpy ML20247E3231989-06-30030 June 1989 Nonproprietary Verification of Acceptability of 1-Pin Burnup Limit of 60 Mwd/Kg for C-E 16x16 PWR Fuel ML20245G7121989-05-31031 May 1989 Submittal in Response to NRC Bulletin 88-11, 'Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification' ML20246N3841989-04-30030 April 1989 Analysis of Capsule ANI-C,Arkansas Power & Light Co, Arkansas Nuclear One,Unit 1,Reactor Vessel Matl Surveillance Program ML20211A1031986-09-30030 September 1986 Small Break LOCA Analysis for B&W 177FA Lowered Loop Plants in Response to NUREG-0737,Item II.K.3.31 ML20155J4911986-05-31031 May 1986 Rev 0 to Core Protection Calculator/Control Element Assembly Calculator Software Mods for CPC Improvement Program Reload Data Block ML20155J5051986-05-31031 May 1986 Rev 1 to Functional Design Requirements for Control Element Assembly Calculator ML20155J5231986-05-31031 May 1986 Rev 1 to Functional Design Requirement for Core Protection Calculator ML20202B1131986-04-30030 April 1986 Nonproprietary Suppl 1,Rev 3, CPC Protection Algorithm Software Change Procedure ML20151Z0521986-01-31031 January 1986 Rev 3 to CEN-39(A)-NP, CPC Protection Algorithm Software Change Procedure ML20151Z0641986-01-31031 January 1986 Rev 0 to CEN-323-NP Reload Data Block Constant Installation Guidelines ML20135A5571985-08-31031 August 1985 B&W Owners Group Cavity Dosimetry Program ML20134N3021985-07-31031 July 1985 Rev 00 to Functional Design Requirement for Core Protection Calculator ML20134N2941985-07-31031 July 1985 Rev 00 to Functional Design Requirement for Control Element Assembly Calculator ML20129F9301985-07-31031 July 1985 Cycle 5 Shoulder Gap Evaluation ML20100J1551985-03-31031 March 1985 Nonproprietary Typical Data Base Constants for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 ML20100J1801985-03-31031 March 1985 Nonproprietary Rev 0 to Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Core Protection Calculator Sys Phase I Design Qualification Test Rept ML20100J1991985-03-31031 March 1985 Nonproprietary Rev 0 to Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Core Protection Calculator & Control Element Assembly Calculator Data Base Listing ML20100J2221985-03-31031 March 1985 Nonproprietary Rev 1 to Core Protection Calculator/Control Element Assembly Calculator Sys Phase II Software Verification Test Rept ML20101U3551984-12-31031 December 1984 Nonproprietary Revised Rod Bow Penalties for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 ML20106E3251984-10-31031 October 1984 Nonproprietary Once-Through Steam Generator Mechanical Sleeve Qualification ML20107N0221984-10-31031 October 1984 Nonproprietary CPC Methodology Changes for Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2 Cycle 5 ML20094J7101984-07-31031 July 1984 Analyses of Capsule AN1-A,Arkansas Power & Light Co, Arkansas Nuclear One,Unit 1,Reactor Vessel Matl Surveillance Program ML20098F1361984-04-30030 April 1984 Thermal-Hydraulic Crossflow Applications ML20083G5321983-11-30030 November 1983 Cycle 4 Shoulder Gap Evaluation ML20087N2541983-11-30030 November 1983 Nonproprietary Shoulder Gap Data Taken on Batch D Assemblies After Cycle 3. Info Deleted ML20066D2241982-03-31031 March 1982 Effects of Vessel Head Voiding During Transients & Accidents in C-E Nsss. Portions Intentionally Deleted Due to Lack of Relevancy to NUREG-0737,Item II.K.2.17.Util Did Not Participate in Development of Deleted Sections ML20039F8681981-12-31031 December 1981 Evaluation of Pressurized Thermal Shock Effects Due to Small Break LOCAs W/Loss of Feedwater for AR Nuclear One- Unit 2 Reactor Vessel. ML20009F2021981-07-31031 July 1981 Nonproprietary Version of Response to Questions on Documents Supporting ANO-2,Cycle 2,License Submittal, Amend 2-NP 1999-07-29
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217L8931999-10-31031 October 1999 Rev 1 to BAW-10235, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs ML20212L1141999-10-0101 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Request for Exemption from Technical Requirements of 10CFR50,App R,Section III.G.2.c 0CAN109902, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Arkansas Nuclear One,Units 1 & 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Arkansas Nuclear One,Units 1 & 2.With ML20216J6271999-09-27027 September 1999 Rev 0 to CALC-98-R-1020-04, ANO-1 Cycle 16 Colr ML20212F5261999-09-22022 September 1999 SER Approving Request Reliefs 1-98-001 & 1-98-200,parts 1,2 & 3 for Second 10-year ISI Interval at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 0CAN099907, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with ML20211F4281999-08-25025 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee Provided Acceptable Alternative to Requirements of ASME Code Section XI & That Authorization of Proposed Alternative Would Provide Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety 0CAN089904, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with ML20210K8831999-07-29029 July 1999 Non-proprietary Addendum B to BAW-2346P,Rev 0 Re ANO-1 Specific MSLB Leak Rates 0CAN079903, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with ML20207E7231999-06-0202 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Proposed Alternative Exam Methods Proposed in Alternative Exam 99-0-002 to Perform General Visual Exam of Accessible Areas & Detailed Visual Exam of Areas Determined to Be Suspect ML20196A0191999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Arkansas Nuclear One,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196A6251999-05-31031 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 0 to TR BAW-10235, Mgt Program for Volumetric Outer Diameter Intergranular Attack in Tubesheets of Once-Through Sgs ML20195D1991999-05-28028 May 1999 Probabilistic Operational Assessment of ANO-2 SG Tubing for Cycle 14 ML20206M7711999-05-11011 May 1999 SER Accepting Relief Request from ASME Code Section XI Requirements for Plant,Units 1 & 2 0CAN059903, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with ML20206F0691999-04-29029 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Re ISI Plan for Third 10-year Interval & Associated Requests for Alternatives for Plant,Unit 1 ML20205M6941999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief for Second 10-yr Inservice Inspection Interval for Plant,Unit 1 ML20205D6061999-03-31031 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Proposed Approach Acceptable to Perform Future Structural Integrity & Operability Assessments of Carbon Steel ML20205R6351999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with ML20205D4711999-03-26026 March 1999 SER Accepting Util Proposed Alternative to Employ Alternative Welding Matls of Code Cases 2142-1 & 2143-1 for Reactor Coolant System to Facilitate Replacement of Steam Generators at Arkansas Nuclear One,Unit 2 ML20204B1861999-03-15015 March 1999 Safety Evaluation Authorizing Licensee Request for Alternative to Augmented Exam of Certain Reactor Vessel Shell Welds,Per Provisions of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(5) 0CAN039904, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with ML20212G6381999-02-25025 February 1999 Ano,Unit 2 10CFR50.59 Rept for 980411-990225 ML20203E4891999-02-11011 February 1999 Rev 1 to 97-R-2018-03, ANO-2,COLR for Cycle 14 ML20199F0351998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Ano,Units 1 & 2 ML20198M7841998-12-29029 December 1998 SER Accepting Util Proposal to Use ASME Code Case N-578 as Alternative to ASME Code Section Xi,Table IWX-2500 for Arkansas Nuclear One,Unit 2 0CAN129805, LER 98-S02-00:on 981124,security Officer Found Not to Have Had Control of Weapon for Period of Approx 3 Minutes Due to Inadequate self-checking to Ensure That Weapon Remained Secure.All Security Officers Briefed.With1998-12-11011 December 1998 LER 98-S02-00:on 981124,security Officer Found Not to Have Had Control of Weapon for Period of Approx 3 Minutes Due to Inadequate self-checking to Ensure That Weapon Remained Secure.All Security Officers Briefed.With ML20196F4911998-12-0101 December 1998 SER Accepting Request for Relief ISI2-09 for Waterford Steam Electric Station,Unit 3 & Arkansas Nuclear One,Unit 2 ML20198D2441998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with ML20199F7401998-11-16016 November 1998 Rev 9 to ANO-1 Simulator Operability Test,Year 9 (First Cycle) ML20195B4801998-11-0707 November 1998 Rev 20 to ANO QA Manual Operations ML20195C4841998-11-0606 November 1998 SER Accepting QA Program Change to Consolidate Four Existing QA Programs for Arkansas Nuclear One,Grand Gulf Nuclear Station,River Bend Station & Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Into Single QA Program 0CAN119808, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Ano,Units 1 & 2. with ML20197H0741998-10-29029 October 1998 Rev 1 to Third Interval ISI Program for ANO-1 ML20155C1351998-10-26026 October 1998 Rev B to Entergy QA Program Manual ML17335A7641998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980923,inadvertent Actuation of Efs Occurred During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Involved with Event Were Counseled & Procedure Changes Were Implemented.With 981022 Ltr ML20154J2471998-10-0909 October 1998 SER Accepting Inservice Testing Program,Third ten-year Interval for License DPR-51,Arkansas Nuclear One,Unit 1 0CAN109806, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for ANO Units 1 & 2. with1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1998 for ANO Units 1 & 2. with ML20154E2171998-09-28028 September 1998 Follow-up Part 21 Rept Re Defect with 1200AC & 1200BC Recorders Built Under Westronics 10CFR50 App B Program. Westronics Has Notified Bvps,Ano & RBS & Is Currently Making Arrangements to Implement Design Mods 0CAN099803, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for ANO Units 1 & 2. with1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for ANO Units 1 & 2. with ML20237B7671998-08-19019 August 1998 ANO REX-98 Exercise for 980819 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML20236X2351998-08-0505 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Defect Associated W/Westronics 1200AC & 1200BC Recorders Built Under Westronics 10CFR50,App B Program.Beaver Valley,Arkansas Nuclear One & River Bend Station Notified.Design Mod Is Being Developed 0CAN089804, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Ano,Units 1 & 21998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Ano,Units 1 & 2 ML20196C7831998-07-30030 July 1998 Summary Rept of Results for ASME Class 1 & 2 Pressure Retaining Components & Support for ANO-1 ML20155H7161998-07-15015 July 1998 Rev 1 to 96-R-2030-02, Revised Reactor Vessel Fluence Determination ML20236R0531998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Ano,Units 1 & 2 ML20249B7791998-06-22022 June 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Findings,Resolutions & Conclusions Re Failure of Safety Related Siemens 4KV,350 MVA,1200 a Circuit Breakers to Latch Closed ML20249B5091998-06-15015 June 1998 SG ISI Results for Fourteenth Refueling Outage 1999-09-30
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X- .
a CEN-261(A)
I ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT 2 CYCLE 4 SHOULDER GAP EVALUATION NOVEMBER, 1983 COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC. -
WINDSOR, CT.
8401040275 831216 PDR ADOCK 05000360 P PDR
s
- l. IfFRODUCTI0fl Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (AN0-2) completed Cycle 3 on September 26, 1983. During the refueling outage, inspections of the shoulder gaps (distance between the top of the fuel rods and the bottom of the upper end fitting) in several fuel assemblies were performed. This report sumarizes those inspections and also describes the evaluation of the predicted shoulder gaps for fuel assemblies being operated for a third cycle in Cycle 4.
Shoulder gaps decrease with residence time in the reactor due to differential growth between the fuel rods and the fuel assembly structure (guide tubes).
Measurements of shoulder gap changes have now been made on selected ANO-2 fuel assemblies after Cycles 1, 2, and 3.
The measurements after Cycle 2 had indicated that the shoulder gap was de-creasing at a faster rate than expected. Since the fuel assemblies at ANO-2 are the lead exposure assemblies of the C-E 16 x 16 fuel design, a conservative prediction was made for the third cycle shoulder gap decrease rate. Use of the prediction, in combination with the measurements, had indicated that there was a potential for rods in some Batch C assemblies to come into contact with the upper end fitting before the end of Cycle 3.
A design modification was implemented in order to increase the shoulder gaps in those assemblies.
The shoulder gap measurements taken after Cycle 3 have provided the opportunity to monitor the actual behavior of the 16 x 16 fuel design at typical three cycle 7xposures, and thus permit a more accurate evaluation of the next batch (Batch D) being inserted for a third cycle of operation.
The measurements also have been used to determine whether a Batch C demonstra-tion assembly had sufficient shoulder gap to operate for a fourth cycle in Cycle 4.
A statistically based method has been used to evaluate shoulder gap clearance during Cycle 4. The method utilized both the measured Batch D performance thru two cycles and that of Batch C in its third cycle. Based on the '
evaluation, it was concluded that all Batch D assemblies would satisfy the criterion of 95% probability that the worst rod would not contact the upper end fitting during Cycle 4. This maintained the original design basis of the Batch D fuel. Therefore, none of the Batch D assemblies were modified for purposes of operation in Cycle 4.
One Batch D assembly was modified duringthe Cycle 3 outage in order to prepare it for a potential fourth cycle of operation in Cycle 5. The design modification incorporated stainless steel spacer shims that were essentially the same as those used in the Cycle 2 outage, except for a slightly shorter length.
The Batch C demonstration assembly could not be shown to have sufficient shoulder gap for a fourth cycle of operation. It will be replaced by a Batch A assembly in Cycle 4. All Cycle 4 fuel management studies and safety analyses had considered the option of either the Batch A or Batch C astembly being present in Cycle 4.
a
It. SHOULDER GAP MEASUREMEN_TS The fuel inspection program which provided the data for the evaluation of Cycle 4 shoulder gap clearance consisted of shoulder gap measurements in eight Batch C and sixteen Batch D fuel assemblies. Each assembly was examined on all four faces, and measurements were made on all peripheral fuel rods and (with the exception of one Batch D assembly) on any measur-able interior rods which might be limiting. A total of sewn Batch E assemblies were measured to gather information for future evaluations.
Eight Batch C assemblles were inspected. These included two characterized demonstration assemblies which had exhibited high gap closure rates during their initial two cycles; and six non-characterized assemblies, with two each in the categories of high, moderate, and low gap change rates thru the end of Cycle 2. Important conclusions from the Batch C inspections are summarized below.
- a. Those Batch C rods which had shown high shoulder gap change rates in earlier cycles continued to have high rates in Cycle 3 (rates are defined as inches of closure per unit of fluence). Therefore, it is not possible to take advantage of reduced rates of closure as the fuel assembly achieves higher exposures.
- b. The highest rate of shoulder gap change observed was less limiting than the maximum rates assumed in the Cycle 3 projection that determined which Batch C assemblies required modification for continued operation.
All four of the measured Batch C assemblies that were not modified for Cycle 3 continued to have adeouate shoulder gap clearance. All four measured Batch C assemblies that had been modified also had adequate shoulder gap clearance. None of the eight assemblies had shoulder gap change rates as high as the maximum rate used to determine whether they required modification for Cycle 3.
- c. The Batch C assemblies which had moderate or low change rates thru -
two cycles continued to exhibit similar behavior in their third cycle.
A total of sixteen of the 60 Batch D assemblies loaded for Cycle 4 were measured. The Batch D assemblies that were measured included two character-ized demonstration assemblies, which contained various test rods and which had been measured following Cycle 2. The other Batch D assemblies were the remaining three Batch D as:emblies inspected after one cycle, and eleven assemblies whose selection was biased to include a large representation of those which will have accumulated high exposures after three cycles.
Significant conclusions from the Batch D inspections are listed below,
- a. The shoulder gap change rates in Batch D were lower thru the first two cycles of operation than those in Batch C fuel thru its first two cycles. The maximum observed shoulder gap change in any Batch D assembly was about 85% of the maximum observed in Batch C at comparable fluences.
_ _ _ ____________ ___ _ _ _ _ )
,. b. For those Batch D assemblies that had shoulder gap measurements taken after both cycles 2 and 3, there was a trend toward lower shoulder gap change rates in the second cycle of operation (Cycle 3).
III. SHOULDER GAP EVALUATION The criterion used to evaluate the shoulder gap clearance in Batch D fuel was that, at the 95% probability level or grezter, the worst rod in the fuel assembly will not have shoulder gap closure at the end of operation (end of Cycle 4). The statistical method which was used to determine the status of the Batch D assemblies o th respect to the criterion is summarized below.
- a. Limiting shoulder gap change rates thru two cycles were determined for the inspected Batch D assemblies, based on measurements of peripheral fuel rods and end of Cycle 3 fluences. The maximum Batch D rate was less than the highest Batch C rate determined after Cycle 2.
- b. The Batch D assemblies were divided into two groups, depending on their calculated fluences at the end of Cycle 4. This separation was based on the fact that the lower fluence group could be evaluated by the use of a single shoulder gap change rate applied throughout life, which did not take credit for improved Batch D behavior. It was necessary to take some credit for the improved behavior in the 2y higher-fluence group. The fluence cutoff between groups was 7.6 x 10 nyt.
- c. An end-of-Cycle 4 maximum shoulder gap change was calculated for the lower-fluence Batch D group. The maximum value was obtained by multiplying the highest individual fuel rod fluence at end of Cycle 4 (for fuel rods in this group) by the highest Batch C peripheral rod gap change rate determined for three cycles of operation. The use of the Batch C rate for the entire three cycles of Batch D operation is very conservative based on the differences noted earlier between '
the two batches.
- d. An end-of-Cycle 4 maximum shoulder gap change was calculated for the higher-fluence Batch D group by a si'ightly diffbrent method.
For these assemblies, different rates were used for two different periods of. operation. For the first two cycles (Cycles 2 and 3),
a rate was used which was equal to the maximum rate for any measured peripheral shoulder gap in the group of assemblies. For the third cycle (Cycle 4) the shoulder gap change rate was selected to be equal to the maximum rate observed for Cycle 3 in any of the measured Batch C assemblies. The predicted shoulder gap change within the higher-fluence Batch D group was obtained by multiplying the two rates by the appropriate increments of fluence for rods within the group. The maximum predicted shoulder gap change resulted from the most adverse ccmbination of fluences during the two periods.
- e. The two resulting maximum shoulder gap changes (one from Step c and one from Step d) were compared to the minimum available shoulder gap at the beginning of life. This minimum gap was based on adverse tolerances, maximum differential thermal expansion betwe n the fuel rods and guide tubas, and elastic compression of the guide tubes under the fuel assembly holddown force.
, -e-
- f. In both cases, the maximum Batch D shoulder gap change was less than the beginning of life value. Since each of the rates used in the evaluation represented at least an upper 95/95 value, the calculated gap changes also represented at least 95/95 values.
The conclusion from this statistical analysis was that all Batch D assemblies would satisfy the gap criterion for standard rods throughout Cycle 4. Therefore, none of the Batch D assemblies required modification to provide additional clearance.
A special case was made fo.- the two Batch D demonstration assemblies which contained test fuel rods with experimental Niobia-doped fuel pellets. In some cases (approximately six rods per assembly) the test rods exhibited rates of shoulder gap decrease higher than those of standard Batch C and 0 fuel rods. The difference is thought to be due to higher fuel pellet dwell-ing in Niobia-doped fuel pellets. The method outlined below was used to evaluate the Cycle 4 performance of the test rods,
- a. Several of the test rods had been measured after both Cycles 2 and 3, as part of the test program. In all cases, rods which had shown the high gap change rates had a lower Cycle 3 rate than that in Cycle 2.
This indicated a reduced rate effect at higher exposures. Therefore, the assumption of the same change rate in Cycle 4 as that observed over the first two cycles was conservative.
- b. For each test rod that was measured, a specific two-cycle average change rate was determined and used to extrapolate its performance during Cycle 4. The calculated Cycle 4 fluence increment for each rod was utilized.
- c. The measured gap at the end of Cycle 3 was then reduced by the value obtained in Step b. The resulting end-of-Cycle 4 prediction was corrected for operating conditions and examined for clearance.
The conclusion from this analysis was that none of the measured test rods would be predicted to contact during Cycle 4. Photographs of the test assemblies were examined and it was determined that all of the limiting rods had been measured. Therefore, the two test assemblies did not require modification for Cycle 4 operation.
Since it is desired to operate one of the assemblies for a fourth cycle, and since all of the equipment and parts were available to modify Batch D assemblies, additional shoulder gap was provided for assembly 0040 by a method essentially the same as that used on Batch C assemblies at the end of Cycle 2. The design modification is further described in Reference 1.
The six high change rate test rods containing Niobia-doped fuel pellets were removed from 0040, since application of the observed rates in these test rods by the method described earlier indicated the potential for contact during Cycle 5. The test rod locations involved are scattered in the interior of the test assembly.
Another special case was one of the Batch C demonstration assemblies, which had been considered as a potential core center assembly for Cycle 4. As noted in Section II, h.gh change rate Batch C fuel rods did not exhibit a reduced ate during Cycle 3. Using the same limitir.g Batch C rate used for the Batch D evaluation, some of the rods in the Batch C demonstration assembly would be predicted to contact the upper end fitting during Cycle 4.
Therefore, the option of substituting a Batch A assembly in the core center was chosen for Cycle 4. This option had been considered in all fuel manage-ment and safety analysis work.
i .
-5 IV. CONCLUSIONS
- 1. It was determined that all of the Batch D assemblies satisfied the shoulder gap criterion for Cycle 4 without requiring increases in the shoulder gap.
- 2. One Batch D demonstration assembly was modified to prepare it for a potential fourth cycle of operation in Cycle 5. Certain test rods were removed from this assembly because of observed high growth rates,
, and were replaced with dummy rods. The assembly modification incorporated stainless steel spacer shims that had essentially the same design as those used to modify Batch C fuel assemblies during the Cycle 2 outage.
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- 3. The Batch C demonstration assembly could not be shown to have sufficient shoulder gap for a fourth cycle of operation. A Batch A assembly will be substituted for the Batch C assembly as planned.
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- - - - - - - - - - - _ , . - - , , - me---, ,- - - ., , , -- ---.
e - .,.--,
l REFEREllCES
/. John R. Marshall (AP&L) to Robert A. Clark (NRC) Docket flo. 50-368, Letter No. 2CAN038308, August 19, 1983.
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