ML20073R821

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Quarterly Status Rept of Advanced Light Water Reactor Reviews for 920601-0831
ML20073R821
Person / Time
Site: 05200001, 05200002, 05200003, 05200004
Issue date: 10/23/1992
From: Taylor J
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Rogers, Selin I, The Chairman
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20024G666 List: ... further results
References
NUDOCS 9211040101
Download: ML20073R821 (19)


Text

U, Ib

  1. E c7ee XA 6 om UNITED STATES M

!')

(

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

c.

0 WASHINGTON, D, C. 20555 October 23, 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Curtiss /

Commissioner Remick Commissioner de Planque FROM:

James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT OF ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR REVIEWS (JUNE - AUGUST 1992)

In a memorandum of June 20, 1991, I directed the staff to prepare quarterly reports outlining the status of the NRC staff's reviews of advanced reactor designs. The enclosed quarterly report is the fifth in the series and covers the period from June 1 through August 31, 1992.

In this report, the staff addresses the review status of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Utility Requirements Documents (URDs) for evolution-ary and passive reactors, the General Electric Company (GE) advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) design, the Asea Brown Boveri/ Combustion Engineering (ABB/CE) System 80+ design, and the Westinghouse AP600. The staff received the General Electric Simplified Lolling Water Reactor (SBWR) application on August 27, 1992, and is revic ing '.t for acceptance.

The staff will describe the status of the SBWR review 1.. One next quarterly report.

The enclosed report consists of three sections:

(1) an Executive Summary, (2) a discussion of technical and policy issues that could affect the schedule for more than one project, and (3) the status of the review of each advanced reactor project. The staff assessed the progress toward resolving each tech-nical issue discussed and noted any effect on schedules.

The staff measured the progress in reviewing each advanced reactor project against milestones established in SECY-91-161, " Schedules for the Advanced Reactor Reviews and Regulatory Guidance Revisions." For instances in which significant milestones were not met, the staff estimated the effect on the overall schedules and described recovery acticns that could minimize the effect on schedules.

In August 1992, the staff issued the safety evaluation report (SER) describing the results of its review of the EPRI Utility Requirements Document for Evolu-tionary LWRs. The SER was issued in accordance with the schedule listed in SECY-91-161.

CONTACT:

Joseph G. Glitter, NRR 504-1113 h/VNN/

YJr

The Commissioners The staff planned to issue the draft FSER on the GE ABWR to the Commission in August 1992. However, the staff was delayed in completing its review due to 1

difficulties encountered in resolving first-of-a-kind issues and by the lack of timely, high-quality design information [especially information pertaining to inspections, tests, analysis, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) and severe accident closure] from GE. This delay prevented the staff from issuing a draft FSER in August 1992 as planned.

The staff issued the draft final safety evaluation report (FSER) on the ABWR to the Commission on October 14. The ABWR draft FSER includes 379 open items (about half of which pertain to ITAAC) and 266 confirmatory items. Although GE has indicated that it will commit an increased amount of resources to address open issues in the draft FSER, it will need to submit a significant amount of information, which the staff will need to review in order to support issuance of the final design approval (FDA) for the ABWR. Consequently, the staff will not be able to issue the FSER/FDA in December.

The staff issued the ABB/CE System 80+ DSER to the Commission on September 28, 1992. Although this represents a one-month slip for this intermediate schedule milestone, the staff expects to recover this slippage and not impact the schedule for issuing the FSER. A factor that is more critical to issuing the System 80+ FSER on schedule is that the DSER will not address several major areas of the review, such as ITAAC, shutdown risk, and severe accident closure because CE has not provided this information to the staff or the information provided was not submitted in time to be included in the review for the DSER. The staff will review this information expeditiously once it is provided by CE and does not anticipate needing to delay issuing the FSER because of not including these areas in the DSER review.

On August 18, 1992, the staff transmitted a letter to Westinghouse regarding the staff's acceptance review of the AP600. The staff stated that the application contained an extensive amount of information but did not include all of the information required by 10 CFR Part 52. Although the staff will continue to review the AP600 application, it will establish a formal review schedule only after Westinghouse completes the application. Until receiving a complete application, the staff will continue to develop and issue requests for additional information where sufficient information is available to do so.

4

/

W.

es M.

or xecutive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

As Stated cc: SECY OGC MMcCabe, D0J

i l

l QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT OF ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR REVIEWS JUNE - AUGUST 1992 I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMRY This is the fifth quarterly report to the Commission on the status of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's design certi-fication reviews of evolutionary and advanced light water reactors (LWRs). The report addresses the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Utility Requirements Document (URD) for evolutionary and passive reactors, the General. Electric Company (GE) advanced boiling.

water reactor (ABWR) design, the Asea Brown Boveri/ Combustion Engi-I neering (ABB/CE) System 80+ design and the Westinghouse AP600. The l

staff received the GE simplified boiling water reactor (SBWR) appli-j cation on August 27, 1992, and is reviewing it for acceptance. The staff will describe the status of.this application in the next: quar-terly report. This report also includes a discussion of technical 1

and policy issues that-could affect the schedule for more than one i

project and an ast.essment and comparison of the progress of. project reviews with the ~ schedules listed in SECY-91-161, " Schedules for the Advanced Reactor Reviews and Regulatory Guidance Revisions," of May 31, 1991.

]

In August 1992, the staff published NUREG-1242, the FSER on the EPRI Utility Requirements Document for Evolutionary Designs (Volume II),

in accordance with the schedule in SECY-91-161.

l The staff planned to issue the draft FSER on the GE ABWR to the Commission in August 1992. However, the staff was delayed in com-pleting its review due to difficulties encountered in resolving first-of-a-kind issues and by the lack of timely, high-quality design l

information (specifically information related to ITAAC and severe accident closure) from GE.

This delay' prevented the staff from issuing a draft FSER in August 1992 as planned. The draft FSER was sent to the Commission on October 14.

The draft FSER includes 379 open items (about half of which pertain to ITAAC) and 266 confir-matory items. Although GE indicated that it will commit an increased amourt of resources to address open issues, it will need to submit a significant amount of information, which the staff will need to review in order to support issuance of the final design approval (FDA) for the ABWR. Consequently, the staff will not be able to issue the FSER for FDA in December.

The staff issued the ABB/CE System 80+ DSER to the Commission on September 28, 1992. Although this represents a one-month slip for ENCLOSURE i

. I this intermediate level milestone, the staff expects to recover this slippage and not impact the schedule for issuing the FSER. A factor more critical to issuing the System 80+ FSER on schedule is tt the DSER will not address several major areas of the review, such o j

l ITAAC, shutdown risk, and severe accident closure because CE has not provided information to the staff or the information provided was not submitted in time to be included in the review for the DSER. The staff will review this information expeditiously once it is provided by CE and does not anticipate needing to delay issuing the FSER because of not including these areas in the DSER review.

i l

On August 18, 1992, the staff transmitted a letter to Westinghouse l

regarding the staff's acceptance review of the AP600 design certifi-l cation application. The staff stated that the application contained an extensive amount of information but did not include all of the l

information required by 10 CFR Part 52. The staff informed Westing-house that it will continue to review the application for AP600, but l

that it will establish a formal review schedule only after Westing-l house completes the application.

Until receiving a complete applica-tion, the staff will continue to issue requests for additional l

information where sufficient information is available to do so.

II.

TECHNICAL AND POLICY ISSUES THAT COULD AFFECT REVIEW SCHEDULES In items A through F, the staff discusses the status of six major policy issues, including key milestones for each issue, that may affect the schedules for reviewing evolutionary and advanced reactor design applications.

Items C and F are new items, not previously

reported, j

A.

NEPA SAMDAs The staff previously indicated that the resolution of the Na-tional Environmental Policy Act Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives (NEPA SAMDAs) may delay the projected review sched-ules.

On July 31, 1991, the staff submitted to the Commission SECY-91-229, " Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives for Certified Standard Designs."

In this paper, the staff requested that the Commission approve the staff's recommendations to (1) address SAMDAs for certified designs in a single rulemaking, l

(2) approve the staff's approach for considering the costs and benefits of reviewing SAMDAs for standard plant design certif-ication, and (3) approve the staff's proposal to advise appli-cants for design certification that they must assess SAMDAs and provide rationale supporting their decision.

l In a staff requirements memorandum of October 25,1991, the Commission approved the staff's recommendations and " expressed a l

l l

l 1

l l desire to be kept informed of the staff progress in defining remote and speculative as it reviews the ABWR submissions."

The Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) indicated that it would like to suggest a definition of " remote and specu-l lative" for the staff to consider. The staff will make a recom-mendation to the Commission about a definition of " remote and speculative" after it considers the views from industry.

1.

MILESTONES FOR LAST QUARTER l

a.

To continue to interact with the applicants and to develop a comprehensive set of questions for the 10 CFR 50.34(f) and NEPA/SAMDAs review of the ABWR.

b.

Determine the necessity for including averted onsite costs in the value-impact assessment of SAMDAs.

c.

Determine whether or not SAMDAs require consideration of alternatives for both prevention and mitigation.

2.

MILESTONES ACCOMPLISHED a.

The staff had earlier met with NUMARC to define the l

format for prospective SAMDA submittals from the evolu-tionary LWR vendors. The proposed format was outlined in the NUMARC document, " Suggested Outline for NEPA/SAMDA Amendments to 10 CFR Part 51 for ALWR Designs - Technical Support Document," dated April 3, 1992.

The staff agreed 1

in general with the proposed form and content of the NUMARC document. The staff issued questions to GE on the 10 CFR 50.34(f) review of the ABWR.

In these questions, the staff informed GE that it is NRC's policy that in considering the ratio of cost to benefit in the analysis of design alternatives, averted onsite costs should be i

accounted for in the cost-benefit equation as reductions in the costs of the proposed design alternative. The staff also believes that NEPA SAMDA reviews should in-clude design alternatives that reduce the frequency of severe accidents as well as design alternatives that i

i mitigate the consequence of severe accidents.

The staff has completed the final 10 CFR 50.34(f) and l

NEPA/SAMDAs review schedules for the ABWR. These sched-l ules are consistent with the schedule for design certifi-I cation.

b.

The staff met with GE in October to discuss questions and proposed responses to RAIs.

l l

l

I -

l 3.

MILESTONES NOT ACCOMPLISHED None 4.

EFFECT ON SCHEDULE AND RECOVERY The staff is reviewing a document submitted by GE _in response to a 10 CFR 50.34(f) requirement. This document addresses alternatives for improving core and containment heat removal design features and will likely be the foundation for the i

ABWR NEPA/SAMDAs review.

If the staff receives timely re-i sponses to questions developed while reviewing the 10 CFR 50.34(f) issues and SAMDA issues, it can complete the SAMDAs review on a schedule consistent with ABWR certification.'

j 5.

MILESTONE PLANNED FOR NEXT QUARTER The staff will continue to interact with GE and the industry-while reviewing the design alternatives for the ABWR.

B.

ITAAC The resolution of the ITAAC is the most critical issue in review-I ing the evolutionary LWR designs.

I 1.

MILESTONES FOR LAST QUARTER 1

i a.

Review ITAAC submittals from GE and CE as they are re-ceived.

b.

Meet with Westinghouse to discuss sample AP600 ITAAC and schedules.

2.

MILESTONES ACCOMPLISHED a.

On August 26, 1992, GE and the NRC held a senior manage-ment meeting in San Jose, California, to discuss ITAAC.

Representatives of CE, Westinghouse, and NUMARC also attended. The staff and GE discussed many policy issues, including those found in SECY-92-287, on the form and l

content of a design certification rule, proprietary information, the status of nonsafety-related systems in Tier 1.

NUMARC and NRC held another senior management meeting on September 18, 1992, in Rockville, Maryland.

b.

In the last quarterly report, the staff stated that it organized an independent review group known as the " Grey-beards" to review the ITAAC and their role in the 10 CFR Part 52 process. The charter of this group of senior NRC managers calls for advising the Director of the Office of I

l l

l i l 1

l Nuclear Reactor Regulation on (1) whether or not the NRC staff can make a final safety decision based on the information available in the safety analysis report (SAR), the Tier I description, and the ITAAC; and j

(2) whether or not the NRC staff has defined the appro-priate scope and level of detail for the Tier 1 design certification process. The Greybeards met on July 9 and July 21-22, 1992. The staff also organized an ITAAC Working Group, consisting of inspection staff from each region and engineers from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. This group reviewed the ABWR system design descriptions, ITAAC, and SSAR sections for 10 ABWR sys-l tems from an independent perspective.

SECY-92-327, " Reviews of Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) for the General Electric (GE) Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR)," which summa-j rizes the findings of the Greybeards and the ITAAC Work-1 ing Group, was sent to the Commission on September 22, 1992. The staff has established a review group to ensure l

that the comments from the Greybeards are incorporated i

into all of the ITAAC.

l c.

On June 22, 1992, the staff met with Westinghouse to discuss a schedule for submitting ITAAC and gave samples l

of the information expected in the ITAAC submittals.

l Westinghouse submitted seven pilot ITAAC for the AP600 on September 4, 1992, for initial comments by the staff.

d.

On August II, 1992, CE resubmitted eight pilot system ITAAC for the System 80+.

e.

In a letter of August 12, 1992, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) agreed with the general ap-proach to ITAAC and agreed with the staff that ITAAC should be required for FDA. The staff will meet with the ACRS in September and October 1992 to further discuss the ITAAC.

l l

f.

Meeting between NRC and NUMARC on September 18, 1992, to discuss ITAAC policy issues.

3.

MILESTONES NOT ACCOMPLISHED None 4.

EFFECT ON SCHEDULE AND REC 0VERY In SECY-91-210, " Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Requirements for Design Review and Issuance l

r

~

l l

of a Final Design Approval (FDA)," and during the August 21, 1991, Commission briefing, the staff stated that the schedule for design certification will be delayed if ITAAC submittals are significantly delayed or incomplete.

GE ABWR l

In its-quarterly status reports to the Commission, the staff i

has described how ITAAC submittals from GE have been delayed or lacking in necessary detail.

The staff, including senior l

NRR management, has met frequently with GE to resolve issues on the ITAAC submittals.

However, about half of the ABWR FSER open items pertain to ITAAC. The staff also has found inconsistencies between the design certification material and the standard safety analysis report (SSAR).

This is of significant concern to the staff because it reflects a-lack of internal quality assurance (QA) by GE. On September 9, l

1992, GE and NUMARC began a month-long intense review of the l

GE ITAAC at San Jose, California.

GE will revise and resub-l mit the Tier 1 material, including QA certification, after this review. The additional time rcquired to resolve open items for ITAAC has delayed the staff in issuing an FSER and l

will delay it in granting a final design approval for the l

ABWR. The extent of this delay will depend on GE's ability f

to promptly resolve the open items noted by the staff (See 1

Section III.A).

i' CE System 80+

On May 1, 1992, ABB/CE submitted 10 pilot ITAAC for the staff l

to review.

The staff concluded that the ITAAC lack suffi-cient detail and specific acceptance criteria for Tier 1 l

material. ABB/CE resubmitted the 10 pilot ITAAC on August 11, 1992 and intends to submit the full ITAAC this fall.

Although this information will not.be submitted in time for the staff to have considered in developing the ABB/CE System 80+ DSER, which was issued to the Commission in September of 1992, it should not affect the FSER issuance date of July 1993.

AP60Q The staff completed an acceptance review of the Westinghouse application for the AP600, which was submitted in June 1992.

The staff concluded that the application contained an exten-sive amount of information, but did not include all of the information required by 10 CFR Part 52, including ITAAC.

However, the application did contain three pilot ITAAC. The staff has informed Westinghouse that it will continue to review the AP600 application, but will establish a formal

l >

1 review schedule only after determining that the application is complete. On September 4, 1992, the staff received seven additional pilot ITAAC for the AP600.

5.

MILESTONE PLANNED FOR NEXT QUARTER The staff will continue to review ITAAC submittals from the vendors and will meet with the vendors, as necessary, to resolve issues found during the review.

C.

SEVERE ACCIDENT CLOSURE The PRA (Chapter 19.1) and closure of severe accidents (Chap-ter 19.2) represents a significant element of the staff's review of the ABWR. To close severe accidents for advanced designs, the staff requires a balar.ced approach of severe accident prevention and mitigation, and development of an accident management plan.

The basis for the review is to ensure that advanced plants have a higher degree of severe accident safety perf riance than previous

(

designs and to take advantage of lessons cned from performance l

of PRAs, operating experience, and severe accident research. The staff is using the Commission's Severe Accident Policy Statement and Commission-approved positions from SECY-90-016, " Evolutionary Light Water Reactor (LWR) Certification Issues and Their Rela-l tionship to Current Regulatory Requirements" as guidance in determining acceptability. The utilization of PRA to resolve l

severe accidents has to recognize the inherent uncertainties. To this extent, the staff believes that a combination of both PRA and deterministic methods may be used to alleviate uncertainties and reach closure for severe accidents.

The staff is working with GE to resolve open areas relative to severe accidents.

In order to resolve these issues in a timely manner, the staff must receive quality information. The staff has forwarded remaining open issues to GE and has met with GE to address resolution of these issues. The major open issues relate to the evaluation of core-concrete interactions, core debris coolability, and fuel-coolant interactions. The staff recognizes that resolution of severe accidents may become a critical path and is therefore accelerating the review.

D.

LEVEL OF DESIGN DETAIL l

The staff found several areas in the ABWR application in which it needed additional information to resolve its safety concerns.

For a few limited areas of the design, it may be impractical for the designer to provide detailed information, such as detailed specifications for equipment that may soon become obsolete as technology continues to improve.

The staff and GE agreed to prepare design acceptance criteria (DAC) in lieu of detailed

\\

h i l design information for these very limited areas of the design.

j The NRC would base its safety determination at design certifi-l cation on acceptance criteria that are general and objective.

Check points would be established to confirm compliance with system requirements and the acceptance criteria after the NRC issued the combined operating license. GE would document these issues in the safety analysis report (SAR) and the ITAAC,_as appropriate. The review and approval of the DAC are especially important to the review process since the staff needs the DAC to 1

~

arrive at a final safety determination on certain issues. As the staff completes its review of the DAC, it will forward them to the Commission and the ACRS.

If the staff finds no additional concerns, this will be the last report in which the policy issue of the level of detail will be considered separately.

1.

MILESTONES FOR LAST QUARTER a.

The staff was to continue to review DAC submittals.

b.

The staff was to continue to meet with the ACRS to dis-cuss issues related to DAC.

c.

The "Greybeards" were to meet to discuss DAC for ABWR l

piping r stems.

l l

2.

MILESTONES ACCOMPLISHED a.

The staff continued to review DAC submittals from GE and l

CE.

l b.

The staff continued to discuss DAC at ACRS subcommittee and full committee meetings.

c.

On July 9,1992, the "Greybeards" met to discuss piping DAC for the ABWR.

i l

d.

On August 27, 1992, the staff submitted SECY-92-299, which contains information on the DAC for instrumentation and control and for the control room.

j 3.

MILESTONES NOT ACCOMPLISHED 1

None 4.

EFFECT ON SCHEDULE AND RECOVERY On February 15, 1991, the Commission provided guidance on the level of design detail necessary to support a design certifi-cation application (SRM on SECY-90-377).

GE was delayed in submitting information needed by the staff to make a safety l

l

\\

1,

l

(

I determination. The staff established many of the open items for the ABWR draft FSER as a direct result of insufficient design detail. As discussed under project milestones for the ABWR (Section III.A.), this issue has substantially affected l

l the staff's ability to issue an FDA for the ABWR on schedule.

i 5.

MILESTONES PLANNED FOR NEXT QUARTER a.

The staff will continue to review DAC submittals from the j

vendors.

b.

The staff will continue to meet with the ACRS to discuss issues regarding DAC.

E.

DIVERSITY OF DIGITAL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS The staff proposed new requirements to address the diversity, l

reliability, and fault tolerance of-the hardware and software in digital instrumentation systems.

For example, if a common-mode failure can defeat a safety-function, the designer must provide a diverse means to perform either the same function or a differ-ent safety function that provides equivalent protection. The designer would be required to provide safety-grade displays and controls to actuate and monitor systems that perform critical safety functions and to monitor parameters. These safety-grade displays and controls would be independent of the computer systems and would be located in the control room.

Neither the GE ABWR design nor the CE System 80+ design meet the l

staff's proposed requirements.

In a June 3, 1992, meeting with the Commission, GE stated that the current ABWR design has ade-quate diversity and that requirements proposed by the staff warranted a policy decision by the Commission.

In a letter of i

May 18, 1992, ABB/CE also disagreed with the staff's position.

On June 1, 1992, the staff met with Combustion Engineering to discuss this issue in greater detail. On September 8, 1992, the staff met with the Commission to discuss this and other ALWR l

policy issues. Although the Commission did not take a position i

on this issue, it encouraged the staff to continue to work with vendors in resolving this issue. The staff is reviewing an analysis submitted by GE for the ABWR that is intended to demon-strate that the control room includes adequate diversity to cope with common-mode failures that can affect I&C safety systems.

CE l

is also completing a similar study for the System 80+.

On September 10, 1992, the staff discussed this issue with the ACRS.

In its letter of September 16, 1992, the ACRS, stated that the l

thrust of the position was appropriate, but disagreed with the staff's position on the requirement for an analog backup and recommended that the staff revisit the issue.

Based on evalua-i tion of the comments from the industry and ACRS, the staff is i

l revising its position and proceeding with reviews of each vendor's defense-in-depth. This position will allow use of simple digital equipment for dedicated displays and controls.

I.

MILESTONES FOR LAST QUARTER a.

To obtain the Commission's resolution of this policy issue.

l b.

To discuss this issue with the ACRS.

2.

MILESTONES ACCOMPLISHED a.

This issue was discussed during a Commission meeting on September 8, 1992.

l b.

The staff discussed this issue with the ACRS during a l

meeting on September 10, 1992.

l 3.

MILESTONES NOT ACCOMPLISHED l

None 4.

EFFECT ON SCHEDULE AND RECOVERY Although this issue has not yet affected the schedule, it could significantly affect schedules since it could involve changes to the control room designs. By resolving this issue quickly, the NRC may prevent it from delaying the schedule.

5.

MILESTONES PLANNED FOR NEXT QUARTER The staff will promptly resolve this issue and implement the guidance from the Commission upon receiving an SRM on this issue.

F.

REGULATORY TREATMENT OF NON-SAFETY SYSTEMS IN PASSIVE REACTOR DESIGNS Passive LWR designs, such as the AP600 and the SBWR, rely on features such as stored water supplies and natural circulation l

instead of active systems in standby readiness. However, to reduce challenges to these passive safety systems, various nonsafety-grade systems, such as high pressure injection pumps, l

also are used as a first line of defense.

EPRI refers to these systems as " investment protection systems." Because investment protection systems do not meet safety-grade standards, no credit is taken for these systems by the designers in the design basis accident analyses.

The EPRI URD would require designers to ensure, as a minimum, that these nonsafety-grade systems are

included in a reliability assurance program. The staff's initial position was that active systems should not be required to meet strict safety-related requirements, but must conform to graded requirements based on their importance to safety.

EPRI and the industry believe that plant safety should be totally assured by the passive safety systems, and that no regulatory performance or quality requirements should be imposed on the I

active non-safety systems.

1 The Commission has instructed the staff to work with EPRI to determine'what passive safety system functional and reliability l

requirements would be necessary to alleviate the necessity of any non-safety systems requirements. The staff currently has this activity underway.

l l.

MILESTONES FOR LAST QUARTER Discuss this issue with the Commission.

l 2.

MILESTONES ACCOMPLISHED l

On September 8, 1992, the staff discussed this issue with the Commission.

3.

MILESTONES NOT ACCOMPLISHED None 4.

EFFECT ON SCHEDULE AND RECOVERY During the Commission meeting on September 8, 1992, the staff stated that this issue could affect design certification schedules for passive LWRs. The Commission also emphasized that these issues should be resolved in the EPRI URD.

5.

PLANNED MILESTONES FOR NEXT QUARTER To promptly implement the recommendations of the Commission SRM on this subject.

j III.

PROJECT MILESTONES A.

ABWR 1.

MILESTONES FOR LAST QUARTER The staff indicated it would issue the draft FSER to the Commission in August 1992.

i :

2.

MILESTONES ACCOMPLISHED a.

The staff held senior management meetings with GE to resolve open items.

1 i

b.

The staff also met with ACRS on several occasions to discuss issues associated with the ABWR review.

3.

MILESTONES NOT ACCOMPLISHED The staff planned to issue the draft FSER to the Commission in August 1992. However, the staff was delayed in completing its review due to difficulties encountered in resolving l

first-of-a-kind issues and by the lack of timely, high-quality design information (specifically information related to ITAAC and' severe accident closure) from GE. This delay prevented the staff from issuing a draft FSER in August 1992 as planned. The staff issued ~the draft FSER to the Commis-sion on October 14, 1992.

4.

EFFECT ON SCHEDULE AND REC 0VERY The ABWR draft FSER will include 379 open items, about half of which are related to ITAAC, and about 266 confirmatory l

items. Although GE. indicated that it will commit an in-creased amount of resources to address open issues, it will-need to submit a significant amount of information, which the l

staff will need to review in order to support issuance of the FDA for the ABWR.

The staff continues to meet with GE to resolve open issues.

On September 9, 1992, the staff met with the GE staff to discuss PRA open items. On September 9, nuclear industry utility representatives and NUMARC began reviewing the ITAAC for the GE ABWR.

5.

MILESTONES PLANNED FOR NEXT QUARTER a.

Discuss the status of the ABWR review at the November 23 l

Commission meeting.

b.

Meet with GE as necessary to resolve open issues identi-fied in the draft FSER.

B.

CE SYSTEM 80+

l 1.

MILESTONES FOR LAST QUARTER a.

Continue to review ITAAC from ABB/CE.

On August 11, 1992, ABB/CE submitted eight pilot ITAAC.

i l

1 I

b.

Review the shutdown risk report due in August.

c.

Issue the DSER in August 1992.

I 2.

MILESTONES ACCOMPLISHED a.

The staff completed a preliminary review of the eight pilot ITAAC that were resubmitted by CE and is submitting comments for CE to address.

b.

The staff also started to review the shutdown risk report submitted by CE on July 31, 1992.

3.

MILESTONES NOT ACCOMPLISHED The staff issued the DSER to the Commission on September 28, 1992. The DSER was scheduled to be issued to the Commission by August 26, 1992.

4.

EFFECT ON SCHEDULE AND REC 0VERY Although the staff did not issue the DSER to the Commission on schedule, this'one-month slippage is not expected to l

affect the schedule for issuing an FSER. A factor more i

critical to issuing the System 80+ FSER on schedule is that 1

l the DSER will not address several major areas of the review, such as ITAAC, shutdown risk, and severe accident closure because CE has not provided information to the staff or the information provided was not submitted in time to be included in the review for the DSER.

The staff will review this information expeditiously once it is provided by CE.

5.

MILESTONES PLANNED FOR NEXT QUARTER Continue to meet with ABB/CE to discuss and resolve open items identified in the DSER.

C.

WESTINGHOUSE AP600 1.

MILESTONES FOR LAST QUARTER Complete acceptance review of the AP600 application.

2.

MILESTONES ACCOMPLISHED On August 18, 1992, the staff transmitted a letter to West-inghouse regarding the staff's acceptance review. The staff stated that the application contained a large amount of information but did not include all of the information re-quired by 10 CFR Part 52.

l l

1 3.

MILESTONES NOT ACCOMPLISHED None 4.

EFFECT ON SCHEDULE AND REC 0VERY The staff informed Westinghouse that it will continue to review the application for AP600, but that it will establish l

a formal review schedule only after determining that the application is complete.

5.

MILESTONES PLANNED FOR NEXT QUARTER The staff will continue to review the AP600 design including sending Westinghouse requests for additional information where sufficient information will be available to do so.

D.

EPRI UTILITY REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT FOR PASSIVE REACTORS i

1.

MILESTONES FOR LAST QUARTER Issue draft policy and technical issues paper'(" Grandson of l

SECY-90-016") to the Commission in June 1992.

l 2.

MILESTONES ACCOMPLISHED a.

In June 1992, the staff issued the draft passive LWR policy and technical issues paper to the Commission.

On September 8, the staff briefed the Commission on four issues discussed in this paper:

(1) digital instrumentation and control diversity (2) containment bypass (3) multiple steam generator tube ruptures (4) regulatory treatment of nonsafety systems b.

On September 9, 1992, the staff briefed an ACRS subcom-mittee on the draft passive LWR policy and technical issues paper.

On September 10, 1992, the staff briefed the ACRS full committee on this paper.

l c.

Received EPRI's comments on the DSER on September 2, 1992.

3.

MILESTONES NOT ACCOMPLISHED None

O a

4 4.

EFFECT ON SCHEDULE AND RECOVERY See items II.E.4. and II.F.4.

5.

MILESTONES PLANNED FOR NEXT QUARTER l

1 a.

Review EPRI's response to the DSER.

l b.

Begin preparing the FSER.

f i

i r

l i

l l

i 4

er 4

l t

I

@h t

I l

I i

h I

F; l

l l

t ff W

't s

-