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j UNITED STATES 3"
i IN RESPONSE, PLEASL.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REFER TO:
M900718A E.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
James M. Taylor Executive Director for Operations 92 to William C.
Parler, General unsel FROM:
Samuel J.
Chilk, Secretar i
SUBJECT:
STAFF REQUIREMENTS - BRIE I G ON ESSENTIALLY COMPLETE DESI 1 ISSUE FOR PART 52 SUBMITTALS (SECY-90-241), 2:00 P.M.,
WEDNESUAY, JULY 18, 1990, COMMISSIONERS' CONFERENCE ROOM, ONE WHITE FLINT NORTH, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND (OPEN TO PUBLIC ATTENDANCE)
The Commission was briefed by the-NRC staff on the implementation of Part 52 with respect to an essentially complete design.
l The commission requested the staff to provide a paper in l
advance of each semi-annual briefing addressing current issues l
pending resolution, any changes in schedule, specific accomplishments in the six months preceding the briefing, the l
current critical path, and projected personnel resource needs
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for the next six months, including any anticipated personnel resource shortages.
The staff is already committed to provide a semi-annual briefing on the progress of design certification reviews (SRM M900427 dated 6/18/90).
(EDO)
(SECY Suspense:
11/5/90)
In addition, the Commission requested a paper describing the advantages and disadvantages of the two-tier approach proposed by industry for design certification.
The Commission also requested staff's recommendations on those structures, systems and components for which it may not be feasible or practical to achieve a level of design detail in the application consistent with levels 1 and 2 described by the staff in SECY-90-241 and why it is not feasible or practical-to supply.such design detail.
Staff should also advise the Commission of those structures, systems and components for which level 1 design detail is not necessary to achieve standardization.
9400030226 940629 PDR cot 91S NRCC i
C_ORRESPONDENCE PDR l
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Commissioner Remick, while strongly supporting the need for standardization, believes that there is a need for some controlled flexibility, beyond what Section 50.12 permits, to j
provide for technological advancement, component unavail-ability, and construction deviations.
Commissioner Remick requested the staff to consider the pros and cons of incorporating an "ASARA" principle (As Standard As Reasonably Achievable) into a two-tier approach to provide such flexibility while preserving standardization throughout the life of a certified plant.
(EDO/OGC)
(SECY Suspense:
9/28/90)
The staff should provide the Commission an analysis of the public comments received on SECY-90-241.
(EDO)
(SECY Suspense:
9/28/90) l The staff should provide the Commission a description of what, specifically, is envisioned in the " standardization portion" of j
the review, as that term is used in SECY-90-241, including a description of the process that the staff will use for collating the experience gained from existing reactors and j
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applying those lessons in the review of future designs.
i (EDO)
(SECY Suspense:
9/28/90) l 1
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Chairman Carr Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Curtiss Commissioner Remick GPA ACRS PDR - Advance DCS - P1-24 i
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UNITED STATES
' f, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NOM E
W ASHIN GT ON, D.C. 20555 8
September 10, 1990
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l OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY l
MEMORANDUM FOR:
James M. Taylor l
Executive Director for ftions i
FROM:
Samuel J. Chilk, Secreta Q-
SUBJECT:
SECY-90-241 - LEVEL OF EETA IL REQUIRED FOR DESIGN CERTIFICATION UNDkR PART.52 1
The attached public comments from General Electric and Westinghouse addressing the subject SECY paper were received by the Secretary and are forwarded for your use.
Copies of both letters-have been informally provided to the designated' point of contact, Martin Virgilio.
Attachments:
i As stated I
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cc:
Chairman Carr Commissioner Rogers Commissioner Curtiss Commissioner Remick OGC j
GPA PDR - Advance DCS - P1-24 I.3 Ao c'
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Wt.stingnouse Energy Systems gga;,aggea Electric Corporation Box 355 PmsD;;rgh PennsyIvama 15230-0355 September 5, 1990 NS-NRC-90-3540 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary Office of the Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 ATTENTION:
Docketing and Service Branch
SUBJECT:
SECY 90-241, level of Detail Required for Design Certification under Part 52; Response to Commission Request for Comments.
Dear Mr. Chilk:
Westinghouse supports the comments on the issues raised in SECY 90-241 and in related Commission briefings which were submitted to you on behalf of the nuclear power industry by NUMARC in its letter dated August 31, 1990 and the attachments thereto. We have the following additional comments which we believe reinforce the comments submitted by NUMARC, particularly as they relate to standardization issues.
It is important to emphasize that the reforms embodied in Part 52 will result in substantially greater standardization of plants which are built to certified designs than that which resulted from the Part 50 licensing process. However, we see the real potential for delaying actions necessary for effective implementation of the Part 52 design certification process by tying the level of detail required for design certification to the current focus on the additional degree to which nuclear power plants which reference a certified design should be standardized.
Plant standardization relates to the control of differences between plants which reference a given certified design after the first one has been constructed and begins operation.
It need not, and in our view should not, be related to the NRC certification (assuring the safety) of a standardized design.
It is premature to attempt to establish the details of standardization for plants referencing a certified design through the design certification process.
Such decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis. As was stated by Mr. Minnick in his additional comments in the ACRS letter dated August 14th on this subject,
... it is clear that standardization is not an unmixed blessing.... the ultimate degree of standardization should not be pursued for its own sake, 4
NS-NRC-90-3540 Page 2 but rather should be limited to that degree clearly essential to the
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assurance of plant safety.
"... competition among suppliers, and innovation and improvement in general, are considerably hampered by standardization...."
Informed decisions in this regard require a knowledge of the details of the j
proposed change from the baseline, why it is being considered, what the alternatives are, if any, and most importantly, what the safety and economic effects of making (or not making) the change may be.
This can only be done for i
a real proposed change on an actual plant implementing the certified design.
l It cannot be done in the abstract.
The control of standardization for a given type or family of plants referencing a certified design can and should be achieved through the process by which the certified design is implemented. That is, the first plant built referencing a l
certified design will establish the plant baseline from which changes for l
future implementation may be evaluated.
l The industry recognizes the value of the enhanced standardization of plants l
resulting from referencing certified designs reviewed and approved by the NRC pursuant to Part 52 and views it as a step toward attaining a fuller realization of the economic benefits of plant standardization. Westinghouse l
believes that these economic benefits of standardization should be achieved l
through industry initiatives.
Hence, Westinghouse agrees that standardization beyond that related to safety l
should be achieved through the the industry approach outlined in NUMARC's comment letter and that this should be pursued while the NRC completes the review and certification of the evolutionary and passive ALWRs. The level of detail in applications for certification should be independent of this initiat1ve and should be based on that necessary to make the required safety
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l determinations and to issue the certification rule.
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1 thank you for this opportunity to present our views on this very important matter.
Very truly yours, Willi J
oh son, Manager Nucl r
Department 4
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l GE Nuclear Energy i
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DenelA w n es Accancea Bong Water Reactor Program t
Geners Manager Generat ite:troc Company l
175 Curtner Avenue. San Jose. CA 95125 408 925 E555 l
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i September 5, 1990
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j Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary Office of the Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 l
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Dear Mr. Chilk:
l l.
This is in response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's request for comments on the NRC. staff paper, SECY-90-241, which discusses the level of
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design detail required to be submitted by an applicant seeking a standard i
design certification under 10 CFR Part 52.
We commend the NRC's efforts to l
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solicit wide public comment'by interested parties on such a fundamentally j
important topic and appreciate this opportunity to offer.our views.
j As you are aware, GE, from the beginning, has been a staunch supporter of j
standard plant certification and we. are of the view that.it represents the i
only viable path to reestablishment of'the nuclear option.
Most recently, we have been heavily involved in industry discussions concerning key Part 52 implementation issues.
As such, we have provided substantial input to the 3
detailed industry response, communicated through NUMARC, regarding such issues as " level of detail" and the need for and use of a "two-tier approach."
We heartily endorse the NUMARC comments and urge the Commission to give them, and the unified industry positions they represent, the utmost l
consideration.
l It is GE's belief that the forthcoming Commission guidance on these and related issues, in regard to both its timeliness and content, is likely to i
have a profound effect on the ongoing attempt to demonstrate the viability j
of Part 52 and, thus, the very future of nuclear power in this country.
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Sincerely,
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D. R. Wilkins i
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NUC1 EAR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES COUNCIL 1776 Eye Street. N W. e $une 300 e Woshrgton, DC 2000624%
(202) 872 1280 September 4, 1990 T0:
Standardization Oversight Working Group
SUBJECT:
NUMARC Response to SECY 90-241 Attached is the NUMARC response to SECY 90-241, Level of Detati required for Design Certification under Part 52, which was transmitted to the NRC today.
A separate letter documenting the NUMARC response to the questions posed by the Comissioners on costs, schedules and suggested improvements to the NRC review processes will be forwarded to you next week for review and coment.
It is unlikely that the Comission will make a decision on the level of detail issue before mid-October 1990. We intended to hold further discussions with the NRC Staff, the Comissioners' Technical Assistants and the Comissioners during the next six weeks to emphasize our positions on these important topics.
Sincerely, William H. Rasin Director, Technical Division WHR/APH/kls I
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l I: f fM Ec NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES COUNCIL 4776 Eve Street. N W.
Sune 300
- westungton. DC 200062496 (202) 872 1280
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August 31, 1990 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary i
office of the secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 ATTENTIOR:
Docketing and Service Branch i
SUB'ECT:
SECY 90-241, Imvel of Detail' Required for Design J
Certification under Part 52; Response to Commission Request for Comments.
i
Dear Mr. Chilk:
l On July 16, 1990, NUMARC briefed the Commission on the issue of level of design detail required to support design certifications and on associated issues involved in implementing
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Part 52.
A Commission briefing on these matters by the NRC Staff, with SECY 90-241 as the focus, followed on July 18.
In the course of those briefings, the Commission asked specific 1
questions and requested follow-up information.. Subsequent to the briefings the Commission made available SECY 90-241 for the purpose of receiving public comments prior to further Commission guidance to the statf.
This letter and its enclosure are the nuclear power industry's comments on the issues raised in the two briefings and in SECY 90-241.
NUMARC is the organization of the nuclear power industry that is responsible for coordinating the combined efforts of all utilities licensed by the NRC to construct or operate nuclear power plants, and of other nuclear industry organizations, in all matters involving generic regulatory issues affecting the nuclear power industry.
Every utility responsible for constructing or operating a commercial nuclear power plant in the United States is a member of NUMARC.
In addition, NUMARC's members include major architect-engineering firms and all of the major nuclear steam supply system vendors.
NUMARC and its member organizations are committed to
. pursuing nuclear power plant standardization.
The industry welcomed the Commission's Part 52 initiative and it will continue to give full support to the NEC's standardization and licensing reform efforts.
Practical implementation of Part 52 f
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j otandardization and licensing reform is essential if additional l
nuclear power plants are to be built in the United States.
If offectively implemented, industry believes that Part 52 can contribute substantially to restoring the confidence of
--utilities, the financial community and the nation at large in the future of nuclear power.
Timely implementation of Part 52 is, however, essantial if industry is to achieve its objective to have the next generation of nuclear power plants on line by the turn of the century.
The consistent view of the nuclear power industry has been that Part 52, in its current form, can be implemented in a manner which assures not only protection of the public health and cafety, but also meaningful nuclear power plant design standardization.
The industry believes that its proposed two-tier approach and its position on level of design detail are faithful to the letter and spirit of Part 52, while providing a cound basis for practical implementation of the new regulations.
The practical implementation will provide for a safety determination for resolving all safety matters before the opproval of a design certification.
The site specific portions of a Combined License (COL) application will be resolved during the licensing process.
Thus, the resultant plant configuration and design will take full advantage of the safety benefits of otandardization as anticipated in Part 52.
After the recent dialogue with the NRC Staff and the ACRS, Cnd based on discussions at the two Commission meetings and the contents of SECY 90-241,we believe that four basic points, developed more fully in the Enclosure, warrant particular amphasis:
1.
The Commission should adopt what has come to be called the two-tier approach.
Industry believes that a two-tier structure for design certification rules and for referencing combined licenses is a necessary consequence of the provisions of Part 52.
The industry's expression of this approach faithfully implements Part 52, the Commission explanations in the accompanying Statements of consideration and the regulatory context within which Part 52 was developed.
Moreover, the two-tier structure with a flexibility provision for the second tier is the only viable approach that has been suggested.
Industry believes that the Section 50.59 flexibility provision for second-tier design changes --
which Part 52 currently prescribes -- can be implemented in the form which NUMARC presented at the July 16 briefing without erosion of legitimate standardization objectives.
Part 52 has built-in disincentives to changes from Tier 2 and the design 2
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l certification rule itself can only be changed by j
rulamaking amendment.
The Commission has expressed a concern.that I
additional assurances might need to be provided to' maintain standardization during the life of the certification as well as the life of the plants built i
under that certification.
NUMARC maintains that the-main driving force for standardization in other
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countries, notably France and Canada, is economics.
NUMARC agrees with the Commission that a product of j
standardization is a general improvement in the i
facilitation of reliability and hence, an overall improvement in the safety climate for nuclear power plants will be attained through standardization.
Other factors, such as construction schedules, general i
economics and the need to reduce' operation and Maintenance (OEM) costs will result in the adoption of l
standardization practices, which will address the l
concerns over the need for additional controls to a
ensure the maintenance of standardization and the j
prevention of the gradual erosion of safety benefits from standardization.
In addition, in recent years there has been an increased interest by the state commissions during the rate assessments associated with the financial aspects of nuclear power plants,_which becomes an added incentive to sustain the i
standardization working practices and designs during i
the life of the plant.
If additional assurances are still deemed necessary, it is more appropriate for the
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industry to develop the additional philosophies, practices and procedures, since the maintenance of standardization is predominantly an economic issue with 4
safety implications.
It is also vital that the i
controls can be applied in a manner that will
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accommodate the practical needs of construction and j
operation of nuclear facilities.
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NUMARC is committed to developing methodologies and guidelines to assure that the benefits of standardization are not eroded during the life of the certification or the life of the plant.
These 1
processes will-include change control mechanisms which i
will build on established and proven practices.
NUMARC j
intends to keep the NRC fully appraised of the progress j
on this issue and is interested in maintaining a i
positive and open dialogue that will provide the j
additional assurances that the industry is addressing i
the concerns of the Commission over standardization as 3
well as meeting its commitment to implementing the l
intent of Part 52.
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l 2.
A major objective of Part 52 is to identify and resolve i
issues as early as possible in the regulatory process j
precluding the re-review and re-litigation of issues that have been resolved in a design certification i
rulemaking.
Issue finality is a key implementation i
feature of Part 52.
Such issue finality is not only j
sound regulatory policy, it is essential for industry I
commitment of the enormous technical and financial l
resources necessary to develop, obtain certification of i
and implement standardized nuclear power plant designs.
i 3.
Industry believes that design certification i
applications should contain, at a minimum, a level of.
design detail for safety systems and components at what the Staff has characterized in SECY 90-241 as being j
equivalent to the Standard Roview Plant i.e. Final l
FSAR, less as-procured, as-built and site-specific j
details.
To ensure standardization is maintained at a level commensurate with the aims and intent of Part 52 l
the industry accepts that the amount of information j
provided at the design certification stage will be j
significantly greater than that provided under the i
current system (Part 50) at the construction permit j
application.
The level of detail will be.that which is J
required for the NRC Staff to make safety determinations.
The level of detail vill vary from system to system, dependent on the safety significance, with the level of detail ranging from Level 3, as depicted in SECY 90-241 to something in excess of Level i
2.
In general, the greater the safety significance the
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greater is the level of detail.
This approach is not only consistent with existing regulatory practices, but also assures the attainment and maintenance of i
standardization safety benefits.
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4.
With regard to proprietary information, industry i
believes that the process utiliz~ed for Part 50 licensing proceedings, and adopted in Part 52, is
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adequate to protect proprietary information in design i
certification proceedings.
Industry further believes i
that, under a properly constituted two-tier structure, the information submitted will be sufficient to enable the NRC to make the necessary safety determinations j
without compromising proprietary information contained i
in an application for a design certification.
2 i
j For the reasons summarized above and explained more fully in i
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J the enclosure, NUMARC respectfully requests that the Commission provide early guidance to the Staff stating:
j 1.
Endorsement of the two-tier approach described in the j
industry presentations and summarized in the enclosure 1
and including the provisions assuring issue finality j
for matters considered and resolved at the design j
certification stage.
1 2.
Acknowledgement of the need for a flexibility mechanism in Tier 2 during the implementation of Part 52 that j
accommodates both NRC standardization interests and the j
practical implementation considerations associated with j
the design, construction and operation of new nuclear i
power plants over the life of the design certification and the life of the plant referencing that certification.
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3.
Issuance of general policy guidance on the level of
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design detail required for design certification in i
accordance with the concepts and process described in l
the Enclosure.
The industry reiterates the statements made during the i
recent discussions and presentations in regard to approval dates for the design certifications.
These are, 1991/92 for the Evolutionary plants and 1994/95 for the Passive plants.
Until i
design certifications are obtained, the financial risk to any j
prospective owner or finance group will be too great to make a i
commitment for purchase of a plant.
NUMARC will send a separate l
1etter to the Commission on the subject of costs, estimates on i
the percentage of design work completed at various stages of the Part 52 process and suggestions as to possible improvements to j
the existing review process that will assist in the attainment of the industry's schedules.
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NUMARC will continue to work with the. Commission and the Staff to resolve issues involved in the implementation of Part j
52.
The industry appreciates the opportunity to comment on these
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natters, which are of vital importance to the future of commercial nuclear power and to the energy future of the country.
sincerely,
&D7 William H. Rasin Director, Technical Division 4
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ENCLDSURE i
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DETAILED INDUSTRY COMMENTS ON j
ISSUES RAISED IN JULY 16 & 18, 1990 i
COMMISSION MEETINGS AND SECY-90-241 1.
The Two-Tier structure A. -
Basis and General Descrietion.
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WUMARC's two-tier structure for a design certification rule, j
cnd for a referencing combined license, is a faithful as well as i
practical implementation of Part 52.
Moreover, the two-tier I
otructure constitutes the best format to document the results of l
a design certification rulemaking.
There must be a j
voll-documented exposition of *those matters resolved in connection with the issuance... of a design certification"
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(Section 52.63 (a) (4)), in order to specify (i) the issues resolved and thus precluded from re-review and re-litigation in loter licensing proceedings, (ii) the obligations assumed by
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roferencing COL applicants / holders and (iii) the bases for NRC l
backfit constraints.
Industry believes that the most effective i
voy to accomplish such documentation is through a rule with a i
ro-tier structure -- Tier i describing the certified portion of i
as design and Tier 2 identifying that portion which was not cortified but which was, nonetheless, reviewed and about which 2
j issues were resolved as a result of the design certification rulemaking.
Part 52 states the Commission's expectation that there will ba less detail in a certification than in an application for cortification, and that a rule certifying a design is likely to oncompass roughly the same features that Section 50.59 prohibits changing without NRC approval.
Further, Part 52 provides that j
facility-specific changes can be made from design information oubmitted in the application but not certified if such changes i
ocet Section 50.59 requirements.
The two-tier structure which industry recommends is simply a means for giving concrete cpplication to the foregoing in formatting and documenting the results of a design certification proceeding.
j The first tier would contain a self-standing description of the design bases and design features of structures, systems and co:ponents based on the scope and organization of the SSAR Section 1.2.
The detail we?\\d be further amplified to a level i
thnt eguates to the detail O current Safety Evaluation Reports i
(SER).
Thus, the critical p;&nt design features affecting the j
cafety systems and conseqt.,1y the safe operation of the plant j
'uld be documented, revieww3 and approved at the design Ni rtification.
The first tier would also contain the R
i worresponding array of inspections, tests, analyses and i
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acceptance criteria (ITAAC) which Part 52 requires.
The second tier would reference the entire SSAR.
The SSAR is the primary technical document of the design certification j
application and will be the basis for the NRC's final design' approval and design certification reviews.
By referencing the j
SSAR in the design certification rule's second tier, the NRC 1
would document the features and commitments that were the basis i
for NRC approval (beyond those certified in the first tier) and i
document the " matters... resolved in connection with the i
issuance... of a design certification" (per Section 2
52.53 (a) (4) ).
The second tier would also contain the " validation attributes," which the FUMARC ITAAC report proposes as a bridge to demonstrating compliance with those first-tier acceptance j
criteria that are not readily measurable or otherwise verifiable j
by direct field inspection or test.
i The design certification rulemaking would consider and resolve all safety issues covered by hath tiers -- including the design detail to be included in each tier and the related change j
mechanisms -- for purposes of later COL and pre-operational i
proceedings (per Section 52.63 (a) (4)).
This resolution of issues j
will be binding on later COL applicants and licensees, the NRC i
and any intervanors in subsequent COL and pre-operational j
proceedings.
4 COL applicants and licensees will be obligated to comply j
vith all provisions in both tiers, absent an exemption, amendment 1
or other permitted change.
Matters covered by the first tier I
could only be changed by a COL applicant / holder through an NRC-approved exemption or amendment preceded by a hearing i
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opportunity (per Sections 52.63 (b)(1) and 52.97(b)).
Second tier j
matters could be changed by a COL holder without NRC approval oniv if a change met the requirements of Section 50.59 (per Section 52.63 (b) (2)).
NRC backfits involving satters described in the first tier l
would be governed by the provisions of Section 52.63, whereas i
Section 50.109 would govern backfitting as respects the second t
tier.
I j
3.
Floribility The need for a reasonable degree of flexibility to accommodate practical problems resulting from procurement, i
as-built considerations, start-up issues, obsolescence and i
equipment improvements for non-safety significant systems and structures, was recognized by all participants during the July
. presentations to the Commission.
Part 52 describes the control process for implemention.
J NUMARC believes that the process described in part 52 adequately j
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l addresses the Commission's concerns in regard to the reduction in the safety associated with changes to the design or the facility through the use of the 50.59 process.
In keeping with the specific language of Part 52, NUMARC has proposed to the Commission a flexibility provision within the two-tier approach paralleled to section 50.59.
In substance, a COL holder could j
make changes from the design content of the second tier only if l
they did not involve changes from the first tier design description or ITAAC or raise an unreviewed safety question.
While faithful to Part 52, this initial proposal raised a commission concern as to whether, over time, the benefits of standardization might be eroded resulting in the reduction of
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mome of the safety benefits.
NUMARC understands the Commission's concern that flexibility i
not result in an erosion of the safety benefits of j
standardization.
In the industry's view, this need not be the j
case.
In recognition of this concern NUMARC is committed to developing and implementing a process to maintain standardization l
beyond the requirements of Design certification dictated by Part 52.
In addition, as a parallel activity NUMARC will assess the 3
alternatives for developing a change control process and l
philosophy to address changes during construction, operation and the life span of certified designs and power plants to address the standardization concerns.
At present it is envisaged that, i
as a starting point, the processes and procedures would be modelled after the existing and proven practices.
NUMARC will l
keep the NRC staff fully appraised of this process to assure that the issues are being addressed.
I There are multiple economic as well as regulatory incentives for industry to maximize standardization.
Accordingly, NUMARC believes that section 50.59 flexibility for facility-specific changes from tier 2 criteria remains a reasonable and acceptable a
Part 52 approach.
As stated above, the industry is committed to i
developing a provision to address these additional concerns that are considered to be primarily economic issues with safety overtones.
These provisions would need to accommodate the a
ability of a COL holder or applicant to deal effectively with the j
practical problems of plant construction, operation and maintenance as well as the commission's desire to maintain the j
safety benefits of standardization.
I Flexibility is a major issue for any company undergoing the later use of a certified design; accordingly a practical i
j accommodation of these matters is essential.
NUMARC considers j
that these additional features to address the commission's i
concern should be developed as a parallel program with the i
evaluation of the designs presented for certification to date.
The industry does not foresee flexibility impacting policy
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guidance associated with the level of detail issues.
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Acelication of Section 50.59 l
The industry interpretation of Part 52 is that section 50.59 i
__ say be utilized only after a combined license is issued, and'then j
only by the licensee to make changes from the non-certified j
portions of the design (NUMARC's second tier) on a j
facility-specific basis (see section 52.63 (b) (2)).
Under Section 52.63 (b) (2), a COL applicant referencing a design j
certification rule may not use section 50.59 to make changes from j
the design' covered by the second tier of the rule but must seek j
an exemption from the Commission.
We understand the staff is investigating the potential use of 50.59 for COL applicants.
We think this makes functional sense and encourage the staff to pursue this latitude for COL I
applicants within the confines of Part 52.
Finally, it is our
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understanding that section 50.59 does not permit anyone to make i
changes in the design certification rule itself, irrespective of tier.
2.
Issue Finality.
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NUMARC believes that the matter of issue finality under the j
two-tier approach also calls for clarification in light of the questions raised during the July 16 and 18 briefings and certain l
statements contained in SECY 90-241.
Part 52 embodies the objective that issues should be resolved at the earliest feasible decisional point and that, once resolved, they should not be subject to further licensing review or hearing consideration.
Thus, all matters resolved in a design certification proceeding should be precluded from consideration in subsequent COL proceedings involving that certified design.
NUMARC believes such preclusion is mandated by section 52.63(a)(4), which specifies that "in making the findings required for issuance of a j
combined license, or for any hearing under section 52.103, the Commission shall treat as resolved those matters resolved in connection with the issuance... of a design certification."
l Applying these provisions to the two-tier rule means issue j
preclusion would apply to every matter covered in either tier.-
All such matters -- including the determination of what should l
properly be placed in each tier of the design certification rule and the change mechanisms applicable thereto -- would have been i
reviewed by the NRC and have been subject to hearing i
consideration in the design certification proceeding.
I j
It bears emphasis that a design certification rule structured on a two-tier basis results in more than just issue finality for both tiers in later COL and section 52.103 l
proceedings.
In addition to Issue Finality, COL applicants and 1
i 4
holders referencing a design certification rule must comply with l
both tiers of the rule, absent an exemption, amendment or other i
permitted change, as appropriate.
While the col holder would be j
authorized to make Section 50.59 changes from the second tier of
__ a design certification rule, this latitude is specifically sanctioned by Section 52.63 (b) (2).
Moreover, as pointed out i
above, all parties in design certification proceedings, including the NRC Staff and intervenors, will have had the opportunity to review and be heard on the appropriateness of placing matters in i
i the first or second tier, and such opportunity would occur in I
advance of the certification rule.
i i
Section 50.59 changes could be subject to challenge in a j
pre-operational hearing, as noted in SECY 90-241 and pointed out in the July 16 )RDLARC briefing.
In order to qualify as a hearing l
issue, a challenger would need to show non-compliance with the l
application of Section 50.59 criteria and/or process (as embodied in the design certification rule) and that this results in 3
i non-compliance with one or more of the acceptance criteria (the i
j touchstone for Section 52.103 pre-operational hearings and l
findings).
This potential for future challenge is, as noted in l
SECY 90-241, a practical disincentive to col holders -for making Section 50.59 changes.
In this regard, the benefits of design certification to the holder of, or applicant for, a COL utilizing a certified design are in direct proportion to the lack of change i
from that design during the licensing and construction processes.
1 Similarly, vendors have a strong incentive to assure that the i
level of detail supporting a. design certification application provides assurance that changes from the certified design will l
not be necessary during the performance of the implementation i
i phase of the detailed design work.
This implementation phase, as acknowledged during the presentations to the Commission in July, would be performed following the receipt of an order, after i
design certification.
There is much common ground with the Staff in our respective understandings of Part 52 and the two-tier. approach.
- NUMARC, would like to offer our understanding regarding certain j
statements in SECY 90-241 about issue preclusion.
The Staff, in
{
assessing the consequences of what it characterizes as a Level 3 approach to design detail, observed that a substantial amount of i
design engineering will need to be completed after certification
]
and concluded that:
1
- (t]his information may be subject to adjudication at some l
later time as part of a combined license proceeding or later prior to operation" (SECY 90-241, p.11).
Our understanding is that the only time such information is 1
subject to adjudication is in the event that such additional
]
engineering requires modification to information considered and i
resolved in the design certification rulemaking.
1 5
J
I What the Staff, in SECY 90-241, calls Level 3 design detail (Final FSAR, less site-specific, as-procured and as-built information plus ITAAC) is sufficient to enagle the NRC to resolve all design safety issues, review and approve proposed
-- ITAAC and make the findings for design certification required by Part 52.
The Staff recognized this to be the case in the course of questions from the Commissioners during the July 18, 1990 briefing.
The fact that further engineering detail will be developed and, which can be considered to be in two categories, (1) site specific design activities, and (2) construction details necessary to implement the design described in the DC or COL.
The first will be subject to the scrutiny of the COL proceedings; the second will be strictly governed by the NRC approved ITAAC.
This additional detail will be developed no matter what the level of detail in the design certification and in no way compromises the quality of the findings for design certification nor undermines their efficacy and their preclusive effect in later licensing proceedings.
It is well established that the commission has the authority to determine what issues are relevant for consideration in making its licensing determinations, when those issues should be considered in the sequence of licensing actions and the amount of information necessary for the Commission to make its licensing determinations.
Part 52 is structured on the premise that, if the reguirements of Section 52.47 are satisfied, enough information will be available to make the requisite design certification findings.
Part 52 further presupposes that complete engineering detail vill not be available at the design
'i certification stage. Indeed, Part 52 expressly contemplates that the available-for-audit information will be greater than that in the design certification application but that the result, nonetheless, will be issue-preclusive pursuant to Section 52. 63 (a) (4).
In short, engineering design detail to implement a certified design cannot be the basis for subsequent hearing consideration unless there are proposed changes from the design encompassed in the design certification rule (Tier 1).
If this were not the case, there would be no issue finality value to obtaining a design certification -- contrary to the express intent of Part 52.
3.
Level of Detail The level of detail for the Design certification process will vary from system to system and that although a degree of general guidance can be given regarding the level of detail, the specific level of detail for each system can best be practically
. determined during the review process of each design certification application, as envisioned in Part 52.
Under the proposed industry approach, various systems and components would be 6
4 i
I j
i i
described to a varying level of detail, dependent on their safety significance.
This appears to be consistent with what the NRC i
I Staff suggests in SECY 90-241 and with what the Staff and the
{
commissioners implied in their discussions during the,
j
__ presentations of the July 18, 1590 meeting.
1 We agree with the Staff's characterization in SECY 90-241 i
that the depth of design detail submitted by an applicant for i
design certification will be similar to that of a final safety 1
analysis report ("FSAR") at the operating license ("OL") stage for a recently licensed plant minus site-specific, as-built and 4
as-procured information, plus ITAAC.
The applicant must provide design criteria and bases, system descriptions, performance requirements, and component descriptions and characteristics in enough detail for the NRC to make its final conclusions on all i
safety questions and to enable procurement specifications and j
construction and installation specifications to be developed.
In j
terms of typical engineering design documentation, this would l
include system performance requirements, plant general i
arrangement and layout drawings, P& ids, process flow diagrams and j
one-line electrical drawings.
Also, included would be general equipment locations, major pipe, duct and cable routing, QA a
i program description, test and acceptance requirements, as well as j
pertinent design bases and analytical results and summaries.
The j
level of design detail would be related to the safety j
significance of the particular structure, system or component; in general, the greater the safety significance, the greater the
]
level of design detail.
In this regard, the review process conducted by the Staff in j
accordance with the Standard Review Plan ("SRP") and the guidelines developed for review of new plant designs for the purpose of issuing Final Design Approvals ("FDAs") is relevant.
Information is submitted consistent with the level of detail appropriate for the review contemplated by the SRP and relevant guidance and supplemented as needed by the question and answer process that has been successfully utilized by the Staff in the
]
licensing of over 100 nuclear power plants.
Thus, the Staff will i
be able to make their safety determinations associated with the approval of a design certification application.
Following this approach results in the general specification of individual 1
components and corresponding systems and/or structures to varying j
degrees dependent on their safety significance, based on an accumulation of industry and regulatory experience with respect 3
to the particular structure, system and component and its i
specific application.
Similarly the level of detail would vary from system to system.
Expressed in terms of the options characterized by the Staff in SECY 90-241, the level of detail j
would range from Level 3, as a minimum, to in excess of Level 2.
j
.As suggested in SECY 90-241, the difference in the varying levels i
of detail among systems would mainly be found in the specific descriptions of the physical attributes of individual system i
7 i
4
~
f I
components.
Whether or not such information was included, and to what degree, would depend on the safety significance of that given component to both the system and the plant as a whole, as l
discussed above.
i It should be noted that for Part 52 applications, reflecting current and future AIMR designs and the prerequisites of the ALWR i'
Requirements Documents the Part 52 process is already resulting in a substantial increase in the level of detail being submitted to the NRC compared to what has historically been provided at the pre-construction stage under Part 50.
In addition, the format, j
content and demands of the ALWR Requirements Documents will require applicants to address USIs/GSIs, conduct a PRA, adhere to the resulting maintenance and reliability requirements, provide uncertainty analyses, and to develop ITAAC documents.
The above factors together with the standard NRC safety review practices, augmented by specific guidance for ALWRs and combined with industry initiatives will result in a level of detail consistent with Part 52 standardization objectives.
To demand an even greater level of detail at the design certification stage would result in nugatory work, increased financial risk and an increase in the review cycle which would significantly reduce the 4
probability of any new nuclear plant orders in the near term.
4.
Preerietary Information NUMARC believes that the provisions respecting proprietary information contained in Section 52.51(c) provide means that are adequate to protect proprietary information submitted in a design certification application.
NUMARC further believes that, with a properly constituted two-tier structure, proprietary information will not be part of the design description in the first tier of a design certification rule.
As noted by NUMARC during the course of the Commission briefing on July 16, Part 52 provides that proprietary information in design certification proceedings will be protected in the same manner and to the same extent as proprietary information submitted in Part 50 license proceedings (section 52.52(c)).
This provision was included in Part 52 in response to a NUMARC rulemaking comment.
The effect was to eliminate for design certifications the following disparity in'Section 2.790 between protection of proprietary information in rulamaking and in licensing proceedings:
"(proprietary) information submitted in a rulamaking proceeding which subsequently forms the basis t'or the final rule will not be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and will not be returned to the applicant after denial of any application for withholding submitted in connection with that information."
10 CFR Section 2.790(c).
8
While eliminating the above disparity, Section 52.51(c) specifies that "the design certification shall be published in Chapter 1 of this Title".
NUMARC believes that a " design
___ certification can be published which describes the certified a
design in an appropriately informative but non-proprietary manner.
However, the greater the level of detail " certified" the greater the likelihood of encountering propriety obstacles in the published description; and publication would entail significant disclosure of proprietary information if the level of detail contained in the certification were to be that which SECY 90-241 characterizes as Inval 1.
In the foregoing context, therefore, NUMARC agrees with the Staff observation in SECY 90-241 that, " decisions about level of detail and the certification itself could have important consequences for the commercial value of vendor design information" -- and, we would add, for the viability of the Part 52 design certification process.
The practical -- and appropriate -- answer we believe is a properly constituted two-tier structure, as recommended by the industry.
9
d f nouq'o UNITED STATES 4
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
,E ADVISORY COMMITTEEVN REACTOR SAFEGUARDS g
A g
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 oe.e+
August 14, 1990 The Honorable Kenneth M.
Carr Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Chairman Carr:
SUBJECT:
LEVEL OF DETAIL REQUIRED FOR DESIGN CERTIFICATION UNDER PART 52 During the 364th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, August 9-11, 1990, we reviewed the Commission Policy Issue Paper SECY-90-241 related to the level of detail required for design certification under 10 CFR Part 52.
Our Subcommittee on Improved Light Water Reactors also reviewed this matter during a meeting on August 8,
1990.
During these reviews, we had the benefit of discussions with representatives of the NRC staff and 1
of NUMARC.
We also had the benefit of the documents referenced.
~
Two imoortant issues are addressed in SECY-90-241. The first deals I
with t.he level of detail to be included in an application for design certification under Part 52.
The second deals with the level of detail to be included in the design certification rule itself.
The first issue is of immediate importance and needs to be resolved before the NRC staff completes its review of the Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR) and other documents on which the application for design certification is to be based.
One might view the second issue as being less urgent, since it comes into play only after the application for design certification has been filed.
At that point, one decides what portion of the information in the application is to be included in the design certification rule.
However, we believe it is important for the staff to have an early awareness of the extent to which the information it is reviewing may become subject to revision during the design certification rulemaking.
This would allow the staff to include appropriate wording in its Safety Evaluation Report (SER), identifying certain features for mandatory inclusion in the design certification rule.
This would ensure that such features would not be changed in the future without the full protection of Part 52 design change requirements.
3 h'
l
-l j
The Honorable Kenneth M. Carr.
3 August 14, 1990 Additional comments by ACRS Member Lawrence E.
Minnick are presented below.
Sincerely,
/
Carlyle Michelson
)
Chairman i
l Additional Comments by ACRS Member Lawrence E.
Minnick Neither the written material referenced above, nor our discussions with the staff has revealed any justification in terms of enhanced
)
safety for standardization of plant designs beyond those portions l
directly and significantly related to safety.
Since it is clear that standardization, per se, is not an unmixed-
- blessing, I
strongly recommend that the_ ultimate degree of I
standardization should not be pursued for its own sake, but rather should be limited to that degree clearly essential to the assurance of plant safety.
obviously competition among suppliers, and innovation and improve-ment l'n general, are considerably hampered by standardization.
Those considerations have been so fundamental to this country's technical supremacy that they should require no elucidation here, but perhaps it does bear pointing out that standardization of nuclear units is inherently limited in any event, for example, by differing site characteristics and. inevitable variations in operating experience.
I feel that the "two-tier" approach proposed by NUMARC will also alleviate the burden of standardization.
I endorse that approach, which by reliance on the well-demonstrated 10 CFR 50.59 require-ments will limit changes to those having no significant effect on safety.
References:
1.
SECY-90-241, Memorandum dated July 11, 1990 for the Commis-sioners from James M. Taylor, Executive Director for Opera-1 tions,
Subject:
Level of Detail Required for Design
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Certification Under Part 52.
2.
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rules and Regulations -
10 CFR Part 52, "Early Site Permits; And Combined Licenses for Nuclear Power Reactors," April 28, 1989 j
.