ML20071C875
| ML20071C875 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 03/01/1983 |
| From: | Golden J COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8303080200 | |
| Download: ML20071C875 (303) | |
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'o UNITEpn . S OF AMERICA NgCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket 50-454 OL
) d) 455 OL Byron Nuclear Power Station, ) D Units 1 & 2) ) g kpg -
SUMMARY
OF TESTIMOb S OF ~[; JOHN C. GOLDEN -i p/p - Dr. John C. Golden is the Su 'so _ f He f Physics and Emergency Planning for Applica 'l a uch is responsible for the Applicant's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) and the site specific Byron annex of GSEP. His testimony addresses DAARE/ SAFE Contention 3 and the League's Contontions 19 and 108. Dr. Golden introduces the GSEP and sites specific Byron annex to GSEP. He describes the previous testing that has been done of GSEP at Applicant's operating nuclear power plant and confirms that the GSEP site specific I annex for Byror. will be tested during the scheduled exercise. Dr. Golden explains the ongoing review and revision of these documents. Dr. Golden also introduces an evacuation time ; estimate study which was commissioned by Applicant. l Dr. Golden concludes that based on Applicant's ) considerable experience in the development and impler.tentation d_ 8303080200 830301 PDR ADOCK 05000454 T PDR d
2 -- I, of GSEP and site specific annexes at its other nuclear power plants that GSEP and the site specific Byron annex to GSEP will be adequate to respond effectively to a nuclear emergency. l i t _J
Dato: 3/1/83
.- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In The Matter of )
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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-454 OL
) 50-455 OL
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(Byron Nuclear Power Station, ) Units 1 & 2) ) TESTIMONY OF JOHN C. GOLDEN 01: Please state your name, present occupation, and present position. Al: My name is John C. Golden. I am employed by the Commonwealth Edison Company (" Commonwealth Edison") as Supervisor of Health Physics and Emergency Planning. I am also Commonwealth Edison's Radiation Protection Officer. I have been employed by Commonwealth Edison since January ll, 1971. 02: Briefly state your educational and professional qualifications. A2: I have a Bachelor of Science in Physics (1962) from the University of Massachusetts, and a Master of Public l Health (1964) and Doctor of Public Health (1970) from the University of Michigan. At Michigan I majored in radiological and environmental health. Prior to working for Commonwealth Edison, I worked as a health physicist for the Florida State
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? ' Board of Health (1964-1966) and Sandia Corporation, Albuquerque, New Mexico (1966-1968).
g3: Describe your duties and responsibilities as Supervisor of Health Physics and Emergency Planning. 4 A3: As Supervisor of Health Physics and Emergency Planning, I am responsible for (a) the functional control of Commonwealth Edison's nucJear station radiation protection programs, (b) development, review, coordination and approval of nuclear station environmental radiological monitoring programs and emergency planning, and (c) providing radiation protection services to Commonwealth Edison's licensed non-nuclear generating stations. I g4: To which contention is this testimony addressed? A4: DAARE/ SAFE Contention 3 and League of Women Voters' Contentions 19 and 108. Q5: Briefly describe the emergency preparedness plan for Byron Station. A5: The emergency preparedness plan in Illinois for Byron Station is composed of five parts: (1) the generic Commonwealth Edison Generating Stations Emergenc-f Plan (GSEP); (2) the site specific Byron annex of GSEP: (3) the generic Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA Vol. 1); (4) the site specific Byron local plan (IPRA, Vol. 6); and (5) the various plans of the Federal agencies (such as NRC and FEMA). GSEP and the site specific Byron annex of GSEP are in final form and attached as Exhibits 1 and 2
- respectively. The other three parts of the plan are ad-dressed by witnesses from the respective agencies.
06: Has GSEP been tested and reviewed in connection with exercises conducted at Commonwealth Edison's nuclear power plants? A6: Yes. GSEP has been successfully tested and reviewed nine times in connection with exercises at Commonwealth Edison's four operating plants, Dresden (1980, 1981, 1982), LaSalle (1980, 1982), Quad Cities, (1981, 1982), and Zion (1981, 1983). GSEP will again be tested and reviewed along with the site specific Byron Annex to GSEP in connection with an exercise at Byron scheduled for the week of August 22, 1983. Prior to this Byron exercise we will test the GSEP twice more, once at Quad Cities in May and once at LaSalle in July. 07: Please clarify your statement that the GSEP and site specific Byron annex to GSEP are in final form. A7: GSEP and the site specific annexes to GSEP j are documents which are subject to constant review and 1 revision. GSEP is reviewed annually and on a routine basis. The GSEP annexes are reviewed closely in connection with their respective exercises. Any changes which are deemed I necessary as a result of this review process are incorporated t ! into the documents. l l l 08: Has Commonwealth Edison Company prepared an l evacuation time estimate study in regard to the emergency
i b planning zone around Byron Station? A8: Yes. Commonwealth Edison Company commis-sioned the preparation of an evacuation time estimate study. f The final report is dated December, 1982 and attached as I Exhibit 3. The evacuation time estimate study was prepared i by Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation using site spe-cific information gathered by them as well as information , f gathered by the planning team who wrote the Byron annex to l IPRA. Many of the assumptions underlying the evacuation f time study were based on the concept of operations specified i in IPRA. 09: If the further review and revision of the Byron annex to IPRA indicates a significant change in assumptions l used in the evacuation time study, would that study be revised to reflect those changes? , l A9: The evacuation time study will be revised if I l such changes are warranted for an effective implementation 1 of the Byron emergency plan. 010: Do you have any reason to believe that the GSEP and the site specific Byron annex to GSL? will not be adequate to respond effectively to a nuclear emergency. A10: No. Commonwealth Edison has had considerable experience in the implemenation of the GSEP through exercises at its other nuclear power plants. The site specific Byron annex to the GSEP has been developed based on the experience gained at those other plants and with consideration of the circumstances particular to Byron. l
,C 1q LNCON301D C03Y ,,, _ ,, 1,,1 Revision 3 GEIGERIC GSEP REVISI0tt INDEX PAGE Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision Page Revision i 3 4-26 3 6-5 3 9-2 3 ii 3 4-27 3 6-6 3 9-3 3 iii 3 4-28 3 6-7 3 9-4 3 iv 3 4-29 3 6-8 3 9-5 3 v 3 4-30 3 6-9 3 9-6 _ 3 vi 3 4-31 3 6-10 3 9-7 3 vii 3 4-32 3 6-11 3 9-8 3 viii 3 4-33 3 6-12 3 9-9 3 ix 3 4-34 3 6-13 3 9-10 3 x 3 4-35 3 6-14 3 9-11 3 1-1 3 4-36 3 6-15 3 9-12 3 1-2 3 4-37 3 6-16 3 2-1 3 4-38 3 6-17 3 2-2 3 4-39 3 6-18 3 2-3 3 4-40 3 6-19 3 2-4 3 4-41 3 6-20 3 3-1 3 4-42 3 6-21 3 3-2 3 4-43 3 6-22 3 i 3-3 3 4-44 3 6-23 3 3-4 3 4-45 3 6-24 3 i
4-1 3 4-46 3 7-1 3 4-2 3 4-47 3 7-2 3 4-3 3 4-48 3 7-3 3 4-4 3 4-49 3 7-4 3 4-5 3 4-50 3 7-5 3 4-6 3 4-51 3 7-6 3 1 4-7 3 4-52 3 7-7 3 4-8 3 4-53 3 7-8 3 4-9 3 4-54 3 7-9 3 4-10 3 4-55 3 7-10 3 4-11 3 4-56 3 7-11 3 4-12 3 5-1 3 7-12 3 4-13 3 5-2 3 7-13 3 4-14 3 5-3 3 7-14 3 4-15 3 5-4 3 7-15 3 4-16 3 5-5 3 7-16 3 4-17 3 5-6 3 8-1 3 4-18 3 5-7 3 8-2 3 4-19 3 5-8 3 8-3 3 4-20 3 5-9 3 8-4 3 - 4-21 3 5-10 3 8-5 3 4-22 3 6-1 3 8-6 3 4-23 3 6-2 3 8-7 3 ! 4-24 3 6-3 3 8-8 3 4-25 3 6-4 3 9-1 3 Date for Revision 3: November, 1981 41123A
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l 1 1 Isovember,1981 . Revision 3 O O e 4 (miank) i 1 l i e
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,s ,a November, 1981 Revision 3 GEIERATING STATIONS ENERGENCY PLAN (GSEP)
TABLE OF CONTElqS I Page 1.0 Scope and Applicability 1-1 2.0 Definitions 2-1. 3.0 Summary of Emergency Plan 3-1 4.0 Organisational Control of Emergencies 4-1 4.1 Normal Plant Organization, 4-l' i' 4.2 Station Group 4-3 4.3 Offsite GSEP Organization 4-15 4.3.1 Offsite GSEP Organization for Emergencies of Limited Extent 4-15 l 4.3.2 Offsite GSEP Organization for Emergencies 4-17 of Great Extent 4.4 Non-Commonwealth Support Groups , 4-42 4.5 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 4-43 4.6 Participating Federal Organizations 4-44 4.6.1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4-44 4.6.2 Federal Emergency Management Agt wy' 4-44 4.6.3 Federal Interagency Central Coor.'inating 4-45 j Committee i 4.6.4 Department of Eneroy Chicago Operations Office 4-45 4.6.5 U.S. Coast Guard 4-46
- 4.6.6 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 4-46 4.6.7 Federal Bureau of Investigation 4-47
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November, 1981 novision 3 . MRLE OF CONTENFS (COtrf) l _Plggg 4.7 The State of Illinois 4-47 ! 4.8 The State of Iowe 4-53 4.9 The State of Wisconsin 4-54 5.0 Classification of Emergency conditions 5-1 6.0 Emergency Heasures 6-1 l 6.1 Commonwealth Emergency Response Actions 6-1 6.2 Assessment Actions 6-13 6.2.1 Evaluation of Plant Conditions 6-13 l 6.2.2 Radiological blessurements 6-13 6.2.3 Dose Projections for the Offsite Public 6-13 6.2.4 Core Damage Assessment 6-14 6.3 Protective Actions for the Offsite Public 6-14 6.3.1 Commonwealth Recommendations for Protective Action 6-14 6.3.2. Notification of the Public 6-15 , 6.3.3 Implementation of Offaite Protective Hessures 6-16 6.4 Protective Actions for Onsite Personnel 6-20 l 6.4.1 Protective Cover, Evacuation, Accountability 6-20 6.4.2 Use of Protective Equipment and Supplies 6-20 6.4.3 contamination Control Measures 6-21 6.5 Aid to Affected Onsite Personnel 6-21 4 6.5.1 Emergency Personnel Exposure 6-21 6.5.2 Decontamination and First Aid 6-22 6.5.3 Medical Transportation 6-23 11
,e ,a November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT) .
Page 6.5.4 Medical Treatment 6-23 7.0 Emergency Facilities and Equipment 7-1 7.1 Emergency Control Centers 7-1 ! 7.1.1 Station Control Room 7-1 7.1.2 Onsite Technical Support Center 7-1 7.1.3 Onsite Operational Support Center 7-2; 7.1.4 Corporate command Center 7-3 ,I 7.1.5 Nearsite Emergency Operations Facility 7-3 7.2 Communication Systems 7-5 7.2.1 Nuclear Accident Reporting System 7-5 ( 7.2.2 Communications for Command and control 7-5 7.2.3 Environmental Assessment Communications 7-6 7.2.4 NRC Communications 7-6 7.3 Assessment Facilities 7-11 7.3.1 Onsite Systems, Instrumentation, and Equipment 7-11 7.S.2 Safety Parameter Display System 7-11 7.3.3 Offaite Dose Calculation System 7-11 l l 7.3.4 Nuclear Data Link 7-13 7.4 Protective Facilities and Equipment 7-13 , 7.5 First Aid and Medical Facilities 7-13 7.6 Damage Control Equipment and Supplies 7-14 7.7 Facilities and Equipment for Offsite Monitoring 7-14 iii
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Novsaber, 1981 i Revision 3 MELE OF CONTENTS (CObrf) BSS 8.0 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness 8-1 m.L Organizational Preparedness 4-1 8.1.1 Division Vice-President, Nuclear Stations 4-1 8.1.2 Station Superintendent 8-1 8.1.3 Nedical Directer 8-2 8.2 Tre!r.ing 8-2 , l j 8.3 Exercises and Drills 8-3 8.3.1 Exercises 8-3 8.3.2 Drills 8-5 8.4 Public Education and Information 4-6 l 8.5 Review and Updating of the GSEP and Corresponding EPIPs 8-4 I
) i 8.6 Emergency Equipment and Supplies 8-7 s 1 9.0 Appendix 9-1 9.1 Required Content of Site Specific Annexes 9-1 9.2 Required content of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures 9-3 l 9.3 Additional Emergency Response / Notification Requirements 9-6 9.4 References / Supporting Plans 9-11 )
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l November, 1981 Revision 3 SITE SPECIFIC AMIEXES A. Dreedia Station Emergency Plan Annex B. Quad Cities Station Emergency Plan Annex C. Eion Station Emergency Pl.t.ta Annes D. LaSalle Station Emergency Plan A.m E. Byron Station Emergency Plan Annes (Later) F. Braidwood Station Emergency Plan Annex (Later) l l v , 1 l
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November, 1941 Nevision 3 LISTING OF FIGURES Figure 1.0-1 Commonwealth Edison Electric Service TerTitory Figure 4.1-1 Normal Nuclear Flant Organisation Figure 4.2-1 GSEP Station Group Organization Figure 4.2-2 Minimum Shift Manning for All Nuclear Stations Figure 4.2-3 Augmentation Guidance for Bach Nuclear Station Figure 4.3-1 Limited Offsite GSEP Organisation Figure 4.3-2 Full Response Offsite GSEP Organisation Figure 4.7-1 IFRA Concept of Operations Figure 6.1-1 Simplified Emergency Notification Scheme Figure 6.1-2 Sector and zone Designators Figure 7.1-1 Commonwealth Emergency Control Centers Figure 7.2-1 Nuclear Accident Reporting System Figure 7.2-2 Communications for Command and control-Figure 7.2-3 Environmental n====-at Communications Figure 7.2-4 NRC h hations LISTING OF TABLES l Table 4.2-1 Station Director Table 4.2-2 Operations Director ' Table 4.2-3 Technical Director ) Table 4.2-4 Maintenance Director l Table 4.2-5 Stores Director Table 4.2-4 Administrative Director Table 4.2-7 Security Director Table 4.2-8 Rad /Chen Director Table 4.3-1 Necovery Manager Table 4.3-2 Plant Operations Manager Table 4.3-3 Advisory Support Director , Table 4.3-4 Technical Support Manager Table 4.3-5 Environmental / Emergency Coordinator Table 4.3-6 Design & Construction Support Manager Table 4.3-7 Scheduling Planning Manager Table 4.3-8 Weste Systems Radiation Control Manager Table 4.3-9 Admin./ Logistics Manager Table 4.3-10 Emergency News Centar Director j Table 4.3-11 Corporate Command (.4nter Director ! Table 4.3-12 System Power Dispatcher Table 4.3-13 Medical Director i Table 4.3-14 Legal Consultant Table 4.3-15 Engineering Director Table 4.3-16 Intelligence Director Table 4.3-17 .5ealth Physics Director l Table 4.3-18 Information Director l Table 4.3-19 Environmental Director Table 4.3-20 Manpower and Logistics Director l Table 4.3-21 Accounting Director l . vi l l l
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November, 1981 Revision 3 LISTING OF TABLES (CONT) Table 4.3-22 Communications Director Table 4.3-23 ERP Director Table 4.3-24 Division Director Table 4.3-25 Environs Director Table 4.3-26 Training Director Table 5.0-1 Description of Transportation Accident Table 5.0-2 Description of Unusual Event Table 5.0-3 Description of Alert Table 5.0-4 Description of Site Emergency ' Table 5.0-5 Description of General Emergency l Table 5.0-4 Emergency Action Levels for Radioactivity in Liquid l Effluents Table 6.1-1 Commonwealth. Actions for Transportation Accident l Table 6.1-2 Commonwealth Actions for Unusual Event Table 6.1-3 Commonwealth Actions for Alert T;tble 6.1-4 Commonwealth Actions for Site Emergency l Table 6.1-5 Commonwealth Actions for General Emergency Table 6.3-1 n - nded Protectivi
,. Actions for Gaseous Release -
( Table 6.3-2 GSEP Guidelines for Protection Against Ingestion of contamination for the offsite Public Table 6.3-3 Summary of Possible Offsite Protective Actions to be Recommended or Implemented during an Emergency Table 7.7-1 Minimum Requirements for offsite Emergency Monitoring Equipment for Each Nuclear Station e 1 vil
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- tuvember, 1981 Revision 3 LISTING OF ACR0lWNS A/E Architect / Engineer 30m Boiling Water Reactor CCC Corporate Connand Center l CFR Code of Federal Regulations DOE Department of Energy EAL Emergency Action Level ECCS -Emergency Core Cooling System j EMS Emergency Notification System (NRC) l EOC Emergency Operations (or Operating) Center EDF Energency Operations Facility DA Environmental Protection Agency EPIP Energency Plan Implementing Procedure ESDA Emergency Services and Disaster Agency ,
EFI Energency Planning Ione j ERP Energency Restoration of Power FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FEMA Pederal Baergency Management Agency i FDA Food and Drug Administration ! l FICCC Federal Interogency Central Coordinating Committee l FRNAP Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessmerce Plan GSEP Generating Stations Emergency Plan
. MPN Esalth Physics Network (NRC) '
IDMS Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety IMPO Institute of Nuclear Power operations , , IFRA l Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents I IRAF Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan NARS Nuclear Accident Reporting System NCRP " National Council on Radiation Protection imL Nuclear Data Link IFIC , Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply Synda 0a8 operating Resis Earthquake . ODCS Offsite Dose Calculation System CSC Operational Support Center OSC On-Scene Coordinator (Coast-Guard) PAG Protective Action Guide PEID Piping and Instrument Diagram PWR Pressurized Water Reactor RAC Regional Advisory Committee RAFT Xadiological Assistance Field Team RAP Radiological Assistance Plan RSAC Radiological Emergency Assessment Center i RF Radio Frequency ; SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake l SPCC Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure i SPDS Safety Parameter Display System l TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TS Technical Specification TSC Technical Support Center ws whole Body viii
Nove'aber, 1981 Revision 3 PREFACE The GSEP was prepared to comply with current requirements. Because of time constraints, equipment availability, and construction and/or installation of facilities and systems, there are areas within the GSEP where the planned capability, as described, may not be completely satisfied at this time. Identified below are areas where GSEP descriptions depart from actual conditiocs. Communiestions
- 1. Beereency Support Facilities The upgrade of Stations' onsite TSCs and nearsite Bors and the development of the Safety Parameter Display System and Noelcar Data Link will be completed consistent with NaC established schedules. In addition, the Offsite Dose Calculation System is still under development.
- 2. Plant Modifications for Po,st Accident Sampling and High Ranoe Radiation Monitors
, Modifications to Station Post Accident Sampling and High / Range Monitor equi; ment / systems are being completed consistent with NaC established schedules.
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leovember, 1981 Revision 3 (Blank) X e I
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November, 1981 Revision 3 GENERATING STATIONS EMERGENCY PLAN (GSEP) , 1.0 SCOPE A8D APPLICABILITY commonwealth Edison Company (Commonwealth) provides electrical services to three million customers ' within a service area covering 11 525 square3 miles. Most of this territory is in northern ~ Illinois and includes about one-fifth of the State. Refer to Figure 1.0-1. In providing its electrical service, commenwealth is committed to the use of nuclear power and is licensed to operate several nuclear generating units within the State of Illinois by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
- I In order to minimise the number of adbac decisions made du:ing an emergency and to ensure that necessary equipment, supplies, and essential services are available to meet the needs of an emergency, Commonwealth has developed the Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP). The GSEP is an emergency plan applicable to all nuclear generating stations operated by l Commonwealth and considers the consequences of radiological emergencies, as l required by 10CPR50, Paragraph 50.47 and Appendix E. Additionally, the GSEP. l l addresses the supplemental guidance provided by the NBC in the form of f NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 (Revision 1, November, 1980). The GSEP also considers )
the consequences of nonradiological emergencies. ; i ( The GSEP provides for the protection of the health and safety of the public, including commonwealth employees, the limitation of damage to ! facilities and property, and the restoration of such facilities in the event of an emergency. The GSEP describes the related emergency organization, including , assignments of authority and re'sponsibility. The GSEP provides for detection ! and evaluation of emergency situations, protective measures, communications,- I coordination and notifications of governmental authorities, document review l J
- and control, emergency preparedness assessment, and training of all emergency l personnel.
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yovember, 1981 Revision 3 2.0 DEFINITIOleS 2.1 Assessment Actions *i Those actions taken during or after an emergency to obt'ain and process information that is necessary to make decasions to implement specific emergency measures. 2.2 Dedicated , Communications A communications link between two or more locations,- access to which is limited to designated locations, and used only for the purpose intended. The communications link may be either telephone or radio. l 2.3 Drill - I . A supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular operation. A drill is often a cos,ponent of an exercise. 2.4 Emergency Action Levels (EAL) - Radiological dose rates, specific concentration levels of airborne, '
, waterborne, or surface-deposited radioactive materials, or specific ; instrument indications that may be used.as thresholds for initiating such \ specific emergency measures as designating a particular class of emergency, initiating a notification procedure, or initiating a particular protective action.
l 2.5 Emergency Personnel - Those organisational groups that perform a functional role during an emergency condition. Within Commonwealth, emergency personnel include the directors of the GSEP organisation, accident assessment personnel, radiological monito' ring teams, fire brigades, first aid teams, and security personnel. 2.6 Emergency Planning Rone (EP3) That area surrounding a nuclear station in which emergency planning is conducted for the protection of the public. With respect to protecting the public from the plume exposure resulting from an incident, the EPZ is usually an area with a radius of about 10 miles surrounding the facility. With respect to tiie ' ingestion exposure pathway, the EPS is usually an area with a radius of about 50 miles.
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2.7 Exercise An event-that tests the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within an emergency plan. 2-1
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November, 1981 Revision 3 2.8 GEEP A document called the Generating Stations Emergency Plan that consists of two parts:
- 1) A generic plan that contains emergency planning information common to all ca==amanalth nuclear stationar and
- 2) Site specific annexes that contain detailed emergency planning information unique to each nuclear station.
2.9 uesardoes___ Material A substance or material which has been determined by the United States Secretary of Transportation to be capable of posing and unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property when transported in connesce, and shich bt3 been so designated in 49 CFEt 172. 2.10 uucleae Station "Muclear station" as used herein refers' to Commonvecith Ediaon nuclear generating statices. 2.11 offsite .
- That area arcxami a nuclear generating station whic's lies outside the station'a
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2.12 onsite The area around a nuclear generating station which lies within the station's " site boundary *. L 2.13 Projected Does
. That does that is likely to be received by a population group if no protective actions are Y --- ted.
2.14 Protective Action Guides (PAG) Projected radiological dose or dose commitment values to individuals in the general population that warrant protective action. i Protective actions would be warranted provided the reduction in individual dose expected to be achieved by carrying out the selected protective action is not offset by excessive risks to individual safety in taking the protective action. l 2.15 Protective Actions Those emergency measures taken for the purpose of preventing or minimizing radiological exposures to affected population groups. 2-2
November, 1981 Revision 3 2.16 Shall, should, and May The word "shall" is used to denote a requirement, the word "should" to denote a recommendation, and the word "may" to denote permission, neither a requirement nor a recommendation. 2.17 Thyroid Blocking Agent An agent administered to an individual that will result in sufficient accumulation of stable iodine in the thyroid to prevent significant uptake of radiolodine. 2.18 worst Case Meteorology Atmospheric dispersion conditions which are expected to occur only 51 of the time, i.e., conditions should be mora favorable 95% of the time. ( 2-3
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. Revision 3 3.0 SusetARY OF EMERGENCY PLAN The Division vice-President, Nuclear Stations is responsible for the safe and reliable operation and maintenance of nuclear generating stations within Commonwealth Edison. This individual- reports to the Vice-President (Nuclear Operations) and has line responsibility for the administration, management, and direction of all Production Department activities at operating nuclear stations. The Division vice-President, Nuclear Stations, is also responsiLle for radiological emergency planning within Commonwealth Edison.
3.1 Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) [ l The Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) is a written radiological emergency plan that establishes the concepts, evaluation and assessment criteria, and protective actions that are necessary in order to limit and mitigate the consequences of potential or actual radiological emergencies. The GSEP provides the necessary prearrangements, directions, and organization so that all nuclear emergencies can be e Moctively and efficiently resolved in order to , safeguard station persoc k property, and the general public. The GSEP consists of two parts, a generic plan applicable to all generating stations, and a site specific annex for each nuclear generating station containing information and guidance that is unique to f L a particular station. 3.2 GSEP Organization The GSEP organization consists of directors and staff personnel who will ensure timely activation and implementation of any required emergency response. The GSEP organization can be divided into two functional areast onsite and offsite. 3.2.1- Onsite Emergency Organization The onsite GSEP organization consists of a Station Group and is primarily concerned with emergency response efforts necessary to control the plant during an incident. The Station Group functions under a Station Director for organizing and coordinating the emergency efforts at and within the immediate vicinity of the station. Collectively, members of the Station Group provide for the following activities during an emergency:
- 1) Plant systems operations;
- 2) Radiological survey and monitoring;
- 3) Firefighting; 3-1
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November, 1981 Revision 3
- 4) Rescue operations;
- 5) First aid:
- 6) Decontamination
- 7) Security of plant and access control;
- 8) Repair and damage contro1r
- 9) Personnel accountability;
- 10) Recordkeepinga
- 11) Communications.
I The responsibility for initial assessment of and response to an emergency normally rests with the Shift Engineer. The Station Diz wtor is responsible for making the initial determination of the severity of the emergency and for actuation of the GSEP as appropriate in accordance with the guidance provided in the generic GSEP, the site specific annex, and the station's implementing, procedures. The Shift Engineer is normally the initial Station 1 responsibilities and Director and has the Station Director's ' I authority until relieved of those responsibilities by the designated Station Director or his alternate (See Section'4.2). - 1 3.2.2 Offsite Emergency Organisation The Offsite GSEP organization consists of corporate personnel, division support, and environmental assessment and monitoring teams that provide long term support to the affected l as liaison with Fe deral, State, and local station as well 1 authorities. During the less serious emergencies, the GSEP Corporate Command Center Group is responsible for evaluating, coordinat'ing, and directing the overall company activities involved in coping with the emergency. The Corporate Command Center Group functions under a Director and its responsibilities include command and control, intelligence, logistics, engineering support, medical health care manpower physics, requirements consanications, accounting, legal, environmental, and information. During the more serious emergencies, the GSEP Corporate Command Center (CCC) Director is responsible for activating a GSEP Group at the affected station's Nearsite Emergency 2 Recovery i Operations Facility (EOF) . Once activated, this Recovery Group will direct, control, and coordinate all Commonwealth recovery efforts.
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. November, 1981 Revision 3 The CCC Group then becomes a support staff to the Recovery Group.
The Recovery Group functions under a Recovery- Manager with responsibilities consistent with the recommendations of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. (See Section 4.3). 3.3 Classification of Emergencies The GSEP provides for . classification of emergencies into five (5) categories. The first category, Transportation Accident, concerns an emergency involving the transportation of radioactive or other hasardous material from a generating station. The other four (4) categories: Notification of Unusual Event; Alert; Site Area Emergency; and General Emergency address emergencies of increasing steerity. (See Section 5.0) . Bereafter in this plan, Notification of Unusual Event. will be . referred to as Unusual Event, and Site Area Emergency will be referred to as Site Emergency. 3.4 Emergency Neasures Enargency measures to be taken for each class / category of emergency are also identified in the GSEP. Emergency seasures begin with ( activation of the emergency organisation. Subsequent measures are generally organized into assessment actions, corrective actions,
,._ protective actions; and aid to affected persons. (See Section 6.0).
i
' 3.5 Facilities and Equipment The GSEP identifies onsite and 'offsite facilities a'vailable for emergency assessment, communications, first aid and medical care, and damage control. Of particular importance are the emergency support centers. The centers are the Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC), the Onsite Operational Support Center (OSC), the Corporate Command Center (CL'C) and the Nearsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) . (Refer to Section 7.0).
3.5.1 Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) The Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) is utilized by plant management, technical, and engineering support personnel to support the Control Room command and control function, for assessment of plant status and potential offsite impact, and -for implementation of emergency actions. 3.5.2 Onsite Operation Support center (Osc) The Onsite Operational Support Center (OSC) is the location to which support personnel will report during an emergency and from l which they will be dispatched for usignment or duties in support of emergency operations. l 3-3
*- -e c - - , -- .---,w-..,,,.-. , -
--.----y- - - - , , . - --,-,..-,-2-.,-,,,----.-,----,wr--,,.
l .. .. I November, 1981 ! Revision 3 ' { 3.5.3 Corporate Command Center (CCC) The Corporate Command Center (CCC), located in dauntown Chicago, is the location from which the Corporate Command Center Director will normally direct a staff in evaluating, coordinating, and directing the overall company activities involved in coping with an emergency. If the Recovery Group is activated at the Nearsite EDF, then the CCC will be the location for a support staff reporting to the secovery Group. 3.5.4 Bearsite Eneroency Operations Facility (EOF) The Nearsite Emergency Operations Facility (BOF) is the location near the station that provides for the management of overall emergency response, the coordination of radiological assessments, and for management of recovery operations. The Nearsite EOF and the associated becovery Group function under a Recovery knager and are activated for all Site and General Emergency situations. Activation for other emergency situations is optional. 3.5 Maintaining anergency Preparedness The GSEP describes the manna to be empicyed to ensure that this plan will continue to be effective throughout the lifetimes of Comacnueelth nuclear stations. Emergency preparedness includes training, exercises - and drills, review and updating of the GSEP and procedures, as well as the administration of public information programs. (See Section 8.0) . s 3-4 l
November, 1981 Revision 3 4.0 ORGANIZATIONAL COtffROL OF EMERGENCIES meergency planning must consider the capabilities of the normal plant ; organisation, the onsite and offsite emergency organisations of Commmonwealth l Edison, and the offsite non-Commonwealth Edison emergency response ' agencies. The initial phases of an emergency situation at a nuclear station will involve a relatively small number of individuals. These individuals must be capable of: (1) determining that an emergency exists; (2) providing initial classification and assessment; and (3) promptly notifying other groups and individuals in the emergency organisation. The san snt phases of the emergency situation may require an increasing augmentation to the emergency organisation. In the case of a General Emergency, this will result in the mobilisation of all personnel resources of Commonwealth Edison poder the direction of the GSEP Recovery Manager. The GSEP organisation described in this section generally parallels Commonwealth's normal organisation. - 4.1 Moraal Plant Organisation The normal plant organization is basically the same for all Commonwealth nuclear stations and is depicted in Figure 4.1-1. 4.1.1 Station Superintendent Each Commonwealth nuclear station is managed by a Station ( s Superintendent who is responsible for direct management of the station, including Industrial Relations, planning, coordination, ' direction of the operation, maintenance, refueling, and technical activities. The Station Superintendent is responsible for , compliance with the Station's Mac operating license, government regulations, ASME Code requirements, and the Commonwealth Quality Assurance Program. He also authorises the use of procedures contained in the Station Procedures Manual and is responsible for final approval and distribution of station reports. The Station Superintendent authorizes all modifications to the Station af ter the issuance of an Operating License and completion of preoperational testing. He forwards requests for modifications to the Commonwealth Edison Station Nuclear Engineering Department. The Superintendent supervises the Station's onsite review function as provided in Station Technical Specifications. During an emergency situation, the Station Superintendent normally acts as the GSEP Station Group Director. 4.1.2 Succession of Authority The Station Superintendent has overall responsibility for station operation. During periods when the Superintendent is unavailable, this responsiblity is designated to alternates who satisfy the requirements of ANSI N18.1-1971, " Experience Requirements for Plant Manager." l 4-1
, , . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , __ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ l
s . November, 1981 Revision 3 4.1.3 shift Engineer The Shift Engineer on duty is responsible for operating the plant in compliance with the station operating license and the station operating procedures. During his shif t, the Shift Engineer is in charge of. the entire plant operation and is responsible for the plant being operated in a safe and reliable condition. He receives direction from the Operating Assistant Superintendent. The authority and responsibility of the operations shift supervisors and shift crews include:
- 1) The reactor operator's authority and responsibility for shutting down the reactor when he determines that the safety of the reactor is in jeopardy or when operating parameters escoed any of the reactor protection circuit setpoints and automatic shutdown does not occurs
- 2) The responsibility to determine the circumstacee, cause, and limits under which operations can safely proceed before the reactor it returned to power following a trip or an unscheduled or unexplained power reductiont
- 3) The senior reactor operator's responsibility to be ,
present at the plant and to provide direction for returning the reactor to power following a trip or a unscheduled or unexplained power reduction; -
- 4) The responsibility to adhere to the plant Technical Specifications:
- 5) The responsibility to review routine operating data to assure safe operation; and
- 6) The responsibility to adhere to plant operating procedures and the requirements for their use. (sowever, l
in case of emergency, operations personnel are authorized l to depart from approved procedures where necessary to prevent injury to personnel, including the public, or damage to the facility.) l A Shift Engineer is on duty 24 hours a day and is the initial GSEP Station Group Director and as such has the authority for l declaring an emergency and reconnending protective actions to local ! authorities. 4-2 l l f _ _ . _ _ .__
November, 1981 Revision 3 4.1.4 Minimum Shift Mannino All casumonwealth nuclear stations have capability at all times to perform detection, classification,. and notification functions required in the early phases of an emergency. Minimum shift manning at each nuclear generating station is specified in Figure 4.2-2. 4.1. 5 Health Physics Organization The Station Rad /Chen Supervisor is respor.sible for the health physics program and for handling and monitoring of radioactive materials. Normally reporting to the Rad /Chen Supervisor are health pigsicists, chemists, foremen, and technicians. ' 4.2 Station Group i The GSEP Station Group is the onsite emergency organisation which is activated during an emergency. The Station Group functions neder a-Station Director responsible for carrying out all onsite emergency , efforts as well as for carrying out the Commonwealth initial offsite environs monitoring efforts which are necessary for assessing plant , releases. A diagram of the GSEP Station Group organisation is shown in I Figure 4.2-1. s The Shift Engineer, as initial Station Dirwtot, will take immediate action during an emergency and will activate the GSEP Station Group as , appropriate. In the Shift Engineer's absence, the line of succession is: ;
- 1) Shif t Forement
- 2) Senior Nuclear Station Operator.
! The Shift Engineer, or his alternate, may be relieved of the Station Director position of responsibility when it is assumed by the designated Station Director or the Station Director's alternate. An individual assigned the duty as a shift technical advisor shall
- be available to the Control Room within 10 minutes of being called. It is the responsibility of the shift technical advisor to diagnose off-normal events and advise the operating shift accordingly.
NUREG-0654 Criyterion II.B.S states that " licensee must be able to augment on-shif t capabilities within a short period after declaration of an emergency." It further defines that short period as 30 and 60 minutes. Commonwealth Edison considers these timeframes to be the goal for on-shift augmentation. However, Cosumonwealth Edison will not commit to rigid, inviolate times due to the diversity of residential patterns for the stations' staffs, possible adverse weather conditions, and possible road congestion. This position is consistent with that of the NRC as stated in a letter dated October 26, 1981 from W.J. Direks to Dr. D.F. Knuth of KNC, Inc. 4-3
l l Nowaber, 1981 Revision 3 To facilitate meeting this commitment, commonwealth Edison will estahlfah a 24-Bour duty-call individual who would be notified first after a station emergency. This individual would initiate a prioritized notification (can-list) procaiure. The procedure identifies individuals who are capble of 'fulfining the specific response functions which are listed in GEEP Figure 4.2-3, Guidance for Augmentation of the Onsite Emergency Organisation within 60. minutes. GSEP Figure 4.2-3 was developed based on the functions listed in Table B-1 of NUERG-0654. The can-list procedures are prioritized considering least travel time of station staff. All GSEP Ctation Group personnel shan have the authority to perform asseigned duties in a mannar consistent with the objectives - of this plan. The mejor responsibilities and duties of the station Group directors are given in the fo H owing tables:
- 1) Table 4.2.1 - Station Directors
- 2) Table 4.2 Operations Director;
- 3) Table 4.2 Technical Director;
- 4) Table 4.2 Maintenance Director;
- 5) Table 4.2 Stores Director; ,
- 6) Table 4.2 Administrative Director;
- 7) Table 4.2 Security Director;
- 8) Table 4.2 Rad / Chem Director.
In addition to the onsite emergency organization (Station Group), the station's resources are augmented by the offsite Gsty organization and nosh:cumonwealth support groups. l 4-4 .
3 . s FIGURE 4.1-1 .
! NORidAL NUCLEAR Pt. ANT ORGANIZATION STATION SUPERINTENDENT; 7
i i i l- I ADMNilSTRATIVE & PERSONNEL SUPPORT SERVICES M RAT M N NANCE uma ASSISTANT ADWNISTRATOR ASS T ASSISTANT g gy SUPERINTENDENT SUPERINTENDENT , t I
~
I I I { SUPERVISOR TRAINING OFFICE SUPERVISOR
" "" OPERATING MASTER "i
TER NT MASTER EMINEERS ELECTRICIAN MECHANIC g , l I I I PERV S SUPERVi EiF RS 1 FMEMEN FMEEN NKN ON-SITE REVIEW 8 INVESil6ATIVE l -- I I FUNCTION STATION l
=== FMMN STORES SECURITV ADMINISTRATOR n
R g - SUPERVISOR (( g I [
- ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATORS b==== "
== = == = FUNCTIONAL A[SOR E
11IIS TAlllE IS IERIVED FTION IMOIMATION 00NTAllED IN ME 00PMONWEAL1H EDISON 00FFANY QUALITY ASSURAPCE MAfUAL. ANY CilANCES IN MIAT MAf0AL WILL SUPENSEDE IMORMATION CONTAIPED IN MIIS GS6P.
l l . FIGURE 4.2-1 l GSEP STATION GROUP ORGANIZATION STATION DIRECTOR I I I I
- OPERATIONS TECHNICAL MAINTEllAlfCE STORES DIRECTOR DIRECTOR i DIRECTOR DIRECTOR i
I I I I
- STAFF STAFF STAFF STAFF I
I I ADMINISTRATIVE $EEURITY : AAD- CHEM
- DIRECTOR CinECTOR DIRECTOR
- I I I j STAFF STAFF STAFF ,
7g
~ cr DN ; "O.
i s i O i e j /
November, 1981 Revision 3 FIGURE 4.2-2 MINI 8EIN SHIFT MMAIING REQUIREME3FFS ! Unit (s) Operating (5) (Single Control Room) One Two Shift Engineer 1 1 Shift Foreman (3) 1 1 Nuclear Station Operator 2 3 Equipment Operator /Attendent (3) ' 3 4 Rad /Chen Technicians 3 2 l . Shift Technical Advisor (4) 1 1 Radweste Operators (3) 1 (2) 1 (2) Emergency Coordinator / 1 (2) 1 (2) l Station Director l [' Notification /r'namun t, ation 1 (2) 1 (2) Rescue Operations /First Aid 2 (2) 2 (2) TOTAL 10 12 Minimum (1) 9 11 Notes: - (1) The minimum number refers only to the case of shift shortage caused by a sudden sickness or home emergency. (2) May be provided by shift personnel assigned other functions. l (3) These personnel are capable of performing emergency electrical, instrument or mechanical corrective actions and temporary repairs. (4) STA function is presently accomplished utilising an interim approach consisting of Sac's with augmented training or a technical graduate. l (5) Nanning requirements do not consider Dresden Unit 91 which is in an l extended outage and is not expected to be operational until late 1986. l l 4-7
a, ~ November, 1981 Revision 3 FIGURE 4.2-3 GUIDANCE FOR AUGbENTATION OF THE ONSITE EBERGENCY ORGANISATION WITHIN 60 MINUTES Auementation Within 60 Minutes Functional Area. Unusual Event Alert. Site & General Emergency
- 1. Command & Control Notification Only Station Director 1 1 1 Opet. Directe 1 1 1 h int. Director *1 1 1 -
- tech Director *1 1 1 l Admin, Director *1 *1 1 -
Storea Director *1 ,
*1 1 l Aad-Chem Director *1 1 1 Security Director *1 *1 1 Environs Director *1 1 1 '
i
- 2. Notifications &
Communications 1 1 Accident Assessment ', Offsite *2 4 Onsite *1 1 , In-Plant *1 1 Rad /Chen (Lab) *1 1
- 4. Technical Support Nuclear (Core) *1 1 '
Electrical .
*1 1 Mechanical *1 1
- 5. Repair & Correction Mechanical *1 1 Electrical *1 1 Radweste *1 1 Inst. & Control *1 1
- 6. Protective Actions Radiation Protection *2 4 i
! *2-9 *7-24 28 cAs needed depending upon the nature of the emergency NOTE: Additional support in the areas of Comeand & Controit Communications; and Accident Assesament will be available from the offsite GSEP ceganisation. It is reasonable to expect partial manning of the CCC or Nearsite EDF within 60 minutes for the Site & General Emergencies. 4-8
November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 4.2-1 STATION DIREC' TOR The Station Director reports to the Corporate Command Center Director. He supervises and directs the GSEP Station Group in organising and coordinating onsite emergency efforts (as well as directing all other plant activities) . If the Recovery Group is activated at the Nearsite EOF, the Station Director also serves as the Plant Operations Manager; he will report to the Recovery Manager but will not relocate from the Onsite TSC to the nearsite EDP. the station Directo:: will perform the following functions: o Classify emergencies in accordance with Section 5.0 of this plan. l .2 Er.sare that notifications are made as outlined in Section 6.0. l (System Power Dispatcher, NRC, and State / local agencies in a l i G6neral Energang) . i o Activate the GSEP Station Group as outlined by Figure 4.2-3 of tkis plan. I o Notify local support agencies, including ambulance service, as j k required in order to expedite their response to the emergency. , o Provide for an assembly and evacuatior cf nonassential personnel l from the site for a Site and General Emergency, or when other conditions warrant (refer to Section 6.4) . o Reep the CCC Director and Nuclear Regulatory Commission informed as to the status of the plant as determined by the station staff, c Request, from the offsite GSEP organisatior', additional material, manpower, and equipment as necessary to perform decontamination, repair, and restoration work. o Ensure adequate manning and access control of the Onsite TSC when activated. o Implement emergency and recovery efforts as directed by the Corporate Command Center / Recovery Manager. o In the case where the emergency involves hazardous substance and/or oil discharges (per the SPCC Plan) , ensure that the appropriate notifications and responses have been made. (Additional information is given in Section 9.3) . o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. 4-9 1
- - ~ - - ~ '~ .._,_ - , . _ - . - - -- - - - - - , - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - -
l l November, 1981 Revision 3 ' ThBLE 4.2-2 OPERATIONS DIRECTOR The Operations Director determines the extent of station emergencies, initiates corrective actions, and implements protective actions for onsite permaanal. Specifically, the Operations Director wills o Verify that the ' System Power Dispatcher and the Station Superintendent have been notified of an emergency. o Direct a staff in determining the nature and extent of emergencies pertaining to equipment and plant facilities. o Initiate immedi. ate corrective actions to limit or contain the - emergency. o Direct switching and valving operations, equipment operations, i equipment checking, and miscellaneous operations as required. o Ipuplement protective actions for onsite personnel, to include site assembly and evacuation (when ordered by the Station Director) . , o 'Organtae and direct rescue operations of injured personnel. Verify that ambulance services have been notified, as required. I Coordinate the transfer of injured personnel offsite. O Ensure adequate meaning of the Onsite OSC and Control Room. Designate an individual to manage and supervise activities at the Onsite OSC. o Identify steps or procedures that the Operations staff should be utilizing to properly respond to the GSEP condition. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. l 4-10 I
November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 4.2-3 TECHNICAL DIRECTOR The Technical Director directs a staff in performing technical asseaments of station emergencies and assists in recovery planning. Specifically, the Technical Director will l o Accumulate, tabulate, and evaluate data on plant coMitions such ! as plant operating data and inspection reports, o Evaluate vital plant parameters during an emergency to determine the overall condition of safety related systems, the core, and fission product bereiers. o Identify critical data points and control parametars that the Operatievrs ataff rbould monitor. o Identief special procedures needed to effect recovery. o supervise the total onsite technical staff effort. Acquire sufficient technical personnel to provide assistance during the l - stabilization and restoration phases. o Assist the Rad / Chem Director Iot onsite radiological / technical astters. ! o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activites. 4-11 l . _ _ _ . _
I November, 1981 Revision 3 s TABLE 4.2-4 NAINTENANCE DIRECTOR The Maintenance Director directs a staff in providing labor, tools, protective equipment, and parts needed for emergency repair, damage control, and recovery efforts to return the plant to 'its pre-accident status. Specifically, the Maintenance Director wills o Direct the total onsite ~ maintenance and equipment restoration effort. o Request additional equipment through the GSEP organization in order to expedite recovery and restoration. Equipment such as trucks, cranes, or pumps may be required. o Assist in rescue operations by providing labor, tosis, .and ,
- equipment. ,
t o Identify required steps or procedures that need to be written or implemented in support of recovery efforts. o Naintain a record of the GBEF related activities. TASLE 4.2-5 STORES DIRECTOR The Stores Director directs a staff in obtaining and delivering to the point og need all peri.s, protective equipment, and materials needed in recovery operations. Specifically, the Stores Director wills o Identify what materials and supplies are available onsite and ti m frames for delivery of other materials and supplies from offsite. o Expedite delivery of needed materials from offsite. o Inventory required emergency materials so that neces. ary supplies are not depleted and uninterrupted work can continue, o Provide adequate respiratory equipment and protective clothing to emergency personnel. . I o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities.
- ku l
+
November, 1981 Revision 3 TABI2 4.2-6 ADMINISTRATIVE' DIRECTOR The Mainistrative Director provides administrative services in support of emergency / recovery operations. Specifically, the Administrative Director wills o Direct a staff in the typing of emergency procedures and interim reports during an emergency. l c Coordiute recordkeeping efforts at the Station. o Assist the Station Director in arranging for s' tift reliaft and continual manning of the station. ' o Arrange for food and sleeping facilities for onsite emergency workers. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. I r TABLE 4.2-7 (., SECURITY DIREC'!OR The Security Director maintains plant security and personnel accountability at the nuclear station. Specifically, the Security . Director wills, o Maintain plant security and account for all personnel within the protected area. In the event of an onsite assembly of all personnel, you should account for all individuals within the protected area at the time that the assembly was announced and should be able to ascertain the names of missing individuals within 30 minutes. o Identify to the Station Director any non-routine security procedures and/or contingencies that are in effect or that l require a response. o Coordinate with Rad /Chen Director in controlling ingress and egress to and from the protected area. o Maintain security at the Nearsite EOF if it is activated. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. 4-13
November, 1981 Revision 3 x TABLE 4.2-8 RAD /CEEN DIRECTOR The Rad /Chen Director directs a staff in determining the extent and nature of radiological or hasardous material problems onsite (and initially effsite). Specifically, the Rad /Chen Director wills o Accumulate, tabulate, and evaluate data on plant conditions such as meteorological and radiation area monitoring readings, hazardous materfal surveys, and other pertinent data. o 12sure use of protective clothing, respiratory protection, and access control within the plant as deemed appropriate to control , personnel exposures, r l 0 Ensuae that appropriate bioassay procedures have been impleneated j t for onsite personnal when a ra11oactivity incident has occurred.l
-o Ansure that personnel are decontaminated, if necessary.
o Assist in planning personnel tercue operations and with respect i to hasardious material accidents, provide monitoring services as required. o set up, as appropriate, a group qualified to receive contaminated , l and injured personnel and perform first aid duties. o ' Assist in the transfer of injured and non-essential personnel. o Decide which of the predetermined personnel evacuation routes is to be used when deemed necessary. o Request through the offsite G8EP organization the following as necessary:
- Additional or special personnel monitoring devices (TLDs, whole body counters, etc.)
- Engineering evaluations of temporary shielding or special equipment and tools.
- Additional health physics support personnel.
- Additional instrumentation and equipment, as required.
o Coordinate initial offsite monitoring efforts until such activities can be directed by a designated Environs Director. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. I i 4-14
---.m,.e m.,-,., , - , -
l November, 1981 Revision 3 4.3 offaite GSEP Organization The sine of the offsite GSEP organization will vary depending upon the nature and extent of the emergency. For planning purposes, two separate organisational arrangements will be defined. 4.3.1 offsite GSEP Organisation for Eneroencies of Limited Extent During Transportation Accident situations or during incidents at nuclear stations that are classified as Unusual Events or Alarts, it is unlikely taat the usarsite Emergency operations Facility would be activateo. In those instances, the offsite Recovery Group would also not be activated and the offsite GSEP organisation would consist primarily of Corporate Command Center perscanal as outlined in Figure 4.3-1. The offsite " limited" GSEP organisation consists of the following directors whose major duties are delineated in the referenced tables
- 1) Table 4.3-11 Camporate Command Center Director
- 2) Table 4.3-12 System Power Dispatcher
- 3) Table 4.3-13 Medical Director
- 4) Table 4.3-14 Legal consultant
- 5) Table 4.3-15 Engineering Director
- 6) Table 4.3-16 Intelligence Director
- 7) Table 4.3-17 sealth Physics Director
- 8) Table 4.3-18 Information Director
- 9) Table 4.3-19 Environmental Director
- 10) Table 4.3-20 Manpower and Logistics Director
~
- 11) Table 4.3-21 Accounting Director
- 12) Table 4.3-22 Communications Director
- 13) Table 4.3-23 ERP Director
- 14) Table 4.3-24 Division Director
- 15) Table 4.3-25 Environs Director 4-15
1 i FIGURE 4.3-l LIMITED RESPONSE OFFSITE GSEP ORGAN!ZATION CORPORATE enMMAM CENIER DIRECTOR I ' SYSTEM POWEk DISPATCHERS - - -_ _ LEGAL CONSULTAll) MEDICAL - DIRECTOR
, . I I -
I ~I ENVlNONMENTAL MAllPOWER ANO A ENGINEERING INTELLIGENCE
- DIRECTOR DIRECTOR GIRECTOR LOGISTICS DIRECTOR
} _
I I I I I I HEALTH PHYSICS INFORMATl001 STAFF ACCOUNTill6 COMMulilCAT10llS STAFF DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR DIRECTOR I I
. ERP DIRECTOR STAFF STAFF I
I I ,, ENVIRONS: STAFF DIVISI0li $$ DIRECTOR MRECTOR pg l r! =" i STATION GROUP (S) i STf.FF STAFF '
~
"[
i........................: (0NSITE) i $ L
'\ . }
November, 1981 Revision 3 4.3.2 offsite GSEP Organization for Emergencies of Great Extent During incidents at nuclear stations that are classified as Site or General Emergencies, the GSEP Recovery Group will be activated at the Nearsite Emergency Operr' ions Facility. In many instances, activation of the Recovery Group requires that desiginated directors of the Corporate r%== mad Center staff ralocate to the Nearsite EDF and assume additional responsibilities for assigned positions. The Recovery Group functions under a Recovery Manager who is responsible for the overall company activities aimed at restoring the affocted station to a safe status. The Corporate Command Center staff provides support to the Recovery Group under this organisational arrangement. The offsite GSEP organisation for serious energeacies (e.g., site and 'G3neral Emergency) is depicted in Figure 4.3-2. Tnis organisation consists of the following directors whose major duties are antineated in the referenced tables:
- 1) Tabin 4.3-1 Rcccvery Nueger
- 2) Table 4.3-2 Plant Operations Manager
- 3) Table'4.3-3 Advisory support Directcr
- 4) Table 4.3-4 Technical Sapport Manager
(
\ 5) Table 4.3-5 Environmental / Emergency Coordinator
- 6) Table 4.3-6 Design & Construction Support Manager l . 7). Table 4.3-7 Scheduling Planning Manager
- 8) Table 4.3-8 Maste Systems Radiation Control Manager
- 9) Table 4.3-9 Admin./ Logistics Manager
- 10) Table 4.3-10 Emergency News Center Director
- 11) Table-4.3-11 Corporate Command Center Director
- 12) Table 4.3-12 System Power Dispatcher
- 13) Table 4.3-13 Medical Director
- 14) Table 4.3-14 Legal Consultant
- 15) Table 4.3-15 Engineering Director
- 16) Table 4.3-16 Intelligence Director
- 17) Table 4.3-17 Health Physics Director l 4-17
l t l l l November, 1981 Eevision 3
- 18) Table 4.3-18 Information Director
- 19) Table 4.3-19 Environmental Director
. 20) Tab'le 4.3-20 Mr.npower and Logistics Director
- 21) Table 4.3-21 Accounting Director
- 22) Table 4.3-22 Communications Director
- 23) Table 4.3-23 ERP Director
- 24) Table 4.3-24 Division Director i .
I ' t 25) Table 4.3-25 Environs Director I l 26) Table 4.3-26 Training Director ' Once the Nearsite Emergency Operations Facility is activated, all Commonwealth recovery efforts will be directed, ocordinated, and l contrclied from that location. There will be three mejor emergency j control funtions (centers) at the Nearsite EOF. They ares (1) the l Recovery Center, (2) the Emergency Control Center;' and (3) the , Emergency Newe Center. Refer to Section 7.1.5 for a description of 1 these centers. ) For activation of the EOF, Commonwealth Edison has developed a prioritized Escovery Manager notification list. This call list will enable the responsible corporate Duty Officer to notify the Recovery Manager who would require the least travel time to a particular EOF. Consistent with our onsite augmentation goal, we will activate the EOF as promptly as possible when necessary. 1
=m l
l 4-18
FIGURE 4.3-2 FUI.L RESPONSE OFFSITE GSEP ORGANIZATION , RECOVERY MANAGED l E. i
~
E I I I ,,,,,,, [,,,,,, E E I E < EMERGUICY ADMINISTRATION / ADVISORY TED#RCAL i PLANT i SSTE SYETEMSh ENVIRONMENTAL / SCEDULU16 DESIGN AIS LOGISTICS SUPPORT SUPPORT l0PERAT10NSs RADIAT M EMElIGEllCY PLAINRIIS C000SilIUCT10ll i NEWS CENTER i DIRECTOR MANAGER MANAGER iMA14AGERj CONTIl0L COORDINATOR - MANAGER MANAGER DNIECTOR * , MANAGER I l STAT M 3 TRAmNo " I . sR0w i -u h F l STATFj ENVIR0lIS l STAFF l DIRECTOR l STAFF] l STAFF l l STAFF l l
!s.......
(ONSI.TE.).al CTOR DIRECTOR COMIIUNEATMS , g l STAFF l l STAFF OlllECTOR . 3;gy, INY lMN umnE
----- mer n..- - - - -- -------- ----
m oort WITELLIGEllCE ENVIRONIIENTAL reou EllGINEERille
- INFORMATION MANPOWER DIRECTOR sur DIRECTOR DIRECTOR AllD LOGISTICS DIRECTOR ~
i DIRECTOR g g_ g l l l l STAFF l STAFF l l STAFF l I I ! ACCOUNilll6 ; ERP DIRECTOR l , DIRECTOR ' ( E s n .
, STAFF l DIVISM h ,,
DIRECTOR CORPORATE C0tillANO w,
- CENTER DIRECTOR g, E . e STAFFI I I MEDICAL DIRECTOR l LEGAL CONSULTANT lSYSTEM POWER '
DISPATCHER e +- m. m w_ _ __
\
movember, 1981 . Revision 3 - TABLE 4.3-1 RECOVERY M& Man ** The Recovery Mas:ager is the designated individual from Commonwealth Edison who has requisite authority, management ability, and technical j l knowledge to manage the overall nuclear plant recovery operations whenever the Recovery Group is activated'at the Nearsite EDF Recovery Center. The primary i individual designated as the Recovery Manager is the Division vice-President, ) Nuclear Stations. ! Specifically, the Esco wry Manager will: o 1 Direct the Recovery Group and coordinate all company and industry I r,upport activities in ocping with an energency. O Easue notificatica of ' Federal, State, asad appropriate local agenc$es, of emergency declarations or re-classificaticas in accordance w1th Scction 6.0 of this plan. . o Ensure that FeSeral, State, cognisant of the status of and local acatherities remain the energency situation. If ' requested, dispatch informed individuals to State governmental
- emergency operations centers.
o Approve all company press releases to the public. .i o Ensure that appropriata measures are promptly taken onsite to: Terminate the condition causing the emergency. Protect employees and the public. Minimise damage to the plant. Effect post-accident recovery and organisation. deactivate the GSEP o l Request assistance fross outside emergency response organisations, auch as the Department of Energy Chicago operations Office, required. if o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. l l t 4-20
l l
.c l
l l l November, 1981 Revision 3 i TABLE 4.3-2 PLiufT OPERATIONS 89umGER The Plant Operations Manager is the designated individual from Commonwealth who has the requisite authority, plant operating experience, and qualifications to implement in-plant recovery operations. The primary individual designated as the Plant Operations Manager is that person - designeted as the statiou Director in the Station Group organization. The Plant Operations Manager will not normally relocata to the Nearsite EOF, but j should remain at'the Onsite TSC. " Responsibilities assigned to the Plant Operations' Manager are to
- o Supervise the onsite operations support staff and the onsite Statica Gro
t , ThBLE 4.3-17 BEALTH PHYSICS DIRECTOR I ( The Eer.lth Physics Director will serve as support from the CCC to the l onsite health physics activities by providing additional instrumentation or personnel as necessary, under the direction of the Intelligence Director. He I will make recommendations .on dose management techniques for both onsite and offsite activities. Upon activatilon of the Recovery Group, he will serve as a l support individual for the Weste Systems Radiation Control Manager at the EOF. l l Responsibilities assigned to the Health Physics Director (prior to Recovery Group activation) are to: o Determine-the need for additional radiological support personnel. o Determine the need for additional health physics instrumentation dosimetry, and protective equipment. o Review plant health physics information and make recommendations l to the Intelligence Director. To the extent possible, make recommendations that will ensure that emergency and recovery operations are performed in accordance with Commonwealth radiation protection standards. Especially during reentry situations, normal 10CFR20 exposure limits are not to be exceeded. J o Assist the affected station in the development of plans for plant surveys, sampling, shielding, and special tools in support of weste systems processing and design modification activities, o Eeep informed of the activities of offsite environmental monitoring teams. Make recommendations that will assist those teams maintain their exposures as low as reasonably, achievable. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. Following a Recovery Group activation, the Health Physics Director will perform activiti
- similar to those listed above, escept that they will be done at the EOF in coordination with and in support of the Weste Systems Radiation Control Manager. Also, he (she) will provide for the radiation protection of personnel at the EOF.
4-34 -
November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 4.3-18 INFORMATION DIRECTOR The Information Director is responsible for collecting, verifying, and disseminating. information on emergency situations to the public via the news media, under the direction of the Intelligence Director. Upon the activation of the Recovery Group, the Information Director 'will serve as a support individual for the Emergency News Center Director. Responsibilities assigned to the Information Director (prior to Recovery Group activation) are to: o Obtain information. Through GSEP personnel, determine the nature of the emergency and its effect on the public and other company l operations. o Release information.' Take steps to release accurate information l as soon as possible. Coordinate the release of information with other involved agencies and companies. The news media seeking interviews and comments from Commonwealth officials should be given full cooperation. o Distribute internal information. Information should be promptly j disseminated to commonwealth employees as soon as possible through appropriate communications channels. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. Following a Recovery Group activation, the Information Director becomes a support individual to the Emergency News Center Director and will release information when directed by the Emergency News Center Director. l 1 4-35
I movember,1981 Revision 3 ' TABLE 4.3-19 ; ENVIROl#WITAL DIRECTR The Environmental Director is responsible for initially coordinating all offsite sampling / monitoring activities of Commonwealth personnel and for interfacing with State personnel regarding does assessment programs. Upon activation of the Recovery Group,. he will serve as a support individual for the Environmental / Emergency coordinator at the Nearsite EOF. Responsibilities assigned to the Environmental Director (prior .to Recovery Grog activation) are to: o Direct the environmental sampling activities of the Environs Director. l o Coordinate the environmental contractor's assistance in the collection of environmental data. o Cooperate with the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (and contiguous State agencies) in the implementation of an offsite dose assessment program. o Based on environmental sampling or known plant releases, calculate projected dose values for affected- areas; hased on J these projections, advise the CCC Director of- protective action recommendations for plant personnel and ===hars , of the public. These recommendations swiu be consistent with Tables 6.3 1, 6.3-2, and 6.3-3 of this plan. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. Following a Recovery Group activation: l o obtain information and perform activities at the Corporate j Environmental Center at the direction of the Environmental / l Emergency Coordinator. l I 4-36 l l
I l November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 4.3-20 MANPOWER AND LOGISTICS DIRECTOR The Manpower and Logistics Director is responsible for directing a staff ~ of manpower, logistics, communications, aerial assistance, and accounting personnel in support of the station as required by the Corporate Command Center Director. Upon activation of the Recovery Group, he will serve as a. support individual for the Administration and Logistice Manager. Responsibilities assigned to the' Manpower and Logistics Director (prior to Recovery Group Activation) are tot o Ensure that emergency communications equipment is kept operable during the course of the emergency. o Provide personnel, equipment, and services as required, primarily from the appropriate Division. Services may include transportation of personnel and equipment. o Keep the Ccc Director informed of support services available to assist the station. I ' o Direct the activities of the Accounting Director,and the ERP Director. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. Following a Recovery Group activation, the Manpower and Logistics Director will perform activities at the CCC under the direction of the Administration and Logistics Manager. e e e 4-37
November, 1381 Revision 3 TABLE 4.3-21 ACCOUWFING DIRECTOR The Accounting Director is responsible for accounting and related cost monitorng practices related to the emergency. Be will remain at the CCC throughout the emers wicy and recovery activities, functioning under the - direction of the Manpower and Engistics Director. . Responsibilities assigned to the Accounting Director are tot o seek counan', of Industrial Relations, the comptroller's office, and others as required. o Initiate use of the special GSEP function number to absorb GSEP costs. o Make provisions to establish a proper method of accounting for costs of contractual services and other expenditursa related to the emergency. o Fulfill the clerical requirements for the other directors of the Corporate Command Center. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. ,j m ALE 4.3-22 COMM3NICATIONS DIRECTOR The Communications Director is res m aible for the procurement of
. required telephone and radio communications services and facilities as specified by the Manpower and Imgistics Director and maintenance of these communications as required. Upon activation of the Recovery Group, the Communications Director will serve. as a support individual for the Administration and Logistics Manager.
Responsibilitial assigned to the Communications Director are tot o obtain additional radio and telephone equipment as necessary to mest the needs of the emergency. o obtain sufficient personnel to maintain communications equipment in an operable condition. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. 4-38 I
November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 4.3-23 ERP DIRECMOR The Corporate Cosmand Center ERP Director will coordinate from the Tech Center the activities involving Division personnel and equipment. Under the direction ' of the Manpower and Iagistics Director, he will provide for Division support to the affected station. Responsibilities assigned to the ERP Director are tot o Inform the respective Division Director of support service required by the Station or the Nearsite BOF. o obtain additional support from the' other Division Directors, as the level of requirements increases.
~
o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. TABLE 4.3-24
'[ Divis!ON DIRECTOR The Division Director will direct the GSEP Division personnel to provide support services required by the Corporate Command Center ERP Director.
- Responsibilities assigned to the Division Director (s) are to o Activate the Division resources for emergency support and coordinate all activities.
, o Provide the required personnel, instruments, equipment, and ( material to the station as specified by the CCC ERP Director. o Assist government agencies, if required, with the movement and evacuation of the public from a defined area. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. 4-39
November, 1981 - Bevision 3 TABLE 4.3-25 ENVIRONS DIRECTOR' The Environs Director is the semaer of the offsite GSEP organization who wil?, supervise the activities of Commonwealth environmental sampling teams in an emergency. He will carry out his activities at the direction of the Environmental Director at the CCC. S@r:Trnt to a Recovery Group activation, he will serve under the Environmental / Emergency Coordinator. Responsibilities assigned to the Environs Director are tot o Establish a headquarters at either the affected station's casite TSC or Nearsite EF. o Assemble one or more environmental monitoring teams. During an actual or suspected gaseous relea'se situation from the plant, two teams should be dispatched. If sufficient manpower is avcilable, tgere should be three persons per team. o Dispatch and coordinate the activities of Commonwealth Edison environmental monitoring teams in- order to determine the extent and nature of offsite releases of radioactive or other hasardous materials. Activities of the teams may includes , J
- Does rate surveys (including plume tracking);
- Air sampling:
- Soil, water, and vegetation sampling;
- Contamination surveys; and
- Exchange of T2s and filter cartridges from fixed environmental stations.
o Request through the GSF* Organisation
- Assistance for road blocks and security until State personnel are available;
- Communications equipment as necessary. Telephones, mobile radios, and portable radios may be required;
- Required transportation for personnels and
- Sufficient technical and non-technical personnel to expand the operation as necessary.
o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities. 4-40
November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 4.3-26 TRAINING DIRECTOR The Training Director will coordinate the training of- individuals needed to support recovery operations. The Training Director reports to the Administration and Logistics Manager Responsibilities assigned to the GSEP Training Director includes o Provide the ocordifontion necessary to train large numbers of personnel needed ts support recovery operations at an affected
, nuclear station.
o Ensure that training given to incoming personnel includes
- descriptions of the station layout, basic radiation protection, status of systems, and emergency procedures.
o
- o. , Ensure that training is given on out-of-normal procedures for shift operators, .zaintenance, health physics, and chemistry
- personnel.
o Determine areas of abnormal radiation levels and provide specific instructions to personnel on how to limit exposures in such areas. o Maintain a record of the GSEP related activities.
. -~ .
S 4-41
November, 1981 Revision 3 4.4 Non-Commonwealth Support Groups Agreements are maintained with support agencies for each nuclear station. These support provide services of: agencies (to be named in each site specific annex)
- 1) law enforcement:
- 2) fire protection; *
- 3) ambulance services;
- 4) medical and hospital support; and
- 5) radiological assistance.
Support groups providing transportation and treatment of injured station personnel are described in Section 6.5 of this plan. Cosmonwealth retains contractors to provide supporting services to nuclear generating ' stations. Among services currently provided are the following:
- 1) Easlaton Environmental Sciences Corporation provides services of environmental radiological sonitoring and analysis. radiochemical s In an ' emergency situation, Easlaton field personnel, j at a minimum, would continue to maintain Commonwealth air samplers and exchange TIDs under the supervision of either the Envizcamental/ Emergency Coordinator or the Environs Director.
The Easleton laboratory in Northbrook, Illinois would analyze the environmental samples for their radioactivity content and report results to Commonwealth Edison.
- 2) Radiation Management Corporation (RMC) provides ' services of medical and health physics support. RMC advises on the health physics. aspects of situations requiring medical assistance, analyzes urine samples for their radioactivity content, provides and maintains whole body counters at Commonwealth nuclear stations, and interprets these bioassay results.
- 3) Murray and Trettel, Inc. provides meteorological monitoring services, including weather forecasts. Murrary and Trettel maintains all Cosmoonwealth nuclear station meteorological l facilities. Murray and Trettel has computer capability to pool i remotely the meteorological facilities to ascertain local conditions and to detect instrument failure.
- 4) R. S. Landauer, Jr.,
services. Company provides personnel dosimetry ' Landauer provides film badges and TLD rings to personnel at the nuclear stations; processes the dosimetry; and 4-42
o .-
)
i November, 1981 Revision 3 reports the results in hardcopy and computer card format. In an ' l emergency, Landauer would provide additional dosimetry to the ' affected nuclear station and to the Environmental / Emergency Coordinator. 4.5 Institute of nuclear Power Operations Experience has shown that a utility may need resources beyond in-house capabilities for the recovery from a rtaclear plant emergency. One of the roles of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations is to assist affacted utilities by quickly applying the resources of the nuclear industry to meet the needs of an emergency. INPO has an emergency response plan that enables it to provide the following emergency support functions: o Assistance to the affacted utility in locating sources of emergency manpower and equipments o Analysis of the operational aspects of an incident; j o The dissemination of information to ===har utilities concerning aspects of the incident that are applicable to their operations; and r o Organizing the support of industry experts who could advise the utility on technical matters. To support these functions, INPO maintains the following emergency support capabilities: l o A dedicated emergency call number; o Designated INPO representative (s) who can be quickly dispatched to the utility emergency response organization to coordinate INPO support activities and information flow; and o The 24 hour-per-day operation of an Emergency Response Center at l INPO headquarters. Commonwealth Edison will notify INPO (via the designated emergency call number) for all situations involving an Alert, site Emergency, or General l Emergency declaration. INPO has coordinated the preparation of a Voluntary Assistance Agreement for transportation accidents. Commonwealth has signed this agreement which establishes the rights and responsibilities of electric -utilities in requesting or providing assistance for response to a nuclear materials transportation accident. 4-43
I movember, 1981 , Revision 3 l 4.6 Participatine Federal organisations 4.6.1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission TheN1=ar Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear facilities and materials and. for conducting process. research in support of the licensing and regulatory These responsibilities include protecting the public health and safety, protecting the environment, protecting and safeguarding materials and plants in the interest of national security and assuring conformity with anti-trust laws. I The NBC Office of Inspection and Enforcement has the t responsibility for auditing of nuclear power reactor, special nuclear, source, and byproduct saterial licensees. It is responsible for ensuring that such activities are conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of such NRC licenses and that as a result of l such the operations, there is no undue risk to the health and safety of pub'.,1c. 1 7be unC office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, established by the Energy Reoraanization Act of 1974, as amended, performs licensing functions associated with the construction and operation of nuclear reactors and with the receipt, possession, ownership, and use of j special nuclear and byproduct materials used at reactor facilities. With regard to emergency preparedness, the Mac will:
- 1) Assess licensee emergency plans for adequacy:
2) Re' view the Federal Emergency Management Agency findings and determinations on the adequacy and capability of implementation of State and local plans; and
- 3) Make decisions with regard to tho' overall state of emergency preparedness and issuance of operating licenses.
The role of the NRC during a radiation emergency is that of verifying that emergency plans and procedures _ have been implemented, assuring that the public health and safety are. protected, and conducting investigative activities associated with an incident. The NBC will assist in coordination of Federal response resources and provide Commonwealth, state, and local agencies advisory assistance associated with assessing and mitigating hasards to the public. 4.6.2 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) establishes policy and coordinates the civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of the executive agencies of the j 4-44
l l l November, 1981 Revision 3 l United States. FEMA is also responsible for establishing a program of federal disaster preparedness and for providing technical assistance to states in developing comprehensive plans and practical programs for preparation against disaster. With regard to radiological emergency preparedness, FEMk will:
- 1) Establish policy and provide leadership via the Federal ;
Badiological Prepar'edness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) in the coordination of all Federal assistance to State and local governments for developing, reviewing, assessing, and testing the State and local radiological emergency response plans;
- 2) Review and approve state and local radiological emergency response plans and preparedness in accordance with FENk regulations;
- 3) Develop, with the NRC, scenarios for use by MRC licensed facility operators and State and local governments in testing and exercising radiological emergency plans; and
, 4) Develop, W I -t, and maintain a training program to support state and local radiological emergency response plans.
/~ The role of FEMA during an emergency is that of coordinating and directing the offsite activities of all Federal agencies during a radiological accident.
4.6.3 Federal Interagency Central Coordinatine Committee (FICCC) The Federal Interagency Central Coordinating Committee consists of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which chairs the Committee, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Bealth and Human Services, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculturs, the Department of Commerce, and where appropriate and on an ad hoc basis, other Federal departments and agencies. The FICCC shall assist FEMA in providing policy direction for the program of Federal assistance to State and local governments in their radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities through the Regional Advisory Committees (RAC). 4.6.4 Department of Energy Chicago Operations Office l The Department of Energy has extensive radiological monitoring equipment and personnel resources that it can assemble and dispatch to the scene.'of a radiologic.al incident. Upon request, the Department of Energy (DOE) Chicago Operations Office will provide assistance to Commonwealth Edison 4-45 e- , - - , -- , .,, , , . _ , , . - - - - - . . . - , . , . - - , - . - -
- s i
November, 1981 ' Revision 3 'T following a radiological incident as outlined in the DOE { Radiological Assistance Plan. The immediate objective of the DOE Chicago operations Office would be to rapidly dispatch a team of specialists to the incident site where the team would
- 1) Evaluate the hasard; and l 2) Take or recommend action to counteract and control any j acute hasard.
If Commonwealth' Edison deems that assistance from DOE is necessary or desirable, the Recovery Manager, the Corporate en===ad Center Director, or the Station Director would notify the DOE Chicago Operations Office. Assistance provided by DOE shall not abridge State or local authority. [ The resources of the Radiological Assistance Plan (RAF) and the Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP) are being merged to form a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan < (FRMAP). The concept of operations for the PRMAP is basically the - same as the RAP and IRAP. The main purpose of FRMAP is to establish an organisation and operating arrangement to be used in the event of a major accidental release or loss of control of radioactive material seriously endangering the public health and safety. 4.6.5 The U.S. Coast Guard The U.S. Coast Guard patrols and ensures the safety of navigable waterways in the United States. The U.S. Coast Guard shall be promptly notified of any oil or hasardous substance discharges into rivers or lakes or radioactive contamination of rivers or lakes under Coast Guard jurisdiction at levels requiring assistanes to effect protective actions. (Refer to Section 9.3). The U.S. Coast Guard will be contacted by the Illinois
. Department of Conservation in the event of an incident at a nuclear j power plant. The Coast Guard will be responsible for officially closing the waterways to all commercial traffic.
(Refer to the State plan). l 4.6.6 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers controls barge and boat traffic at locks and dans on navigable waterways in the United States. The Corps of Engineers will be contacted by the Illinois Department of Conservation in the event of. an incident.at a nuclear power plant. The Corps will be responsible for closing their locks and dans to all waterway traffic leading to the affected area, allowing only traffic leaving the area. (Refer to the State Plan). 4-46
)
November, 1981 Revision 3 4.6.7 Federal Bureau of Investiestion (FBI) Support from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is available through its Statutory responsibility based in Public Law and the US code, and thecogh a memorandum of understanding for cooperation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Notification to the FBI of emergencies in which they would have an interest will be through provisions of thw Nuclear Station's Security Plan, or by the NRC. 4.7 The State of Illinois The state of Illinois has the statutory responsibility and authority for protecting the health and safety of the public in Illinois. The state of Illinois has developed an " Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents" ~ #(IPRA) . This plan was developed in accordance with the guidance suggested by NUREG 0396 and NUREG 0654. This section provides a summary of the essential elements of the State Plan. The Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPkA) .is based upon the
, implementation of five basic functions:
i o Command and Coordination o Notification and Narning o Accident Assessment o Protective Actions o Parallel Actions Figure 4.7-1 depicts the overall concept of operations for the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA). 4.7.1 Governor of the State of Illinois The Governor of the State of Illinois has overall command authority for both the radiological and nonradiological aspects of a nuclear incident. The Governor will make the final recommendation for protective actions, and will serve as the State's primary spokesperson. 4-47 _ _ - - - - =. - - - - -
l
. o l
November, 1981 Revision 3 .1 4.7.2 Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (DIES) Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety has both the command authority for radiologic?1 aspects of a nuclear incident and the responsibility for performing various radiologic 1 functions. These functions include food, water and milk control, radiation exposure control for the general public, and confirmatory accident assessment. During an emergency situation, the DasS will make protective action recommendations to the Governor and the Illinois Emerqtacy Services and Disaster Agency. The DeIS response to a nuclear incident utilizes two functional su H roups. They are the Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC) and the Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT) . l l 4.7.2.1 Radiological Emergence Assessment Center (REAC) l ta DesS has established ,REAC at its Springfield headquarters. REAC will serve as the command location for all (State-related) radiological aspects of a nuclear incident. The Associate Director of DNS, or his designated alternate, is in command of REAC. 4.7.2.2 Radiological Assessment Field Team (RAFT) RAFT has been organized to perform the field radiological functions of confirmatory accident assessments
- during a nuclear emergency. RAFT consists of a Mobile Command l Center, a Mobile Nuclear I,aboratory, and all monitoring and sampling teams.
4.7.3 Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) has command authority for the non-radiological aspects of a nuclear incident and provides the overall coordination of the emergency resycase. The Illinois ESDA has the programma*,1c responsibility to implement protective actions as recommended for the public by the DNS and the Governor. The State of Illinois has defined four levels of operational response; each level requires increasing degrees of response from State and local agencies. An immediate level of operational response , for a given emergency (GSEP) classification will be required so that the level of response will accord with the accident classification. The asanisium operational response levels for given incident classifi-cations can be summarized as follows: i 4-44 l _
l i l 1
)
November, 1981 Revision 3 Level 1 Unusual Event Notification of ESDA and DNS Level 2 Alert Notification of ESDA and its key personnel, DNS and ' its key personnel, and key local governments. REAC will be activated. I 1 l Level 3 Site Emergency Same as Level 2 plus the following: RAFT will be dispatched to the affected siter ESDA will activate the State EDQ county and local governments will activate their EOCs and activate their public notification system. Level 4 General Emergency j motification of all parties involved in the i operational response. Activation of all operations and command centers asacciated with the operational response. REAC will be activated and RAFT will be dispatched. Local governments will activate their public notification system and implement protective action. The operational response level for the Unusual Event, Alert, and Site Emergency may be increased to a higher level if deemed necessary. The State's operational response to an emergency utilises six (6) operational centers: o State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) o State Command Post (SCP) o State staging Center (SSC) o Community Command Post (CCP) - o County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) o Local Government Emergency Operations Center (LGEOC) The following sections .will discuss the role of these operational centers. Depending upon the nature of the emergency, one or more of these centers may not be activated. e 4-49
November,1981 Revision 3 w., 4.7.3.1 State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) The SEOC (manned 24 hours per day) is located in Springfield, Ininois and is the central command post for state agencies. The primary function of the SEOC is to coordinate the State's response with local governments. For . this purpose, the SEOC is staffed during emergencies by representatives of State -agencies under the overall direction of the ESDA Internal Support Coordinator. 4.7.3.2 State Command Post (SCP) The SCP will be located near or within the affected plume exposure DS and is responsible for the allocation of state agency resources and personnel in support of local government actions. 4.7.3.3 State stagine Center (SSC) The Shc will be located near the affected plume exposure EPs and win serve as an extension of the SEOC. Staging center personnel will be responsible for susunarizing personnel assignments. The SSC win also be used to store state resources, such as TLDs and potassium iodide. 4.7.3.4 Community Command Post (CCP) Por certain sites, particularly those near major metropolitan areas and/or contiguous states, a Community i Command Post will be utilized. The CCP will be similar to the SEOC in that, it win provide a central meeting place for representatives from local governments and contiguous states for tasks like response management and radiological assessment updaus. 4.7.3.5 County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) In those areas without a CCP, the County EOC will serve as the primary coordinating center for local government response within the county's jurisdiction and for coordination between counties. 4.7.3.6 Local Government Emergency Operations Center (LGEOC) The LGEOC will serve as the command post for organizing each local government's implementation of protective actions. j 4-5) w= w~--- - - -.= .
November, 1981 Revision 3 l 4.7.4 Notification Following the preliminary notification by the affected nuclear station, the state will initiate a notification procedure commen-sura *e with the reported emergency. (Refer to the state Plan). 4.7.5 Accident Assessm_enj Upon notification of an emergency, the Dus will conduct a confirmatory accident assessment. This aseesament will involve the determination of the source term, the projection of the atmospheric dispersion of the release, j and the deposition of the radioactive material if appropriate. 4.7.6 Protective Actions l The recommendation for protective actions for the public . l during the preliminary phase of a fixed nuclear facility incident will, of necessity, he based upon the preliminary assessment made by the facility. After the confirmatory accident assessment, the recommendation for protective actions, if appropriate, will be made by the Director of DNS to the Governor and the Director of ESDA. Such a recommendation will be based upon the projected population dose e.s determined through the confirmatory accident assessment and/or the Petential for such exposure. G Following the determination of appropriate protective actions,. implementation of these actions shall be under the command and control of the ESDA which shall ensure completion in accordance with the State plan. Protective actions includes evacuation; shelter;' access control; food, water, and milk control; and protective actions for emergency workers. 4.7.7 Parallel Actions Parallel actions are performed by the state after or in , conjunction with protective actions. Parallel actions consist of: l
- 1) Law enforcement;
- 2) Social services;
- 3) Emergency medical services;
- 4) Radiation exposure control; and
- 5) Re-entry.
l 1 4-51 1
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November, 1981 Revision 3 4.8 The State of Iowa Much of the Emergency Planning zone for
- the Quad Cities Nuclear Station lies within the State of Iowa. The State of Iowa has developed an " Iowa Emergency Plan". This section provides a summary of the essential elements of the Iowa Emergency Plan.
{ 4.8.1 Protective Actions l The State of Iowa uses the following criteria in deciding upon specific protective actions during a radiological emergency:
- 1) EPA Manual of Protective Actions Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents; and
- 2) Food and Drug Administration guidance regarding contani-nation of human food and animal feeds published in the Federal negister on December 15, 1978.
The Governor or, in his absence, the Lt. Governor win make evacuation decisions. These decisions wiu be coordinated with the local government entities involved.
, 4.8.2 office of Disaster Services The State Office of Disaster Services win coordinate an activities of State agencies and departments in support of emergency response activities. These activities will be coordinated from the Iowa State BOC in Des Moines.
4.8.3 Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) i The State Department of Environmental Quality is responsible l for supervision in obtaining samples of earth, vegetation, air, t water, and such samples that may be required to determine the extent l and degree of environmental contamination. The DEQ will identify
- industrial, chemical, biological, and radiological hazards generated by an emergency.
4.8.4 State Hygienic Laboratory (SHL) The State Hygienic Laboratory located in Iowa City, Iowa win perform radiological assessment efforts for the Department of ! Environmental Quality during an emergency, since the SEL is better equipped to perform such efforts. l i During a serious radiological emergency at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, an Emergency Operating Center win be j activated at the Scott County Courthouse in Davenport, Iowa. Environmental sampling conducted by the State of Iowa win be coordinated from the Scott County BOC by the Director of the State 4-53
November, 1981 Revision 3 Hygienic Laboratory (or his designated alternate). During an emergency, communications shall be maintained between the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety in Springfield, Illinois and the Scott County EOC for the purpose of mutual cooperation between Illinois and Iowa with regard to radiological assessment efforts. 4.8.5 Local Government Local governments are responsible for overall emergency' i preparedness at the local level. This includes preparation of emergency plans and designation of assembly areas and congregate care facilities within jurisdiction areas. The local governments are responsible for implementing ' the actual protective actions taken, including evacuation. 4.9 The State of Wisconsin A portion of the Emergency Planning Sone for the Sion Nucl~ ear Station lies within the State of Wisconsin. The State of Wisconsin has developed a ' State of Wisconsin Peacetime Radiological Energency Response Plan." This section provides a an-ary of the essential elements of the Wisconsin emergency plan. 4.9.1 Concept of Operations Initially, responsibility for responding to a radiological emergency, including evacuation, rests with local governments and j their emergency services. Notification, by either local authorities or legal possessors of uncontrolled materials, to the Division of Emergency Government D EG) that a radiological emergency exists will bring in the resources of the Division of Health, Radiation Protection Section to assess and evaluate the situation and determine protective action. State agency notification for assistance and coordination of response operations of the state agencies in support of local government will be performed -by the DEG as determined by the Governor. 4.9.2 Division of Emergency Government The DEG is to provide the principal support response to emergencies in the State of Wisconsin, coordinate the responses of other state agencies, brief the Governor of emergency situations, and activate the State Emergency Operating Center in Madison, if necessary. 4.9.3 Division of Health The Chief of the Radiation Protection Section, Bureau of Health, is the State Radiological Coordinator (SRC) for peacetime 4-54
o .* . November, 1981 Revision 3 radiological emergencies of the State Radiological Response (RAD RESP) Team. Team members are personnel of the section, as designated by the Sac, augmented by selected personnel from the DEG and other state agencies trained specifically for radiological incidents. Environmental sampling conducted by the State of Wisconsin followiing a serious radiological emergency will be coordinated from the Madison EOC by the Sac or his designated alternate. In the case of a serious radiological emergency at sion Station, communications shall be maintained between the Madison EOC and the Illinois Depart-ment of Nuclear Safety in Springfield, Illinois for the purpose of mutual cooperation between Illinois and wisconsin with regard to radiological assessment efforts. The State of Niaconsin utilises guidance promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as the basis for determining what protective actions are necessary during a radiological incident. r 4-55
I
*. . )
l 2%r, 1931 Revision 3 n l l t i i I (Blank) 4-56 O O
1 November,1981 ) 4 Revision 3 l 5.0 CIASSIFICATION OF E8nemw'T CONDITIONS ( The GREP describes five mutually exclusive classifications for emergency j conditions, covering the postulated spectrum of emergency situations, l Each of the five (5) emergency classifications are characterized by Emergency Action Levels, or initiating conditions. These initiating conditions have ne t, for the most part, been selected so as to infer any immediate rmed to implement protective actions, but rather to ensure adequate time is available to confirm inplant readings by implementing assessment measures. This section describes the GSEP emergency classification system and gives generic example initiating conditions for each class. Additionally, the GSEP l Station Director may declare an incident to fall within a specific emergency classification if he decides that the incident is of equivalent magnitude to , the criteria used to define the emergency class. Each class is' associated l with a particular set of immediate actions to be taken to cope with l situations. (These actions-are described in Section 6.0). Refer to the following tables:
- 1) Table 5.0 Description of Transportation Accident
' 2) Table 5.0 Description of Unusual Event
- 3) Table 5.0 Description of Alert
- 4) Table 5.0 Description of Site Emergency
- 5) Table 5.0 Description of General Emergency -
As a minimum, site specific annemes shall include applicable initiating conditions given in the tables referenced above, and where possible, will relate those conditions with plant instrumentation readings. In some instanews, it may be inappropriate for a particular station to adopt initiating conditions exactly equivalent to those conditions specified in this generic plan. In addition to the initiating conditions given in this generic GSEP, site specific annexes should categorize postulated accidents contained in the Stations' Final Safety Analysis Reports. i 5-1
November, 1981 Revision 3 s TABLE 5.0-1 DESCRIPTION OF TRAeMSPORTATION ACCIDENT A. CLASS D M IPFION This class involves an accident involving the transportation of radioactive or other hazardous material from a nuclear station. B. RELEASE POTENTIAL Depending on the materials involved and the type of accident, there is a wide range of possible releases, i.e., the accident could be of almost g severity. C. INITIATING CONDITIONS
- 1. A vehicle transporting radioactive . materials or nonradioactive hazardous materials from a nuclear station is involved in a situation in which:
- a. Fire, breakage, or suspected radioactive contamination occurs involving a shipment of radioactive materialt or
- b. As a direct result of any hasardous materials: -
)
s o A person is killed o A person receives injuries requiring hospitalisation o Estimated carrier or other property damage exceeds $50,000.
- 2. Any other condition of equivalent magnitude to the criteria used to define this category, as determingd by the Station Director or the Corporate Ommand Center Director.
l l l 1 5-2
I I I l November, 1981 { Revision 3 1
- TABLE 5.0-2 M rBTPTION OF UNUSUAL EVErf A. CLASS DESCRIPTION This class involves events which indicate a potential degradation of
! the level of safety at a nuclear station. The situation may or may not ( have caused damage to the plant, but if there is damage, it does not i necessarily require an immediate change in plant operating status. l B. RELEASE POTErf1AL No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems j occurs, C. INITIATING COISITIOIS
- 1. An aircraft crash or other missile impacting onsite free whatever source.
- 2. Earthquake being experienced at less than or equal to operating Basis
, Earthquake (CRE) levels.
- 3. Explosion causing damage onsite but not affecting plant operation.
- 4. Fire requiring offsite assistance but not affecting plant operation.
- 5. Flocd being caperienced (e.g., rupture of cooling pond dike affecting offsite property).
- 6. ' tornado nearby that could potentially strike the facility.
- 7. Toxic gas incident observed near or onsit'e.
- 8. Security threat (event) which also poses a radiological threat, or has the potential for substantial degradation of the level of physical security at the station. (Refer to Section 9.3 for more information with regard to the Station Security Plan).
- 9. Loss of required systems to the extent that a unit shutdown is required due to a Technical Specifications ACTION statement (such as for ECCS, fire protection systems, etc).
- 10. Loss of primary coolant indicated or probable due to
- a. An unplanned initiation of BCCS resulting in injection of coolant; or
- b. Failure of a primary system safety valve to closer or 5-3
Hovember,1981 Revision 3 3 TABLE 5.0-2 (CONT)
- c. Exceeding either primary / secondary leakage Technical Specification or primary system leakage rate Technical Specification limit.
- 11. Rapid depressurisation of PWR secondary side.
- 12. A g=-= effluent release greater than but less than ten times the 10CFR20 instantaneous release limits (per 10CFR20.105).
- 13. A liquid effluent release at levels indicated in Table 5.0-6.
- 14. Transportation of a radioactivity contaminated injured person to an offsite medical facility.
- 15. An incident which as a direct result of hasardous materials a person is killed or hospitalised or estimated property damage exceeds $50,000.
- 16. Any other condition of equivalent magnitude to the criteria used to define this category, as determined by the Station Director.
..)
5-4 l
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_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---'~' -
November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 5.0-3 DESCRIPFION OF ALERT f A. CIAgg nesr oTPTION This class describes events which involve actual or potential sub-substantial degradation of the level of safety at a nuclear station. An Alert dituation may be brought on by either mannede or natural phenomena and can reasonably be expected to occur during the life of the plant. B. REI2ASE POTENTIAL Offaite doses up to the lower EPA Protective Action Guides (1.0 rem whole body or 5.0 rem thyroid) are possible. C. IMITIATING COISITICIE
- 1. Aircraf t crash or other missile impacting onsite and affecting plant operation (e.g., requiring a unit shutdown due to an ACTION statement of the Technical Specifications).
- 2. Earthquake being experienced at levels greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (CEE) levels.
4
- 3. Explosion causing damage to facility and affecting plant operation (e.g., requiring a unit shutdown due to an ACTION. statement of the Technical Specifications).
- 4. Fir's requiring offsite assistance and affecting plant operation (e.g.,
requiring a unit shutdown due to an ACTION statement of the Technical Specifications) . l
- 5. Flood near design levels.
- 6. Tornado striking facility or sustained winds near design levels.
- 7. Toxic gas entry into the facility at life threatening levels but not affecting vital areas.
- 8. Evacuation of Control Room anticipated or required with control of shutdown systems established from local stations within 15 minutes.
~
- 9. An ongoing security threat (event) of increasing severity, or a different threat, which involves actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the station from either the radiological or physical security point of view.
- 10. Loss of offsite power to the onsite Class IE distribution systems g all diesel generators inoperable as per the Technical Specifications.
5-5
- , - - - - , y,-- --
November,1981 Revision 3 ^ ThaLE 5.0-3 (CONT)
- 11. Loss of vital DC power for less than 15 minutes.
- 12. Ioss of plant shutdown systems:
I l a. Loss of all systems capable of maintaining cold shutdown; or 1
- b. Failure of the Reactor Protection System to initiate and complete a reactor trip which brings the reactor subcritical.
i 13. Loss of required systems addressed in the Technical Specifications to the extent that an immediate unit shutdown is required.
- 14. Loss of one of the following three fission product barriers:
- a. Cladding
- b. Reactor Coolant System
- c. Primary Containment
- 15. l l Loss of primary coolant indicated by a reactor coolant system leakage increase greater than 50 gym.
J
- 16. Significant primary te secondary leakage for a PWR due to a failure of steam generator tubes. '
- 17. Fuel damage accident with release of radioactivity to containment or fuel handling building.
- 18. A gaseous effluent release greater than ten times the 10CFR20 instantaneous release limits (per 10CFR20.105) .
- 19. A liquid effluent release at levels indicated in Table 5.0-6.
- 20. An activity in the containment, if released under worst case meteorological conditons, would result in an offsite dose of greater than 50% of but less than or equal to the lower EPA Protective Action Guides (1.0 rem whole body or 5.0 ren thyroid).
- 21. Any other condition of equivalent magnitude to the criteria used to define this category, as determined by the Station Director.
5-6
November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 5.0-4 DESCRIPTION OF SITE M **ca rY A. CLAgg wsratPTICEI This class describes events which involve major failures of plant iunctions needed for the protection of the public. B. EELEASE POTEarTIAL offsite doses up to the upper EPA Protective Action Guides (5 rem whole body or 25 rem thyroid) are possible. C. IMITIATING COISITIONS
- 1. Aircraft crash or other missile impaccing onsite, affecting
- ital structures, and requiring an immediate unit shutdown.
- 2. Earthquake being experienced at levels greater than Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) levels with a unit not in cold shutdown or refueling.
- 3. Explosion causing severe damage and requiring immediate unit shutdown.
- 4. Fire requiring offsite assistance and requiring ismediate unit shut-down.
- 5. Ficod emceeding design levels.
- 6. sustained winds escoeding design levels.
- 7. Toxic gas entry into vital areas at life threatening levels.
- 8. Evacuation of Control Room and control of shutdown systems not established from local stations within 15 minutes.
- 9. Security threat involving an isminent loss of physical control of the facility.
- 10. Loss of offsite power to the onsite Class IE distribution systems and all diesel generators inoperable as per the Technical specifications.
- 11. Loss of vital DC power for more than 15 minutes.
- 12. Loss of all systems capable of maintaining hot shutdown.
1 e e 5-7
/
l .. . i November, 1981 Revision 3 T TABLE 5.0-4 (CONT)
- 13. Ioss of two of the following three fission product barriers:
- a. Cladding *
- b. Reactor Coolant
- c. Primary Containment
- 14. Ioss of primary coolant .
- a. (BNR) reactor coolant system leakage increase greater than 500 gpur or t
i
- b. (auR) main steam line break outside containment without isolations or
- c. (PWR) reactor coolant system leakage increase greater than make-up capacity; or
- d. (Fwa) steam line break with greater than 50 gym primary to seconday leakage and indication of fuel damage.
- 15. Severe primary. to secondary leakage for a PWR due to a failure of j steam generator tubes.
- 16. Major damage to spent fuel in containment or fuel handling building.
- 17. Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 50 mR/hr for 1/2 hour og greater than 500 mR/hr whole body for two minutes at the site boundary for worst case meteorological conditions.
- 18. A liquid effluent release at levels indicated in Table 5.0-6.
l 19. An activity in the containment, if released under worst case meteoro- ' logical conditions, would result in an offsite dose. greater than the , lower EPA Protective Action Guides (1.0 rem whole body or 5.0 ren thyroid) but less than or equal to the upper EPA Protective Action Guides (5.0 rem whole body or 25 rem thyroid).
- 20. Any other condition of equivalent magnitude to the criteria used to define this category, as determined by the Station Director.
5-8 y - - , . - -. ,,,,.--n - , -
. e November, 1981 Revision 3 TkBLE 5.0-5 DESCRIPTION OF GENERhL EMBEGREY A. CLAgg mar arprIce This class involves events which involve actual or imminent substan-tial core degradation or molting with the likelihood of a related release of appreciable quantities of fission products to the environment. This class is characterized by offsite consequences requiring protective measures as a matter of prudence or necessity.
l B. ELEASE POTENTIAL l Domes greater than the upper EPA Protective Action Guides (5 rem whole body or 25 ren thyroid) are possible for the offsite public. j C. INITIATING CONDITIONS
- 1. Security threat involving a loss of physical control of the facility.
- 2. Loss of 3 of the following three fission product barriers with an imminent loss of the third fission product barriers
- a. Cladding
- b. Reactor Coolant System
- c. Primary Containment
- 3. Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to greater than 1 remVhr whole body at the site boundary under actual meteorological conditions.
- 4. A liquid effluent c' lease e at levels -indicated in Table 5.0-6.
- 5. Concurrent with a potential failure of containment, activity in the containment which if released under ' worst case meteorological-l conditions would result in an offsite dose greater than the upper EPA l Protective Action Guides (5.0 rem whole body or 25 rem thyroid).
- 6. Any other coudition of equivalent magnitude to the criteria used to define this category, as determined by the Station Director.
l 5-9
- . . . _ _ . . . . , - - - - - . --m -
t TABLE 5.0-6 ) EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR RADI0 ACTIVITY IN LIQUID EFFLUENTS CSEP CLASSIFICATION RASIS
~
EMERCENCY ACTION LEVEL" CROSS BETA / CAM 4A TRITIUM (PWR) UNUSUAL EVENT Parallel logic to the NRC EAL for airborne release T.S. limit <Ralease _< 10xT.S. limit 1x10'I < C(uC1/ml) 110 3x10~3 < C(uci/st) 13x10-2 x ALERT Lower limit based on EFA's suggested 10 mren whole body 11mith or drinking water alert level 40 < A(C1)12000* 500 < A(C1)120,000 Upper limit based on FDA's pre-ventive level of 500 mese whole
, body l 8, OR o OR OR Release > 10xT.S. 11mit ' C(uct/al) > 10'0 C(uct/al) > 3x10-2 SITE EMERGENCY lower limit based on FDA's preventive level Upper level based on FDA's 2000< A(C1)120,000 0 '
5 emergency level of 5000 area 2x10 < A(CL)12x10 whole body GENERAL EMERGENCY In excess of FDA's emergency 0 5 A(C1) > 2x10 A(C1) > 2x10 1evel i e EAla are measured or estimated to be in discharge water flow. j b Unofficial EFA guidance. ,g c Assumptiones oo g g e Water dilution ,of 10 10 liters (typical for any .h tion). ' e. e j e Weighted concentration limit of 0.2 uC1/1 for FDAs pheventive level (assumes a mixture of II each "5 I-131. St-90; 10% Sr-89; 44% each Cs-134 Cs-137). ga ;
. Dose from Cs-134 is twice that from Cs-137 per unit of activity consumed.
, November, 1981 Revision 3 l 6.0 EMERGENCY MEASURES 1
6.1 Commonwealth Emergency Response Actions Durig an emergency situation at one of its nuclear stations, Commonwealth Edison has the responsibility to implement appropriate emergency measures. These measures includes o Notification of responsible authorities; i o Activation of the GSEP organization; o Assessment of the emergency situations o Initiation of actions to correct or mitigate an emergency at or near the source of the problem; o Recommendation of protective actions for the offsite public; i I o Initiation of protective measures for onsite personnel; and o Provision of aid to affected onsite personnel. l
/~ When Commonwealth Edison initially notifies State or local authorities of an emergency condition, the following information should be transmitted as a minimum:
- 1) same and title of the reporting person;
- 2) Location and type of incident (i.e., the emergency classification);
- 3) Date and time of incident;
- 4) Whether a release of radioactive material is taking place; 1
l 5) Potentially affected population and areas; 1
- 6) Whether protective measures may be necessary; and
- 7) Verification to confirm authenticity of call.
Figure 6.1-1 shows the initial notification scheme for declared GSEP emergencies. l l 6-1 l l
November, 1981 Revision 3 Pollowup messages to State and local authorities shall contain the ' fellcwing information if it is known and appropriate:
- 1) Type of actual or projected release (airborne, waterborne, surface spill), and estimated duration / impact times;
- 2) Estimate of quantity of radioactive material released or being released and the points and height of release;
- 3) Chemical and physical form of released material, including estimates of the relative quantities and concentration of noble gases, iodines, and particulates;
- 4) Noteorological conditions at appropriate levels (wind speed, direction (to and from), indicator of stability; form of precipitation, if any);
- 5) Actual or projected dose rates at site boundary; projected integrated dose at site boundary;
- 6) Projected dose rates and integrated dose at the projected peak and at about 2, 5, and 10 miles, including sector (s) affected; *
- 7) Estimate of any surface radioactive contamination inplant, onsite, or offsite; '
)
- 8) Emergency response actions underway;
- 9) Recommended emergency actions, including protective measures;
- 10) Requested onsite support from offsite organizations; and
- 11) Prognosis for worsening or termination of event based on plant information.
Maior Commonwealth emergency response actions for each emergency class are identified in Tabic 6.1-1 through Table 6.1-5 as indicated below: I
- 1) Table 6.1 Actions for Transportation Accident;
- 2) Table 6.1 Actions for Unsual Event;
- 3) Table 6.1 Actions for Alert;
- 4) Table 6.1 Actions for She Emergency;
- 5) Table 6.1 Actions for General Emergency.
- Figure 6.1-2 gives the sectors and zone designators that are used at each nuclear station. -
6-2
1
\
FIGURE 6.1-I SIMPLIFIED EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SCHEME TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM C0flP0 RATE STATION ACC10ENT DIRECTOR
- POWER : COMMAND CENTER : ESOA : LOCE i'
OISPATCHER DIRECTOR AGENCES UNUSUAL EVENT T _f NRC IDMS CONil60005 STATE AUTHORITY l . -- f cg.P.'Ec2LEWg5PJE"!!!.7,1'EL------ i ! ALERT STATION SYSTEM CORPORATE I
- LOCR I POWER :
^
e 4 SITE EMERGENCY OIRECTOR DISPATCHER COMMAND CENTER DIRECTOR ESDA AGENCES I g NRC I IONS g CONil6000S STATE AUTHORITY INPO I CORPOR . I I II GENERAL EMER6ENCY STATION DIRECT (Ni
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SYSTEM - COMMAII0 CENTER .! ESOA LOCAL E OlSPAT HER g fC AGENCES [, l g "C L .!Kf.!!'EJ5EAS*".!T2L .J '""' -- ALREADY IS ACTIVATED CONil6UOUS STATE AUTHORITY
- INPO
\
November 1981 s Revision 3 FIGURE 6.1-2 SECTOR AND ZONE DESIGMATORS A, R A B Q NNW NNE ,g . NW g P D 1
** l East E M
SW SE L SSW g SSE G K n mi H J 6-4
1eovember,1981 Revision 3 TABLE 6.1-1 Cope 00tIIIEALTE ACTIOI88 FOR TRANSPORTATIOII ACCIDERIT l
- 1. STATION DIRECTOR *
- a. Declare Transportation Accident-Condition.
- b. Ilotify System Power Dispatcher.
- c. Ilotify the NRC Operations Center.
- d. Activate those parts of the GSEP Station Group needed to meet the needs of the emergency.
- e. Dispatch personnel for evaluation, if deemed necessary.
- 2. SYSTEN POTTER DISPATCHER
- a. Immediately notify the Corporate command Center Director.
- 3. CORPORATE COISEntID CENTER DIRETOR
- a. Activate those parts of the offsite GSEP organisation needed to meet l the needs of the emergency.
I ! b. Ensure that the following agencies have been promptly notified of l the emergency by the carriers o The United States Department of Transportation o The local emergency agenci nearest to the scene of the accident o The Illinois Emergency services and Disaster Agency (if the accident occurred within the State of Illinois) Each notification should have included: o Name of reporter o Name and address of the carrier represented by the reporter o Phone number where the reporter can be contacted o Date, time, and location of incident _. o The extent of injuries, if any o The classification, name, and quantity of hazar' dous materials involved, if such information is available o The type of incident and the nature of hazardous material involvement and whether a continuing danger to life or health l exists at the scene. l c. If deemed necessary, dispatch environmental monitoring teams or seek the aid of other emergency response organisations to assist in the field.
*Since a Transportation Accident condition is an offsite occurrence, the Corporate Command Center Director may be notified of the emergency prior to a Station Director being notified; in that case, the CCC Director would declare the Transportation Accident condition.
6-5
9 = November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 6.1-1 (CONT)
- d. If the Transportation Accident occurs outside Edison's service territory and additional radiological assistance is necessary, contact the appropriate utility which has signed into the INDO voluntary Assistant Agreement.
- 4. OVERALL GSEP RESPONSE l a. Assess situation and respond.
- b. Activate the Corporate Command Center.
- c. Initiate recovery measures in cooperation with State and local emergency personnel.
6-6
- - , - - - - - "* ~ - - - - - - ' ' ' ' "'
l t November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 6.1-2 CODGEONNEALTH ACTIONS POR UNUSUAL EVENT
- 1. STATION DIRECTOR
- a. Declare an Unusual Event condition.
- b. Notify System Power Dispatcher
- c. Notify the NBC Operations Center.
- d. Activate those parts of the GSEP Station Group needed to meet the l
needs of the emergency. ' l .~ ,
- 2. SYSTEN PONER DISPATCHER
- a. Immediately notify the Corporate Command Center Director.
- 3. CORPORATE CODGilulD CENTER DIRECTOR
- a. Notify the following organizations of the emergency:
o Illinois ESDAr , o Iowa Office of Disaster Services (for Quad Cities Station only) o Nisconsin Division of Emergency Government (for Eion Station only).
- b. Activate those parts of the offsite GSEP organisation needed to meet the needs of the emergency.
- c. Close out with a verbal summary to NRC, State of Illinois, and contiguous State authorities as appropriate, or escalate to a more severe class.
- 4. OVERALL GSEP RESPOttSE
- a. Assess situation and respond.
- b. Augment on-shift resources.
- c. Activate the Corporate Command Center.
l 6-7
November, 1981 Revision 3 m TABLE 6.1-3 COISONNEALTtt ACTIONS FOR F **T
- 1. STATION DIRECTOR
- a. Declare Alert condition.
- b. Motify the System Power Dispatcher.
- c. Notify the ERC Operations Center.
l
- d. Activate those parts of the GSEP Station group needed to meet the needs of the emergency.
- e. Activate the Onsite TSC and Onsite OSC.
- 2. SYSTEM POWER DISPATCHER
- a. Notify the Corporate command Center Director.
- b. If the COC Director cannot be contacted within five (5) minutes, immediately notify the following agencies of the emergency conditions o I111acis ESDh; o Iowa Office of Disaster Services (for Quad cities Station only) o Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government (for Elon Station only).
- c. Resume efforts to contact the COC Director.
- 3. COItPORATE CDISBND CENTER DIRECTOR -
- a. Notify the following organisations of the emergency:
o Illinois ESDhr o Iowe Office of Disaster Services (for Quad Cities Station only) o Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government (for Zion Station only) o Institute of Nuclear power Operations.
- b. Activate those parts of the offsite GSEP organization needed to meet the needs of the emergency. Activate the Recovery Group if deemed necessary.
- c. Close out or recommend reduction in emergency class by briefing the NRC, State of Illinois, and contiguous State authorities as appropriate, or escalate to a more severe class.
- 4. OVERALL GSEP RESPONSE
- a. Assess situation and respond.
- b. Augment on-shift resources.
- c. Activate the Corporate Command Center, the Onsite TSC, and the Onsite OSC.
- d. Provide periodic plant status updates and meteorological information to ESDA/DNS and contiguous State authorities. If any releases are occurring, provide dose estimates for actual releases.
6-8 1
l l November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 6.1-4 COMMOtefEALTH ACTIONS FOR SITE """Y
- 1. STATION DIRECTOR
- a. Declare Site Emergency.
- b. Notify the System Power Dispatcher.
- c. Notify the NRC Operations Center.
- d. Activate the Station Group.
- e. Activate the Onsite TSC and OSC. '
- f. Dispatch personnel for environs monitoring if required.
- g. Call-in additional personnel as necessary.
- 2. SYSTEN PONER DISPATCHER
- a. Notify the Corporate Command Center Director.-
- b. If the CCC Director cannot be contacted within five (5) minutes, immediately notify the following agencies of the emergency:
o Illinois ESDA. o Iowa Office of Disaster Services (for Quad Cities Station only) . o Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government (for Sion Station only) .
- c. Resume efforts to contact the CCC Director.
1 ,-
- 3. CORPORATE COletAND CENTER DIRECTOR / RECOVERY MANAGER
- a. Notify the following organisations of the emergency:
o Illinois ESDA; o Iowa Office of Disaster Services (for Quad Cities Station only); o Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government (for Sion Station only); o Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.
- b. Activate the total offsite GSEP organization, including the Recovery Group.
- c. Close out or recommend reduction in emergency class by briefing NRC, i State of Illinois, and contiguous State agencies as appropriate, or escalate to a General Emergency.
- 4. OVERALL GSEP RESPONSE
- a. Assess situation and respond.
- b. Augment resources through activation of the Corporate Command Center, the Onsite TSC, the Onsite OSC, and the Nearsite EOF.
- c. Dispatch environmental monitoring teams if deemed necessary. (At first these teams are under the direction of the Station Group; as soon as possible, direction will be transferred to a designated Environs Director.)
6-9 -
November, 1981 Revision 3 s. M BLE 6.1-4 (Corr)
- d. Provide periodic plant status updates and meteorological information tc. ESDA/DNS and contiguous State authorities. If any releases are occurring, provide dose estimates for actual releases,
- e. Recommend protective actions to ESDh/DNS and contiguous State authorities consistent with Tables 6.3-1, 6.3-2, and 6.3-3.
/
t m I i
)
6-10
- November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 6.1-5 C00GIONNEALTH ACTIONS POR GENERAL ENERGENCY
- 1. _S_M_ TION DIRECTOR
- a. Declare a General Emergency.
o b. Notify the System Power Dispatcher.
*c. Notify the Illinois ESDA and appropriate local authority of the emergency situation and make recommendations consistent with Table 6.3-1 (for gaseous plume exposure) . Also, notify the Iowa Office of Disaster Services and the Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government in the cases of guad Cities and Zion, respectively.
- d. Notify the NaC Operations Center.
- e. Activate the Station Group.
- f. Activate the Onsite TSC and OSC.
- g. Dispatch personnel for environs monitoring if required.
- h. Call-in additional personnel as necessary.
- 1. Provide plant status updates to the state and local aut'sorities (until this function can be performed by the CCC Director or the Recovery Manager.)
i
- 2. SYSTEN POWER DISPATCHER
- a. Immediately notify the CCC Director.
- 3. CORPORATE C000 Gum CENTER DIRECTOR / RECOVERY MANAGER
- a. Notify the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations.
- b. Activate the total offsite GSEP organization, including the Recovery Group.
- c. Close out or recommend reduction in emergency class by briefing of the NBC, State of Illinois, local authorities, and contiguous State agencies, as appropriate.
- 4. OVERALL GSEP RESPONSE
- a. Assess situation and respond.
- b. Augment resources through activation of the Corporate Command Center, the Onsite TSC, the Onsite OSC, and the Nearsite EOF.
- The responsibility for notifying State and local agencies of a General Emergency condition is given to the Station Director. However, if the CCC or the Nearsite EOF has already been activated for a previous emergency declaration, this notification will normally be performed by the CCC Director or the Recovery Manager. In addition, if the State EOC is already activated at the time of the General Emergency declaration, the CCC Director or Recovery Marager may brief State officials before pecrective action recommendations are given to local authorities via the Nuclear Accident Reporting System.
6-11
l l November, 1981 Revision 3 M BLE 6.1-5 (CONT)
- c. Dispatch environmental monitoring teams if required. (At first these teams are under the direction of the Station Groups as soon as possible, direction will be transferred to a designated Environs i
Director.)
- d. Provide periodic plant status updates and meteorological information to ESDA/DMS and contiguous State authorities. If any releases are occurring, provide dose estimatse for actual releases,
- e. Recommend protective actions to ESDA/DNS and contiguous State authorities consistent with Tables 6.3-1, 6.3-2, and 6.3-3.
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O 6-12
l November, 1981 l Revision 3 6.2 Assessment Actions '
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l Throughout each emergency situation, continuing accident assessment i will occur. Based upon these assessments, decisions will be made to
- implement specific emergency measures.
6.2.1 Evaluation of Plant Conditions Evaluations of plant conditions is accomplished through the monitoring of important plant parameters. Some of the parameters to be monitore3 would include reactor coolant system pressure, reactor / pressuriser water level, containment pressure, containment radiation level, effluent monitor readings, and area radiation monitor read-ings. Upon installation of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), these parameters and others will be directly available for display in the Control Ecom, Onsite TSC, the CCC, and nearsite EOF. At this time, important plant parameters can only be monitored from the control noon itself. 6.2.2 Radiological Measurements Inplant radiological measurements will provide information that will help determine the nature, extent, and source of emergency conditions, Systems are . installed to permit reactor coolant and containment atmosphere sampling even un(cr severe accident condi-tions. , i Offsite environmental teams will be dispatched by Common-wealth to perform a variety of functions during conditions that involve releases of radioactive materials from the plant. In addition to beta / gamma field onasurements, the change-out of TLDs and air sampler cartridges may be performed. Other actions will include soil, water, and vegetation
- sampling, as well as plume location werification.
6.2.3 Dose Projections for the Offsite Public Dose assessment activities shall be conducted with an emphasis on determining the necessity for protective action. Radiological and meteorological instrumentation readings shall be used to project dose rates at predetermined distances from the station, and to determine the integrated dose received. The primary l method of estimating offsite doses is through the .use of an Offsite Dose Calculation System described in Section 7.3.3. 6-13
i November, 1981 Revision 3 - 6.2.4 Core Damage Assessmen3 To aid GSEP at d Control Room personnel in .an ascessment of core damage during an emergency condition, each site specific annex shall contain a plot of activity (Ci) versus containment radiation reading (R/hr) for each teactor unit at the site (if of different design). Four points shall be marked on this plot representing:
- 1) Core release of 254 iodines and 1004 noble gases
(
Reference:
Reg. Guide 1.3) : 2). 1004 release of gap activity (References Reg. Guide 1.25) ; i
- 3) 0.2% core release of iodines and noble gases (for BWRs) or 2.04 core release of iodines and noble gases (for PWRs) (references Reg. Guide 4.2); and
- 4) 1004 release of coolant activity; at t = 0 following an accident, assuming an immediate release of said activities into the containment.
6.3 Protective Actions for the Offsite Public 6.3.1 Commonwealth Recommendations for Protective Action < Por incidents involving actual or imminent releases of I radioactive material to the atmosphere, the current issue of the
" Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents" (EPA 520/1-75-001) will be used as the basis for ,
recommendations for protective actions for the offsite public. The l EPA Guide provides Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for whole body j external gamma radiation and for inhalation of radioactive material in an airborne plume. The most effective . actions to be recommended to the public
~
are evacuetion, sheltering, and access control. Evacuation potentially provides the grea*,est margin of protection and should be the primary means of protective emergency action in the event of a gaseous fission product release. On the other hand, because sheltering may be implemented in less time than evacuation, it may be the protective action of choice if rapid evecuation is impeded for any reason. Also, since sheltering is less disruptive than evacuation, it may be the protective action of choice when the dose reduction factor associated with shelter is adequate to reduce the l projected dose to less than PAG 1evels. Access control is an j effective action to avoid exposure of personnel who might otherwise ) enter high exposure areas unnecessarily. 6-14
. s November, 1981 Revision 3 Por incidents involving contamination of food, water, or
, milk, protective action recommendations will be consistent with the guidance of the U.S. Pood and Drug Ad:sinistration published in the Pederal Register, Vol. 43, No. 242, December 15, 1978. The PDA guidance includes PACS for two levels: a preventive and an emergency PAG. The preventive PAG is a 1.5 res projected dose commitment to the thyroid or a 0.5 rem whole body dose commitment.
The emergency PAG is 10 times the preventive PAG, or a 15 rem thyroid or a 5 rem whole body dose commitment. Protective action (such as placing dairy cows on uncontani-nated stored feed) should be taken whenever a contaminating event is projected to expose an individual at the preventive level PAG. When the projected dose reaches the emergency' level, food stuffs should be withheld from commerce until a judgement is made on condemnation or other appropriate action.
. Tables 6.3-1, 6.3-2, and 6.3-3 summarise possible recommended protective actions to be made to state and local agencies during an emergency.
- 6.3.2 Notification of the Public motification capability exists for members of the public within the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning zone surrounding operating nuclear stations. This capability consists of public alerting sirens and local emergency vehicles equipped with public address (PA) systems.
, The emergency vehicles (such as fire department or police vehicles) will travel within portion of the EPs and broadcast a message over the PA systems. This message will inform citizens of an accident at the nuclear station and will advise the citizens to either take shelter or evacuate. Also, the message will instruct the residents to tune in to, a local radio station. The sirens will alert the citizens to tune in to the radio station for specific instructions and information related to the emergency. ' The residents of the 10-mile EPZ receive informative brochure (described in Section 8.4) which describes possible actions to be taken during an emergency. The brochure identifies the radio stations which will be broadcasting instructions and protective action recommendations. The actual means for providing notification to the public will be more specifically addressed in the site-specific annexes. 6-15
November, 1981 . Revision 3 6.3.3 Implementation of Offsite Protective Measures State and local governments have the responsibility to coordinate actions taken to protect the pchlic during emergency situations. Refer to state and local emergency response plans for itotective action information for offsite areas. (Also refer to Sections 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 of this plan) . Time estimates for evacuation of the plume exposure EPZ surrounding each Commonwealth nuclear station appear in each site specific annex. These evacuation time estimates may be used by the CCC Environmental / Emergency Coordinator as an aid in determining the recommended protective action, for the offsite public (i.e., sheltering or evacuation) . d i i 6-16 l l
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6 17
) TABLE 6.3-2 , CSEP GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST INGESTION CF CONTAMINATION FOR THE OFFSITE FUBLIC FOOD AND WATER CONTAMINATION A. Derived Response Levels Preventive Action 14vele*
/ Total Intake via All Pasture Crass
! Nuclide** Critical Organ Milk / Water *** Food and Water Pathways (Fresh wetaht) 1-131 Thyroid 0.012 oci/1 0.09 uCi 0.27 uC1/kg co-137 Whole Body 0.34 uC1/1 7 uci 3.5 uC1/kg Sr-90 Bone 0.007 uC1/1 0.2 uC1 0.7 uct/ka Sr-89 Bone 0.13 uC1/1 2.6 uCi 13 uC1/kg
*The preventive derived response action levels relate to a 1.5 rem projected dose commitment to the thyroid or to a 0.5 ran projected dose commitment to the whole body, bone, or any other organ. Emersency action levels are equal to ten (10) times the preventive levels and relate to either a 15 res projected dose com-mitment to the thyroid or a 5 res projected dose commitment to the whole body, bone, or any other organ.
**If other nuclides are present, use Regulatory Guide 1.109 to calculate the dose commitment to the criticol f
e organ (s) . Infants are considered to be the critical segment of the population. a> B. Recomumended Protective Actions Preventive Level Exceeded Emersency Level Exceeded e For pasture; remove lactating dairy cous from o Isolate food containing radioactive contami-contaminated pasturage and substitute uncon- nation to prevent its introduction into com-taminated stored feed. Also, substitute a merce and determine whether condemnation or source of uncontaminated water. another disposition is appropriate. Before e For milk; withhold milk from market to allow taking this action, considers radioactive decay. Consider diversion of fluid milk for production of butter or evaporated milk. -Availability of other possible actioneg e For fruits and vegetableag wash, brush, or scrub -Importance of particular foods in to remove contamination. Allow radioactive decay nutrition; and through canning, dehydration ~, or storage. -Time and effort required to take action. e For grains; mill and polish. ,g eo
***The preventive action levels apply to water as well as milk; the protective action for water would be dj ,
"8 to use a suitable source of uncontaminated water. oe D #1 ta v O
O 5
f TABLE 6.3-3 St#9tARY OF POSSIBLE OFFSITE PROTECTIVE A NTONS TO BE RECOMMENDED OR IMPLEMENTED DURING AN EI.t.RGENCY* ACCIDENT PHASE EXPOSURE PATHWAY EXANFLES OF ACTION TO BE REcolttENDED g Inhalation of gases. Evacuation, shelter, access control, respiratory protection. EMERGENCY radiotodine, or particulate prophylaxis (thyroid protection) PHASE (0.5 to 30 hours)* Direct uhole body exposure Evacuation, shelter, access control Ingestion of milk Take cows off pasture, prevent cows from drinking surface water, discard contaminated milk, o'r divert to stored ! products such as cheese l Ingestion f fruits and Wash all produce, or impound produce, delay harvest until 2 l INTERMEDIATE vegetables approved, substitute uncontaminated produce l PHASE
- Ingestion of water cut off contaminated supplies, substitute from other sources.
filter, dominere11 e (30 hours to 30 days)* Whole body exposure and Relocation, decontamination, access control
,, inhalation 4 Ingestion of foM and water Decontamination, condemnation, or destruction of food; deep en contaminated from the soil plowing, condemnation, or alternate use of land 3 either by resuspension or LONG TERN uptake through roots PHASE Whole body exposure from Relocation, access control, decontamination, fLaing of (over 30 days)* deposition material or contamination, deep plowing '
inhalation of resuspended ,, material 1 i I I Emergency phase - Time period of major release and subsequent plume exposure. 3 2 E. ' Intermediate phase - Time period of moderate continuous releases with plume exposure S ,, and contamination of environment. p 3 e l Long Term Phase - Recovery period. "
*" Typical" Post-accident time periods.
- Reference USEPA " Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents " 1975.
November, 1981 Revision 3 6.4 Protective Actions for Onsite Personnel 6.4.1 Protective Cover, Evacuation, Personnel Accountability During an emergency situation, an assembly and evacuation of onsite nonessential personnel should be provided for by the Station l Director whenever: l l 1) It is determined that projected doses should be avoided by a relocation of personnels or
- 2) A Site or General Emergency is declared; or
- 3) Other dangers exist that present a threat to the safety of onsite personnel as determined by the Station Director.
All nuclear stations have a siren system to signal personnel to assemble in previous 2- designated areas. Persons not having an emergency response assagnment, including visitors and contractor personnel, are required to assemble when notified by the siren. l l 6.4.2 Use of Protective Equipment and Supplies During the course of an emergency, protective actions will be considered to minimise the effects of radiological exposures or - contamination problems associated with personnel who must work ) within the restricted area of the affected site. Measures that will be considered are:
- 1) Distribution of respirators;
- 2) Use of protective clothing; and
- 3) Use of thyroid blocking agents.
The criteria for issuance of respiratory protection and protective clothing are described in Commonwealth radiation protection standards and/or site specific radiation / chemistry procedures. The use of thyroid blocking agents is recommended when a l projected dose of 10 rem is exceeded for a worker's tnyroid. This is the value recommended by NCRP-55, " Protection of the Thyroid Gland in the Event of Releases of Radioiodine." The Commonwealth Medical Director is responsible for maintaining a supply of thyroid blocking agents within the company and for establishing the specific policy for its use. 6-20
November, 1981 Revision 3 6.4.3 Contamination control Measure = During an emergency, provisions will be made for preventing or minimizing direct or -Mat. ingestion exposure to radioactive materials deposited on the ground or other sarfaces. Commonwealth radiation protection standards describe general methada to be used in con *==ination control. 6.5 Aid to Affected Onsite Personnel 6.5.1 Emergency Personnel Exposure Eoing licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, all Commonwealth nuclear stations maintain personnel exposure control programs in accordance with 10CFR20. The Commonwealth Edison Radiation Protection Standards include guidance that should be used for limiting personnel exposures under emergency conditions. When-ever.possible, the prior approval of the Station Superintendent,.the h1th Medical Director, and the station's radiation protec-tion supervisor should be secured before exposing individuals to does equivalents beyond 10CFR20 limits. In addition to the guidance of the commonwealth Edison Radiation Protection Standards, emergency personnel exposures shall be limited to the recommendations of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as follows: 1
- 1) Emergency Workers - This applies to conditions where it is desirable to enter an emergency area to protect facilities, eliminate serious unplanned release of effluents, or to control fires.
a) Planned whole body dose equivalent shall not exceed 25 rema> b) Planned dose equivalent to the thyroid shall not exceed 125 rens. ,
- 2) Life Saving Actions - This applies to search for and removal of injured persons or entry to the emergency area to prevent conditions that would injure other people.
a) Dose Equivalent to the whole body shall not exceed 75 remst
~.
b) No limit for the thyroid since total loss of thyroid function could be allowable. The emergency limits outlined in this section shall be voluntary and be limited to once in a lifetime. 6-21
l November, 1981 Revision 3 - 6.5.2 Decontamination and First Aid 4.5.2.1 General There are no resident physicians, nurses, or industrial hygienists on the staff of Commonwealth's generating stations. Bowever, the radiation protection personnel at each nuclear station are experienced in control of radioactive contamination and decontamination work. The radiation protection personnel and certain supervisors are also trained and qualified to administer first aid. These individuals are annually. retrained in first aid by the station training staff. At least one of these individuals is available on shift at all times. D e functions of station personnel in handling onsite injured 1 people are:
- 1) afford rescuer
- 2) administer first aid including such resuscitative measures as are deemed necessary; i
- 3) begin decontamination procedures; and
- 4) arrange suitable transportation to a hospital when required.,
6.5.2.2 Initial First Aid Primary attention will be directed to the actual factors involved in the treatment of casualties, such as: control of bleeding, resuscitation including heart and lung, ' protection of wousads from bacterial or radioactive contami-nation and the' immobilization of fractures. 6.5.2.3 Decontamination l Nuclear Station radiation protection personnel will I provide an initial estimate of the magnitutde of surface contamination of the injured and preliminary estimates of total body dose to the injured. Directed by radiation protection personnel, the station will carry out primary rapid and simple decontamination of the surface of the body when possible and advisable before transportation of the injured to a designated hospital. I 6-22 1 b
November, 1981 Revision 3 6.5.3 Medical Transportation l Arrangements are made by each nuclear generating station for prompt ambulance service for transporting persons with injuries ' involving radioactivity from the respective generating station to designated hospitals. Such service is available on a 24-hour per day basis and is confirmed in writing. Radiation monitoring services Anall be provided by Commonwealth whenever it becomes necessary to use the ambulance service for the transportation of contaminated persons. l Injured persons will be transported to a hospital or other medical facility in a prudent and timely manner. Those persons contaminated with radioactive material will be taken to the desig-nated hospital and be accompanied by a person qualified in radi-ation monitoring techniques. 6.5.4. Medical Treatment 6.5.4.1 Hospital Facilities Arrangements, confirmed in writing, are maintained by Commonwealth with a qualified hospital located in the vicinity of each nuclear generating station for receiving and treating of contaminated or exposed persons. Such nearby hospital facilities shall be utilised for decontamination and initial treatment of persons with injuries involving radio-activity and requiring immediate hospital care. Commonwealth will provide medical consultants to aid in any special care necessary at these facilities. Arrangements, confirmed in writing, are also maintained by the corporate office with a qualified major medical facility well equipped and staffed for dealing with pertans having radiation injuries and whenever necessary, ' such persons will be transferred to this major hospital facility for extended specialised treatment.. Currently, Northwestern Memorial Bospital in Chicago, Illinois serves as this hospital. Commonwealth will have available to the' staff of this hospital its specialist who will provide the direc-tion of the special care necessary for the treatment of persons having radiation injuries. 6.5.4.2 Radiological Medical Consultants Because of the specialized nature of the diagnosis and treatment of radiation injuries, Commonwealth's corporate I medical office maintains a roster of physicians especially l competent in this area of n;edicine and available for the 1 6-23
November, 1981 Revision 3 '- care of persons with these special problems. Included in this roster are experts in the ' treatment of internal contamination, cutaneous radiation injury, total body irradiation and other potential problems related to exposure to ionizing radiation or radioactive materials. These specialists may be in direct charge of the care of these patients or serve as consultants to other physicians in charge of their care'. 1
~
O l l 6-24 l
November, 1981 Revision 3 7.0 EMERGIWCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 7.1 Emergency Control Centers Station Control Room 7.1.1 The nuclear station control room shall be the initial onsite center of emergency control. Control Room personnel must evaluate and effect control over the initial aspects of an emergency and initiate activities necessary for coping with the initial phases of an emergency until such time that support centers can be activated. These activities shall includes o continuous evaluation of the magnitude and potential consequences of an incident , o Initial corrective actions; and o motification of appropriate individuals as outlined in Section 6.0 of this plan. Support centers provided are an Onsite Technical Support Center, and Onsite Operational Support Center, a Corporate Command Center, and a Nearsite Emergency Operations Facility. 7.1.2 Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC)
~
I Each nuclear generating station has established an Onsite l Technical Support Center (TSC) for use during emergency situations by plant management, technical, and engineering support personnel. When activated during an emergency, the Onsite TSC shall be manned by sufficient personnel to: o support the Control-Aoom command and control functions o Assess the plant status and potential offsite impact; and o Coordinate emergency response actions. Staffing of the Onsite TSC shall be as directed by the Station Director. Reporting initially to the Onsite TSC for the Site and General Emergency shall be all directors of the Station Group, i.e., the Station Director, Operations Director, Technical Director, Maintenance Director, Stores Director, Administrative Director, Security Director, and Rad / Chem Director. (The Shift Engineer when acting as initial Station Director would not report to the Onsite TSC) . Other personnel may augment the Onsite TSC staff upon approval of the Station Director. 7-1
November, 1981 l Revision 3 i Each Creite TSC is in close proximity to the Control Room and is sized for at least 25 persons and supporting equipment. of the 25 persons, five will ne considered to represent the NRC and one' person will be considered to represent the State of Illinois. At l l Quad Cities and Zion Stations, an additional slot per station will be held for a contiguous state representative. Personnel in the Onsite TSC shall be protected from radiological hazards, including direct radiation and airborne contaminants under accident conditions to the same degree as control Room personnel. To ensure adequate radiological protection, permanent radiation monitoring systems have been installed in the onsite TSC. These systems continuously indicate radiation dose rates and airborne radioactivity inside the onsite TSC while in use. In addition, protective breathing apparatus (full face air purifying respirators) and thyroid blocking agents are available for use as required. t The Onsite TSC has access to a complete set of as-built drawings and other records, including general arrangement diagrams, P& ids, piping system isometrics, and the electrical schematics. The Onsite plant data, TSCin(will real have) time tothe becapability to record and display used by knowledgeable individuals vital j l responsible for engineering and management support of reactor ~ operations, and for implementation of emergency procedures. 7.1.3 onsite coerational {apport Center (OSC) Each nuclear ger. rating station has established an Onsite operational Support C=nter (OSC) . The Onsite OSC is the location to which operations support personnel will report during an emergency and from which they will be dispatched for assignments or duties in suFport of emergency cerrations. Personnel who may report to the onsite OSC includes o Opezating personnel not assigned to the Control Rooms o Radwaste personnel; and o Rad / Chem Technicians. The Operations Director shall designate an individual from the Station Operations staff to manage and supervise the activities of the Onsite OSC. A limited inventory of supplies will be kept in the Onsite OSC. This inventory will include respirators, protective clothing, portable lighting, and portable survey instruments. 1 7-2 -
. - . - . - . , . - , . . -. - - g
1 I l November, 1981 Revision 3 7.1.4 Corporate Command Center (CCC) l The Corporate Command Center located in the Edison Building, l downtown Chicago, is the location from which the Corporate Command Center Director win normally direct a staff in evaluating, ocordinating, and directing the overall company activities involved in coping with an emergency. If the Recovery Group is activated at the Nearsite EDF, then the CCC will be the location for a support staif reporting to the Recovery Group. In addition to the above functions, the CCC win serve as the corporate environmental center where environmental monitoring win be directed and offsite dose projections performed under the direction of the CCC Environmental Director. ' 7.1.5 Hearsite Emergency Operations Facility (EDF) The Nearsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is the , location near the generating station that provides for the management of overan emergency respon,Te, the coordination of radiological assessments, 'and for management of ' recovery operations. The Nearsite EOF and associated Recovery Group function under a Recovery Manager and are activated for all Site and General anergency situations. Activation for other emergency conditions is optional.
~ There win be three major emergency control functions at each Nearsite EDF. They are (1) the Recovery Centers (2) the Emergency Control Centers,and (3) the Emergency News Center. Refer to Figure 7.1-1.
The Recovery Center functions under the direction of the l Recovery Manager and is the command post for direction of all recovery operations. i The amergency Control Center is under the direction of the Environmental /Baergency Coordinator and functions as a location from which to evaluate emergency situations that affect the public. - The meergency News Center is under the direction of the Emergency News Canter Director and functions as the single-point contact for disseminating information to the public. A technical spokesperson will be chosen by Commonwealth's top management. -This spokesperson will be knowledgeable about the affected station and its operation and will have the authority and responsibility to discuss technical problems associated with the emergency. The spokesperson win be available to brief the press at the Emergency News Center. 7-3
November, 1981 Revision 3 FIGURE 7.1 1 COPJiONWEALTH EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTERS
& COMMUNICATIONS FLOW (for a full response situation)
PLANT CONTROL - ONSITE TECHNICAL ROOM ~ SUPPORT CENTER h y Al
~
ONSITE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER ONSITE ......_===--_==. ___... . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . NEARSITE RECOVERY m m M RGENCY _ _
~
CENTER
, - COEROL -
CENTER NEARSITE EOF '
,)
EMERGENCY NEWS CENTER News Media Public NEARSITE REMOTE FROM SITE CORPORATE C COMMAND C CENTER Note: The Nearsite EOF has three defined functional centers. Space limitations of individual Nearsite EOFs may not allow separate physical rooms for each " center".
/
74
l . November, 1981 Revision 3 7.2 Communication Systems commonwealth has extensive and reliable communication systems installed at its generating stations, system power supply offic'e, corporate headquarters, and Division load dispatching offices. These systems include the use of normal and special telephone lines, radio, microwave voice channels, mobile radio units, and handi-talkies. For the purposes of GSEP -niications, the system is addressed in terms of functional areas as described in the following sections. 7.2.1 Nuclear Accident Reporting System (MMtS) The Nuclear Accident Reporting System is a dedicated telephone voice communications system that has been iristalled for the purpose of notifying State and local authorities of declared nuclear emergencies. This system links together the station Control Rooms, the Corporate Command Center, Onsite Technical Support Centers, System Power Supply Office, Nearsite Emergency Operations Facilities, and State and local authorities as appropriate. (See Figure 7.2-1). The State of Illinois Emergency Services & Disaster Agency, in cooperation with Commonwealth Edison, is responsible for the development and esecution of all steps necessary to ensure continuous operation of the MMts. 7.2.2 Communications for Command and Control Commonwealth has established four separate dedicated communication systems that ensure reliable and timely exchange of information necessary to provide offective command and control over any emergency responsa. These systems includes o A microwave . voice channel between the Corporate Command Center and the Shift Engineer's Of fice, the Onsite TSC, and the Nearsite EOF at each nuclear station. o A telephone link that enables communication between the Corporate Command Center, the Onsite TSC, and the Nearsite EOF. o A telephone link that enables communication between the Control Room and the Onsite TSC. o A telephone link that enables communication between the Control Room and the Onsite OSC. Refer to Figure 7.2-2 for a more descriptive representation of the l above systems. 7-5
November, 1981 Revision 3 7.2.3 Environmental Assessment Communications Two separate communication systems have been installed to allow ocordinated environmental monitoring and assessment during an emergency. - The first system consists of the necessary hardware to allow communication between the Corporate e-ad Center, - the Control Boom, the Onsite Tsc, the Nearsite EDF mobile units in Consonwealth vehicles, and har.di-talkies held by environmental monitoring teams in the field. The radio system has scramble capability to prevent monitoring by non-company equipment. The second system consists of a dedicated telephone which allow continuous communication between the Corporate e-ed Center and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety REAC in Springfield. Refer to Figure 7.2-3. 7.2.4 inc Comunmications There exists a dedicated telephone, Emergency .Motification System (E35) , between each nuclear station's Control Ecom and the IRC, with an eatension of that line in the Onsite Technical Support Center. There also esists a separate dedicated telephone, Realth Physics Network (EPN) , between the NRC and the Radiation Protec-tion Office at each nuclear station (See Figure 7.2-4) . The actual - configuration of these systems may vary from station to station. ') Installation and use of the Inc phones is under the direction of the Inc. 7.2.5 MANAS
, The Wisconsin Mstional Merning System (MANAS) network is -
available at the locations shown on Figure 7.2-1. The MANAS is used to provide the initial notification of a reportable incident at the Ilon Station to the State of Wisconsin. MANAS is used for initial contact only. Details of the initial report and subsequent changes in status will be provided to Wisconsin officials by other commanications. l l 7-6 A
November, 1981 Revision 3 FIGURE 7.2-1 i NUCLEAR ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM (NARS) ) Selection of a predetermined code rings selected phones. The MARS phones are color coded ggggg. Dial Code 20 I H inois Emergency Services
& Disaster Agency IH inois Department of Nuclear Safety Dial Code 22 Dial Code 24 IHinois Emergency Services IHinois Emergency Services &
& Disaster Agency Disaster Agency Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety I Hinois Department of Nuclear Safety Dresden Station Control Room *Elon Station Control Boon j Dresden Onsite TSC Eion Onsite TSC
' Corporate ca====d Center Corporate Command Center System Power Dispatcher
- System Power Dispatcher Dresden Nearsite EF Iion Nearsite EF Grundy County Sheriff I. eke, County Sheriff Grundy County EDC Elon City Police Department Will County EDC *Eenosha County Sheriff (WI)
- Wisconsin Division.of Emergency i /
Government
- Wisconsin State Warning Center at Maukesha Dial Code 23 Dial Code 25 I Hinois Emergency Services IHinois Emergency Services ~& .
& Disaster Agency Disaster Agency Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety Illinois Department of Nuclear Ssfety l Quad Cities Station control Room LaSalle Station Control Roca Quad Cities Onsite TSC LaSalle Onsite TSC Corporate Coemand Center Corporate Command Center.
System Power Dispatcher . System Power Dispatcher , Quad Cities Nearsite EDF LaSalle Nearsite EF Iowa State EDC (Des Moines) LaSalle County Sheriff Rock Island ESDA Grundy County Sheriff Rock Island Communications Center Grundy County EDC Scott County Sheriff (Iowa) Clinton County EDC (Iowa) Whiteside County Sheriff Whiteside County EDC Dial Code 33 Dial Code 35 Illinois Emergency Services & IHinois Emergency Services & Disaster Agency Disaster Agency Iowa State EDC (Des Moines) Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government
- Extension of National Narning System (MANAS) is available.
7-7
Novcabar 1981 Revision 3 1 FIGURE 7.2-2 COMMUNICATIONS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL ONSITE yJ q CONTROL OSC V ROOM SHIFT k G ONSITE TSC g ENGINEER.'S 0FFICE @ t CORPORATE NEARSITE m EOF f P,
@ COMMAND (
CENTER h j kTelephonelinebetweentheOnsiteOSCandControlRoom. Color coding of this system is at the discretion of each nuclear station. Telephone line between the Control Room and Onsite TSC. Color coding of this system is at the discretion of each nuclear station. k Microwave voice channel between the Corporate Command Center and the Nearsite EOF, Shift Engineer's Office, and the Onsite TSC. Phone receivers are color-coded gray,. , Telephone line between the Nearsite EOF, Corporate Command Center, and Onsite TSC. Phone receivers are color-coded yellow. l @ Phone receiver
- At the discretion of each nuclear station, the gray phone for the Shift Engineer's Office may be placed in the Control Room.
7-8
November 1981 Revision 3 l FIGURE 7.2-3 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT COMMUNICATIONS CONTRgL ROOM p8 g ONSITE TSC 4 NEARSITE EOF g CORPORATE CMD _ CENTER , j (P)A ! GSEP ENVIRONS m MS i h ILLINDI DEPARTMENT F NUC MOBILE SAFETY
' UNITS REAC I
h Microwave radio link between the Corporate Comutand Center, Onsite TSC, Control Room, Nearsite EOF, GSEP environs teams, and mobile units. d Telephone line between the Corporate Command Center Phone and are receivers the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety. color-coded black. (Q Radio / console unit l @ Handi-talkie (153.590 MHz)
@ Radio (153.590 MHz)
@ Phone receiver
- At'the discretion of each nuclear station, the radio console for the Control Room may be placed in the Shift Engineer's Office. .
7-9
mNis Pa1 FIGURE 7.2-4
- NRC COMMUNICATIONS ,
i NRC 7 , HPN INS 5TATION CONTROL RADIATION ROOM PROTECTION OFFICE NEARSITE ', Q EOF h j
-c m'" e-ENS: Emergency Notification System; phone receivers are color-coded red.
t HPN: Health Physics Network; phone receiver colors vary from station to station.
@ Phone receiver The exact configuration of the above systems may vary from one nuclear station to another. Installation and use of the NRC phones are under the direction of the NRC.
7-10
November, 1981 Revision 3 l 7.3 Assessment Facilities 7.3.1 Onsite Systems, Instrumentation, and Eauipment Each nuclear station is equipped with instrumentation for seismic monitoring, radiation monitoring, fire protection, and meteorological monitoring. The actual instrumentation varies somewhat from site to site and thus will not be described in this generic plan. Descriptions of the above equipment will appear in each site specific annex. With regard to Commonwealth Edison's meteorological monitoring program, there has been a quality assurance program since 1976. The program was adopted from 10CFR50, Appendix B. However, cince the meteorological facilities are not composed of structures,
, systems, and components that prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and are thus not " safety related", not all aspects of 10CFR50, Appendix B apply. Those aspects of quality assurance germane to supplying good meteorological information for a nuclear power station were adopted into the meteorological quality assurance program.
7.3.2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) (will) provide a display of plant parameters from which the safety status of
- operation may be assessed in the Control Room, Onsite TSC, the CCC,
(" and Nearsite EOF for each nuclear station. The primary function of the SPDS is to help operating personnel in the Control Room make quick assessments of plant safety status. Duplication of the SPDS displays in the Onsite TSC, the CCC, and Nearsite EOF will promotta the exchange of information between these facilities and the Control Room and assist management in the decision making process. 7.3.3 Offaite Dose Calculation System (ODCS)* l The Offsite Dose Calculation System (ODCS) is a computer l based method for estimating the environmental impact of unplanned I airborne releases of radioactive material from nuclear stations. I
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The objectives of the Commonwealth ODCS ares o Meet the meteorological criteria of NUREG-0654. o Provide, where possible, redundant independent pathways of data transmission and redundant data processing computers for use in an emergency situation.
- This system will not be fully operable as described until the stations are equipped with supplemental plant process computers.
7-11 y e*-g g-_m--- w. ,--, _ _ , - - - - - - - . - . _ _ _ _ _ - _ , _ __ _ _ _ _ _ -__- - - -,.,---wr
l November, 1981 Revision 3 o Provide quick 'and reasonably accurate estimates of radiation dose to pers::ns living offsite, including preparation of procedures and training of users required to accomplish this assessment. o Provide a method for the meteorological contractor to secure meteorological data for assessment of routine releases and to detect equipment failure quickly.
-Each nuclear station meteorological tower' will be interrogated many times daily by the meteorological contractor to secure the information necessary for preparation of meteorological operating reports and to detect system failures.
Every hour, and more frequently during an accident, a corporate (in Chicago) SYFA computer will poll each meteorological facility to prepare the corporate data file and to check the system in order to maintain the ODCS in a readiness posture. Corporate IBM computers will then store the data for an extended period of time and process the data when refined estimates.of dose are needed. At each nuclear station, two computers with different functional requirements will process the meteorological information. The plant process computer will produce initial - transport and diffusion estimates within 15 minutes following j classification of an incident. The plant SYFA computer will produce refined estimates of dose as a terminal entry system to the corporate IBM. During an accident these four computer syst.eas (plant process, plant SYFA, corporate SYFA, corporate IBM) will provide the various users with timely information required to make decisions. Emergency actions will be performed in the following sequences First - time frames initial one-half hour or so post-accident - the contr'o1 room operator will rely on wind speed and direction and effluent release rate information provided by the plant process computer and these data converted into requisite Emergency Action Levels (EALs) by the Class A computer model. second - 1/2 hour to few hours - the plant will rely on the station-designated 00CS user to analyze the off-site consequences using the corporate IBM computer (Class C model) or plant process computer system (C-Model) . 7-12
, - , , , _ _ _ _ . . - _ _ - _ . . . , . -,r-- =- r
. .o i - November, 1981 Revision 3 third = few hours to duration of accident - a corporate environ-mental group will perform refined estimates of the offsite consequences for the duration of the emergency period using effluent information provided by plant personnel and the corporate IEN Class a model. This corporate group has been formed to support all nuclear stations and will perform its work in Chicago in lieu of having to relocate' to each Nearsite Emergency Operations Facility (EDF) . A data link between the corporate facility and each Nearsite
. EDF will be provided.
The class A model will provide warning to the Control Room operator when the following EALs have been exceeded: for Site Emergency: 2-minut'e average noble gas release rate having projected - offsite dose rate of 50 0 mR/hr and 30-minute average noble gas release rate -having projected offsite dose rate of 50 mR/hr, using worst case meteorology; and for' General' Emergency: 2-minute average noble gas release rate having projected offsite dose' rate of 1000 mR/hr using 15-minute average actual meteorology.- 7.3.4 Nuclear Data Link The Nuclear Data Link (NDL) (will be) a data transmission system designed' to send a specified set of variables from the nuclear station to the NRC Operations Center. The purpose of the system is to provide management personnel at NRC with timely, reliable, and accurate plant system, meteorological, and radiological information. The system will also be available to State and utility personnel. 7.4 ' Protective Facilities and Equipment Each nuclear station has chosen locations to serve as both onsite assembly areas and offsite evacuation assembly areas. The specific locations of these areas are shown in each site specific annex. 7.5 First Aid and Medical Facilities I Each nuclear station maintains onsite first aid supplies and equip-ment necessary for the treatment of contaminated or injured persons. As described in Section 6.5.2 of this plan, no resident' physicians, nurses, or industrial hygienists are on the staff of Commonwealth's generating stations, and as such, medical treatment given to injured persons is of a "first ald" nature. When more professional care is needed, injured per-sons are transported to a local clinic or hospital. Hospital facilities are discussed in Section 6.5.4 of this plan. 7-13
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November,1981 Revision 3 ' l 7.6 Damage Control Equipment and Supplies I l l The onsite storeroom of each nuclear station maintains a supply of parts and equipment for normal plant maintenance. These parts, supplies, and equipment are available fer damage control use as necessary. When'an emergency condition exists at one station, additional supplies can be obtained from other stations and from Division resources upon request. 7.7 Facilities and Equipment for Offsite Monitoring Commonwealth Edison has contracted with a company (currently Basleton Environmental Sciences Corperation) to conduct an extensive offsite environmental monitoring program to provide data on measurable levels of radiation and radioactive materials in the envitons. The program includes: fixed continuous air samplars; routine sampling of river watert routine sampling of milk; routine sampling of fishr and a fixed Tr.D monitoring network. The TLD program consists of the following elements at each nuclear station l o A nearsite ring of dosimeters covering the 16 meteorological ! sectors. l o A 16 sector ring of dosimeters placed in a some about 5 miles from the plant.
.J o TLDs placed at each of the normal fixed air sampler locations (typically about 8-15 air samplers per nuclear station).
Each nuclear station maintains a supply of emergency equipment and supplies which may be used for offsite monitoring. The actual equipment may vary somewhat form site to site and thus the specific listing of equipment appears in Station anergency Plan Isplementing Procedures. Table 7.7-1 specifies mini === requirements for each nuclear station. Sufficient supplies of emergency equipment should be maintained in order to meet the initial requirements of two environmental sampling teams that would be dispatched for declared emergencies that involve releases of , radioactive material to the environment. During subsequent phases of an emergency, equipment would be available from other Commonwealth Edison nuclear stations, vendors, and offsite response organizations. I O 7-14 l
l November, 1981 Revision 3 TABLE 7.7-1 MINIM 26 REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFSITE
. EMERGENCY MONITORING EQUIPMENT FOR EACE NUCLEAR STATION EQUIPMENT QUANTITISS*
A. InstrumentKg
- 1. High range cutie-pie ion chamber (at least up to 50 R/hr)
- 2. GM survey meter (Beta-gamma) capable of measaring ( 0.2 mR/ar
- 3. Sample counting equipment capable of measuring radio-iodine concentrations in air in the plume exposure EPs as low as 1 X 10E-07 uCi/cc under field conditions
- 4. Dosimetry o Film or TLD Badges o 0-200 mR self-reading dosimeters o High range self-reading dosimeters 2 50 R o Dosimeter charger
- 5. Instrument check sources
- 6. Air Sampling Equipments o Portable air sampler operated either with battery or portable generator o Filters for air sampler o Ag teolite Cartridges o Tripod (or equivalent) for air sampier .
B. Protective Clothine-
- 1. Coveralls (various sizes)
- 2. Gloves
- 3. Head coverings
- 4. Shoe Covers
- 5. Plastic Suits
- 6. Boots
- 7. Full face respirators with combination filter / charcoal cartridges
- Actual quantities of listed items are lef t to the discretion of each nuclear station.
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November, 1981 Revision 3 s TABLE 7.7-1 (CONT) EQUIPMiff QUANTITIES
- C. Communications Equipment
- 1. Bandi-talkies on freque.ncy of 153.590 Mz with scramble capability. Note: These radios are probably not to be stored with the rest of the equipment listed in this table.
D. Sample Collection Kit
- 1. Plastic Bags (various sizes)
- 2. Plastic Bottles (various sizes)
- 3. Masking Tape and Labels
- 4. Marking Pencil or Pen E. Miscellaneous Supplies
- 1. Spare Batteries
- 2. Radiation Signs, Radiation Rope or Ribbon
- 3. Eigh Intensity Flashlights or Lanterns
- 4. Smears Pads
- 5. Shovel
- 6. Flares ;
- 7. Pocketknife .)
- 8. Ladder
- 9. Set of keys to Environs Stations
- 10. Screwdriver (Plain and Phillips)
- 11. Scissors
- 12. Teri Towels (or equivalent)
- 13. Stopwatch F. Data Reference Kit *
- 1. Environmental Emergency Procedures (EG Series Procedures)
- 2. Emergency Log Book (for rC"itril team activities)
- 3. Packet containing site sa4 oya maps, note pad, pencils or pens
- 4. Forms for recordinf t m wer- M and/or dosimeter readings l 5. Instrument Manuals G. First Aid Eit l
- l Actual quantitie9 of listed ' items are left to the discretion of each nuclear station.
7-16
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November, 1981 Revision 3 8.0 MAINFAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 8.1 Organizational Preparedness l 8.1.1 Division Vice-President, Nuclear Stations The Division Vice-President, Nuclear Stations has overall responsibility for radiological emergency response planning within Commonwealth Edison. This individual is also the primary designated Recovery Group Manager. A staff assigned to the Division Vice-President, Nuclear Stations has the responsibility for development and updating of the GSEP and coordination of the GSEP with otner response organiza-tions. This staff is headed by the Supervisor of Radioecology and Emergency Planning. . All personnel designaud as directors in . the GSEP organi-zation shall be appointed by the Division Vice President, Nuclear Stations and documented by inclusion in the GSEP telephone directory listing of positions and personnel. 8.1.2 Station Superintendent The Station Superintendent (or a designated alternate) has the responsibility to contact agencies with which the Station desires agreements for support during an emergency. This contact will include: I
- 1) An annual written invitation for members of these organi-sations to visit the station, discuss the emergency plan, and familiarise themselves with plant facilities;
- 2) Annual written offer by the nucleare stations to provide f radiological training or retraining to members 'of these l organizations with respect to their role in the emergency plan (also see Section 8.2) and
- 3) Once every two years, a request for written confirmation of the availability of assistance from each supporting organization. Letters of agreement will be referenced in the site specific annex and the actual letters will be maintained on file at each station respectively. Letters of agreement shall, as a minimum, state that the cooperating agency will provide their normal services in support of an emergency at the affected station.
8-1 l l
November, 1981 Revision 3 ' The Station Superintendent has the following additional responsibilities:
- 1) Ensure the operational readiness of station communication systans for use during an emergency;
- 2) Ensure the operational readiness of emergency equipment and suppliest and
- 3) Ensure that Station EPIPs age reviewed annually.
8.1.3 Medical Director The Commonwealth Medical Director is responsible for obtaining, in accordance with Section 6.5.4, agreements for the services of physicians or clinics, and medical consultants specifically skilled in the medical aspects of radiation accidents and other medical consultants as might be necessary for the case of a person involved in a radiation incident. The Medical Director is responsible for maintaining a supply of thyroid blocking agents within the company and for establishing policy for its use. 8.2 Training ', J The proficiency of emergency personnel (as defined in Section 2.0) is ensured by the following means:
- 1) Assigning persons to emergency duties which are similar to those performed as a part of their regular work assignment;
- 2) The initial and annual retraining of emergency personnel on applicable generic and site specific portions of the GSEP and corresponding Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures; and 3 Participation in exercises and drills designed to sharpen those skills in which they are expected to use during a radiological emergency.
The training program for emergency personnel allows each member to meet the following objectives: o Know the objectives of the GSEP; o Understand the graded emergency classification system; o Display an adequate knowledge of personal responsibilities and duties as listed in the GSEP and EPIPs; 8-2
November, 1981 Revision 3 o Know the persons with whom they may interface while performing GSEP functions; and , , o Display a functional . knowledge of the documents (e.g. , procedures) necessary to fulfill their role in the GSEP. The Commonwealth Production Training Department has the responsi-bility of ensuring that Commonwealth emergency personnel receive all necessary training and retraining. In order to carry out this responsi-bility, the Supervisor of Radioecology and Beergency Planning will notify the Production Training Department whenever new personnel are assigned GSEP related positions. The Production Training Department shall ensure that appropriate training sessions are scheduled and given. It shall also maintain records of all emergency personnel trained. Station personnel not specifically assigned to GSEP positions shall be provided with an annual review of the GSEP by the Station training
- staff.
Commonwealth shall make an annual written offer to train those non-Commonwealth organisations referenced in the GSEP which will provide specialised services during a radiological emergency (e.g., fire-fighting, medical services, transport of injured, etc.). This training shall acquaint the participants with the special problems potentially encountered during a radiological emergency, notification procedures, and
- t. heir expected roles. Those organizations who must enter the site shall also receive training in site access procedures and the identity (by position and title) of those persons in the onsite organization who will control their support activities.
Commonwealth Edison shall -offer programs (at least annually) to acquaint news media with the GSEP, information concerning radiation, and . points of contact for release of public information in an emergency. 8.3 Exercises and Drills 8.3.1 Exercises The Division Vice-President, Nuclear Stations, shall ensure that at.nual exercises are conducted at each nuclear station in order to test the adequacy of timing and content of implementing pro-cedures and methods; to test emergency equipment and communication networks; and to ensure that emergency personnel are familiar with their duties. Both full-scale and small-scale exercises are to be conducted and shall be scheduled as follows: 8-3
4 November, 1981 ; Revision 3 ' o Full-scale exercises which test as much of the GSEP and State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be scheduled in order to permit agencies to fulfill their full-scale exercise frequency requirements as listed belowi States with jurisdiction in the plume exposure EPE of a nuclear station-at least once every five years at each nuclear station and at least one full-scale exercise per year (somewhere). States with jurisdiction in the ingestion exposure EPE of a nuclear station--at least once every three years (somewhere). Federal emergency response agencies--at least once every five years at each nuclear station. o small-scale exercises which test the adequacy of communication links, establish that emergency response agencies understand the concept of emergency action levels, and test at least one .other component of the offsite emergency response plan shall be conducted at each nuclear station each year that a full-scale exercise is not conducted. 3' A written scenario shall be prepared for each annual exercise. This scenario shall include:
- 1) The basic objective of the exerciser
- 2) The dates, time period, places, and participating organizations:
- 3) The simulated eventst
- 4) The time schedule of real and simulated initiating events; ~
- 5) A narrative summary describing the conduct of the exercise to include such things as simulated casualties, l rescue of personnel, deployment of radiological moni-toring teams, and public information activities; and l
- 6) Arrangements for qualified observers.
Once every six years, an exercise should be scheduled between the hours of 6:00 PM and midnight, and another between midnight and 6:00 AM. l ' l ! 8-4 1
November, 1981 Revision 3 A critique shall be conducted as soon as practical after each exercise. The critique win evaluate the ability of the GSEP organisation to respond to a simulated emergency situation as called for in the GSEP. 8.3.2 Drills 8.3.2.1 Communications Drills The GSEP communications systems outlined in Section 7.2 of this plan shall be tested annually. The capability to notify the Illinois ESDA, the Iowa Office of Disaster Services (for Quad Cities Station) , the Nisconsin Division of Emergency Government (for Zion Station) , and appropriate local agencies shall be deoonstrated at least monthly. The capability to notify the NRC from the Control Room, Onsite TSC and Nearsite EOF shall be demonstrated at least monthly. The capability to notify Federal emergency response organisations shall be demonstrated from ,the Commonwealth
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corporate office at least quarterly. 8.3.2.2 Fire Drills Fire drills shall be conducted at each nuclear station in accordance with Station Technical Specifications
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and/or Station procedures.
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8.3.2.3 Environmental Monitoring Drills . Plant environs and radiolog.ical monitoring drills ? shall be conducted annually. These drills shall include-collection and analysis of sample media such as water, grass, soil, and air. - 8.3.2.4 Health Physics Drills t Health. Physics Drills shall be conducted semi--
. annually. These drills will include response to, and analysis of, simulated airborne and liquid samples within the.
plant. At least annually, these drills shall include a test of post-accident sampling systems. 8.3.2.5 Medical Emergency Drills A medical emergency drill, involving a simulated contaminated individual, which contains , provisions . - f.or participation by local support services agencies (i.e., ambulance and offsite support hospital) shall be .. conducted annually at each nuclear station. .The offsite portions of the medical drill may be performed as part of the required annual exercise. . 8-5
'% e November, 1981 s Revision 3 8.3.2.6 Assemb1v and Accountability Drins An assembly and accountability drin shall be conducted annually. ' The drill shall include identifying the locations of all individuals within the protected area af ter en assembly is announced.
8.3.2.7 Operator's Response Drill I l A drill shall be conducted annually to observe the operator's response t; a reactor problem scenario. The drill shall be for Edison involvement only and may or may not be concurrent' with the GSEP exercise. 8.3.2.8 Offshift Amtation Drill Bach station shall initiate an unannounces offshift notification drill at least every six months. These drills win involve implementation of the individual station's notification peccedure and documentation of the times at which persons are notified. This drin will serve to demonstrate the capability to augment the onshift staff in a I short period after. declaration of an emergency. 8.4 Public Education and Information Commonwealth Edison is committed to distribute informational brochures on an annual basis. This becchus= will be distributed to the public residing within the ten mile plume exposure EFE and will address how they will be notified and what their ac.tions should be in an emergency. , The public information brochure will include the fonowing infor-motions what to do if a take-shelter request is given, what to do if an evacuation request is given, educational information concerning radiation i and respiratory protection, a map of major evacuation routes, a list of communities likely to serve as host shelter areas, and instructions on how to obtain additional information, especially for the disabled or their caretakers and those without transportation. The public information brochure described above will be mailed to all residents in the plume exposure EPs of each nuclear station and will also be provided to city halls, gas stations, state parks, campgrounds, and other areas where a transient population may obtain a copy. 4.5 Review and Updati m of the G*** and Corre W ina EPIPs To ensure that the GSEP and the corresponding Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures are kept current and that updated copies are maintained by an persons assigned GSEP manuals, Commonwealth's Supervisor of Radioecolcgy and Emergency Planning will ensure the following: 8-6
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1 l i l I November, 1981 Revision 3 l
- 1) Each GSEP manual shan be assigned a serial number;
- 2) An assignment record shall be maintained of a n GSEP manuals;
- 3) GSEP manuals win be distributed on a controlled basis to all individuals requiring them, including directors of GSEP positions and all appropriate Pederal, State, and local agencies
- 4) The GSEP shall be reviewed and updated as needed; the GSEP
( win be certified (recorded) as current on an annual basier
- 5) Proposed changes to the GSEP shall be approved by Onsite and Offsite Review. This does not include the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) , telephone directory, or personnel assignmentar
- 6) All persons in possession of an authorised GSEP manual shan receive authorised changes. Revised pages of the CSEP shall be dated and marked to show where changes have been made;
- 7) ' Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures shall be developed consistent with the GSEP (see Section 9.2) and reviewed at least annuaHy. (Station Superintendents shall ensure that this review is conducted for Station EPIPs)
- 8) Names and phone numbers of the GSEP organization and support personnel shall be reviewed and updated at least quarterly;
- 9) Nbenever exercises and/or drills indicate deficiencies in the GSEP or corresponding EPIPs, such documents will be revised as necessary to ensure corrective action.
An independent audit of the GSEP shan be conducted on an annual basis by the commonwealth Quality Assurance Department. Actions shall be taken for evaluation and correction of all audit findings. 8.6 Emergency Equipment and Supplies various types of emergency equipment and supplies are maintained. This plan specified items that must be kept in the Onsite Tsc and the Onsite OSC. This plan also specifies equipment to be maintained for offsite emergency monitoring (storage location may vary) . The opera-tional readiness of these and other supplies is ensured by quarterly inventory and inspection required by each Station's procedures and their use during the required drills and exercises. 8-7
s . November, IM 1 Revision 3 m I e (Blank) , M i l l l 8-8 -
< s November, 1981 Revision 3 9.0 APPENDIX 9.1 Required Content of Fite Specific Annex The Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) consists of two parts, a generic plan and a site specific annex for 'e ach nuclear station. The site specific annes shall be developed by the respective nuclear station and shall contain information and guidance which is unique (site spec-ific) to the station. The annex becomes part of the plan and is subject to the same review and audit requirements as the generic plan.
9.1.1 Annez Pormat and General Content The annex format shall conform to the format used in the generic plan. Information that is in the generic plan need not be restated in the annex; however, it may be. desirable to do so in some cases in the interest of continuity and clarification. The annex shall address how (means, methods, resources) the requirements and responsibilities set forth in the generic plan are to be satisfied. 9.1.2 Annez Content (Specific) References have been made throughout the generic plan that additional information shall be in the site specific annex. Some areas require little additional information while other areas re-quire significant input. As a minimum, site specific annexes shall address the areas described in the following an h tions. 9.1.2.1 Introduction Define the unit, station and surrounding area (in-clude maps, drawings and/or diagrams) and address "in a summary statement the annex's interface with the generic GSEP and Station procedures. Include a map or table that indicates the population distribution around the nuclear station. 9.1.2.2 Definitions Provide definitions and/or abbreviations for terms used in the annex which are unique or have a meaning or connotation that differs from normally accepted usage. 9.1.2.3 Summary of Emergency Plan Address in a summary statement the participating status of state and local authority with regard to increasing severity of emergency classifications. 9-1
, s ,
November, 1981 s Revision 3 9.1.2.4 organizational control of Emergencies o Specify organization and manning for both day and night crews (to include health physics
. organization).
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o Address the Station's commitment to augment the onsite emergency organization following declared GSEP emergencies. o Specify the agencies with which the Station has agreements for support during an emergency. ' 9.1.2.5 Classification of Emergency Conditions Include a table of EALs for all emergency classes. 9.1.2.6 Emeresney Measures o Address provisions for the classif ;ation and declaration of an emergency from the control rm. Specify the line of authority and responsibility for emergency classification and for contacting State and local authorities (of- . ficials) who have the responsibility for taking j protective actions in the interest of the ' public. Also specify who has authority and responsibility for recommending to state and local authority the protective actions to be taken, to include recommending ev.tcuation. o Describe the means (methods) of State and local governments in notifying che public of an emergency condition and of the protective actions to be taken during an emergency. o Include a table and/or map indicating evacuation time estimates for members of the public. o Include a map indicating the lo .ation of onsite assembly areas, o Include map indicating site evacuation routes and address site personnel relocation and ac-countability and monitoring of site evacuees. Also address roadway / traffic control measures of roads under the control of the station. o Include a plot of Containment Activity versus Radiation Level for the four points described in Section 6.2.4 of the generic GSEP. 9-2
l November, 1981 ' Revision 3 v.l.2.7 Emergency Facilities and Equipment o Include "as built diagrams" and descriptions of l the Station Control Room, the Onsite Technical Support Center, onsite Operational support Center, and the Nearsite Emergency Operations Facility.* o Include a description of the StaLion seismic l instrumentation, radiation monitoring equipment, l fire protection equipment, and meteorological l instrumentation, o specify location of offsite fixed radiation environmental monitors including the rings of TLDs. o Describe the capability and resources available to categorize accidents, including provisions for a) Detection of inadequate core cooling; b) Monitoring of the high level radiation readig in the containment; c) Post-t xident sampling; and d) Nonitoring of in-plant iodine. o Specify the onsite dedicated comunications to be established and maintained during an emergency. 9.1.2.8 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness o Address the Station requirements to provide training of emergency personnel. o Describe the means (methods) of ensuring that local agencies, media, general public (including transient populations) are provided educational
,information concerning planning in their behalf.
9.2 _ Required content of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) that are necessary for implementation of this plan shall be. developed and updated as described in Section 8.5. The content and format of the EPIPs shall be in accordance with this plan and guidelines issued by the Division Vice-President,' Nuclear Stat' ions.
- This information will be provided in a later revision of the CSEP site specific arinexes.
l 9-3 l l l
w ., November, 1981 Revision 3 j The lead person assigned to each GSEP position is responsible for i preparing an EPIP (or EPIPs) that provides information applicable to his duties and responsibilities. i The Station Superintendent is responsible for ensuring that EPIPs are developed which e.ddress the following subject areas:
- 1) Notification procedures using call lists to notffy offsite authorities and to mobilize station personnel for all -usergency conditions;
- 2) Emergency classification through the 'use of Emergency Action Levelar
- 3) Calculation procedures that provide a brief and relatively simple method of determining offsite doses from plant releases;
- 4) Radiological survey procedures for emergency surveys in the plant and for onsite areas;
- 5) Corrective actions aimed at correcting the emergency situation at or near the source of the problem (e.g., firefighting);
- 6) Personnel monitoring and decontamination procedures for individuals leaving restricted areas or other areas known or s.
suspected of being contaminated; '
- 7) Evacuation procedures for onsite areass
- 8) Methods of personnel accountability that ensure all individuals within the site are warned of imminent threats or hazardous conditions;
- 9) Methods and instuctions for receiving, transporting, and "
handling injured persons and providing onsite first aid and offsite medical treatment:
- 10) Assignments of responsibility and access control for onsite emergency control centers;
- 11) Operation and use of onsite emergency cosumunication systems
{ l ! 12) Inventory and operational readir:ess of emergency equipment and
- supplies; and I
- 13) GSEP organization and support agency phone numbers.
Information to be addressed in Station EPIPs may be fulfilled by other station procedures, but those procedures shall be referenced within the context of the EPIPs. i 9-4
November, 1981 Revision 3 The supervisor of Radioecology and Emergency Planning is responsible for ensuring that EPIPs are developed which address the following subject areas: C
- 1) Notification procedures using call lists to notify corporate management, offsite GZ3P organization personnel, State authorities, and offsite emergency response organizations;
- 2) Detailed procedures for determining projected and actual doses to members of the public following a release of radioactive material from a nuclear station;
- 3) Detailed procedures for radiological surveys in the environs;
- 4) operation ar.d use of offsite emergency communications;
- 5) Assignments of responsibility and access control for offsite emergency control centers;
- 6) Methods of disseminating information to the media and the general public;
- 7) Procedures that address the exercise and drill program;
/ 8) Procedures that address the recovery of a nuclear station to a pre-accident status, including reentry into previously evacuated arease decontamination of the affected site, repair of critical PAant equipment, and disposal of contaminated equipment and waste. It is not practical to plan detailed recovery actions for all conceivable situations in advance, but procedures that include at least initial planning considerations should be developed. Detailed procedures shall be developed after an emergency situation occurs as :.ecessary; and
- 9) GSEP organization and support agency rAxme numbers.
9-5
+ .,
i l November, 1981 s Revision 3 9.3 Additianal Emergency Response / Notification Requirements Tne Generating Stations Emergency Plan is a plan written primarily to comply with the requirements of 10CFR50, Paragraph 50.47 and Appendix l E. As such, GSEP ' addresses emergency conditions as defined in NUREG 0654. On the basis,of other regulatory requirements, additional emergency conditions and required notifications have been defined. These regulations are listed below and define emergency conditions that 3 or may not warrant an emergency declaration under the GSEP in accordance with Section 5.0 of this plan
- 1) 10CFRS).70, " Inspections, Records, Reports, Notifications".
- 2) 10CFR73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials".
- 3) 33CFR153, " Control of Pollution by Oil and Hazardous Substances."
- 4) 10CFR20.403 and State of Illinois Rules and Regulations for Protection against Radiation, Section D.403, " Incident Notifi-cation Requirements."
The following sections summarise the actions required in accordance with the above rules and regulations. i 9.3.1 Notifications of NBC Operations Center # An on-duty Station management person shall notify the NRC operations Center as soon as possible and in all cases within one hour by telephone of the occurrence of any of the following signifi-cant events and shall identify that event as being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72
- 1) Any event requiring an emergency declaration as per Sec-tion 5.0 of the GSEP.*
- 2) The exceeding of any Technical Specification Safety Limit.*
.3) Any event that results in the nuclear power plant not being in a controlled or expected condition while operating or shut down.*
- 4) Any act that threatens the safety of the nuclear power plant or site personnel, or the security of special nuclear material, including instances of sabotage or attempted sabotage.*
With respect to the events reported under subparagraphs 1), 2) , 3), and 4) above, in addition to prompt telephone notification, the Station shall also establish and maintain an open, continuous , communication channel with the NRC Operations Center, and shall close this channel only when notified by the NRC. 9-6 \ ..-_-_,-N-,--------------
November, 1981 Revision 3
- 5) Any event requiring initiation of shutdown of the nuclear power plant in accordance with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for operation.
- 6) Personnel error or procedural inadequacy which, .iuring normal operations, anticipated operational occurrences,
, or accident conditions, prevents or could prevent, by itself, the fulfillment of the safety function of those structures, systems, and components important to safety that are needed to (i) shut down the reactor safely and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (ii) remove residual heat following reactor shutdown, or (iii) limit the release of radioactive material to acceptable levels or reduce the potential for such release.
- 7) Any event resulting in manual or automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features, including the Reactor Pro-tection System.
- 8) Any accidental, unplanned, or uncontrolled radioactive release. (Normal or expected releases from maintenance or other operational activities are not included.)
, 9) Any fatality or serious injury occurring on the site and requiring transport to an offsite medical facility for treatment.
- 10) Any serious personnel radioactive contamination requiring extensive onsite decontamination or outside assistance.
- 11) Any event meeting the criteria cf 10CFR 20.403' for notification. (Refer to Section 9.3.4).
- 12) Strikes of operating employees or security gunds, or honoring of picket lines by these employees.
~.
6 9-7
+
i November, 1981 s Revision 3 l 9.3.2 Nuclear Station Security Plan Each nuclear station shall have a Security Plan that complies with tLa requirements of 10CFR73. The interface between the GSEP and the Nuclear Station Security Plan is basically one of parallel operation. The plans are compatible. The GSEP emergency response measures, once initiated, are executed in parallel with measures taken in accordance with the Station Security Plan. The Nuclear Station Security Plan, Appendix C, Contingency Events, identifies situations which could be initiatiag conditions for GSEP response measures. Contingency events include bomb threats, attack threats, civil disturbances, protected area intrusions, loss of guard / post contact, vital area intrusions, bomb devices discovered, loss of guard force, hostages, extortion, fire / explosions, internal disturbances, security communications failure, and obvious attempts of sabotage. The Station Security Plan pro-vides guidance for decisions and actions to be taken for each secur-ity contingency event. As guidance, the Security Plan allows for differing responses depending upon the assessment of the actual situation within each contingency event classification. - l The assaessment of any security contingency event and the , decision to initiate, or not to initiate the GSEP will be the l responsibility of the Station Director or the Shif t Engineer acting as the Station Director. All identified security contingency evsnts have the potential of being assessed as initiating conditions for an emergency declarattion under the GSEP. 9.3.3 Control of Pollution by Oil and Hazardous Substances 9.3.3.1 Reportable Discharges of Oil or Hazardous Substances A reportable discharge for the purpose of compliance with 33CFR153 is defined' as the spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying , or dumping into or upon any public water body of: o Oil in such quantities as to cause a film or sheen upon or discoloration of the water or upon adjoining shore-lines; or o Hazardous substances designated in 40CFRll6 in quantities equal to or exceeding in any 24 hotar period the harmful quantities establish in 40 CFR 118. Also, PCB fluid leaks or discharges of greater than one-half gallon or ten pounds are considered as reportable ' incidents. 9-8
November, 1981 Revision 3 i 9.3.3.2 Reporting Procedure l Upon learning of a reportable discharge as described in Section 9.3.3.1 above, the Station Superintendent or an alternate shall immediately notify the Duty officer, National Response Center, U.S. Coast Guard, toll free telephone number 800-424-8802. If notification to the National Response Concer is not possible or practical, notice will be given to each of the following officials in order of priority:
- 1) Designated EPA / Coast Guard On-Scene Coordinator (OSC); and
- 2) Commanding Officer of any Coast Guard unit in
, the vicinity of the discharge; and
- 3) Commander of the Coast Guard district in which the discharge occurs.
In addition, the Station Superintendent or an alternate will notify:
- 1) Th Director of Water Quality, Environmental Affairs; and
- 2) The Division Vice President, Nuclear Stations.
9.3.3.3 Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plans Each generation station shall have a Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) Plan prepared in accora nce with 40CFRll2.7 in order to minimise the potential for oil discharges. No SPCC Plan shall be effective unless it has been reviewed and certified by a Registered i Profossional Engineer. Each SPCC Plan shall be reviewed and evaluated at IJast once ev7ry three years in accordance with 40CFR112.5. ' Upon learning of an oil discharge into a navigable waterway at levels determined to be harmful to the public health or welfare, the United States Coast Guard must be immediately notified as set forth in Section 9.3.3.2. The exact criteria for declaring oil discharges a.nd the subsequent notification procedure shall be defined in the SPCC Plan and/or Station Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. 9-9
I ~ November, 1981-Revision 3 - 9,3.4 Incident Notification Requirements for the NRC Region III Office and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety An on-duty Station management person shall immediately notify the KRC Region III Office and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety by telephone and telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile of any incident involving any source of radiation possessed by the Station and which any have caused or threatens to cause:
- 1) A dose to the whole body of any individual of 25 rems or more of radiations a dose to the skin of the whole body of any individual of 15 rems or more of radiation; or a dose to the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms of any individual of 375 reas or more of radiation; or,
- 2) The release of radioactive material in concentrations which if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 5,000 times the limits specified for such materials in Appendix B Table II of 10CFR20; or,
- 3) A loss of one working week or more of the operation of any facilities affected; or,
- 4) Damage to property in emcess of $200,000.* ,
An on-duty Station management person shall within 2_4, hours notify the NRC Region III Office and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety by tolvphone and telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile of any incident involving any source of radiation possessed by the Station and which may have caused or threatens to cause:
- 1) A dose to the whole body of any individual of 5 rems or more of radiation; a dose to the skin of the whole body of any individual of 30 reas or more of radiations or a dose to the feet, ankles, hands, or forearms of 75 rems or more of radiation; or,
- 2) The release of radioactive material in concentrations which, if averaged over a period of 24 hours, would exceed 20 times the limits specified for such materials in Appendix B, Table II of 10CFR20; or,
- 3) A loss of one day or more of the operation of any facilities affected; or,
- 4) Damage to property in' excess of $2',000.*
*For the State of Illinois, the property damage reporting requirements are
$100,000 and $1,000 for immediate and 24 hour notification, respectively.
'3-10
n.On November, 1981 Revision 3 9.4 References /Succortine Plans .
~
~
References and supporting plans consulted in writing the commonwealth Generating Stations Emergency Plan are listed .in this section. With exception of regulatory requirements, inclusion of material on this list does not imply adherence to all criteria or guidance stated in each individual reference.
- 1) Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 1 Parts 20, 50, 73, and 100.
- 2) Code of Federal Regulations, Title 33, Chapter 1, part 153. '
- 3) Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Chapter 1, Parts 110, 112, 116, and 118.
- 4) Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44, Chapter 1, Part 401.
- 5) Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Chapter 1, Parts 171 and 172.
- 6) h =1th Edison Quality Assurance Manual.
; 7) EPA
- Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents," 1975 (and updated,1979).
- 8) " Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human and Animal Feeds and potassium Iodide as a Thyroid-Blocking Agent in a Radiation Emergency," Federal Register, Vol. - 43, p. 58790, December 15, 1978.
- 9) NUREG 03'96, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," Dec. 1978.
- 10) NUREG 0578, "TNI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Tern Recommendations."
- 11) NUREG 0654, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Padio-logical Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, November, 1980.
- 12) NUREG 0696, " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities."
- 13) " Federal surea2 of Investigation and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation Regarding Threat, Theft, or Sabotage in U.S. Nuclear Industry", Federal Register, Vol. 44, p. 75535, December 20, 1979.
1 N 9-11 l
%0 a ,e November, 1981 Revision 3 '
- 14) NCRP Report No. 55, " Protection of the Thyroid Gland in the Event of Releases of Radioiodine", 1977.
- 15) " Illinois Rules and Regulations for- ' Protection Against Radiation," Section D.403.
- 16) EPA 520/1-78-0015, ~" Protective Action Evaluation, Part 2, Evacuation arid Sheltering as Protective Actions against Nuclear Accidents Involving Gaseous Releases".
- 17) " Commonwealth Edison Offsite Dose Calculation System," system description, dated July, 1980.
- 18) "Draf t Emergency Preparedness INPO Criteria," dated Pobruary 12, 1980.
- 19) ANSI /ANS 3.7.2 - 1979, " Emergency Control Centers for Nuclear Power Plants." -
- 20) ANSI /ANS 3.7.3 - 1979, " Radiological Energency Preparedness Exercises for Nuclear Power Plants."
- 21) " Nuclear Statiert Security Plan" Note: "The Station Security Plan contains industrial security information must be withheld from public disclosure under provisions of 10CPR2.790(d) .
s
- 22) Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA),
December 19, 1980.-
- 23) The Iowa Emergency Plan, March'2, 1981.
1 24) State of Nisconsin Peacetime Radiological Emergency Response Plan, dated July, 1980.
- 25) " Radiological Assistance Plan," Region 5, Department of Energy, August 25, 1978. .
- 26) INPO Beergency Response Plan, Revision 0, dated August 11, 1980.
- 27) NUREG 0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
November, 1980. I
- 28) " Evacuation Time Estimates for Areas Near Nuclear Power Plants -
l Dresden, Quad Cities, Elon, LaSalle County Stations", D.L. Peoples letter to B.E. Grimes, dated March 11, 1980.
- 29) " Voluntary Assistance Agreement' By and Among Electric Utilities Involved in Transportation of Nuclear Materials," dated November 1, 1980.
- 30) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980.
l 31) NUREG 0728 " Report to Congress: NaC Incident Response Plan". 9-12
SYRON STATION EMERGENCY PLAN ANNEX UNtDNTMiiE3 CO)Y 1 1 i i l I I SITE . I O ',__, l %I s
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BYR0H GSEP ANNEX REVISION INDEX PAGE BYA PAGE REVISION BYA PAGE REVISION i 0 6-1 0 6-2 0 1-1 0 6-3 0 1-2 0 6-4 0 1-3 0 6-5 0 1-4 0 6-6 0 1-5 0 6-7 0 1-6 0 6-8 0 1-7 0 6-9 0 1-8 0 1-9 0 7-1 0 7-2 0 2-1 0 7-3 0 7-4 0 3-1 0 7-5 0 7-6 0 4-1 0 7-7 0 4-2 0 7-8 0 4-3 . 0 7-9 0 4-4 0 7-10 0 4-5 0 7-11 0 l 7-12 0 5-1 0 7-13 0 5-2 0 7-14 0 5-3 0 7-15 0 5-4 0 7-16 0 5-5 0 7-17 0 5-6 0 7-18 0 l 5-7 0 7-19 0 l 5-8 0 7-20 0 5-9 0 7-21 0 5-10 0 7-22 0 5-11 0 7-23 0 5-12 0 7-24 0 I 5-13 0 7-25 0 l 5-14 0 7-26 0 7-27 . 0 7-28 0 8-1 0 8-2 0 8-3 0 l l l
i % June, 1982 Revision 0 BYRON STATION EMERGENCY PLAN ANNEX TABLE OF CONTENTS This annex generally follows the same fonnat as the generic section of the GSEP. However, an exact section by section correspondence is not intended. 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Definitions 3.0 Suninary of Emergency Plan 4.0 Organizational Control of Emergencies 4.1 Nomal Plant Organization 4.2 Non-Commonwealth Support Groups 4.3 Coordination with Governmental Agencies 5.0 Classification of Emergency Conditions 6.0 Emergency Meast..es 6.1 Activation of the Emergency Organization 6.2 Assessment Actions l 6.3 Protective Actions for the Offsite Public 6.4 Protective Actions for-0nsite Personnel , 7.0 Emergency Facilities and Equipment l 7.1 Emergency Control Centers 7.2 Consnunications Systems l 7.3 Assessment Facilities 7.4 Protective Facilities and Equipment 7.5 First Aid and Medical Facilities 8.0 Maintaining Emergency Preparedness 8.1 General 8.2 Review and Updating of the Plan and Procedures l
, .. .b June, 1982 Revision 0 B_YRON STATION EMERGENCY PLAN ANNEX
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This Connonwealth Generating Stations Emergency Plan Annex addresses site specific emergency planning for the Byron Nuclear Station. Planning efforts connon to all Consnonwealth nuclear generating stations are encompassed within the generic GFEP. Written station procedures implement the requirements and guidance given in this plan. The Byron Station Emergency Plan Annex is not independent of the generic Commonwealth GSEP. Emergency planning information common to all Commonwealth Nuclear Stations is not necessarily repeated in this annex, but may be in some cases in the interest of continuity and clarification. The content of this annex confonns to Section 9.1 of the generic GSEP. 1.1 Facility Description The Byron Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1 &2 (Byron Station) is located in northern Illinois, approximately 3.7 miles south-southwest of the City of Byron and 2.2 miles _ east of the Rock River, in Ogle County. The site is situated approximately in the center of the county in a predominantly agricultural area. The station site is roughly rectangular in shape, with the plant structures occupying the southeast portion of the site. The
- following coordinates of the centers of the containments in Zone 16 of the Universal Transverse Mercator Coordinate System are given below to the nearest 100 meters. Latitude and longitude are given to the nearest second.
Nuclear Unit Latitude and Longitude UTM Coordinates 1 42 4' 29" N x 89* 16' 55"W 4,661,800 N 310,700 E l 2 42" 4' 32" N x 89* 16' 55"W 4,661,888 N 310,700 E BYA 1-1 j
r
, .1 June, 1982 Revision 0 At its closest approach, the Rock River is approximately 1.5 miles west of the western site boundary and 2.2 miles west-southwest of the . actual plant location.
Byron Station occupies approximatEly 1288 acres of land. This area includes the main site area and the transmission and pipeline corridor to the Rock River. The main site area occupies approximately 904 acres, and the corridor occupies the remaining 384 acres. Figure BYA 1-1 shows the general location of" Byron Station. The plant consists of two identical pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS) and turbine-generators furnished by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Each nuclear steam supply system is designed for a power output of 3425 MWT. The equivalent warranted gross and approximate net electrical outputs of each unit are 1175 MWe and 1120 MWe, respectively. Cooling for the plant is provided by two natural' draft cooling towers for nonessential service cooling water, and by mechanical draft cooling l towers for essential service cooling water. Byron Station has two release points for gaseous radioactive effluents, the two Auxiliary Building ventilation stacks. The top of each stack rises 200 feet above the grade elevation. Byron Station has one release point for liquid radioactive effluents, the Rock River. Liquid radioactive wastes are stored and sampled prior - to release to the Rock River. A radiation monitor in the discharge line will automatically terminate releases if radioactivity levels exceed predetermined values. l i 1 ! BYA 1-2
. .)
June, 1982 Revision 0 1.2 Plant Exclusion Area The Byron Station Exclusion Area as defined in 10 CFR 100 is located entirely within the site boundary, as shown in Figure BYA 1-2. Since Comonwealth Edison owns all properties within the s.ite boundary, it also owns the Exclusion Area and has the authority to determine and control all activities occurring within the Exclusion Area, including removal and exclusion of personnel or property from the site. Commonwealth Edison owns all mineral rights and easements for the Exclusion Area, a= well as for the remainder of the site property. For accident releases, the minimum Exclusion Area Boundary distance is 445 meters, measured from the outer containment wall. 1.3 Low Population Zone (LPZ) The Low Population Zone (LPZ) as defined in 10 CFR 100 is "the area immediately surrounding the Exclusion Area which contains residents, the total number and density of which are such that there is a reasonable probability that appropriate protection measures could be taken in their behalf in the event of a serious accident." The 10 CFR 100.11 also lists numerical criteria to be met by the LPZ, namely that the LPZ is "of'such size that an individual located at any point on its outer boundary who is exposed to the radioactive f cloud resulting from the postulated fission product release (during 1 the entire period of passage) would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to the thyroid from iodine exposure." l BYA 1-3
Jun2, 1982 Revision 0
. The Low Population Zone that was chosen for the Byron Station consists of that area within a 3-mile radius (measured from the midpoint between the two reactors) of the site. The Low Population Zone for the Byron Station is based on dose considerations as delineated in 10 CFR 100 and the population distribution around the station. Figure BYA 1-3 depicts the transportation route and public facilities within the LPZ.
1.4 Population Centers A pcpulation center distance as defined in 10 CFR 100 means the distance from the reactor to the nearest boundary of a densely populated center containing more than 25,000 residents. Additionally, there must be "a population center distance of at least one and one-third times the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the low population zone." The closest such center is Rockford, Illinois. Its nearest boundary is located approximately 15 miles northeast of the reactors, although the city is actually located 17 miles northeast of the plant. Rockford had a 1970 population of 147,370, and a 1980 population of 139,600. Refer to Table BYA 1-1 which lists the population distribution within a fifty mile radius of Byron Station. 1.5 Emergency Planning Zone The plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for Byron l Station shall be an area surrounding the Station with a radius of about ten miles. See Figure BYA 1-1. The ingestion exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for Byron Station shall be an area surrounding the Station with a radius of about 50 miles. See Figure BYA 1-4. BYA 1-4
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. s Jun2, 1982 Revision 0 2.0 DEFINITIONS Terms used in this annex have the same meaning as those provided in Section 2.0 of the generic portion of the Commonwealth GSEP. Abbreviations used in this annex that are site specific are as follows: ANSI - American National Standards Institute ARM - Area Radiation Monitor BNPS - Byron Nuclear Power Station BTR - Boron Thermal Regeneration BYA - Byron Annex CASP - Containment Air Sample Panel CVCS - Chemical Volume and Control System DEG - Division of Emergency Government DNBR - Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio ESF - Engineered Safety Feature FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report HRSS - High Radiation Sampling System HVAC - Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning MSL - Mean Sea Level NFPA - National Fire Protection Association RCC - Rod Cluster Control RMS - Radiation Monitoring System RHR - P.esidual Heat Removal VCT - Volume Control Tank BYA 2-1
1
- . =
June, 1982 Revision 0 3.0
SUMMARY
OF EMERGENCY PLAN The Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) addresses Commonwealth's planning efforts for emergency situations at each of its nuclear generating stations. Both the generic GSEP and this site specific annex were prepared utilizing guidance provided by Regulatory Guide 1.101, Revision 2, and NUREG 0654, Revision 1. The Plan addresses:
- 1) Organizational control of emergencies;
- 2) Classification of emergency conditions;
- 3) Emergency response measures; 4-) Emergency facilities and equipment; and
- 5) Maintaining emergency preparedness.
This GSEP annex provides specific planning information that was deemed inappropriate for inclusion into a generic plan but yet considered necessary for a full understanding and representation of the Station's emergency response capabilities. ; This annex does not specifically address efforts for protecting the public from . the effects of an accident. The State of Illinois has developed an " Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents" and will coordinate implementation of all necessary protective actions for the public in Illinois. The State of Wisconsin will coordinate with the State of Illinois to implement all necessary protective actions for the public in Wisconsin. State emergency responses increase commensurate with the reported emergency. BYA 3-1
[ June, 1982 Revision 0 4.0 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL OF EMERGENCIES The GSEP organization consists of two major groups. Firs t, there is the Station Group, consisting of the directors and their associated staffs. Secondly, there is an offsite GSEP organization. For a full response situation, this group consists of twenty-six directors and staff 1 personnel. A detailed description of the total GSEP organization appet.rs in Section 4.0 of the generic GSEP. The purpose of this section is to provide specific information with regard to the Byron Station organization and governmental support agencies. 4.1 Nonnal Plant Organization The normal plant organization is basically the same for all Commonwealth nuclear stations. (Refer to Section 4.1 of the generic plan.) 4.1.1 Station Superintendent Byron Station is managed by a Station Superintendent who is responsible for direct management of the station including industrial relations, planning, coordination and direction of the operation, r.aintenance, refueling, and technical activities. During an emergency condition, the Station Superintendent is normally the GSEP Station Director. His specific responsibilities and duties are l o"tlined in Table 4.2-1 of the generic GSEP. Those responsibilities of the Station Director that may not be l delegated are as follows: BYA 4-1
June', 1982 Revision 0
- 1) Declaration that an Unusual Event, Alert; Site Emergency, or General Emergency Condition exists.
General categorization of emergencies may be done by other plant personnel in accordance with approved Station procedures. But the final decision to declare the emergency condition rests with the Station Director; and
- 2) Decision to notify and recommend protective actions to offsite authorities in the case where a Site Emergency or General Emergency condition exists and i
the Recovery Manager or Corporate Command Center Director have not been contacted or are not prepared to make an informed decision. In all other cases, the decision to notify and reconnend protective actions to offsite authorities shall be made by the Recovery Manager or Corporate Connand Center Director. This responsibility may not be delegated. Actual notification and transmittal of these recommendations may be delegated. 4.1.2 Shift Engineer The Shift Engineer on duty is responsible for operating the plant in compliance with the station operating license and procedures, During his shift, the Shift Engineer is in charge of operating the entire plant in a safe and reliable condition. A Shift Engineer is en duty 24 hours a day and is normally the initial GSEP Station Group Director and as such has the authority for declaring an emtrgency and reconinending protective actions to local authorities. l 4.1.3 Cualifications Of Plant Personnel The guidelines of ANSI N18.1-1971 are generally followed by Byron Station management for personnel selection and training. For some positions, alternate qualifications are utilized based upon operating experience. l BYA 4-2
June, 1982 Revision 0 4.1.4 Contractor Perfonnance Ultimate responsibility for contractor performance from support contractors rests with the Station Superintendent. 4.1.5 Minimum Shift Manning The minimum staffing required at Byron Station is the same as is required at other Commonwealth two-unit nuclear stations. Refer to Figure 4.2-2 of the generic GSEP. 4.1.6 Health Physics Organization The Station Rad / Chem Supervisor is responsible for the health physics program and for handling and monitoring of radioactive materials. Nonnally reporting to the Rad / Chem Supervisor are health physicists, chemists, foremen, and technicians. During an emergency situation, the Rad / Chem l Supervisor nonnally acts as the GSEP Rad / Chem Director. 4.1.7 Augmentation of Plant Staffing During An Emergency Byron Station is committed to augment its onsite l organization under emergency conditions. The Station uses, as guidance, Figure 4.2-3 of the generic GSEP in planning for its augmentation of plant staffing during an i emergency. To facilitate the augmentation of plant staffing, Byron Station has established a 24 hour. duty-call individual who would be notified first after a station emergency is declared. This individual would initiate a prioritized notification (call-list) procedure. BYA 4-3
June, 1982 Revision 0 4.2 Non-Comonwealth Support Groups Agreements exist on file at Byron Station with several support agencies. These agencies and their support roles are ellows:
- 1) The Ogle County Sheriff's Office ! v' rvices of law enforcement.
- 2) Byron Fire and Rescue pro' e protection and ambulance services.
- 3) Rockford Memorial Hosp rord will serve as the supporting medical fac. .aNPS .
I 4) The Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) on the l State, County, and municipal levels will implement protective actions for the public. Note: The agreement with the Illinois ESDA pledges the support of all State of Illinois agencies that have a role in the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents.
- 5) The Department of Energy, Chicago Operations Office, will respond to requests for radiological assistance. This assistance will normally be limited to advice and emergency action essential for the control of the immediate hazards to health and safety.
- 6) Electric Utilities Involved in Transportation of Nuclear Materials (INPO) provide voluntary assistance in l mitigating the consequences of nuclear transportation i accidents.
Additionally, Commonwealth Edison Company has contractural . agreements with several companies whose services would be available l in the event of en emergency. These agencies and their available services are as follows:
- 1) Hazelton Environmental Sciences Corporation provides environmental radiological monitoring services and radiochemical analysis.
l 2) Radiation Management Corporation provides services of I medical and health physics support.
- 3) Murray & Trettel, Inc. provides meteorological monitoring services.
- 4) Landauer, Inc. provides personnel dosimetry se vices.
l BYA 4-4
r June, 1982 Revision 0 4.3 Coordination with Governmental Agencies As stated in the generic plan, the State of Illincis has the statutory responsibility and authority for protecting the health and safety of the public in Illinois. Within the State of Illinois authority is delegated as follows:
- 1) The Governor has overall offsite coninand authority for the l protectio;. of the public.
- 2) The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) exercises consnand and coordination and has programmatic responsibility for the implementation of protective actions as recommended for the public by the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS) and the Governor.
- 3) The Department of Nuclear Safety has both the command authority for radiological aspects of a nuclear acciaent and the responsibility for perfoming various radiological functions. During an accident situation, the IDNS will make protective action reconsnendations to the Governor and the Illinois ESDA.
The State of Illinois will develop an annex to its State plan which specifically addresses protective action for the Illinois portion of the Byron Station Emergency Planning Zones. l The State of Wisconsin is a contiguous state affected by the Byron Station Ingestion Pathway Emergency Planning Zone. Within the State of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government will coordinate and provide liaison with the Illinois ESDA and supporting Federal agencies to ensure effective responses and aid in i emergencies involving Byron Station which affect Wisconsin.
, BYA 4-5 l ___
June, 1982 Revision 0 5.0 CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS The generic section of the GSEP provides for classification of l emergencies into five (5) categories. The first category, Transportation Accident, concerns an emergency involving the transportation of radioactive or other hazardous material from a nuclear generating
- station. The other fust (4) categories
- Unusual Event; Alert; Site 1
(Area) Emergency; and General Emergency address emergencies of increasing severity. Table BYA 5-1 includes the specific initiating conditions for each emergency class at Byron Station. Where possible, these initiating conditions are related to plant instrumentation readings. In the event of equipment installation or other requirements, it may be necessary to quickly change the GSEP Emergency Action Levels at Byron Station. This may be done by first changing the Station EPIP of EALs and then, as soon as practical, by changing Table BYA 5-1 of this annex. In an emergency situation, if more than one distinctive EAL. of different classification levels is reached, e.g., an EAL for Alert and an EAL for Site Emergency, the highest classification level reached shall be declared. l Similarly, if more than one distinctive EAL of the same
- classification level is reached, e.g., two EALs for Site Emergency, consideration shall be given for declaration of a higher classification.
BYA 5-1
June, 1982 Revision 0 . TABLE BYA 5-1
- BYRON EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS l
CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE ENERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Class Description Events in progress or Events in progress Events in progress or Events in progress have occurred which or have occurred have occurred which or have occurred , indicate a potential which involve an involve actual or which involve actual , t degradation of the actual or potential likely major or imminent substan-level of safety of substantial degrada- failures of plant tial core degradation the plant. tion of the level of functions needed or melting with poten-safety of the plant. for protection of tial for loss of con-the public, tainment integrity.
- 1) Aircraft crash Impacted on-site. Ingacted on-site and A) Iapacted onsite or missiles has degraded equip- and has degraded from whatever ment described in equipment described source. the Technical Spect- in the Technical i fications such that Specifications beyond i a limiting conditon the limiting condition i
for operation for operation that requires a shutdown. requires a shutdown; or B) has exceeded a Technical Specifi-cation safety limit.
- 2) Control Room When 10CFR20 Due to exceeding Evacuation exposure limits 10CFR20 exposure are expected to limits, evacuatinn is be exceeded. required and control is not established from Local Control Stations or from Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 mins.
BYA 5-2
Jung, 4982 Revision 0 ~ TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYRON EHERGENCY ACTION LEVELS , CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMEkGENCY IIEarthquake Seismic equipment At a level gieater At a level greater (activation of is activated. than Operating than Safe seismic monitor- (at level of Basis Earthquake Shutdown Earthquake ing alarm with 0.029 ) ( > 0.095) ( > 0.21g) level verifica-tion, not . . spurious or testing)
- 4) Unplanned Onsite but not Explosion onsite A) Explosion has Explosion affecting plant has degraded equip- has degraded equip-operations. ment described in ment described in the Technical Speci- the Technical Speci-fications such that fications beyond the a limiting condition condition for opera-for operation tion that requires a requires a shutdown. shutdown; or B) has exceeded a Technical Specifica-tion safety limit.
- 5) Fire (ongoing A) Fire requires Fire requires off- A) Fire requires off-as described by NRC notification if site assistance and site assistance and observation or not identified with- has degraded equip- has degraded equip-alarm, and in 10 minutes; ment described in ment described in the verified by the or the Technical Speci- Technical Specifica-fire brigade) B) Fire requiring fications such that tions beyond the offsite assistance a limiting condition limiting condition but not affecting for operation for operation that plant operation, requires a shutdown. require a shutdown; or B) has exceeded a Technical Specifica-tion safety limit.
BYA 5-3
June, o982 Revision 0 , TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYRON EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE ENERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY , 6) Flood or Water at level of Water at level of Water above Essen-Low Water ESF Essential Probable Maximum tial Service Wter Level Service Water Pump Flood (708.3 feet Pumps and no well (698 feet HSL) MSL) pumps avaiTible; or or or Rock River flow Low level condition Low level condition 6714 cubic feet for Unusual Event for Alert plus no per second and Rock p_lu_s break of the well pumps available. River leve1 6665 Oregon Dam. feet HSL
- 7) Security Threat The following events An ongoing security An ongoing security An ongoing security Definition: Acts as described in the threat (event) of threat (event) in- threat (event) involv-1 which threaten Security Plan: increasing severity volving an insninent ing a loss of physical the safety of (1) Obvious attempt that persists for loss of physical control of the facility .
station personnel to sabotage. more than 60 min. control of the or the security (2) Internal disturb- facility. of the nuclear ance(disturbance units or special which is not short nuclear material. lived or is not a This includes harmless outburst crowd disturb- involving one or ances or acts of nore individuals ! sabotage, within the pro- , tected area). 1 (3) Bomb device dis-l covered. (4) Hostage. (5) Civil disturbance (spontaneous col-1ective group gathering which disrupts normal operations). (6) Armed or forced pro-tected area intrusion. (7) Armed or forced vital , area intrusion. BYA 5-4
June, 1982 Revision 0 . i TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYROM EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 8) Tornado or A) Tornado near A) Tornado strikes Sustained winds severe winds Facility Facility or > 90 mph and being experi- (1) Control room B) Sustained winds either unit not enced (Wind infonned by > 75 mph in cold shutdown.
1 speed as load dispatcher i indicated in or i control room is (2) Statior, personnel used to classify have made visual condition.) sighting; or ] B) Sustained winds
> 60 mph.
- 9) Toxic Gas Uncontrolled release Entry of toxic gas Entry of toxic gas
. of toxic gas at life into the protected into vital areas threatening levels arua, affecting the safe near or onsite, shutdown of the plant. t
- 10) Loss of AC Loss of AC power A) Loss of AC power Engineered safety Ongoing loss of power l' Power has degraded equip- has degraded equip- feature busses are and total loss of ment described in ment described in ~ deenergized for feedwater makeup the Technical Speci- the Technical Speci- >15 minutes. capability.
fications such that fications beyond the a limiting condition limiting condition for operation for operation that requires a shutdown. requires a shutdown; or B) has exceeded a Technical Specifica-
- l. tion Safety Limit.
BYA 5-5
Junt., 1982 Revisicn 0
- l TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...)
BYRON EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS f6NiifTitTNS 0NtiSUALEVENT ALERT SITETHEEE~NCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 11) Loss of DC Loss of DC power A) Loss of DC power Busses 111 (211)
Power sources has degraded sources has degraded and 112 (212) are equipment described equipment described all deenergized in the Technical in the Technical for > l5 minutes. Specifications such Specifications that a limiting beyond the limiting condition for. conditions for operation requires operation that a shutdown. require a shutdown; or i B) has exceeded a Technical Specifica-tion safety limit.
- 12) Plant Shut- A) Loss of all Lnss of all Transient requiring down Functions systems capahTe of systems capable of operation of shutdown maintaining cold maintaining hot systems with failure shutdown; shutdown; to trip and core damage or or is evident.
B) Failure of the Transient requir-Reactor Protection ing operation of System instrumenta- shutdown systems tion to initiate with failure to and complete a trip. (Power reactor trip, which Generation continues, brings the reactor but no core damage subcritical once a evident) limiting safety i system setpoint has been exceeded. E BYA 5-6
June, i982 Revision 0 . TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYRON EHERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 13) Other conditions Equipment described A) Equipment described or systems re- in the Technical in the Technical quired by Techni- Specifications is Specifications is cal Specifica- degraded such that degraded beyond the
> tions (i.e. ECCS, a limiting condition limiting condition I fire for operation for operation that etc.) protection, requires a shutdown. requires a shutdown; or B)hasexceededa Technical Specifica-tion safety limit.
- 14) Abnornal Fuel > 650*F in average >B00"F in average >l200"F in average Temperature of 10 highest incore of 10 highest incore of 10 highest incore thermocouple thermocouple readings. thermocouple readings, readings.
I5] hbnormal Coolant < 50"F on subcooling ( 35"F on subcooling Tenperature neter for 215 min. meter for> 15 min.
- 16) Loss of Primary A) ECCS initiation A> 50 gpm leakage Primary system leak- And Failure to Coolant (non-spurious) increase in a 4-hour age is beyond makeup activate ECCS or period as indicated capabilities of B) Failure of a by either leak rate of charging pumps.
primary system calculations,
- safety or relief charging pump flow valve to close; or VCT level or changes.
i C) Exceeding Reactor coolant system leak rate as specified in Technical Specifi-
, cations.
BYA 5-7
- June, 1982 Revision 0 ~
TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYRON EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT I ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 17) Main Steam Line With zero or small With 1 gpm primary Ten (10) gpm primary Break primary to secondary to secondary leak- to secondary leakage leakage and/or small age and with 1% And significant fuel .
percentage of failed failed fuel. dansge, fuel.
- 18) Loss of Reactor loss of reactor Instantaneous Coolant Flow coolarit flow due seizure of a reactor FSAR 15.3.1. to electrical or coolant pump rotor i FSAR 15.3.2. mechanical failure occurs using extremely FSAR 15.3.3. where several conservative assump-FSAR 15.3.4. separate circuits tions where the will trip the integrity of the reactor promptly. primary coolant system is not endangered under the worst case. The hot spot remains con-siderably less than 2700*F. The core will remain in place and intact with no loss of core cooling capacity.
I
- 19) Loss of Less than 640 psig Non-isolable steam Non-isolable steam Loss of Feedwater and Secondary in any operational release with > 1 gpm release with 10 gpm and Aux. Feedwater for Coolant steam generator. primary to secondary primary to secondary 3/4 hour plus condi-leakage. leakage and indica- tions for Site Emer-tion of Tuel danage gency.
> 1%.
- 20) 5 team Generator FSAR accident consist-Tube Rupture ing of a double ended rupture of a single FSAR 15.6.3. steam generator tube.
BYA 5-8 4
June, 1982 Revision 0 . TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYRON EHERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CURUITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EllERGENCY
- 21) Feedwater mal- Transient resulting function (ex- in excessive heat cessive heat removal due to cold renoval) feedwater addition maintaining con-FSAR 15.1.1. siderable margin FSAR 15.1.2. above a limiting.
DNBR of 1.3.
- 22) CVCS Malfunction Should erroneous boron Erroneous Boron dilution occur, numer-Dilutions ous alarms and indica-tions are available to FSAR 15.4.6. alert the operator to the condition to take corrective action be-fore excessive shut-down margin is lost.
- 23) Uncontrolled Should a continuous RCC withdrawal control rod assembly from sub- withdrawal occur, the critical transient will be terminated by the FSAR 15.4.1 source range neutron flux level trip.
- 24) Uncontrolled ,Should a continuous RCC withdrawal control rod assembly
~~~at power withdrawa! occur, the transient will be FSAR 15.4.2. terminated by the
- power range high
; neutron flux level l ,
j ftrip. BYA 5-9
June, .982 Revision 0 . TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYRON EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 25) Rupture of The FSAR accident Control Rod predicts a 2% increase Drive Mechanism in failed fuel as a (rod ejection result of this accident accident) which places it in the Alert category based FSAR 15.4.8. On NUREG 0654.
- 26) Turbine-Generator A turbine generator A turbine generator accident in which failure in which failure in which missiles are missiles are generated missiles are generated generated and no penetration of and penetration of the the ~asing occurs casing does occur; all and normal reactor possible impact areas shutdown follows. containing essential equipmbnt are protect-ed and normal reactor '
shutdown follows. i BYA 5-10 i
June, 1982 Revision 0 . TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYRON EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS CONDIT10flS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 27) Loss of Fission A. > 2 x 102 R/Hr. A.> 4 x 102 R/Hr A.7 2 x 103 R/Hr Product Barriers Primary Containment Prinary Containment Primary Containment Radiation, or Radiation, or Padiation, and B. Loss of I of the B. Loss of 2 of the B. Loss of 2 of the following 3 fTssion following 3 fEsion following 3 fTision product barriers: product barriers: product barriers with an imminent loss oTThe third barrier:
- 1) Cladding: 1) Cladding: 1) Cladding:
grab sample results grab sample results ' rab g sample results
> 300 uci/cc > 300 uci/cc wr300 uci/cc equivalent of I-131 equivalent of 1-131 equivalent of I-131
- 2) Reactor Coolant 2) Reactor Coolant 2) Reactor Coolant System: System: System:
a) Containment a) Containment a) Containment press.> 5 psig and press.> 5 psig and press. > 5 psig and b) Containment b) Containment b) Containment temp. > 150*F and temp. > 150*F and temp. > 150*F and c) Containment c) Containment c) Containment humidity > 50% humidity > 50s himidity >50% -
- 3) Primary 3) Primary 3) Primary Containment Containwent Containment a) Containment a)Centainment a) Containment press.> 50 psig, or press. > 50 psig, or press. > 50 psig, or b) Containment b) Containment b) Containment tem tem tem c) p. '> 280*F, Loss of or c) p. >280*F, Loss of or c) p. > 280*F Loss of or containment containment containment integrity when integrity when integrity when containment containment containment integrity is integrity is integrity is required required required BYA 5-11
* -e
June, 1982 Revision 0 - TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYRON EMERGENCY ACTION tEVELS COND1TIONS LIFiUSUAL EVENT ALERI 51TE EMERGENCY GENERXE ERERGENCY
- 28) Fuel Handling Fuel Handling A) Radiation levels Accident Building exhaust in the Fuel Handling (Directinforma- has been diverted Building are tion from fuel through the char- > 100 mR/hr, or
; handling person- coal filters. B) Fuel 81andling
; nel indicating .
Building exhaust that an irradiated charcoal filters fuel assembly has are depleted and been damaged). and radioactivity i is being released to the atmosphere.
- 29) Elevated Area Unplanned increase Unplanned increase Rad Honitor by factor of 20 in by factor of 100 Readings any ARM. in any ARM.
- 30) Gaseous Radia- 10CFR20 instantane- >10 times the Effluent monitors Effluent monitors tion Releases ous release limits 10CFR20 instantane- detect level corres- detect levels corres- '
Fran the Plant. (10CFR20.105) are ous release limits 50mR/hr ponding to > 1 Rem /Hr exceeded as neasured (10CFR20.105) as pondingtg>uCi/sec) (8.9 x 10 whole body at the site by effluent nonitor- measured by the for 1/2 hour, or bounda ry. This condi-ing or counting effluent monitoring > 500mR/Hg tionexistswgen: . instrumentation, or counting instru- (8.9 x 10 uCi/sec) Q/u> 7.1 x 10 mentation. for 2 minutes at the where site boundary. Q = release rate in uCi/sec u = mean wind speed in meters /sec. 3T) Liquid 1) Gross yeta 1)Grossgeta 1) Gross Beta 1) Gross4Beta Radiation >l x 10" uCi/ml >l x 10' uC1/mi > 2,000 Ci total > 2 x 10 Ci total Releases from or . or in 24 hours in 24 hours the Plant as 2) Tritium 2.40 Ci total or or neasured by > 3 x 10~3 uCi/ml in 24 hours 2)Tritigm 2)Tritiga effluent or > 2 x 10 Ci total > 2 x 10 Ci total nonitoring or 2) Tritium in 24 hours in 24 hours counting instru- : >3 x 10 2 uCi/mi mentation. I or
; > 500 Ci total i in 24 hours '
BYA 5-12
i June, 1982 Revision 0 . TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYRON ENERGENCY ACTIDN LEVELS EUfdITIONS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 32) Personnel Transportation of injury radioactivity con-taminated injured person to hospital
- 33) Hazardous As a direct result of Materials hazardous materials a person is killed or hospitalized or esti-mated property damage exceeds $50,000.
- 34) Any other Warrants increased Warrants activation Imminent Core Melt conditions of awareness on the of Technical Support equivalent part of the state Center magnitude to and/or local off-to the criteria site officials, used to define the accident category as determined by the Station Di rector.* ,
- Conditions that may or may not warrant classification under GSEP include:
- a. Incident reporting per 10CFR50.72
- b. Incident reporting per 10CFR20.403 or Illinois Rules and Regulations, Part D.403.
I c. Discharges of oil or hazardous substances into waterways per 33CFR153.
- d. Security contingency events per the Station Security Plan.
1he Station Director may, at his discretion, categorize the above situations as GSEP emergencies, depending upon the seriousness of the situation. (Refer to Section 9.3 of the generic plan for additional information.) BYA 5-13 l
June, 1982 Revision 0 . TABLE BYA 5-1 (Continued...) BYRON EHERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT A. A vehicle transporting radioactive asterials or non-radioactive llazardous
- materials from a Commonwealth Edison generating station is involved in a situation in which:
- 1. Fire, breakage or suspected radioactive contamination occurs involving a shipment of radioactive material or;
- 2. As a direct result of Hazardous materials, a A person is killed; or b A person receives injuries requiring hospitalization; or c Estimated carrier or other property damage exceeds $50,000.
1 B. Any other condition involving Hazardous material transportation and equivalent to the criteria in Item A. BYA 5-14
i June, 1982 Revision 0 6.0 EMERGENCY MEASURES Connonwealth Edison emergency response actions are basically the same for all nuclear stations and are thus cov.ered by Section 6.1 of the generic plan. 6.1 Activation of the Emergency Organization If the conditions at Byron Station indicate that one of the Emergency Action Levels in Table BYA 5-1 is exceeded, the Station Director declares and classifies the emergency. A Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) Fonn is completed and the information contained on this form is conveyed to the System Power Dispatcher. In addition, the NRC Operations Center is notified of the emergency , in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. For the General Emergency, the Station Director is responsible for notifying the following Illincis and Wisconsin agencies of the emergency condition, as well as recommending initial protective actions for the offsite public: l e Illinois ESDA in Springfield l l o Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government in Madison. Wisconsin l e Ogle County Sheriff's Office When State and local agencies are notified of the emergency condition, they will take action in accordance with State and local j emergency plans. 1 BYA 6-1 l l
June, 1982 Revision 0 , Figure 4.2-3 of the generic GSEP will be used by
- Byron Station in augmenting the Byron onsite emergency organization for declared GSEP emergencies. In addition, Byron Station has established an Onsite Technical Suppo.rt Center and an Onsite Operational Support Center. These centers are activated (manned) for an Alert, Site Emergency, and General Emergency. Augmentation of plant staffing is achieved by implementing a prioritized notification procedure as described in Section 4.1.7.
6.2 Assessment Actions Throughout each emergency situation, continuing assessment will occur. Assessment actions at Byron Station may include an evaluation of plant conditions; inplant, onsite, and initial offsite radiological measurements; and initial estimates of offsite doses. To aid emergency personnel in an assessment of core damage during an emergency condition, a figure has been prepared which represents a plot of activity (C1) versus containment ' radiation readings. Figure BYA 6-1 is simplistic in nature and is intended only to provide a preliminary estimate of primary containment activity, based on containment radiation readings. 6.3 Protective Actions for the Offsite Puolic Protective actions for the offsite public will be recommended and coordinated by the Illinois ESDA and Wisconsin Division of l Emergency Government (DEG) in cooperation with local officials. The initial recommendation of protective actions will be issued to ESDA and DEG by Comonwealth Edison based on conditions at Byron Station. A notification capability to the population within the 10-mile EPZ i BYA 6-2 l i _ _
. - . - - . _. _ . _ = . ._
l June, 1982 Revision 0 is available for the purpose of alerting the population of' recomended protective actions. The notification system consists of three parts:
- 1) A pennanently installed outdoor notification system within the O to 5 mile radius around the station. The O to 5 mile radius around the station is primarily an agricultural area with a population density well below 2000 persons per square mile.
The installed notification system will essentially cover all inhabited areas with a minimum noise level of 60 db using an attenuation factor of 10 db loss per distance doubled. For the possibility of a dwelling not being exposed to a 60 db minimum
. noise level, a local coverage siren or an inhouse warning receiver will be utilized.
- 2) A permanently installed outdoor notification system covering the heavily populated areas within the 5 to 10 miles radius.
The area outside the five mile radius and inside the ten mile radius contains a number of communities that will be covered by installed notification systems.. These systems will utilize existing sirens plus additional sirens to ensure complete coverage with either a 60 db minimum or 10 db above daytime background.
- 3) A mobile notification ' system for the remainder of the area within the 5 to 10 mile radius. The total 1980 population of the area outside the tive mile radius and inside the ten mile radius is approximately 12,000. Of this total, that population i residing in communities within the 5 to 10 mile radius will be covered by the installed notification system mentioned in part
- 2 above. The remaining population live in rural residences or farm steads and will be alerted by a mobile system including sirens and public address. The plan for a mobile notification system includes the use of law enforcement vehicles with siren and portable announcing systems. Contained in the Emergency Plans of each of the counties associated with Byron Station, will be the general guidance for early notification of the population within the county. The routing of law enforcement vehicles through the 5 to 10 mile EPZ will be accomplished by the county sheriff dispatcher aided by the state police dispatcher if needed. The purpose of the prompt notification system is to advise citizens to either take shelter or evacuate
! and to instruct them to tune to designated emergency information radio stations. Once the public has tuned to designated radio stations in an emergency, detailed instructional messages will be given to the public. State and local procedures provide for these messages, j BYA 6-3
~
r June, 1982 Revision 0 Protective actions for the public may include: e Sheltering by remaining inside buildings or homes. e Evacuation from a potentially affected area and relocation to a preestablished registration / evacuation center. e Food, water and milk control by sampling, testing and restricting the consumption of these potentially affected items. ! e Access control by roadblocks and barriers to prevent entrance to potentially affected areas. Sector evacuation times may be a factor in the recommended protective ac,tions. Refer to Figure BYA 6-2 for a sumary of evacuation time estimates for the ten-mile area surrounding Byron Nuclear Power Station. 6.4 Protective Actions for Onsite Personnel Byron Station has a siren system to warn onsite personnel of emergency conditions. Upon hearing a continuous two (2) minute siren all personnel within the protected area have been instructed to report to designated locations / assembly areas. Station GSEP directors report to the Onsite Technical Support Center. Certain Rad / Chem, maintenance, and operations personnel report to the Onsite Operational Support Center. Personnel not having emergency assignments report to either one of two designated assembly areas. Permanent station personnel should nor 1 ally report to the Service Building Machine Shop area. Contract 2'should normally assemble in the Unit #1 Turbine Building Track-way. Refer to Figure BYA 6-3. Accountability of site personnel will be the responsibility of the Byron Station Security Director using the computerized security control system. l BYA 6-4
l . Juna, 1982 Revision 0 If a site evacuation is considered necessary by the Station Director, personnel will be relocated and monitored at one or more of the following locations:
- 1) Dixon District Headquarters in Dixon, IL.
- 2) Rock River Division Headquarters in Rockford, IL.
- 3) Quad Cities Nuclear Generating Station, near Cordova, IL.
Traffic control for onsite areas during an evacuation will be the responsibility of the Byron station security force. As necessary, equipment and personnel will be furnished by Byron Station to the relocation site (s) for monitoring, decontamination, and bioassay. Refer to Figure BYA 6-4 for evacuation routes to the relocation sites. Other emergency measures are common to all nuclear station and are thus discussed in the generic plan. BYA 6-5
Juns, 1982 Rsvision O FIGURE BYA 6-1 COP.E DAMAGE ASSESSMENT BYRON UNITS 71 & F2 i
$2 3
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w I J ,' , , , , l 10 1-i i i ' 'l il y I I I I I 2 3 4 5 6789 2 3 4 $ 5 789 2 3 4 5 6 . 89 10 10 10 10 Radiation Level in Containment (Rad /hr) Curve @ represents estimated activity levels in the containment following releases in wnich the ratio of the "% noble gasr. releasec to the core" to the "% iocines released from the core" is equal to 4. Curve @ represents estimated activity levels in the containment following releases in which the above mentioned ratio is equal to one(l). Specifically, the following points are plotted on the curves: Point 1 --100a/ noble gases released, 25% of iodines released Point 2 10% noble gases released, 10% of iodines released Point 3 2% noble gases releasec. 2*A of iodines released Total coolant activity (Iodines plus noble gases) is 700 curies. If this activity becomes airborne in the containment, the radiation level would be less than one rad /hr and thus is too low of an activity to be plottec on this craph. SYA 6-6
June, 1982 FIGURE BYA d-2 Revision 0 BYRON STATION EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES N
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Reference:
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June, 1982 Revision 0 7.0 EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 7.1 Emergency Control Centers 7.1.1 Station Control Room The Byron Station Control Room is the initial onsite center of emergency control and is loca'ted on the 451-foot elevation of the Auxiliary Building. Refer to Figure BYA 7-1 for the relative location of the Control Room within the Station. Figure BYA 7-2 provides an approximate layout. 7.1.2 Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) Byron Station has designated on Onsite TSC which will exist at the south end of the Turbine Building, as shown in Figure BYA 7-1. The Onsite TSC will fully meet the requirements of Section 7.1.2 of the generic plan. Refer to Figure BYA 7-3 for an "as-built" diagram of the Onsite TSC. 7.1.3 Onsite Operational Support Center (OSC) Byron Station r,:.s designated a primary Onsite Operational Support Center. The primary Onsite OSC is Meeting Room #1 on elevation 451 of the Service Building, as shown in Figure BYA 7-1. The Onsite OSC will conform to the requirements of Section 7.1.3 of the generic plan and will be the location to which operations support personnel will report during an emergency and from which they will be dispatched for assignments in support of . emergency operations. Refer to Figure BYA 7-4 for an BYA 7-1
l . . June, 1982 Revision 0 "as-built" diagram of the Onsite OSC. The backup Onsite OSC is the Shift Engineer's office on Elevation 451 of the. Auxiliary ?uilding. 7.1.4 Corporate Command Center The Corporate Consnand Center (CCC), located in the Edison Building, downtown Chicago, is the location from which the CCC Director will normally direct a staff in evaluating, coordinating, and directing company activities involved in coping with'an emergency. 7.1.5 Nearsite Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Byron Station has designated a Nearsite Emergency Operations Facility. The Nearsite EOF will be located at the Dixon District Headquarters Building in Dixon, which is approximately 19 miles SSW of the Station. The Nearsite EOF is the location where the GSEP Recovery Group would be activated, primarily for a Site or General Emergency. Refer to Figure BYA 7-5 for an a s-buil t" drawing of the Nearsite EOF. The designated Nearsite E0F is greater than 10 miles from the Onsite TSC and therefore is exempt from habitability criteria. . 7.2 Communications Systems l Dedicated consnunications systems at Byron Station allow effective coordination of any emergency response. These systems include:
- 1) A Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) which links the Control Room, the Corporate Cocynand Center, the Onsite TSC, the System Power Supply Office, the Nearsite E0F, the Illinois ESDA (in Springfield), the IDNS (in Springfield),
and selected local government agencies. i BYA 7-2 l
June, 1982 , Revision 0 l I
- 2) A microwave voice channel between the CCC and the Shift Engineer's Office, the Onsite TSC, and the Nearsite EOF.
- 3) A telephone link that enables communication between the CCC, the Onsite TSC, and the Nearsite E0F.
~
- 4) A telephone link that enables comunication between the Control Room and the Onsite TSC.
- 5) A telephone link that enables communication between the Control Room and the Onsite OSC.
- 6) A telephone link that enables comunication between the
{ Onsite TSC and the Onsite OSC.
- 7) A radio voice channel between the CCC, the Shift Engineer's Office, the Onsite TSC, the Nearsite EOF, mobile vehicles, and handi-talkies in the field.
- 8) An Emergency Notification System and a Health Physics Network that allow comunications between the Station and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The Byron Station dedicated communications systems comply with the requirements of Section 7.2 in the generic GSEP. Following a GSEP declaration, Byron Station makes initial notifications in accordance with Section 6.1 of the generic GSEP and this annex. In addition, the Control Room shall establish a comunications link with the Onsite TSC and the Onsite OSC when activated. As soon as the Onsite TSC is activated and manned, the Control Room shall be relieved of the responsibility for maintaining an open comunications link with the NRC Operations Center. The Control Room will then maintain comunications with only the Onsite i ! TSC and the Onsite OSC. The Onsite TSC shall maintain l comunications with the NRC Operations Center, the Control Room, the CCC, and/or the Nearsite EOF. Communications links that are not required to be maintained open shall be teminated as quickly as prudence dictates. Temination is accomplished to minimize the BYA 7-3 .
June, 1982 Revision 0 number of personnel needed as communicators, to minimize confusion in control centers and .to reduce the probability for promulgation of erroneous information. Communications initiated by interested outside parties, not specifically addressed in the GSEP, shall be referred to the corporate office. Such communications shall never be allowed to interfere with response to an emergency condition nor l with the implementation of the GSEP. In addition to the dedicated GSEP communications described in this section, Byron Station has other reliable intraplant and plant-to-offsite communications. These communications include: e A public address system e A commercial phone system o Security / Operations radio consoles and handi-talkies e System Power Dispatcher microwave communications e Sound-powered phones e Vehicle radios e flicrowave communications The Station's communications systems will be further described in an Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure. 7.3 Assessment Facilities 7.3.1 Onsite S'..raic Monitoring Instrumentation A cencral recording time-history accelerograph unit I with strip chart recorder, indicator lights, and playback s>. tem is provided. ( The lights indicate whether the system is triggered and whether the operating basis or safe shutdown maximum accelerations are exceeded in any one of the three BYA 7-4 l
June, 1982 Revision 0 orthogonal directions in the basement of the containment structures. An acceleration of .02g in any direction activates the seismic switch which turns on the seismic
- monitors and lights up the seismic alarm lights at the central station panel.
l 7.3.2 Onsite Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation A 250-foot meteorological tower is located approximately 3400 feet southwest of the Byron Station Containment Buildings and has been in operation since 1973.
~The Byron Station meteorological monitoring system is l
equipped to monitor the following parameters:
- 1) Temperature (at 30 feet)
- 2) Differential Temperature (between 30 and 250 ft)
- 3) Dew point (at 30 and 250 feet) -
- 4) Wind speed and direction (at 30 and 250 feet)
- 5) Precipitation (at base of tower)
In addition to the above, sigma-sub-theta, a derived meteorological parameter, is computed and is available to the CCC Environmental Director. Information gathered from the tower is recorded on chart recorders located in a building at the tower base. These metecrclogical parameters will be provided as input to the station's process computer and will be available as up-to-the-minute data in the control room. BYA 7-5
June, 1982 Revision 0 The meteorological program at Byron Station provides information sufficient to assess local weather conditions and to determine the degree of atmospheric dispersion of airborne radioactive effluents from the station. The Commonwealth Edison meteorological contractor maintains a comprehensive field program. Routine visits are made to each tower once a week to retrieve analog data and inspect equipment. These visits are directed towards ground based equipment, although a visual inspection of the tower sensing equipment is also made. Those instru-ments equipped with internal calibration capabilities are checked also. A log of the week's activities is filled out and kept on file both with the contractor and at the general office. Besides the routine meteorological maintenance pro-gram, several independent methods are used to verify quality data transmissions and recovery from each meteoro-logical tower. The corporate computer polls each meteoro-
. logical tower throughout the day. Each day's data are screened by a validation program which flags all missing and/or suspect values. The meteorological contractor is j notified of persistent outages and the proper restoration procedure is followed.
As an independent method of data retrieval, the meteorological contractor also interrogates each meteoro-l logical tower during the day. Data are passed through a validation procedure, and suspect data closely examined. l Field teams are then assigned for restoration of the system. SYA 7-6
^
June, 1982 Revision 0 Cooperation between the corporate office and the meteorological contractor assures that a timely restoration of any outage can be made. Emergency field visits to the meteorological sites are made as quickly as
- possible after detection of a failure.
Should an event of sufficient magnitude occur to destroy the tower structure, a contract is maintained to have a temporary tower erected within 72 bnurs, weather i conditions permitting. Further, the meteorological I contractor maintains two levels of sensors (wind speed, wind direction and temperature) in a state of readiness for use on the temporary tower. 7.3.3 Onsite Radiation Monitoring Equipment The onsite radiation monitoring capability includes an installed process, effluent, and area radiation monitoring system; portable survey instrumentation; i counting equipment for radiochemical analysis; and a l personnel dosimetry program to record integrated exposure. Some onsite equipment is particularly valuable for accident situations and is described in the following subsections. 7.3.3.1 Radiation Monitoring System Chapters 11 and 12 of the Byron FSAR describe the radiation monitoring system (RMS) in detail. The installed RMS is designed to continuously monitor the containment atmosphere, plant effluents, and various in-plant locations. BYA 7-7
. . . _ . , ~ _ _ _ ,
m._ _ . , . _,_-,._,_,.,_..,_.,,m,_ - . , , _ , _ , _ . , _ _ , , _ . _ , . _ , _ _ _ . . , - . _ _ . _ _ . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . . . .
June, 1982 Revision 0 The system includes Control Room readouts and recorders for each parameter that is monitored and an audible Control Room alam when predetemined setpoints are exceeded. The system can be subdiviuso into process / effluent instrumentation and an area monitoring system. e The process / effluent instrumentation consists of pumps, filter samplers, detectors, and associated electronics to determine noble gas, iodine, and particulate concentrations in plant cubicles or liquid and gaseous effluents. Several monitored effluent pathways have control functions which will terminate the release at a predetemined setpoint. These setpoints are premised on compliance with federal regulations. e The area monitoring system provides information of existing radiation levels in various areas of the plant to ensure safe occupancy. It is equipped with Control Room and local readout and audible alarms to warn personnel of an increased radiation level. Some onsite equipment is particularly valuable for accident situations and is described in the following sections. I BYA 7-8 l
June, 1982 RGvision 0 7.3.3.2 Post Accident Sampling Capability The capability to obtain and perform
~
radioisotopic and chemical analyses of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples is provided by the high radiation sampling system (HRSS), the design of which is cutlined in the following paragraphs. The system is installed in the auxiliary building and consists of ' a liquid sampling subsystem and an air sampling subsystem. The
. major components of the system are:
- a. HRSS liquid sample panel,
- b. Liquid sample cooler rack,
- c. Chemical analysis panel,
- d. Chemical analysis monitor panel,
- e. HRSS auxiliaries control panel (liquid subsystem only),
- f. Waste drain tank and pumps,
- g. Containment air sample panel (CASP),
- h. CASP control panel, and i 1. Valves and piping for the system.
The liquid sampling subsystem is installed at elevation 401 feet in the auxiliary building except for the waste drain tank and pumps which are installed at elevation 383 feet. The air sampling subsystem is installed in the auxiliary building in proximity to the containment. BYA 7-9
June, 1982 Revision 0 The HRSS liquid sampling panel is capable of sampling:
- a. Pressurizer steam space,
- b. Pressurizer liquid space,
- c. Each accumulator (emergency core coolingsystem),
- d. Reactor coolant hot leg loops 1 and 3,
- e. Reactor coolant cold leg loops 1 through 4 -
- f. RHR heat exchangers A and B outlets,
- g. Reactor coolant letdown heat exchanger outlet,
- h. CYCS demineralizer outlet,
- i. BTR demineralizer outlet, J. Reactor coolant filter outlet,
- k. Auxiliary building floor drain tank A (B on Unit 2 panel),
- 1. Auxiliary building equi drain tank A (B on Unit 2 panel)pment
- m. Recycle holdup tank A (B on Unit 2 panel),
- n. HRSS waste drain tank,
- o. Containment floor drain sump',
- p. Chemical drain tank (Unit 1 panel only),
- q. Steam generator blowdown sample line, and,
- r. Regeneration waste drain tank (Unit 1 panel only).
BYA 7-10
June, 1982 Revision 0 In addition to taking'the above samples for onsite and/or offsite analysis, the HRSS liquid sampling panel is capable of routing the reactor coolant samples to the chemical analysis panel. The chemical analysis panel is capable of performing the on-line analysis of pH, dissolved oxygen, specific conductivity, chloride, and hydrogen. For boron and isotopic analysis, samples diluted by a factor of 1000 to one will be transferred to the onsite laboratory. Excessive exposure to the system operator is limited by:
- a. Lead shielding in the liquid sampling panel and the chemical analysis panel;
- b. Concrete shielding above, below, and around .the sides of the panels .to prevent radiation from scattering around the lead shielding;
- c. The optimized design and reduced amount
! of piping in the panels containing reactor coolant;
- d. A special cart equipped with a shielding cask to transport the radioactive sample to its destination; and,
- e. A ventilation system drawing air out of the sampling panels and discharging into a remote HVAC train.
The containment air sampling panel is capable of sampling the primary containment atmosphere. The sample is drawn from the containment through a dedicated penetration. l BYA 7-11
June, 1982 Revision 0 Once the interfacing valves are arranged and the sampling programmer is initiated, the containment air sampling panel utilizes automatically sequenced sampling to trap the designated sample in a shielded cart. The air sample will then be analyzed onsite. Excessive exposure to the operator is limited by:
- a. Steel shielding in the containment air sampling panel;
- b. Concrete shielding above, below, and around the sides of the panel to prevent radiation from scattering around the steel shielding;
- c. Automatic sampling;
- d. Special carts each equipped with a shielding cask to transport the radioactive sample to its destination; and,
- e. A ventilation system drawing air out of the sampling panels and discharging l into a remote HVAC train.
Actual frequency of sampling shall be determined by station management; however, as a minimum the first sample can be taken within 1 hour from the time a decision is made to take a sample, continuing with at least one sample per day for the next 7 days and at least one sample per week thereafter. The time interval between taking a sample and receipt by plant management of the results of the analysis is estimated to l be less than 2 hours. l BYA 7-12
June, 1982 Revision 0 7.3.3.3 Radiological Noble Gas Effluent Monitoring Two General Atomic Company wide-range monitors will be installed on the auxiliary building vent stacks (final release points), one monitor per stack. The monitor has a range for radioactive gas concentration o f 1 x 10-7 uCi/cc 5 to 1 x 10 uti/cc. The monitor includes the following: two isokinetic nozzles, one for normal conditions operating at 2 ft8/ min and one for high range conditions operating at 0.06 ft3/ min; sampling ' rack; sample conditioner, operating only at high range conditions to filter out large concentrations of radioiodine and particulates; and the wide-range gas detectors assembly, consisting of three radioactive gas detectors, a low-range detector (Model Number RD-52), a mid-range detector (Model Number RD-72-01), and a high-range detector (Model Number RD-72-02). Each monitor system has a microprocessor which utilizes digital processing techniques to analy:e data and control monitor functions. Control room readouts include a chart recorder and an RM-23 remote display module for all monitored parameters. BYA 7-13
June, 1982 Revision 0 Four General Atomic Company RD-12 detectors will be provided for each of the four main steamlines upstream of the safety and relief valves. The range of the monitor is 10 mr/hr to 105mr/hr. -- The monitors will be i mounted external to the main steamline piping and corrections made for the loss of low energy gannas. Readouts in the control room will include strip chart recorders. 7.3.3.4 Radioiodine and Particulate Effluent Monitoring The General Atomic Company wide range gas monitor includes a sampling rack for collection of the auxiliary building vent stack particulate and radioiodine samples. Filter holders and j valves are provided to allow grab sample collection for isotopic analyses in the station's counting rooms. The sampling rack is shielded to minimize personnel exposure. The sampling media will be analyzed by a gamma ray spectrometer which utilizes a Ge(L1) detector. The iodine cartridges are reverse blown for at least ten minutes to reduce the level of entrapped noble gases. Ir addition, s'ilver zeolite cartridges are availeble to further reduce the interference of noble gases. BYA 7-14
June, 1982 R2 vision 0 7.3.3.5 High-Range Containment Radiation Monitors Two high range containment radiation monitors are installed for each operating reactor. The monitors will detect and measure the radiation level within the reactor containment during and following an accident. The range of the monitors is 1 rad /hr tc 8 10 rads /hr (beta-gama) or alternatively, 1 R/hr to 10 7R/hr for gamma only. 7.3.3.6 In-Plant Iodine Instrumentation Effective monitoring of increasing iodine levels in buildings under accident conditions will include the use of portable instruments using silver zeolite as a sample media. Byron Station has a Transportable Data Acquisition and Analysis System for analyzing samples that cannot be counted and analyzed in the normal Station counting room because of background problems. Auxiliary counting room locations have been identified within the Turbine Building. It is expected that a sample can be obt W ed, purged, and analyzed for iodine i l content within a two-hour time frame. BYA 7-15
Juna, 1982 R: vision 0 7.3.3.7 Station Survey and Counting Equipment The Station maintains portable survey l instrumentation to assess contamination levels, exposure rates, and gaseous, iodine, and particulate airborne radioactivity concen-trations. This equipment includes GMs, ion chambers, and air samplers. The equipment is operated and calibrated by Station personnel.- The Station counting room contains GeLi gamma spectrometer systems, gas-flow proportional ccunters for alpha and beta /gama analysis, and liquid scintillators for tritium analysis. The Station uses various combinations of . film badges, TLDs, direct reading nocket ion chambers, and electronic dosimeters to monitor personnel exposures. In addition, a whole body counting system for bioassay determinations is located onsite. 7.3.4 Monitoring for Vital Plant Parameters Adequate monitoring capability exists to properly assess the plant status for all modes of operation and is . described in the Byron /Braidwood FSAR. Instrumentation is l installer. to ensure monitoring of the following vital parameters: BYA 7-16
June, 1982 Revision 0 INSTRUMENT
- 1. Containment Pressure
- 2. Reactor Coolant Outlet Temperature - TH0T -
Wide Range
- 3. Reactor Coolant Inlet Temperature - TCOLD ~
Wide Range
- 4. Reactor Coolant Pressure - Wide Range
- 5. Pressurizer Water Level
- 6. Steamline Pressure
- 7. Steam Generator Water Level - Narrow Range
- 8. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level
- 9. Boric Acid Storage Tank Level A Byron Station Emergency Operating Procedure will aid personnel in recognizing inadequate core cooling.
This procedure relies upon core exit thermocouples to indicate an inadequate core cooling condition. 7.3.5 Site Hydrulogical Characteristics The hydrological characteristics of the Byron Station vic'.nity are described in Section 2.4 of the Byron FSAR. The river screen house is the only structure that could be affected by flooding on the Rock River and is designed for a combined event flood, where a combined event flood is defined as a flood on the Rock River having a 1 x 10-6 annual probability of being exceeded at a 90% confidence level. All other Byron Station structures are 161 feet or more above the Prot able Maximum Flood level of the Rock River, i l BYA 7-17
June, 1982 R: vision 0 The minimum design operating level of the essential service water makeup pumps is 3.8 feet lower than the water level for the 1-day 100 year low flow drought condition. In the unlikely event that emergency make-up water requirements cannot be satisfied by surface water withdrawals from the Rock River, groundwater welis will serve for makeup to the essential service water cooling towers. Becuse of the site hydrological characteristics given above, plant operation should not be affected by Rock River water level conditions and therefore, I hydrological monitors have not been installed. The Rock i River is not used for any public water supply. There are l no recorded plans for any future public water supply usage from the Rock River. The nearest surface water users downstream from Byron Station are on the Mississippi River over 115 miles away. This allows for sufficient mixing that makes permanently installed hydrological monitors unnecessary. Provisions have been made for grab samples to establish release rates. In performing dose calculations from liquid releases, Byron Station uses a historical average river flow value, Fw, as a parameter in l the liquid release model. BYA 7-18 -
l June, 1982 Rsvision 0 7.3.6 Onsite Fire Detection Instrumentation The fire detection systen is designed in accordance with applicable National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standards. The system is equipped with elec-trically supervised ionization smoke and heat detectors to quickly detect any fires and the instrumentation to provide local indication and Control Room annunciation. In addition to the smoke and heat detection systems, each fire protection carbon dioxide, halon, or water system is instrumented to inform the Control Room of its actuation or of system trouble. In the event that a portion of the fire detection instrumentation is inoperable, an increased frequency of fire watches in affected areas is required. 7.3.7 Facilities and Eouipment for Offsite Environmental Monitoring As described in the generic GSEP, Commonwealth has contracted with a company to conduct an offsite environ-mental monitoring program at each nuclear station. Figure 4 BYA 7-6 shows the locations of the fixed continuous air samplers. Figure BYA 7-7 shows the inner and outer rings i of TLD's in a 5-mile radius. Byron Station maintains a supply of emergency equip-ment and supplies for offsite monitoring and sampling. The supply includes the minimum requirements delineated by Figure 7.7-1 of the generic GSEP. BYA 7-19 i -- . - - - _ _ .
June, 1982 Revision 0 7.4 Protective Facilities and Equipment The principal onsite assembly areas for Byron Station are the Machine Shop on the 401-foot elevation of the Service Building and the Unit #1 Turbine Building track-way. These areas are suitable because:
- 1) They are large open areas suitable for assembling a large number of people in a short time;
- 2) They are relatively close to the Security Gatehouse; and
- 3) They have a low probability of being affected by a serious accident involving the NSSS.
The offsite evacuation / relocation areas for Byron Station are discussed in Section 6.0 of this annex. All three locations are suitable, depending on the emergency condition. All three locations are owned by Commonwealth; thus, personnel, supplies, and communica-tions are readily available. 7.5 First Aid and Medical Facilities . Byron Station has an in-plant first aid / decontamination room on the 426-foot elevation of the auxiliary building near the station laboratory complex. This room is provided with a sink, a shower, a portable leaded glass shield, and a supply cabinet. First aid kits, stretchers, sinks, eyewashes, and emergency showers have been placed in strategic locations throughout the station. BYA 7-20
1 Juna, 1982 Revision 0 As mentioned in the generic plan, medical treatment given to injured persons at the station is of a "first aid" nature. When more professional care is needed, injured persons are transported to a local hospital or clinic. Rockford Memorial Hospital in Rockford, Illinois is the designated hospital for handling contaminated injured personnel. l l l BYA 7-21
FIGUHE BYA 7-1 LOCATION OF STATION EMEHGENCY CONTHOL CENTERS PJA I v 7 w; 1 -
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June, 1982 Revision 0 ! FIGURE BYA 7-4 APeROXIMATE LAYOUT FOR BYRON STATION OSC r l
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- - June, 1982 R: vision 0 8.0 MAINTAINING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 8.1 General As required by the generic GSEP, appropriate initial and annual retraining must 'be given to all Connonwealth Edison emergency personnel. The Commonwealth Production Training Department is responsible for ensuring that necessary training is given. As a matter of practice, the Station Training Department will actually perform the training of onsite emergency _ personnel, under the guidance of the Production Training Department. Station personnel who are assigned positions in the offsite GSEP organization will receive appropriate additional training from staff members of the Division Vice-President, Nuclear Stations.
Section 8.3 of the generic GSEP outlines the required schedule for exercises and drills. The Division Vice-President, Nuclear Stations and his staff are responsible for ensuring that the required exercises and drills are scheduled and conducted. (Forthe l monthly NARS test and periodic fire drills, however, the Station is entirely responsible for completion.) The required exercises and drills include:
- 1) Annual exercises
- 2) Annual Communication drills
- 3) Monthly NARS tests
- 4) Annual Environmental Monitoring drills
- 5) Semiannual Health Physics d-ills
- 6) Annual Medical drills
- 7) Annual Assembly and Accountability drills l
BYA 8-1 l l - -
T 4 *
- June, 1982 Revision 0
- 8) Annual Operator Response drills
- 9) Semi-annual Offshift Augmentation drills
- 10) Periodic Fire drills (in accordance with technical specification requirements).
The augmentation drills are unannounced and involve implementation of the Station call-list procedure and documentation of the times when persons are notified. These drills will serve to demonstrate the capability to augment the onshift staff within a short period following an emergency declaration. Comunications will be tested quarterly with the State of Wisconsin. Comunications with the NRC Region III Office and the NRC Operations Center will be tested monthly from the TSC, EOF, and Control Room. During all scheduled exercises and drill s , the Station is responsible for supplying requested equipment, facilities and participants; the Station is also responsible for providing assistance in choosing exercise and drill dates that are suitable for all involved parties. Commonwealth Edison is comitted to offer and provide educational information to the local population, news media, and local support agencies. With regard to annual dissemination of information to the populace within the ten mile EPZ, the Comonwealth Public Affairs Department is responsible for mailing this information to the populace as well as . distributing the information to city halls, gas stations, state parks, campgrounds, and other areas where a transient population may obtain a copy. The Comonwealth News Information Department will offer annual BYA 8-2
. . June, 1982 R; vision 0 information programs to local news media surrounding each nuclear station. The Station Superintendent is responsible for offering training to local support organizations as described in Section 8.1.2 of the generic GSEP.
8.2 Raview and Updating of the Plan and Procedures This Annex shall receive an annual review by Byron Station and l shall be updated as required in order to keep it consistent with the generic plan and to incorporate significant changes in site specific equipment, procedures, local agencies, etc. Refer to the generic plan for other aspects of document control for the GSEP. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures shall be developed consistent with the GSEP, shall be reviewed annually, and shall address items discussed in Section 9.2 of the generic plan. l P i BYA 8-3
a .a - - + u _- __. - - . _ - _ . . - _ i EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES WITHIN THE PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE FOR THE BYRON NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY l DECEMBER 1982
- . - - - . - - - ~_ _ _ _ _
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EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES !; WITHIN THE PLUll2 EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE FOR THE BYRON NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 4 9 T COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY 1 DECEMBER 1982 f C
1 I g lab EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES WITHIN THE PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE FOR THE BYRON NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION TABLE OF CONTENTS I , Section Title Page 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.1
SUMMARY
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 t . 1.2 PURPOSE . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 t -
1.3 SCOPE . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 2 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE AND EVACUATION SCENARIOS . . . . . . . . 2-1 I! 2.1 EVACUATION STUDY AREAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1. 2.2 PRIMARY EVACUATION ZONES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 l r-2.3 EVACUATION SCENARIOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2 L e 3 DEMOGRAPHIC'AND VEHICLE DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
! 3.1 SUMMER SEASON POPULATION DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 r- 3.1.1 Summer Daytime Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 I
3.1.2 Summer Nighttime Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
, 3.2 WINTER SEASON POPULATION DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 i
3.2.1 Winter Daytime Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 3.2.2 Winter Nighttime Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 [. 3.3 SPECIAL FACILITIES POPULATION DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 4 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS . . . . . . 4-1 7 i 4.1 GENERAL POPULATION EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES . . . . . . . 4-1 4.1.1 Evacuation Time Estimates Methodology . . . . . . 4-1 !L 4.1.2 Public Response Times and Network Loading Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3 4.1.3 Assumptions Used in Developing the Evacuation Time Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 m l l 4.2 SPECIAL FACILITIES TIME ESTIMATE METHODOLOGY !4 1 AND ASSUMPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6 I l i \
l s9 nD TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont) Section Title Page 5 EVACUATION ROAD NETWORK DESCRIPTION . ... .... . ... . . 5-1 5.1 ROAD NETWORK DEFINITION . . ......... . .. ... . 5-1 5.2 ROAD CAPACITIES AND CLASSIFICATIONS . . ...... ... . 5-1 6 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES . . . . .... .. ... .. .... . 6-1 6.1 GENERAL PUBLIC EVACUATION TIMES . .. . .. . . .. . . . . 6-1 6.2 SPECIAL FACILITIES EVACUATION TIMES . ... . . .. ... . 6-2 6.3 EVACUATION CONFIRMATION TIMES . .. . ... .. .. .. , . 6-3 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . ..... ... . ... ... . 7-1 i REFERENCES . . . .. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R-1 APPENDICES A - NETVAC2 DESCRIPTION B - EVACUATION NETWORK NODE IDENTIFICATION C - NETVAC2 COMPUTER OUTPUT I i 1 l I 11
l LIST OF TABLES Table Title 1-1 Summary of Evacuation Time Estimates - Summer 1-2 Summary of Evacuation Time Estimates - Winter 2-1 Communities and Facilities by Evacuation Study Area 3-1 Demographic and Vehicle Data by Evacuation Study Aret. 3-2 Schools Within the Emergency Planning Zone 3-3 Major Employers Within the Emergency Planning Zone 3-4 Camps and Recreation Areas Within the Emergency Planning
. Zone 3-5 Health Care Facilities, Motels, and County Jail Within
< ! the Emergency Planning Zone (
, 4-1 Public Response Time Estimates 6-1 Evacuation Time Estimates - General Public Evacuation Times 6-2 Special Facilities Evacuation Times i!
6-3 Evacuation Confirmation Times by Primary Evacuation Zone I l l l l l l l l l l - i iii l i
; . LIST OF FIGURES Figure Title 1-1 Byron Station Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone , and Site Vicinity 2-1 Evacuation Study Areas 3-1 Permanent Population Distribution by Compass Sector 3-2 Permanent Vehicle Distribution by Compass Sector
( 3-3 Population Distribution by Compass Sector - Summer Day r 3-4 Vehicle Distribution by Compass sector - Summer Day 3-5 Population Distribution by Compass Sector - Summer Night [ 3-6 Vehicle Distribution by Compass Sector - Summer Night 3-7 Population Distribution by Compass Sector - Winter Day 3-8 Vehicle Distribution by Compass Sector - Winter Day
, 3-9 Population Distribution by Compass Sector - Winter Night I
i 3-10 Vehicle Distribution by Compass Sector - Winter Night 3-11 Special Facilities - Schools I i 3-12 Transient Population - Major Employers 3-13 Transient Population-Camps, Recreation Areas, and Special Fac'.lities 4-1 Public Response Time Estimates 5-1 Byron Nuclear Generating Station Evacuation Road Network l l I iv
SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION This study presents evacuation time es.imates for those portions of Illinois within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for the Byron Nuclear Generating Station, hereafter referred to as Byron Station. The Byron Station is located near the Rock River in Rockvale, Illinois (Figure 1-1). The Byron Station plume exposure pathway EPZ includes portions of ogle and Winnebago Counties. Figure 1-1 presents a map of the Byron Station EPZ. 1.1
SUMMARY
l The evacuation time estimates presented in this study have been
'f developed using the NETVAC2 traffic simulation computer model. Detai2ed site-specific evacuation road network and vehicle data, and public response time distributions have been used in NETVAC2 to determine 3 evacuation time estimates. For each of ten primary evacuation zones, , evacuation time estimates for the general population within the Byron I
r l Station EPZ have been developed for eight combinations of conditions: summer and winter seasons; daytime and nighttime: normal and adverse t weather. Results of the general population evacuation time estimates, for these eighty scenarios, rounded to the nearest minute, are j summarized in Tables 1-1 and 1-2. Results indicated that summer and winter evacuation time estimates are similar. Tables 1-1 and 1-2 show that for normal weather conditions in summer and winter, the general population evacuation time estimates for the full plume exposure pathway EPZ range from approximately 191 minutes l [ l 1-1 (
F
~
,, i .
during the day to 111 minutes at night. In adverse weather, these time estimates range from approximately 227 minutes for day to approximately 123 minutes for night scenarios, respectively. Evacuation time estimates for the general population have also been prepared for various other evacuation scenarios in the 0-2, 0-5, and 0-10 mile evacuation zones. Summer and winter normal weather 0-2 mile evacuation time estimates range from 184 minutes during the day to 110 minutes at night. Adverse weather condition evacuation time P estimata.. for 0-2 miles for the same time periods are 217 minutes during the day and 120 minutes at night. The 0-5 mile estimates are slightly longer for some scenarios, prin arily due to the larger number of vehicles in the 0-5 mile zones. Normal weather conditions result in a range of 184 to 191 minutes for the day to 96 to 110 minutes at night. [' The 0-5 mile adverse weather estimates range from 217 to 226 minutes during the day to 98 to 122 minutes at night. I 1' In normal weather conditions, the evacuation times.for the other 0-10 I mile primary evacuation zones during the day are about 191 minutes and L at night range from 106 to 111 minutes. The adverse weather condition
- k. time estimates range from 226 to 227 minutes for daytime and from 114 to 123 minutas for nighttime.
l- Special facility evacuation time estimates range from approximately l1 50 minutes to 60 minutes for normal weather, and from approximately l
- 51 minutes to 68 minutes for adverse weather scenarios. These estimates l
- have been based on winter simulations for the general population, since l
schools are the most numer ous special facilities in the EPZ. 1-2
o s. r f 1.2 PURPOSE This evacuation time estimate study has been developed in support of the State of Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents (IPRA), Byron Volume VI, Revision 0, 12-82, and Commonwealth Edison's Generating Stations Emergency Plan Byron Annex. The primary purpose of this 1 evacuation time estimate study is to analyze the feasibility of I evacuation for the Byron Station Emergency Planning Zone. This evacuation study has been prepared in close coordination with the State of Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) personnel responsible for the preparation of the Byron Volume of IPRA. It is important to note that while the Byron Volume of IPRA is a detailed emergency operations plan, this study presents representative time frames for the evacuation of various areas around the Byron Station for a range of seasonal, diurr.al, and weather conditions. This study has been favorably reviewed by Ogle County and State of Illinois ESDA i officials. Copies of this study have been provided to these ESDA i (; officials. 1.3 SCOPE This study has been prepared by the Commonwealth Edison Company in compliance with the recommendations of Appendix 4 to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Evacuation Time Estimates within the Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone,1 which is the current regulatory guidance for preparing evacuation time estimates. Section 2 presents the evacuation study areas and evacuation scenarios. Section 3 discusses the various demographic and vehicle data utilized in this 1-3 i
- . - , .--_,v. . --- _-
j .. .6 study. Section 4 presents the evacuation time estim, ate methodology and assumptions. This includes both the general population and the special facilities methodology. Section 5 is a description of the evacuation
- road network. Section 6 presentis the evacua' tion time estimates. The conclusions and recommendations are presented in Section 7.
P l 'i I( 6 l l-4 l l l
I D L TABLE 1-1
SUMMARY
OF EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES SUMMER Cenera l Public Evacuation Times (minutestf31 Primary Evacuation Population (21 Vehicles Daytime Nighttime Zone (Il Daytime Nighttime Daytime Nighttime Normal Adverse Normal Adverse 0-2 mile A,B 10,757, 7,857 4,942 3.512 184 217 110 120 0-5 mile A,B,C 17.129 12,3'0 8 7.364 5,050 188 225 110 122 0-5 mile A,B,D 11.149 8.249 5,076 3,646 184 217 110 120 0-5 mile A,0,E 18,993 ~12,755 8,053 5,228 191 225 110 120 0-5 mile A,B,F 11,409 8,209 5,183 3,633 184 217 110 120 0-10 mile A-F,G 31,027 22,040 12,528 8,518 191 227 111 123 0-10 mile A-F,il 28,134 19,747 11,456 7,627 191 226 til 123 0-10 mile A-F,1 34,060 22,946 14.332 8,786 191 226 111 122 0-10 mile A-r,J 28,842 20,455 11,709 7,880 191 227 110 122 full EPZ A-J 42,836 31,122 17,475 11,748 191 227 111 123 NOTES: (1) See f igure 2-1 for evacuation study area locations. (2) Population is composed or permanent population and appropriate transients and special facilities. (3) All times have been rounded to nearest minute, 1 1 of 1
1ABLE 1-2 SUNMARY OF EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES WINTER Gene ra l Public Evacuation 1.imes Iminutes1131 Primary Evacuation Pgpulation (2) Yehicles _' Daytime Nighttime Zone (11 Daytime Nighttime Daytime Nighttime Normal Adverse No rma l Adverse 0-2 mile A,B 88,257 1. e45 7 1,988 588 184 217 96 98 0-5 mito A,B,C 8,975 4,792 3,736 1,766 188 223 105 113 0-5 mile A,B,D 4',649 1,849 2.122 722 184 217 96 98 0-5 mile A,B,E 12,180 6,319 4,892 2,292 191 226 105 112 0-5 mile A,B,F 4,759 1,809 2,184 709 191 217 105 98 0-10 mile A-F.C 23.043 14,356 8,564 5,162 191 226 106 115 0-10 mile A-F,H 19,781 12,223 7,632 4,361 191 226 106 114 0-10 mile A-F,8 24,819 14,932 10,137 5.359 191 226 106 114 0-10 mile A-F,J 20,674 12,831 7,917 4,584 191 226 106 114 Full EPZ A-J 3 4 , 98s1 23,148 13,340 8,291 191 227 106 115 i NOTES: l (1) Soo Figure 2-1 for evacuation study a ron locations. (2) Population is composed of permanent population and appropriate transients and special racilities. (3) All times have been rounded to nea rest minute. I or 1
SECTION 2 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE AND EVACUATION SCENARIOS The study area for potential evacuation is the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) for the Byron Station. Since it may not be necessary or desirable to evacuate the entire plume exposure pathway EPZ at once, for the purposes of this study, several evacuation study areas have been defined within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. 2.1 EVACUATION STUDY AREAS The evacuation study areas for the plume exposure pathway EPZ approximate the 0-2 mile, 2-5 mile, and 5-10 mile sectors suggested in 7 NUREG-0654. These evacuation study areas have been discussed with and favorably reviewed by ESDA officials of Ogle County and the State of [ Illinois, i- . Figure 2-1 identifies the ten evacuation study areas. Table 2-1 lists their locations in addition to the communities and facilities contained within each study area. 2.2 PRIMARY EVACUATION ZONES To facilitate preparation of realistic evacuation time estimates, the l l evacuation study areas have been grouped into ten primary evacuation l zones. These evacuation zones have been designated as follows:
. 0-2 mile, Evacuation Study Areas A and B l~ . 0-5 mile, Evacuation Study Areas A,B and C
. 0-5 mile, Evacuation Study Areas A,B and D l
l - 2-1 i
. 0-5 mile, Evacuation Study Areas A,B and E
. 0-5 mile, Evacuation Study Areas A,B and F
. 0-10 mile, Evacuation Study Areas A through F and G
. 0-10 mile, Evacuation Study Areas A through F and H
. 0-10 mile, Evacuation Study Areas A through F and I
. 0-10 mile, Evacuation Study Areas A through F and J
. Full EPZ, Evacuation Study Areas A through J.
l l Evacuation time estimates have been developed for each of these primary
. evacuation zones for the conditions discussed in the following sections.
2.3 EVACUATION SCENARIOS i Evacuation scenarios have been developed to simulate evacuation conditions established by the combination of primary evacuation zones with a specified season, time of the day, and weather condition during which an evacuation may be necessary. There are ten primary evacuation zones, two seasons (summer and winter), two time considerations (daytime and nighttime), and two weather lL i conditions (normal and adverse). Therefore, a total of eighty
,. evacuation scenarios have been considered in this evacuation time estimate study.
The summer season attracts vacationers to the recreational facilities in l [ the area of Byron Station. Therefore, the summer daytime scenarios have
; included the permanent resident, daytime employee, seasonal, and visiting or transient populations. The summer nighttime scenarios have included the permar.ent resident, nighttime employee, and overnight 1
l j 2-2 l l
~
i transient populations. The winter daytime scenarios have included the permanent resident, school student, and daytime employee populations. The winter nighttime scenarios have included the permanent resident population, and nighttime employee populations. These baseline evacoation scenarios are representative of weekday conditions because they are the most frequent situations. To address f the weekend events, additional simulations of special events have been undertaken (see Section 6). These special events include the Autumn on Parade, which occurs the first weekend in October and large weekend events at the Byron Dragway and Motosport Speedway. Section 3 further describes the aforementioned populations. Normal and adverse weather conditions have also been considered. Adverse weather ! has been defined as those conditions that reduce road capacity to 70 percent of normal weather capacity, and includes conditions that may impair visibility and/or traction, such as light snow, icing, rain, or l' fog. l I 1 l l l l 2-3 l 1
TABLE 2-1 COMMUNITIES AND FACILITIES BY EVACUATION STUDY AREA Study Evacuation Area County Area Major Communities / Facilities 0-2 Miles Ogle A Byron Nuclear Generating Station, North Rockvale Twp., Marion Twp. 0-2 Miles Ogle B Byron Nuclear Generating Station, South Rockvale Twp., Marion Twp. 2-5 Miles Ogle C Rockvale Twp., Byron Twp., Northeast Marion Twp., Byron 2-5 Miles Ogle D Marion Twp., Pine Rock Twp. Southeast 2-5 Miles Ogle E Rockvale Twp., Oregon Twp., Southwest Pine Rock Twp., Oregon, Lowden State Park 2-5 Miles Ogle F Rockvale Twp., Byron Twp. Northwest
- 5-10 Miles Ogle G Byron Twp., Rockford Twp.,
( t. Northeast Winnebago Marion Twp., Sco,tt Twp., Winnebago Twp., Seward Twp., 1 Davis Junction, Stillman Valley, j Westfield Corners 5-10 Miles Ogle H Scott Twp., Marion Twp., White Southeast Rock Twp., Pine Rock Twp., Holcomb, Davis Junction, Chana, Kings, Paynes Point, Flagg Twp. 5-10 Miles Ogle I Oregon Twp., Nashua Twp., Pine Southwest Creek Twp., Mt. Morris Twp., Rockvale Twp., Mt. Morris, Castle , Rock State Park, Daysville, Honey l Creek ! 5-10 Miles Ogle J Rockvale Twp., Mt. Morris Twp., Northwest Winnebago Leaf River Twp., Byron Twp., Seward Twp., Lightsville, Leaf River, Myrtle, Egan I l NOTE: See Figure 2-1 for Study Area Identification. l l 1 of 1 l b .. _
~
.. n, SECTION 3 DEMOGRAPHIC AND VEHICLE DATA Demographic data for this study has been derived from the official 1980 census data.7 Additional information has been provided from field survey work, and ogle County and State of Illinois Emergency Services P
and Disaster Agency (ESDA) officials. Further information has been p obtained by Illinois ESDA personnel from local property owners and employers. The vehicle data has been derived from the demographic data r~t and the Ogle County average number of persons per household. It has f been assumed that each household represents one vehicle. The number of L registered vehicles in Ogle and Winnebago Counties supports the adequacy of this assumption. Figures 3-1 through 3-10 present specific population and vehicle data by compass sector and distance from the
; Byron Station for various seasonal and diurnal conditions.
i r This study has identified 21,622 permanent residents within the evacuation study areas. Figures 3-1 .and 3-2 present the permanent (resident) population and vehicle data by compass sector and distance. F The summer daytime period represents the period of greatest population, reaching about 42,800 persons due to the additional count of seasonal transients, employees and appropriate special facilities population. The summer daytime period also has the greatest number of vehicles due !I to the increase in transient (non-resident) population. The summer b nighttime population is about 31,100 representing the permanent population, overnight transients, and appropriate special facilities population. The winter daytime population is about 34,900. Students and employees residing within the EPZ have been counted twice in the l !_ 3-1 i! l
winter day population, thus resulting in a conservative estimate. The " winter nighttime population is essentially representative of the i permanent (resident) population and represents the lowest population and fewest vehicles for the evacuation study areas. Table 3-1 summarizes the population and vehicle data by seasonal period for each of the evacuation study areas. This population data does not' include short term events such as the Autumn on Parade and large events at the Byron Dragway and Motosport Speedway. I I 3.1 SUMMER SEASON POPULATION DATA I The summer season extends from Memorial Day weekend through Labor Day i. weekend. There is a significant population influx during this season. i !! 3.1.1 Summer Daytime Data r i Summer daytime population includes sammer visitors, campers, and boaters (see Table 3-4), and appropriate special facilities (see Table 3-5), in addition to the permanent and employee populations. Figures 3-3 and 3-4 present this data by sector for population and vehicles, respectively. 3.1.2 Summer Nighttime Data r The seasonal population increase caused by overnight transients (i.e., campgrounds, summer camps, and other special facilities), and the l associated vehicles, have been added to the winter nighttime population and vehicle distribution to obtain the summer nighttime data shown by sector on Figures 3-5 and 3-6. l l [? 3-2 I +
1 3.2 WINTER SEASON POPULATION DATA . The winter season includes the non-tourist months, when schools are in i session. In this study, this season extends from Labor Day through
> Memorial Day.
3.2.1 Winter Daytime Data { I ! Winter daytime populations include permanent residents, school !! enrollments (see Table 3-2), employees (see Table 3-3), appropriate camps and recreational facilities (see Table 3-4), appropriate special f facilities (see Table 3-5), and the visitors at facilities where j significant populations have been known to gather. The winter daytime p populations and vehicle data are shown by compass sector on Figures 3-7 i I t and 3-8. 3.2.2 Winter Nighttime Data ( l Winter nighttime populations include permanent residents, employee night-shift populations, and appropriate special facilities (see Table 3-5). These population estimates and corresponding vehicle data
- l. are shown by compass sector on Figures 3-9 and 3-10.
l1 3.3 SPECIAL FACILITIES POPULATION DATA For the purpose of this study, special facilities are those institutione. ( or other population concentrations, which are transportation-dependent or have other special problems such as long mobilization times. These i special facilities include schools, major employers, recreation areas, i health care facilities, and the Ogle County jail. l L. I 3-3 l ' _ - m__
f
.o 6 Schools are shown on Fig Ire 3-11. Figures 3-12 and 3-13 identify the f
locations of transient populations, including major employers and camps i and recreation areas. Nursing homes, campgrounds, the Ogle County jail,
; , and other similar institutions that have been identified within the EPZ i .
are shown on Figure 3-13. T' ( r f n i i l r F t
, t.
i. I. L { u t ( L
; 3-4 t
h
.~__ q ._ . _ _ , . ._ _ _ _ _ , ,, ,, _
E TARLE 3-1 DEMOGRAPHIC AND VEHICt.E DATA BY EVACUATION STUDY AREA , Summer Winter Evacuation Dayt!me N ehttime Daytime M chttime Study Area focunstior lig_ Lea._ Populat on yehicles fop _ulation vehicles Populat on Vehicles A 7,1ST .. 7,057 3,153 657 229 657 229 8 3,600 1,759 800 359 3,600 1,759 800 359 C 6,372 2,422 4,523 1,538 4,718 1,748 3,335 1,178 D 392 134 392 134 392 134 392 134 E 8,236 3,111 4,898 1,716 7,923 2,9r4 4,862 1,704 F 652 241 352 121 502 196 352 121 G 4,618 1 678 4,018 1,497 5,251 1,594 3,958 1,431 H 1,725 606 1,725 606 1,989 662 1,825 636 1 7,651 3,482 4,924 1,755 7,027 3,167 4,534 1,634 J 2,433 859 2,433 859 2,882 947 2,433 859 1 or 1
, , . , .y . . ,
i TABLE 3-2 SCHOOLS WITHIN THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (1) racility Direction / Study No.(21_ Mlle Area Name of School No. of Students /Starrt11 41 WSW/7-8 1 Mt. Morris E.S. 343/26 42 WSW/T-8 i Mt. Morri s J r. H.S. 189/16
~
43 WSW/7-8 i Mt. Morris Sr. H.S. 235/25 44 SSW/5-6 E Oregon Community H.S. 408/38 45 SSW/5-6 E Etnyre Middle School 388/28 46 SSW/5-6 E Jerrerson E.S. 427/26 49 SSW/4-5 E Oregon Bible College 80 50 SW/4-5 E Lorado Taf t Field Campus 122 51 WNW/6-7 J Lea r R i ve r Commun i ty Schoo l , K-12 413/36 52 WSW/7-8 1 Ogle County Educational Coop 40/17 53 NNE/3-4 C Byron Middle School 231/32 54 NNE/3-4 C Byron Ma ry Morgan School, K-5 388/43 55a ENE/5-6 G Highland Grade School & Early Childhood 417/20 55b ENE/5-6 G Meridian Jr. H.S. 341/20 55c ENE/5-6 G Stillman Valley H.S. 462/33 56 NNE/3-4 C Byron H.S. 316/49 ST SSW/5-6 E Oregon Annex School Special 76/11 l Education Bldg. 58 SSW/5-6 E Oregon Dayca re Center 68 66 SW/6-7 I Village or Progress 106 Notes (1) This information provided by State of Illinois ESDA personnel responsible for the development of IPRA, Byron Volume VI ( See Reference 6), (2) See rigure 3-11 for school locations. (3) Numbers represent students plus starr. 1 of 1
, _ ..- ~ , . __ _ _ . . , - . , _ . _ . , ,, ,
i TABLE 3-3 MAJOR EMPLOYERS WITHIN THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (1) (2) racility Direction / Study No.83) Mile Area Name or Manufacturer No. of Employees pay M12b1 24 NNE/4-5 C Quality Metal Finishing Co. 204 0 25 NNE/4-5 C Kysor of Byron 120 0 26 SW/6-7 i Acme Resin Co. 20 20 27 SSW/5-6 E Atwood Vacuum Machine Co. 80 0 , 28 SSW/5-6 E Cook Manuracturing 55 0 29a SSW/5-6 E E.D. Etnyre & Co. 86 0 29b SSW/5-6 E E.D. Etnyre & Co. 78 0 30 SW/6-7 1 Martin Marietta Aggregates 53 0 31 SSW/4-5 E Progressive Graphics 135 0 32 SSW/7-8 1 Woods Brothers, Div. of 440 0 Hesston Corp. 33 WSW/7-8 1 Kable Printing Co. 500 0 34 WSW/7-8 1 Kable News 272 0 38 E/0-1 B Byron Nuc lea r Gene ra t ing 3340 540 Station Notes (1) for the purpose or this study major employers a re those with 25 or more total employees. (2) This information provided by State or Illinois ESDA personnel responsible for the development of IPRA, Byron Volume VI (See Reference 6). (3) See figure 1-12 for employer locations. 1 of 1
_ . . . . ~, TABLE 3-4 CAMPS AND RECREATION AREAS WITHIN THE . EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (1) Facility Direction / Study No.(2) Mile Arer _ Facility Name Periods or coeration Transient Population Day Night 1 SW/9-10 1 Lake LaDonna Summe r/ Day 1200 0 3 W/1-2 A River Road Camping and Marina Summer / Day & Night 1500 1400 4(3) N/1-2 A Motosport Pa rk Summe r/ Day 5000 0 6 SW/8-9 I White Pines Ranch Summer / Day & Night 170 170 Winter / Day & Night 140 140 7(3) N/3-4 C Byron Dragway Summe r/Might 500 0 8 NNE/4-5 C Lake Louise Summer / Day & Night 2188 1188 9 WSW/3-4 E Stronghold Camp Summer / Day & Night 170 170 Winter / Day k Night 140 140 10 SSW/8-9 1 Castle Rock State Park and Summe r/ Day 212 0 Nature Preserve Winter / Day 107 0 11 SW/4-5 E Lowden Memorial State Pa rk Summe r/ Day 1844' O Winte r/ Day 865 0 12 SSW/9-10 1 Camp Lowden Boy Scout Camp Summer / Day & Night 150 150 Winter / Day & Night 100 100 13 NNE/6-7 G Camp McCormick Girl Scout Camp Summer / Day & Night 120 120 Winter / Day & Night 60 60 14 E/6-7 H Kings Camp Summer / Day & Night 10 10 15 NNW/3-4 F Byron Sportsmen's Club Yea r-raund 150 150 16 SSW/7-8 1 Lutheran Outdoor Ministry Summe r/ Day 200 100 17 SSE/8-9 H Rochelle Conservation Club Yea r-round 50 0 18 WSW/8-9 I Camp Ross Summer / Day & Night 60 60 19 NW/2-3 F Ht. Morris Boat Club Summe r/ Day 150 0 20 ENE/3-4 C We l d Memo ri a l Pa rk Summe r/ Day 25 0 21 SSW/4-5 E Oregon Country Club Summe r/ Day 100 0 1 of 2
, ~ . _
a TABLE 3-4 (Cont) Facility Direction / ' Study No.i21 Mile Area Facility Nasa Periods or 00eration Transient Pooulation pay Night 22 NE/9-10 G Fuller Memorial Forest Prese rve Summe r/ Day 600 0 23 SSW/5-6 E Oregon Park District Summe r/ Day 8(0 0 70 WSW/9-10 i Camp Emmaus Summer / Day & Night 60 60 Winter / Day & Night 20 20 1 Notes: (1) This information provided by State of Illinois ESDA personnel responsible for the development or IPRA, Byron Volume VI l (See Reference 6) (2) See rigure 3-13 for facility locations. (3) Weekends only i i l I l l 2 of 2
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i l y .A e* I J 868 N S70 2001 NNW 46 NNE SO 1t0 928 80 .. 78 71 186t NW NE 338 " 03 64 SS 43 75 67 107 SO g 86 18 S 0 962 1666
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4 027 98 61 21 14 I 18 31 28 43 67 4 25 880 D 86 358 298 S4 16 36 7l 21 1 4 37 I8 149 25 77 67 $9 62 422 E els 28 6 21 U 3
'I 7 4 39 39 6 SS 54 2 41 7 12 43 26 19 3 gg 995 tvil gg 4e $7 92 86 21 57 WSW 778 64 ESE 3209 895 23 j 79 60 388 SS SS ISil 47 02 50 44 14 2 SS 35 f 195 377 62 SW 37 SE 2237 SI $9 425 St I3 g SSW S6 ast 2966 444 S
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% B4 0 -
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WSW 4 6 ESE 28 4 10 SW \ SE SSW g SSE 0 lMILE RADIUS FIGURE 3-1 PERMANENT POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY COMPASS SECTOR
.a e-r P
304 N 199 994 NNw NNE 16 it 3, 58 / 328 28 25 6S9 Ne li NE 42 33 3 22 410 30 15 26 23 38 ' 21 28 30 l 340 66 WNw
,7 350 $90 23 to S4 ENE 39 27 to tS 433 52 17 124 l i31 S ii
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' to 35 23 I 8 308 w 30 I27 10 6 19 S 12 2l 6 1 13 6 27 23 22 l 17 8 21 15 0 E 287 10 2 - II 4 15 8 7
13 13 62 19 2 II 39 19 20 50 2 4 I4 6 IS 9 642 13 354 396 30 16 20 32 0 wSw 277 24 ESg i 3, , II3S 28 24 334 33 18 0IO ' II 29 IS SO 19 12 26 22 68 90 Sw 13 SE 792 32 II 148 le 26 21 ASw 20 SSE !, 1052 225 l 14 0 '! 6 s 0 2 ui 0-S ut 0 tous 2-5 em 6 #0 MI 226 2531 7538 2305 $107 NNw N gqg , NW NE l' WNw 0 O O o 2 ENE
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w l 0 0 lE
- i 0 %
WSw I 2 ESE 10 g 3 SW SE SSW g SSE 0 luitE uOius FIGURE 3-2 PERMANENT VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION j BY COMPASS SECTOR I i' i i
.a **
6368 N 720 5572 NNW 46 NNE S0 11 0 III 1078 80 71 2441 NW 78 gg 11 8 g4 1751 43 ' SS ISS 47 ' 107 61 62 ** 63 135 67 62 l WNW 29 153 ENE ! 77 29 19 3 1539 M8 14 7 49 58 388 84 135 33 43 43 231 4 377 98 28 14 18 Si S6 28 67 2380 W 86 358 298 54 16 36 7. El 204 37 le l 49 25 77 67 59 62 422 E 2486 x 3"
- 25 19:
IS 49 3, 39 39 ll ** 6 SS 33 33 14 2 1885 I 12 43 26 19 182 5 If25 28 .3 57 92 21 8 ' 4440 2289 23 20$8 152 68 IOS g 1 711 47 SO 294 14 2 SS 35 835 277 SW 37 SE S$38 303 59 475 201 59 l SgW 56 ggg 5562 g 644 401 lt 0 2 ui 0 S ul 0-e0 Mi 2-5 Me S 80 m. 10494 23920 42836 13424 19916 \ NNW N NNE NW NE OOo
- WNW 0 0 gng n 0 0 s
[ W 0 1670 E O
- 1670 WSW E8E 0 0 O OO SW SE SSW g SSE 0 luitE na0iuS l
FIGURE 3-3 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY COMPASS SECTOR -SUMMER DAY
ee se 3054 274 214 3 hNW 16 NNE 17 3, 58 373 28 25 27 840 Nw NE 42 22 5 91 30 15 146 g3 38 i7 21 u M 22 66 23 340 17 1055
** ,3 54 27 to ' ** E N
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35 21 g o " *1 8 '8 6 23 8 4 762 w 30 127 106 19 S 12 21 6 55 13 6 17 8 27 23 21 22 ISO EIl22 12 8 r-58 5 '7 11 13 13 3 22 2 g SO 572 2
- 8 6 15 1463 13 379 403 30 20 32 16 30 7 20 1022 8 EII 6
2035 969 101 24 44 18 692 16 gy 29 26 50 19 12 12 L9 gg 22
, SW 13 SE g
1804 17 3 168 26 El SSW 20 ggg 2624 g 225 64 0 e t' l 02W 0 S di 0-80mi 2-S W $ 4 mt { 4850 9881 17475 S 031 7S94 NNW N yyg Nw NE WNW 0 0 gyg is
% 0 0 f W 0 835 E
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835 WSW 0 E8E 0 O o O Sw SE SSW g SSE 0 lun.E u0ius FIGURE 3-4 , VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION BY COMPASS SECTOR - SUMMER DAY
J
.n 5868 570 ~
4248 NNW 46 NNE
~
'a 11 0 III 928 80 71 1861 NW I3 NE 118 1151 64 85 43 ISS 67 107 61 92 86 962 1*$
50 2308 1866 WNW 29 153 ENE 66 292 ,g 77 29 43 1215 M7 4g 348 98
. 368 14 33 43 43 13 5 231 4 277 34 y, M 21 61 q 4g 67 18 25 2200 W 86 358 298 54 16 36 7, 21 1404 37 18 i49 25 77 67 59 62 422 E 1084 32 6 19? 10 49 39 gg 46 gi 64 6 30 55 58 14 2 41 7 13 12 43 26 1962 38 112 5 1125 28 48 57 92 930 23 ESE 3668 650 99 68 55
- I' #
55 50 82 214 142 55 35 75 62 395 277 SW 37 SE 91 59 425 2441 201 59 SSW 56 SSE 3416 3 644 4 01 l l.. I , l t o 2 Mi 0 5 Mi 0 -60 Mi 2-5 Mi 5-40 Ms 7594 15668 3112 2 8074 15454 NNW N NNE NW NE OOo WNW 0 0 ENg [, % 0 0 ,_ . W 0 270 ' E
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, 0.iun.E na0ius FIGURE 3-5 .
1 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY COMPASS SECTOR-SUMMER NIGHT l I
W&
.e **
1 r 2004 N 199 ISI6 NNW 16 NNE 17 g $8 328 28 25 659 NW 27 NE 42
~
53 22 410 30 - 15 14 6 23 , 38 21 28 34C 590 WNW 17 752 10 S4 ENE 27 to 15 433 52 17 124 35 131 5 g 11 y$ IS 82 Il 3S4 I 80 35 21 10 el 17 23 6 8 732 W Jo 12 7 106 19 5 12 2 6 42 is 6 l 17 8 27 23 21 22 150 E 422 12
$ ,7 8 13 13 43 2 39 39 20 14 2 4 S0 6 IS 9 698 13 379 403 10 16 20 32 30 7 20 7
W8W 277 28 E3E 320 8 1263 og 24 y, 269 [ 18
' 87 29 to 50 19 12 26 22 12 8 98 l SW 13 SE
, 830 32 II 148 168 26
,_ 21 l SSW 20 ggg I
1283 S m 140 e-l 1 1* 0 2181 0 6 ue 0-80 ut 2 -5 us S 40 ml 3420 6187 18748 2767 S SSI NNW N NNE NW NE i OOO WNW 0 0 ENE O O lL % s W 0 13 5 E O ISS WSW 0 E8E 0 0 0 0 SW SE SSW g SSE 0 luiLE RADHJS VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION BY COMPASS SECTOR-SUMMER NIGHT
% eo l
868 N 720 4383
, NNn 46 NNE SO 11 0 928 80 78 186i NW D NE 11 8 64 IISI 86 43 I3S 67 30 7 86 68 82 14 11 185 67 2959 WNW 50 2179 l 66 '
392 III 77 29 193 1539 14 7 49 348 98 817 14 g33 33 43 43 234
' 32/ 4 227 98 6, El 14 10 18 31 i ') 880 W 16 S 86 358 298 S4 i6 36 7i 21 4 37 IS 49 25 77 67 59 62 422 E 2486 36 25
[ 161 15 46 31 64 33 39 39 6 55 142 7 82 ICR8 m 43 26 10 1889 66 S7 48 92 i Wsw S26S 778 1467 68 23 kS ESE 2222 2S8 gg3 SS 3075 47 80 18 4 44 2 SS 35 75 D 62 733 g77 SW 37 SE I 3 SS: IS S 69 473
-- ISI 73 39 l
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$887 644 401 r
h, e t 0 2 ut 0 5 Me 0 -IO Ms 2-5 Ms S to us 3994 83939 34941 9945 210 02 s. I l NNW N NNE
, NW NE i
OOo WNW O O ENE m O O s W o et 70 l E
' O 16 %
l WSW O ESE O OoO SW SE ssW , :SE 0 iuiLE naciuS FIGURE 3-7 l POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY l COMPASS SECTOR-WINTER DAY
e se ** I a 304 N 274 4666
, NNW 16 NNE
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17 $8 328 28 25 NW 27 659 Ng
, 33 SS 42 22 410 30 15 86 23 38 21 ! 28 30
. 428 66 23 747 ( Wr W 10
- S4 ENE
' 23 10 4 27 ' 30 90 757 52 t7 124 2 19 5 Il 15 35 4g g5 82 80 ' 1 3 35 21 n 91 17 23 6 8 308 W 30 127 106 19 5 12 2 6 I 13 1 6 l f7 8 27 23 21 22 150 E 3122 Il 2 12 8
'r 5 ty 49 16 II 13 13 3 2 19 g
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- r Ii 0-2 ul 0 - 5 181 0-tous 2-S ui 5-to ut 1896 5855 13340 3839 7505 NNW N ggg
(, NW NE O O O f WNW O O gNE
% O O s l W O SM E l - O 835 %
WSW O O ESE O O O SW SE SSW g SSE O-s uitE unius FIGURE 3-8 VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION BY l COMPASS SECTOR-WINTER DAY l
l we
& f e6e N
570 3000 NNW 46 NNE SO 11 0 928 80 73 1861 NW 78 NE lie 64 IISI e5 43 135 87 107 06 61 82 63 67 WNW 29 153 ENE ggg 77 29 43 1215 34 7 49 348 88 36e 54 33 43 2 38 ' 33 3 43 g 4 227 98 at 21 e4 10 ig 3, 2e 48 67 18 2S soo W e6 3Se 29e S4 56 36 7; ti l 4 37 is 14, n 67 $2 422 2S Se E 10e6
'32 6 30 l$ 2S
' 43 II 39 39 46 ,, 64 g SS Se i I 12 14 2 41 19 43 26 962 38 10lS 111 9 28 40 57 92 86 21 57 WSW 778 '
352s 930 23 g, se $$ 658 SS 02 50 604 14 2 SS 35 75 ggs gyy 62 SW 37 SE 2405 91 59 425 ISI _' 59 l SgW S4 SSE 3266 644 S 4 01 f i I i
.s 0 2 us 0 6 ut 0-60 ml 2-5 ui 6-10 Ms 1194 8044 13148 6850 15104 N4W N NNE NW NE OO O WNW 0 0 ENE
-, O O -
W 0 270 l E O 70 WSW O O ESE OOO sw SE SSW g SSE 0-s uii.E naciuS FIGURE 3-9 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY ! COMPASS SECTOR-WINTER NIGHT l
9 304 N 199 1096 NNW 16 NNE 17 58 32s 25 25 NW 27 659 ng 3 $ 42 410 22 r 30 15 06 23 i 30 30 21 28 340 66 gy 392 550 WNW 23
- 27 go, 39
, to 15 4 33 52 37 1
33 131 5 il IS 82 g 4, IS 1 00 35 21 7 536 17 It
)
- f. 10 1 23 6 e 308 W 30 12 7 10 6 19 ' S 12 2i 6 13 l 6 l 17 8 27 23 1
21 22 ISO E 422 11 2 12 5 17 8 g j 13 13 80 3 2 19 19 20 l SO 14 2 g 4 ,, h 6 91 360 13 400 10 16 20 32 7 Wsw 277 24 ESE 1235 24 4, 39 269
; 18 3 17 24 SO 19 12 r 26 gg gg 22 i
I SW g3 SE S25 32 21 343 11 8
** 21
{ SSW 20 sSE
; 1203 g 22S 14 0 I
l 8
, t Ms 0 S Mi 0-s0MI 2 -5 Me 6-s0 Ms 2E 41 8291 2395 S400 NNW\ N unt
- l NW NE f WNW 0 0 ENE m 0 0 s W 0 ISS : E
' O
- 13 5 WSW 0 0 ESE O
O O SW ,, SE SSW g SSE 0 iun.E naciuS FIGURE 3-10 VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION BY COMPASS SECTOR-WINTER NIGHT
F*
.o ..
Y u SECTION 4 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS t ! This section presents the methodology and assumptions used to develop the evacuation tine estimates for the general population and special facilities. 4.1 GENERAL POPULATION EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES I ,' The general population, for the purposes of developing evacuation time l, estimates, has been defined as being composed of the permanent population, transients, and special facilities population appropriate for each of the particular evacuation scenarios. The general population evacuation time estimates are presented in Section 6.1. 1
~
i The general population evacuation time estimates have been calculated I (_ using the NETVAC2 computerized traffic simulation modela which has been developed to simulate the traffic flow over a transportation network i during an evacuation. As input for the evacuation time estimates, this model utilizes site specific road network and vehicle data, as well as public notification and mobilization times. i 4.1.1 Evacuation Time Estimates Methodolocy L The NETVAC2 model has been developed primarily for calculating the I' evacuation times for areas around nuclear power facilities. This model simulates the flow of traffic from entry nodes, where the vehicles enter the road network, to the exit nodes, located outside the EPZ boundary, where the vehicles leave the network. The model uses the Highway 4-1
,o ..
N Capacity Manuala equations and revisions contained in the Interim Material on Highway capacity 4 to calculate the capacity of the road
. network. In addition, vehicle speeds on the road network are computed using the inverse linear relationship between speed and density presented in the Highway capacity Manual. The NETVAC2 model has been extensively used for other evacuation studies similar to the Byron Study,and the results in those other studies have been favorably i
reviewed by the appropriate local, State and Federal authorities. r . The NETVAC2 model allows a detailed evacuation road network to be f
! analyzed by utilizing an area specific data base, which includes link (road segment) length, lane width, number of lanes, node (intersection, point of entry, or point of exit) approach width, shoulder width, l traffic controls, signal timing, turning lanes, and direction of turns.
This data is used to determine road network capacity and direction of traffic flow. The evacuation road network is discussed in Section 5.
;$ Additional input data is ured by the model to derive vehicle loading rates for each primary evacuation zone. Vehicles are entered at
-! specific points (nodes) on the network and their loading rates varied with time. Therefore, the vehicle loading rate is tailored to match actual population centers and time distributions of the public's l response to notification. This notification response has been approximated by a probability distribution of the public's reaction time during an evacuation and is discussed in detail in Section 4.1.2. In addition, NETVAC2 uses dynamic route choice, which mear.s that vehicle turning movements at individual intersections are changed with traffic
, 4-2 i
conditions to reduce the number of vehicles that have turned onto a congested roadway. Appendix A discusses the NETVAC2 Model in greater detail. 4.1.2 Public Response Times and Network Loading Rates The range and variation of public reaction to evacuation notification have been described by a probability distribution of response times. This response time distribution has been derived by combining the response time distributions for several smaller components or events of ! the public response to the evacuation notification process. These i l l events have been assumed to be the following: i
. Receive Warning, the time period from when the prompt public notification system is activated to when the public has i
received the message to evacuate:
. Leave W--h, the time period required for employees to leave work and travel to their vehicles;
. Travel from Work to Home, the time period required to drive t
from work to homs; and
. Evacuate the Home, the time period required to pack belongings and prepare home for absence.
Total mobilization times have been determined by combining these events for each evacuation scenario. Average public response times for each of j the above events are shown in Table 4-1. These event times have been l (~ favernbly reviewed by ogle County and State of Illinois ESDA officials. l l 4-3
k A normal distribution has been asswned for the time spread of these individual events. Normal distribution represents the situation in which most persons respond in the average time for a given ev.ent and lesser numbers of individuals respond earlier and later than the average time. Therefore, the cumulative probability distribution of each of these events is an "S" shape. The curves have been derived by using standard mathematical techniques based on NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 . recommendations.1 Figure 4-1 presents the distribution curves used for this study. Nighttime curves have been derived by combining two events: Receive Warning and Evacuate Home. Daytime curves have been derived by combining the Receive Warning, Ieave Work, Travel Home, and Evacuate
, Home time distributions. The cumulative distribution of these different events combined has an "S" shape similar to the curves for the ! individual events, and represents the spectrum of public response times.
These public response time curves have been used to determine the rate and time for vehicle loading. These curves provide information on the percentage of people leaving their homes within specific perieds of time. Vehicles were loaded onto the evacuation roadway network using the percentage and times cutlined in the public response time curves. j 4.1.3 Assumptions Used in Developing the Evacuation Time Estimates t The following assumptions have been used in this evacuation time !, estimate study:
. All persons within the plume exposure pathway EPZ when instructed to evacuate, will leave.
4-4
. People in the outer primary evacuation zones will not evacuate when an inner primary evacuation zone is the only zone to be evacuated.
~ . The prompt public notification system, which utilizes sirens, will be used. (Based on this system, the time to notify essentially 100 percent of the fell plume exposure pathway EPZ population has been estimated to be 15 minutes.)
. Traffic rules and controls will be obeyed, only the proper travel lane will be used (not shoulders or opposite flow lanes), and all traffic lights will be operating normally.
. Appropriate traffic and accere, control points will be manned.
. Evacuation routes will be passable.
. No major traffic will be on the road network prior to the start I
of an evacuation.
. Roadway capacities will be reduced to 70 percent of normal weather capacity during adverse weather.5 l
. Private vehicles will be the primtry mode of evacuation.
l
. Only one car per household will be used in an evacuation.
(There are 2.8 persons per household, based on people per
/
/ household in Ogle County.7)
/
/
/ . The people without cars will receive rides from either f
neighbors or designated public service vehicles. 4-5 7
. One car per employee at major employers and schools will be used in an evacuation.
. Boats will moor and the occupants will then evacuate by car with one vehicle allotted per boat.
. One car per campsite at recreational campgrounds will be used I
for evacuation. (This assumes 3.3 people per car as this is the Illinois State average number of people per family.s)
. Adequate transportation will be available for summer camps.
4.2 SPECIAL FACILITIES TIME ESTIMATE METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTICNS In addition to an estimate of the time required to evacuate the general population, NUREG 0654 recanmends that a separate estimate be made of i i the time required to evacuate special facilities within the EPZ. ll Special facilities, as defined in NUREG 0654, can include health care facilities, nur;ing homes, jails, schools, and other facilities requiring special transportation or mobilization considerations during
, an evacuation. For this study, special facilities identified as 1!
I requiring separate estimates included schssis, nursing homes, and the Ogle county jail. These evacuation time estimates for special facilities are presented in Section 6.2. 1 Special facility evacuation time estimates include mobilization time for obtaining transportation, time for loading persons into vehicles, and the travel time out of the EPZ. Mobilization and loading times for special facilities have been obtained by State of Illinois ESDA personp1 through interviews with facility officials. Speciel 4-6
9 facilities and transient populations have been loaded on the network with an average of 15 minutes to receive warning and an average of 30 minutes to prepare to leave. The 30-minute average time for preparation to enter the roadway conforms to the estimates provided by school officials through State of Illinois ESDA personnel. Therefore, the response curve for these populations is similar, with respect to time, to the night scenario shown on Figure 4-1, since that curve is F also the combination of a 15-minute and a 30-minute event. Travel time out of the plume exposure pathway EPZ has been determined using the average vehicle speed calculated by the NETVAC2 model. along the appropriate evacuation route. Data for these calculations has been taken from the general population evacuation simulation for the full EPZ winter daytime scenario for both normal and adverse weather conditions. The winter simulation has been utilized for these special facility evacuation time estimates since the winter period is concurrent with the school year. The individual mobilization time estimates for each i special facility have been combined with the travel time out of the plume exposure pathway EPZ to calculate the total special facilities evacuation time. l 4 l l_ : 4-7 l
1 .. .. TABLE 4-1 i PUBLIC RESPONSE TIME ESTIMATES (1) Average Time for Event (minutes) (2) Receive Warning (3) 15 Leave Work (4) 15 Travel Home(4) Normal Weather 30 Adverse Weather (5) 45 Evacuate Home 30 NOTES: .
. (1) Favorably reviewed by Ogle County and State of Illinois ESDA Officials.
(2) See Figure 4-1 for public response distribution curves. (3) An average time of 15 minutes has been utilized with a 0 to 30 minute time distribution. (4) Daytime evacuation scenarios only. (5) Based on a reduced adverse weather road capacity factor of 0.7. 1 of 1
1.0 - - _ --- ______ _ _ _ _ _
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70 - 9 NIGHT DAY NORMAL DAY ADVERSE Q,7 _ WEATHER WEATHER J
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o ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' o 20 40 so so Ico 120 14 0 iso iso 200 220 TIME, MINUTES NOTE: SEE TABLE 4-1 FOR AVERAGE TIME FOR EVENTS FIGURE 4-1 PUBLIC RESPONSE TIME ESTIMATES
SECTION 5 EVACUATION ROAD NETWORK DESCRIPTION 5.1 ROAD NETWORK DEFINITION The series of roads designated to evacuate the plume exposure pathway EPZ is called the evacuation road network. The network includes major I arterials- and collector roads. The major intersections have been assigned numbers as nodes in the network. The road segments between these nodes are called links. ricare 5-1 illustrates the series of links and nodes that represent the _ation road network for the Byron Station EPZ. Appendix B presents the location of each node by identifying the names of the roads that intersect at that node. The evacuation road network exit nodes, which are located outside the Byron Station EPZ, have been numbered in I the 800s. This evacuation road network has been derived from official Illinois Department of Transportation maps and has been field verified l by road data collection. The evacuation network has been favorably reviewed by ogle County and State of Illinois ESDA officials. 5.2 EOAD CAPACITIES AND CLASSIFICATIONS l The NETVAC2 model used field data, such as road widths and travel i l( speeds, to calculate the capacity of each of the links and nodes in the evacuation network. The specific capacities and classifications of each . road and intersection in the evacuation network are presented in , t I l Appendix C. The majority of the roads in this study have been j l 5-1 ) l l 1
classified as rural undivided highways, with a few rural divided highways. f 4 9 Ii l l t 1 I l l i 5-2 l
NOTE:
, Figure 5-1 is located at the end of this report.
l l I l f i -
SECTION 6 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES
- 6.1 GENERAL PUBLIC EVACUATION TIMES Evacuation time estimates for the general public, including mobilization and travel times, have been calculated using the NETVAC2 model for the various combinations of the ten evacuation study areas that have been i
discussed in Section 2. Each of the ten primary evacuation zones has I l been analyzed for four population combinations associated with summer and winter, day and night times, and normal and adverse weather conditions. Thus, a total of eighty evacuation scenarios have been [ considered in this evacuation time estimate study. Table 6-1 presents f the evacuation time estimates for these NETVAC2 calculations for each
?
[ primary evacuation zone. t l The NETVAC 2 model results have shown that the summer and winter evacuation time estimates for all primary evacuation zones do not differ r I significantly. Under normal weather conditions, evacuation of the full [ EPZ takes about 191 minutes for the daytime scenario and about 106 to l *~ 111 minutes for the nighttime scenario. For adverse weather conditions the evacuation time estimates are about 227 minutes during the day, and about 115 to 123 minutes at night for the full EPZ scenario. [~ In normal weather conditions, the evacuation times for the other 0-10 mile evacuation zones are about 191 minutes during the daytime and range from 106 to 111 minutes for the nighttime condition. The adverse 1
, weather time estimates range from 226 to 227 minutes during the daytime l- and from 114 to 123 minutes during the night.
I 6-1
_..mo_ _a 4 _. f The evacuation time estimates for the four 0-5 mile evacuation zones in normal weather for the daytime range from about 184 minutes to about 191 minutes, and for the nighttime evacuation from 96 to 110 minutes. The adverse weather condition evacuation time estimates for the four 0-5 mile evacuation zones during the day range from about 217 minutes to 2?s minutes, and at night from about 98 to 122 minutes. The evacuation l time estimates for the 0-2 mile evacuation zone are only a few minutes less than the 0-5 mile results. Special events evacuation scenarios, such as the Autumn on Parade in Oregon (attendance approximately 25,000 to 30,000) and large weekend events at the Byron Dragway and Motosport Speedway have been analyzed by i separate simulations. Thm.e special events do not increase the time required to evacuate (191 minutes) the primary evacuation zones even with the larger number of vehicles associated with these special events. ? ^I l' 6.2 SPECIAL FACILITIES EVACUATION TIMES As discussed in Section 4.2, the evacuation time estimates for special l facilities have been calculated separately from those of the general population. These results are shown in Table 6-2. The special facilities evacuation times range from approximately 50 to 60 minutes during normal weather conditions, and from about 51 to about 68 minutes i; during adverse weather conditions. The largest component of these time l estimates is the mobilization time, 45 minutes. This indicates that a significant factor in evacuating many special facilities is the time required to ready persons and necessary vehicles, and not the travel time out of the EPZ. 6-2
1 t 6.3 EVACUATION CONFIRMATION TIMES Evacuation confirmation time, as defined by NUREG 0654, is the time I required for emergency service vehicles to traverse the roads within the primary evacuation zones to confirm that all persons desiring to evacuate have done so. The evacuation confirmation times have been estimated by assuming that emergency service vehicles will drive the l evacuated areas, road by road, at 6 miles per hour. This speed allows for the effective use of public address systems. This speed is about I twice the walking speed of an adult. The number of emergency service t {i vehicles available for confirmation of evacuation has been discussed
, with State of Illinois ESDA personnel and 15 vehicles have been assumed.
The t.ime estimates for evacuation confirmation are presented in Table
, 6-3.
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TABLE 6-2 SPECIAL FACILITIES EVACUATION TIMES Evacuation Time (1) Normal Adverse Facility (2) Location Weather Weather Oregon Schools SSW/5-6 55 58 Mt. Morris Schools WSW/7-8 50 51 Leaf River Schools WNW/6-7 50 52 Byron Schools NNE/4-5 53 57 Stillman Valley Schools ENE/5-6 51 53 Oregon Bible College SSW/4-5 56 62 Lorado Taft Field Campus SW/3-4 60 68 Ogle County Educational Co-op WSW/7-8 50 51
. Oregon Annex School SSW/5-6 54 58 Neighbor's Nursing Home NNE/4-5 54 58 White Pines Manor SSW/5-6 54 58 Pine Crest Manor WSW/7-8 50 51 Ogle County Jail SSW/4-5 56 62 }
NOTES: (1) Times have been rounded to the nearest minute. t (2) Figures 3-11 and 3-13 show Special Facilities locations. 6 e l t I of 1 7 7 "- - - ' - r -
TABLE 6-3 EVACUATION CONFIRMATION TIMES BY PRIMARY EVACUATION ZONE 4 Primary Evacuation Zone (1) Evacuation Confirmation Time (2) 0-2 mile A, B 17 0-5 mile A, B, C 38 0-5 mile A, B, D 30 1 0-5 mile A, B, E 38 0-5 mile A, B, F 35 0-10 mile A-F, G 157
. 0-10 mile A-F, H 161 0-10 mile A-F, I 152 0-10 mile A-F, J 152 Full EPZ A-J 349
~
NOTE: 1-(1) See Figure 2-1 for evacuation study area locations which comprise the primary evacuation zones. (2) Evacuation confirmation times have been rounded to the nearest minute. I ( l 2 l 1 of 1 i
SECTION 7 i CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Based upon this evacuation time estimate study, it has been concluded that the entire population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for Byron Station (including the general public and special facilities) could be evacuated in 3 to 4 hours in most situations. The longest
- daytime evacuation time estimate for the full EPZ in normal weather is , approximately 191 minutes. The longest daytime adverse weather evacuation time estimate for the full ESI is approximately 227 minutes.
For the eighty baseline, evacuation scenarios, the NETVAC2 model results indicate that there has been no queuing (backup) on the evacuation road i network during summer or winter, daytime or nighttime evacuations in either normal or adverse weather conditions. Consequently, the , y evacuation time estimates are only slightly longer than the total public i response times. For the special event evacuation scenarios, the NETVAC2 model results l indicate that there will be queuing in the evacuation road network. The I special event evacuation simulation of the Autumn on Parade indicates
; queuing in Oregon at all intersections in the evacuation road network.
Also, the special event evacuation simulation of large weekend events at the Byron Dragway and Motosport Speedway indicates queuing along Ge rman Church Road south of the town of Byron including the intersection of 1 Route 72, River Road and German Church Road. j As discussed in Section 6.1, these special events do not increase the i time required to evacuate the primary evacuation zones. The queuing 7-1 1 l
I . t indicated in the special events simulations could be reduced through the
. deployment of traffic control personnel.
The results, conclusions, and recommendations of this study have beca 9 provided to ogle County and State of Illinois Emergency Services and l Disaster Agency officials. V ~
. *N i .
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a l I 1 APPENDIX A k NETVAC2 DESCRIPTION l
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9 APPENDIX A
, NETVAC2 DESCRIPTION
, This Appendix describes the general structure of the NETVAC2 Model and three of its major features: the dynamic route selection, the priority treatment of flow at unsignalized intersections, and the capacity calculat* ion. General Structure i NETVAC2 is organized in four basic units (procedures): the main program,
.- the data procedure, the preprocessor, and the simulator. This section briefly explains the functions of each of these units. The main program I
i controls the entire execution. It starts by calling on the data procedure, which reads in the data and execution instructions, then calls in the preprocessor, which performs some preliminary capacity
- < calculations. Next, the main program controls the simulation itself and the reporting of the network conditions at specified intervals including the plotting. This program also controls the rest of the reports and i ,.
the length of the simulation by terminating the program once the network is empty (or after a specified time). l _ The data procedure reads in the network, the parameters and the options ! to be used in the run. This subroutine uses a special list processing tachnique to store the r.etwork; the link list is stored with both i forward and backward pointers. In other words, all the links pointing into and out of any given node can be easily identified at any moment A-2
during the simulation. This list processing technique is one of the keys to the model's computational efficiency. On request, the data procedure performs a set of checks on the network to ensure connectivity and validity. It also performs a set of checks o.- the input data to identify coding errors. It is expected that these checks we,uld be performed only once for each site studied. If errors are found, the routine keeps scanning the network until it has been completely checked and the run is then terminated. The data procedure also produces a set of warnings if unlikely (but possible) situations are encountered.
/
- l+ The processor procedure converts the physical description of each link into measures of capacity, speed and density. For each specified type of link, the preprocessor computes two types of capacity
t . section capacity - which is the capacity along the link regardless of downstream intersection restrictions; and [ t.i
,. . approach capacity - which is the capacity of the link to handle vehicles approaching the downstream intersection.
. Section capacities are associated with highway sections whereas the traffic flow through intersections is controlled by the approach i
capacity. NETVAC2 computes both capacities since they serve different 3, purpo'ses. The section capacity serves as an upper bound on the flow that can move along a link, restricting the number of vehicles that will reach the intersection during a simulation interval and the number of A-3 1
vehicles that can be loaded onto a link from the intersection. The
. approach capacity, on the other hand, limits the number of cars that can actually move through the intersection. Vehicles that reach the intersection but cannot move through it are assir id to a queue.
The NETVAC2 simulator includes two seperate procedures, the link pass and the node pass. The link pass handles the flow on the links while the node pass handles the transfer of flow from link to link. Dynamic Route Selection (~ NETVAC2 does not use a pre-specified set of turning movements at each intersection; instead, the turning movements are determined at each I simulation interval as a function of the changing traffic conditions and direction of the links. Drivers approaching an intersection are assumed to make a choice of outhound (away from the intersection) links based on
! how fast this outbound link can get them to safety. This, in turn, is a
- function of the direction of the outbound links (away from the nuclear i
plant or hazard area) and the traffic conditions on the outbound links. ( i The route selection procedure used in NETVAC2 reflects the two above-mentioned choice criteria through a user-supplied " preference factor" which is specified for each link and the speeds on each of the outbound links. To facilitate the explanation of the route choice mechanism, let PF3 denote the perference factor for the j-th outbound
)
link at some intersection. In other words, the relative 'a priori' preference of link j is PFj kPFk where the sum goes over all the links i. emanating out of the node under consideration (including j). The chcice A-4
probability, or the share of drivers choosing an outbound link j out of a given intersection at (simulated) time t, P3 (t), is determined as a function of the preference factors and the speeds on all the outbound I links are PF x P (t) = I . U)(t) 3 f kPFk
- U k(t) where Uj(t) is the speed on link j at time t. Note that driver behavior t during an evacuation is assumed to be myopic in that only information .
l { regarding the benediate outbound links at each intersection is assumed are to influence route choice decisions. Also note that the P)(t)s t l computed for each incoming link separately due to turning prohibitions from some links into some other links (a reference to the incoming link i
! was omitte'd from the notation of the choice probability for clarity of
' exposition).
t
'- The Priority Treatment Even under evacuation conditions, it can be expected that traffic from certain links approaching an unsignalized intersection would have the right of way over incoming traffic from lower priority approaches.
Since it is not clear that such priority would correspond to the
'- existing intersection controls, the inupt to NETVAC2 includes a user-specified link priority parameter. This is a binary parameter I
i j indicating primary or secondary priority of a link. l l r A-5 f I l
i i The volume of vehicles being processed (at every intersection and at each simulation interval) and transferred from inbound to outbound links is subject to several constraints which determine the effective capacity of the intersection. During the simulation, traffic coming in from all ! primary priority links is assigned to the intersection first, subject only to the intersection capacity constraints. Lower p;iority traffic, on the other hand, is restricted by both the capacity of the intersection and the effect of the higher priority traffic.
; The capacity of the secondary priority approaches is a function of the gap acceptance behavior of the minor approach drivers and the headway distribution in the primary approaches' flow. To model the cepacity of secondary priority approaches, a capacity allocation problem procedure l is utilized. The secondary priority approaches emit traffic only under one of the following conditions: first, if there is residual intersection capacity from the primary priority traffic, flow can be j, emitted into the intersection from the secondary priority road subject to the residual capacity constraint. Second, if the residual capacity is zero, NETVAC2 provides some small capacity for the lower priority approaches to allow for " sneak-in" effects.
4 Note that the priority treatment applies only to unsignalized
- intersections and that both types of approaches (primary and secondary priority) are treated identically in the model in all respects except for the added constraint on the flow from secondary priority approaches.
A-6
l Capacity Calculations The capacity of a transportation facility is the maximum flow that can go through the facility. NETVAC2 determines capacity in two stages: first, the preprocessor assigns a section capacity and an approach capacity to each link in the network. Second, approach capacities are updated throughout the simulation depending on the conditions at certain
~
points in the simulation. l I The capacity calculations are based on the Highway Research Board's
; Highway Capacity Manual (HCM). Following this reference, the section capacity is calculated in the preprocessor for links with and without j physical separation between opposing directions while the approach capacity is calculated as a function of the physical conditions (width, I parking, turning pockets, etc.), environmental conditions (area type, l .
peak hour and load factors), traffic cha-acteristics (traffic mix and 4 ! percentage of turning movements), and appro ach type. Derivation: of i . (, j ' these calculations are outlined in the users manual for the model. As mentioned before, the approach capacities calculated in the preprocessor are not the actual bounds on the f'.ow. NETVAC2 adjusts the
.I approach capacity continuously in order to refitet the changing vehicular movements resulting from the dyr.amic route selection. The capacity of the i th approach coming inte an intersection at simulation interval t, C;(t) is given by:
, Cg (t) = Cg , x AL(t) x AR(t) l
- A-7 i
l l
9 1 where Cg is the standard capacity of link i calculated by the preprocessor and AL(t) and AR(t) are the correction factors for left and right turning movements, respectively. These correction factors are a function of the percent of turning traffic, the approach width, and parking allowance, as suggested by the HCM. These factors do not apply when the turning traffic is using special turning lanes or turning pockets. i t
.?
l
}
l l I I i I i l I A-8 l r 1
I APPENDIX B 1 1 EVACUATION NETWORK NODE IDENTIFICATION f' t i 4 l l I l i l l l B-1 l
.. . l l
APPENDIX B ' I EVACUATION NETWORK NODE IDENTIFICATION Node Location 5 Rte. 64 & Church Rd. 6* Rte. 64 & Meridian Rd. 7* Lindenwood Rd. & Meridian Rd. 8* Church Rd. & Lindenwood Rd. 11* Holcomb Rd. & Church Rd. i i 12* Holcomb Rd. & Meridian Rd. r 13* Rte. 72 & Meridian Rd. 14 Rte. 72 & Rothwell Rd.
', 15 Rte. 72 (Chicago St.) & Rte. 51 16 Rte. 72 & Stillman Rd.
I 17* Stillman Rd. & Holcomb Rd. (east of Stillman Rd.) 18* Stillman Rd. & Holcomb Rd. (west of Stillman Rd.) 19* Holcomb Rd. & German Church Rd. I 20* Hill St., Seventh St. & Pine St. l
, 21* Rte. 64 & German Church Rd.
I 22* Rte. 64 & Chana Rd. '
, 23* Chana Rd. & Brick Rd.
! I 24* Brick Rd. & Stillman Rd. 28* Daysville Rd., Honey Creek Rd. & Lowden Rd. I 29* Rte. 64 & Daysville Rd. 30 Rte. 64 & River Rd. l 31 Rte. 64 (Washington St.) & Third St. 32* Third St. & Gale St. B-2 ( I i
APPENDIX B (Cont) Node Location l 33* Gale St. & Rte. 2 (Fourth St.) 34 Rte. 2 (Fourth St.) & Rte. 64 (Washington St.) i 35* Rte. 64 & Monroe St. 36* Rte. 64 & Ridge Rd. F 37* Ridge Rd. & Oregon Trail [ 38* Pines Rd. & Ridge Rd. (east of Ridge Rd.) 39* Pines Rd. & Ridge Rd. (west of Ridge Rd.) 41* Brayton Rd. & S. McKendrie Ave. 42 N. McKendrie Ave. & Rte. 64 (E. Hitt St.) 43* Rte. 64 (E. Hitt St.) & Ogle Ave. 44* Mt. Morris Rd. & West Grove Rd.
, 45* West Grove Rd. & Leaf River Rd.
46* Rte. 2 & Mud Creek Rd. - 47* Rte. 72 & Mt. Morris Rd. 49* Rte. 72 & Hain St. 50* Rte. 72 & Pecatonica Rd. 51* Rte. 2 & Rte. 72 52* Rte. 2 (Main St.) & Tower Rd. l l 53* Second St. & Tower Rd. 54 Union St. & Rte. 2 (Main St.) 55* Second St. & Union St. l 56* Tower Rd. & Mill Rd. (east of Tower Rd.) 57* Tower Rd. 6 Mill Rd. B-3
.. e APPENDIX B (Cont)
Node Location 58* Montague Rd. & Tower Rd. 59* Fecatonica Rd. & Montague Rd. 62* Rte. 72, German Church Rd. & River Rd. 63* Rte. 72 & Kishwaukee Rd. 64* Rte. 2 & Kennedy Hill Rd.
! 65* Kennedy Hill Rd. & McGregor Rd.
66* McGregor Rd. & Meridian Rd. 67* Rte. 2 & Meridian Rd. 68* Meridian Rd. & Kishwaukee Rd. 69* Stillman Valley Rd. & Meridian Rd. 74 Montague Ed. & Osborne Rd. 75* Westfield Rd., Kennedy Hill Rd. & Montague Rd. 86* Stillman Valley Rd. & Rothwell Rd. 88 Rte. 64, 1 block north of Monroe St. I 89 Rte. 2 (Fourth St.) & Ford St. j 90* Jackson St., between Rte. 2 & Rte. 64 91* Rte. 2 & Camling Rd. I ; 92* Rte. 72 & Junction Rd. 93* Rte. 2 & Castle Rd. 94* Rte. 64 (W. Hitt St.) & S. Reynolds Ave. 103* Rte. 64 & White Rock Rd. 104 Lindenwood Rd. & Stillman Valley Rd. 105* Brick Rd. & German Church Rd. l B-4
APPENDIX B (Cont) Node Location 206* Honey Creek Rd. & Chana Rd. 107* Daysville Rd. (Daysville North City Limits) 108* River Rd. & Park Rd. 109* River Rd. & Spring Creek Rd. 110* River Rd. & Devil's Lane l 111* River Rd. & Razorville Rd. 112* River Rd. & Byron Dragway Entrance i 113* Ash Rd. & German Church Rd. 114* German Church Rd. & N. Site Access Rd. 115* German Church Rd. & S. Site Access Rd.
- 116* Rte. 72 & Bradley St.
117* Stillman Rd. & Valley Dr. 118* Rte. 72 & Armour Rd. 120* Holcomb Rd. & Junction Rd. 121 Rothwell Rd. & Edson Rd. 122 Tower Rd. & Byron High School Entrance 124* Mt. Morris Rd. & Midtown Rd. 125 West Grove Rd. & 4deline Rd. 129* Kendall Rd. & Montague Rd. 801** Rte. 51, north of Utility Rd. 802** Rte. 72, west of Blackwood Rd. 803** Rte. 51 & Big Mound Rd. . 804** Rte. 51 & Holcomb Rd. J B-5
.s ..
1 APPENDIX B (Cont) Node Location 805** Rte. 51 & Lindenwood Rd. 806** Rte. 64 & First St. 807** Chana Rd. & Flagg Rd. 808** Flagg Rd. & Daysville Rd. 809** Hay Rd. & Lowden Rd. 810** Rte. 2, north of Nashua Township line 811** Ridge Rd. & Henry Rd. 812** Pines Rd. & Columbian Rd. 313** Canada Rd. & Lowell Park 814** Rte. 64, east of Maple Grove Rd. i 815** West Grove Rd., east of Cedar Rd. i
~
816** Rte. 72, east of Adeline Rd. I 817** Egan Rd. & Leaf River Rd. 816'* Spielman Rd. & Montague Rd. 819** Pecatonica Rd., south of Murphy Rd. 820** Osborne Rd. . south of Edwardsville Rd. 821** Westfield Rd., south of Edwardsville Rd. 822** Severson Rd. & Montague Rd. 823** Meridian Rd., south of Tipple Rd. 824** Rte. 2 & Prairie Rd. 825** Kishwaukee Rd. & Stillman Valley Rd.
- Utilized as a vehicle entry node.
** Utilized as a vehicle exit node located outside the EPZ.
B-6
y . _ _ s# g@ l APPEND 7X C i NETVAC2 COMPUTER OUTPUT F e I I i C-1
,. ,=
a APPENDIX C KEY TO NETVAC2 COMPUTER PRINTOUT ! 1 LINK = Link identification number-FRM = Upstream node number (A-node) for associated link
=
TO Downstream node number (B-node) for associated link LEN = Link length in feet (A-node to B-node) AW = Approach width in feet l
; LW = Link lane width in feet
- SW = Lateral clearance or shoulder width in feet = Distance from edge of travel-way to obstructions along link midblock
, L = Number of lanes in direction of travel PR = Priority of movement along link, in re'ference to movement along intersecting links. Dominant or major link approaches are classified as Priority 1. Secondary (i.e., those link approaches controlled by stop signs, yield signs, etc.) approaches are generally classified as
; Priority 2.
LT = Lane type, classified as follows: l 1 - One-way, no parking
! 2 - One-way, parking on one side
, 3 - One-way, parking on both sides 4 - Two way, no parking 5 - Two-way, with parking 6 - Rural dividtd highway, no parking , 7 - Rural undivided highway, no parking 8 - Freeways and expressways l AT = Area type,, classified as follows: 1 - Central business district 2 - Fringe i 3 - Outer business district 4 - Residential PK = T
- Parking along link permitted F - Parking along link prohibited SPD = Free-flow or average speed over link in n.11es per hour JAH = Jam Denrity or relative measure of link's carrying capacity in vehicles per mile C-2 l
.. s s l
APPENDIX C (Cont) PRF = User preference or moverent along each outbound link in terms of percentage. Preferences are initially assigned based upon free-flow conditions. Actual route assignments are calculated by the program, considering the assigned preference s as well as speed, density and , capacity relationships. FCAP = Link capacity per lane STR SPLT CAP
= Identifies node destination of straight movement from , downstream node, and associated percent green signal time (split) and intersection capacity.
RGT SPLT CAP
= Identifies node destination of right-turn movement from downstream node, and associated percent green signal time and special turning lane capacity, if applicable.
LFT SPLT CAP
= Identifies node destination of left-turn movement from downstream node, and associated percent green signal time and special turning lane capacity, if applicable.
DIAG SPLT CAP g
= Identifies node destination of diagonal movement from downstream node, and associated percent green signal time and capacity.
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