ML20069M115
| ML20069M115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1982 |
| From: | Haight R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
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| NUDOCS 8211230062 | |
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Text
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O ASSESSMENT OF EMERGENCY EARLY WARNING AT 3l WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM HANFORD SITE
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I R.F. Haight, Supervisor Radiological Assessment and Audit Washington Public Power Supply System October 1982 l
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D I l I This study assesses the reduced health risks and costs associated with various options for providing emergency lI I
notification of occupants within a ten-mile radius of the Washin ton Public Power Supply System Nuclear Project No. 2 (WNP-2 at Hanford, Washington. It is shown that early I warning systems provide extremely small incremental risk reductions and are not cost effective. It is also shown that approximately 98 percent of the possible risk-reduction benefit from early warning in the ten-mile
,l Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) can be attained at less than 10 percent of the cost of a complete system which warns all occupants within 15 minutes.
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Table of Contents
.Page 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Site Characteristics 2.1 Demography 2.1.1 Resident Population within Ten Miles 2.1.2 Transient Population Within Ten Miles !
2.1.3 Population Between Ten and Fifty Miles 2.2 Meteorology 2.3 Hanford Emergency Response Resources 3.0 Assumptions and Calculational Methodology 3.1 Assumptions 3.2 WNP-2 Early Warning i 3.3 Source Tems l 3.4 Accident Sequences 4.0 Results '
5.0 Error and Sensitivity Discussion 5.1 Source Term Errors 5.2 ALARA l 5.3 Population Changes 5.4 Response Time 5.5 General Applicability to Other Sites 5.6 Value of Reduced Fatality [
i 6.0 Conclusions
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Following the Three Mile Island accident, the concept of an early warning system evolved and has been codified in federal regulations. The coverage of the system has been tied to the area of the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in its rulemaking proceedings, stated that "The size of the EPZs for a nuclear power plant shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." This study examines the bene-fits and costs of various early warning system coverage options with respect to the NRC criteria for determining EPZ size.
Washington Public Power Supply System Plant #2 (WNP-2)is located on an extremely low population site. The plant is approximately four miles west' of the Columbia River on the Department of Energy's Hanford Reservation in East-ern Washington. It is ten miles from the boundary of the nearest community. '
There is no permanent resident within three miles of the site, and between three and ten miles there are only 1300 residents. The area has historically been involved in nuclear operations, and there is currently a large pool of technical people and resources. In addition, the Department of Energy (DOE),
the State, and counties have active emergency preparedness programs. These unique features are important considerations in establishing emergency pre-paredness provisions such as early warning capability.
In this study, the population within the ten-mile EPZ was found to consist of four groups, as follows and as shown on Figure 1-1. .
A. Hanford workers B. Residents C. Recreationists within five miles D. Recreationists within five to ten miles
,4 The study uses probabalistic analysis methods and the CRAC II computer code (References 1 and 2) to evaluate the probable benefits from early warning of '
cach of the groups and from the early warning of the total ten-mile popula-tion. Costs are estimated for each segment of the warning system and cost- -
effectiveness ratios determined.
l It is shown that risk reductions provided by early warning are small and that l only providing early warning for only Group A attains 98 percent of the poten-tial risk reduction at less than 10 percent cf the cost of the blanket (ten-mile radius) early warning system.
This report is presented in six major sections: Section' 2.0 provides a description of Hanford Site features, including demography, meteorology, and emergency preparedness resources which are important when considering early warning options. Section 3.0 describes assumptiens 'and computational method ,' '
ology used in this study. Section 4.0 reports the computational results.
Section 5.0 discusses error and parameter sensitivity considerations, and finally, Section 6.0 summarizes the study's conclusions.
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1 i i t. A HANFORD Rt St RV AilON FIGURE 1-1 POPULATION GROUPS . _
2.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS 2.1 Demography WNP-2 is located in the southeast area of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford site in Benton County, Washington. The site is approximately 3 miles west of the Columbia River at River Mile 352, approximately 10 miles north of North Richland, 18 miles northwest of Pasco, and 21 miles northwest of Kennewick (Figures 2-1 and 2-2).
In 1980, the population densities within the 10 , 20 , and 30 mile radii were 4, 73,, and 51 people per square mile, respectively. In 2030, the densi-ties at the samelistances are estimated to be 13,123, and 8 , respectively.
The calculations in this analysis are performed for the population out to 200 miles. The computer code uses a 16-sector grid, anf each sector is com-posed of 26 radial distances. Table 2-1 shows how the population grid was formed. Table 2-2 lists the WNP-2 population by sector and radial distance.
2.1.1 Resident Population Within Ten Miles The ten-mile radius around the site is shown in Fi In 1980, an esti-mated 1306 people were living within this radius. gure This2-2.
number was derived from counts of households, based on information by the Postal Service and county plier (3.0) was applied. assessor's The nearestoffice, to which inhabitants an average occupy persons-per-household farms which are multi-located east of the Columbia River and are thinly spread over five compass sectors. There are no permanent inhabitants located within three miles of the site. Only about 80 persons reside between the three-mile and the five-mile radii, and all are east of the Columbia River. Within a five-mile radius of the site, there are no proposed public facilities (schools, hospitals, etc.),
business f acilities, or primary transportation routes for use by large numbers of people.
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No significant changes in land use within five miles are anticipated. The Hanford site is expected to remain dedicated primarily to industrial use with-f out private residences. No change in the use of the land east of the Columbia River is expected since it currently is irrigated to about the maximum amount practicable.
The industrial areas in the northern part of Richland and the residential area south-southwest of the Yakima River near the Horn Rapids Dam are within the ten-mile radius. The residential area near the Horn Rapids Dam is unincorpo-rated. The primary increase in population within the ten-mile radius is expected to be in this area (see Table 2-3).
There are no population centers within ten miles of the site. The nearest population center is the city of Richland,12 miles to the south. The nearest residents within the city are located just outsiae the ten-mile radius south-southwest of the site. The 1980 population of 33,578 is expected to grow to about 61,000 in the year 2000. Most of this growth is expected to be to the south and south-southeast. The growth to the north is expected to be about 500 persons at a distance of eight to ten miles from the site. .
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2.1.2 Transient Population Within Ten Miles The transient population consists of agricultural workers needed for harvest-ing crops produced in the region, industrial and construction workers, both on and off the Supply System's site, and sportsmen engaged in hunting, fishing, and boating. Figure 2-3 shows the distribution of the transient population. '
ll Table 2.4 lists industrial employnent within ten miles of the project site and 4
accounts for all shif ts. The majority of these individuals are directly involved with research and operation of various programs and facilities for the Department of Energy and its contractors on the Hanford Site. Most of this workday population reside within 10 to 30 miles, of the project and are also included in the total resident population for the area.
Many agricultural workers are located within the 50-mile radius during the early spring and late fall months. In the st. ier months, during peak harvest, the agricultural labor force is an estimated 34,000. However, within the ten-mile' radius, only an estimated 1000 migrant workers are employed during the peak months of May and June. These workers are concentrated in the north-a to-south-southeast sectors on the irrigated farm units located east of the Columbia River in Franklin County. Approximately 925 of these workers reside temporarily between the five- to ten-mile radii; the remaining 75 are located within five miles of the site. Hunting, boating, and fishing activities within the ten-mile radius are also centered in the north to south-southeast sectors along the' Columbia River. Recreational facilities near the plant consist of Horn Rapids Park near the Horn Rapids Dam on the Yakima River, Ringold and Wahluke Wildlife Refuges, and the Columbia River. The Horn Rapids 4
Park, also known as Columbia Camp, is located about nine miles southwest of the site. This park is_ presently undeveloped, and it is unlikely that more than 30 people would be there at one time. The wildlife refuges are located between the northeast boundary of the Hanford Site and the Columbia River. '
- These areas contain about 4,000 acres of DOE land which are managed by the Department of Game for hunting and fishing. The Columbia River borders the j refuge areas and is open to the public as far as the Hanford Townsite, ]
1 approximately eight miles upstream from the plant. The Ringold Fish Hatchery is located outside of the southern boundary of the Ringold Wildlife Refuge, l within five miles of the site, and encourages steelhead fishing nearby. l
, The number of fishermen and hunters along the Columbia River varies with the season, the weather, the day of the week, and the time of day. The main hunt- !
ing season is from mid-October until the end of January, and the main fishing )
season is from June through November. The heaviest use of the area for both sports is on weekends and holidays in the early morning hours. It is esti-
, mated that the peak number of hunters and/or fishermen present in the area l
would total 1,000. It is estimated that, on the average, 10 hunters are pres-ent in the area on weekdays; the number increases to 50 on weekends and holi-
. days. The average number of fishermen present is 50 and 100 for weekdays and weekends and holidays, respectively. Hunters and fishermen also have access to the Yakima River in the southwest and south-southwest sectors, where they may total 50. During the summer months, recreational boaters are present on the Coltsnbia River, particularly within the south-southeast sector.
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2.1.3 Population Between Ten and Fifty Miles About 252,000 people were estimated to be living within a 50-mile radius of the WNP-2. project in 1980. Beginning with the ten-mile radius, the population count increases rapidly because of the Tri-Cities region to the south and i south-southeast. Total population within the 20-mile radius was estimated to be 91,734 in 1980, or about 37 percent of the total within 50 miles. When the {
30-mile radius is reached, another 52,000 persons can be added to the resident population, making the number of residents within the entire 30-mile radius total 143,735. Most of this zone's population count stems from the contri-bution of compass sectors containing the Tri-Cities and the residents of the fringe areas. Based on 1980 census reports, the Tri-Cities are the only sig-nificantly large Richland (33,578), population Kennewick centers located (34,397), and Pasco in the(17,944).
10- to 30-mile zone:
The next 10 miles (to the 40-mile range) adds another 41,135 persons, for a total 40-mile radius count of 184,870; while the 50-mile range adds the final 66,814 persons, for a total of 251,684 persons living within a 50-mile radius of the construction site in 1980.
Future increases in population are expected to be in the southeast to south-southwest sectors which include the entire Tri-Cities and adjoining areas.
Little increase is generated westward. The population increases in the rural areas are based on the expected increase in irrigated agriculture. The rest of the population is primarily in the Tri-Cities area as a result of increased activity on the Hanford Site and expansion of agricultural activities through-out the general region.
From the estimated 1980 population of 251,684, the population is projected to be 301,943 in 1990, 336,115 in 2000, and 360,395 in 2010 within the 50-mile radius. By 2020, the population within the 50-mile radius is estimated at 379,930, and by 2030 at 383,828, which is a 53 percent increase over 1980.
[ The population beyond 50 miles from WNP-2 has no significant impact on t
probable effects, although the total population out to 200 miles was included in the calculations.
f 2.2 Meteorology This section briefly discusses the key meteorological parameters with respect i to probablistic analysis of accidents. A detailed description of site meteorology can be found in Section 2.3 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (Reference 3).
f The meteorological parameters which are of importance in probabalistic risk assessment are wind direction, wind speed, and stability category. Precipi-tation is also of importance to the analysis; however, precipitation's primwy effect is on ground deposition, which has very little bearing on early warning system effectiveness.
The CRAC II computer code uses a special form of meteorological sampling. It first analyzes one year of meteorology and places all meteorological values into 29 separate categories, called met bins, and determines the probability 5
O associated with each bin. Four random samples are then taken from each bin, and the effect and probability calculated for each event. Since each bin represents a different type of meteorological condition, this sampling method assures that all types of conditions, including those with low probability and severe consequence, are sampled.
The climatewide at WNP-2 subject to somewhat seasonalisrange a relatively mild, continental in temperature. steppe climate,is Annual precipitation approximately 6.4 inches and occurs mainly in the winter months.
The winds at the WNP-2 site show a slight bimodal distribution centering around the northwest and south-southwest. Percentages of wind range from a high of 11 percent for winds from the northwest to a minimum of 3 percent for winds from the east. Time periods of directional persistence are associated with relatively good diffusion parameters with unstable through moderately stable stability and moderate to light winds. Poor stability conditions, stable conditions and low wind speeds, are fairly uniformly distributed with respect to direction and tend to occur late at night and early in the morning. Table 2-5 gives the met bin break-down for WNP-2. Tables 2-6 through 2-12 give joint frequency tables for WNP-2 by stability class.
Figure 2-4 is the Wind Rose for the WNP-2 Site. The maximum wind directions are west-southwest and southwest. Strong winds occur during the winter months, light winds are frequent during the f all and early summer. Calms
(<.8 mph) occur approximately 10 percent of the time.
2.3 Hanford Emergency Preparedness Resources The primary benefit of an early warning system is to shorten the response time of evacuation. Response time is the time from recognition of a need for pro-tective actions until actual departure from a residence occurs. Response time is the sum of the following four separate events:
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, Time for operator to notify authorities. J 2.
Time for authorities to interpret data and decide to evacuate.
- 3. Time for authorities to notify public.
4 Time for population to mobilize and commence evacuation.
Evaluation of actual public protection, however, requires consideration of all l four of these events, plus time for the population to clear the affected area or to take other protective actions.
l Early warning affects only event number three, i.e., the time required for authorities to notify the public. Properly implemented emergency preparedness plans and resources can productively influence the total sequence leading to protection of the surrounding population.
The Hanford area, with its history of nuclear operations, contains a large pool of technical personnel and resources, constituting an exceptional emer-gency response capability. While this study does not attempt to quantify the public safety benefits of Hanford resources, the unique ability to evaluate i
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and mitigate the consequences of a nuclear accident is an important factor in determining emergency preparedness needs. The followin examples of available emergency preparedness resources.g paragraphs describe In addition to the Supply System's computerized and back-up meteorology monitoring and dose projection systems, the Supply System maintains mutual assistance agreements that make available meteorology and dose projection capability through the Department of Energy and Battelle Pacific Northwest 1.aboratories. The DOE meteorology-monitoring capability consists of a network of multiple meteorological towers and access to the national weather network i AF05 system. The DOE dose projection system is completely independent of the i Supply System operation.
The Benton and Franklin County Sheriffs' offices both maintain manpower levels capable of routinely patrolling large areas. Concentrating those resources in the relatively small populated areas around the WNP-2 plant can provide effec-tive coverage for the sparse population. Additionally, the bi-county Depart-ment of Emergency Services operation maintains arrangements with the Civil Air Patrol, and the area contains rural volunteer fire departments with the usual notification capabilities.
The United States Coast Guard maintains river control capability of the city of Kennewick. Agreenents and procedures are in place for closing and clearing the river of recreationists. Department of Energy jet boats are available to assist if needed.
The Supply System maintains mutual assistance agreements with the Department of Energy, Exxon, Portland General Electric, and INP0. The first two are based locally and are innediately available, as is the Department of Energy l IRAP (Interagency Radiological Assistance Program) team. Along with the l
Supply System teams, the agreement resources are available to evaluate off-site conditions and assist with protection actions on short notice.
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TABLE 2.1 POPULATION SPATIAL GRID DESCRIPTION REGION OUTER RADIUS (MI) AVE. RADIUS (MI) AREA (MI**2) 1 1.00E+00 5.00-01 1.96E-01 2 2.00E+00 1.50E+00 5.89E-01 3 3.00E+00 2.50E+00 9.82E-01 4 4.00E+00 3.50E+00 1.38E+00 5 5.00E+00 4.50E+00 1.77E+00-6 6.00E+00 5.50E+00 2.16E+00 7 7.00E+00 6.50E+00 2.55E+00 8 8.00E+00 7.50E+00 2.95E+00 9 9.00E+00 8.50F+00 3.34E+00 10 1.00E+01 9.50E+00 3.73E+00 11 1.50E+01 1.25E+01 2.46E+01 12 2.00E+01 1.75E+01 3.44E+01 13 2.50E+01 2.25E+01 4.42E+01 14' 3.00E+01 2.75E+01 5.40E+01' 15 3.50E+01 3.25E+01 6.38E+01 16 4.00E+01 3.75E+01 7.37E+01 17 4.50E+01 4.25E+01 8.35E+01 18 5.00E+01 4.75E+01 9.35E+01 19 5.50E+01 5.25E+01 1.03E+02 20 6.00E+01 5.75E+01 1.13E+02 l 21 6.50E+01 6.26R+01 1.23E+02 22 7.00E+01 6.75E+01 1.33E+02 23 8.50E+01 7.75E+01 4.57E+02 24 1.00E+02 9.25E+01 5.45E+02 25 1.50E+02 1.25E+02 2.46E+03 26 2.00E+02 1.75E+02 3.44E+03
REFERENCES
- 1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Reactor Safety Study," WASH 1400 (NUREG-75/014), October 1975.
- 2. L.T. Richie, J.D. Johnson, R.M. Blond, " Calculations of Reactor Accident Consequences Version 2," Sand 81-1944 (NUREG CR 2326), September 1981.
- 3. Washington Public Power Supply System, " Final Safety Analysis Report WNP-2," Docket No. 50-397, March 1978 as amended.
- 4. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, " Evacuation Risks-An Evaluation,"
EPA-520, 6-74-002, June 1974.
- 5. M.P. Moeller, T. Urbank, A.E. Desrosiers, " Clear - A Generic Transporta-tion Network Model For The Calculation Of Evacuation Time Estimates,"
NUREG CR 2504, March 1982.
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- 6. D.B. Ottley, "Hanford Site Evacuation Time Assessment Study," Washington Public Power Supply System, September 1981.
l 7. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Final Environmental Statement Related To The Operation Of WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2," Docket No. 50-397, NUREG 0812, December 1931.
- 8. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, " Risk Management Guide," ERDA 76-45/11, June 1977.
- 9. H.W. Lewis, et. al., " Risk Assessment Review Group Report To The U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission," NUREG/CR0400, September 1978.
- 10. M. Levinson, R. Rahn, "The Need For Realistic Estimate Of The Consequence Of A Nuclear Accident," paper presented at ANS Winter Meeting, Washington, D.C., November 1980.
- 11. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix I, January 1981.
- 12. W.J. Marble, T.L. Wong, F.J. Moody and D. A. Hankins, " Retention Of Fission Products By BWR Suppression Pools During Severe Reactor Accidents," International Thermal Reactor Safety Conference, Chicago Illinois, August 29-September 2, 1982.
- 13. General Electric Standard Safety Analysis Report (GESSAR-II) Appendix 150, May 1982.
- 14. M.K. Lindell, W.L. Rankin, R.W. Perry, " Warning Mechanisms In Emergency Response System," BHARC/411-80-003, February 1980.
- 15. A.F. Klauss, " Description Of The Early Warning System For The Washington Public Power Supply System Nuclear Plants,1, 2 and 4," Washington Public Power Supply System, December 1981.
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REFERENCES (Continued)
- 16. " Washington Public Power Supply System, Emergency Preparedness Plan, Washington Nuclear Projects 1, 2 and 4," Rev. 2, December 1981.
- 17. R.M. Blond, " Relationship Of Source Term Issues To Emergency Planning,"
paper presented at EPRI Emergency Planning Workshop, May 1982.
- 18. "PRA Procedure Guide," NUREG/CR-2300, September 1981.
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Tahle 2-3 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY C0tfASS SECTOR AND DISTANCE FRDM SITE 1980 1990 P000 P010 ?0 20 ?n30 Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative i Olstance Direction Number Total Number Total Number Total Number Total Number Total Number Total i THITF (Compass Segment) 0-3 All 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3-5 N-NNE O O O O O O O O O O O O NE 10 10 35 35 48 48 52 52 55 55 86 86 ENE 22 32 43 78 56 134 60 112 63 118 64 150 E 22 54 43 121 56 160 60 172 63 181 64 214 ESE 22 76 43 164 56 216 60 232 63 244 64 278 SE 4 80 6 170 9 225 11 243 11 255 12 290 SSE-NNW 0 80 0 170 0 225 0 243 0 255 0 290 5-10 N 26 106 58 228 77 302 83 326 81 342 83 373 NNE 83 189 126 354 152 454 162 488 170 512 172 550
( NE 155 344 198 552 224 67S 240 728 252 764 254 804 ENE 114 4 58 157 709 171 855 190 918 200 964 202 1006 l E 135 593 200 909 257 1112 276 1194 290 1254 293 1299 ESE 168 761 276 1185 34 1 1453 366 1560 385 1639 389 1633 SE 190 951 406 1591 5 36 1989 575 2135 604 2243 610 2298 SSE 45 996 253 1844 308 2237 3 30 2465 347 2590 350 2643 5 50 1046 272 2116 483 2780 518 2983 544 3134 550 3193 l SSW 235 1291 535 2651 809 3509 867 3850 911 4045 9 20 4118 l SW 25 1306 25 2676 25 3614 27 3877 28 4073 29 4117 l WSW-NNW 0 1306 0 2676 0 3614 0 3917 0 4073 0 4147 L
Table 2-4 Industrial employnent in the ten-mile EPZ includes:
WNP-1 (Projected 3/84 construction value) 3500 Plant Support Facility (Projected 3/84 staffed value) 300 DOE, FFTF, Fast Flux Test Facility 1187 Exxon, Horn Rapids Road Facility 750 DOE 300 Area 2918 DOE 3000 Area, Pacific Northwest Laboratory 2016 DOE 1100 Area, Bus Lot, Stores 1040 Supply System, Downtown Complex 1021 Others in Port of Benton Industrial Complex 448 12
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egion Table 2.2 WNP #2 Population Distribution (Scctor & Radius) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 sect 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ,
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( 11 0. O. O. 1.2E3 0. O. O. O. 2.5El 0.
4.9E2 2.6E3 3.8E2 5.3E3 2.2E2 2.5E2 2.0E2 2.2E2 ,7.6E2 8.4E2 9.lE2 9.8E2 3.4E3 4.0E3 5.8E3 2.4E4 12 0. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
4.0E2 5.5E2 7.0E2 8.9E2 4.4E3 1.7E4 3.8E2 4.3E2 7.6E2 8.4E2 t _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
Region TABLE 2.2 WNP #2 (cont'd) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 sect. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 12 9.lE2 9.8E2 3.9E3 4.0E3 5.7E4 1.5E6 13 0 O. O. O. O. O. 0.- O. O. O.
O. O. 5.4E2 6.6E2 1.7E3 1.9E3 6.lE3 1.2Er 2.9E3 7.4E4 3.5E3 3.7E3 1.3E4 1.5E4 4.8E4 2.2E5 14 3.5E3 0. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
1.9E3 1.4E3 8.0El 1.0E2 6.5E2 7.5E2 8.2E2 9.2E2 5.8E2 6.9E2 6.9E2 1.8E4 1.0E4 3.lE3 7.lE5 2.5E6 15 0. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. 9.9E2 2.0El 2.2El 1.9E2 5.2E2 3.8E2 4.3E2 5.8E2 6.4E2 6.9E2 7.0E2 2.9E4 5.6E3 2.5E4 6.4E5 16 0. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.
O. O. 8.0El- 1.0E2 3.2E2 1.3E3 2.5E2 2.8E2 1.2E3 1.3E3 1.5E3 1.7E3 6.2E3 7.4E3 2.5E4 1.5E4 9
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Taole 2-5 WNP-2 METEOROLOGICAL BIN StJNARY Bin Priorities R: Rain within intervals S: Slowdowns within intervals C,0,E,F: Stability categories 1 (0-1), 2 (1-2), 3 (2-3), 4 (3-5), 5 (GT 5): Wind speed intervals (M/S)
Wind Direction Met Bin 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Total Per C 1R 0 14 7f T6 Ts IT TJ 43 76 7 3 1 2 3 7 TF Fr 231 'T.6J 2R S 6 3 7 2 12 7 12 4 4 4 1 1 3 2 2 3 73 .83 3 R 10 8 3 3 6 4 12 35 10 2 2 1 2 1 5 6 5 105 1.19-4 R 15 4 9 2 3 6 12 17 9 0 2 4 4 0 2 4 5 83 .94 5 R 20 1 3 1 2 2 17 17 8 5 3 2 1 0 1 4 8 75 .85 6 R 25 4 7 1 3 3 8 19 8 6 3 1 2 1 0 4 2 72 .82 7 R 30 4 6 4 2 3 10 19 7 3 2 0 3 0 0 6 4 73 .83 8 S 10 9 8 2 10 7 13 2 5 2 3 3 1 2 0 0 10 77 .87 9 S 15 5 6 1 2 3 8 4 3 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 4 43 .49 10 S 20 8 2 4 2 1 12 3 4 5 4 1 2 0 0 4 5 57 .65 11 S 25 2 3 6 6 1 7 7 3 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 4 44 .50 12 S 30 8 1 3 1 1 7 6 2 2 3 1 0 0 3 0 5 43 .49 13 C 3 106 77 63 56 53 56 133 74 87 49 27 28 26 59 92 104 1090 12.44 14 C 4 170 198 84 86 64 84 62 45 70 26 28 10 7 7 17 42 1001 11.42 15 D 1 12 10 11 3 15 12 22 7 9 3 2 0 5 8 10 11 140 1.59 16 0 2 20 29 23 21 29 4F 108 68 36 35 27 19 10 17 21 38 546 6.23 17 0 3 31 12 15 16 14 49 76 56 44 25 19- 4 5 20 36 51 473 5.39 18 D 4 41 31 8 15 19 84 135 71 37 14 11 4 2 1 19 51 543 6.19 19 D 5 41 67 24 30 14 87 120 49 27 19 3 2 0 0 3 18 504 5.75 20 E 1 12 6 5 10 13 13 21 16 7 8 5 4 3 4 8 7 142 1.62 21 E 2 38 39 28 28 31 50 81 46 37 38 22 11 8 11 30 38 536 6.11 22 E 3 30 20 27 21 23 4A 73 35 22 14 14 5 6 4 31 47 416 4.74 23 E 4 30 17 19 10 20 80 99 23 10 4 3 0 0 5 20 32 372 4.24 24 E 5 24 41 17 13 17 38 17 7 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 17 194 2.21 25 F 1 15 14 17 15 15 18 28 17 35 15 12 14 11 8 15 6 255 2.91 26 F 2 70 41 32 24 37 32 94 89 76 69 52 23 14 22 40 75 790 9.01 27 F 3 67 37 19 18 11 31 55 51 39 16 25 7 1 3 24 106 510 5.82 28 F 4 44 25 8 8 8 23 39 8 1 2 7 0 0 0 8 68 249 2.84 29 F 5 13 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 23 .26
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TABLE 2-9 PERCENT JOIKT REQUIRES TABLE PASQUILL STABILITY CLASS D PERCENT FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE, WIND DIRECTION VS SPEED FROM 4/74 THROUGH 3/76 AT WNP-l/4 FOR 33 FOOT LEVEL TEMPFRATURE CHANGE LESS THAN 0.5 AND GREATER THAN OR EQUAL =1.6 OEGREE8 F PER 200 FEET SPEED CLAS8(MPH)
CALM l.3 a.7 A.12 13.ta 19 24 25.UP UNMNO TO7AL NNE .00 22 52 25 07 01 07 01 1.14 ,
1 NE .00 .17 ~.28 .11 .02 .41 .00 .00 [. 5 6 l ENE .00 .18 .35 12 .on 00 .00 01 .66 E 00 .te .30 06 06 00 00 01 .55 ESE 00 .32 .30 45 00 00 00 01 .67 SE 00 .31 .67 35 05 61 00 01 1.19
$$E .00 3a .e2 39 10 00 00 00 1.76 l
$ 00 .23 .62 49 3a 05 00 01 237 l l
53W .0n .32 .65 1.01 .83 23 .11 05 3.20 i Sw 00 ,3. , 36 ,.0 ,5n ,29 ,15 ,0i 2,13 l WSa 00 2a ,33 26 26 05 1.28 13 61 d 00 23 .35 28 27 .og 05 01 1.30 -
NNW 59 ,49 Nh 00 .a0 .e7 34 06 01 2.31 00 42 ,q6 ,6a 54 31 ,13 06 3.06 NNd 00 .g7 00 01 1.g8
.80 .46 el 3 02 N 00 35 54 37 .it 00 00 00 1.39 VAR .00 .19 01 00 00 00 00 26 46 CALM 00 00 '. 0 0 00 00 00 00 00 00 UNHO 00 02 02 00 00 00 03 TOTAL 00 a;, o n ,.07
,,q 9.98 3 82 1.c6 60 . 25 26 07 0'
TABl.E 2-10 PE2 CENT JOINT FREQUENCY TABLE PASQUILL STABILITY CLASS E PERCENT FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE, WIND DIRECTION VS SPEED FROM 4/74 THROUCH 3/76 AT WNP-1/4 FOR 33 FOOT LEVEL TFMPERATilRF CHANGE tESS TMan 1.6 AND GRE4TFe THAN 04 EQUAL *0.5 DEGREES F PER 200 FEt;T SPEED CLASS (MPH)
CALM 13 a.7 4-12 13-18 19 24 25-UP UNaNo TOTAL NNE 00 7% .18 07 07 0a 05 00 60 NE 00 ,19 ,29 ,04 01 ,00 00 01 5m ENE .00 .t5 45 00 00 27 .0 3 02 .4' E .00 14 .19 02 .00 00 00 01 42 ESE ,00 ,p6 ,t* 05 00 00 00 00 50 SE .00 .31 .e5 25 05 01 00 00 1.07 SSE 00 78 .89 .85 elf 02 00 01 2.22 S ,00 ,18 ,79 ,79 ,a0 ,03 ,00 ,03 2,39 SSW .00 77 .59 .71 32- .11 56 07 2.66 SW .00 24 .57 .37 .as .t7 06 04 1.93 W8W 700 .51 W
32 .a0 .ta 07 .03 .03 1 53 eco 26 ,55 46 15 05 01 .03 1 53 WNW 00 .o9 91 1 19 .75 17 .03 .01 3.57 NW 00 NNW
.a7 1,26 8.74 .48 06 00 00 348 00 .o2 01 47 07 00 00 .02 1 81 N 00 37 38 13 01 00 00 01 .#0 V4R .
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3.0 ASSUMPTIONS AND CALCULATIONAL METHODOLOGY This study used the CRAC II computer code (Reference 2) to evaluate accident consequences associated with various early warning options. The code method-ology considers release categories and atmospheric dispersion, cloud deple-tion, population density, early warning, and evacuation to assess probable health effects and property damage. Figure 3-1 is a simplified schematic outline of the CRAC II computer model.
3.1 Assumptions For purposes of the study, any population covered by an early warning system i
has a total response time of one hour. This is based on Response Events 1, 2, and 3 (Section 2.3) all occurr.ing within one-half hour and Event 4 taking an additional half hour. Early warning is assumed to be 100 percent effective.
This assumption maximizes the computed benefit derived from early warning.
Populations not covered by early warning are assumed to respond in the follow-ing manner: for persons five miles or less from the site, 30 percent respond within one hour, 40 percent respond within three hours, and 30 percent respond within five hours. For persons beyond five miles, 25 percent respond within one hour, 25 percent respond within three hours, 25 percent respond within l five hours, and 25 percent respond within nine hours. This evacuation scenario is slightly more conservative than the Reactor Safety Studies (Reference 1) evacuation which assumed 30 percent of the ten-mile population responding within one hour, 40 percent in three hours, and 30 percent in five hours. It should be noted that the more conservative evacuation was used to coincide with EPA criteria (Reference 4) which states that a rural area requires ten hours to clear, and not because of any special problem with effective evacuation at this site.
Evacuation measures are evaluated for a plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) which is a circular area with a ten-mile radius with the reactor at the center. It is assumed that people living within this area would evacuate promptly upon notification of imminent or actual release of significant quantities of radoactivity to the atmosphere. Significant atmo-spheric releases of radioactivity would, in general, be preceded by one or more hours of warning time (postulated as the time interval between the aware-ness of impending core-melt and the beginning of the release of radioactivity from the Containment Building). To calculate radiological exposure, the model assumes that all people who live in a fan-shaped area (fanning out from the reactor) within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, who would potentially be under the radioactive cloud that would develop following the release, would leave their residences after lapse of a specified amount of response time and then evacuate.
The model assumes that each evacuee moves radially out and in the downwind direction with an average effective speed of ten miles per hour. This value has been verified as attainable even under inclement conditions by inputting population distribution and traffic-handling capabilities into the CLEAR Com-puter Code (References 5 and 6),
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25
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The model incorporates a finite length radioactive cloud in the downwind direction, which is determined by the product of the duration over which the atmospheric release would take place and the average wind speed during the release. It is assumed that the front and the back of the cloud formed move with an equal speed, which is the same as the prevailing wind speed; there-fore, its length would remain constant at its initial value. At any time after the release, the concentration of radioactivity is assumed to be uniform over the length of the cloud. If evacuation is initiated before a radioactive release occurs, all evacuees would have a head start, i.e., the cloud would be initially trailing behind the evacuees. If the evacuation begins after release of the plume, there are three possibilities, depending on initial locations of the evacuees: (a) An evacuee will still have a head start, or (b) The cloud would already be overhead when an evacuee starts out to leave, or (c) An evacuee would be initially trailing behind the cloud. However, th.is initial picture of cloud / people disposition changes as the evacuees travel.
Depending on the relative speed and positions between the cloud and people, it is possible that the cloud and the evacuee could overtake one another one or more times before the evacuee reaches his or her destination.
All evacuation parameters except response time are the same as used in the Reactor Safety Study (Reference 1). These parameters are given in Table 4-1.
3.2 WNP-2 Early Warning The total ten-mile warning system configuration is shown in Figure 3-2.
The population within ten miles of WNP-2 is broken down into four groups.
1 A. Hanford Workers. Fairly large group within five miles of the plant and another large group seven to ten miles from the plant. Group A is best warned by a telephone system and one siren located on site. The 40-year cost of the system is $96,000. I B. Residents. Small group, mostly beyond five miles. Group B is best warned by tone-activated radios. The 40-year cost for these radios is $134,000.
t C. Recreationists Within Five Miles--Hunters and Fishermen. Small group located within four to five miles of plant. Group C is best warned by sirens. The forty-year cost of these sirens is $500,000.
D.
Recreationists Between Five and Ten Miles--Hunters and Fishermen. Small group located five to ten miles from plant. Group 0 is best warned by sirens. The 40-year cost of these sirens is $280,000.
The total 40-year cost for providing early warning to all population groups is approximately $1,010,000.
3.3 Source Terms The source terms for the analysis are the rebaselined source terms calculated by the NRC (Reference 7). The rebaselined results have only small cierall 26 1
1
differences as compared to the original WASH 1400 values. In general, the rebaselined source terms have slightly decreased magnitudes for iodines and particulates and decreased probability of steam explosion events.
The source terms and their associated relead parameters' are input into the i computer code for each release category, which are composites of several ,
possible accident sequences. The following parameters are used-in the { i calculation: ,
- 1. Probability of the event. ,
- 2. \
Time between shutdown and release. Used for isotopic decay. ; (
- 3. Duration of release. i
- 4. Warning time. Used in evacuation modeling, j
- 5. Sensible Heat. Used in plume rise calculations. > ,
- 6. Release Height. Input for the Supply System plant results in a ground ' ' d level release and building wake effects., !'
i '
- 7. Leakage Fraction. The percent of inventory that Jeaks out.
Fission products are the primary source of radi_oactive material available for release. The amount of fission products is based on maximum inventories at the end of a fuel cycle. Release leakage groe,is hre:
Noble Gases Radioiodines--includes inorganic and organic >
Cs-Rb Tc-Sb Ba-Sr Ru--includes Ru, Rh, Co, Mn, and Tc La--includes Y, La, Zr, Nb, Co, o , rPu, Am and Cm In general, accidents with high leakage fractions for iodines and particulates have low probabilities of occurrence.
3.4 Accident Sequences The accident sequences expected to dominate risk from the WNP-2 GE BWR design (Reference 7) are discussed below. Acciwnt sequences are designated (see Table 3-2) by a string of identification characters. Each character re;.re- '
sents a f ailure of one or more of the important plant systems or \ features that ultimately result in fuel damage and significant release of radioactive !
material to containment. '
> t For example, in Table 3-2, sequences having a y' at the end of'the stri g'mean a particular failure mode (overpressure) of the containmen,t structure and a 27 ,
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' rupture location where a release of radioactivity takes place directly to the atmosphere from the primary containment. In the sequence having a y at the end of the string, the containment failure mode is again by overp: essure, but s
this time the rupture location is such that the release takes place into the
' Reactor Building (secondary containment) before discharging to che environ-ment.
s In this latter (y) case, the overall magnitude of radioactivity release is .smewhat diminished by the deposition and platc-out processes that take place within the Reactor Building.
TCy' and TCy j ; These sequences involve a transient event requiring shutdown of the reactor while at full power, followr1 by a failure to make the reactor subcritical I (i.e., terminate power generation by the core). The containment is assumed to be isolated by these events; then, one or the other of the following chain of events is assumed to happen:
- - (a) High-pressure coolant-spray system would succeed for some time in pro-viding makeup water to the core in sufficient quantity to cope with the rate of coolant loss through relief and safety valves to the suppression pool of the containment. During this time, the core power level varies
= but causes substantial energy to be directed into the suppression pool; this energy is in excess of what the containment and containment heat-removal systems are designed to cope with. Ultimately, in about
- 1/3 hours, the containment is estimated to f ail by overpressure, and it i
is assumed that this rather severe structural failure of the containment would discole the high-pressure coolant makeup system. Over a period of L
roughly 1-1/2 hours after breach of containment, it is assumed the core g> 3 would melt. This has been estimated to be one of the more dominant sequences in terms of accident risks to the public.
p (b) A variant to the above sequence is one where the high-pressure coolant j
spray system fails somewhat earlier and prior to containment over-pressure failure. In this case, the earlier melt could result in a
' reduced magnitude of release because some of the fission products dis-charged to the suppression pool via the safety and relief valves could be more effectively retained if the pool remained subcooled. The overall accident consequences would be somewhat reduced in their earlier melt sequence, but, ultimately, the processes accompanying melt (e.g., non-p
' condensables, steam, and steam pressure pulses during reactor vessel i melt-through) could cause overpressure failure (y or y') of the containment.
TWy' and TWy s
E The TW sequence involves a transient where the reactor has been shut down and
, containment has been isolated from its normal heat sink (i.e., the power con-g
=
version system). In this sequence, the failure to transfer decay heat from the core and containment to an ultimate sink could ultimately cause over-E pressure failure of containment. Overpressure failure of containment would take many, many hours, allowing for repair or other emergency actions to be t
- accomplished, but should this sequence occur, it is assumed that the rather T
E
?
23 ,
severe structural failure of containment would disable the sytems (e.g., HPCS, RCIC) providing coolant makeup to the reactor core. (In the RSS g sign, the service water system which conveys heat from the contaimnent via lR system to the ultimate sink wds found to be the dominant f ailure contribution in the TW sequence.) After breach of containment, the core is assumed to melt.
(TQUVy', AEy', SI Ey') and (TQUVy' AEy, S2 Ey, S2Ey) l Each of the accident sequences shown grouped into the two bracketed categories above is estimated to have quite similar consequence outcomes, and these would be sanewhat smaller than the TCy', y, and TWy' sequences described above. In essence, these sequences, which are characterized as in the Reactor Safety Studies (Reference 1), involve failure to deliver makeup coolant to the core af ter a LOCA or a shutdown transient event requiring such coolant makup. The core is assumed to melt down, and the melt processes ultimately cause over-pressure failure of containment (either y' or y). The overall risk from these sequences is expected to be dominated by the higher frequency initiating events (i.e., the small LOCA (S2 ) and shutdown transients (T)).
i Calculated probability per reactor year for ear.i BWR accident sequence (or sequence group) is given in Table 3-3, along wih the leakage fraction of each isotope group. Table 3-4 provides the core inventory and half lives of the l significant accident radionuclides by leakage group.
e 29
TABLE 3-1 EVACUATION PARAMETERS Parameters Common to Evacuation Scenarios Evacuation Speed (m/sec) 4.4705+00 Maximum Distance of Evacuation (m) 1.6095+04 Distance Moved by Evacuees (m) 2.4145+04 9 sSheltering Radius (m) 1.6095+04 Evacuation Scheme (1 or 2) 2.0005+00 Exposure Duration (days 0.
Cloud Shielding - Stationary People 7.5005-01 Cloud Shielding - Moving Evacuees 1.000E-00 Cloud Shielding - Sheltering 5.000E-01 Cloud Shielding - No Emergency Action 7.500E-01 Ground Shielding - Stationary People 3.300E-01 Ground Shielding - Moving Evacuees 5.0005-01 Ground Shielding - Sheltering 8.000E-02 Ground Shielding - No Emergency Action 3.300E-01 Breathing Rate Stationary Evacuees 3 2.660E-04 Breathing Rate Moving Evacuees/ ec) (m3 s(m /sec) 2.660E-04 Breathing Rate Sheltering Region One (m3/sec 1.330E-04 Breathing Rate Sheltering Region Two/(m3 sec)) 2.660E-04 Radius of Circular Area Evac Near Reactor (m) 8.045E+03 Width of Evacuated Arc (degrees) 9.000E+01 Evacuation Direct Cost ($/ evacuee / day) 9.500E+01 Itax Duration of Release for Key-Shaped Evac (hr) 3.000E+00
i Table 3-2 KEY TO BWR ACCIDENT SEQUENCE SYMBOLS A Rupture of reactor coolant boundary with an equivalent diameter of greater than six inches.
B Failure of electric power to ESFs.
C Failure of the reactor protection system.
l 0 Failure of vapor suppression.
E Failure of emergency core-cooling injection.
F Failure of emergency core-cooling functionability.
G Failure of containment isolation to limit leakage to less than 100 volume percent per day.
H Failure of core spray recirculation system.
I Failure of low-pressure service water system.
J Failure of high-pressure service water system.
I M Failure of safety / relief valves to open.
P Failure of safety / relief valves to reclose af ter opening.
Q Failure of nomal feedwater system to provide core makeup water.
S1 Small pipe break with an equivalent diameter of about 2"-6".
52 Small pipe break with an equivalent diameter of about 1/2"-2".
T Transient event.
U Failure of HPCS or RCIC to provide core makeup water.
V Failure of low-pressure ECCS to provide core makeup water.
W Failure to remove residual core heat, a Containment failure due to steam explosion in vessel.
8 Containment f ailure due to steam explosion in containment, y Containment f ailure due to overpressure--release through Reactor Building.
31
Table 3-2 (contd.)
y' Containment failure due to overpressure--release direct to atmosphere.
6 Containment isolation failure in drywell.
c Containment isolation failure in wetwell.
c Containment leakage greater than 2400 volume percent per day.
n Reactor Building isolation failure, e Standby gas treatment system failure.
l 32
Table 3-3 -
SUMMARY
OF ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE IN HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT SEQUENCES IN A BWR (REBASELINED)
Fraction of Core Inventory Released Accident Sequence or Accident Group Probability Xe-Kr I Cs-Rb Te-Sb Ba-Sr Ru(c) La (b)
(reactor-yr 1)
TCy' 2.0 x 10-6 1.0 0.45 0.67 0.64 0.73 0.052 0.0083 TWy' 3.0 x 10-6 1.0 0.098 0.27 0.41 0.025 0.028 0.005 TQUVy' 3.0 x 10-7 1.0 0.95 0.3 0.36 0.034 0.027 0.005 l AEy' '
SI Ey' S2 Ey' TCy 8.0 x 10-6 1.0 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.015 0.01 0.002 TWy 1.0 x 10-5 1.0 0.003 0.11 0.083 0.011 0.007 0.001 TQUVy AEy 1.0 x 10-6 1.0 0.02 0.055 0.11 0.006 0.007 0.0013 SIEy l S2Ey (a) Background on the isotope groups and release mechanisms is presented in Appendix VII, WASH 1400 (Reference 52).
(b)See Appendix H for description of the accident sequences and sequence groups.
(c) Includes Ru, Rh, Co, Mo, Tc.
(d) Includes Y, La, Zr, Nh, Ce, Pr, Nd, Np, Pu, Am, Cm.
Table 3-4 ACTIVITY OF RADIONUCLIDES IN THE WNP-2 REACTOR CORE AT 3468 MWt Radioactive Inventory Group /Radionuclide in Millions of Curies Half-Life (days)
A. Noble Gases Krypton-85 0.61 3950 Krypton-85m 26 0.183 Krypton-87 51 0.0528 Krypton-88 74 0.117 Xenon-133 184 5.28 Xenon-135 37 0.384
- 8. Iodines Iodine-131 92 8.05 Iodine-132 130 0.0958 Iodine-133 184 0.875 Iodine-134 -
206 0.0366 Iodine-135 163 0.280 C. Alkali Metals Rabidium-86 0.028 18.7 Cesium-134 8.1 750 Cesium-136 3.2 13.0 Cesium-137 5.1 11,000
- 0. Tellurium-Antimony Tellurium-127 6.4 0.391 Tellurium-127m 1.2 109 Tellurim-129 34 0.048 l
' Tellurium-129m 5.7 34.0 Tellurium-131m 14 1.25 Tellurium-132 130 3.25 Antimony-127 6.6 3.88 Antimony-129 35 0.179 E. Alkaline Earths Strontium-89 102 52.1 Strontium-90 4.0 11,030 Stronti m-91 119 0.403 Barium-140 173 12.8 34
Table 3-4 (contd.)
Radioactive Inventory Group /Radionuclide in Millions of Curies Half-Life (days)
F. Cobalt and Noble Metals Cobalt-58 0.85 71.0 Cobalt-60 0.31 1920 Molybdenum-99 173 2.8 Technetium-99m 152 0.25 Ruthenium-103 119 39.5 Ruthenium-105 78 0.185 Ruthenium-106 27 366 Rhodium-105 53 1.50 G. Rare Earths, Refractory 0xides, and Transuranics Yttritsn-90 4.2 2.67 Yttrium-91 130 59.0 Zirconitsn-95 163 65.2 Zirconium-97 163 0.71 Niobium-95 163 35.0 Lanthanum-140 173 1.67 Ceritsn-141 163 32.3 Cerium-143 141 1.38 Ceritsn-144 92 284 Praseodynium-143 141 13.7 Neodymitsn-147 65 11.1 Neptunium-239 1780 2.35 Plutonium-238 0.62 32,500 Plutonium-239 0.023 8.9 x 106 Plutonium-240 0.023 2.4 x 106 Plutonium-241 3.7 5350 Americium-241 0.0018 1.5 x 105 Curium-242 0.54 163 Curitsn-244 0.025 6630 35
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4.0 RESULTS As previously discussed, the population surrounding the site was divided into four groups. It was assumed that evacuation response time was reduced to one hour for all persons in a population group served by an early warning system.
Evacuation response times for a population group with no early warning were assumed as follows.
0- to 5-Mile 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 30%
3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 40%
5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 30%
5- to 10-Mile 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 25%
3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 25%
5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 25%
9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> 25%
The numbers of acute f atalities, latent fatalities, total f atalities, and -
whole body dose and thyroid dose versus probability of occurrence were calcu-lated for each population group, with and without early warning. Specific sequences analyzed are as follows.
Probable Total Sequence Desription Fatalities (40 Years) 1 Reactor Safety Studies Baseline 0.24 2 Hanford Worker Warning (Group A) 0.066 3 Tone-Activated Radios for Ten-Mile Residents (Groups A and B) 0.063 4 Five-Mile Sirens for Recreationists (Groups A, B and C) 0.062 5 Ten-Mile Sirens for Recreationists (Groups A, B, C, and D) 0.062 38
L
- The results show that sequential implementation of early warning to the four population groups results in reduction of the probable risks, but the incre-mental decreases af ter Sequence 2 become insignificantly small with each added sequence. Note that probable fatalities include both acute and latent fatali-ties for 40 years from all pathways.
Without any early warning system, the 40-year integrated probable total f atalities for WNP-2 is 0.24 probable fatalities /40 years, and the probable population dose is 430 probable man-rem /40 years. The risks associated with early warning of the population groups is as follows.
The population of maximum risk at WNP-2 is the industrial workers located on the Hanford Project (Group A). Early warning of this population ' group decreases the 40-year integrated total fatality risk by 0.18 probable f atali-ties per 40 years. Probable man-rem reduction is 280 rem /40 years.
The population group with the second highest risk is residents within the ten-mile zone (Group B). Early warning of this population group reduces the 40-year integrated total fatalities by only 0.0036 probable fatalities per l 40 years. Probable population dose reduction is less than three (3) man-rem /40 years.
l l Recreationists between four to five miles are the third population group (Group C). This group is composed of hunters and fishermen on the Columbia River and adjacent land within five miles of the site. There are no other recreation sites closer than five miles. Providing early warning to this group reduces integrated total fatalities by only 0.00054 per 40 years.
Probable population dose reduction is less than one man-rem /40 years.
The fourth population group is composed of recreationists located between five to ten miles (Group D). This includes the Columbia and Yakima River areas.
This group has such a small population, and is far enough from the site, that the reduction in calculated probable fatalities due to early warning system is less than the significant figures of the calculation. It is estimated that the decreased probable fatalities from early warning of five- to ten-mile recreationists is less than 0.0001 probable fatalities per 40 years. Probable population dose reduction is less than 0.1 man-rems /40 years.
The remaining' probable fatality risk and probable population dose are associ-ated with f actors that are not affected by an early warning system in the ten-mile EPZ.
Tables 4-1 to 4-5 provide 40-year probability versus magnitude for number of total f atalities, number of acute fatalities, number of latent fatalities, whole body dose, and thyroid dose for total population and Groups A, B, and C. Group D was not included since all probababilities are insignificantly small .
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 plot the 40-year probability versus the number of total f atalities and whole body dose for no early warning, Group A early warning, and blanket ten-mile early warning. The plots clearly show that only early warning of Group A has any effect on reducing WNP-2 probable risks.
39 l
Several general observations can be made from the analysis results.
- 1. Even without early warning, probable risks are already very low (approximately .24 probable fatality /40 years).
- 2. Latent fatalities risks are equal to or greater than risks of acute fatalities.
- 3. Acute risks are affected more by early warning than latent risks.
- 4. Early warning has negligible benefits for groups with low population densities unless they are located close to the site.
- 5. Early warning system cost / benefit ratios exceed $7,000,000,000 per reduced fatality (40 years) for recreationists beyond five miles from the site.
- 6. Blanket early warning systems cannot be justified by ALARA principles and probablistic man /ren reductions.
40
Table 4-1 WNP-2 FULL POPULATION RSS 10-MILE EVALCULATION PROBABILITY PER FORTY YEARS MAGNITUDE
- TOTAL ACUTE LATENT WHBDY THYROID 1.00E+000 1.59E-003 5.42E-005 1.54E-003 1.53E-003 1.54E-003 2.00E+000 1.59E-003 5.28E-005 1.53E-003 1.51E-003 1.53E-003 3.00E+000 1.58E-003 5.03E-005 1.53E-003 1.50E-003 1.52E-003 5.00E+000 1.55E-003 4.79E-005 1.50E-003 1.47E-003 1.45E-003 7.00E+000 1.53E-003 4.68E-005 1.49E-003 1.44E-003 1.38E-003 1.00E+001 1.50E-003 4.53E-005 1.45E-003 1.37E-003 1.37E-003 2.00E+001 1.41E-003 3.90E-005 1.37E-003 1.13E-003 1.32E-003 3.00E+001 1.29E-003 3.60E-005 1.26E-003 9.41E-004 1.31E-003 5.00E+001 1.07E-003 2.73E-005 1.04E-003 6.63E-004 1.17E-003 7.00E+001 9.01E-004 2.57E-005 8.75E-004 4.82E-004 1.06E-003 1.00E+002 7.31E-004 2.31E-005 7.08E-004 3.11E-004 9.54E-004 2.00E+002 4.00E-004 2.02E-005 3.79E-004 1.19E-004 7.47E-004 3.00E+002 2.34E-004 1.76E-005 2.16E-004 6.41E-005 6.22E-004 5.00E+002 1.19E-004 1.45E-005 1.05E-004 1.82E-005 4.37E-004 7.00E+002- 7.54E-005 1.05E-005 6.49E-005 1.23E-005 3.71E-004 1.00E+003 4.44E-005 9.27E-006 3.51E-005 6.18E-006 2.74E-004 2.00E+003 1.42E-005 6.04E-006 8.21E-006 8.82E-007 1.35E-004 3.00E+003 8.77E-006 4.91E-006 3.86E-006 0.00E-000 8.13E-005 4
5.00E+003 1.18E-007 7.50E-008 4.30E-008 0.00E-000 2.42E-005
- Number of fatalities (for Total, Acute, & Latent)
Number of REM (for Whole Body and Thyroid)
\
J G
i l
I i
41
' ~
Table 4-2 WNP-2 HANFORD WORKERS NO EARLY WARNING PROBABILITY PER FORTY YEARS MAGNITUDE
- TOTAL ACUTE LATENT WHBDY THYROID 1.00E+000 1.21E-003 5.24E-005 1.16E-003 1.15E-003 5.81E-004' 2.00E+000 1.21E-003 5.10E-005 1.15E-003 1.14E-003 5.81E-003 3.00E+000 1.20E-003 4.86E-005 1.15E-003 1.13E-003 5.62E-004 5.00E+000 1.18E-003 4.65E-005 1.13E-003 1.10E-003 5.60E-003 7.00E+000 1.16E-003 4.56E-005 1.12E-003 1.07E-003 5.50E-004 1.00E+001 1.14E-003 4.41E-005 1.10E-003 1.02E-003 5.21E-004 2.00E+001 1.05E-003 3.81E-005 1.01E-003 8.19E-004 4.50E-004 3.00E+001 9.52E-004 3.51E-005 9.17E-004 6.70E-004 3.78E-004 5.00E+001 7.75E-004 2.65E-005 7.49E-004 4.60E-004 2.82E-004 7.00E+001 6.41E-004 2.50E-005 6.16E-004 3.29E-004 2.27E-004 1.00E+002 5.15E-004 2.24E-005 4.93E-004 2.12E-004 2.03E-004 2.00E+002 2.88E-004 1.98E-005 2.68E-004 8.32E-005 1.78E-004 3.00E+002 1.73E-004 1.72E-005 1.56E-004 4.48E-005 1.59E-004 5.00E+002 8.89E-005 1.42E-005 7.48E-005 1.15E-005 1.28E-004 7.00E+002 5.63E-005 1.02E-005 4.60E-005 7.68E-006 1.21E-004 1.00E+003 3.38E-005 9.05E-006 2.48E-005 3.62E-006 9.88E-005 2.00E+003 1.09E-005 5.88E-006 4.98E-006 4.47E-007 5.17E-005 3.00E+003 7.25E-006 4.81E-006 2.44E-006 0.00E-000 3.41E-005 5.00E+003 2.05E-008 2.66E-008 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 2.40E-005
- Number of fatalities (for Total, Acute, & Latent)
Number of REM (for Whole Body and Thyroid) 42
Table 4-3 WNP-2 RESIDENTS NO EARLY WARNING PROBABILITY PER FORTY YEARS l
MAGNITUDE
- TOTAL ACUTE LATENT WH80Y THYROID 1.00E+000 2.11E-005 1.04E-006 2.01E-005 9.88E-006 1.04E-005 2.00E+000 2.08E-005 9.65E-007 1.98E-005 9.80E-006 9.93E-006 3.00E+000 2.00E-005 9.18E-007 1.91E-005 7.88E-006 9.92E-006 5.00E+000 1.90E-005 9.08E-007 1.81E-005 7.04E-006 9.78E-006 i 7.00E+000 1.82E-005 8.85E-007 1.74E-005 5.96E-006 9.76E-006 l
1.00E+001 1.82E-005 8.45E-007 1.73E-005 5.32E-006 9.48E-006 2.00E+001 5.38E-006 7.43E-007 4.56E-006 2.90E-006 8.08E-006 3.00E+001 5.21E-006 6.72E-007 4.54E-006 2.56E-006 8.04E-006 5.00E+001 -5.01E-006 5.27E-007 4.48E-006 2.48E-006 7.62E-006 7.00E+001 3.76E-006 4.84E-007 2.88E-006 1.40E-006 7.50E-006 1.00E+002 3.14E-006 4.22E-007 2.72E-006 1.24E-006 7.48E-006 2.00E+002 3.04E-006 3.73E-007 2.67E-006 1.11E-006 7.42E-006 3.00E+002 2.21E-006 3.31E-007 1.88E-006 3.94E-007 6.10E-006 5.00E+002 8.81E-007 2.53E-007 6.28E-007 2.65E-007 5.26E-006 7.00E+002 6.87E-007 1.89E-007 4.98E-007 2.51E-007 4.33E-006 1.00E+003 6.68E-007 1.70E-007 4.97E-007 2.44E-008 3.66E-006 2.00E+003 2.77E-007 1.17E-007 1.60E-000 0.00E-000 2.24E-006 3.00E+003 1.89E-007 8.97E-008 9.91E-008 0.00E-000 2.16E-006 l 5.,00E+003 2.01E-009 7.97E-009 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 2.19E-006 l
- Number of f atalities (for Total, Acute, & Latent) i Number of REM (for Whole Body and Thyroid) 1
. 43
Table 4-4 WNP-2 RECREATIONISTS WITHIN 5-MILES NO EARLY WARNING PROBABILITY PER FORTY YEARS MAGNITUDE
- TOTAL ACUTE LATENT WHBOY THYROID 1.00E+000 1.05E-005 8.64E-007 9.68E-006 9.64E-006 9.64E-006 2.00E+000 1.05E-005 8.44E-007 9.64E-006 9.56E-006 9.60E-006 3.00E+000 1.04E-005 8.04E-007 9.60E-006 9.32E-006 9.40E-006 5.00E+000 1.01E-005 7.68E-007 9.36E-006 8.96E-006 9.20E-006 7.00E+000 9.91E-006 7.52E-007 9.16E-006 8.60E-006 9.04E-006 1.00E+001 9.65E-006 7.28E-007 8.92E-006 7.96E-006 8.76E-006 2.00E+001 8.51E-006 6.28E-007 7.88E-006 5.84E-006 7.60E-006 3.00E+001 7.34E-006 5.80E-007 6.76E-006 4.28E-006 6.44E-006 5.00E+001 5.40E-006 4.36E-007 4.96E-006 2.48E-006 4.80E-006 7.00E+001 4.13E-006 4.12E-007 3.72E-006 1.68E-006 3.82E-006 1.00E+002 3.11E-006 3.70E-007 2.74E-006 1.01E-006 3.38E-006 2.00E+002 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 4.60E-007 2.94E-006 3.00E+002 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 2.56E-007 2.62E-006 5.00E+002 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 1.20E-007 2.24E-006 7.00E+002 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 1.88E-006 1.00E+003 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 1.53E-006 2.00E+003 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 7.80E-007
- 3.00E+003 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 5.04E-007 l 5.00E+003 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 0.00E-000 l
- Number of fatalities (for Total, Acute, & Latent)
Number of REM (for Whole Body and Thyroid) 44
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5.0 ERROR AND SENSITIVITY DISCUSSION This study uses the standard probablistic risk assessment methodology, similar to that used in the Reactor Safety Studies (Reference 1), and rebaselined accident source terms (Reference 7). There has been considerable controversy over the Reactor Safety Studies (RSS) and Probabalistic Risk Analysis (PRA).
The NRC commissioned an independent report (Reference 9), referred to as the f.ewis Report, to analyze the RSS and PRA methodology. The Lewis Report found that PRA methodology was valid and the best available method for evaluating reactor risk. The report also stated that it could not determine if source terms probabilities were over- or understated. Because of these problems with source terms, a rebaseline of source terms was performed. However, rebase-lining only slightly changed the original source terms. Analysis of Three Mile Island data has resulted in considerable evidenc.e (Reference 10) that the leakage fraction for iodines and particulates is overly conservative. Recent tests and analyses by General Electric Company (References 12 and 13) have also indicated that the WASH 1400 methodology is overly conservative in assessing radiological' risks associated with suppression pool boiling water reactors. In view of the continued uncertainty over source terms, this study focuses primarily on the relative benefits of early warning which minimize any errors associated with source tem probabilities and leakage fractions. This section briefly discusses the errors associated with the various PRA parame-ters and how these errors affect early warning system results.
5.1 Source Term Errors Standard, rebaselined source terms were used in this analysis. It is cur-rently felt (References 10 and 12) that the large leakage fractions for par-ticulate and iodine events are overestimated. Since these events produce almost all of the acute and latent fatalities associated with reactor acci-dents, any significant reduction of high iodine a'id leakage fraction events also has a significant reduction in probable fatalities. However, relative risk reductions for each early warning option would not change significantly with respect to source terms.
A factor of 10, reduction in probability of high leakage fraction events would impact the cost effectiveness of the blanket and targeted systems similarly.
Relative cost effectiveness would remain essentially unchanged.
Also, recent tests and analyses conducted by General Electric (GE) Company (References 12 and 13) indicate that the methodology used in our study is particularly conservative for a boiling water reactor (BWR) such as WNP-2.
The GE work demonstrates significant retention of fission products in the suppression pool and suggests that the risk of radiation exposure may be reduced by approximately three orders of magnitude by realistic consideration of suppression pool effects. The GE tests show large decontamination factors for those accident sequences that result in release through the suppression pool which are not accounted for by the rebaselined source terms. The GE work and other plant-specific PRA studies, such as the Limerick Study, suggest that the probability of accidents that result in " dry releases" probably are sub-stantially over-estimated by our evaluation results.
49 I
3 Reduction of the doses by three orders of magnitude, as suggested by GE, would reduce health effects by a comparable factor and effectively eliminate the
. benefit of early warning, even for the Group A population.
5.2 ALARA Considerations There has been discussion recently that ALARA considerations need to be incor-porated into emergency planning. Based on analyses of WNP-2, the decrease in probable population doses (probable man-rem /40 years) for early warning systems is approximately:
Population Group A (Hanford Workers) 280 Total Ten-Mile System 284 Using the standard general population $1000/ man-rem value (Reference 11), only early warning of the Hanford workers would be warranted based on ALARA con-siderations. Population doses are not quite as sensitive to high leakage fraction source terms; however, it is estimated that reducing high leakage fraction events by a factor of 10 would decrease populations exposure reduc-tion by at least a factor of 3. More realistic treatment of suppression pool effects, as has been suggeste3 by GE (References 12 and 13), would result in similar reduction in the ALARA benefits of early warning options.
5.3 Population Changes Population distributions used in the calculation were based on best available information and are considered quite accurate with respect to both numbers and locations. The calculation considered the construction force for WNP-1 to be present, even though that construction effort has been temporarily halted.
Elimination of the WNP-2 work force would reduce Group A benefits by approxi-mately a f actor of 3. Other future changes to population are not expected to be significant. It'~is possible, but unlikely, that a local area might undergo large increases such as a new housing development; these would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis. General increases in population would not have a significant effect upon any of the results.
5.4 Response Time Changes in the percent of the population which responds within a certain time would affect the results. However, these values were conservatively chosen for the non-early warning system so it is unlikely that risks associated with no early warning are underestimated. In general, the response time change, between three and five hours, has the most significant effect upon results; population segments with no early warning were assumed to have 50 percent of the population responding in five or more hours. Population segments with early warning were assumed to have 100 percent response with one hour; any decrease in response to early warning will decrease the benefit of early warning.
50
5.5 General Applicability to Other Sites No attempt was made to make this a generic study, and all parameters are site-specific. The population distribution of WNP-2, with high-density industrial workers located close to the site and extremely low-density population for the other population groups, is most likely not representative of other locations.
5.6 Value of Reduced Fatality The discussion of absolute efficiency in this report alludes to a value of one million dollars per reduced 40-year probable fatality. This arbitrarily selected value is considerably higher than what is used by other industries.
The ratio of absolute efficiencies and the conclusions to this report would be unchanged by adjustment of the value of reduced fatality.
I 51
l
6.0 CONCLUSION
S Using probablistic evaluation methods, it has been shown that the blanket ten-mile early warning system (all population groups) has a composite cost effectiveness ratio of 5.4 million dollars per probable 40-year fatality reduction. That cost is far in excess of the resources applied to other risks encountered in today's society.
The cost-effectiveness ratio can be improved in two ways.
- 1. Increase the protection provided without significantly increasing the overall costs.
- 2. Reduce the costs while maintaining the system effectiveness at or near its maximum level.
This study shows that the inherent risk at WNP-2, even without early warning, is extremely small ( .24 total probable fatalities /40 years) and that nearly all potential risk reduction can be accomplished with early warning options covering less than a blanket ten-mile system. The remaining fractional prob-able risk can only be addressed by extending the system well beyond the ten-mile zone. Such action, while possibly gaining a very small measure of reduced risk, would significantly increase the costs and lower actual effi-ciency. Therefore, it is not possible to improve the cost effectiveness ratio with the first alternative.
The results indicate that much can be done to improve the cost / effectiveness ratio with the second alternative. It is apparent that considerable cost reduction can be achieved, without significantly reducing the level of public protection, simply by selecting the appropriate options.
The study results presented in Section 7.0 can be summarized as follows.
Population Relative Sequence Group Absolute Risk Reduction Risk Reduction Cast 1 None 2 Group A 0.18 Prob. Fat./40 yrs 98% $ 96,000 3 Group B 0.0036 Prob. Fat./40 yrs 17% 134,000 4 Group C 0.00054 Prob. Fat./40 yrs 0.3% 500,000 5 Group D <0.0001 Prob. Fat./40 yrs 0.02% 280,000 The cost effectiveness ratios for each of the early warning groups in terms of per-reduction in 40-year probable fatalities are listed below.
Group A $ 530,000 Group B 37,000,000 Group C 930,000,000 Group D 7,000,000,000 52 l
It should be noted that the Group A $530,000 per reduction of one probable f atality in 40 years compares reasonably with the 1977 ERDA guidelines (Reference 8) of $200,000 per reduced fatality.
Figure 6-1, a plot of percent risk reduction versus percent of the blanket ten-mile system cost, shows that Groups B, C, and D provide little increase in protection in relation to Group A, while adding significantly to the cost.
An evaluation of the public protection purchased per dollar spent provides further indication of justifiable costs. Two values, relative efficiency and absolute efficiency, provide that measure for each of the warning system groups.
Relative efficiency is defined as the percent of reduced probable fatalities divided by the percent of total system cost.
Absolute efficiency is defined as actual reduced 40-year probable fatalities divided by actual costs in multiples of $1,000,000.
Values obtained are presented in the following table.
Relative Efficiency Absolute Efficiency Group A 10 2' Group B 0.2 0.03 Group C 0.006 0.001 Group D <0.001 <0.001 Figure 6-2 plots relative and absolute efficiency versus the percent of total system cost expended. From that plot, it is readily apparent that, of the total possible public protection attainable by a ten-mile early warning system, only that associated with the Group A population has any relative cost-effectiveness merit.
In summary, it has been shown:
- 1. that for the Hanford Site, the ten-mile population can be logically divided into four groups,,
- 2. that providing early warning for one segment (Group A) attains nearly all of the benefits available through early warning,
- 3. that only the Group A early warning option (at $500,000 per reduced 40-year fatality) carries any degree of cost effectiveness,
- 4. that the risk associated with the remaining groups, 8, C, and D, is extremely small, and
- 5. that the cost effectiveness associated with warning systems other than Group A range as high as seven billion dollars per probable fatality reduction over 40 years.
53
=
c It is concluded that the early warning systen for the WNP-2 Hanford Site !
should consist of means of effectively and imediately warning the industrial /
, construction workers within ten miles of the plant.
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